教育部九十八年度

「全球化下臺灣文史與藝術中程綱要計畫：課程強化研發植根計畫：學術英文暨文學理論研習營」計畫

期末成果報告

計畫期程：九十八年四月一日至九十八年十二月三十一日

指導暨補助單位：教育部

主辦單位：中央研究院中國文哲研究所

計畫主持人：彭小妍、楊小濱、何乏筆

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1. 報名網頁及成果網頁

2. 報名、報到與住宿學員清單

3. 文宣設計樣本：海報、宣傳摺頁、研習證書樣本

4. 各演講/授課/座談之錄影授權書

5. 講座逐字稿（不包括英文論文寫作）（附件光碟）

八、 附件：

（1）研習手冊

（2）研習營活動錄影光碟

（3）研習營活動照片光碟

一、 計畫宗旨

本計畫乃針對中文、台文所研究生學術訓練上的需求而設計。近年來研究生喜歡運用理論，但往往閱讀劣質的翻譯，引用時不知所云。在引用外文書籍時，研究生亦對基本的引用格式一無所知。本計畫目標爲訓練研究生直接閱讀英文理論和英文論文，同時熟悉英文著作引用格式。今年將增加開放外文所、哲學所研究生申請。

接續九十六、九十七年度研習營之經驗，參考全體學員與助教之意見，本年度研習營以現代性與跨文化、認同與能動性、權力關係等議題爲主軸，串連各家理論。主要以文學理論爲主，並以華文文本說明理論，使同學理解理論與文本的關係。

二、 計畫期程

九十八年四月一日至九十八年十二月三十一日

三、 研習營活動基本資料

1.指導暨補助單位：教育部顧問室

2.主辦單位：中央研究院中國文哲研究所

3.舉辦日期：九十八年七月六日~九十八年八月一日

4.舉辦地點：世新大學

5.課程：

星期一	星期二	星期三	星期四	星期五
7.6 巴赫汀專題 學員報到 開業式暨導論	7.7 巴赫汀專題 英文論文格式	7.8 巴赫汀專題 中文作業（1）	7.9 巴赫汀專題 英文論文格式	7.10 巴赫汀專題
7.13 阿多諾專題 英文作業（1）	7.14 阿多諾專題 英文論文格式	7.15 阿多諾專題 中文作業（2）	7.16 阿多諾專題 英文論文格式	7.17 阿多諾專題
7.20 德希達專題 英文作業（2）	7.21 德希達專題 英文論文格式	7.22 德希達專題 中文作業（3）	7.23 德希達專題 英文論文格式	7.24 德希達專題
7.27 拉岡專題 英文作業（3）	7.28 拉岡專題 英文論文格式	7.29 拉岡專題 中文作業（4）	7.30 拉岡專題 英文論文格式	7.31 拉岡專題

1.報名人數：

41人

2.報到人數（需細分男/女及總數）

男：10人

女：28人

總計：38人

3.報到率統計及分析

報到率：93%

僅兩人報名而未報到，報到率幾近百分之百。未報到原因皆爲個人因素（如家庭發生臨時事故…等）

年級/職稱	人數
國外大學博士生	2 人
國外大學碩士生	1 人
本國大學博士生（含博畢）	8 人
本國大學碩士生（含碩畢）	27 人
共計	38 人

4.課程摘要：

教授科目	教師	主題	參考文本（部份）
拉岡專題	楊小濱 中央研究院 中國文哲研究所	現代性議程	Lacan, Jacques. "The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious or Reason Since Freud." *Ecrits*. Trans. Bruce Fink. New York: Norton, 2006. ---. "Metaphor and Metonymy (I): 'His Sheaf Was Neither Miserly Nor Spiteful'." & "Metaphor and Metonymy (I): Signifying Articulation and Transference of the Signified'." *The Seminar of*

			Jacques Lacan, Book III: The Psychoses 1955-1956. Ed. Jacques-Alain Miller. Trans.Russell Grigg. New York: Norton, 1993.
班雅明	何乏筆 中央研究院 中國文哲研究所	拱廊街專題	Horkheimer, Max and Theodor W. Adorno. *Dialectic of Enlightenment.* Ed. Gunzelin Schmid Noerr. Trans. Edmund Jephcott. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2002.
德希達專題	黃冠閔 中央研究院 中國文哲研究所	認同及多樣性問題	Derrida, Jacques. "The Other Heading: Memories, Reponses, and Responsibilities." *The Other Heading.* Trans. Pascale-Amme Brault and Michael B. Nass. Bloomington:Indiana UP, 1992. Brague, Rémi. *Eccentric Culture: A Theory of Western Civilization.* Trans. Samuel Lester. South Bend: St. Augustine Press, 2009.
巴赫汀專題	鄢定嘉 政治大學 俄文系	眾聲喧譁	Bakhtin, Mikhail. "The Hero, and the Position of the Author with Regard to the Hero, in Dostoevsky' s Art." & "Characteristics of Genre and Plot Composition in Dostoevsky' s Works." *Problems of Dostoevsky'sPoetics.* Ed. & Trans. Caryl Emerson. Minnesota: University of Minnesota,1984.
英文論文寫作	Paul Manfredi 太平洋路德大學 人文學部中國語文及文學學系	英文寫作格式	Gibaldi, Joseph. 2003. ***MLA Handbook for Writers of Research Papers, Sixth Edition.*** **New York: The Modern Language Association**

5.學員學習成果：請見學員作業（附件光碟）

6.研習營精彩活動暨顯著事件紀實：請見研習營活動照片（附件光碟）

7.研習營學員提問紀錄：

2009 學術英文研習營結業式記錄（2009 年 8 月 31 日）

彭小妍老師（以下以彭老師代表）：我們今天要瞭解一下四周以來學員對研習營的想法。

學員：我們可以感受到研習營用心的規劃，不管是種種的安排和設計都讓我們覺得很開心，工作人員和助教都能注意到我們的反饋，讓我們更能認識理論。我們更想學到如何在理論和文本之間彼此對話的方式。

彭老師：有學員希望我們在寄發文本給學員之前，可以先標明重點段落，以利他們閱讀。我們下年度會針對這點改進。

吳佳玲助教：我去年當學員，今年當助教。這屆對我來說是一種挑戰，設計上也很人性化。住宿和網路方面的配合都很棒，我和學員都能很自由的使用網路，和去年在文化的經驗很不一樣，我覺得今年世新的設備很能符合我們的需求。

張巧瑜同學：我覺得從第一屆到這一屆收穫很多。大概我對理解文本的能力還不夠，但我覺得下午的討論是非常重要的，可以得到很多東西。講座都很優秀，比在學校跟老師學到更多東西。

夏婉雲同學：我覺得中研院的事前準備非常好，如果上課時間可以從九點到十二點的話，會對我們瞭解文本和理論大家有很大的幫助。

彭老師：基本上一次上課三小時對老師的體力來說都是很大的負擔，三小時連續五天是很累的，所以上課三小時的話我會有點遲疑。我們會和老師再行討論看看這個方案。

學員：我們希望有一天的下午是可以專門來上英文格式課。

彭老師：我知道有些同學對今年的英文格式課特別喜歡，老師會帶進理論的討論，有些同學二天都想上英文格式課，我們看看英文格式課如何和理論互相配合，讓同學學到更多東西。

學員：老師在上格式課的時候，多了很多討論和實用的時間，也教我們如何寫摘要，這是我們覺得收穫很大的部分。

吳佳玲助教：今年二個小時授課和二個小時的討論我覺得很好，時間壓力上比較沒有那麼緊迫。

學員：何老師有提供給我們文本段落的翻譯，讓我們比較中文各種不同譯本的翻譯，讓我

們對文本有更多瞭解。不知道下一次是否可以沿用此模式。

彭老師:我們想想看怎麼樣設計對同學能更有幫助。有時候現有的翻譯反而讓我們更模糊。

李廣益助教:在來研習營之前,可以給學員一些問題,讓學員比較有概念瞭解。也可以多提供一些延伸文本,讓學員可以多方面瞭解理論和文本。

學員:對我來說念英文很吃力,我希望可以有中英對照。

學員:在討論課時可以多花一點時間討論當天的上課內容,可以對我們在瞭解文本上有所幫助。

江欣珍助教:雖然我沒有上英文格式討論課,但我覺得一個禮拜一個小時可能太少了。可能不要在早上,可能挪在某一天的下午,可能會好一點。

學員:下午的討論課對我們對文本的幫助是很重要的。我覺得英文格式討論課時很需要自己練習的,所以我覺得一個小時大概就夠了,我希望對文本能有多一點機會瞭解。

彭老師:如果魏老師的教學對大家有幫助,我現在想到的,是請魏老師設計二種不同課程,學員願意多上的,就多上第二次的課,如果自己評估覺得一小時的課程已足夠,就自行決定不參加。

廖冠惠助教:希望理論文本可以分成課堂精讀和課後補充部分。希望能夠縮短課堂精讀部分,讓學員更能在下午的討論時段精讀瞭解文本,課後閱讀可以作爲學員課後自行閱讀的補充教材。

學員:這四個理論家分屬不同學派,但只學一個禮拜之後,我們馬上又要學另一個理論家,感覺事前和事後的準備都非常要求,不知道是不是可以專注在某一個議題或一個學派上深入討論,這樣對我們撰寫作業上也有很大的幫助。

彭老師:巴赫金是開導理論之先驅,巴赫金之外讀阿多諾,不是說這樣你就把巴赫金丟到腦後,而是同學要去思考巴赫金和其他理論家之間溝聯的部分。看看巴赫金對 identity formation 的論述和阿多諾、德希達和拉岡之間的關係是什麼。我們老師之間也在討論這些問題,對我而言我是吸收很多東西,對四位理論家彼此傳承和對話的過程更有瞭解。

何乏筆老師:針對那位學員最後的想法,希望能在理論上更集中,更能把握不同理論家之間的脈絡,是個不錯的想法,但很難做的到。這個影響不是很直接的,也不是都有對話的狀況下存在,但可以讓我們思考彼此理論家的關連是否能更緊密。理論的量時不是太多?

我覺得研習營最大的作用是提供一種廣度和寬度的部分，讓學員可以作進一步深入的閱讀。幾個小時的介紹性閱讀，已經把理論簡化到一種不太複雜的地步，如果再簡化下去，就變得太簡單，容易被化約成大家熟悉的口號，但這正是我們想避開的一種危險。

學員：英文格式的時間如果可以增加半個小時的話可能會比較充裕一點。

學員：這個研習營隊我助益很大，下午討論課因爲大家的英文能力有所差距，會在一二個句子一直打轉的感覺。是否有更有效率的方法來解決。

彭老師：我們希望助教可以多幫忙學員瞭解。先把主詞動詞抓出來，再抓出修飾語。慢慢的就比較容易抓出大概的輪廓。

學員：老師在談拉岡時也談到索緒爾和黑格爾，但我不太熟悉，不知道可不可以請老師開幾本有關背景資料的書籍共我們閱讀。

學員：下午討論安排是前三天外國助教，後二天是國內助教，但二個助教對文本的看法都很不一樣，不知道助教是不是可以五天討論都全程參與？

彭老師：這種安排的話對助教來說是非常累的。帶討論課要有很高的技巧，精神上是非常緊繃的，但我們一定要給助教休息的時間，不然他們太辛苦了。

學員：我希望可以多瞭解相關參考資料，讓大家瞭解理論彼此之間的對話關係。

彭老師：現在網路很發達，資訊很多，如果你想知道更多，資訊是很多的，老師可以建議哪一些寫的比較好，這些是我們可以做的、。

學員：我覺得三個小時的講座授課有點多，我覺得二個小時其實夠了，要給學員一些時間反芻。希望一次有二次一小時的英文格式課程安排。有學員在語言課程和討論課程都跟同一個助教，我覺得有點太長。如果同學可以常和不同助教學習，我覺得很有幫助。

學員：我希望在討論分組設計上可以打散，分開安排，這樣大家可以用更多不同視角討論議題。

解芳助教：我希望各位老師是不是可以多帶進來他們個人的發揮和研究。

彭老師：因爲我們這個研習營已經第三年，到第四年的時候，我們是不是可以帶進各位老師關心的議題。

何乏筆老師：我們剛剛討論的重點是：是不是用英文文本作爲討論重點的方向要調整？英文理論好像是被看成一種有權威的理論，在這種框架下，我們研習營要介紹理論，而不是介紹老師的研究。這個問題可以解決的方向是各位學員要多閱讀中文理論文本，這種安排可以擺脫某種理論殖民主義的危險，對於理論思考有更多發揮空間。

彭老師：每一年的研習營都有修正的地方，每一年我們都在摸索，我們討論不只英文文本，也嘗試把中文文本的理論帶進來，看看彼此之間有沒有更多對話的空間。我們也會去思考明年如何展現這些問題。

學員：之前我在學校也有上過理論課，我覺得這個研習營隊我幫助很大，這個月和四個理論家在一起是一種痛苦和快樂的過程。學到很多東西。

學員：我覺得下午的討論有時候沒有一個主題，不知道助教和老師是否可以先討論，擬出一些主題，對我們來說收穫更多。

彭老師：我來想想看怎麼解決這樣的溝通模式。

學員：我覺得鄢老師教的很清楚，何老師的中文翻譯讓我釐清很多問題，黃老師對於德希達的教授是概念式的，我覺得對我瞭解德希達有很大的幫助。楊小濱老師花很多時間談隱喻和換喻，帶我們看夏宇的詩，我覺得這對我幫助很大。

彭小妍老師：在設計課程之中，我們就先討論這四個理論家之間彼此是否有什麼關連，我們再去看哪一些文本可以跟同學分享。我們在這個共通點上討論問題。理論的話語會發展，不會定在某一個定點，某些詞彙反覆出現其實都有它不同的意義。像 discourse 這個字，幾乎沒有理論家不用他，Foucault 把 discourse 變成一個議題，巴赫金好像跟阿多諾很不一樣，但他的翻譯對理論世界造成很大影響，但如果你不去看英文譯本和法文本，你是沒有辦法找到彼此之間的連結。理論家的聯繫可能都不是很直接的，但思想界的氛圍可能都有共通。

學員：我覺得英文格式寫作課對我幫助很大，讓我知道怎麼寫好一篇好摘要。

學員：在上完課之後，自我沈澱的時間好像很少。早上上完課，下午上課，這中間我們好像沒有太多時間準備下午討論課的課程。或許我們可以提前上課，中間可以空下一些時間複習。

彭老師：我們再討論看看明年課程的安排。

學員：先謝謝各位老師的教授。這四個理論家都很有深度和難度，我在吸收上面比較多的

是巴赫金。我對巴赫金比較有想法是我有花時間去理解。我們的教材以英文文本爲主，我每天有那種一直追趕英文的感覺，常有力不從心之感，閱讀速度很慢，不知道老師是否可以提供一些中文輔助教材供我們閱讀。語言交換和討論課之間的區隔可以更明顯，有些時候後二種課程方面重複性太高。各位助教的討論方面可以更相關。

李廣義助教：如果可以招到六個以上的外國學員的話，就可以解決這些問題了。

彭老師：我們比較難掌握外國學員的招生。如果是台灣的外國學生可能比較有可能。

學員：今年的討論課比較有重點，但選定主題也是很重要的。對於選擇文本上我也比較有疑問。

彭老師：選擇文本的確是一個問題。我們的考量也非常多方面，不管選誰，大家都會有意見，爲了研習營，各位老師都作了時間上的犧牲和付出。

學員：能有機會細讀文本我自己收穫很大。不知道在上完課之後，老師是否可以丟幾個問題讓我們思考。我們希望助教在討論課的帶領上主導性可以比較強一點。

學員：因爲每個理論家背後都有一個很龐大的理論體系去處理。我們需要時間去消化理論。不知道是否可以取消作業？理論當代闡釋的問題我們比較沒有機會碰到，希望有多一點時間討論。

學員：作業應該是藉由作業書寫過程中，來面對自己誤讀、失敗。可以讓我們更差去思考自己的盲點。

學員：這個研習營時間比較匆促，這樣的課程安排比較沒有辦法把自己準備好。我們需要有時間在講座授課和下午討論課之間作消化。

學員：帶到華文文本都比較倉促，比較希望聽到老師對於理論和華文文本之間的連結。

學員：鄢老師事後有把她自己做的中文講義檔案寄給我們，對我複習的時候很有幫助，還可以思考到其他議題。如果老師可以把他們的摘要寄給我們，有助於我們對理論的瞭解。

學員：非常謝謝工作人員對住宿問題的付出。我希望老師在講授理論時可以多加講解理論的架構性，以幫助我們對理論的瞭解。

學員：我覺得寫作業對於瞭解理論是有收穫的。是否老師可以拋出固定議題讓助教帶領我們瞭解。

學員：希望外文所和中文所在寫作課時分開授課。

學員：英文格式寫作課上面外文所的同學大部分是在幫助其他同學，但我們也想在這個研習營中增進個人的寫作能力。關於理論文本使用英文譯本的問題，希望下次可以更進一步討論。

學員：我覺得鄢老師和黃老師的授課對我很有幫助，老師上課時可以給同學大綱，配合大綱讓同學了解。

黃冠閔老師：有同學提到德希達有些句子不懂。但我有點懷疑爲什麼同學不提出來。或許明年可以針對這一點改進。可能我們同學都比較希望老師給東西。也許上課的時候同學要帶著問題來，你們要攻擊老師。也許換各話說，你是帶著問題的眼光來學習，你比較會覺得說不是老師給東西，而是從老師身上挖到東西。

何乏筆老師：的確互動方面需要加強。助教和老師之間的溝通很重要，助教要把他們碰到的問題向老師反映。很多學生會問問題，但不敢在課堂上問，但有些問題對其他同學是很有幫助的。我覺得是加上半個小時分組討論方式，各位老師可以比較細膩的去瞭解各位學員的問題。

楊小濱老師：我聽到同學在課間和課後思考問題，是蠻感動的。課下和課間有同學會來問問題，我覺得是非常有意義的，如果可以在課堂之間問問題，我覺得這是非常好的。課堂之間的互動是我相當期待。

解芳助教：我希望各位同學在來上課之前可以事先準備。

李廣益助教：和大家討論過程是非常好的。我覺得台灣學生在知識結構上面的整合能力要多瞭解，如果你對西方文化和模式瞭解不夠的話，對於理解上可能有比較大的問題。如果要真正把自身的問題思考清楚的話，必須要多瞭解其他國家的的問題，以爲借鏡。從其他國家借鏡，發展出一套自己的論述。這樣比較好。

王勝宇助教：我覺得學生都很主動配合，彼此幫助。同學要有自信。不要過份套用某個概念到某事物上。

江欣珍助教：理論的閱讀是一件很不容易的事。新理論對想法有啓發，但對於寫成論文是有一段差距的，要作的功課其實很多。

廖冠惠助教：希望學員精讀理論，深入瞭解理論，中間脈絡是什麼。學員帶著問題來的話，

這樣的討論會更有深度。

吳佳玲助教：學員不問老師問題，因爲他們都把問題拿來爲難助教。雖然學員對於寫作業感到很痛苦，但助教可以從中瞭解問題。學員應該帶問題來，而不是希望老師和助教一直給東西，大家應該主動學習。

五、 執行成果分析與檢討

1.主要成就及成果之價值與貢獻度

本研營活動已連續舉辦三年，每年平均皆有四十至五十位左右全國的中文、台文所研究生報名參考。並於第二屆開始，接受國外學員及全國外文、哲學研究所（第三屆）研究生的報名。本營初始計畫爲針對中文、台文所研究生學術訓練上的需求而設計，開辦之初，除了吸引中文、台文所學員的加入外，外文所的研究生也一直希望我們開放名額，提供該所研究生學習的機會。

接續九十六、九十七年度研習營之經驗，參考全體學員與助教之意見，九十八年度研習營以現代性與跨文化、認同與能動性、權力關係等議題爲主軸，串連各家理論。主要以文學理論爲主，並以華文文本說明理論，使同學理解理論與文本的關係。

近年來台灣文學研究在國內學界引起熱潮，台灣文學深受中國文學、日本文學及歐美文學的影響，適合跨界、跨文化的研究，所以研究生在撰寫論文時，喜歡運用許多國外理論，但往往閱讀劣質的翻譯，引用時不知所云。本營連續三年介紹了目前在國內較受歡迎的理論家，如阿多諾、傅柯、德希達…等。主要的目的即是爲了讓研究生能對理論有正確的理解，進一步的，更希望中文、台文所的研究生能直接對面原典，不要一直對非中文的文本卻步。

我們很高興的發現，學員在經過一個月間的密集訓練後，大都能克服對閱讀原文的恐懼。理論的養成非一朝一夕得以完成，但是能讓參加的學員以正確的方

式理解理論，是我們可以持續努力的方向。

本計畫的目標除了訓練研究生直接閱讀英文理論和英文論文，另一個重點即是使參加的學員能同時熟悉英文著作引用格式。本研習營在籌備之初，即將格式訓練列爲重點之一，起因於召集人彭小妍研究員與授課教師在討論教學目標時，發現國內研究生在引用外文書籍時，對基本的引用格式一無所知。正確的格式關念爲研究的基礎，並且對參加的學員來說，論文格式課程對於他們更具實用性，反而意外的受到學員熱烈的歡迎。

2.學員意見回饋問卷統計、分析及檢討

統計（本表僅就課程內容統計，其餘學員建議請見附見光碟之學員問卷調查）

課程	非常有幫助		很有幫助		有幫助		普通		沒幫助		無意見	
鄢定嘉授課內容	30	77%	6	15%	3	7%	1	3%				
何乏筆授課內容	21	54%	12	30%	5	13%			1	3%		
黃冠閔授課內容	22	56%	11	28%	6	16%						
楊小濱授課內容	19	49%	10	26%	9	22%	1	3%				
魏樸授課內容（論文格式）	19	49%	9	22%	5	13%					6	16%
作業討論及語言交換	16	41%	15	37%	6	16%			1	3%	1	3%
下午分組討論	13	33%	13	33%	8	21%	2	5%	2	5%	1	3%

＊意見調查表填寫人數共39名，含6名助教（助教免上論文格式）

分析及檢討

本屆學員對課程的安排及講座授課的內容多數都持正面的肯定，在學員問卷調查中，也表達了對其他理論家的興趣，希望未來研習營能持續的介紹。學員對於這種密集式的上課法雖然覺得辛苦，但是在一個月的研習營課程結束後，都深

感受獲良多，尤其是在討論課中，由助教帶領，反覆辯論理論的方式，更是每年學員都非常重視的安排之一。

六、 結論與未來建議

經過三年的努力，研習營已建立了相當的口碑，在學員意見調查表中，也可以看到學員對研習營的肯定。本營的初衷是補足研究生在學時，課堂上的不足之處，希望利用密集訓練的方式，讓學員得以在理論的深度上獲得加強。研習營由於受限於整體的時間，我們已盡力配合學員的希望，將焦點集中在學員特別感興起的課題上。不過我們注意到一個現象，期待學員能加強自我學習的精神：雖然研習營在課程開始之前，一個月前即事先通知學員提早閱讀相關教材，但大部份學員的觀念仍比較被動。講座希望學員是帶著問題來到課堂中，而不是被動的等待授課，這是本國研究生需要再加強之處。

七、 附錄：

1.報名網頁及成果網頁：

報名網頁：http://www.litphil.sinica.edu.tw/modern/work_other/2009summerschool.html

成果網頁：

http://www.litphil.sinica.edu.tw/modern/work_other/2009summerschool_NEWS.html

瀏覽人次：約800人次

2.報名、報到與住宿學員清單

報名清單：

1.	游昇俯	男	政大	台文所	碩二
2.	郭顥瑄	女	政大	中文所	碩一
3.	莊士玉	女	政大	台文所	碩二
4.	林孜曄	女	政大	中文所	碩二
5.	許育婷	女	政大	台文所	碩一
6.	吳婉萍	女	政大	台文所	碩二
7.	何瑄	女	政大	斯拉夫語文學系	碩一
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10	胡晏函	女	中興	中文所	碩二
11	林爲棟	男	台大	哲學系	大四（開學後碩一）
12	黃啓峰	男	中央	中文所	博二
13	周佳靜	女	中央	中文所	碩一
14	尹子玉	女	中央	中文所	博畢
15	詹閔旭	男	成大	台文所	博一

16	張瑋儀	女	成大	中文所	博六
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18	張文婷	女	台北大學	中文所	碩一
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22	黃小民	女	文化大學	中文所	博三
23	沈瑞馨	女	逢甲	中文所	博二
24	陳芊卉	女	台中教育大學	語文教育所	碩一
25	馬艾苓	女	世新	英語所	碩一
26	湯雅雯	女	世新	中文所	碩一
27	蔡雅蒨	女	世新	英語所	碩二
28	張惠芬	女	世新	英語所	碩一
29	涂書偉	男	北教大	台灣文化研究所	碩一
30	蕭幼丹	女	北教大	台灣文化研究所	碩二
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35	顏訥	女	東華大學	中文所	碩二
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37	夏婉雲	女	淡江	中文所	博一
38	葉人豪	男	中正	中文所	碩一
39	柯涵娜	女	劍橋	Chinese Studies	大四（開學後碩一）
40	王光亮	男	牛津	Chinese Studies	博班
41	林沛翎	女	暨南大學	外文所	碩一

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38	林沛翎	女	暨南大學	外文所	碩一

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1.	1. 周怡君	218
	2. 胡晏涵	
2.	3. 張微君	220

	4. 陳芊卉	
3.	5. 郭穎瑄	222
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	22. 林沛翎	
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海報

宣傳摺頁

2009學術英文暨文學理論
研習營
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Academic English & Literary Theory

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研習營

研習證書樣本

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CERTIFICATE FOR
2009 SUMMER SCHOOL ON ACADEMIC CHINESE AND LITERARY THEORY
中國文哲研究所

5.講座逐字稿（不包括英文論文寫作）：

（附件光碟）草稿，請勿引用

八、 附件：

（1）研習手冊

（2）研習營活動錄影光碟

（3）研習營活動照片光碟

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學術英文暨文學理論研習營

Summer School for Academic English & Literary Theory

2009 理論講義

「學術英文暨文學理論」研習營

Summer School on Literary and Philosophical Theory and Academic Chinese

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L129-4
F499-3

JACQUES LACAN

ÉCRITS

THE FIRST COMPLETE EDITION IN ENGLISH

TRANSLATED BY

BRUCE FINK

IN COLLABORATION WITH

HÉLOÏSE FINK

AND

RUSSELL GRIGG

W. W. NORTON & COMPANY
New York · London

中研院文哲所圖書館

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Manufacturing by R. R. Donnelley, Bloomsburg Division
Book design by Rhea Braunstein
Production manager: Julia Druskin

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Lacan, Jacques, 1901–
[Ecrits. English]
Ecrits : the first complete edition in English / Jacques Lacan ; translated by Bruce Fink in collaboration with Héloïse Fink and Russell Grigg.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-393-06115-9 (hardcover)
1. Psychoanalysis. I. Fink, Bruce, 1956– II. Title.
BF173.L14213 2005
150.19'5—dc22

2005014598

W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 500 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10110
www.wwnorton.com

W. W. Norton & Company Ltd., Castle House, 75/76 Wells Street, London W1T 3QT

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0

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The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious

or Reason Since Freud

"Of Children Who Are Wrapped in Swaddling Bands"
O cities of the sea, I behold in you your citizens, women as well as men, tightly bound with stout bonds around their arms and legs by folk who will have no understanding of [y]our speech; and you will only be able to give vent to your griefs and sense of loss of liberty by making tearful complaints, and sighs, and lamentation one to another; for those who bind you will not have understanding of your speech nor will you understand them.[1]
—Leonardo Da Vinci

While the theme of the third volume of *La Psychanalyse*[2] commissioned this contribution by me, I owe this deference to what will be discovered here by introducing it in situating it between writing and speech—it will be halfway between the two.

Writing is in fact distinguished by a prevalence of the *text* in the sense that we will see this factor of discourse take on here—which allows for the kind of tightening up that must, to my taste, leave the reader no other way out than the way in, which I prefer to be difficult. This, then, will not be a writing in my sense of the term.

The fact that I contribute something wholly new at each class of my seminar has heretofore prevented me from providing such a text, except in one class, which has nothing particularly outstanding about it in terms of the series, and is only worth referring to for an idea of its overall level.

For the urgency that I am now taking as a pretext for leaving that aim behind merely covers over the problem that, in maintaining it at the level at which I must present my teachings here, it might stray too far from speech, whose
494 very different measures are essential to the training I seek to effect.

This is why I took the opportunity presented to me at that time by an invitation to meet with the philosophy group of the Fédération des étudiants ès lettres[3] to make an appropriate adjustment to my exposé—its necessary generality matching the extraordinary character of their interest, but its sole object

encountering the connivance of their common background, a literary background, to which my title pays homage.

Indeed, how could we forget that Freud constantly, and right until the end, maintained that such a background was the prime requisite in the training of analysts, and that he designated the age-old *universitas litterarum* as the ideal place for its institution?[4]

Thus this reference to the real-life context of my lecture, by showing whom I tailored it for, also marked those to whom it is not addressed.

I mean: none of those who, for whatever reason in psychoanalysis, allow their discipline to take advantage of some false identity.

This is a vice of habit and its effect on the mind is such that its true identity may appear among them as just one more diversion, whose refined redoubling one hopes will not escape the notice of subtler minds.

It is thus that we observe with curiosity the beginnings of a new tack concerning symbolization and language in the *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*, a great many wetted fingers leafing through works by Sapir and Jespersen. These exercises are still green around the edges, but it is above all the tone that is missing. A certain seriousness always raises a smile when it enters the domain of veracity.

And how could a contemporary psychoanalyst not sense, in coming upon speech, that he had reached this domain, when it is from speech that analytic experience receives its instrument, its frame, its material, and even the background noise of its uncertainties?

I. The Meaning of the Letter 495

My title conveys the fact that, beyond this speech, it is the whole structure of language that psychoanalytic experience discovers in the unconscious. This is to alert prejudiced minds from the outset that the idea that the unconscious is merely the seat of the instincts may have to be reconsidered.

But how are we to take the letter here? Quite simply, literally [*à la lettre*].

By "letter" I designate the material medium [*support*] that concrete discourse borrows from language.

This simple definition assumes that language is not to be confused with the various psychical and somatic functions that serve it in the speaking subject.

The primary reason for this is that language, with its structure, exists prior to each subject's entry into it at a certain moment in his mental development.

Let us note that, although the deficits of aphasia are caused by purely anatomical lesions in the cerebral systems that provide the mental center for

these functions, they prove, on the whole, to be distributed between the two aspects of the signifying effect of what I am calling here "the letter" in the creation of signification.[5] This point will become clearer in what follows.

And the subject, while he may appear to be the slave of language, is still more the slave of a discourse in the universal movement of which his place is already inscribed at his birth, if only in the form of his proper name.

Reference to the experience of the community as the substance of this dis-
496 course resolves nothing. For this experience takes on its essential dimension in the tradition established by this discourse. This tradition, long before the drama of history is inscribed in it, grounds the elementary structures of culture. And these very structures display an ordering of exchanges which, even if unconscious, is inconceivable apart from the permutations authorized by language.

With the result that the ethnographic duality of nature and culture is giving way to a ternary conception of the human condition—nature, society, and culture—the last term of which may well be reduced to language, that is, to what essentially distinguishes human society from natural societies.

But I shall neither take sides here nor take this as a point of departure, leaving to their own obscurity the original relations between the signifier and labor. To settle accounts with the general function of *praxis* in the genesis of history by way of a quip, I will confine myself to mentioning that the very society that wished to restore the hierarchy responsible for the relations between production and ideological superstructures to its rightful political place, alongside the privilege of the producers, has nevertheless failed to give birth to an Esperanto whose relations to socialist reality [*réel*] would have ruled out from the start any possibility of literary formalism.[6]

For my part, I will put my faith in only those premises whose value has already been proven, in that they have allowed language to attain the status in experience of a scientific object.

This is what permits linguistics[7] to present itself in the pilot position in this domain, around which a reclassification of the sciences is signaling, as is usu-
497 ally the case, a revolution in knowledge; only the necessities of communication have made me term this domain, in the theme of this volume of *La Psychanalyse*, "the sciences of man"—despite the confusion that may hide behind it.

To pinpoint the emergence of the discipline of linguistics, I will say that, as in the case of every science in the modern sense, it consists in the constitutive moment of an algorithm that grounds it. This algorithm is the following:

$$\frac{S}{s}$$

It is read as follows: signifier over signified, "over" corresponding to the bar separating the two levels.

The sign written in this way should be attributed to Ferdinand de Saussure, although it is not reduced to this exact form in any of the numerous schemas in which it appears in the printed version of the various lectures from the three courses he gave in 1906–7, 1908–9, and 1910–11, which a group of his devoted disciples collected under the title, *Cours de linguistique générale*—a publication of prime importance for the transmission of a teaching worthy of the name, that is, that one can stop only on its own movement.

This is why it is legitimate for us to credit him for the formalization $\frac{S}{s}$, which characterizes the modern stage of linguistics, despite the diversity between schools of linguistics.

The major theme of this science is thus based, in effect, on the primordial position of the signifier and the signified as distinct orders initially separated by a barrier resisting signification.

This is what makes possible an exact study of the connections characteristic of the signifier, and of the magnitude of their function in generating the signified.

For this primordial distinction goes well beyond the debate over the arbitrariness of the sign, such as it has been elaborated since the reflections of Antiquity, and even beyond the impasse, already sensed at that time, which opposed the one-to-one correspondence between word and thing, even in the act of naming—despite the appearances suggested by the role imputed to the index finger pointing to an object as an infant learns its mother tongue, or in the use of so-called concrete academic methods in the study of foreign lan- 498
guages [*langues*].

We can take things no further along this path than to demonstrate that no signification can be sustained except by reference to another signification.[8] This ultimately leads us to the remark that there is no existing language [*langue*] whose ability to cover the field of the signified can be called into question, one of the effects of its existence as a language [*langue*] being that it fulfills all needs there. Were we to try to grasp the constitution of the object in language, we could but note that this constitution is found only at the level of the concept—which is very different from any nominative—and that the *thing* [*chose*], when quite obviously reduced to the noun, splits into the double, divergent ray of the cause in which the thing has taken shelter in French, and of the nothing [*rien*] to which the thing has abandoned its Latin dress *(rem)*.

These considerations, as existent as they may be to philosophers, divert us from the locus whence language questions us about its very nature. And we

will fail to sustain this question as long as we have not jettisoned the illusion that the signifier serves [*répond à*] the function of representing the signified, or better, that the signifier has to justify [*répondre de*] its existence in terms of any signification whatsoever.

For even if it is reduced to this latter formulation, the heresy is the same—the heresy that leads logical positivism in search of the "meaning of meaning,"* as its objective is called in the language [*langue*] in which its devotees snort. It can be seen here how this sort of analysis can reduce the text the most highly charged with meaning to insignificant trifles. Only mathematical algorithms resist this process; they are considered to be devoid of meaning, as they should be.[9]

499 The fact remains that if we were able to subtract solely the notion of the parallelism of its upper and lower terms from the algorithm $\frac{S}{s}$, each term only being taken globally, it would remain the enigmatic sign of a total mystery. Which, of course, is not the case.

In order to grasp its function, I will begin by reproducing the faulty illustration by which its usage is classically introduced:

We can see here how it lends itself to the kind of direction indicated above as erroneous.

In my lecture, I replaced this illustration with another, which can be considered more correct only because it exaggerates in the incongruous dimension psychoanalysts have not yet altogether given up, because of their justified sense that their conformism derives its value from it alone. Here is the other illustration:



Here we see that, without greatly extending the scope of the signifier involved in the experiment—that is, by simply doubling the nominal type

500 through the mere juxtaposition of two terms whose complementary meanings would seem to have to reinforce each other—surprise is produced by

the precipitation of an unexpected meaning: the image of two twin doors that symbolize, with the private stall offered Western man for the satisfaction of his natural needs when away from home, the imperative he seems to share with the vast majority of primitive communities that subjects his public life to the laws of urinary segregation.

The point is not merely to silence the nominalist debate with a low blow, but to show how the signifier in fact enters the signified—namely, in a form which, since it is not immaterial, raises the question of its place in reality. For in having to move closer to the little enamel plaques that bear it, the squinting gaze of a nearsighted person might be justified in wondering whether it is indeed here that we must see the signifier, whose signified would in this case be paid its last respects by the solemn procession in two lines from the upper nave.

But no contrived example can be as telling as what is encountered in the lived experience of truth. Thus I have no reason to be unhappy I invented the above, since it awoke in the person the most worthy of my trust a childhood memory which, having come serendipitously to my attention, is best placed here.

A train arrives at a station. A little boy and a little girl, brother and sister, are seated across from each other in a compartment next to the outside window that provides a view of the station platform buildings going by as the train comes to a stop. "Look," says the brother, "we're at Ladies!" "Imbecile!" replies his sister, "Don't you see we're at Gentlemen."

Aside from the fact that the rails in this story materialize the bar in the Saussurian algorithm in a form designed to suggest that its resistance may be other than dialectical, one would have to be half-blind to be confused as to the respective places of the signifier and the signified here, and not to follow from what radiant center the signifier reflects its light into the darkness of incomplete significations.

For the signifier will raise Dissension that is merely animal in kind, and destined to the natural fog of forgetfulness, to the immeasurable power of ideological warfare, which is merciless to families and a torment to the gods. To 501
these children, Gentlemen and Ladies will henceforth be two homelands toward which each of their souls will take flight on divergent wings, and regarding which it will be all the more impossible for them to reach an agreement since, being in fact the same homeland, neither can give ground regarding the one's unsurpassed excellence without detracting from the other's glory.

Let us stop there. It sounds like the history of France. Which it is more humane to recall here, and rightly so, than that of England, destined to flip from the Large to the Small End of Dean Swift's egg.

It remains to be grasped up what steps and down what corridor the S of the signifier, visible here in the plurals [*hommes* and *dames*] by which it focuses its welcome beyond the train window, must pass to impress its curves upon the ducts by which—like hot air and cold air—indignation and scorn hiss on this side.

One thing is certain: this access must not, in any case, carry any signification with it if the algorithm, $\frac{S}{s}$, with its bar is appropriate to it. For insofar as the algorithm itself is but a pure function of the signifier, it can reveal only a signifying structure in this transfer.

Now the structure of the signifier is, as is commonly said of language, that it is articulated.

This means that its units—no matter where one begins in tracing out their reciprocal encroachments and expanding inclusions—are subject to the twofold condition of being reduced to ultimate differential elements and of combining the latter according to the laws of a closed order.

These elements, the decisive discovery of linguistics, are *phonemes*; we must not look for any *phonetic* constancy in the modulatory variability to which this term applies, but rather for the synchronic system of differential couplings that are necessary to discern vocables in a given language [*langue*]. This allows us to see that an essential element in speech itself was predestined to flow into moveable type which, in Didots or Garamonds squeezing into lower-cases, renders validly present what I call the "letter"—namely, the essentially localized structure of the signifier.

The second property of the signifier, that of combining according to the
502 laws of a closed order, affirms the necessity of the topological substratum, of which the term I ordinarily use, "signifying chain," gives an approximate idea: links by which a necklace firmly hooks onto a link of another necklace made of links.

Such are the structural conditions that define the order of the signifier's constitutive encroachments up to the unit immediately above the sentence as grammar, and the order of the signifier's constitutive inclusions up to the verbal locution as the lexicon.

In the limits within which these two approaches to understanding linguistic usage are confined, it is easy to see that only signifier-to-signifier correlations provide the standard for any and every search for signification; this is indicated by the notion of "usage" of a taxeme or semanteme, which refers to contexts just one degree above that of the units in question.

But it is not because grammatical and lexical approaches are exhausted at a certain point that we must think that signification rules unreservedly beyond it. That would be a mistake.

For the signifier, by its very nature, always anticipates meaning by deploying its dimension in some sense before it. As is seen at the level of the sentence when the latter is interrupted before the significant term: "I'll never . . .," "The fact remains . . .," "Still perhaps . . ." Such sentences nevertheless make sense, and that sense is all the more oppressive in that it is content to make us wait for it.[10]

But the phenomenon is no different, which—making her appear, with the sole postponement of a "but," as comely as the Shulamite, as honest as a virtuous maiden—adorns and readies the Negress for the wedding and the poor woman for the auction block.

Whence we can say that it is in the chain of the signifier that meaning *insists*, but that none of the chain's elements *consists* in the signification it can provide at that very moment.

The notion of an incessant sliding of the signified under the signifier thus comes to the fore—which Ferdinand de Saussure illustrates with an image resembling the wavy lines of the upper and lower Waters in miniatures from manuscripts of Genesis. It is a twofold flood in which the landmarks—fine streaks of rain traced by vertical dotted lines that supposedly delimit corresponding segments—seem insubstantial. 503

All our experience runs counter to this, which made me speak at one point in my seminar on the psychoses of the "button ties" [*points de capiton*] required by this schema to account for the dominance of the letter in the dramatic transformation that dialogue can effect in the subject.[11]

But while the linearity that Saussure considers to be constitutive of the chain of discourse—in accordance with its emission by a single voice and with the horizontal axis along which it is situated in our writing—is in fact necessary, it is not sufficient. It applies to the chain of discourse only in the direction in which it is oriented in time, even being taken up therein as a signifying factor in all languages [*langues*] in which the time of "Peter hits Paul" is reversed when the terms are inverted.

But it suffices to listen to poetry, which Saussure was certainly in the habit of doing,[12] for a polyphony to be heard and for it to become clear that all discourse is aligned along the several staves of a musical score.

Indeed, there is no signifying chain that does not sustain—as if attached to the punctuation of each of its units—all attested contexts that are, so to speak, "vertically" linked to that point.

Thus, if we take up the word *arbre* (tree) again, this time not in its nominal isolation, but at the endpoint of one of these punctuations, we see that it is not simply because the word *barre* (bar) is its anagram that it crosses the bar of the Saussurian algorithm.

504 For broken down into the double specter of its vowels and consonants, it calls up—with the robur-oak [*robre*] and the plane tree [*platane*]—the significations of strength and majesty that it takes on in our flora. Tapping all the symbolic contexts in which it is used in the Hebrew of the Bible, it erects on a barren hill the shadow of the cross. Next it reduces to a capital Y, the sign of dichotomy—which, without the illustration that historiates armorials, would owe nothing to the tree, however genealogical it claims to be. Circulatory tree, arbor vitae of the cerebellum, lead tree or silver amalgam [*arbre de Diane*], crystals precipitated into a tree that conducts lightning, is it your countenance that traces our destiny for us in the fire-scorched tortoiseshell, or your flash that brings forth from an infinite night that slow change in being in the Ἕν Πάντα of language:

No! says the Tree, it says No! in the scintillating
Of its superb head

verses that I consider to be as legitimately heard in the harmonics of the tree as their reverse:

Which the storm treats universally
As it does a blade of grass.

For this modern verse is organized according to the same law of the parallelism of the signifier, whose concert governs both primitive Slavic epic poetry and the most refined Chinese poetry.

This can be seen in the common mode of beings [*l'étant*] from which the tree and the blade of grass are chosen, so that the signs of contradiction—saying "No!" and "treat as"—can come into being here, and so that, through the categorical contrast between the particularity of "superb" and the "universally" of its reduction, the indiscernible scintillating of the eternal instant may be accomplished in the condensation of *tête* (head) and *tempête* (storm).

But all this signifier can only operate, it may be objected, if it is present in the subject. I answer this objection by assuming that he has shifted to the level of the signified.

For what is important is not whether the subject know more or less about it. (If GENTLEMEN and LADIES were written in a language [*langue*] with which the little boy and girl were unfamiliar, their quarrel would simply be more exclusively a quarrel over words, but it would be no less ready to take on signification for all that.)

505 What this structure of the signifying chain discloses is the possibility I

have—precisely insofar as I share its language [*langue*] with other subjects, that is, insofar as this language [*langue*] exists—to use it to signify *something altogether different* from what it says. This is a function of speech that is more worthy of being pointed out than that of disguising the subject's thought (which is usually indefinable)—namely, the function of indicating the place of this subject in the search for truth.

I need but plant my tree in a locution, *grimper à l'arbre*, or even project onto it the derisive light that a descriptive context gives the word, *arborer*, to not let myself be imprisoned in some sort of *communiqué* of the facts, however official it may be, and if I know the truth, convey it, despite all the censors, *between-the-lines* using nothing but the signifier that can be constituted by my acrobatics through the branches of the tree. These acrobatics may be provocative to the point of burlesque or perceptible only to the trained eye, depending on whether I wish to be understood by the many or the few.

The properly signifying function thus depicted in language has a name. We learned this name in our childhood grammar book on the last page, where the shade of Quintilian, relegated to some phantom chapter to convey final considerations on style, seemed suddenly to hasten its voice due to the threat of being cut off.

It is among the figures of style, or tropes—from which the verb "to find" [*trouver*] comes to us—that this name is, in fact, found. This name is *metonymy*.

I shall refer only to the example of it given there: "thirty sails." For the worry I felt, over the fact that the word "ship" [*bâteau*] that was hiding therein seemed to split its presence there in two by having been able to borrow its figurative sense from the very rehashing of this example, veiled [*voilait*] not so much those illustrious sails [*voiles*] as the definition they were supposed to illustrate.

The part taken for the whole—I said to myself, if the thing is supposed to be based on reality [*réel*]—leaves us with hardly any idea what we are to conclude about the size of the fleet these thirty sails are nevertheless supposed to gauge: for a ship to have but one sail is very rare indeed.

This shows that the connection between ship and sail is nowhere other than 506
in the signifier, and that metonymy is based on the *word-to-word* nature of this connection.[13]

I shall designate as metonymy the first aspect of the actual field the signifier constitutes, so that meaning may assume a place there.

The other aspect is *metaphor*. Let me illustrate it immediately; Quillet's dictionary seemed appropriate to me to provide a sample that would not be suspected of being deliberately selected, and I didn't pursue the farce any far-

ther than Victor Hugo's well-known verse, "His sheaf was neither miserly nor hateful . . .," with which I presented metaphor, when the time came for it, in my seminar on the psychoses.

Let us say that modern poetry and the Surrealist school led us to take a major step forward here by showing that any conjunction of two signifiers could just as easily constitute a metaphor, if an additional condition—that of the greatest disparity of the images signified—weren't required for the pro-
507 duction of the poetic spark, in other words, for metaphoric creation to occur.

Of course, this radical position is based on the so-called "automatic writing" experiment, which would not have been attempted without the assurance its pioneers drew from Freud's discovery. But it remains marked by confusion because the doctrine behind it is false.

Metaphor's creative spark does not spring forth from the juxtaposition of two images, that is, of two equally actualized signifiers. It flashes between two signifiers, one of which has replaced the other by taking the other's place in the signifying chain, the occulted signifier remaining present by virtue of its (metonymic) connection to the rest of the chain.

One word for another: this is the formula for metaphor, and if you are a poet you will make it into a game and produce a continuous stream, nay, a dazzling weave of metaphors. You will, moreover, obtain the intoxicating effect of Jean Tardieu's dialogue that goes by this title, due solely to the demonstration it provides of the radical superfluousness of all signification to a perfectly convincing representation of bourgeois comedy.

In Hugo's verse, it is obvious that not the slightest light emanates from the assertion that a sheaf is neither miserly nor hateful, because it is clear that the sheaf has no more the merit than the demerit of these attributes, since miserliness and hatred, along with the sheaf, are properties of Booz, who exercises them when he uses the sheaf as he sees fit, without making his feelings known to it.

If "his sheaf" refers back to Booz, as is clearly the case nevertheless, it is because it replaces him in the signifying chain—at the very place that awaited him, because it had been raised up a step by the clearing away of miserliness and hatred. But the sheaf has thus cleared this place of Booz, ejected as he now is into the outer darkness where miserliness and hatred harbor him in the hollow of their negation.

But once *his* sheaf has thus usurped his place, Booz cannot go back to it, the slender thread of the little "his" that attaches him to it being an additional obstacle thereto, because it binds this return with a title of ownership that would detain him in the heart of miserliness and hatred. His asserted generosity is thus reduced to *less than nothing* by the munificence of the sheaf which, being

drawn from nature, knows neither our reserve nor our rejections, and even in 508
its accumulation remains prodigal by our standards.

But if, in this profusion, the giver disappears with the gift, it is only to reemerge in what surrounds the figure of speech in which he was annihilated. For it is the radiance of fecundity—which announces the surprise the poem celebrates, namely, the promise of acceding to paternity that the old man receives in a sacred context.

Thus it is between a man's proper name qua signifier and the signifier that metaphorically abolishes it that the poetic spark is produced, and it is all the more effective here in bringing about the signification of paternity in that it reproduces the mythical event through which Freud reconstructed the path along which the mystery of paternity advances in the unconscious of every man.

The structure of modern metaphor is no different. Hence the jaculation, "Love is a pebble laughing in the sun," recreates love in a dimension that I have said strikes me as tenable, as opposed to its ever imminent slippage into the mirage of some narcissistic altruism.

We see that metaphor is situated at the precise point at which meaning is produced in nonmeaning—that is, at the passage which, as Freud discovered, when crossed in the opposite direction, gives rise to the word that is "the word" ["*le mot*"] par excellence in French, the word that has no other patronage there than the signifier *esprit* [14]—and at which it becomes palpable that, in deriding the signifier, man defies his very destiny.

But to return to metonymy now, what does man find in it, if it must be more than the power to skirt the obstacles of social censure? Doesn't this form, which gives oppressed truth its field, manifest a certain servitude that is inherent in its presentation?

It's worth taking the time to read a book in which Leo Strauss, from the land that has traditionally offered asylum to those who have chosen freedom, 509
reflects on the relations between the art of writing and persecution.[15] By honing in on the sort of connaturality that ties this art to this condition, he allows us to glimpse something that imposes its form here, in the effect of truth on desire.

But haven't we been feeling for a while now that, in following the paths of the letter to reach the Freudian truth, we are getting hot, its flames spreading all around us?

Of course, as it is said, the letter kills while the spirit gives life. I don't disagree, having had to pay homage somewhere here to a noble victim of the error of seeking in the letter, but I also ask how the spirit could live without the letter. The spirit's pretensions would nevertheless remain indisputable if

the letter hadn't proven that it produces all its truth effects in man without the spirit having to intervene at all.

This revelation came to Freud, and he called his discovery the unconscious.

II. The Letter in the Unconscious

In Freud's complete works, one out of three pages presents us with philological references, one out of two pages with logical inferences, and everywhere we see a dialectical apprehension of experience, linguistic analysis becoming still more prevalent the more directly the unconscious is involved.

Thus what is at stake on every page in *The Interpretation of Dreams* is what I call the letter of discourse, in its texture, uses, and immanence in the matter in question. For this book inaugurates both Freud's work and his royal road to the unconscious. And we are informed of this by Freud, whose confession in letters to Fliess that have since been made public, when he launches this book toward us in the early days of this century,[16] merely confirms what he continued to proclaim to the end: that the whole of his discovery lies in this no-holds-barred expression of his message.

510 The first clause, articulated already in the introductory chapter because its exposition cannot be postponed, is that the dream is a rebus. And Freud stipulates that it must be understood quite literally [*à la lettre*], as I said earlier. This is related to the instance in the dream of the same "literating" (in other words, phonemic) structure in which the signifier is articulated and analyzed in discourse. Like the unnatural figures of the boat on the roof, or the man with a comma for a head, which are expressly mentioned by Freud, dream images are to be taken up only on the basis of their value as signifiers, that is, only insofar as they allow us to spell out the "proverb" presented by the oneiric rebus. The linguistic structure that enables us to read dreams is at the crux of the "signifierness of dreams," at the crux of the *Traumdeutung*.

Freud shows us in every possible way that the image's value as a signifier has nothing to do with its signification, giving as an example Egyptian hieroglyphics in which it would be ridiculous to deduce from the frequency in a text of a vulture (which is an aleph) or a chick (which is a vau) indicating a form of the verb "to be" and plurals, that the text has anything whatsoever to do with these ornithological specimens. Freud takes his bearings from certain uses of the signifier in this writing that are effaced in ours, such as the use of determinatives, where a categorical figure is added as an exponent to the literal figuration of a verbal term; but this is only to bring us back to the fact that we are dealing with writing where even the supposed "ideogram" is a letter.

But psychoanalysts who have no training in linguistics don't need the current confusion regarding the term "ideogram" to believe in a symbolism deriving from natural analogy, or even from instinct's coaptational image. This is so true that, apart from the French school, which attends to this, it is with a statement like "reading coffee grounds is not the same as reading hieroglyphics" that I must recall to its own principles a technique whose pathways cannot be justified unless they aim at the unconscious.

It must be said that this is admitted only reluctantly, and that the mental vice denounced above enjoys such favor that the contemporary psychoanalyst can be expected to say that he decodes before resolving to take the journey with Freud (turn at the statue of Champollion, says the guide) that is necessary for him to understand that he deciphers—the latter differing in that a cryptogram 511
only takes on its full dimensions when it is in a lost language [*langue*].

Taking this journey simply amounts to going further in the *Traumdeutung*.

Entstellung, translated as "transposition"—which Freud shows to be the general precondition for the functioning of the dream—is what I designated earlier, with Saussure, as the sliding of the signified under the signifier, which is always happening (unconsciously, let us note) in discourse.

But the two aspects of the signifier's impact on the signified are also found here:

Verdichtung, "condensation," is the superimposed structure of signifiers in which metaphor finds its field; its name, condensing in itself the word *Dichtung*, shows the mechanism's connaturality with poetry, to the extent that it envelops poetry's own properly traditional function.

Verschiebung or "displacement"—this transfer of signification that metonymy displays is closer to the German term; it is presented, right from its first appearance in Freud's work, as the unconscious' best means by which to foil censorship.

What distinguishes these two mechanisms, which play a privileged role in the dream-work, *Traumarbeit*, from their homologous function in discourse? Nothing, except a condition imposed upon the signifying material, called *Rücksicht auf Darstellbarkeit*, which must be translated as "consideration of the means of staging" (the translation by "role of the possibility of representation" being overly approximate here). But this condition constitutes a limitation operating within the system of writing, rather than dissolving the system into a figurative semiology in which it would intersect the phenomena of natural expression. This would probably allow us to shed light on problems with certain types of pictography, which we are not justified in regarding as evolutionary stages simply because they were abandoned in writing as imperfect. Let us say, then, that dreams are like the parlor game in which each person, in

turn, is supposed to get the spectators to guess some well-known saying or variant of it solely by silent gestures. The fact that dreams have speech at their
512 disposal makes no difference since, for the unconscious, speech is but one staging element among others. It is precisely when games and dreams alike run up against the lack of taxemic material by which to represent logical relationships such as causality, contradiction, hypothesis, and so on that they prove they have to do with writing, not mime. The subtle procedures dreams end up using to represent these logical connections—in a much less artificial way than games usually employ—are taken up specifically in Freud's work, where it is once again confirmed that the dream-work proceeds in accordance with the laws of the signifier.

The rest of the dream revision is termed "secondary" by Freud, taking on its value from what is at stake: they are fantasies or daydreams, *Tagtraum*, to use the term Freud prefers to use to situate them in their wish-fulfilling function (*Wunscherfüllung*). Given that these fantasies may remain unconscious, their distinctive feature is clearly their signification. Now, Freud tells us that their role in dreams is either to serve as signifying elements for the statement of the unconscious thought (*Traumgedanke*), or to be used in the secondary revision that occurs—that is, in a function not to be distinguished, he says, from our waking thought (*von unserem wachen Denken nicht zu unterscheiden*). No better idea of this function's effects can be given than by comparing it to patches of colorwash which, when applied here and there on a stencil, can make stick figures—which are rather unprepossessing in themselves—in a rebus or hieroglyphics look more like a painting of people.

I apologize for seeming to spell out Freud's text myself; it is not merely to show how much is to be gained by not lopping off parts of it. It is to be able to situate what has happened in psychoanalysis in terms of its earliest reference points, which are fundamental and have never been revoked.

Right from the outset, people failed to recognize the constitutive role of the signifier in the status Freud immediately assigned to the unconscious in the most precise and explicit ways.

The reason for this was twofold, the least perceived being, naturally, that this formalization was not sufficient by itself to bring people to recognize the
513 instance of the signifier, because when the *Traumdeutung* was published it was way ahead of the formalizations of linguistics for which one could no doubt show that it paved the way by the sheer weight of its truth.

The second reason is merely the flip side of the first, for if psychoanalysts were fascinated exclusively by the significations highlighted in the unconscious, it was because these significations derived their most secret attraction from the dialectic that seemed to be immanent in them.

I demonstrated to those who attend my seminar that the apparent changes of direction or rather changes in tack along the way—that Freud, in his primary concern to ensure the survival of his discovery along with the basic revisions it imposed upon our knowledge, felt it necessary to apply to his doctrine—were due to the need to counteract the ever-accelerating effects of this partiality.

For, I repeat, given the situation he found himself in, where he had nothing corresponding to the object of his discovery that was at the same level of scientific maturity, he at least never failed to maintain this object at the level of its ontological dignity.

The rest was the work of the gods and took such a course that analysis today finds its bearings in the imaginary forms I have just shown to be sketched out through inverse printing on the text they mutilate. It is to them that the analyst's aim now adapts, confusing them, in the interpretation of dreams, with the visionary liberation of the hieroglyphic aviary, and seeking more generally to verify the exhaustion of the analysis in a sort of "scanning"*[17] of these forms wherever they appear—with the idea that they bear witness both to the exhaustion of the regressions and to the remodeling of "the object-relation" that is supposed to typify the subject.[18]

The technique that is based on such positions can give rise to many varied effects, which are quite difficult to criticize behind their therapeutic aegis. But 514
an internal critique can emerge from the flagrant discordance between the mode of operation by which the technique legitimates itself—namely, the fundamental rule of psychoanalysis, all the instruments of which, starting with "free association," derive their justification from its inventor's conception of the unconscious—and the complete ignorance reigning there of this very conception of the unconscious. The most trenchant supporters of this technique let themselves off the hook here with a mere flourish: the fundamental rule must, they say, be observed all the more religiously since it is only the fruit of a lucky accident. In other words, Freud never really knew what he was doing.

A return to Freud's texts shows, on the contrary, the absolute coherence between his technique and his discovery, and this coherence allows us to situate his procedures at their proper level.

This is why any rectification of psychoanalysis requires a return to the truth of that discovery, which is impossible to obscure in its original moment.

For in the analysis of dreams, Freud intends to give us nothing other than the laws of the unconscious in their broadest extension. One of the reasons why dreams were the most propitious here is, Freud tells us, that they reveal these laws no less in normal subjects than in neurotics.

In neither, however, does the efficacy of the unconscious cease upon awak-

ening. Psychoanalytic experience consists in nothing other than establishing that the unconscious leaves none of our actions outside its field. The presence of the unconscious in the psychological order—in other words, in the individual's relational functions—nevertheless deserves to be more precisely defined. It is not coextensive with that order, for we know that, while unconscious motivation manifests itself just as much in conscious psychical effects as in unconscious ones, conversely it is elementary to note that a large number of psychical effects that are legitimately designated as unconscious, in the sense of excluding the characteristic of consciousness, nevertheless bear no relation whatsoever, by their nature, to the unconscious in the Freudian sense. It is thus only due to an incorrect use of the term that "psychical" and "unconscious" in this sense are confused, and that people thus term psychical what is actually an effect of the unconscious on the soma, for example.

515 The point is, therefore, to define the topography of this unconscious. I say that it is the very topography defined by the algorithm:

$$\frac{S}{s}$$

What it has permitted me to elaborate concerning the impact of the signifier on the signified allows for its transformation into:

$$f(S)\frac{1}{s}$$

It is on the basis of the copresence in the signified not only of the elements of the horizontal signifying chain but also of its vertical dependencies, that I have demonstrated the effects, distributed in accordance with two fundamental structures, in metonymy and metaphor. We can symbolize them by:

$$f(S \ldots S')\, S \cong S\,(—)\, s$$

that is, metonymic structure, indicating that it is the signifier-to-signifier connection that allows for the elision by which the signifier instates lack of being [*le manque de l'être*] in the object-relation, using signification's referral [*renvoi*] value to invest it with the desire aiming at the lack that it supports. The — sign placed in ( ) manifests here the maintenance of the bar — which, in the first algorithm, denotes the irreducible nature of the resistance of signification as constituted in the relations between signifier and signified.[19]

Now we turn to

$$f\left(\frac{S'}{S}\right)S \cong S\,(+)\,s$$

metaphoric structure, indicating that it is in the substitution of signifier for signifier that a signification effect is produced that is poetic or creative, in other words, that brings the signification in question into existence.[20] The + sign in ( ) manifests here the crossing of the bar, —, and the constitutive value of this crossing for the emergence of signification.

This crossing expresses the condition for the passage of the signifier into the signified, whose moment I pointed out above by provisionally conflating 516
it with the place of the subject.

It is the function of the subject, thus introduced, on which we must now dwell since it lies at the crux of our problem.

"I am thinking, therefore I am" (*cogito ergo sum*) is not simply the formulation in which the link between the transparency of the transcendental subject and his existential affirmation is constituted, at the historical apex of reflection on the conditions of science.

Perhaps I am only object and mechanism (and so nothing more than phenomenon), but assuredly, insofar as I think so, I am—absolutely. Philosophers certainly made important corrections here—namely, that in that which is thinking *(cogitans)*, I am never doing anything but constituting myself as an object (*cogitatum*). The fact remains that through this extreme purification of the transcendental subject, my existential link to its project seems irrefutable, at least in the form of its actuality, and that *"cogito ergo sum" ubi cogito, ibi sum*, overcomes this objection.

Of course, this limits me to being there in my being only insofar as I think that I am in my thought; to what extent I really think this concerns me alone and, if I say it, interests no one.[21]

Yet to avoid it on the pretext of its philosophical semblances is simply to demonstrate one's inhibition. For the notion of the subject is indispensable even to the workings of a science such as strategy in the modern sense, whose calculations exclude all "subjectivism."

It is also to deny oneself access to what might be called the Freudian universe—in the sense in which we speak of the Copernican universe. Indeed, Freud himself compared his discovery to the so-called Copernican revolution, emphasizing that what was at stake was once again the place man assigns himself at the center of a universe.

Is the place that I occupy as subject of the signifier concentric or eccen-
517 tric in relation to the place I occupy as subject of the signified? That is the question.

The point is not to know whether I speak of myself in a way that conforms to what I am, but rather to know whether, when I speak of myself, I am the same as the self of whom I speak. And there is no reason not to bring in the term "thought" here. For Freud uses the term to designate the elements at stake in the unconscious, that is, in the signifying mechanisms I just pointed to there.

It is nonetheless true that the philosophical *cogito* is at the center of the mirage that renders modern man so sure of being himself in his uncertainties about himself, and even in the distrust he has long since learned to exercise regarding the pitfalls of pride.

Now if, turning the weapon of metonymy against the nostalgia that it serves, I stop myself from seeking any meaning beyond tautology, and if, in the name of "war is war" and "a penny's a penny," I resolve to be only what I am, how can I escape here from the obvious fact that I am in this very act?

And how—in going to the other, metaphoric, pole of the signifying quest, and dedicating myself to becoming what I am, to coming into being—can I doubt that, even if I were to lose myself there, I am there?

Now it is on these very points, where the obvious is subverted by the empirical, that the trick of the Freudian conversion lies.

This signifying game of metonymy and metaphor—up to and including its active tip [*pointe*] that "cotter-pins" my desire to a refusal of the signifier or to a lack of being, and links my fate to the question of my destiny—this game is played, in its inexorable subtlety, until the match is over, where I am not because I cannot situate myself there.

That is, it wasn't going very far to say the words with which I momentarily dumbfounded my audience: I am thinking where I am not, therefore I am where I am not thinking. These words render palpable to an attentive ear with what elusive ambiguity the ring of meaning flees from our grasp along the verbal string.

What we must say is: I am not, where I am the plaything of my thought; I think about what I am where I do not think I am thinking.

This two-sided mystery can be seen to intersect the fact that truth is evoked only in that dimension of ruse whereby all "realism" in creation derives its
518 virtue from metonymy, as well as this other fact that access to meaning is granted only to the double elbow of metaphor, when we hold in our hand their one and only key: namely, the fact that the S and *s* of the Saussurian algorithm

are not in the same plane, and man was deluding himself in believing he was situated in their common axis, which is nowhere.

At least until Freud made this discovery. For if what Freud discovered isn't precisely that, it is nothing.

The contents of the unconscious, in their deceptive ambiguity, supply us no reality in the subject more consistent than the immediate; it is from truth that they derive their virtue in the dimension of being: *Kern unseres Wesen* is Freud's own expression.

Metaphor's two-stage mechanism is the very mechanism by which symptoms, in the analytic sense, are determined. Between the enigmatic signifier of sexual trauma and the term it comes to replace in a current signifying chain, a spark flies that fixes in a symptom—a metaphor in which flesh or function is taken as a signifying element—the signification, that is inaccessible to the conscious subject, by which the symptom may be dissolved.

And the enigmas that desire—with its frenzy mimicking the gulf of the infinite and the secret collusion whereby it envelops the pleasure of knowing and of dominating in jouissance—poses for any sort of "natural philosophy" are based on no other derangement of instinct than the fact that it is caught in the rails of metonymy, eternally extending toward the *desire for something else*. Hence its "perverse" fixation at the very point of suspension of the signifying chain at which the screen-memory is immobilized and the fascinating image of the fetish becomes frozen.

There is no other way to conceive of the indestructibility of unconscious desire—given that there is no need which, when its satiation is prohibited, does not wither, in extreme cases through the very wasting away of the organism itself. It is in a kind of memory, comparable to what goes by that name in our modern thinking-machines (which are based on an electronic realization of signifying composition), that the chain is found which *insists* by reproducing itself in the transference, and which is the chain of a dead desire.

It is the truth of what this desire has been in his history that the subject cries out through his symptom, as Christ said that stones themselves would have cried out, had the children of Israel not lent them their voices.

And this is also why psychoanalysis alone allows us to differentiate in memory the function of remembering. The latter, rooted in the signifier, resolves the Platonic aporias of reminiscence through the ascendancy of history in man. 519

One need but read *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality*—which is covered over for the masses by so many pseudo-biological glosses—to note that Freud has all accession to the object derive from a dialectic of return.

Having thus begun with Holderlin's νόστος, Freud arrives less than twenty years later at Kierkegaard's repetition; that is, his thought, in submitting at the outset to the humble but inflexible consequences of the talking cure* alone, was never able to let go of the living servitudes that, starting from the royal principle of the Logos, led him to rethink the deadly Empedoclean antinomies.

And how, if not on the "other scene" Freud speaks of as the locus of the dream, are we to understand his recourse as a man of science to a *Deus ex machina* that is less derisory in that here it is revealed to the spectator that the machine directs the director himself? How can we fathom the fact that a scientist of the nineteenth century valued more highly than all his other works his *Totem and Taboo*—with its obscene, ferocious figure of the primordial father, who is inexhaustibly redeemed in the eternal blinding of Oedipus—before which contemporary ethnologists bow as before the development of an authentic myth, unless we realize that he had to bow to a force of evidence that went beyond his prejudices?

Similarly, the imperious proliferation of particular symbolic creations—such as what are called the sexual theories of children—which account for even the smallest details of the neurotic's compulsions, answer to the same necessities as do myths.

This is why, to bring you to the precise point of the commentary on Freud's work I am developing in my seminar, little Hans, left in the lurch at the age of five by the failings of his symbolic entourage, and faced with the suddenly actualized enigma to him of his sex and his existence, develops—under the direction of Freud and his father, who is Freud's disciple—all the possible permutations of a limited number of signifiers in the form of a myth, around the signifying crystal of his phobia.

520 We see here that, even at the individual level, man can find a solution to the impossible by exhausting all possible forms of the impossibilities that are encountered when the solution is put into the form of a signifying equation. This is a striking demonstration that illuminates the labyrinth of a case study which thus far has been used only as a scrap heap. It also makes us grasp that the nature of neurosis is revealed in the fact that a symptom's development is coextensive with its elimination in the treatment: whether phobic, hysterical, or obsessive, neurosis is a question that being raises for the subject "from where he was before the subject came into the world" (this subordinate clause is the very expression Freud uses in explaining the Oedipus complex to little Hans).

At stake here is the being that appears in a split second in the emptiness of the verb "to be" and, as I said, this being raises its question for the subject. What does that mean? It does not raise it *before* the subject, since the subject cannot come to the place where being raises it, but being raises it *in* the sub-

ject's *place*—in other words, being raises the question in that place *with* the subject, just as one raises a problem *with* a pen and as antiquity's man thought *with* his soul.

Freud brought the ego into his doctrine in this way, defining it by the resistances that are specific to it.[22] I have tried to get people to understand that these resistances are imaginary in nature, like the coaptational lures that ethology shows us in display or combat in animal behavior, these lures being reduced in man to the narcissistic relation introduced by Freud and elaborated by me in "The Mirror Stage." While Freud—by situating in this ego the synthesis of the perceptual functions in which the sensorimotor selections are integrated—seems to agree with the tradition that delegates to the ego the task of answering for reality, this reality is simply all the more included in the suspension of the ego.

For this ego, distinguished first for the imaginary inertias it concentrates against the message of the unconscious, operates only by covering over the displacement the subject is with a resistance that is essential to discourse as such.

This is why an exhaustion of the defense mechanisms, as palpable as 521
Fenichel renders it in his *Problems of Psychoanalytic Technique* because he is a practitioner (whereas his whole theoretical reduction of the neuroses and psychoses to genetic anomalies in libidinal development is pure platitude), turns out to be the other side of unconscious mechanisms, without Fenichel accounting for or even realizing it. Periphrasis, hyperbaton, ellipsis, suspension, anticipation, retraction, negation, digression, and irony, these are the figures of style (Quintilian's *figurae sententiarum*), just as catachresis, litotes, antonomasia, and hypotyposis are the tropes, whose names strike me as the most appropriate ones with which to label these mechanisms. Can one see here mere manners of speaking, when it is the figures themselves that are at work in the rhetoric of the discourse the analysand actually utters?

By obstinately characterizing resistance as having an emotional permanence, thereby making it foreign to discourse, contemporary psychoanalysts simply show that they have succumbed to one of the fundamental truths Freud rediscovered through psychoanalysis. Which is that we cannot confine ourselves to giving a new truth its rightful place, for the point is to take up our place in it. The truth requires us to go out of our way. We cannot do so by simply getting used to it. We get used to reality [*réel*]. The truth we repress.

Now it is especially necessary to the scholar, the sage, and even the quack, to be the only one who knows. The idea that deep within the simplest of souls—and, what's more, in the sickest—there is something ready to blossom is one thing. But that there may be someone who seems to know as much as them

about what we ought to make of it . . . come to our rescue yon categories of primitive, pre-logical, and archaic thought—nay, of magical thought, so convenient to attribute to others! It is not fitting that these country bumpkins should keep us breathless by posing enigmas to us that prove overly clever.

To interpret the unconscious as Freud did, one would have to be, as he was, an encyclopedia of the arts and muses, as well as an assiduous reader of
522 the *Fliegende Blätter*. And the task would become no easier were we to put ourselves at the mercy of a thread spun of allusions and quotations, puns and equivocations. Must we make a career out of "antidoted fanfreluches"?

Indeed, we must resolve to do so. The unconscious is neither the primordial nor the instinctual, and what it knows of the elemental is no more than the elements of the signifier.

The three books that one might call canonical with regard to the unconscious—the *Traumdeutung*, *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life*, and *Jokes (Witz) and their Relation to the Unconscious*—are but a web of examples whose development is inscribed in formulas for connection and substitution (though multiplied tenfold by their particular complexity, diagrams of them sometimes being provided by Freud outside the main body of the text), which are the formulas I give for the signifier in its *transference* function. For in the *Traumdeutung* it is in terms of such a function that the term *Übertragung*, or transference, which later gave its name to the mainspring of the intersubjective link between analysand and analyst, is introduced.

Such diagrams are not solely constitutive in neurosis of each of the symptoms, but they alone allow us to encompass the thematic of its course and resolution—as the major case histories provided by Freud demonstrate admirably.

To fall back on a more limited fact, but one that is more manageable as it provides a final seal with which to close these remarks, I will cite the 1927 article on fetishism and the case Freud reports there of a patient for whom sexual satisfaction required a certain shine on the nose (*Glanz auf der Nase*).[23] The analysis showed that he owed it to the fact that his early English-speaking years had displaced the burning curiosity that attached him to his mother's phallus—that is, to that eminent want-to-be, whose privileged signifier Freud revealed—into a "glance at the nose,"* rather than a "shine on the nose"* in the forgotten language [*langue*] of his childhood.

It was the abyss, open to the thought that a thought might make itself heard in the abyss, that gave rise to resistance to psychoanalysis from the outset—
523 not the emphasis on man's sexuality, as is commonly said. The latter is the object that has clearly predominated in literature throughout the ages. And the evolution of psychoanalysis has succeeded by a comical stroke of magic in turning it into a moral instance, the cradle and waiting area of oblativity

and attraction. The soul's Platonic steed, now blessed and enlightened, goes straight to heaven.

The intolerable scandal when Freudian sexuality was not yet holy was that it was so "intellectual." It was in this respect that it showed itself to be the worthy stooge of all those terrorists whose plots were going to ruin society.

At a time when psychoanalysts are busy refashioning a right-thinking psychoanalysis, whose crowning achievement is the sociological poem of the "autonomous ego," I would like to say, to those who are listening to me, how they can recognize bad psychoanalysts: by the word they use to deprecate all research on technique and theory that furthers the Freudian experience in its authentic direction. That word is "intellectualization"—execrable to all those who, living in fear of putting themselves to the test by drinking the wine of truth, spit on men's bread, even though their spittle can never again have any effect but that of leavening.

III. The Letter, being, and the other

Is what thinks in my place, then, another ego? Does Freud's discovery represent the confirmation, at the level of psychological experience, of Manichaeism?[24]

There can, in fact, be no confusion on this point: what Freud's research introduced us to was not some more or less curious cases of dual personality. Even at the heroic era I have been describing—when, like animals in the age of fairy tales, sexuality spoke—the diabolical atmosphere that such an orientation might have given rise to never materialized.[25]

The goal Freud's discovery proposes to man was defined by Freud at the 524
height of his thought in these moving terms: *Wo Es war, soll Ich werden.* Where it was, I must come into being.

This goal is one of reintegration and harmony, I might even say of reconciliation [*Versöhnung*].

But if we ignore the self's radical eccentricity with respect to itself that man is faced with—in other words, the very truth Freud discovered—we will renege on both the order and pathways of psychoanalytic mediation; we will make of it the compromise operation that it has, in effect, become—precisely what both the spirit and letter of Freud's work most repudiate. For, since he constantly points out that compromise is behind all the miseries his analysis assuages, we can say that resorting to compromise, whether explicit or implicit, disorients all psychoanalytic action and plunges it into darkness.

But neither does it suffice to rub shoulders with the moralistic tartufferies of our time or to be forever spouting forth about the "total personality" in order to have said anything articulate about the possibility of mediation.

The radical heteronomy that Freud's discovery shows gaping within man can no longer be covered over without whatever tries to hide it being fundamentally dishonest.

Which other is this, then, to whom I am more attached than to myself [*moi*], since, at the most assented to heart of my identity to myself, he pulls the strings?

His presence can only be understood in an alterity raised to the second power, which already situates him in a mediating position in relation to my own splitting from myself, as if from a semblable.

If I have said that the unconscious is the Other's discourse (with a capital O), it is in order to indicate the beyond in which the recognition of desire is tied to the desire for recognition.

In other words, this other is the Other that even my lie invokes as a guarantor of the truth in which my lie subsists.

Here we see that the dimension of truth emerges with the appearance of language.

Prior to this point, we have to admit the existence—in the psychological relation, which can be precisely isolated in the observation of animal behav-
525 ior—of subjects, not because of some projective mirage, it being the psychologist's vacuous watchword to hack this phantom to pieces, but because of the manifested presence of intersubjectivity. In the animal hidden in his lookout, in the well-laid trap, in the straggler ruse by which a runaway separated from the flock throws a raptor off the scent, something more emerges than in the fascinating erection of display or combat. Yet there is nothing here that transcends the function of a lure in the service of a need, or that affirms a presence in that beyond-the-veil where the whole of Nature can be questioned about its design.

For the question to even arise (and we know that it arose for Freud in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*), there must be language.

For I can lure my adversary with a movement that runs counter to my battle plan, and yet this movement has its deceptive effect only insofar as I actually make it for my adversary.

But in the proposals by which I initiate peace negotiations with him, what my negotiations propose is situated in a third locus which is neither my speech nor my interlocutor.

This locus is nothing but the locus of signifying convention, as is seen in the comedy of the distressed complaint of the Jew to his pal: "Why are you telling me you are going to Cracow so I'll believe you are going to Lemberg, when you really are going to Cracow?"

Of course the aforementioned flock-movement can be understood in the

conventional register of a game's strategy, where it is on the basis of a rule that I deceive my adversary; but here my success is assessed as connoting betrayal—that is, it is assessed in the relationship to the Other who is the guarantor of Good Faith.

Here the problems are of an order whose heteronomy is simply ignored if it is reduced to some "awareness of others," or whatever people choose to call it. For the "existence of the other" having, not long ago, reached the ears of Midas, the psychoanalyst, through the partition that separates him from the phenomenologists' confabs, the news is now being whispered through the reeds: "Midas, King Midas, is the other of his patient. He himself said so." 526

What sort of breakthrough is that? The other—which other?

Which other was the young André Gide aiming at when he defied the landlady, in whose care his mother had placed him, to treat him as a responsible being by unlocking right in front of her—with a key that was fake only insofar as it opened all locks of the same kind—the lock that she herself considered to be the worthy signifier of her educational intentions? Was it she who would later intervene and to whom the child would laughingly say: "Do you really think a lousy padlock can ensure my obedience?" But by simply remaining out of sight and waiting until that evening before lecturing the kid, after giving him a suitably cold reception upon his return home, it was not simply a female other whose angry face she showed him, but another André Gide, one who was no longer really sure, either then or even later when he thought back on it, what he had wanted to do—who had been changed right down to his very truth by the doubt cast on his good faith.

Perhaps it would be worth dwelling on this realm of confusion—which is simply that in which the whole human *opera buffa* is played out—to understand the pathways by which analysis proceeds, not only to restore order here but also to instate the conditions for the possibility of its restoration.

Kern unseres Wesen, "the core of our being"—it is not so much that Freud commands us to target this, as so many others before him have done with the futile adage "Know thyself," as that he asks us to reconsider the pathways that lead to it.

Or, rather, the "this" which he proposes we attain is not a this which can be the object of knowledge, but a this—doesn't he say as much?—which constitutes my being and to which, as he teaches us, I bear witness as much and more in my whims, aberrations, phobias, and fetishes, than in my more or less civilized personage.

Madness, you are no longer the object of the ambiguous praise with which the sage furnished the impregnable burrow of his fear. And if he is, after all, not so badly ensconced there, it is because the supreme agent at work since

time immemorial, digging its tunnels and maze, is reason itself, the same Logos he serves.

Then how do you explain the fact that a scholar like Erasmus, with so little talent for the "commitments" that solicited him in his age, as in any other,
527 could hold such an eminent place in the revolution brought about by a Reformation in which man has as much of a stake in each man as in all men?

It is by touching, however lightly, on man's relation to the signifier—in this case, by changing the procedures of exegesis—that one changes the course of his history by modifying the moorings of his being.

It is precisely in this respect that anyone capable of glimpsing the changes we have lived through in our own lives can see that Freudianism, however misunderstood it has been and however nebulous its consequences have been, constitutes an intangible but radical revolution. There is no need to go seeking witnesses to the fact:[26] everything that concerns not just the human sciences, but the destiny of man, politics, metaphysics, literature, the arts, advertising, propaganda—and thus, no doubt, economics—has been affected by it.

But is this anything more than the dissonant effects of an immense truth where Freud has traced a pure path? It must be said here that a technique that takes advantage of the psychological categorization alone of its object is not following this path, as is the case of contemporary psychoanalysis apart from a return to the Freudian discovery.

Thus the vulgarity of the concepts by which its practice shows its mettle, the embroidery of Freudery [*fofreudisme*] which is now mere decoration, and what must be called the discredit in which it prospers, together bear witness to the fundamental repudiation of that discovery.

Through his discovery, Freud brought the border between object and being that seemed to mark the limits of science within its ambit.

This is the symptom of and prelude to a reexamination of man's situation
528 in the midst of beings [*dans l'étant*], as all the postulates of knowledge have heretofore assumed it to be—but please don't be content to classify the fact that I am saying so as a case of Heideggerianism, even prefixed by a "neo-" that adds nothing to the trashy style by which it is common to spare oneself any reflection with the quip, "Separate that out for me from its mental jetsam."

When I speak of Heidegger, or rather when I translate him, I strive to preserve the sovereign signifierness of the speech he proffers.

If I speak of the letter and being, if I distinguish the other from the Other, it is because Freud suggests them to me as the terms to which resistance and transference effects refer—effects against which I have had to wage unequal battle in the twenty years that I have been engaged in the practice that we all,

repeating after Freud, call impossible: that of psychoanalysis. It is also because I must help others avoid losing their way there.

It is to prevent the field they have inherited from falling fallow, and to that end to convey that if the symptom is a metaphor, it is not a metaphor to say so, any more than it is to say that man's desire is a metonymy. For the symptom *is* a metaphor, whether one likes to admit it or not, just as desire *is* a metonymy, even if man scoffs at the idea.

Thus, if I am to rouse you to indignation over the fact that, after so many centuries of religious hypocrisy and philosophical posturing, no one has yet validly articulated what links metaphor to the question of being and metonymy to its lack, something of the object of this indignation must still be there—something that, as both instigator and victim, corresponds to it: namely, the man of humanism and the irremediably contested debt he has incurred against his intentions.

T.t.y.e.m.u.p.t.
May 14–26, 1957

Related to this article is a presentation I made on April 23, 1960, to the Philosophical Society regarding the paper Mr. Perelman gave there on his theory of metaphor as a rhetorical function—found in his *Traité de l'argumentation.*

My presentation is included as an appendix (Appendix II) in this volume [*Écrits* 1966].

Notes

1. *Codice Atlantico*, 145. r. a., trans. Louise Servicen (Paris: Gallimard), vol. II, 400.

2. The theme was "Psychoanalysis and the sciences of man."

3. The talk took place on May 9, 1957, in the Descartes Amphitheater at the Sorbonne, and discussion continued afterward over drinks.

4. "Die Frage der Laienanalyse," *GW* XIV, 281–83.

5. This point—so useful in overturning the concept of "psychological function," which obscures everything related to the matter—becomes clear as day in the purely linguistic analysis of the two major forms of aphasia classified by one of the leaders of modern linguistics, Roman Jakobson. See the most accessible of his works (coauthored by Morris Halle), *Fundamentals of Language* ('s Gravenhage and New York: Mouton, 1956), part II, chapters 1 to 4; see too the collection of translations into French of his works that we owe to Nicolas Ruwet, *Essais de linguistique générale* (Paris: Minuit, 1963).

6. Recall that discussion about the need for a new language in communist society really did take place, and that Stalin, much to the relief of those who lent credence to his philosophy, put an end to it as follows: language is not a superstructure.

7. By "linguistics" I mean the study of existing languages [*langues*] as regards their structure and the laws they reveal; this does not include the theory of abstract codes (incorrectly placed under the heading of communication theory), so-called information theory (originating in physics), or any more

or less hypothetically generalized semiology.

8. Cf. St. Augustine's *De Magistro*; I analyzed the chapter "De significatione locutionis" in my seminar on June 23, 1954.

9. Thus I. A. Richards, author of a book about procedures appropriate for reaching this objective, shows us their application in another book. He selects for his purposes a page from Meng Tzu (Mencius, to the Jesuits) and calls the piece *Mencius on the Mind*, given its object. The guarantees provided of the purity of the experiment are nothing compared to the luxury of the approaches employed. And the man of letters, an expert on the traditional Canon that contains the text, is met right on the spot in Peking where our demonstration-model wringer has been transported, regardless of the cost.

But we will be no less transported, though less expensively, upon witnessing the transformation of a bronze, which gives off bell-tones at the slightest contact with thought, into a rag with which to wipe clean the slate of the most depressing British psychologism. And not, alas, without quickly identifying it with the author's own brain—all that remains of his object or of him after he has exhausted the meaning [*sens*] of the one and the common sense of the other.

10. It is in this respect that verbal hallucination, when it takes this form, sometimes opens a door that communicates with the Freudian structure of psychosis—a door which was hitherto missed since it went unnoticed (see my Seminar from 1955–1956).

11. I did so on June 6, 1956, taking as an example the first scene of *Athaliah*, incited, I confess, by an allusion—made in passing by a highbrow* critic in *The New Statesman and Nation*—to the "supreme bitchery" of Racine's heroines, designed to dissuade us from making reference to Shakespeare's savage tragedies, which has become compulsory in analytic circles where such references serve to whitewash the vulgarity of Philistinism.

12. (Added in 1966:) The publication by Jean Starobinski, in *Le Mercure de France* (February 1964), of the notes left by Saussure on anagrams and their hypogrammatical use, from the Saturnine verses to the writings of Cicero, provide the corroboration I didn't have at the time.

13. I pay homage here to what this formulation owes to Roman Jakobson, that is, to his written work, in which a psychoanalyst can always find something to structure his own experience, and which renders superfluous the "personal communications" that I could tout as much as anyone else.

Indeed, one can recognize in such oblique forms of allegiance the style of that immortal couple, Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, who are a set that cannot be broken up, not even by the imperfection of their destiny, for it lasts by the same method as Jeannot's knife, and for the very reason for which Goethe praised Shakespeare for presenting the character in their doublet: all by themselves they are the whole *Gesellschaft*, Society in a nutshell (*Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre*, Vol. 5, ed. Trunz [Hamburg: Christian Wegner Verlag], 299)—I mean the International Psychoanalytical Association.

> (We should extract the whole passage from Goethe: Dieses leise Auftreten, dieses Schmiegen und Biegen, dies Jasagen, Streicheln und Schmeicheln, dieses Behendigkeit, dies Schwänzein, diese Allheit und Leerheit, diese rechtliche Schurkerei, diese Unfähigleit, wie kann sie durch einen Menschen ausgedruckt werden? Es sollten ihrer wenigstens ein Dutzend sein, wenn man sie haben könnte; denn sie bloss in Gesellschaft etwas, sie sind die Gesellschaft.)

Let us be grateful, in this context, to the author of "Some Remarks on the Role of Speech in Psycho-Analytic Technique" (*IJP* XXXVII, 6 [1956]: 467) for taking the trouble to point out that his remarks are "based on" work by him that dates back to 1952. This no doubt explains why he has assimilated nothing of the work published since then, but which he is nevertheless aware of since he cites me as its publisher (*sic*. I know what "editor"* means).

14. *Esprit* is clearly the equivalent of the German *Witz* with which Freud marked the aim of his third fundamental book on the unconscious. The far greater difficulty of finding an equivalent in English is instructive: "wit," weighed down by a discussion running from

Davenant and Hobbes to Pope and Addison, left its essential virtues to "humor," which is something else. The only other choice is "pun," but its meaning is too narrow.

15. Leo Strauss, *Persecution and the Art of Writing* (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1957).

16. See the correspondence, in particular, letters 107 and 119 selected by its editors.

17. This is the procedure by which a study ensures results through a mechanical exploration of the entire extent of its object's field.

18. (Added in 1966:) By referring only to the development of the organism, the typology neglects the structure in which the subject is caught up in fantasy, the drive, and sublimation, respectively. I am currently developing the theory of this structure.

19. The sign $\cong$ designates congruence.

20. Since S′ designates, in this context, the term that produces the signifying effect (or signifierness), one can see that the term is latent in metonymy and patent in metaphor.

21. Things are altogether different if—in raising a question like "Why are there philosophers?"—I become more candid than usual, since I am raising not only a question that philosophers have been asking themselves since time immemorial, but also the one in which they are perhaps the most interested.

22. (Added in December 1968:) This and the next paragraph were rewritten solely to achieve greater clarity of expression.

23. "Fetischismus," *GW* XIV, 311.

24. One of my colleagues went as far as this thought in wondering if the id (*Es*) of Freud's last doctrine wasn't in fact the "bad ego." (Added in 1966:) You see the kind of people I had to work with.

25. Note, nevertheless, the tone with which people spoke in that period of the impish pranks of the unconscious: *Der Zufall und die Koboldstreiche des Unbewussten* ("Chance and the Impish Pranks of the Unconscious"), one of Silberer's titles, which would be absolutely anachronistic in the present context of soul-managers.

26. I'll highlight the most recent in what flowed quite smoothly from François Mauriac's pen, in the *Figaro littéraire* on May 25, by way of an apology for refusing "to tell us his life story." If one can no longer undertake to do this with the old enthusiasm, the reason, he tells us, is that, "for half a century, Freud, whatever we may think of him," has left his mark there. And after briefly yielding to the received idea that it would be to submit to the "history of our body," Mauriac quickly returns to what his writer's sensibility could not help but let slip out: our discourse, in endeavoring to be complete, would publish the deepest confessions of the souls of all our loved ones.

THE PSYCHOSES

The Seminar of Jacques Lacan

Edited by Jacques-Alain Miller

BOOK III 1955–1956

Translated with notes by
Russell Grigg



ROUTLEDGE

Originally published in French as *Le Seminaire, Livre III, Les Psychoses*
by Editions du Seuil, Paris 1981

First published in English translation in 1993
Published in the US by W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., New York

Published in the UK in 1993 by Routledge
11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE

English translation © W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1993

Printed and bound in Great Britain by
Mackays of Chatham, PLC, Chatham, Kent

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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

ISBN 0-415-10183-2

XVII

Metaphor and metonymy (I): "His sheaf was neither miserly nor spiteful"[1]

THE TRUTH OF THE FATHER
THE INVASION BY THE SIGNIFIER
SYNTAX AND METAPHOR
WERNICKE'S APHASIA

Sie leben also den Wahn wie sich selbst. Das ist das Geheimnis. This sentence is taken from the correspondence with Fliess,[2] where the beginnings of the themes that will appear successively in Freud's work can be found with singular prominence.

Would we have Freud's style if we didn't have these letters? Yes, we still would, but they teach us that this style, which is nothing other than the expression of what orientates and animates his research, never deviated. Even in 1939, when he wrote *Moses and Monotheism,* one feels that his passionate questioning hasn't waned and that it's still with the same almost desperate tenacity that he strives to explain how it is that man, in the very position of his being, should be so dependent upon these things for which he is obviously not cut out. This is said and named – it's a question of the truth.

I reread *Moses and Monotheism* with the intention of preparing for the paper I have been asked to give in two weeks time on the person of Freud.[3] It seems to me that in this work we find confirmation yet again of what I'm here trying to make you feel, namely that analysis is absolutely inseparable from a fundamental question about the way truth enters into the life of man. The dimension of truth is mysterious, inexplicable, nothing decisively enables the necessity of it to be grasped, since man accommodates himself to non-truth perfectly well. I shall try to show you that this is indeed the question that is troubling Freud to the end in *Moses and Monotheism.*

In this little book one senses a gesture of renunciation and a hidden face. Having accepted death, he continues. The renewed questioning over the person of Moses, over his hypothetical fear, has no other motive than to answer this question – by what path does the dimension of truth enter in a living

[1] *"Sa gerbe n'était point avare, ni haineuse,"* Victor Hugo, *Booz endormi.*

[2] "Thus they love *their delusion as they love themselves.* That is the secret." "Draft H," Freud-Fliess, 111; Origins, 113. See above, chap. 11, p. 157.

[3] See below, chap. 19.

way into life, into the economy of man? Freud's answer is that it's mediated by the ultimate meaning of the idea of the father.

The father belongs to a reality that is sacred in itself, more spiritual than any other, since ultimately nothing in lived reality strictly speaking points to his function, his presence, his dominance. How does the truth of the father, how does this truth that Freud himself calls spiritual,[4] come to be placed in the foreground? The thing is thinkable only by means of this ahistorical drama, inscribed in the very flesh of men at the origin of all history – the death, the murder of the father. A myth, obviously, a very mysterious myth, one impossible to avoid in the coherence of Freud's thought. There is something veiled here.

All the work we did last year meets at this point – one can't deny the inevitability of Freud's intuition. Ethnographic criticisms are beside the point. It's a question of an essential dramatization through which an internal movement going beyond the human being enters into life – the symbol of the father.

The nature of the symbol remains to be clarified. We have come close to its essence by locating its genesis at the same point as that of the death instinct. We are expressing one and the same thing. We are moving towards a point of convergence – what does the signifier essentially signify in its signifying role? What is the original and initiatory function, in human life, of the existence of the symbol qua pure signifier?

This question takes us back to our study of the psychoses.

1

The sentence I have written on the blackboard is typical of Freud's style and I give it to you so that we may continue to hear its resonances.

In this letter Freud speaks of the different types of defence. The word has been so overused in our usage that we cannot help but wonder – who is defending himself? What is being defended? What is one defending oneself against? In psychoanalysis defence is directed against a mirage, a nothingness, a void, and not against anything that exists and carries weight in life. This latter enigma is veiled by the phenomenon itself even as we apprehend it. This letter shows us for the first time, in an especially clear way, the various mechanisms of the neuroses and the psychoses.

Nevertheless, when he comes to psychosis it's as if Freud has been struck by a more profound enigma. He says – *As for those suffering from paranoia, delusions, psychosis, they love their delusion as they love themselves.*

[4] See "The Advance in Intellectuality," section C, pt. 2, essay 3, *Moses and Monotheism*, SE 23:111–15. Freud's *"geistigkeit,"* "intellectuality" in SE, is translated by Lacan as *"spiritualité."*

There is an echo here, which should be given full weight, of what is said in the commandment, *Love thy neighbor as thyself.*

A sense of mystery is never absent from Freud's thought. It's its beginning, middle, and end. I believe that if we allow it to vanish, we lose what's essential to the very procedure upon which every analysis has to be founded. If we lose the mystery for one single moment we get lost in a new type of mirage.

Freud had the profound impression that something in the psychotic's relationship to his delusion goes beyond the workings of the signified and meanings, the workings of what we would later call *id* drives. There is an affection here, an attachment, an essential bringing to presence, the mystery of which remains almost total for us, which is that the delusional, the psychotic, clings to his delusion as to something which is himself.

With this resonance in our ears we shall once again raise the question raised last time concerning the economic function that the relationship to language assumes in the form and development of psychosis.

Let us start by taking as our data the sentences that Schreber tells us he hears coming from those intermediate beings, diverse in their nature – the forecourts of Heaven, the deceased souls or the blessed souls, these shadows, these ambiguous forms of beings dispossessed of existence and carriers of voices.

The full part of the sentence, which contains the kernel-words, as the linguists say, which give the sentence its sense, is not experienced as hallucinatory. On the contrary, the voice stops, forcing the subject to utter the meaning in question in the sentence.

Now it's time . . . that he was subdued![5] Here it's the implied expression that carries the significant weight. Our subject signifies to us that he is not hallucinating. He is placed in the overhang [*porte à faux*], in what remains empty after the grammatical or syntactic part of the sentence, consisting of auxiliaries, connectives, conjunctions, or adverbs, which is suddenly verbalized, as coming from without, as a sentence by the other. It's a sentence by this subject, who is both empty and full, whom I have named the inter-I of delusion.

Now that is going too far according to the conception of the souls. The entire function of this conception of the souls resides in what, according to Schreber, is put into words by somewhat higher agencies than the subjects that convey the refrains, learned by rote, made up of words he considers empty. It alludes to functional notions that decompose his various thoughts. A psychology does indeed have a place within his delusion, a dogmatic psychology

[5] I.e., "He must be done now." Mem, 311 n.114; see also Mem, 217–18.

that is expounded to him by the voices that interpellate him, by explaining to him how his thoughts are formed.

In particular, that which is implied has assumed a hallucinatory form and is not expressed out loud in the hallucination. This is the *principal thought.* The subject's delusional lived experience presents its own essence in the phenomenon. It indicates that the hallucinatory phenomenon lived through, whether elementary or not, lacks the principal thought. *We rays lack thought,* that is, that which signifies something.

With respect to what we might call the chain of the delusion, the subject seems to be both agent and patient. He undergoes rather than organizes the delusion. To be sure, as a finished product this delusion can up to a point be described as reasoning madness, in the sense that in certain respects its articulation is logical, though from a secondary point of view. That madness should achieve a synthesis of this nature is no less a problem than its very existence. It takes place over the course of a genesis that starts from elements perhaps immanent to [*gros de*] this construction, but which in their original form present themselves as closed or even enigmatic.

First there were several months of prepsychotic incubation in which the subject was in a state of profound confusion. This is the period in which the phenomena of the twilight of the world occur, which are characteristic of the beginning of a delusional period. Towards the middle of March 1894 he was admitted to Flechsig's clinic. In mid-November '93 the hallucinatory phenomena began, the spoken communications which he attributes to different grades in this fantasmatic world, consisting of two levels of divine reality, the anterior and posterior realms of God, and of all sorts of entities that are in a more or less advanced stage of reabsorption into this divine reality.

These entities, the souls, move in an opposite direction to what he calls the *world order,* a fundamental notion in the structuring of his delusion. Instead of moving towards the reintegration of the absolute Other, they move on the contrary in the direction of attaching themselves onto him, Schreber, in forms that vary over the delusion's course of development. At the outset we see the phenomenon of introjection expressed openly, in his lived experience, when he says that Flechsig's soul enters him here and that it resembles the threads of a spider's web, that it's big enough to be unassimilable by him, and that it comes out again through his mouth.[6] Here we have a sort of lived schema of introjection, which will become attenuated later on, be polished into a much more spiritualized form.

In fact Schreber will become increasingly integrated into this ambiguous speech with which he becomes as one, and to which, with all his being, he

[6] Mem, 82–83.

gives a response. He literally loves it like himself. This phenomenon can hardly be described as an internal dialogue since it's precisely around the existence of the other that the meaning of the preeminence of the signifying game revolves, increasingly emptied of meaning.

What is the meaning of this invasion by the signifier that tends to drain itself of signified as it occupies more and more place in the libidinal relation and invests all the moments, all the desires, of the subject?

I paused at a series of those repetitive texts, which it would be tedious to unfold for you here. Something struck me – even when the sentences may have a meaning, one never encounters anything that resembles a metaphor.

But what is a metaphor?

2

I am introducing you here to an order of inquiry never pointed out.

Metaphor is not the easiest thing in the world to speak about. Bossuet says it's an abridged simile [*comparaison*]. Everyone is aware that this is not entirely satisfactory, and I believe that in fact no poet would accept it. I say *no poet* because a definition of poetical style could be to say that it begins with metaphor, and that where metaphor ceases poetry ceases also.

His sheaf was neither miserly nor spiteful – Victor Hugo. That's a metaphor. It's certainly not a latent simile, it's not – *just as* the sheaf was willingly dispersed among the needy, *so* our character was neither miserly nor spiteful. There's not a comparison but an identification. The dimension of metaphor must be less difficult for us to enter than for anyone else, provided that we recognize that what we usually call it is identification. But that's not all – our use of the term *symbolic* in fact leads us to restrict its sense, to designate only the metaphorical dimension of the symbol.

Metaphor presupposes that a meaning is the dominant datum and that it deflects, commands, the use of the signifier to such an extent that the entire species of preestablished, I should say lexical, connections comes undone. Nothing in any dictionary usage can suggest for one instant that a sheaf is capable of being miserly, and even less of being spiteful. And yet it's clear that the use of a language is only susceptible to meaning once it's possible to say, *His sheaf was neither miserly nor spiteful*, that is to say, once the meaning has ripped the signifier from its lexical connections.

Here we have the ambiguity of the signifier and the signified. Without the signifying structure, that is, without predicative articulation, without the distance maintained between the subject and its attributes, the sheaf cannot be qualified as miserly or spiteful. It's because there is a syntax, a primordial order of the signifier, that the subject is maintained as separate, as different from its qualities. It's completely out of the question that an animal could

create a metaphor, even though we have no reason to think that it doesn't also have an intuition of what is generous and what can easily and abundantly grant it what it desires. But insofar as it doesn't possess the articulation, the discursive – which is not just meaning, with all that this entails about attraction and repulsion, but an alignment of signifiers – metaphor is unthinkable within the animal psychology of attraction, appetite, and desire.

This phase of symbolism that is expressed in metaphor presupposes similarity, which is exhibited uniquely by position. It's by virtue of being the subject of *miserly* and *spiteful* that the sheaf can be identified with Booz in his lack of avarice and in his generosity. It's by virtue of the similarity of position that the sheaf is literally identical to the subject Booz. This dimension of similarity is, surely, the most striking thing about the significant use of language, which so dominates the apprehension of the workings of symbolism as to mask from us the existence of the other dimension, the syntactic. However, this sentence would lose all sense if we disturbed the word order.

This is what gets neglected when symbolism is discussed – the dimension linked to the signifier's existence, its organization.

3

What, on this basis, cannot fail to occur to one, and which occurred to a linguist friend of mine, Roman Jakobson, is that the distribution of certain disorders known as aphasias can be reconsidered in the light of the opposition between on the one hand the relations of similarity, or substitution, or choice, and also of selection or concurrence, in short, all that is of the order of synonymy, and on the other hand the relations of contiguity, alignment, signifying articulation, syntactic coordination.[7] From this perspective the classical opposition between sensory and motor aphasia, which has been criticized for a long time, becomes strikingly coordinated.

You are all familiar with Wernicke's aphasia. The aphasic links together a sequence of sentences of an extraordinarily developed grammatical nature. He will say – *Yes, I understand. Yesterday, when I was up there, already he said, and I wanted, I said to him, that's not it, the date, not exactly, not that one . . .*

The subject thereby demonstrates complete mastery of everything articulated, organized, subordinated, and structured in the sentence, but what he says is always wide of what he wants to say. Not for an instant can you be in any doubt that what he wants to say is present, but he never manages to give verbal incarnation to what he is aiming at in the sentence. He constructs

[7] See Roman Jakobson, "Two Aspects of Language and Two Types of Aphasic Disturbances."

around it an entire fringe of syntactic verbalization, the complexity and level of organization of which are far from indicating a loss of attention to language. But if you ask him for a definition, an equivalent term, even without wanting to go so far as a metaphor, if you confront him with the use of language that logic calls metalanguage, or language about language, he can't follow you.

There's no question of making the slightest comparison between a disorder of this type and what happens to our psychotics. But when Schreber hears *Factum est,* which then stops, a phenomenon certainly manifests itself here at the level of the relations of contiguity. The relations of contiguity dominate, following the absence or failure of the function of meaningful equivalence by means of similarity.

We, too, have to take account of this striking analogy by introducing an opposition under the two rubrics of similarity and contiguity into what happens in hallucinatory delusional subjects. One could not make the dominance of contiguity in hallucinatory phenomena more evident than by pointing out the effect of interrupted speech – and of interrupted speech precisely as it's given, that is, as invested and, let's say, libidinized. What imposes itself on the subject is the grammatical part of the sentence, the one that exists only by virtue of its signifying character and by being articulated. This is what becomes a phenomenon imposed within the external world.

The aphasic I was speaking of is incapable of coming to the point. Hence an apparently empty discourse, which, curiously, even in the most experienced subjects, in neurologists, always sets off nervous laughter. Here you have this character who employs enormous, extraordinarily articulate bla-bla-bla, but who can never get to the heart of what he has to communicate. The imbalance in the phenomenon of contiguity that comes to the fore in the hallucinatory phenomenon, and around which the whole delusion is organized, is not unlike this.

Typically, it's always the signified that we draw attention to in our analyses, because it's undoubtedly what is the most seductive, and it's what at first sight appears to be the true dimension of symbolic investigation by psychoanalysis. But in misrecognizing the primordial mediating role of the signifier, in misrecognizing that it's the signifier that in reality is the guiding thread, not only do we throw the original understanding of neurotic phenomena, the interpretation of dreams itself, out of balance, but we make ourselves absolutely incapable of understanding what is happening in the psychoses.

While a later part of analytic investigation, one concerning identification and symbolism, is on the side of metaphor, let's not neglect the other side, that of articulation and contiguity, with what is here sketched out that is initial and structuring in the notion of causality. The rhetorical form that is the opposite of metaphor has a name – it's called metonymy. It involves

substitution for something that has to be named – we are in fact at the level of the name. One thing is named by another that is its container, or its part, or that is connected to it.

If, using the technique of verbal association as it's practiced at the level of the laboratory, you give a subject a word like *hut,* he has more than one way to respond. Certain responses will be in the register of contiguity. *Hut – Burn it.* Also, the subject may say *hovel* or *cabin* to you – there we already have the synonymous equivalent, a little bit further on we move into metaphor, in saying – *burrow,* for example. But there is also another register. If for example the subject says *thatch,* no longer is it quite the same thing. It's a part of the hut that enables it to be designated as a whole – it's possible at a pinch to talk of a village composed of three thatches, to mean three little houses. Here it's a question of evoking. The subject may also say *dirtiness* or *poverty.* We no longer have metaphor, we have metonymy.

The opposition between metaphor and metonymy is fundamental, since what Freud originally drew attention to in the mechanisms of neurosis, as well as in the mechanisms of the marginal phenomena of normal life or of dreams, is neither the metaphorical dimension nor identification. It's the contrary. In general what Freud calls condensation is what in rhetoric one calls metaphor, what he calls displacement is metonymy. The structuration, the lexical existence of the entire signifying apparatus, is determinant for the phenomena present in neurosis, since the signifier is the instrument by which the missing signified expresses itself. It's for this reason that in focusing attention back onto the signifier we are doing nothing other than returning to the starting point of the Freudian discovery.

Next week we shall return to this question by studying why in psychosis these workings of the signifier end up totally preoccupying the subject. The issue in this case is not the mechanism of aphasia — it's a certain relationship to the other as lacking, deficient. It's by proceeding from the subject's relation to the signifier and to the other, with the different levels of otherness, imaginary other and symbolic Other, that we can articulate this psychical intrusion, this invasion by the signifier, called psychosis.

2 May 1956

XVIII

Metaphor and metonymy (II): Signifying articulation and transference of the signified

SENSORY APHASIA AND MOTOR APHASIA

THE POSITIONAL LINK

ALL LANGUAGE IS METALANGUAGE

DETAIL AND DESIRE

In introducing the opposition between similarity and contiguity here, I'm not saying that I consider that psychosis is in any way comparable to aphasia.

I would say more than this. What I retain from the two levels of disorder that have been distinguished in aphasia is that there is the same opposition between them as the one that appears, no longer in a negative but in a positive way, in metaphor and metonymy.

I was told that this opposition had thrown some of you into great perplexity, and that you have been telling yourselves – *Metaphor has indeed shown us the importance of opposition, disagreement, and confusion.*

The opposition between signifier and signified isn't a simple substitute for the famous and no less inextricable opposition between idea, or thought, and word. Someone, an outstanding grammarian, has written a remarkable work in which there is only one fault, its unfortunate subtitle, *Words for thought.*[1] This way of putting it is, I hope, no longer sustainable for any of you.

1

We clearly show the constant life of metaphor in these transferences of signified, an example of which I gave you last time with *His sheaf was neither miserly nor spiteful.*

Here you have an example of metaphor. One may say, in a sense, that meaning dominates everything, that it's all of a sudden the meaning that imprints on the subject, *his sheaf*, this value that shows it generously dispersing itself, as if of its own accord. However, the signifier and the signified are always in a relationship that may be described as dialectical.

This isn't a rehash of the relation upon which the notion of expression

[1] *"Des mots à la pensée":* the subtitle of Damourette and Pichon, *Essai de grammaire.*

rests, where the thing, that which one refers to, is expressed by a word regarded as a label. My discourse is intended precisely to destroy this idea.

You must have heard aphasics spoken about, and you are aware of their extraordinarily lively and rapid, apparently fluid speech, at least up to a point. They express themselves admirably on a theme without being able to utter the word, while using an entire, extremely subtle syntactic articulation to get at something whose name or precise indicator they have on the tip of their tongue, but they are only capable of going round it in circles.

What is enthralling here is the persistence of the subject's intentionality despite this localized verbal impotence.

People have claimed to have brought out a kind of intellectual deficit of a predemential order as its correlative. This is a step forward which nuances the initial massive notion according to which it's a question of an incapacity to passively grasp verbal images, a step that indicates that the disorder is much more complex than appears at first sight. But whatever deficits the subject may display if we set him a specific task, according to the modes that characterize the position of the tests, nothing will be solved as long as we are ignorant of their mechanism and their origin.

One can see the subject protest against a reading of an observation that conveys a given precise historical detail, concerning a date, an hour, a form of behavior. This is when the subject trots out his discourse, however disturbed and jargonaphasic its character. Should he make a mistake, it's still in relation to a definite historical detail he possessed just five minutes earlier that he begins to enter the dialogue. Here one can grasp the presence and intensity of the intentionality at the heart of the deployment of discourse, which never manages to catch up with it again.

From the phenomenological viewpoint the sensory aphasic's language is a language of paraphrases. His jargonaphasia – the word is a bit too strong – is characterized by an abundance and ease of articulation and expression of sentences, however segmented they may ultimately become.

Paraphrase is the direct opposite of metaphrase, if by this is meant everything of the order of literal translation. This means that if you ask him to translate, to give a synonym, to repeat the same sentence, the same one he has just uttered, he can't do it. He is able to hook onto your discourse or onto his own, but he has the greatest difficulty in commenting on a discourse. You will get from him replies that are so lively, so pathetic in his desire to make himself heard, as to border on the comical. You have to be interested in the phenomenon itself if you are not to laugh.

Therefore, there is a similarity disorder here, which is that the subject is incapable of metaphrase, and what he has to say lies entirely within the domain of paraphrase.

Alongside sensory aphasia there is what is broadly called motor aphasia. It

ranges from disorders of agrammatism, well-known by now, to an extreme reduction of his stock of words – its immortal image is the famous *pencil* that he is unable to get out. This other dimension of aphasic deficit can be very well ranged within the order of contiguity disorders.

Here it's essentially the articulation, the syntax of language, which, progressively along the scale of cases and in the evolution of certain subjects, deteriorates to the point of making them incapable of articulating in a compound sentence what they are nevertheless able to name correctly. They retain the nominative capacity, but lose the propositional capacity. They are unable to construct propositions.

Owing to the properties of the signifier and the signified, the constant temptation to which linguists themselves, and *a fortiori* those who aren't linguists, succumb is to consider that it's what is the most obvious in the phenomenon that says it all.

Up to a point linguists have fallen victim to this illusion. The emphasis they place, for example, on metaphor, which has always been studied much more than metonymy, is proof of this. In full and living language it's what is the most gripping, but also the most problematical – how does it happen that language is at its most effective when it manages to say something by saying something else? It's enthralling indeed, and it's even thought that this is the way to the crux of the phenomenon of language, in opposition to a naive notion.

The naive notion has it that there is a superimposition, like a tracing, of the order of things onto the order of words. It's thought that a great step forward has been made by saying that the signified only ever reaches its goal via another signified, through referring to another meaning. This is only the first step, and one fails to see that a second is needed. It has to be realized that without structuring by the signifier no transference of sense would be possible.

A number of you rightly saw last time that this is what I meant in emphasizing the role of the signifier in metaphor.

2

The deficit, if we approach things from this angle, has two sides.

The first is the dissolution of the link between intentional meaning and the apparatus of signifiers. The latter is on the whole retained by the subject, who nevertheless fails to master it in relation to his intention. The second is the dissolution of the link internal to the signifier. Here the fact is emphasized that there is a sort of regressive decomposition, which is sufficiently well explained by the Jacksonian theory according to which functions decompose in the inverse order of their acquisition, not in development – language

isn't reducible to the ideally primary language of the infant – but through a veritable *turning*.[2]

For my part, is that what I wanted to emphasize?

I say – *No, it's not.* According to a type of general law of illusion concerning what goes on in language, it isn't what appears in the foreground that is important. What's important is the opposition between two sorts of links that are themselves internal to the signifier.

First, the positional link, which is the foundation of the link that I earlier called propositional. This is what in a given language sets up that essential dimension which is the order of words. To understand this it suffices to recall that in French *Pierre bat Paul* isn't equivalent to *Paul bat Pierre.*

Concerning the second form of aphasic disorders, notice the strict coherence there is between maintaining the positional function of language and maintaining an adequate stock of terms. This is an absolutely incontestable clinical phenomenon and shows us the fundamental binding of the signifier.

What appears at the grammatical level as characteristic of the positional link reappears at all levels and sets up the synchronic coexistence of terms.

The verbal locution is its highest form. At a lower level there is the word, which has the air of a stability that, as you know, has been rightly challenged. While the independence of the word manifests itself from certain angles, it can't be regarded as radical. The word can in no way be regarded as a unit of language, even though it constitutes a privileged elementary form. At an even lower level you find the phonematic oppositions or couplings which characterize the ultimate radical element that distinguishes one language from another.

In French for example *boue* and *pou* are opposed to one another, whatever your accent. Even if, because you live near a border, you tend to pronounce *boue* like *pou,* you will pronounce the other *pou* differently, because French is a language in which this opposition is valid. In other languages there are oppositions totally unknown in French. This binding of opposites is essential to the functioning of language. It must be distinguished from the link of similarity, implicated in the functioning of language, which is tied to the indefinite possibility of the function of substitution, which is conceivable only on the basis of the positional relation.

The mainspring of the metaphor isn't the meaning, which is supposed to be transposed from Booz onto the sheaf. I readily admit that someone might object to me that Booz's sheaf is metonymic, not metaphorical, and that underlying this magnificent poetry, and never named directly, there is Booz's royal penis. But that isn't what gives this sheaf its metaphorical quality, it's that the metaphor is placed in the position of subject, in Booz's place. It's a phenomenon of signifiers that is involved.

[2] In English in the original.

Let's move to the limit of poetic metaphor, which you wouldn't hesitate to describe as surrealist, even though we didn't have to wait for the surrealists to make metaphors. You are unable to say whether it makes sense or not. I won't say that this is the best way of putting things, but, in any case, it's near enough.

Take an expression that we can agree is indeed a metaphor. You will see whether it's the sense that sustains it.

Love is a pebble laughing in the sun .

What does this mean? It's indisputably a metaphor. It's likely enough that if it was born, it's because it contains a sense. As for finding one . . . I could do a whole seminar on it. This seems to me to be an indisputable definition of love, and I shall say that it's the last I paused at, because to me it appears indispensable if one wants to avoid falling endlessly into irremediable confusions.

In short, a metaphor is above all sustained by a positional articulation. This can be demonstrated even in its most paradoxical forms.

None of you has, I believe, failed to hear of the exercise that a poet of our day has carried out under the rubric of *Un mot pour un autre* [one word for another]. It's a little comedy in one act by Jean Tardieu. It concerns a dialogue between two women. One is announced, the other goes up to her and says:

My dear, my dearest, how many pebbles is it since I have had the apprentice to sugar you?

Alas, my dear, answers the other, *I myself have been extremely unvitreous, my three littlest oil-cakes,* etc.

This is confirmation that, even if it's in a paradoxical form, not only is the sense maintained, but that it tends to manifest itself in a particularly fortunate and metaphorical manner. It may be said that the sense is in some way renewed. Whatever effort the poet may have made to push it in the direction of a demonstration, one is at every instant a hair's breadth from a poetic metaphor. It belongs to a register that is no different from what arises as natural poetry as soon as a powerful meaning is involved.

The important thing isn't that the similarity should be sustained by the signified – we make this mistake all the time – it's that the transference of the signified is possible only by virtue of the structure of language. All language implies a metalanguage, it's already a metalanguage of its own register. It's because potentially all language is to be translated that it implies metaphrase and metalanguage, language speaking of language. The transference of the signified, so essential to human life, is possible only by virtue of the structure of the signifier.

Do get it into your heads that language is a system of positional coherence,

and secondly that this system reproduces itself within itself with an extraordinary, and frightful, fecundity.

It's not for nothing that the word *prolixity* is the same word as *proliferation*. *Prolixity* is the frightening word. All use of language incurs fright, which stops people and finds expression in the fear of intellectuality. *He intellectualizes too much,* people say. This serves as an alibi for the fear of language. In fact, you can observe that there is verbalism wherever one makes the error of granting too much weight to the signified, whereas it's by heading further in the direction of the independence of the signifier and the signified that all operations of logical construction adopt their full effect.

At least for the phenomena that interest us, one always falls into verbalism by further adhering to what I call the mythology of significance [*mythologie significative*]. Mathematics on the other hand uses a language of pure signifier, a metalanguage *par excellence*. It reduces language to its systematic function upon which another system is built, grasping the former in its articulation. The efficacity of this way of doing things isn't in doubt in its own register.

3

When one reads the rhetoricians, one realizes that they never get to an entirely satisfactory definition of metaphor, or of metonymy.

This results in, for example, the formula that metonymy is an impoverished metaphor. One might say that the thing is to be taken in exactly the opposite sense – metonymy exists from the beginning and makes metaphor possible. But metaphor belongs to a different level than metonymy.

Let's study the most primitive phenomena, and let's take an example that for us analysts is particularly alive. What is more primitive as the direct expression of a meaning – that is of a desire – than what Freud relates about his youngest little daughter, the one who has since occupied such an interesting place in analysis, Anna?

Anna Freud asleep – things are, you see, in their pure state – she talks in her sleep – *Big strawberries, raspberries, cakes, porridge.*[3]

There's something here that looks like the signified in its pure state. And it's the most schematic, the most fundamental form of metonymy. There's no doubt that she desires these strawberries, these raspberries. But it isn't self-evident that these objects should all be there together. The fact that they are there, juxtaposed, coordinated in this articulated naming is due to the positional function that places them in a situation of equivalence. This is the essential phenomenon.

[3] *Interpretation of Dreams,* SE 4:130.

If there is anything that shows indisputably that it's not purely and simply a question here of a phenomenon of expression that a psychology, say Jungian, could get us to see as an imaginary substitute for the object appealed to, it's precisely the fact that the sentence begins with what? With the name of the person, *Anna Freud*. She's an infant of nineteen months, and we are at the level of naming, of equivalence, of nominal coordination, of signifying articulation as such. It's only within this framework that the transference of meaning is possible.

This is the heart of Freud's thought. His work begins with the dream, its mechanisms of condensation and displacement, of figuration – these are all of the order of metonymic articulation, and it's on this foundation that metaphor is able to intervene.

It's even more apparent at the level of the erotization of language. If there is an order of acquisition, it's certainly not what makes it possible to say that children begin with such and such an element of the verbal stock rather than by some other. There is the greatest diversity. One doesn't take hold of language by one end, like certain painters who start their paintings at the left-hand corner. For language to be born, it must always already be grasped as a whole. On the other hand, for it to be able to be grasped as a whole, it has to be grasped at the outset by means of the signifier.

People speak of the concrete nature of language in children. This is something that, contrary to appearances, refers to contiguity. Someone recently confided to me what had been said by his child, a boy, who at the age of two and a half had grabbed his mother as she was leaning over him to say goodnight and said to her – *My big girl full of bottom and muscles.*

This language is obviously not the same as that of *His sheaf was neither miserly nor spiteful.* The child doesn't do that yet. Nor does he say that *love is a pebble laughing in the sun.* We are told that children understand surrealist and abstract poetry, which would be a return to childhood. This is stupid – children detest surrealist poetry and find repugnant certain stages of Picasso's painting. Why? Because they're not yet up to metaphor, but only metonymy. And when they do appreciate certain things in Picasso's paintings it's because metonymy is involved.

We can also see metonymy in certain passages in Tolstoy, where whenever a woman approaches you see the shadow of a fly, a spot on the upper lip, etc., emerge in place of her – the metonymic process of a great stylist. In general metonymy animates this style of creation called the realist style, as opposed to the symbolic style and to poetic language. The promotion of detail that characterizes it is no more realist than anything else. Only quite specific paths can make a detail the guide of the desiring function – not just any detail can be promoted as equivalent to the whole.

The proof of this is the trouble we go to to emphasize certain of these

details, through a series of significant transferences, in our experiments with mazes designed to bring out what we call the intelligence of animals. Call it intelligence if you wish – it's merely a question of definition. It's a matter of the extension of the field of the real in which we can include the animal with its current capacities of discrimination, provided that it's instinctually, libidinally, interested.

The supposed realism of describing the real by details is only conceivable in the register of an organized signifier, due to which, by virtue of the fact that the mother is *my big girl full of bottom and muscles*, the child will evolve in a certain way. It's clearly as a function of his early metonymic abilities that at a certain moment the bottom can become an equivalent of the mother for him. Whatever the sense by which we can conceive the sensitization on the vital level, it alters absolutely nothing in the problem.

It's on the basis of the metonymic articulation that this phenomenon is able to take place. The coordination of signifiers has to be possible before transferences of the signified are able to take place. The formal articulation of the signifier predominates with respect to transference of the signified.

How do we now raise the question of the repercussions on the function of language of disturbances in the relationship to the other? Just as metaphor and metonymy are opposed to one another, so the fundamental functions of speech are opposed to one another – foundational speech and passwords.

Why are they both fundamentally necessary? What distinguishes them? This is something that arises in relation to a third term. If it's necessary for man to use speech to make discoveries or to get his bearings, it's as a function of his natural propensity to decompose in the presence of the other.

In what way does he compose and recompose himself? We shall come back to this on another occasion, but in the phenomena that Schreber presents you can already grasp the use we can make of these categories.

I spoke to you last time of the interrupted sentences, but there is also question and reply. This has to be understood as having the value of being opposed to the dimension of foundational speech, where one doesn't ask the other for his opinion. The function of question and reply, insofar as it is given value through initiation into language and is its complement and its root, lays bare the signifying foundation of foundational speech in relation to what is profoundly significant in such speech. The delusional phenomenon lays bare, at all levels moreover, the signifying function as such.

I shall give you another example. You know these famous equivalences that the delusional Schreber gives as having been formulated by the birds from the sky parading in the twilight. One finds assonances here – *Santiago or Carthago, Chinesenthum or Jesum-Christum.*[4] Is the absurdity of this all that

[4] Mem, 210.

is to be retained? What strikes Schreber is the fact that the birds from the sky are brainless. On this Freud is in no doubt – they are young girls.[5]

But what's important isn't the assonance, it's the term-by-term correspondence between closely neighboring elements of discrimination, which only have importance for a polyglot like Schreber within the linguistic system of German.

Schreber, with all his perspicacity, once again shows that what is being sought is of the order of the signifier, that is, of phonematic coordination. The Latin word *Jesum-Christum* here is, as we know, an equivalent of *Chinesenthum* only insofar as in German the ending *tum* has a particular sound quality.

Promoting the signifier as such, the emergence of this always hidden substructure that is metonymy, is the condition of any possible investigation of the functional disorders of language in neurosis and psychosis.

9 May 1956

[5] "Case of Paranoia," SE 12:36.

DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT

Philosophical Fragments

MAX HORKHEIMER *and*

THEODOR W. ADORNO



Edited by Gunzelin Schmid Noerr

Translated by Edmund Jephcott

STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

STANFORD, CALIFORNIA

2002

Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments is translated from Volume 5 of Max Horkheimer, *Gesammelte Schriften: Dialektik der Aufklärung und Schriften 1940–1950*, edited by Gunzelin Schmid Noerr, ©1987 by S. Fishcher Verlag GmbH, Frankfurt am Main.

Asterisks in the text and display material mark editorial notes created for the German edition. They include variant readings and other textual concerns. They are keyed in the reference matter section via the number of the page on which the asterisk appears and the preceding word. Numbered notes are those created by Horkheimer and Adorno themselves.

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Horkheimer, Max, 1895–1973
[Philosophische Fragmente. English]
Dialectic of enlightenment : philosophical fragments / Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno ; edited by Gunzelin Schmid Noerr ; translated by Edmund Jephcott.
p. cm. — (Cultural memory in the present)
Includes bibliographical references.
ISBN 0-8047-3632-4 (alk. paper) — ISBN 0-8047-3633-2 (pbk: alk. paper)
1. Philosophy. I. Adorno, Theodor W., 1903–1969. II. Schmid Noerr, Gunzelin. III. Title. IV. Series.
B3279.H8473 P513 2002
193—dc21 2002000073

Printed in the United States of America

Original Printing 2002
Last figure below indicates year of this printing:
11 10 09 08 07 06 05 04 03 02

Typeset at Stanford University Press in 11/13.5 Adobe Garamond



The Concept* of Enlightenment

Enlightenment, understood in the widest sense as the advance of thought, has always aimed at liberating human beings from fear and installing them as masters. Yet the wholly enlightened earth is radiant with triumphant calamity. Enlightenment's program was the disenchantment of the world.* It wanted to dispel myths, to overthrow fantasy with knowledge. Bacon, "the father of experimental philosophy,"[1] brought these motifs together. He despised the exponents of tradition, who substituted belief for knowledge and were as unwilling to doubt as they were reckless in supplying answers. All this, he said, stood in the way of "the happy match between the mind of man and the nature of things," with the result that humanity was unable to use its knowledge for the betterment of its condition. Such inventions as had been made—Bacon cites printing, artillery, and the compass—had been arrived at more by chance than by systematic enquiry into nature. Knowledge obtained through such enquiry would not only be exempt from the influence of wealth and power but would establish man as the master of nature:

Therefore, no doubt, the sovereignty of man lieth hid in knowledge; wherein many things are reserved, which kings with their treasure cannot buy, nor with their force command; their spials and intelligencers can give no news of them, their seamen and discoverers cannot sail where they grow: now we govern nature in opinions, but we are thrall unto her in necessity: but if we would be led by her in invention, we should command her by action.[2]

Although not a mathematician, Bacon well understood the scientific temper which was to come after him. The "happy match" between human understanding and the nature of things that he envisaged is a patriarchal one: the mind, conquering superstition, is to rule over disenchanted nature. Knowledge, which is power, knows no limits, either in its enslavement* of creation or in its deference to worldly masters. Just as it serves all the purposes of the bourgeois economy both in factories and on the battlefield, it is at the disposal of entrepreneurs regardless of their origins. Kings control technology no more directly than do merchants: it is as democratic as the economic system* with which it evolved. Technology is the essence of this knowledge. It aims to produce neither concepts nor images, nor the joy of understanding, but method, exploitation of the labor of others,* capital. The "many things" which, according to Bacon, knowledge still held in store are themselves mere instruments: the radio as a sublimated printing press, the dive bomber as a more effective form of artillery, remote control as a more reliable compass. What human beings seek to learn from nature is how to use it to dominate wholly both it and human beings. Nothing else counts. Ruthless toward itself, the Enlightenment has eradicated the last remnant of its own self-awareness. Only thought which does violence to itself is hard enough to shatter myths. Faced by the present triumph of the factual mentality, Bacon's nominalist credo would have smacked of metaphysics and would have been convicted of the same vanity for which he criticized scholasticism. Power and knowledge are synonymous.[3] For Bacon as for Luther, "knowledge that tendeth but to satisfaction, is but as a courtesan, which is for pleasure, and not for fruit or generation." Its concern is not "satisfaction, which men call truth," but "operation," the effective procedure. The "true end, scope or office of knowledge" does not consist in "any plausible, delectable, reverend or admired discourse, or any satisfactory arguments, but in effecting and working, and in discovery of particulars not revealed before, for the better endowment and help of man's life."[4] There shall be neither mystery nor any desire to reveal mystery.

The disenchantment of the world means the extirpation of animism. Xenophanes mocked the multiplicity of gods because they resembled their creators, men, in all their idiosyncrasies and faults, and the latest logic denounces the words of language, which bear the stamp of impressions, as counterfeit coin that would be better replaced by neutral counters. The

world becomes chaos, and synthesis salvation. No difference is said to exist between the totemic animal, the dreams of the spirit-seer,* and the absolute Idea. On their way toward modern science human beings have discarded meaning. The concept is replaced by the formula, the cause by rules and probability. Causality was only the last philosophical concept on which scientific criticism tested its strength, because it alone of the old ideas still stood in the way of such criticism, the latest secular form of the creative principle. To define substance and quality, activity and suffering, being and existence in terms appropriate to the time has been a concern of philosophy since Bacon; but science could manage without such categories. They were left behind as *idola theatri* of the old metaphysics and even in their time were monuments to entities and powers from prehistory. In that distant time life and death had been interpreted and interwoven in myths. The categories by which Western philosophy defined its timeless order of nature marked out the positions which had once been occupied by Ocnus and Persephone, Ariadne and Nereus. The moment of transition is recorded in the pre-Socratic cosmologies. The moist, the undivided, the air and fire which they take to be the primal stuff of nature are early rationalizations precipitated from the mythical vision. Just as the images of generation from water and earth, that had come to the Greeks from the Nile, were converted by these cosmologies into Hylozoic principles and elements, the whole ambiguous profusion of mythical demons was intellectualized to become the pure form of ontological entities. Even the patriarchal gods of Olympus were finally assimilated by the philosophical *logos* as the Platonic Forms. But the Enlightenment discerned the old powers in the Platonic and Aristotelian heritage of metaphysics and suppressed the universal categories' claims to truth as superstition. In the authority of universal concepts the Enlightenment detected a fear of the demons through whose effigies human beings had tried to influence nature in magic rituals. From now on matter was finally to be controlled without the illusion of immanent powers or hidden properties. For enlightenment, anything which does not conform to the standard of calculability and utility must be viewed with suspicion. Once the movement is able to develop unhampered by external oppression, there is no holding it back. Its own ideas of human rights then fare no better than the older universals. Any intellectual resistance it encounters merely increases its strength.[5] The reason is that enlightenment also recognizes itself in the old myths. No matter which myths are invoked

against it, by being used as arguments they are made to acknowledge the very principle of corrosive rationality of which enlightenment stands accused. Enlightenment is totalitarian.

Enlightenment has always regarded anthropomorphism, the projection of subjective properties onto nature, as the basis of myth.[6] The supernatural, spirits and demons, are taken to be reflections of human beings who allow themselves to be frightened by natural phenomena. According to enlightened thinking, the multiplicity of mythical figures can be reduced to a single common denominator, the subject. Oedipus's answer to the riddle of the Sphinx—"That being is man"—is repeated indiscriminately as enlightenment's stereotyped message, whether in response to a piece of objective meaning, a schematic order, a fear of evil powers, or a hope of salvation. For the Enlightenment, only what can be encompassed by unity has the status of an existent or an event; its ideal is the system from which everything and anything follows. Its rationalist and empiricist versions do not differ on that point. Although the various schools may have interpreted its axioms differently, the structure of unitary science has always been the same. Despite the pluralism of the different fields of research, Bacon's postulate of *una scientia universalis*[7] is as hostile to anything which cannot be connected as Leibniz's *mathesis universalis* is to discontinuity. The multiplicity of forms is reduced to position and arrangement, history to fact, things to matter. For Bacon, too, there was a clear logical connection, through degrees of generality, linking the highest principles to propositions based on observation. De Maistre mocks him for harboring this "idolized ladder."[8] Formal logic was the high school of unification. It offered Enlightenment thinkers a schema for making the world calculable. The mythologizing equation of Forms with numbers in Plato's last writings expresses the longing of all demythologizing: number became enlightenment's canon. The same equations govern bourgeois justice and commodity exchange. "Is not the rule, '*Si inaequalibus aequalia addas, omnia erunt inaequalia*,' [If you add like to unlike you will always end up with unlike] an axiom of justice as well as of mathematics? And is there not a true coincidence between commutative and distributive justice, and arithmetical and geometrical proportion?"[9] Bourgeois society is ruled by equivalence. It makes dissimilar things comparable by reducing them to abstract quantities. For the Enlightenment, anything which cannot be resolved into numbers, and ultimately into one, is illusion; modern posi-

tivism consigns it to poetry. Unity remains the watchword from Parmenides to Russell. All gods and qualities must be destroyed.

But the myths which fell victim to the Enlightenment were themselves its products. The scientific calculation of events annuls the account of them which thought had once given in myth. Myth sought to report, to name, to tell of origins—but therefore also to narrate, record, explain. This tendency was reinforced by the recording and collecting of myths. From a record, they soon became a teaching. Each ritual contains a representation of how things happen and of the specific process which is to be influenced by magic. In the earliest popular epics this theoretical element of ritual became autonomous. The myths which the tragic dramatists drew on were already marked by the discipline and power which Bacon celebrated as the goal. The local spirits and demons had been replaced by heaven and its hierarchy, the incantatory practices of the magician by the carefully graduated sacrifice and the labor of enslaved men mediated by command. The Olympian deities are no longer directly identical with elements, but signify them. In Homer Zeus controls the daytime sky, Apollo guides the sun; Helios and Eos are already passing over into allegory. The gods detach themselves from substances to become their quintessence. From now on, being is split between *logos*—which, with the advance of philosophy, contracts to a monad, a mere reference point—and the mass of things and creatures in the external world. The single distinction between man's own existence and reality swallows up all others. Without regard for differences, the world is made subject to man. In this the Jewish story of creation and the Olympian religion are at one: ". . . and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth."[10] "O Zeus, Father Zeus, yours is the dominion of the heavens; you oversee the works of men, both the wicked and the just, and the unruly animals, you who uphold righteousness."[11] "It is so ordained that one atones at once, another later; but even should one escape the doom threatened by the gods, it will surely come to pass one day, and innocents shall expiate his deed, whether his children or a later generation."[12] Only those who subject themselves utterly pass muster with the gods. The awakening of the subject is bought with the recognition of power as the principle of all relationships. In face of the unity of such reason the distinction between God and man is reduced to an irrelevance, as

reason has steadfastly indicated since the earliest critique of Homer. In their mastery of nature, the creative God and the ordering mind are alike. Man's likeness to God consists in sovereignty over existence, in the lordly gaze, in the command.

Myth becomes enlightenment and nature mere objectivity. Human beings purchase the increase in their power with estrangement from that over which it is exerted. Enlightenment stands in the same relationship to things as the dictator to human beings. He knows them to the extent that he can manipulate them. The man of science knows things to the extent that he can make them. Their "in-itself" becomes "for him." In their transformation the essence of things is revealed as always the same, a substrate of domination. This identity constitutes the unity of nature. Neither it nor the unity of the subject was presupposed by magical incantation. The rites of the shaman were directed at the wind, the rain, the snake outside or the demon inside the sick person, not at materials or specimens. The spirit which practiced magic was not single or identical; it changed with the cult masks which represented the multiplicity of spirits. Magic is bloody untruth, but in it domination is not yet disclaimed by transforming itself into a pure truth underlying the world which it enslaves. The magician imitates demons; to frighten or placate them he makes intimidating or appeasing gestures. Although his task was impersonation he did not claim to be made in the image of the invisible power, as does civilized man, whose modest hunting ground then shrinks to the unified cosmos, in which nothing exists but prey. Only when made in such an image does man attain the identity of the self which cannot be lost in identification with the other but takes possession of itself once and for all as an impenetrable mask. It is the identity of mind and its correlative, the unity of nature, which subdues the abundance of qualities. Nature, stripped of qualities, becomes the chaotic stuff of mere classification, and the all-powerful self becomes a mere having, an abstract identity. Magic implies specific representation. What is done to the spear, the hair, the name of the enemy, is also to befall his person; the sacrificial animal is slain in place of the god. The substitution which takes place in sacrifice marks a step toward discursive logic. Even though the hind which was offered up for the daughter, the lamb for the firstborn, necessarily still had qualities of its own, it already represented the genus. It manifested the arbitrariness of the specimen. But the sanctity of the *hic et nunc*, the uniqueness of the

chosen victim which coincides with its representative status, distinguishes it radically, makes it non-exchangeable even in the exchange. Science puts an end to this. In it there is no specific representation: something which is a sacrificial animal cannot be a god. Representation gives way to universal fungibility. An atom is smashed not as a representative but as a specimen of matter, and the rabbit suffering the torment of the laboratory is seen not as a representative but, mistakenly, as a mere exemplar. Because in functional science the differences are so fluid that everything is submerged in one and the same matter, the scientific object is petrified, whereas the rigid ritual of former times appears supple in its substitution of one thing for another. The world of magic still retained differences whose traces have vanished even in linguistic forms.[13] The manifold affinities between existing things are supplanted by the single relationship between the subject who confers meaning and the meaningless object, between rational significance and its accidental bearer. At the magical stage dream and image were not regarded as mere signs of things but were linked to them by resemblance or name. The relationship was not one of intention but of kinship. Magic like science is concerned with ends, but it pursues them through mimesis, not through an increasing distance from the object. It certainly is not founded on the "omnipotence of thought," which the primitive is supposed to impute to himself like the neurotic;[14] there can be no "over-valuation of psychical acts" in relation to reality where thought and reality are not radically distinguished. The "unshakable confidence in the possibility of controlling the world"[15] which Freud anachronistically attributes to magic applies only to the more realistic form of world domination achieved by the greater astuteness of science. The autonomy of thought in relation to objects, as manifested in the reality-adequacy of the Ego, was a prerequisite for the replacement of the localized practices of the medicine man by all-embracing industrial technology.*

As a totality set out in language and laying claim to a truth which suppressed the older mythical faith of popular religion, the solar, patriarchal myth was itself an enlightenment, fully comparable on that level to the philosophical one. But now it paid the price. Mythology itself set in motion the endless process of enlightenment by which, with ineluctable necessity, every definite theoretical view is subjected to the annihilating criticism that it is only a belief, until even the concepts of mind, truth, and, indeed, enlightenment itself have been reduced to animistic magic.

The principle of the fated necessity which caused the downfall of the mythical hero, and finally evolved as the logical conclusion from the oracular utterance, not only predominates, refined to the cogency of formal logic, in every rationalistic system of Western philosophy but also presides over the succession of systems which begins with the hierarchy of the gods and, in a permanent twilight of the idols, hands down a single identical content: wrath against those of insufficient righteousness.* Just as myths already entail enlightenment, with every step enlightenment entangles itself more deeply in mythology. Receiving all its subject matter from myths, in order to destroy them, it falls as judge under the spell of myth. It seeks to escape the trial of fate and retribution by itself exacting retribution on that trial. In myths, everything that happens must atone for the fact of having happened. It is no different in enlightenment: no sooner has a fact been established than it is rendered insignificant. The doctrine that action equals reaction continued to maintain the power of repetition over existence long after humankind had shed the illusion that, by repetition, it could identify itself with repeated existence and so escape its power. But the more the illusion of magic vanishes, the more implacably repetition, in the guise of regularity, imprisons human beings in the cycle now objectified in the laws of nature, to which they believe they owe their security as free subjects. The principle of immanence, the explanation of every event as repetition, which enlightenment upholds against mythical imagination, is that of myth itself. The arid wisdom which acknowledges nothing new under the sun, because all the pieces in the meaningless game have been played out, all the great thoughts have been thought, all possible discoveries can be construed in advance, and human beings are defined by self-preservation through adaptation—this barren wisdom merely reproduces the fantastic doctrine it rejects: the sanction of fate which, through retribution, incessantly reinstates what always was. Whatever might be different is made the same. That is the verdict which critically sets the boundaries to possible experience. The identity of everything with everything is bought at the cost that nothing can at the same time be identical to itself. Enlightenment dissolves away the injustice of the old inequality of unmediated mastery, but at the same time perpetuates it in universal mediation, by relating every existing thing to every other. It brings about the situation for which Kierkegaard praised his Protestant ethic and which, in the legend-cycle of Hercules, constitutes one of the primal images of

mythical violence: it amputates the incommensurable. Not merely are qualities dissolved in thought, but human beings are forced into real conformity. The blessing that the market does not ask about birth is paid for in the exchange society by the fact that the possibilities conferred by birth are molded to fit the production of goods that can be bought on the market. Each human being has been endowed with a self of his or her own, different from all others, so that it could all the more surely be made the same. But because that self never quite fitted the mold, enlightenment throughout the liberalistic period has always sympathized with social coercion. The unity of the manipulated collective consists in the negation of each individual and in the scorn poured on the type of society which could make people into individuals. The horde, a term which doubtless* is to be found in the Hitler Youth organization, is not a relapse into the old barbarism but the triumph of repressive *égalité*, the degeneration of the equality of rights into the wrong inflicted by equals. The fake myth of fascism reveals itself as the genuine myth of prehistory, in that the genuine myth beheld retribution while the false one wreaks it blindly on its victims. Any attempt to break the compulsion of nature by breaking nature only succumbs more deeply to that compulsion. That has been the trajectory of European civilization. Abstraction, the instrument of enlightenment, stands in the same relationship to its objects as fate, whose concept it eradicates: as liquidation. Under the leveling rule of abstraction, which makes everything in nature repeatable, and of industry, for which abstraction prepared the way, the liberated finally themselves become the "herd" (*Trupp*), which Hegel[16] identified as the outcome of enlightenment.

The distance of subject from object, the presupposition of abstraction, is founded on the distance from things which the ruler attains by means of the ruled. The songs of Homer and the hymns of the *Rig Veda* date from the time of territorial dominion and its strongholds, when a warlike race of overlords imposed itself on the defeated indigenous population.[17] The supreme god among gods came into being with this civil world in which the king, as leader of the arms-bearing nobility, tied the subjugated people* to the land while doctors, soothsayers, artisans, and traders took care of circulation. With the end of nomadism the social order is established on the basis of fixed property. Power and labor diverge. A property owner like Odysseus "controls from a distance a numerous, finely graded personnel of ox herds, shepherds, swineherds, and servants. In

the evening, having looked out from his castle to see the countryside lit up by a thousand fires, he can go to his rest in peace. He knows that his loyal servants are watching to keep away wild animals and to drive away thieves from the enclosures which they are there to protect."[18] The generality of the ideas developed by discursive logic, power in the sphere of the concept, is built on the foundation of power in reality. The superseding of the old diffuse notions of the magical heritage by conceptual unity expresses a condition of life defined by the freeborn citizen and articulated by command. The self which learned about order and subordination through the subjugation of the world soon equated truth in general with classifying thought, without whose fixed distinctions it cannot exist. Along with mimetic magic it tabooed the knowledge which really apprehends the object. Its hatred is directed at the image of the vanquished primeval world and its imaginary happiness. The dark, chthonic gods of the original inhabitants are banished to the hell into which the earth is transformed under the religions of Indra and Zeus, with their worship of sun and light.

But heaven and hell were linked. The name Zeus was applied both to a god of the underworld and to a god of light in cults which did not exclude each other,[19] and the Olympian gods maintained all kinds of commerce with the chthonic deities. In the same way, the good and evil powers, the holy and the unholy, were not unambiguously distinguished. They were bound together like genesis and decline, life and death, summer and winter. The murky, undivided entity worshipped as the principle of *mana* at the earliest known stages of humanity lived on in the bright world of the Greek religion. Primal and undifferentiated, it is everything unknown and alien; it is that which transcends the bounds of experience, the part of things which is more than their immediately perceived existence. What the primitive experiences as supernatural is not a spiritual substance in contradistinction to the material world but the complex concatenation of nature in contrast to its individual link.* The cry of terror called forth by the unfamiliar becomes its name. It fixes the transcendence of the unknown in relation to the known, permanently linking horror to holiness. The doubling of nature into appearance and essence, effect and force, made possible by myth no less than by science, springs from human fear, the expression of which becomes its explanation. This does not mean that the soul is transposed into nature, as psychologism would have us believe; *mana*, the moving spirit, is not a projection but the echo of the real pre-

ponderance of nature in the weak psyches of primitive people. The split between animate and inanimate, the assigning of demons and deities to certain specific places, arises from this preanimism. Even the division of subject and object is prefigured in it. If the tree is addressed no longer as simply a tree but as evidence of something else, a location of *mana*, language expresses the contradiction that it is at the same time itself and something other than itself, identical and not identical.[20] Through the deity speech is transformed from tautology into language. The concept, usually defined as the unity of the features of what it subsumes, was rather, from the first, a product of dialectical thinking, in which each thing is what it is only by becoming what it is not. This was the primal form of the objectifying definition, in which concept and thing became separate, the same definition which was already far advanced in the Homeric epic and trips over its own excesses in modern positive science. But this dialectic remains powerless as long as it emerges from the cry of terror, which is the doubling, the mere tautology of terror itself. The gods cannot take away fear from human beings, the petrified cries of whom they bear as their names. Humans believe themselves free of fear when there is no longer anything unknown. This has determined the path of demythologization, of enlightenment, which equates the living with the nonliving as myth had equated the nonliving with the living. Enlightenment is mythical fear radicalized. The pure immanence of positivism, its ultimate product, is nothing other than a form of universal taboo. Nothing is allowed to remain outside, since the mere idea of the "outside" is the real source of fear. If the revenge of primitive people for a murder committed on a member of their family could sometimes be assuaged by admitting the murderer into that family,[21] both the murder and its remedy mean the absorption of alien blood into one's own, the establishment of immanence. The mythical dualism does not lead outside the circle of existence. The world controlled by *mana*, and even the worlds of Indian and Greek myth, are issueless and eternally the same. All birth is paid for with death, all fortune with misfortune. While men and gods may attempt in their short span to assess their fates by a measure other than blind destiny, existence triumphs over them in the end. Even their justice, wrested from calamity, bears its features; it corresponds to the way in which human beings, primitives no less than Greeks and barbarians, looked upon their world from within a society of oppression and poverty. Hence, for both mythical and enlight-

ened justice, guilt and atonement, happiness and misfortune, are seen as the two sides of an equation. Justice gives way to law. The shaman wards off a danger with its likeness. Equivalence is his instrument; and equivalence regulates punishment and reward within civilization. The imagery of myths, too, can be traced back without exception to natural conditions. Just as the constellation Gemini, like all the other symbols of duality, refers to the inescapable cycle of nature; just as this cycle itself has its primeval sign in the symbol of the egg from which those later symbols are sprung, the Scales (Libra) held by Zeus, which symbolize the justice of the entire patriarchal world, point back to mere nature. The step from chaos to civilization, in which natural conditions exert their power no longer directly but through the consciousness of human beings, changed nothing in the principle of equivalence. Indeed, human beings atoned for this very step by worshipping that to which previously, like all other creatures, they had been merely subjected. Earlier, fetishes had been subject to the law of equivalence. Now equivalence itself becomes a fetish. The blindfold over the eyes of Justitia means not only that justice brooks no interference but that it does not originate in freedom.

The teachings of the priests were symbolic in the sense that in them sign and image coincided. As the hieroglyphs attest, the word originally also had a pictorial function. This function was transferred to myths. They, like magic rites, refer to the repetitive cycle of nature. Nature as self-repetition is the core of the symbolic: an entity or a process which is conceived as eternal because it is reenacted again and again in the guise of the symbol. Inexhaustibility, endless renewal, and the permanence of what they signify are not only attributes of all symbols but their true content. Contrary to the Jewish *Genesis*, the representations of creation in which the world emerges from the primal mother, the cow or the egg, are symbolic. The scorn of the ancients for their all-too-human gods left their core untouched. The essence of the gods is not exhausted by individuality. They still had about them a quality of *mana*; they embodied nature as a universal power. With their preanimistic traits they intrude into the enlightenment. Beneath the modest veil of the Olympian *chronique scandaleuse* the doctrine of the commingling and colliding of elements had evolved; establishing itself at once as science, it turned the myths into figments of fantasy. With the clean separation between science and poetry

the division of labor which science had helped to establish was extended to language. For science the word is first of all a sign; it is then distributed among the various arts as sound, image, or word proper, but its unity can never be restored by the addition of these arts, by synaesthesia or total art.* As sign, language must resign itself to being calculation and, to know nature, must renounce the claim to resemble it. As image it must resign itself to being a likeness and, to be entirely nature, must renounce the claim to know it. With advancing enlightenment, only authentic works of art have been able to avoid the mere imitation of what already is. The prevailing antithesis between art and science, which rends the two apart as areas of culture in order to make them jointly manageable as areas of culture, finally causes them, through their internal tendencies as exact opposites, to converge. Science, in its neopositivist interpretation, becomes aestheticism, a system of isolated signs devoid of any intention transcending the system; it becomes the game which mathematicians have long since proudly declared their activity to be. Meanwhile, art as integral replication has pledged itself to positivist science, even in its specific techniques. It becomes, indeed, the world over again, an ideological doubling, a compliant reproduction. The separation of sign and image is inescapable. But if, with heedless complacency, it is hypostatized over again, then each of the isolated principles tends toward the destruction of truth.

Philosophy has perceived the chasm opened by this separation as the relationship between intuition and concept and repeatedly but vainly has attempted to close it; indeed, philosophy is defined by that attempt. Usually, however, it has sided with the tendency to which it owes its name. Plato banished poetry with the same severity with which positivism dismissed the doctrine of Forms. Homer, Plato argued, had procured neither public nor private reforms through his much-vaunted art, had neither won a war nor made an invention. We did not know, he said, of any numerous followers who had honored or loved him. Art had to demonstrate its usefulness.[22] The making of images was proscribed by Plato as it was by the Jews. Both reason and religion outlaw the principle of magic. Even in its resigned detachment from existence, as art, it remains dishonorable; those who practice it become vagrants, latter-day nomads, who find no domicile among the settled. Nature is no longer to be influenced by likeness but mastered through work. Art has in common with magic the postulation of a special, self-contained sphere removed from the context of profane exis-

tence. Within it special laws prevail. Just as the sorcerer begins the ceremony by marking out from all its surroundings the place in which the sacred forces are to come into play, each work of art is closed off from reality by its own circumference. The very renunciation of external effects by which art is distinguished from magical sympathy binds art only more deeply to the heritage of magic. This renunciation places the pure image in opposition to corporeal existence, the elements of which the image sublates within itself. It is in the nature of the work of art, of aesthetic illusion, to be what was experienced as a new and terrible event in the magic of primitives: the appearance of the whole in the particular. The work of art constantly reenacts the duplication by which the thing appeared as something spiritual, a manifestation of *mana*. That constitutes its aura. As an expression of totality art claims the dignity of the absolute. This has occasionally led philosophy to rank it higher than conceptual knowledge. According to Schelling, art begins where knowledge leaves humans in the lurch. For him art is "the model of science, and wherever art is, there science must go."[23] According to his theory the separation of image and sign "is entirely abolished by each single representation of art."[24] The bourgeois world was rarely amenable to such confidence in art. Where it restricted knowledge, it generally did so to make room for faith, not art. It was through faith that the militant religiosity of the modern age, of Torquemada, Luther, and Mohammed, sought to reconcile spirit and existence. But faith is a privative concept: it is abolished as faith if it does not continuously assert either its opposition to knowledge or its agreement with it. In being dependent on the limits set to knowledge, it is itself limited. The attempt made by faith under Protestantism to locate the principle of truth, which transcends faith and without which faith cannot exist, directly in the word itself, as in primeval times, and to restore the symbolic power of the word, was paid for by obedience to the word, but not in its sacred form. Because faith is unavoidably tied to knowledge as its friend or its foe, faith perpetuates the split in the struggle to overcome knowledge: its fanaticism is the mark of its untruth, the objective admission that anyone who *only* believes for that reason no longer believes. Bad conscience is second nature to it. The secret awareness of this necessary, inherent flaw, the immanent contradiction that lies in making a profession of reconciliation, is the reason why honesty in believers has always been a sensitive and dangerous affair. The horrors of fire and sword, of counter-

Reformation and Reformation, were perpetrated not as an exaggeration but as a realization of the principle of faith. Faith repeatedly shows itself of the same stamp as the world history it would like to command; indeed, in the modern period it has become that history's preferred means, its special ruse. Not only is the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century inexorable, as Hegel confirmed; so, too, as none knew better than he, is the movement of thought itself. The lowest insight, like the highest, contains the knowledge of its distance from the truth, which makes the apologist a liar. The paradox of faith degenerates finally into fraud, the myth of the twentieth century* and faith's irrationality into rational organization in the hands of the utterly enlightened as they steer society toward barbarism.

When language first entered history its masters were already priests and sorcerers. Anyone who affronted the symbols fell prey in the name of the unearthly powers to the earthly ones, represented by these appointed organs of society. What preceded that stage is shrouded in darkness. Wherever it is found in ethnology, the terror from which *mana* was born was already sanctioned, at least by the tribal elders. Unidentical, fluid *mana* was solidified, violently materialized by men. Soon the sorcerers had populated every place with its emanations and coordinated the multiplicity of sacred realms with that of sacred rites. With the spirit-world and its peculiarities they extended their esoteric knowledge and their power. The sacred essence was transferred to the sorcerers who managed it. In the first stages of nomadism the members of the tribe still played an independent part in influencing the course of nature. The men tracked prey while the women performed tasks which did not require rigid commands. How much violence preceded the habituation to even so simple an order cannot be known. In that order the world was already divided into zones of power and of the profane. The course of natural events as an emanation of *mana* had already been elevated to a norm demanding submission. But if the nomadic savage, despite his subjection, could still participate in the magic which defined the limits of that world, and could disguise himself as his quarry in order to stalk it, in later periods the intercourse with spirits and the subjection were assigned to different classes of humanity: power to one side, obedience to the other. The recurring, never-changing natural processes were drummed into the subjects, either by other tribes or by their own cliques, as the rhythm of work, to the beat of the club and the rod, which reechoed in every barbaric drum, in each monotonous rit-

ual. The symbols take on the expression of the fetish. The repetition of nature which they signify always manifests itself in later times as the permanence of social compulsion, which the symbols represent. The dread objectified in the fixed image becomes a sign of the consolidated power of the privileged.* But general concepts continued to symbolize that power even when they had shed all pictorial traits. Even the deductive form of science mirrors hierarchy and compulsion. Just as the first categories represented the organized tribe and its power over the individual, the entire logical order, with its chains of inference and dependence, the superordination and coordination of concepts, is founded on the corresponding conditions in social reality, that is, on the division of labor.[25] Of course, this social character of intellectual forms is not, as Durkheim argues, an expression of social solidarity but evidence of the impenetrable unity of society and power. Power confers increased cohesion and strength on the social whole in which it is established. The division of labor, through which power manifests itself socially, serves the self-preservation of the dominated whole. But this necessarily turns the whole, as a whole, and the operation of its immanent reason, into a means of enforcing the particular interest. Power confronts the individual as the universal, as the reason which informs reality. The power of all the members of society, to whom as individuals no other way is open, is constantly summated, through the division of labor imposed on them, in the realization of the whole, whose rationality is thereby multiplied over again. What is done to all by the few always takes the form of the subduing of individuals by the many: the oppression of society always bears the features of oppression by a collective. It is this unity of collectivity and power, and not the immediate social universal, solidarity, which is precipitated in intellectual forms. Through their claim to universal validity, the philosophical concepts with which Plato and Aristotle represented the world elevated the conditions which those concepts justified to the status of true reality. They originated, as Vico put it,[26] in the marketplace of Athens; they reflected with the same fidelity the laws of physics, the equality of freeborn citizens, and the inferiority of women, children, and slaves. Language itself endowed what it expressed, the conditions of domination, with the universality it had acquired as the means of intercourse in civil society. The metaphysical emphasis, the sanction by ideas and norms, was no more than a hypostatization of the rigidity and exclusivity which concepts have necessarily

taken on wherever language has consolidated the community of the rulers for the enforcement of commands. As a means of reinforcing the social power of language, ideas became more superfluous the more that power increased, and the language of science put an end to them altogether. Conscious justification lacked the suggestive power which springs from dread of the fetish. The unity of collectivity and power now revealed itself in the generality which faulty content necessarily takes on in language, whether metaphysical or scientific. The metaphysical apologia at least betrayed the injustice of the established order through the incongruence of concept and reality. The impartiality of scientific language deprived what was powerless of the strength to make itself heard and merely provided the existing order with a neutral sign for itself. Such neutrality is more metaphysical than metaphysics. Enlightenment finally devoured not only symbols but also their successors, universal concepts, and left nothing of metaphysics behind except the abstract fear of the collective from which it had sprung. Concepts in face of enlightenment are like those living on unearned income in face of industrial trusts:* none can feel secure. If logical positivism still allowed some latitude for probability, ethnological positivism already equates probability with essence. "Our vague ideas of chance and quintessence are pale relics of that far richer notion,"[27] that is, of the magical substance.

Enlightenment as a nominalist tendency stops short before the *nomen*, the non-extensive, restricted concept, the proper name. Although[28] it cannot be established with certainty whether proper names were originally generic names, as some maintain, the former have not yet shared the fate of the latter. The substantial ego repudiated by Hume and Mach is not the same thing as the name. In the Jewish religion, in which the idea of the patriarchy is heightened to the point of annihilating myth, the link between name and essence is still acknowledged in the prohibition on uttering the name of God. The disenchanted world of Judaism propitiates magic by negating it in the idea of God. The Jewish religion brooks no word which might bring solace to the despair of all mortality. It places all hope in the prohibition on invoking falsity as God, the finite as the infinite, the lie as truth. The pledge of salvation lies in the rejection of any faith which claims to depict it, knowledge in the denunciation of illusion. Negation, however, is not abstract. The indiscriminate denial of anything positive, the stereotyped formula of nothingness as used by Buddhism,

ignores the ban on calling the absolute by its name no less than its opposite, pantheism, or the latter's caricature, bourgeois skepticism. Explanations of the world as nothingness or as the entire cosmos are mythologies, and the guaranteed paths to redemption sublimated magical practices. The self-satisfaction of knowing in advance, and the transfiguration of negativity as redemption, are untrue forms of the resistance to deception. The right of the image is rescued in the faithful observance of its prohibition. Such observance, "determinate negation,"[29] is not exempted from the enticements of intuition by the sovereignty of the abstract concept, as is skepticism, for which falsehood and truth are equally void. Unlike rigorism, determinate negation does not simply reject imperfect representations of the absolute, idols, by confronting them with the idea they are unable to match. Rather, dialectic discloses each image as script. It teaches us to read from its features the admission of falseness which cancels its power and hands it over to truth. Language thereby becomes more than a mere system of signs. With the concept of determinate negation Hegel gave prominence to an element which distinguishes enlightenment from the positivist decay to which he consigned it. However, by finally postulating the known result of the whole process of negation, totality in the system and in history, as the absolute, he violated the prohibition and himself succumbed to mythology.

That fate befell not only his philosophy, as the apotheosis of advancing thought, but enlightenment itself, in the form of the sober matter-of-factness by which it purported to distinguish itself from Hegel and from metaphysics in general. For enlightenment is totalitarian as only a system can be. Its untruth does not lie in the analytical method, the reduction to elements, the decomposition through reflection, as its Romantic enemies had maintained from the first, but in its assumption that the trial is prejudged. When in mathematics the unknown becomes the unknown quantity in an equation, it is made into something long familiar before any value* has been assigned. Nature, before and after quantum theory, is what can be registered mathematically; even what cannot be assimilated, the insoluble and irrational, is fenced in by mathematical theorems. In the preemptive identification of the thoroughly mathematized world with truth, enlightenment believes itself safe from the return of the mythical. It equates thought with mathematics. The latter is thereby cut loose, as it were, turned into an absolute authority. "An infinite world, in this case a

world of idealities, is conceived as one in which objects are not accessible individually to our cognition in an imperfect and accidental way but are attained by a rational, systematically unified method which finally apprehends each object—in an infinite progression—fully as its own in-itself. . . . In Galileo's mathematization of nature, *nature itself* is idealized on the model of the new mathematics. In modern terms, it becomes a mathematical manifold."[30] Thought is reified as an autonomous, automatic process, aping the machine it has itself produced, so that it can finally be replaced by the machine. Enlightenment[31] pushed aside the classical demand to "think thinking"—Fichte's philosophy is its radical fulfillment—because it distracted philosophers from the command to control praxis, which Fichte himself had wanted to enforce. Mathematical procedure became a kind of ritual of thought. Despite its axiomatic self-limitation, it installed itself as necessary and objective: mathematics made thought into a thing—a tool, to use its own term. Through this mimesis, however, in which thought makes the world resemble itself, the actual has become so much the only concern that even the denial of God falls under the same judgment as metaphysics. For positivism, which has assumed the judicial office of enlightened reason, to speculate about intelligible worlds is no longer merely forbidden but senseless prattle. Positivism—fortunately for it—does not need to be atheistic, since objectified thought cannot even pose the question of the existence of God. The positivist sensor turns a blind eye to official worship, as a special, knowledge-free zone of social activity, just as willingly as to art—but never to denial, even when it has a claim to be knowledge. For the scientific temper, any deviation of thought from the business of manipulating the actual, any stepping outside the jurisdiction of existence, is no less senseless and self-destructive than it would be for the magician to step outside the magic circle drawn for his incantation; and in both cases violation of the taboo carries a heavy price for the offender. The mastery of nature draws the circle in which the critique of pure reason holds thought spellbound. Kant combined the doctrine of thought's restlessly toilsome progress toward infinity with insistence on its insufficiency and eternal limitation. The wisdom he imparted is oracular: There is no being in the world that knowledge cannot penetrate, but what can be penetrated by knowledge is not being. Philosophical judgment, according to Kant, aims at the new yet recognizes nothing new, since it always merely repeats what reason has placed into

objects beforehand. However, this thought, protected within the departments of science from the dreams of a spirit-seer,* has to pay the price: world domination over nature turns against the thinking subject itself; nothing is left of it except that ever-unchanging "I think," which must accompany all my conceptions. Both subject and object are nullified. The abstract self, which alone confers the legal right to record and systematize, is confronted by nothing but abstract material, which has no other property than to be the substrate of that right. The equation of mind and world is finally resolved, but only in the sense that both sides cancel out. The reduction of thought to a mathematical apparatus condemns the world to be its own measure. What appears as the triumph of subjectivity, the subjection of all existing things to logical formalism, is bought with the obedient subordination of reason to what is immediately at hand. To grasp existing things as such, not merely to note their abstract spatial-temporal relationships, by which they can then be seized, but, on the contrary, to think of them as surface, as mediated conceptual moments which are only fulfilled by revealing their social, historical, and human meaning—this whole aspiration of knowledge is abandoned. Knowledge does not consist in mere perception, classification, and calculation but precisely in the determining negation of whatever is directly at hand. Instead of such negation, mathematical formalism, whose medium, number, is the most abstract form of the immediate, arrests thought at mere immediacy. The actual is validated, knowledge confines itself to repeating it, thought makes itself mere tautology. The more completely the machinery of thought subjugates existence, the more blindly it is satisfied with reproducing it. Enlightenment thereby regresses to the mythology it has never been able to escape. For mythology had reflected in its forms the essence of the existing order—cyclical motion, fate, domination of the world as truth—and had renounced hope. In the terseness of the mythical image, as in the clarity of the scientific formula, the eternity of the actual is confirmed and mere existence is pronounced as the meaning it obstructs. The world as a gigantic analytical judgment, the only surviving dream of science, is of the same kind as the cosmic myth which linked the alternation of spring and autumn to the abduction of Persephone. The uniqueness of the mythical event, which was intended to legitimize the factual one, is a deception. Originally, the rape of the goddess was directly equated with the dying of nature. It was repeated each autumn, and even the repetition

was not a succession of separate events, but the same one each time. With the consolidation of temporal consciousness the process was fixed as a unique event in the past, and ritual assuagement of the terror of death in each new cycle of seasons was sought in the recourse to the distant past. But such separation is powerless. The postulation of the single past event endows the cycle with a quality of inevitability, and the terror radiating from the ancient event spreads over the whole process as its mere repetition. The subsumption of the actual, whether under mythical prehistory or under mathematical formalism, the symbolic relating of the present to the mythical event in the rite or to the abstract category in science, makes the new appear as something predetermined which therefore is really the old. It is not existence that is without hope, but knowledge which appropriates and perpetuates existence as a schema in the pictorial or mathematical symbol.

In the enlightened world, mythology has permeated the sphere of the profane. Existence, thoroughly cleansed of demons and their conceptual descendants, takes on, in its gleaming naturalness, the numinous character which former ages attributed to demons. Justified in the guise of brutal facts as something eternally immune to intervention, the social injustice from which those facts arise is as sacrosanct today as the medicine man once was under the protection of his gods. Not only is domination paid for with the estrangement of human beings from the dominated objects, but the relationships of human beings, including the relationship of individuals to themselves, have themselves been bewitched by the objectification of mind. Individuals shrink to the nodal points of conventional reactions and the modes of operation objectively expected of them. Animism had endowed things with souls; industrialism makes souls into things.* On its own account, even in advance of total planning, the economic apparatus endows commodities with the values which decide the behavior of people. Since, with the ending of free exchange, commodities have forfeited all economic qualities except their fetish character, this character has spread like a cataract across the life of society in all its aspects. The countless agencies of mass production and its culture* impress standardized behavior on the individual as the only natural, decent, and rational one. Individuals define themselves now only as things, statistical elements, successes or failures. Their criterion is self-preservation, successful or unsuccessful adaptation to the objectivity of their function and the

schemata assigned to it. Everything which is different, from the idea to criminality, is exposed to the force of the collective, which keeps watch from the classroom to the trade union. Yet even the threatening collective is merely a part of the deceptive surface, beneath which are concealed the powers which manipulate the collective as an agent of violence. Its brutality, which keeps the individual up to the mark, no more represents the true quality of people than value* represents that of commodities. The demonically distorted form which things and human beings have taken on in the clear light of unprejudiced knowledge points back to domination, to the principle which already imparted the qualities of *mana* to spirits and deities and trapped the human gaze in the fakery of sorcerers and medicine men. The fatalism by which incomprehensible death was sanctioned in primeval times has now passed over into utterly comprehensible life. The noonday panic fear in which nature suddenly appeared to humans as an all-encompassing power has found its counterpart in the panic which is ready to break out at any moment today: human beings expect the world, which is without issue, to be set ablaze by a universal power which they themselves are and over which they are powerless.

Enlightenment's mythic terror springs from a horror of myth. It detects myth not only in semantically unclarified concepts and words, as linguistic criticism imagines, but in any human utterance which has no place in the functional context of self-preservation. Spinoza's proposition: "the endeavor of preserving oneself is the first and only basis of virtue,"[32] contains the true maxim of all Western civilization, in which the religious and philosophical differences of the bourgeoisie are laid to rest. The self which, after the methodical extirpation of all natural traces as mythological, was no longer supposed to be either a body or blood or a soul or even a natural ego but was sublimated into a transcendental or logical subject, formed the reference point of reason, the legislating authority of action. In the judgment of enlightenment as of Protestantism, those who entrust themselves directly to life, without any rational reference to self-preservation, revert to the realm of prehistory. Impulse as such, according to this view, is as mythical as superstition, and worship of any God not postulated by the self, as aberrant as drunkenness. For both—worship and self-immersion in immediate natural existence—progress holds the same fate in store. It has anathematized the self-forgetfulness both of thought and of

pleasure. In the bourgeois economy the social work of each individual is mediated by the principle of the self; for some this labor is supposed to yield increased capital, for others the strength for extra work. But the more heavily the process of self-preservation is based on the bourgeois division of labor, the more it enforces the self-alienation of individuals, who must mold themselves to the technical apparatus body and soul. Enlightened thinking has an answer for this, too: finally, the transcendental subject of knowledge, as the last reminder of subjectivity, is itself seemingly abolished and replaced by the operations of the automatic mechanisms of order, which therefore run all the more smoothly. Subjectivity has volatilized itself into the logic of supposedly optional rules, to gain more absolute control. Positivism, which finally did not shrink from laying hands on the idlest fancy of all, thought itself, eliminated the last intervening agency between individual action and the social norm. The technical process, to which the subject has been reified after the eradication of that process from consciousness, is as free from the ambiguous meanings of mythical thought as from meaning altogether, since reason itself has become merely an aid to the all-encompassing economic apparatus.* Reason serves as a universal tool for the fabrication of all other tools, rigidly purpose-directed and as calamitous as the precisely calculated operations of material production, the results of which for human beings escape all calculation. Reason's old ambition to be purely an instrument of purposes has finally been fulfilled. The exclusivity of logical laws stems from this obdurate adherence to function and ultimately from the compulsive character of self-preservation. The latter is constantly magnified into the choice between survival and doom, a choice which is reflected even in the principle that, of two contradictory propositions, only one can be true and the other false. The formalism of this principle and the entire logic established around it stem from the opacity and entanglement of interests in a society in which the maintenance of forms and the preservation of individuals only fortuitously coincide. The expulsion of thought from logic ratifies in the lecture hall the reification of human beings in factory and office. In this way the taboo encroaches on the power imposing it, enlightenment on mind, which it itself is. But nature as true self-preservation is thereby unleashed, in the individual as in the collective fate of crisis and war, by the process which promised to extirpate it. If unitary knowledge* is the only norm which theory has left, praxis must be handed over to the

unfettered operations of world history. The self, entirely encompassed by civilization, is dissolved in an element composed of the very inhumanity which civilization has sought from the first to escape. The oldest fear, that of losing one's own name, is being fulfilled. For civilization, purely natural existence, both animal and vegetative, was the absolute danger. Mimetic, mythical, and metaphysical forms of behavior were successively regarded as stages of world history which had been left behind, and the idea of reverting to them held the terror that the self would be changed back into the mere nature from which it had extricated itself with unspeakable exertions and which for that reason filled it with unspeakable dread. Over the millennia the living memory of prehistory, of its nomadic period and even more of the truly prepatriarchal stages, has been expunged from human consciousness with the most terrible punishments. The enlightened spirit replaced fire and the wheel by the stigma it attached to all irrationality, which led to perdition. Its hedonism was moderate, extremes being no less repugnant to enlightenment than to Aristotle. The bourgeois ideal of naturalness is based not on amorphous nature but on the virtue of the middle way. For this ideal, promiscuity and asceticism, superfluity and hunger, although opposites, are directly identical as powers of disintegration. By subordinating life in its entirety to the requirements of its preservation, the controlling minority guarantees, with its own security, the continuation of the whole. From Homer to modernity the ruling spirit has sought to steer between the Scylla of relapse into simple reproduction and the Charybdis of unfettered fulfillment; from the first it has mistrusted any guiding star other than the lesser evil. The German neopagans and administrators of war fever want to reinstate pleasure.* But since, under the work-pressure of the millennium now ending, pleasure has learned to hate itself, in its totalitarian emancipation it remains mean and mutilated through self-contempt.* It is still in the grip of the self-preservation inculcated in it by the reason which has now been deposed. At the turning points of Western civilization, whenever new peoples and classes have more heavily repressed myth, from the beginnings of the Olympian religion to the Renaissance, the Reformation, and bourgeois atheism, the fear of unsubdued, threatening nature—a fear resulting from nature's very materialization and objectification—has been belittled as animist superstition, and the control of internal and external nature has been made the absolute purpose of life. Now that self-preservation has been finally automated, reason is dismissed

by those who, as controllers of production, have taken over its inheritance and fear it in the disinherited. The essence of enlightenment is the choice between alternatives, and the inescapability of this choice is that of power. Human beings have always had to choose between their subjugation to nature and its subjugation to the self. With the spread of the bourgeois commodity economy the dark horizon of myth is illuminated by the sun of calculating reason, beneath whose icy rays the seeds of the new barbarism are germinating. Under the compulsion of power, human labor has always led away from myth and, under power, has always fallen back under its spell.

The intertwinement of myth, power, and labor is preserved in one of the tales of Homer. Book XII of the *Odyssey* tells how Odysseus sailed past the Sirens. Their allurement is that of losing oneself in the past. But the hero exposed to it has come of age in suffering. In the multitude of mortal dangers which he has had to endure, the unity of his own life, the identity of the person, have been hardened. The realms of time have been separated for him like water, earth, and air. The tide of what has been has receded from the rock of the present, and the future lies veiled in cloud on the horizon. What Odysseus has left behind him has passed into the world of shades: so close is the self to the primeval myth from whose embrace it has wrested itself that its own lived past becomes a mythical prehistory. It seeks to combat this by a fixed order of time. The tripartite division is intended to liberate the present moment from the power of the past by banishing the latter beyond the absolute boundary of the irrecoverable and placing it, as usable knowledge, in the service of the present. The urge to rescue the past as something living, instead of using it as the material of progress, has been satisfied only in art, in which even history, as a representation of past life, is included. As long as art does not insist on being treated as knowledge, and thus exclude itself from praxis, it is tolerated by social praxis in the same way as pleasure. But the Sirens' song has not yet been deprived of power as art. They have knowledge "of all that has ever happened on this fruitful earth"[33] and especially of what has befallen Odysseus himself: "For we know all that the Argives and the Trojans suffered on the broad plain of Troy by the will of the gods."[34] By directly invoking the recent past, and with the irresistible promise of pleasure which their song contains, the Sirens threaten the patriarchal order, which gives each person back their life only in exchange for their full measure of

time. When only unfailing presence of mind wrests survival from nature, anyone who follows the Sirens' phantasmagoria is lost. If the Sirens know everything that has happened, they demand the future as its price, and their promise of a happy homecoming is the deception by which the past entraps a humanity filled with longing. Odysseus has been warned by Circe, the divinity of regression to animal form, whom he has withstood and who therefore gives him the strength to withstand other powers of dissolution. But the lure of the Sirens remains overpowering. No one who hears their song can escape. Humanity had to inflict terrible injuries on itself before the self—the identical, purpose-directed, masculine character of human beings—was created, and something of this process is repeated in every childhood. The effort to hold itself together attends the ego at all its stages, and the temptation to be rid of the ego has always gone hand-in-hand with the blind determination to preserve it. Narcotic intoxication, in which the euphoric suspension of the self is expiated by deathlike sleep, is one of the oldest social transactions mediating between self-preservation and self-annihilation, an attempt by the self to survive itself. The fear of losing the self, and suspending with it the boundary between oneself and other life, the aversion to death and destruction, is twinned with a promise of joy which has threatened civilization at every moment. The way of civilization has been that of obedience and work, over which fulfillment shines everlastingly as mere illusion, as beauty deprived of power. Odysseus's idea, equally inimical to his death and to his happiness, shows awareness of this. He knows only two possibilities of escape. One he prescribes to his comrades. He plugs their ears with wax and orders them to row with all their might. Anyone who wishes to survive must not listen to the temptation of the irrecoverable, and is unable to listen only if he is unable to hear. Society has always made sure that this was the case. Workers must look ahead with alert concentration and ignore anything which lies to one side. The urge toward distraction must be grimly sublimated in redoubled exertions. Thus the workers are made practical. The other possibility Odysseus chooses for himself, the landowner, who has others to work for him. He listens, but does so while bound helplessly to the mast, and the stronger the allurement grows the more tightly he has himself bound, just as later the bourgeois denied themselves happiness the closer it drew to them with the increase in their own power. What he hears has no consequences for him; he can signal to his men to untie him only by

movements of his head, but it is too late. His comrades, who themselves cannot hear, know only of the danger of the song, not of its beauty, and leave him tied to the mast to save both him and themselves. They reproduce the life of the oppressor as a part of their own, while he cannot step outside his social role. The bonds by which he has irrevocably fettered himself to praxis at the same time keep the Sirens at a distance from praxis: their lure is neutralized as a mere object of contemplation, as art. The fettered man listens to a concert, as immobilized as audiences later, and his enthusiastic call for liberation goes unheard as applause. In this way the enjoyment of art and manual work diverge as the primeval world is left behind. The epic already contains the correct theory. Between the cultural heritage and enforced work there is a precise correlation, and both are founded on the inescapable compulsion toward the social control of nature.

Measures like those taken on Odysseus's ship in face of the Sirens are a prescient allegory of the dialectic of enlightenment. Just as the capacity to be represented is the measure of power, the mightiest person being the one who can be represented in the most functions, so it is also the vehicle of both progress and regression. Under the given conditions, exclusion from work means mutilation, not only for the unemployed but also for people at the opposite social pole. Those at the top experience the existence with which they no longer need to concern themselves as a mere substrate, and are wholly ossified as the self which issues commands. Primitive man experienced the natural thing only as the fugitive object of desire, "but the lord, who has interposed the bondsman between it and himself, takes to himself only the dependent aspect of the thing and has the pure enjoyment of it. The aspect of its independence he leaves to the bondsman, who works on it."[35] Odysseus is represented in the sphere of work. Just as he cannot give way to the lure of self-abandonment, as owner he also forfeits participation in work and finally even control over it, while his companions, despite their closeness to things, cannot enjoy their work because it is performed under compulsion, in despair, with their senses forcibly stopped. The servant is subjugated in body and soul, the master regresses. No system of domination has so far been able to escape this price, and the circularity of history in its progress is explained in part by this debilitation, which is the concomitant of power. Humanity, whose skills and knowledge become differentiated with the division of labor, is

thereby forced back to more primitive anthropological stages, since, with the technical facilitation of existence, the continuance of domination demands the fixation of instincts by greater repression. Fantasy withers. The calamity is not that individuals have fallen behind society or its material production. Where the development of the machine has become that of the machinery of control, so that technical and social tendencies, always intertwined, converge in the total encompassing of human beings, those who have lagged behind represent not only untruth. Adaptation to the power of progress furthers the progress of power, constantly renewing the degenerations which prove successful progress, not failed progress, to be its own antithesis. The curse of irresistible progress is irresistible regression.

This regression is not confined to the experience of the sensuous world, an experience tied to physical proximity, but also affects the autocratic intellect, which detaches itself from sensuous experience in order to subjugate it. The standardization of the intellectual function through which the mastery of the senses is accomplished, the acquiescence of thought to the production of unanimity, implies an impoverishment of thought no less than of experience; the separation of the two realms leaves both damaged. A consequence of the restriction of thought to organization and administration, rehearsed by the those in charge from artful Odysseus to artless chairmen of the board, is the stupidity which afflicts the great as soon as they have to perform tasks other than the manipulation of the small. Mind becomes in reality the instrument of power and self-mastery for which bourgeois philosophy has always mistaken it. The deafness which has continued to afflict the submissive proletarians since the myth is matched by the immobility of those in command. The overripeness of society lives on the immaturity of the ruled. The more complex and sensitive the social, economic, and scientific mechanism, to the operation of which the system of production has long since attuned the body, the more impoverished are the experiences of which the body is capable. The elimination of qualities, their conversion into functions, is transferred by rationalized modes of work to the human capacity for experience, which tends to revert to that of amphibians. The regression of the masses today lies in their inability to hear with their own ears what has not already been heard, to touch with their hands what has not previously been grasped; it is the new form of blindness which supersedes that of van-

quished myth. Through the mediation of the total society, which encompasses all relationships and impulses, human beings are being turned back into precisely what the developmental law of society, the principle of the self, had opposed: mere examples of the species, identical to one another through isolation within the compulsively controlled collectivity. The rowers, unable to speak to one another, are all harnessed to the same rhythms, like modern workers in factories, cinemas, and the collective. It is the concrete conditions of work in society* which enforce conformism—not the conscious influences which additionally render the oppressed stupid and deflect them from the truth. The powerlessness of the workers is not merely a ruse of the rulers but the logical consequence of industrial society, into which the efforts to escape it have finally transformed the ancient concept of fate.

This logical necessity, however, is not conclusive. It remains tied to domination, as both its reflection and its tool. Its truth, therefore, is no less questionable than its evidence is inescapable. Thought, however, has always been equal to the task of concretely demonstrating its own equivocal nature. It is the servant which the master cannot control at will. Domination, in becoming reified as law and organization, first when humans formed settlements and later in the commodity economy, has had to limit itself. The instrument is becoming autonomous: independently of the will of the rulers,* the mediating agency of mind moderates the immediacy of economic injustice.* The instruments of power—language, weapons, and finally machines—which are intended to hold everyone in their grasp, must in their turn be grasped by everyone. In this way, the moment of rationality in domination also asserts itself as something different from it. The thing-like quality of the means, which makes the means universally available, its "objective validity" for everyone, itself implies a criticism of the domination from which thought has arisen as its means. On the way from mythology to logistics, thought has lost the element of reflection on itself, and machinery mutilates people today, even if it also feeds them. In the form of machines, however, alienated reason is moving toward a society which reconciles thought, in its solidification as an apparatus both material and intellectual, with a liberated living element, and relates it to society itself as its true subject. The particularist origin and the universal perspective of thought have always been inseparable. Today, with the transformation of the world into industry, the per-

spective of the universal, the social realization of thought, is so fully open to view that thought is repudiated by the rulers themselves as mere ideology. It is a telltale manifestation of the bad conscience of the cliques in whom economic necessity is finally embodied* that its revelations, from the "intuitions" of the *Führer* to the "dynamic worldview," no longer acknowledge their own atrocities as necessary consequences of logical regularities, in resolute contrast to earlier bourgeois apologetics. The mythological lies about "mission" and "fate"* which they use instead do not even express a complete untruth: it is no longer the objective laws of the market which govern the actions of industrialists and drive humanity toward catastrophe. Rather, the conscious decisions of the company chairmen* execute capitalism's old law of value, and thus its fate, as resultants no less compulsive than the blindest price mechanisms. The rulers themselves do not believe in objective necessity, even if they sometimes call their machinations by that name. They posture as engineers of world history. Only their subjects accept the existing development, which renders them a degree more powerless with each prescribed increase in their standard of living, as inviolably necessary. Now that the livelihood of those still* needed to operate the machines can be provided with a minimal part of the working time which the masters of society have at their disposal, the superfluous remainder, the overwhelming mass of the population, are trained as additional guards of the system, so that they can be used today and tomorrow as material for its grand designs. They are kept alive as an army of unemployed. Their reduction to mere objects of administration, which preforms every department of modern life right down to language and perception, conjures up an illusion of objective necessity before which they believe themselves powerless. Poverty* as the antithesis between power and impotence is growing beyond measure, together with the capacity permanently to abolish poverty. From the commanding heights of the economy* to the latest professional rackets,* the tangled mass of cliques and institutions which ensures the indefinite continuation of the status quo is impenetrable to each individual. Even for a union boss, to say nothing of a manager, a proletarian is no more than a superfluous specimen, should he catch his notice at all, while the union boss in turn must live in terror of his own liquidation.

The absurdity of a state of affairs in which the power of the system over human beings increases with every step they take away from the

power of nature denounces the reason of the reasonable* society as obsolete. That reason's necessity is illusion, no less than the freedom of the industrialists, which reveals its ultimately compulsive nature in their inescapable struggles and pacts. This* illusion, in which utterly enlightened humanity is losing itself, cannot be dispelled by a thinking which, as an instrument of power, has to choose between command and obedience. Although unable to escape the entanglement in which it was trapped in prehistory, that thinking* is nevertheless capable of recognizing the logic of either/or, of consequence and antinomy, by means of which it emancipated itself radically from nature, as that same nature, unreconciled and self-estranged. Precisely by virtue of its irresistible logic, thought, in whose compulsive mechanism nature is reflected and perpetuated, also reflects itself as a nature oblivious of itself, as a mechanism of compulsion. Of course, mental representation is only an instrument. In thought, human beings distance themselves from nature in order to arrange it in such a way that it can be mastered. Like the material tool which, as a thing, is held fast as that thing in different situations and thereby separates the world, as something chaotic, multiple, and disparate, from that which is known, single, and identical, so the concept is the idea-tool which fits into things at the very point from which one can take hold of them. Thought thus becomes illusory whenever it seeks to deny its function of separating, distancing, and objectifying. All mystical union remains a deception, the impotently inward trace of the forfeited revolution. But while enlightenment is right in opposing any hypostatization of utopia and in dispassionately denouncing power as division, the split between subject and object, which it will not allow to be bridged, becomes the index of the untruth both of itself and of truth.* The proscribing of superstition has always signified not only the progress of domination but its exposure. Enlightenment is more than enlightenment, it is nature made audible in its estrangement. In mind's self-recognition as nature divided from itself, nature, as in prehistory, is calling to itself, but no longer directly by its supposed name, which, in the guise of *mana*, means omnipotence, but as something blind and mutilated. In the mastery of nature, without which mind does not exist, enslavement to nature persists. By modestly confessing itself to be power and thus being taken back into nature, mind rids itself of the very claim to mastery which had enslaved it to nature. Although humanity may be unable to interrupt its flight away from neces-

sity and into progress and civilization without forfeiting knowledge itself, at least it no longer mistakes the ramparts it has constructed against necessity, the institutions and practices of domination which have always rebounded against society from the subjugation of nature, for guarantors of the coming freedom. Each advance of civilization has renewed not only mastery but also the prospect of its alleviation. However, while real history is woven from real suffering, which certainly does not diminish in proportion to the increase in the means of abolishing it, the fulfillment of that prospect depends on the concept. For not only does the concept, as science, distance human beings from nature, but, as the self-reflection of thought—which, in the form of science, remains fettered to the blind economic tendency—it enables the distance which perpetuates injustice to be measured. Through this remembrance of nature within the subject, a remembrance which contains the unrecognized truth of all culture, enlightenment is opposed in principle to power, and even in the time of Vanini the call to hold back enlightenment was uttered less from fear of exact science than from hatred of licentious thought, which had escaped the spell of nature by confessing itself to be nature's own dread of itself. The priests have always avenged *mana* on any exponent of enlightenment who propitiated *mana* by showing fear before the frightening entity which bore that name, and in their hubris the augurs of enlightenment were at one with the priests. Enlightenment in its bourgeois form had given itself up to its positivist moment long before Turgot and d'Alembert. It was never immune to confusing freedom with the business of self-preservation. The suspension of the concept, whether done in the name of progress or of culture, which had both long since formed a secret alliance against truth, gave free rein to the lie. In a world which merely verified recorded evidence and preserved thought, debased to the achievement of great minds, as a kind of superannuated headline, the lie was no longer distinguishable from a truth neutralized as cultural heritage.

But to recognize power even within thought itself as unreconciled nature would be to relax the necessity which even socialism, in a concession to reactionary common sense, prematurely confirmed as eternal.* In declaring necessity the sole basis of the future and banishing mind, in the best idealist fashion, to the far pinnacle of the superstructure, socialism clung all too desperately to the heritage of bourgeois philosophy. The relationship of necessity to the realm of freedom was therefore treated as

merely quantitative, mechanical, while nature, posited as wholly alien, as in the earliest mythology, became totalitarian, absorbing socialism along with freedom. By sacrificing thought, which in its reified form as mathematics, machinery, organization, avenges itself on a humanity forgetful of it, enlightenment forfeited its own realization. By subjecting everything particular to its discipline, it left the uncomprehended whole free to rebound as mastery over things against the life and consciousness of human beings. But a true praxis capable of overturning the status quo depends on theory's refusal to yield to the oblivion in which society allows thought to ossify. It is not the material preconditions of fulfillment, unfettered technology* as such, which make fulfillment uncertain. That is the argument of sociologists who are trying to devise yet another antidote, even a collectivist one, in order control that antidote.[36] The fault lies in a social context which induces blindness. The mythical scientific respect of peoples for the given reality, which they themselves constantly create, finally becomes itself a positive fact, a fortress before which even the revolutionary imagination feels shamed as utopianism, and degenerates to a compliant trust in the objective tendency of history. As the instrument of this adaptation, as a mere assemblage of means, enlightenment is as destructive as its Romantic enemies claim. It will only fulfill itself if it forswears its last complicity with them and dares to abolish the false absolute, the principle of blind power. The spirit of such unyielding theory would be able to turn back from its goal even the spirit of pitiless progress. Its herald, Bacon, dreamed of the many things "which kings with their treasure cannot buy, nor with their force command, [of which] their spials and intelligencers can give no news."* Just as he wished, those things have been given to the bourgeois, the enlightened heirs of the kings. In multiplying violence through the mediation of the market, the bourgeois economy has also multiplied its things and its forces to the point where not merely kings or even the bourgeoisie are sufficient to administrate them: all human beings are needed. From the power of things they finally learn to forgo power. Enlightenment consummates and abolishes itself when the closest practical objectives reveal themselves to be the most distant goal already attained, and the lands of which "their spials and intelligencers can give no news"—that is, nature misunderstood by masterful science—are remembered as those of origin. Today, when Bacon's utopia, in which "we should command nature in action," has been fulfilled on a telluric scale, the

essence of the compulsion which he ascribed to unmastered nature is becoming apparent. It was power itself. Knowledge, in which, for Bacon, "the sovereignty of man" unquestionably lay hidden, can now devote itself to dissolving that power. But in face of this possibility enlightenment, in the service of the present, is turning itself into an outright deception of the masses.



Excursus I: Odysseus or Myth and Enlightenment

Just as the story of the Sirens illustrates the intertwinement of myth and rational labor, the *Odyssey* as a whole bears witness to the dialectic of enlightenment. In its oldest stratum, especially, the epic shows clear links to myth: the adventures are drawn from popular tradition. But as the Homeric spirit takes over and "organizes" the myths, it comes into contradiction with them. The familiar equation of epic and myth, which in any case has been undermined by recent classical philology, proves wholly misleading when subjected to philosophical critique. The two concepts diverge. They mark two phases of an historical process, which are still visible at the joints where editors have stitched the epic together. The Homeric discourse creates a universality of language, if it does not already presuppose it; it disintegrates the hierarchical order of society through the exoteric form of its depiction, even and especially when it glorifies that order. The celebration of the wrath of Achilles and the wanderings of Odysseus is already a nostalgic stylization of what can no longer be celebrated; and the hero of the adventures turns out to be the prototype of the bourgeois individual, whose concept originates in the unwavering self-assertion of which the protagonist driven to wander the earth is the primeval model. Finally, the epic, which in terms of the philosophy of history is the counterpart of the novel, exhibits features reminiscent of that genre, and the venerable cosmos of the Homeric world, a world charged with meaning, reveals itself as an achievement of classifying rea-

son, which destroys myth by virtue of the same rational order which is used to reflect it.

Understanding of the element of bourgeois enlightenment in Homer has been advanced by the German late-Romantic interpretation of antiquity based on the early writings of Nietzsche. Like few others since Hegel, Nietzsche recognized the dialectic of enlightenment. He formulated the ambivalent relationship of enlightenment to power. Enlightenment must be "drummed into the people, so that the priests all turn into priests with a bad conscience—and likewise with the state. That is the task of enlightenment: to show up the pompous behavior of princes and statesmen as a deliberate lie."[1] However, enlightenment had always been a means employed by the "great artists of government (Confucius in China, the Roman Empire, Napoleon, the Papacy, when it was concerned with power and not just with the world) . . . The self-deception of the masses in this respect—for instance, in all democracies—is highly advantageous: making people small and governable is hailed as 'progress'!"[2] As this twofold character of enlightenment emerged more clearly as a basic motif of history, its concept, that of advancing thought, was traced back to the beginning of recorded history. However, whereas Nietzsche's attitude to enlightenment, and thus to Homer, remained ambivalent; whereas he perceived in enlightenment both the universal movement of sovereign mind, whose supreme exponent he believed himself to be, and a "nihilistic," life-denying power, only the second moment was taken over by his pre-fascist followers and perverted into ideology. This ideology became a blind eulogy of blind life, which imposes a praxis by which everything living is suppressed. This is seen in the cultural fascists' attitude to Homer. In the Homeric depiction of feudal conditions they detect a democratic element, brand the work a product of seafarers and traders, and condemn the Ionian epic for its of overly rational discourse and its communication of the commonplace. Nevertheless, the evil eye of these sympathizers with all seemingly immediate power, who reject mediation and "liberalism" of any degree, discerns an element of truth. Connections with reason, liberality, and middle-class qualities do indeed extend incomparably further back than is assumed by historians who date the concept of the burgher from the end of medieval feudalism. In identifying the burgher where earlier bourgeois humanism had imagined some pristine dawn of culture, which was taken to legitimize that humanism, the neo-Romantic reaction

equates world history with enlightenment. The fashionable ideology, whose most urgent concern is to liquidate enlightenment, thus pays it involuntary homage. It is forced to acknowledge enlightened thinking even in the remotest past. For the bad conscience of present-day devotees of the archaic it is especially the earliest traces of enlightenment which threaten to unleash the process they seek to hold back, but which they themselves obliviously promote.

But a recognition of Homer's antimythological, enlightened character, his opposition to chthonic mythology, remains untrue because limited. Rudolf Borchardt,* for example, the most prominent and therefore the most impotent of the esoteric apologists of German heavy industry, prematurely breaks off his analysis in the service of repressive ideology. He fails to perceive that the primal powers he extols themselves represent a stage of enlightenment. By indiscriminately denouncing the epic as a form of novel he overlooks what epic and myth actually have in common: power and exploitation. The ignoble qualities he condemns in the epic, mediation and circulation, are only a further development of the dubious nobility he idolizes in myth: naked force. The alleged authenticity of the archaic, with its principle of blood and sacrifice, is already tainted by the devious bad conscience of power characteristic of the "national regeneration" today, which uses primeval times for self-advertising. The original myth itself contains the moment of mendacity which triumphs in the fraudulent myth of fascism and which the latter imputes to enlightenment. But no work bears more eloquent witness to the intertwinement of enlightenment and myth than that of Homer, the basic text of European civilization. In Homer, epic and myth, form and subject matter do not simply diverge; they conduct an argument. The aesthetic dualism of the work gives evidence of the historical-philosophical tendency. "The Apollonian Homer is merely a continuation of the general human artistic process to which we owe individuation."[3]

Myths are precipitated in the different strata of Homer's subject matter; but at the same time the reporting of them, the unity imposed on the diffuse legends, traces the path of the subject's flight from the mythical powers. This is already true, in a profound sense, of the *Iliad*. The anger of the mythical son of a goddess against the rational* warrior king and organizer; the hero's undisciplined inactivity; finally, the enlistment of the victorious, doomed hero in a cause which is national, Hellenic, and no

longer tribal, an allegiance mediated by mythic loyalty to his dead comrade—all these reflect the intertwinement of history and prehistory. The same development is still more vividly present in the *Odyssey*, since it is closer in form to the picaresque novel. The contrast between the single surviving ego and the multiplicity of fate reflects the antithesis between enlightenment and myth. The hero's peregrinations from Troy to Ithaca trace the path of the self through myths, a self infinitely weak in comparison to the force of nature and still in the process of formation as self-consciousness. The primeval world is secularized as the space he measures out; the old demons populate only the distant margins and islands of the civilized Mediterranean, retreating into the forms of rock and cave from which they had originally sprung in the face of primal dread. The adventures bestow names on each of these places, and the names give rise to a rational overview of space. The shipwrecked, tremulous navigator anticipates the work of the compass. His powerlessness, leaving no part of the sea unknown, aims to undermine the ruling powers. But, in the eyes of the man who has thus come of age, the plain untruth of the myths, the fact that sea and earth are not actually populated by demons but are a magic delusion propagated by traditional popular religion, becomes something merely "aberrant" in contrast to his unambiguous purpose of self-preservation, of returning to his homeland and fixed property. All the adventures Odysseus survives are dangerous temptations deflecting the self from the path of its logic. Again and again he gives way to them, experimenting like a novice incapable of learning—sometimes, indeed, out of foolish curiosity, like a mime insatiably trying out roles. "But where danger threatens / That which saves from it also grows":[4] the knowledge which makes up his identity and enables him to survive has its substance in the experience of diversity, distraction, disintegration; the knowing survivor is also the man who exposes himself most daringly to the threat of death, thus gaining the hardness and the strength to live. That is the secret underlying the conflict between epic and myth: the self does not exist simply in rigid antithesis to adventure but takes on its solidity only through this antithesis, and its unity through the very multiplicity which myth in its oneness denies.[5] Odysseus, like the heroes of all true novels after him, throws himself away, so to speak, in order to win himself; he achieves his estrangement from nature by abandoning himself to nature, trying his strength against it in all his adventures; ironically, it is implacable nature

that he now commands, which triumphs on his return home as the implacable judge, avenging the heritage of the very powers he has escaped. At the Homeric stage, the identity of the self is so much a function of the nonidentical, of dissociated, unarticulated myths, that it must derive itself from them. The element which shapes and organizes individuality internally, time, is still so weak that the unity of the adventures remains an outward one, their sequence being formed by the spatial changes of scene, the succession of sites of local divinities on which the hero is flung by the storm. Whenever, at later historical stages, the self has again experienced such weakness, or narration has presupposed it in the reader, the manner of depicting life has slipped back into the form of successive adventures. Laboriously and revocably, in the image of the journey, historical time has detached itself from space, the irrevocable schema of all mythical time.

The faculty by which the self survives adventures, throwing itself away in order to preserve itself, is cunning. The seafarer Odysseus outwits the natural deities as the civilized traveler was later to swindle savages, offering them colored beads for ivory. It is true that Odysseus is only occasionally seen bartering, when gifts of hospitality are given and received. In Homer the gift which accompanies hospitality falls midway between exchange and sacrifice. Like a sacrificial act it is intended to compensate for wrongfully spilled blood, whether of the stranger or of settlers defeated by pirates, and represents an oath of truce. At the same time, however, the gift to the host anticipates the principle of equivalence: the host receives really or symbolically the equivalent value of the service he has performed, while the guest takes away provisions which, in principle, are intended to enable him to reach home. Even though the host receives no direct compensation for this, he can expect the same treatment to be given to him or his kinsmen one day: as a sacrifice to elemental deities the hospitality gift is at the same time a rudimentary insurance against them. The extensive but perilous nautical activities of the early Greeks were the pragmatic reason for the custom. Even Poseidon, Odysseus's elemental foe, thinks in terms of equivalence, constantly complaining that the gifts received by Odysseus at the stations of his journey are worth more than his full share of the spoils of Troy would have been had he been allowed to carry it home without hindrance from Poseidon. And in Homer this kind of rationalization can be traced back to the sacrificial acts themselves. Hecatombs of a certain size are intended to secure the goodwill of partic-

ular deities. If exchange represents the secularization of sacrifice, the sacrifice itself, like the magic schema of rational exchange, appears as a human contrivance intended to control the gods, who are overthrown precisely by the system created to honor them.[6]

The moment of fraud in sacrifice is the prototype of Odyssean cunning, just as many of Odysseus's ruses are wrapped up, as it were, in an offering to natural deities.[7] The deities are duped not only by the hero but also by the solar gods. Odysseus's Olympian friends take advantage of Poseidon's sojourn among the Ethiopians, the backwoodsmen who still worship him and offer him bloody sacrifices, in order to escort Odysseus in safety. Even the sacrifice which Poseidon is glad to accept involves deception: the amorphous sea-god's confinement to a certain locality, the sacred precinct, also restricts his power, and in exchange for sating himself on Ethiopian oxen he is denied the opportunity to cool his temper on Odysseus. All sacrificial acts, deliberately planned by humans, deceive the god for whom they are performed: by imposing on him the primacy of human purposes they dissolve away his power, and the fraud against him passes over seamlessly into that perpetrated by unbelieving priests against believing congregations. Cunning originates in the cult. Odysseus himself acts as both victim and priest. By calculating the risk he incurs as victim, he is able to negate the power to which the risk exposes him. By such bargaining he retrieves the life he has staked. However, deception, cunning, and rationality do not form a simple antithesis to the archaism of sacrifice. Only the moment of fraud in sacrifice, perhaps the innermost reason for the illusory character of myth, is raised to self-consciousness through Odysseus. The awareness that the symbolic communication with the deity through sacrifice was not real must have been age-old. The representative character of sacrifice, glorified by fashionable irrationalists, cannot be separated from the deification of the sacrificial victim, from the fraudulent priestly rationalization of murder through the apotheosis of the chosen victim. Something of this fraud, which elevates the perishable person as bearer of the divine substance, has always been detectable in the ego, which owes its existence to the sacrifice of the present moment to the future. Its substance is as illusory as the immortality of the slaughtered victim. Not without reason was Odysseus regarded by many as a deity.*

For as long as individuals are sacrificed, for as long as the sacrifice contains the antithesis between collective and individual, deception is

objectively implicit in it. If the belief in the representative character of sacrifice springs from recollection of the nonoriginal quality of the self, from its emergence through the history of domination, at the same time, in relation to the fully developed self, this belief becomes untruth: the self is precisely the human being to whom the magic power of representation is no longer attributed. The formation of the self severs the fluctuating connection with nature which the sacrifice of the self is supposed to establish. Each sacrifice is a restoration of the past, and is given the lie by the historical reality in which it is performed. The venerable belief in sacrifice is probably itself a behavior pattern drilled into the subjugated, by which they reenact against themselves the wrong done to them in order to be able to bear it. Sacrifice as representative restoration does not reinstate immediate communication, which had been merely interrupted, as present-day mythologies claim; rather, the institution of sacrifice is itself the mark of an historical catastrophe, an act of violence done equally to human beings and to nature. Cunning is nothing other than the subjective continuation of the objective untruth of sacrifice, which it supersedes. That untruth may not have been always only untruth. At one stage[8] of prehistory sacrifices may have possessed a kind of bloody rationality, which even then, however, could hardly have been separated from the thirst for privilege. The theory of sacrifice prevalent today relates it to the idea of a collective body, the tribe, into which the spilled blood of the tribe's sacrificed member is supposed to flow back. While totemism was an ideology even in its own time, it nevertheless marks a real state in which the dominant reason required sacrificial victims. It is a state of archaic shortage, in which human sacrifice can hardly be distinguished from cannibalism. At some times the numerically increased collective can keep itself alive only by consuming human flesh; perhaps, in some ethnic and social groups, pleasure was linked in some way to cannibalism, a link to which only the aversion to human flesh now bears witness. Customs from later times, such as the *ver sacrum*, whereby a whole age-group of young men was forced into exile with accompanying rites at times of hunger, bear clear traces of such barbaric, idealized rationality. Long before the emergence of mythical popular religions, that rationality must have revealed itself as illusory; as systematic hunting provided the tribe with enough animals to make devouring its own members superfluous, it must have been the medicine men who deluded the shrewd hunters and trappers into believing that people

still needed to be consumed.[9] The magic, collective interpretation of sacrifice, which entirely denies the rationality of sacrifice, is its rationalization; but the straightforward assumption of enlightened thinking that what today is ideology may once have been truth is too uncritical:[10] the newest ideologies are a mere reprise of the oldest, which long antedate those hitherto known, in the same way as the development of the class society refutes the previously sanctioned ideologies. The frequently cited irrationality of sacrifice is no more than an expression of the fact that the praxis of sacrifice outlasted its rational necessity, which was replaced by particular interests. This split between the rational and the irrational aspects of sacrifice gave cunning a point at which to take hold. Demythologization always takes the form of the irresistible revelation of the futility and the superfluity of sacrifices.

If the principle of sacrifice was proved transient by its irrationality, at the same time it survives through its rationality. This rationality has transformed itself, not disappeared. The self wrests itself from dissolution in blind nature, whose claims are constantly reasserted by sacrifice. But it still remains trapped in the context of the natural, one living thing seeking to overcome another. Bargaining one's way out of sacrifice by means of self-preserving rationality is a form of exchange no less than was sacrifice itself. The identical, enduring self which springs from the conquest of sacrifice is itself the product of a hard, petrified sacrificial ritual in which the human being, by opposing its consciousness to its natural context, celebrates itself. That much is true of the famous story in Nordic mythology according to which Odin was hung from a tree as a sacrifice to himself, and of Klages's thesis that every sacrifice is a sacrifice of the god to the god, as is still apparent in Christology, the monotheistic disguise of myth.[11] The difference is that the stratum of mythology in which the self manifests itself as a sacrifice to itself expresses not so much the original conception of popular religions as the absorption of myth into civilization. In class society, the self's hostility to sacrifice included a sacrifice of the self, since it was paid for by a denial of nature in the human being for the sake of mastery over extrahuman nature and over other human beings. This very denial, the core of all civilizing rationality, is the germ cell of proliferating mythical irrationality: with the denial of nature in human beings, not only the *telos* of the external mastery of nature but also the *telos* of one's own life becomes confused and opaque. At the moment when human beings

cut themselves off from the consciousness of themselves as nature, all the purposes for which they keep themselves alive—social progress, the heightening of material and intellectual forces, indeed, consciousness itself—become void, and the enthronement of the means as the end, which in late capitalism is taking on the character of overt madness, is already detectable in the earliest history of subjectivity. The human being's mastery of itself, on which the self is founded, practically always involves the annihilation of the subject in whose service that mastery is maintained, because the substance which is mastered, suppressed, and disintegrated by self-preservation is nothing other than the living entity, of which the achievements of self-preservation can only be defined as functions—in other words, self-preservation destroys the very thing which is to be preserved. The antireason of totalitarian capitalism, whose technique of satisfying needs, in their objectified form determined by domination, makes the satisfaction of needs impossible and tends toward the extermination of humanity—this antireason appears prototypically in the hero who escapes the sacrifice by sacrificing himself. The history of civilization is the history of the introversion of sacrifice—in other words, the history of renunciation. All who renounce give away more of their life than is given back to them, more than the life they preserve. This process unfolds within the framework of wrong society. In that society everyone is one too many, and is cheated. But society's predicament* is that the person who escaped the universal, unequal, and unjust exchange, who did not renounce but immediately seized the undiminished whole, would thereby lose everything, even the meager residue of oneself granted by self-preservation. All the superfluous sacrifices are needed: against sacrifice. Even Odysseus is a sacrificial victim, the self which incessantly suppresses its impulses,[12] and thus he lets slip his own life, that he saves only to recall it as a path of error. Nevertheless, he is sacrificed, also, for the abolition of sacrifice. His lordly renunciation, as a struggle with myth, is representative of a society which no longer needs renunciation and domination—which masters itself not in order to do violence to itself and others but for the sake of reconciliation.

The transformation of the sacrificial victim into subjectivity is done under the aegis of the same cunning which always had its share in sacrifice. In the untruth of guile the deception inherent in sacrifice becomes an element of character; it becomes the mutilation of the cheat [*Ver-*

schlagener], whose shifty look still cowers from the blows [*Schläge*] self-preservation has brought down on him. This look expresses the relation of mind to physical strength. The bearer of mind, the one who issues commands—as Odysseus almost always appears—is in all cases physically weaker than the primeval powers with which he has to wrestle for his life, despite all the reports of his heroic deeds. The occasions when naked bodily strength is celebrated, the fistfight with the beggar Irus instigated by the Suitors and the drawing of the great bow, are sporting in nature. Self-preservation and physical strength have diverged: Odysseus's athletic accomplishments are those of the gentleman who, free of practical cares, can train himself in lordly self-mastery. Precisely the strength which is detached from self-preservation benefits self-preservation: in the struggle with the feeble, gluttonous, undisciplined vagabond or with those who have basked in idleness, Odysseus inflicts on the stay-at-homes symbolically what organized landowning has long since done to them in reality, and legitimizes himself as a nobleman. But when he encounters primeval powers which are neither domesticated nor weakened by indolence, he faces a harder test. He can never engage the exotically persisting mythical powers in physical combat. He has to accept as a given reality the sacrificial ceremony in which he is repeatedly caught up: he is unable to break it. Instead, he makes sacrifice the formal precondition of his own rational decision. This decision is always carried out within the terms of the primeval judgment on which the sacrificial situation is based. That the old sacrifice has meanwhile become irrational presents itself to the cleverness of the weaker party as the stupidity of ritual. The ritual remains accepted, its letter is strictly observed. But its now senseless judgment refutes itself, since its terms constantly leave scope for evasion. The superiority of nature in the competitive struggle is repeatedly confirmed by the very mind which has mastered nature. All bourgeois enlightenment is agreed in its demand for sobriety, respect for facts, a correct appraisal of relative strength. Wishful thinking is banned. The reason, however, is that all power in class society is beset by the gnawing consciousness of its powerlessness in face of physical nature and its social successor, the many. Only deliberate adaptation to it brings nature under the power of the physically weaker. The reason that represses mimesis is not merely its opposite. It is itself mimesis: of death. The subjective mind which disintegrates the spiritualization of nature masters spiritless nature only by imitating its

rigidity, disintegrating itself as animistic. Imitation enters the service of power when even the human being becomes an anthropomorphism for human beings. The pattern of Odysseus's guile is mastery of nature by such adaptation. In the assessment of power relationships that admits defeat in advance and makes survival virtually dependent on death, the principle of bourgeois disillusionment, the external schema for the internalization of sacrifice, is already latent. The nimble-witted man survives only at the cost of his own dream, which he forfeits by disintegrating his own magic along with that of the powers outside him. He can never have the whole, he must always be able to wait, to be patient, to renounce; he may not eat the lotus or the cattle of Hyperion, and when he steers through the narrows he must include in his calculation the loss of the companions snatched from the ship by Scylla. He wriggles through—that is his survival, and all the renown he gains in his own and others' eyes merely confirms that the honor of heroism is won only by the humbling of the urge to attain entire, universal, undivided happiness.

The formula for Odysseus's cunning is that the detached, instrumental mind, by submissively embracing nature, renders to nature what is hers and thereby cheats her. The mythical monsters under whose power he falls represent, as it were, petrified contracts and legal claims dating from primeval times. In the developed patriarchal era the earlier popular religion manifests itself in these scattered relics: beneath the Olympian heaven they have become figures of abstract fate, of a necessity remote from sensuous experience. The fact that it would be impossible to choose any route other than that between Scylla and Charybdis may be interpreted rationalistically as the mythical representation of the preponderant power of sea currents over the little ships of ancient times. But translated into the objectifying language of myth, it means that the natural relationship between strength and powerlessness has already taken on the character of a legal relationship. Scylla and Charybdis have a claim on whatever comes between their teeth, just as Circe has a right to metamorphose those who are not immune, or Polyphemus a right to the bodies of his guests. Every mythical figure is compelled to do the same thing over and over again. Each of them is constituted by repetition: its failure would mean their end. They all bear features of the fate which, in the myths of punishment in the underworld, is meted out by Olympian judgment to Tantalus, Sisyphus, and the Danaids. They are figures of compulsion: the horrors they com-

mit are the curse which has fallen on them. Mythical inevitability is defined by the equivalence between the curse, the abominable act which expiates it, and the guilt arising from that act, which reproduces the curse. All law in history up to now bears the trace of this pattern. In myth each moment of the cycle pays off the preceding moment and thereby helps to establish the continuity of guilt as law. Against this Odysseus fights. The self represents rational universality against the inevitability of fate. But as it finds the universal and the inevitable already inextricably entwined, its rationality necessarily takes a restrictive form, that of an exception. It has to extricate itself from the legal terms encompassing and threatening it, terms which, in a sense, are inscribed in every mythical figure. Odysseus satisfies the legal statutes, but in such a way that by conceding their power he deprives them of it. It is impossible to hear the Sirens and not succumb to them: they cannot be defied. Defiance and beguilement are one and the same, and whoever defies them is lost to the very myth he challenges. Cunning, however, is defiance made rational. Odysseus does not try to steer a different course to the one past the Sirens' island. Nor does he try to insist on the superiority of his knowledge and listen freely to the temptresses, believing his freedom protection enough. He cowers, the ship takes its preordained, fateful course, and he realizes that however he may consciously distance himself from nature, as a listener [*Hörender*] he remains under its spell. He complies with the contract of his bondage [*Hörigkeit*] and, bound to the mast, struggles to throw himself into the arms of the seductresses. But he has found a loophole in the agreement, through which he eludes it while fulfilling its terms. The primeval contract did not specify whether the mariner sailing past should be bound or unbound while listening to the song. The use of bonds belongs to a later era, in which prisoners were not killed straightaway. Technically enlightened, Odysseus acknowledges the archaic supremacy of the song by having himself bound. By yielding to the song of pleasure he thwarts both it and death. The bound listener is drawn to the Sirens like any other. But he has taken the precaution not to succumb to them even while he succumbs. Despite the power of his desire, which reflects the power of the demigoddesses themselves, he cannot go to them, just as his companions at the oars, their ears stopped with wax, are deaf not only to the demigoddesses but to the desperate cries of their commander. The Sirens have a life of their own, but in this bourgeois prehistory it has already been neutral-

ized as the yearning of those who pass it by. The epic does not say what happens to the singers once the ship has passed. But in a tragedy this would have been their last hour, as it was for the Sphinx when Oedipus solved the riddle, fulfilling her command and thereby causing her downfall. For the law of the mythical figures, being that of the stronger, depends on the impossibility of fulfilling their statutes. If they are fulfilled, then the myths are finished, down to their most distant descendants. Since the happily hapless meeting of Odysseus with the Sirens all songs have ailed; the whole of western music suffers from the absurdity of song in civilization, yet the motive force of all art-music is song.

With the dissolution of the contract through its literal fulfilment a change occurs in the historical situation of language: it begins to pass over into designation. Mythical fate had been one with the spoken word. Within the sphere of ideas in which mythical figures executed the unalterable edicts of fate, the distinction between word and object was unknown. The word was thought to have direct power over the thing, expression merged with intention. Cunning, however, consists in exploiting the difference. One clings to the word in order to change the thing. In this way consciousness arises out of intention: in his extremity Odysseus becomes aware of dualism, as he discovers that an identical word can mean different things. Since the name *Udeis* can mean either "hero" or "nobody," the hero is able to break the spell of the name. Unchangeable words remain formulae for the implacable continuities of nature. In magic their fixity was intended to challenge that of fate, which it reflected. The opposition between the word and what it imitated was already implicit in this challenge. At the Homeric stage that opposition became decisive. Odysseus discovered in words what in fully developed bourgeois society is called *formalism*: their perennial ability to designate is bought at the cost of distancing themselves from any particular content which fulfills them, so that they refer from a distance to all possible contents, both to nobody and to Odysseus himself. From the formalism of mythical names and statutes, which, indifferent like nature, seek to rule over human beings and history, emerges nominalism, the prototype of bourgeois thinking. Self-preserving guile lives on the argument between word and thing. Odysseus's two contradictory actions in his meeting with Polyphemus, his obedience to his name and his repudiation of it, are really the same thing. He declares allegiance to himself by disowning himself as Nobody; he

saves his life by making himself disappear. This adaptation to death through language contains the schema of modern mathematics.

Cunning as a means of exchange, in which everything is done correctly, the contract is fulfilled yet the other party is cheated, points back to a form of economic activity which is found, if not in mythical prehistory, at least in early antiquity: the ancient practice of "occasional exchange" between self-sufficient households. "Surpluses are occasionally exchanged, but provisions are predominantly produced by the consumers themselves."[13] The behavior of the adventurer Odysseus recalls that of the parties to the occasional exchange. Even in the pathetic guise of the beggar the feudal lord bears features of the oriental merchant[14] who returns home with untold wealth because he has once, against tradition, stepped outside the confines of the domestic economy and "put to sea." The adventurous element in his undertaking is, in economic terms, nothing other than the irrational aspect his reason takes on in face of the prevailing traditional economic forms. This irrationality of reason has been precipitated in cunning, as the adaptation of bourgeois reason to any unreason which confronts it as a stronger power. The lone voyager armed with cunning is already *homo oeconomicus,* whom all reasonable people will one day resemble: for this reason the *Odyssey* is already a Robinsonade. Both these prototypical shipwrecked sailors make their weakness—that of the individual who breaks away from the collective—their social strength. Abandoned to the vagaries of the waves, helplessly cut off, they are forced by their isolation into a ruthless pursuit of their atomistic interest. They embody the principle of the capitalist economy* even before they make use of any worker;* but the salvaged goods they bring with them to the new venture idealize the truth that the entrepreneur* has always entered the competition armed with more than the industry of his hands. Their powerlessness in face of nature already functions as an ideology for their social predominance. Odysseus's defenselessness against the foaming sea sounds like a legitimation of the enrichment of the voyager at the expense of indigenous inhabitants. Bourgeois economics later enshrined this principle in the concept of risk: the possibility of foundering is seen as a moral justification for profit.* From the standpoint of the developed exchange society and its individuals, the adventures of Odysseus are no more than a depiction of the risks which line the path to success. Odysseus lives according to the ancient principle which originally constituted bourgeois society. One had

to choose between cheating and going under. Fraud was the stigma of reason, which betrayed its particular interest. The universal socialization for which the globetrotter Odysseus and the solo manufacturer Robinson Crusoe provide a preliminary sketch was attended from the first by the absolute loneliness which at the end of the bourgeois era is becoming overt. Radical socialization means radical alienation. Both Odysseus and Crusoe deal in totality: the former measures it out; the latter fabricates it. They can do so only in total isolation from all other human beings, who appear to both men only in estranged forms, as enemies or allies, but always as instruments, things.

One of the first adventures in the *nostos** proper does, admittedly, originate much further back, far beyond even the barbaric age of demonic masks and gods of magic. It is the story of the Lotus-eaters. Whoever tastes their food is as much in thrall as those who listen to the Sirens' song or are touched by the wand of Circe. But no harm is done to those who succumb: "Now it never entered the heads of these natives to kill my friends."[15] They are threatened only by forgetfulness and loss of will. The curse condemns them to nothing worse than a primal state exempt from labor and struggle in the "fertile land":[16] "As soon as each had eaten the honeyed fruit of the plant, all thoughts of reporting to us or escaping were banished from his mind. All they now wished for was to stay where they were with the Lotus-eaters, to browse on the lotus, and to forget that they had a home to return to."[17] Self-preserving reason cannot permit such an idyll—reminiscent of the bliss induced by narcotics, by which subordinate classes have been made capable of enduring the unendurable in ossified social orders—among its own people. And indeed, it is only an illusion of bliss, a dull aimless vegetating, as impoverished as the life of animals. At best, it would be an absence of the awareness of unhappiness. But happiness contains truth within itself. It is in essence a result. It unfolds from suffering removed. The enduring Odysseus is therefore right not to endure life among the Lotus-eaters. Against them he asserts their own cause, the realization of utopia through historical work, whereas simply abiding within an image of bliss deprives them of their strength. But in being exerted by rationality, by Odysseus, this right is inevitably drawn into the realm of wrong. His immediate action is one which reasserts domination. Self-preserving reason can no more tolerate this bliss "near the rim of the world"[18] than the more dangerous form it takes in later stages. The indo-

lent defectors are fetched back to the galleys: "I had to use force to bring them back to the ships, and they wept on the way, but once on board I dragged them under the benches and left them in irons."[19] Lotus is an oriental food. Its thin-cut slices still play a part in Chinese and Indian cooking. Perhaps the temptation ascribed to it is no other than that of regression to the stage of gathering the fruits of the earth[20] and the sea, older than agriculture, cattle-rearing, or even hunting—older, in short, than any production. It is hardly an accident that the epic connects the idea of the life of idleness with the eating of flowers, whereas no such use is associated with them today. The eating of flowers, as is still customary during dessert in the East and is known to European children from baking with rosewater and from candied violets, bears the promise of a state in which the reproduction of life is independent of conscious self-preservation, the bliss of satiety uncoupled from the utility of planned nutrition. The memory of the remote and ancient joy which flashes up before the sense of smell is still inseparable from the extreme proximity of ingestion. It points back to earliest prehistory. No matter how copious the torments endured by the people of that time, they cannot conceive of a happiness not nourished by the image of that primal age: "So we left that country and sailed on sick at heart."[21]

The next figure on whose shore Odysseus is cast up [*verschlagen*]—being cast up and being cunning [*verschlagen*] are equivalents in Homer—is the Cyclops Polyphemus, who wears his single wheel-sized eye as a trace of the same primal world: the singleness of the eye suggests the nose and mouth, more primitive than the symmetry of eyes and ears[22] without which, and the combining of their dual perceptions, no identification, depth, or objectivity is possible. But, compared to the Lotus-eaters, he represents a later, truly barbaric age, one of hunters and shepherds. For Homer, the definition of barbarism coincides with that of a state in which no systematic agriculture, and therefore no systematic, time-managing organization of work and society, has yet been achieved. He calls the Cyclopes "fierce, uncivilized people"[23] because—and his words seem to contain a secret confession of the guilt of civilization itself—they "never lift a hand to plant or plough but put their trust in Providence. All the crops they require spring up unsown and untilled, wheat and barley and the vines whose generous clusters give them wine when ripened for them by the timely rains."[24] Abundance needs no law, and civilization's accusa-

tion of anarchy sounds almost like a denunciation of abundance: "The Cyclopes have no assemblies for the making of laws, nor any settled customs, but live in hollow caverns in the mountain heights, where each man is lawgiver to his children and his wives, and nobody cares a jot for his neighbors."[25] This is already a patriarchal society based on kinship and the suppression of the physically weaker, but it is not yet organized on the model of fixed property and its hierarchy; it is the lack of contact between the cave dwellers which is the true reason for the absence of objective laws and which calls forth Homer's accusation of their mutual disregard and their state of savagery. In a later passage, however, the narrator's pragmatic fidelity to his story contradicts his civilized judgment: despite their disregard for one another, the tribe gather round the blinded Polyphemus's cave when they hear his anguished cry, and only Odysseus's trick with his name prevents the simpletons from coming to his aid.[26] Stupidity and lawlessness share a common definition: when Homer calls the Cyclops a "lawless-minded monster"[27] he does not mean simply that the Cyclops does not respect the laws of morality but that his thinking itself is lawless, unsystematic, rhapsodic—as when he is unable to perform the straightforward mental task of working out how his uninvited guests are able to leave his cave, by clinging underneath the sheep instead of riding on them; or to decipher the sophistic double meaning in Odysseus's false name. Polyphemus, although he trusts in the power of the Immortals, is a cannibal; accordingly, he refuses to show reverence for the gods despite his trust in them: "Stranger, you must be a fool, or must have come from very far afield"—in later times fools and strangers were less scrupulously distinguished, and ignorance of custom, like all foreignness, was branded straight away as folly—"to preach to me of fear or reverence for the gods. We Cyclopes care not a jot for Zeus with his aegis, nor for the rest of the blessed gods, since we are much stronger than they."[28] "We are stronger," Odysseus mockingly reports; but what the giant really meant was: "We are older." The power of the solar system is acknowledged, but much as a feudal lord might acknowledge that of bourgeois wealth, while tacitly regarding himself as more noble and failing to perceive that the wrong done to him is of the same kind as the wrong he himself represents. The nearby sea-god Poseidon, Polyphemus's father and Odysseus's enemy, is older than the universal Zeus in his remote heaven, and the feud between the elemental popular religion and the logocentric religion of laws is fought out,

so to speak, on the backs of the subjects. However, the lawless Polyphemus is not simply the villain he appears to be according to the taboos of civilization and as the giant Goliath appears in the fables of enlightened childhood. In the meager domain in which his self-preservation has taken on orderly habits, he is not without redeeming traits. When he puts the young sheep and goats to their mothers' udders, this practical action shows a concern for creaturely life itself, and the famous speech of the blinded Polyphemus in which he calls the leading ram his friend, asking whether it is the last to leave the cave because it is grieving for its master's eye, has a power and poignancy equaled only at the highest point of the *Odyssey*, when the homecoming Odysseus is recognized by the old dog Argus—despite the appalling brutality with which the speech ends. The giant's behavior has not yet been objectified as character. When Odysseus begs for hospitality he does not reply simply with an expression of savage hatred but only by refusing to respect a law which does not yet apply to him. He says merely that "it would not occur to him"[29] to spare Odysseus and his companions, and it is open to question whether his next question, about the whereabouts of Odysseus's ship, is as devious as Odysseus reports it to be. Boastful and beguiled, the drunken Polyphemus promises Odysseus gifts of hospitality,[30] and it is only the notion of Odysseus as Nobody that gives him the malicious idea of showing his hospitality by eating the leader last—perhaps because he has called himself Nobody and thus may be considered nonexistent in terms of the Cyclops's feeble wit.[31] The physical crudity of the overpowerful creature is the source of his gullible trust. In this way the observance of the mythical law, always an injustice to the judged, also becomes an injustice to the natural power which imposes that law. Polyphemus and the other monsters that Odysseus outwits are models for the stupidly litigious devils of the Christian era, right down to Shylock and Mephistopheles. The giant's stupidity, the basis of his barbaric brutality as long as his cause prospers, represents something better once it is overthrown by one who should know better. Odysseus insinuates himself into Polyphemus's trust and thus subverts the captor's right to human flesh, according to the artful schema whereby the statute is breached in the observance: "Here, Cyclops, have some wine to wash down that meal of human flesh, and find out for yourself what kind of vintage was stored away in our ship's hold,"[32] the bearer of culture recommends.

However, the adaptation of reason to its opposite, a state of con-

sciousness in which no firm identity has yet crystallized—represented by the bungling giant—culminates in the stratagem of the name. This is a widespread motif in folklore. In the Greek version it is a play on words; in a single word the name—Odysseus—and the intention—nobody—diverge. To modern ears *Odysseus* and *Udeis* still sound similar, and it is conceivable that in one of the dialects in which the story of the return to Ithaca was handed down, the name of the island's king did indeed sound the same as "nobody." The calculation that, once the deed was done, Polyphemus would answer "Nobody" when the tribe asked who was to blame, thus allowing the perpetrator to escape pursuit, is a thin rationalistic screen. In reality, Odysseus, the subject, denies his own identity, which makes him a subject, and preserves his life by mimicking the amorphous realm. He calls himself nobody because Polyphemus is not a self, and confusion of the name with the thing prevents the duped barbarian from escaping the trap: his cry for retribution remains magically tied to the name of the one on whom he wants to avenge himself, and this name condemns the cry to impotence. For by inserting his own intention into the name, Odysseus has withdrawn it from the magical sphere. But his self-assertion, as in the entire epic, as in all civilization, is self-repudiation. Thereby the self is drawn back into the same compulsive circle of natural connections from which it sought through adaptation to escape. The man who, for the sake of his own self, calls himself Nobody and manipulates resemblance to the natural state as a means of controlling nature, gives way to hubris. The artful Odysseus cannot do otherwise: as he flees, while still within the sphere controlled by the rock-hurling giant, he not only mocks Polyphemus but reveals to him his true name and origin, as if the primeval world still had such power over Odysseus, who always escaped only by the skin of his teeth, that he would fear to become Nobody again if he did not reestablish his own identity by means of the magical word which rational identity had just superseded. His friends try to restrain him from the folly of proclaiming his cleverness but do not succeed, and he narrowly escapes the hurled rocks, while the mention of his name probably brings down on him the hatred of Poseidon—who is hardly presented as omniscient. The cunning by which the clever man assumes the form of stupidity reverts to stupidity as soon as he discards that form. That is the dialectic of eloquence. From antiquity to fascism, Homer has been criticised for garrulousness—both in the hero and in the narrator. But the

Ionian has proved himself prophetically superior to Spartans old and new in his depiction of the doom which the fluency of the sly fox, the middleman, brings down on the latter. The speech which gets the better of physical strength is unable to curb itself. Its spate accompanies the stream of consciousness, thought itself, like a parody: thought's unwavering autonomy takes on a moment of manic folly when it enters reality as speech, as if thought and reality were synonymous, whereas the former has power over the latter only through distance. Such distance, however, is also suffering. For this reason the astute hero is always tempted to ignore the proverbial wisdom that silence is golden. He is driven objectively by the fear that, if he does not constantly uphold the fragile advantage the word has over violence, this advantage will be withdrawn by violence. For the word knows itself to be weaker than the nature it has duped. By talking too much he gives away the principle of violence and injustice underlying discourse and provokes in the feared adversary the very action he fears. The mythical compulsion acting on language in prehistory is perpetuated in the calamity which enlightened language brings on itself. "Udeis," who compulsively proclaims himself to be Odysseus, already bears features of the Jew who, in fear of death, continues to boast of a superiority which itself stems from the fear of death; revenge on the middleman stands not only at the end of bourgeois society but at its beginning, as the negative utopia toward which coercive violence tends in all its forms.

Unlike the stories of the escape from myth as an escape from barbaric cannibalism, the magical tale of Circe points back once more to the stage of actual magic. Magic disintegrates the self which falls back into its power and thus into the form of an earlier biological species. The power which causes the self's dissolution is, again, that of oblivion. With the fixed order of time, it gains control of the fixed will of the subject, which is based on that order. Circe seduces Odysseus's men into abandoning themselves to instinct, with which the animal form assumed by the victims has always been associated, while Circe has become the prototype of the courtesan, probably on the strength of the words of Hermes, which take her erotic initiatives for granted: "She will shrink from you in terror and invite you to her bed. Nor must you hesitate to accept the goddess' favors."[33] Circe's signature is ambiguity, and in the story she appears by turns as corrupter and helper; ambiguity is expressed even in her lineage: she is the daughter of Helios and the granddaughter of Oceanus.[34] In her

the elements of fire and water are not yet separated, and it is this indeterminacy—in contrast to the primacy of a particular aspect of nature, whether matriarchal or patriarchal—which constitutes the essence of promiscuity and of the courtesan, reappearing as a watery lunar reflection even in the gaze of a nineteenth-century prostitute.[35] The hetaera both bestows joy and destroys the autonomy of its recipient—that is her ambiguity. But she does not necessarily destroy the recipient himself: she holds fast to an older form of life.[36] Like the Lotus-eaters, Circe does not cause lethal harm to her guests, and even those she has turned into wild beasts are peaceable: "Prowling about the place were mountain wolves and lions, actually the drugged victims of Circe's magic, for they not only refrained from attacking my men but rose on their hind legs to caress them, with much wagging of their long tails, like dogs fawning on their master, as he comes from table, for the tasty bits they know he always brings."[37] The bewitched humans behave in a similar way to the wild animals which listen to the playing of Orpheus. The mythical command to which they have been subjected at the same time liberates the very nature which is suppressed in them. What is revoked by their relapse into myth is myth itself. The suppression of instinct which constitutes them as selves and separates them from beasts was the introverted form of the repression existing within the hopelessly closed cycle of nature, to which, according to an earlier theory, the name Circe alludes. But, as the idyll of the Lotus-eaters had done earlier, the violent magic which recalls them to an idealized prehistory not only makes them animals but brings about, in however delusive a form, a semblance of reconciliation. But because they were once men the civilizing epic cannot present their fate as anything other than a calamitous lapse, and in Homer's account there is hardly a trace of the pleasure which went with it. It is all the more emphatically expunged the more civilized the victims themselves are.[38] Odysseus's companions are not turned into sacred creatures of the wilderness, like earlier guests, but into squalid domestic animals, swine. The story of Circe may contain echoes of the chthonic cult of Demeter, for whom the pig was sacred.[39] But perhaps it is also the humanoid anatomy of the pig and its nakedness which explain this motif: as if the same taboo on mingling with the blood of similar species, which has survived among the Jews, already existed among the Ionians. Finally, one may think of the prohibition on cannibalism, since, as in Juvenal, the taste of human flesh has repeatedly been compared to

that of pigs. At any rate, later civilizations have always liked to apply the name of pig or swine to anyone whose impulses tended toward other pleasures than those sanctioned by society for its purposes. Magic and countermagic in the metamorphoses of Odysseus's companions are linked to herbs and wine, as intoxication and waking are to the sense of smell, which is increasingly suppressed and repressed and is closest not only to sex but to the remembrance of prehistory.[40] In the image of the pig, however, the joy of scent is distorted into the unfree snuffling[41] of someone who has his nose to the ground and has renounced the upright posture. It is as if, in the ritual to which she subjects the men, the sorceress-courtesan were reenacting the one to which she herself is repeatedly subjected by patriarchal society. Like her, women are predisposed, under the pressure of civilization, to adopt its judgment on women and to denigrate sex. In the conflict between enlightenment and myth, the traces of which are preserved in the epic, the powerful seductress is at the same time weak, obsolete, and vulnerable and needs the enslaved beasts as her escort.[42] As a representative of nature, woman in bourgeois society has become an enigma of irresistibility[43] and powerlessness. Thus she reflects back the vain lie of power, which substitutes the mastery over nature for reconciliation with it.

Marriage is society's middle way in dealing with this question: woman remains powerless in that her power is mediated to her only through her husband. Something of this is reflected in the defeat of the courtesan-goddess of the *Odyssey*, while the fully evolved marriage with Penelope, more recent in literary terms, represents a later stage in the objective structure of patriarchal arrangements. With the arrival of Odysseus on Aeaea,* the double meaning of the relationship of man to woman, of yearning to command, already takes on the form of an exchange underpinned by contracts. Odysseus resists Circe's magic. And he therefore receives actually what her magic promises only deceptively to those who fail to resist. Odysseus sleeps with her. But beforehand he makes her swear a solemn oath by the blessed gods. The oath is intended to protect the male from the mutilation which avenges the ban on promiscuity and male domination—although that domination, as a permanent suppression of instinct, symbolically performs the self-mutilation of the man in any case. Because of his resistance to metamorphosis, Circe accuses Odysseus of having "a heart in [his] breast which nothing enchants."[44] But she is also willing to submit to the man who has resisted her, the master, the self: "I beg you

now to put up your sword and come with me to my bed, so that in love and sleep we may learn to trust each other."[45] The price she places on the pleasure she bestows is the condition that pleasure should first have been spurned; the last hetaera emerges as the first female character. In the transition from legend to history she makes a decisive contribution to the bourgeois chill. Her behavior puts into effect the ban on love which later became all the more powerful the more love as ideology was obliged to dissimulate the hatred between the competing partners. In the world of exchange the one who gives more is in the wrong; but the one who loves is always the one who loves more. While the lover's sacrifice is glorified, the making of that sacrifice is jealously enforced. It is precisely in love itself that the lover is incriminated and punished. The inability to master himself and others demonstrated by his love is reason enough to deny him fulfillment. With society, loneliness reproduces itself on a wider scale. The mechanism operates even within the tenderest ramifications of feeling, until love itself, in order to have contact with another person at all, is forced to assume such coldness that it shatters at the moment of its realization. Circe's power, which subjugates men as her slaves, gives way to her enslavement to the man who, through renunciation, has refused to submit. The goddess Circe's influence over nature, ascribed to her by the poet, is reduced to priestly soothsaying and even to clever foresight with regard to coming nautical difficulties. This lives on in the caricature of feminine wisdom. In the end, the prophecies of the disempowered sorceress regarding the Sirens, Scylla, and Charybdis merely serve the purposes of male self-preservation.

How high a price was paid for the establishing of orderly arrangements for procreation is hinted at by the obscure passage on the behavior of Odysseus's friends when Circe had transformed them back into men as required by her contractual lord. First we read that "they not only became men again but looked younger and much handsomer and taller than before."[46] But those who are thus confirmed and strengthened in their manhood are not happy: "We were so moved that we all wept for happiness. It was a strange sound for those walls to echo."[47] The earliest wedding song, the accompaniment of the feast celebrating the rudimentary marriage which lasts only a year, may have sounded like this. The actual marriage to Penelope has more in common with it than might be supposed. Harlot and wife are complementary forms of female self-alienation

in the patriarchal world: the wife betrays pleasure to the fixed order of life and property, while the harlot, as her secret accomplice, brings within the property relationship that which the wife's property rights do not include—pleasure—by selling it. Circe and Calypso, the courtesans, are introduced as diligent weavers, thus resembling both mythical powers of fate and bourgeois housewives,[48] while Penelope, like a harlot, mistrustfully scrutinizes the returning Odysseus to make sure he is not really just an old beggar or even a god trying his luck. The much-lauded recognition scene is a truly patrician encounter: "For a long while Penelope, overwhelmed by wonder, sat there without a word. But her eyes were busy, at one moment resting full on his face, and at the next falling on the ragged clothes that made him seem a stranger once again."[49] There is no spontaneous upsurge of feeling; she is determined to avoid a mistake, which she can hardly afford under the weight of the order bearing down on her. This annoys the young Telemachus, who has not yet fully adapted himself to his future position yet already feels man enough to admonish his mother. By reproaching her with obstinacy and hardness, he exactly repeats the accusation of Circe against Odysseus. If the hetaera makes the patriarchal world order her own, the monogamous wife is not satisfied even with this and cannot rest until she has made herself conform to the male character. In this way the spouses settle their differences. The test she sets Odysseus concerns the immovable position of the marriage bed which her husband, as a young man, had constructed around an olive tree, a symbol of the unity of sex and property. With touching artfulness she refers to this bed as if it could be moved from the spot, whereupon her husband, "flaring up" and "rounding on" his wife, proceeds to give a circumstantial account of his durable amateur handiwork: as a prototypical bourgeois he is smart enough to have a hobby. It consists in a resumption of the craft work from which, within the framework of differentiated property relations, he has long since been exempted. He enjoys this occupation, as his freedom to perform superfluous tasks confirms his power over those who have to do such work in order to live. By this the ingenious Penelope recognizes him, flattering him with praise of his exceptional intelligence. But her flattery, which is not without a touch of mockery, is followed, in an abrupt caesura, by words which seek the reason for the suffering of all spouses in the gods' envy of the happiness guaranteed only by marriage, the "confirmation of the concept of permanence":[50] "All our unhappiness is due to the gods,

who couldn't bear to see us share the joys of youth and reach the threshold of old age together."[51] Marriage represents not only the account-balancing order of the living but also solidarity and steadfastness in face of death. In it reconciliation grows up around subjugation, just as in history up to now true humanity has flourished only in conjunction with the barbaric element which is veiled by "humane values." Even if the contract between the spouses sets aside the old hostility only with difficulty, nevertheless the couple aging in peace merges into the image of Philemon and Baucis, as the smoke from the sacrificial altar is transmuted into that rising beneficently from the hearth. Undoubtedly, marriage forms part of the primal rock of myth at the base of civilization. But its mythic solidity and permanence jut from myth, as the small island realm rises from the endless sea.

The farthest point reached on the odyssey proper is no such homely refuge. It is Hades. The images which appear to the adventurer in the first visit to the Underworld* are of matriarchal shades[52] who have been banished by the religion of light: his own mother, before whom Odysseus forces himself to maintain a purposive patriarchal hardness,[53] is followed by heroines from primeval times. The image of the mother, however, is powerless, blind, and speechless,[54] a phantom, like epic narrative at the moments when language gives way to images. Sacrificial blood is required as a pledge of living memory before the shades can speak, breaking free, however vainly and ephemerally, from mythic muteness. Only when subjectivity masters itself by recognizing the nullity of images does it begin to share the hope which images vainly promise. The Promised Land for Odysseus is not the archaic realm of images. Finally, all the images reveal their true essence as shades in the world of the dead, as illusion. Having recognized them as dead he dismisses them with the lordly gesture of self-preservation, banishing them from the sacrifice which he reserves for those who grant him knowledge which benefits his life. In such knowledge the power of myth, transposed into mental forms, survives only as imagination. The realm of the dead, where the disempowered myths gather, is farthest from his homeland, with which it can communicate only from the remotest distance. If one follows Kirchhoff in supposing that Odysseus's visit to the Underworld forms part of the oldest stratum of the epic, composed of actual legends,[55] then this oldest stratum also contains a tendency which—as in the tradition of the journeys to the Underworld of

Orpheus and Heracles—most decisively transcends myth. Indeed, the motif of forcing the gates of hell, of abolishing death, is the innermost cell of all antimythological thought. This antimythological element is contained in Teiresias's prophecy of the possible placation of Poseidon. Odysseus is to wander ever farther, carrying on his shoulder an oar, until he reaches a people "who know nothing of the sea and never use salt with their food."[56] When he meets another traveler who refers to the oar on his shoulder as a "winnowing fan," he will have reached the proper place to offer a sacrifice to Poseidon. The core of the prophecy is the mistaking of the oar for a winnowing fan. This must have struck the Ionian as compellingly comic. However, this comic effect, on which the reconciliation is made to depend, cannot have been directed at humans but at the wrathful Poseidon.[57] The misunderstanding is meant to amuse the fierce elemental god, in the hope that his anger might be dispersed in laughter. That would be analogous to the neighbor's advice in Grimm, explaining how a mother can rid herself of a changeling: "She should carry the changeling into the kitchen, set it on the hearth, light the fire and boil water in two eggshells. That would make the changeling laugh, and if he laughed then that would make an end of him."[58] If laughter up to now* has been a sign of violence, an outbreak of blind, obdurate nature, it nevertheless contains the opposite element, in that through laughter blind nature becomes aware of itself as such and thus abjures its destructive violence. This ambiguity of laughter is closely related to that of name; perhaps names are nothing but petrified laughter, as nicknames still are—the only ones in which the original act of name-giving still persists. Laughter is in league with the guilt of subjectivity, but in the suspension of law which it announces it also points beyond that complicity. It promises a passage to the homeland. It is a yearning for the homeland which sets in motion the adventures by which subjectivity, the prehistory of which is narrated in the *Odyssey*, escapes the primeval world. The fact that—despite the fascist lies to the contrary—the concept of homeland is opposed to myth constitutes the innermost paradox of epic. Precipitated in the epic is the memory of an historical age in which nomadism gave way to settlement, the precondition of any homeland. If the fixed order of property implicit in settlement is the source of human alienation, in which all homesickness and longing spring from a lost primal state, at the same time it is toward settlement and fixed property, on which alone the con-

cept of homeland is based, that all longing and homesickness are directed. Novalis's definition according to which all philosophy is homesickness holds good only if this longing is not dissipated in the phantasm of a lost original state, but homeland, and nature itself, are pictured as something that have had first to be wrested from myth. Homeland is a state of having escaped. For this reason the criticism that the Homeric legends "withdraw from the earth" is a warranty of their truth. They "turn to men."[59] The transposition of myths into the novel, as in the adventure story, does not falsify myth so much as drag it into the sphere of time, exposing the abyss which separates it from homeland and reconciliation. The vengeance wreaked by civilization on the primeval world has been terrible, and in this vengeance, the most horrifying document of which in Homer is to be found in the account of the mutilation of the goatherd Melanthios, civilization itself resembles the primeval world. It is not in the content of the deeds reported that civilization transcends that world. It is in the self-reflection which causes violence to pause at the moment of narrating such deeds. Speech itself, language as opposed to mythical song, the possibility of holding fast the past atrocity through memory, is the law of Homeric escape. Not without reason is the fleeing hero repeatedly introduced as narrator. The cold detachment of narrative, which describes even the horrible as if for entertainment, for the first time reveals in all their clarity the horrors which in song are solemnly confused with fate. But when speech pauses, the caesura allows the events narrated to be transformed into something long past, and causes to flash up a semblance of freedom that civilization has been unable wholly to extinguish ever since. Book XXII of the *Odyssey* describes the punishment meted out by the son of the island's king to the faithless maidservants who have sunk into harlotry. With an unmoved composure comparable in its inhumanity only to the *impassibilité* of the greatest narrative writers of the nineteenth century, the fate of the hanged victims is described and expressionlessly compared to the death of birds in a trap; and, as of the numb pause surrounding the narration at this point, it can truly be said that the rest of all speech is silence. This is followed by a statement reporting that "For a little while their feet kicked out, but not for very long."[60] The exactitude of the description, which already exhibits the coldness of anatomy and vivisection,[61] keeps a record, as in a novel, of the twitching of the subjugated women, who, under the aegis of justice and law, are thrust down into the realm from

which Odysseus the judge has escaped. As a citizen reflecting on the execution, Homer comforts himself and his listeners, who are really readers, with the certified observation that the kicking did not last long—a moment, and all was over.[62] But after the words "not for long" the inner flow of the narrative comes to rest. "Not for long?" the narrator asks by this device, giving the lie to his own composure. In being brought to a standstill, the report is prevented from forgetting the victims of the execution and lays bare the unspeakably endless torment of the single second in which the maids fought against death. No echo remains of the words "not for long" except Cicero's *Quo usque tandem* ["How much longer (will you try our patience)?"], which later rhetoricians unwittingly desecrated by claiming that patience for themselves. But in the report of the infamous deed, hope lies in the fact that it is long past. Over the raveled skein of prehistory, barbarism, and culture, Homer passes the soothing hand of remembrance, bringing the solace of "once upon a time." Only as the novel is the epic transmuted into fairy tale.



Excursus II: Juliette or Enlightenment and Morality

Enlightenment, in Kant's words, is "the human being's emergence from self-incurred minority. Minority is inability to make use of one's own understanding without direction from another."[1] "Understanding without direction from another" is understanding guided by reason. That amounts to saying that the mind combines its individual cognitions into a system in accordance with its own internal logic. "Reason has . . . as its sole object the understanding and its effective application."[2] It posits "a certain collective unity as the goal of the activities of the understanding,"[3] and this unity is the system. Reason's rules are instructions for a hierarchical ordering of concepts. For Kant, as for Leibniz and Descartes, rationality consists in "processes of ascending to the higher genera and of descending to the lower species [by which] we obtain the idea of systematic connection in its completeness."[4] The "systematization" of knowledge lies in "the connection of its parts in conformity with a single principle."[5] Thinking, as understood by the Enlightenment, is the process of establishing a unified, scientific order and of deriving factual knowledge from principles, whether these principles are interpreted as arbitrarily posited axioms, innate ideas, or the highest abstractions. The laws of logic establish the most universal relationships within the order and define them. Unity lies in self-consistency. The principle of contradiction is the system *in nuce.* Knowledge consists in subsumption under principles. It is one with judgment, by which perceptions are incorporated into the system. Any think-

ing not guided by the system is directionless or authoritarian. Reason contributes nothing but the idea of systematic unity, the formal elements of fixed conceptual relationships. Any substantial objective which might be put forward as a rational insight is, according to the Enlightenment in its strict sense, delusion, falsehood, "rationalization," no matter what pains individual philosophers may take to steer us away from this conclusion and toward a reliance on philanthropic feeling. Reason is "a faculty of deducing the particular from the universal."[6] According to Kant, the homogeneity of the general and the particular is guaranteed by the "schematism of pure understanding," by which he means the unconscious activity of the intellectual mechanism which structures perception in accordance with the understanding. The intelligibility which subjective judgment discovers in any matter is imprinted on that matter by the intellect as an objective quality before it enters the ego. Without such a schematism—in short, without the intellectual element in perception—no impression would conform to the corresponding concept, no category to the particular example; thought, not to speak of the system toward which everything is directed, would be devoid of unity. To establish this unity is the conscious task of science. If "all empirical laws [are] only special determinations of the pure laws of understanding,"[7] research must always ensure that the principles are properly linked to the factual judgments. "This harmony of nature with our cognitive faculty is presupposed *a priori* by the Judgment."[8] It is the "guiding thread"[9] of organized experience.

The system must be kept in harmony with nature; just as facts are predicted from the system, so they must confirm it. Facts, however, form part of praxis; they everywhere characterize the contact of the individual subject with nature as social object: experience is always real action and suffering. In physics, to be sure, the perception by which a theory can be proved is usually reduced to the electrical spark appearing in the experimental apparatus. Its nonappearance is generally of no practical consequence; it merely destroys the theory or, at most, the career of the research assistant responsible for setting up the experiment. However, laboratory conditions are the exception. A thinking which fails to maintain agreement between system and perception does not merely violate isolated visual impressions; it conflicts with real praxis. Not only does the expected event fail to occur but the unexpected happens: the bridge collapses, the crop fails, the medicine causes illness. The spark which most conclusively

indicates a lack of systematic thinking, a violation of logic, is not a fleeting perception but sudden death. The system which enlightenment aims for is the form of knowledge which most ably deals with the facts, most effectively assists the subject in mastering nature. The system's principles are those of self-preservation. Immaturity amounts to the inability to survive. The bourgeois in the successive forms of the slave-owner, the free entrepreneur, and the administrator is the logical subject of enlightenment.

The difficulties within this concept of reason, arising from the fact that its subjects, the bearers of one and the same reason, are in real opposition to each other, are concealed in the Western Enlightenment behind the apparent clarity of its judgments. In the *Critique of Pure Reason,* however, those difficulties make themselves apparent in the unclear relationship of the transcendental to the empirical ego and in the other irreconcilable contradictions. Kant's concepts are ambiguous. Reason as the transcendental, supraindividual self contains the idea of a free coexistence in which human beings organize themselves to form the universal subject and resolve the conflict between pure and empirical reason in the conscious solidarity of the whole. The whole represents the idea of true universality, utopia. At the same time, however, reason is the agency of calculating thought, which arranges the world for the purposes of self-preservation and recognizes no function other than that of working on the object as mere sense material in order to make it the material of subjugation. The true nature of the schematism which externally coordinates the universal and the particular, the concept and the individual case, finally turns out, in current science, to be the interest of industrial society. Being is apprehended in terms of manipulation and administration. Everything—including the individual human being, not to mention the animal—becomes a repeatable, replaceable process, a mere example of the conceptual models of the system. Conflict between administrative, reifying science, between the public mind and the experience of the individual, is precluded by the prevailing circumstances. The senses are determined by the conceptual apparatus in advance of perception; the citizen sees the world as made *a priori* of the stuff from which he himself constructs it. Kant intuitively anticipated what Hollywood has consciously put into practice: images are precensored during production by the same standard of understanding which will later determine their reception by viewers.

The perception by which public judgment feels itself confirmed has been shaped by that judgment even before the perception takes place. Although the secret utopia harbored within the concept of reason may have glimpsed the repressed identical interest which lies beyond the diverse accidental interests of subjects, reason, operating under the pressure of purposes merely as systematic science, not only levels out the differences but standardizes the identical interest. It acknowledges no determination other than the classifications of the social operation. No one is different to the purpose for which he has been produced: a useful, successful, or failed member of professional and national groups. He is a single, random representative of his geographical, psychological, and sociological type. Logic is democratic: in this respect the great have no advantage over the most menial. The former are counted as prominent citizens while the latter are prospective objects of welfare relief. Science stands in the same relationship to nature and human beings in general as insurance theory stands to life and death in particular. Who dies is unimportant; what matters is the ratio of incidences of death to the liabilities of the company. It is the law of large numbers, not the particular case, which recurs in the formula. Nor is the concordance of general and particular concealed any longer within an intellect which always perceives the particular as a case of the general and the general only as the aspect of the particular by which it can be grasped and manipulated. Science itself has no awareness of itself; it is merely a tool. Enlightenment, however, is the philosophy which equates truth with the scientific system. Kant's attempt to justify this identity, which was still made with a philosophical intention, gave rise to concepts which have no meaning for science, since they are not simply instructions for performing manipulations according to certain rules. The notion of the self-understanding of science conflicts with the concept of science itself. Kant's work transcends experience as mere operation, and for that reason—and in accordance with its own principles—is rejected as dogmatic by enlightenment today. In confirming the scientific system as the embodiment of truth—the result arrived at by Kant—thought sets the seal on its own insignificance, because science is a technical operation, as far removed from reflection on its own objectives as is any other form of labor under the pressure of the system.

The moral teachings of the Enlightenment bear witness to the hopelessness of attempting to replace enfeebled religion by an intellectual

motive for enduring within society when material interest no longer suffices. As solid citizens, philosophers ally themselves in practice with the powers they condemn in theory. The theories are logical and hard while the moral philosophies are propagandistic and sentimental, even when rigorous in tone, or else the moral philosophies are acts of violence performed in the awareness that morality is nondeducible, like Kant's recourse to treating moral forces as facts. His attempt to derive the duty of mutual respect from a law of reason, although more cautious than any other such undertaking in Western philosophy, has no support within the *Critique*. It is the usual endeavor of bourgeois thought to ground the respect without which civilization cannot exist on something other than material interest—an attempt more sublime and paradoxical than any that went before, but just as ephemeral. The citizen who renounced a profit out of the Kantian motive of respect for the mere form of the law would not be enlightened but superstitious—a fool. The root of Kantian optimism, according to which moral actions are reasonable even when base ones are likely to prosper, is a horror of relapsing into barbarism. If—Kant writes in response to Haller[10]—one of these great moral forces, reciprocal love and respect, were to collapse, "then nothingness (immorality) with gaping maw would drink the whole realm of (moral) beings like a drop of water." But, according to Kant, from the standpoint of scientific reason moral forces are neutral drives and forms of behavior, no less than immoral ones, which they immediately become when no longer directed at that hidden possibility but at reconciliation with power. Enlightenment expels difference from theory. It considers "human actions and desires exactly as if I were dealing with lines, planes, and bodies."[11] The totalitarian order has put this into effect in utter seriousness. Freed from supervision by one's own class, which had obliged the nineteenth-century businessman to maintain Kantian respect and reciprocal love, fascism,* which by its iron discipline relieves its peoples of the burden of moral feelings, no longer needs to observe any discipline. Contrary to the categorical imperative, and all the more deeply in accord with pure reason, it treats human beings as things, centers of modes of behavior. The rulers sought to shield the bourgeois world from the flood of naked violence, which now has broken over Europe, only for as long as economic concentration was insufficiently advanced. Previously only the poor and savages had been exposed to the untrammeled force of the capitalist elements. But the totalitarian order has

granted unlimited rights to calculating thought and puts its trust in science as such. Its canon is its own brutal efficiency.* From Kant's *Critique* to Nietzsche's *Genealogy of Morals*, the hand of philosophy had traced the writing on the wall; one individual put that writing into practice, in all its details. The work of the Marquis de Sade exhibits "understanding without direction from another"—that is to say, the bourgeois subject freed from all tutelage.

Self-preservation is the constitutive principle of science, the soul of the table of categories, even if, as in Kant, it has to be deduced idealistically. Even the ego, the synthetic unity of apperception, the agency which Kant calls the highest point, from which the whole of logic must be suspended,[12] is really both the product and the condition of material existence. Individuals, in having to fend for themselves, develop the ego as the agency of reflective foresight and overview; over successive generations it expands and contracts with the individual's prospects of economic autonomy and productive ownership. Finally it passes from the expropriated citizens to the totalitarian trust-masters, whose science has become the quintessence of the methods by which the subjugated mass society reproduces itself. Sade erected an early monument to their planning skills. The conspiracy of rulers against peoples, implemented by relentless organization, finds the Enlightenment spirit since Machiavelli and Hobbes no less compliant than the bourgeois republic. That spirit is hostile to authority only when authority lacks the strength to enforce obedience, and to violence only when violence is not an established fact. As long as one does not ask who is applying it, reason has no greater affinity with violence than with mediation; depending on the situation of individuals and groups, it presents either peace or war, tolerance or repression, as the given state of affairs. Because it unmasks substantial goals as asserting the power of nature over mind and as curtailing its own self-legislation, reason, as a purely formal entity, is at the service of every natural interest. Becoming simply an organ, thinking reverts to nature. For the rulers, however, human beings become mere material, as the whole of nature has become material for society. After the brief interlude of liberalism in which the bourgeois kept one another in check, power is revealing itself as archaic terror in a fascistically rationalized form.* "The religious chimeras," says the Prince of Francavilla at the court of King Ferdinand of Naples, "must be replaced by utmost terror. The people must be freed from the fear of a

future Hell. Once that is destroyed they will abandon themselves to anything. But that chimerical fear must be replaced by penal laws of enormous severity, which apply, of course, only to the people, since they alone cause unrest in the state. Malcontents are born only to the lower classes. What do the rich care for the idea of a leash they will never feel themselves, if this empty semblance gives them the right to grind down those living under their yoke? You will find no one in that class who will not permit the darkest shadow of tyranny to fall on him, provided it really falls on others."[13] Reason is the organ of calculation, of planning; it is neutral with regard to ends; its element is coordination. More than a century before the emergence of sport, Sade demonstrated empirically what Kant grounded transcendentally: the affinity between knowledge and planning which has set its stamp of inescapable functionality on a bourgeois existence rationalized even in its breathing spaces. The precisely coordinated modern sporting squad, in which no member is in doubt over his role and a replacement is held ready for each, has its exact counterpart in the sexual teams of Juliette, in which no moment is unused, no body orifice neglected, no function left inactive. In sport, as in all branches of mass culture, a tense, purposive bustle prevails, although none but the wholly initiated observer could fathom the different combinations or the meaning of the game's changing fortunes, governed by arbitrarily chosen rules. The special architectonic structure of the Kantian system, like the gymnasts' pyramids in Sade's orgies and the formalized principles of early bourgeois freemasonry—cynically reflected in the strict regime of the libertine society of the *120 Days of Sodom*—prefigures the organization, devoid of any substantial goals, which was to encompass the whole of life. What seems to matter in such events, more than pleasure itself, is the busy pursuit of pleasure, its organization; just as in other demythologized epochs, imperial Rome, the Renaissance, and the Baroque, the schema of activity counted for more than its content. In the modern period enlightenment has released the ideas of harmony and perfection from their hypostatization in a religious Beyond and made them available as criteria for human endeavor within the form of the system. Once the utopia which inspired the hopes of the French Revolution had been absorbed, potently and impotently, into German music and philosophy, the established bourgeois order entirely functionalized reason. It became a purposiveness without purpose, which for that very reason could be harnessed to any end. It is planning

considered as an end in itself. The totalitarian state manipulates nations. "Just so," replies the Prince in Sade to the speaker just quoted, "the government itself must control the population. It must possess the means to exterminate the people, should it fear them, or to increase their numbers, should it consider that necessary. And nothing should weigh in the balance of its justice except its own interests or passions, together only with the passions and interests of those who, as we have said, have been granted just enough power to multiply our own."[14] The Prince points the path which imperialism, reason in its most terrible form, has always followed. "Take away its god from the people you wish to subjugate and you will demoralize it. As long as it has no other god than yours, you will always be its master . . . Grant it in return the widest, most criminal license. Never punish it, except when it turns against you."[15]

As reason posits no substantial goals, all affects are equally remote to it. They are merely natural. The principle according to which reason is simply opposed to everything unreasonable underlies the true opposition between enlightenment and mythology. The latter recognizes spirit only as something immersed in nature, a natural power. For it, inward impulses, like outward forces, are living powers of divine or demonic origin. Enlightenment, by contrast, relocates context, meaning, and life entirely within a subjectivity which is actually constituted only by this relocation. For enlightenment, reason is the chemical agent which absorbs the real substance of things and volatilizes it into the mere autonomy of reason. In order to escape the superstitious fear of nature, enlightenment has presented effective objective entities and forms without exception as mere veils of chaotic matter and condemned matter's influence on the human agent as enslavement, until the subject, according to its own concept, had been turned into a single, unrestricted, empty authority. The whole force of nature became a mere undifferentiated resistance to the abstract power of the subject. The particular mythology which the Western Enlightenment, including Calvinism, had to do away with was the Catholic doctrine of the *ordo* and the pagan popular religion which continued to flourish beneath it. To liberate human beings from such beliefs was the objective of bourgeois philosophy. However, the liberation went further than its humane originators had intended. The market economy it unleashed was at once the prevailing form of reason and the power which ruined reason. The Romantic reactionaries only expressed what the bourgeois themselves

had realized: that freedom in their world tended toward organized anarchy. The Catholic counterrevolution's critique of the Enlightenment proved no less valid than the Enlightenment's critique of Catholicism. The Enlightenment had pinned its colors to liberalism. If all affects are of equal value, then self-preservation, which dominates the form of the system in any case, seems to offer the most plausible maxims for action. It was to be given free rein in the free economy. The somber writers of the early bourgeois period, such as Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Mandeville, who spoke up for the egoism of the self, thereby recognized society as the destructive principle and denounced harmony before it was elevated to the official doctrine by the bearers of light, the classicists. The former writers exposed the totality of the bourgeois order as the horrifying entity which finally engulfed both, the general and the particular, society and the self. With the development of the economic system* in which the control of the economic apparatus by private groups creates a division between human beings, self-preservation, although treated by reason as identical, had become the reified drive of each individual citizen and proved to be a destructive natural force no longer distinguishable from self-destruction. The two principles combined in a murky fusion. Pure reason became unreason, a procedure as immune to errors as it was devoid of content. However, with the revolutionary avant-garde, the utopia which proclaimed the reconciliation between nature and the self emerged from its hiding place in German philosophy as something at once irrational and reasonable, as the idea of the community of free individuals*—and brought down on itself the full fury of reason. In society as it is, despite feeble moralistic attempts to propagate humanity as the most rational means, self-preservation remains unencumbered by a utopia denounced as myth. For those at the top, shrewd self-preservation means the fascist struggle for power, and for individuals it means adaptation to injustice at any price. Enlightened reason no more possesses the means of measuring one drive within itself against others than of ordering the universe into spheres. It rightly exposes the notion of hierarchy in nature as a reflection of medieval society, and later attempts to demonstrate a new order of values bear the unmistakable taint of mendacity. The irrationalism which is evident in such futile reconstructions is far from opposing industrial reason.* Whereas great philosophy, in Leibniz and Hegel, had recognized a claim to truth even in subjective and objective forms of expression—feel-

ings, institutions, works of art—which do not amount to actual ideas, irrationalism, here as elsewhere showing its kinship to the last dregs of the Enlightenment, modern positivism, draws a strict line between feeling, in the form of religion and art, and anything deserving the name of knowledge. Although irrationalism restricts cold reason in favor of immediate life, it turns the latter into a principle merely hostile to thought. Under cover of this illusory enmity feeling, and finally all human expression, indeed culture itself, is stripped of any responsibility to thought and transformed into the neutralized element of the all-embracing rationality of an economic system* long since grown irrational. From the first, that reason has been unable to rely on its attractive power alone and has supplemented it with the cult of emotions. In appealing to this cult, it turns against its own medium, thought, which was always suspect to this self-estranged form of reason. The tender effusions of lovers in films already function as a blow against dispassionate theory, and that is taken further in the sentimental argument against any thought which attacks injustice. This elevation of feelings to an ideology does not abolish the contempt in which they are really held. The fact that, compared to the starry heights into which ideology transposes them, they appear all the more vulgar merely contributes to their ostracism.. The verdict on feelings was already implicit in the formalization of reason. Even self-preservation, as a natural drive like other impulses, has a bad conscience; only bustling efficiency and the institutions created to serve it—mediation, apparatus, organization, systematization as ends in themselves—enjoy the esteem, in practice as in theory, of being deemed reasonable; the emotions are incorporated into this spurious reason.

The Enlightenment of the modern age has been marked from the first by radicalism: This fact distinguishes it from all earlier stages of demythologization. As a rule, whenever a new religion and a new mentality have won a place in world history, bringing a new mode of social existence, the old gods have been cast into the dust together with the old classes, tribes, and peoples. But especially when a people, such as the Jews, has taken on a new form of social life as a result of its own fate, its venerable customs, sacred actions, and objects of worship have been magically transformed into abominable misdeeds and terrifying specters. The phobias and idiosyncrasies of today, the character traits which are most despised and derided, can be deciphered as marks of a huge advance in human

development. From the disgust aroused by excrement and human flesh to the contempt for fanaticism, idleness, and poverty, both spiritual and material, a line connects behavioral forms which were once adequate and necessary to those which are abominated. This line is at once that of destruction and of civilization. Each step has been an advance, a stage of enlightenment. But whereas all the earlier changes, from preanimism to magic, from matriarchal to patriarchal culture, from the polytheism of the slave traders to the Catholic hierarchy, replaced the older mythologies with new albeit enlightened ones, the Great Mother with the God of Hosts, the totem with the veneration of the Lamb, in the glare of enlightened reason any devotion which believed itself objective, grounded in the matter at hand, was dispelled as mythological. All preexisting ties were tabooed by this verdict, not excluding those which were necessary to the existence of the bourgeois order itself. The instrument by means of which the bourgeoisie had come to power, the unfettering of forces, universal freedom, self-determination—in short, enlightenment—turned against the bourgeoisie as soon as that class, as a system of rule, was forced to suppress those it ruled. By virtue of its principle, enlightenment does not stop short at the minimum of belief without which the bourgeois world could not exist. It does not render to power the reliable services which had always been performed for it by the old ideologies. Its antiauthoritarian tendency, which communicates, if only subterraneously, with the utopia contained in the concept of reason, finally made it as inimical to the established bourgeoisie as to the aristocracy, with which, indeed, it lost no time in forming alliances. Ultimately, the antiauthoritarian principle necessarily becomes its own antithesis, the agency opposed to reason: its abolition of all absolute ties allows power to decree and manipulate any ties which suit its purposes. After civic virtue and charity, for which it never offered good reasons, philosophy proclaimed authority and hierarchy as virtues, when enlightenment had long since revealed them as lies. But against such perversion of itself enlightenment, too, had no arguments, since pristine truth has no advantage over distortion, or rationalization over reason, unless it can demonstrate a practical one as well. With the formalization of reason, theory itself, if it seeks to be more than a cipher for neutral procedures, becomes an incomprehensible concept, and thought is deemed meaningful only after the sacrifice of meaning. Once harnessed to the dominant mode of production, enlightenment, which strives to under-

mine any order which has become repressive, nullifies itself. This is expressed in the early attacks of the current form of enlightenment on the "all-crushing" Kant. Just as Kant's moral philosophy set limits to his enlightened critique in order to rescue the possibility of reason, unreflecting enlightened thinking has always sought, for its own survival, to cancel itself with skepticism, in order to make room for the existing order.

In contrast to such precautions, the work of Sade, like that of Nietzsche, is an intransigent critique of practical reason, beside which even that of Kant himself appears like a revocation of his own thought. It pushes the scientific principle to annihilating extremes. Kant, to be sure, had so purified the moral law within the self of any heteronymous belief that respect, despite his assurances, could be no more than a psychological fact of nature, as the starry sky above the self was a physical one. "A fact of reason," he called it,[16] while Leibniz termed it "a general instinct of society."[17] But facts count for nothing where they do not exist. Sade does not deny their occurrence. Justine, the virtuous sister, is a martyr to the moral law. Juliette, however, draws the conclusion the bourgeoisie sought to avoid: she demonizes Catholicism as the latest mythology, and with it civilization as a whole. The energies previously focused on the sacrament are now devoted, perversely, to sacrilege. This inversion is extended to community in general. In all this Juliette does not proceed fanatically, as Catholicism had done with the Incas, but merely attends to the business of sacrilege in the efficient, enlightened way that Catholics, too, still had in their blood from archaic times. The primeval forms of behavior which had been tabooed by civilization, and had grown destructive under the stigma of bestiality, had led an underground life. Juliette revives them in their outlawed, not their natural form. She compensates the value judgment against them—which, like all value judgments, was unfounded—by its opposite. Thus, when she reenacts the primitive reactions they are no longer primitive but bestial. In psychological terms Juliette, not unlike Merteuil in *Les Liaisons Dangereuses*,[18] embodies neither unsublimated nor regressive libido but intellectual pleasure in regression, *amor intellectualis diaboli*, the joy of defeating civilization with its own weapons. She loves systems and logic. She wields the instrument of rational thought with consummate skill. As far as self-mastery is concerned, her instructions sometimes stand in the same relation to Kant's as the special application does to the principle. "Virtue," writes the latter,[19] "in so far as it is grounded on

inner freedom, also contains an affirmative imperative for men, namely to place all their capacities and inclinations under the power [of reason] and therefore under the authority over oneself, which imperative is added to the interdiction on allowing oneself to be commanded by one's feelings and inclinations [the duty of apathy]. For unless reason takes the reins of government into its hands, those feelings and inclinations will play the master over men." Juliette teaches as follows on the self-discipline of the criminal: "First, reflect on your plan for several days in advance. Consider all its consequences, paying attention to what can be useful to you . . . and what might possibly betray you. Weigh these things just as soberly as if you were sure to be discovered."[20] The murderer's face must show utmost calm. "Let your features show calm and indifference. Try to acquire the greatest possible callousness in this situation. . . . If you are unsure of being free of pangs of conscience—and you will gain such certainty only through the habit of crime—if you are unsure of this, I say, then you will labor in vain to master the play of your features."[21] To be free of the stab of conscience is as essential to formalistic reason as to be free of love or hate. Remorse posits the past—which, contrary to popular ideology, has always meant nothing to the bourgeoisie—as something which exists; it is a relapse, to prevent which, for bourgeois praxis, would be remorse's only justification. Spinoza, following the Stoics, states the matter as follows: "Repentance is not a virtue, or, in other words, it does not arise from reason, but he who repents of an action is twice as unhappy or as weak as before."[22] But he goes on at once, quite in the spirit of Francavilla: "If the mob is not in fear, it threatens in its turn,"[23] thus maintaining, as a good student of Machiavelli, that modesty and remorse, like fear and hope, are undoubtedly useful, however contrary to reason. "Apathy (considered as a strength) is a necessary presupposition of virtue," writes Kant,[24] distinguishing, not unlike Sade, between this "moral apathy" and insensibility in the sense of indifference to sensory stimulation. Enthusiasm is bad. Calm and resolution constitute the strength of virtue. "That is the state of health in moral life, whereas the affect, even when it is excited by the idea of the good, is a momentarily lustrous phenomenon which leaves behind lassitude."[25] Juliette's friend Clairwil makes exactly the same observation with regard to vice.[26] "My soul is hardened, and I am far from preferring sensibility to the happy indifference I now enjoy. Oh Juliette . . . perhaps you are deceiving yourself about the dangerous sensibility prized by so

many fools." Apathy arises at the turning points in bourgeois history, as in the history of antiquity, when the *pauci beati* become aware of their powerlessness in face of the overwhelming historical tendency. It marks the retreat of the individual's spontaneity into the private sphere, which is thus established as the truly bourgeois form of existence. Stoicism—which is the bourgeois philosophy—makes it easier for the privileged to look what threatens them in the eye by dwelling on the suffering of others. It affirms the general by elevating private existence, as protection from it, to the status of a principle. The private sphere of the bourgeois* is an upper-class cultural asset which has come down in the world.

Juliette's *credo* is science. She abominates any veneration which cannot be shown to be rational: belief in God and his dead son, obedience to the Ten Commandments, preference of the good to the wicked, salvation to sin. She is attracted by those reactions which have been proscribed by the legends of civilization. She manipulates semantics and logical syntax like the most up-to-date positivist, but unlike that employee of the latest administration she does not direct her linguistic criticism primarily against thought and philosophy but, as a daughter of the militant Enlightenment, against religion. "A dead God!" she says of Christ. "Nothing is more comical than this nonsensical combination of words from the Catholic dictionary: God, which means eternal; death, which means not eternal. Idiotic Christians, what do you intend to do with your dead God?"[27] The conversion of what is condemned without scientific proof into something to be striven for, and of what is respected without proof into an object of revulsion, the transvaluation of values, the "courage to do the forbidden,"[28] though without the telltale histrionics of Nietzsche's "*Wohlan!*" [Onward!] and without his biological idealism, is her specific passion. "Are pretexts needed, to commit crimes?" asks Princess Borghese, Juliette's friend, quite in Nietzsche's spirit.[29] Nietzsche proclaims the quintessence of her doctrine.[30] "Let the weaklings and failures go to ruin: the *first* principle of our philanthropy. And we should help them on their way. What is more damaging than any vice? The pity of active people for the unsuccessful and the weak—Christianity."[31] The latter, "with its curious interest in overthrowing tyrants and making them submit to principles of brotherhood . . . plays the game of the weak. It represents the weak, and has to speak like them. . . . We may be sure that such fraternal bonds were not only proposed but put in place by the weak, when priestly power had

chanced to fall into their hands."[32] This contribution to the genealogy of morals is made by Noirceuil, Juliette's mentor. Nietzsche maliciously celebrates the mighty and their cruelty when it is directed "outside their circle," that is, against everything alien to themselves. "Once abroad in the wilderness, they revel in the freedom from social constraint and compensate for their long confinement in the quietude of their own community. They revert to the innocence of wild animals: we can imagine them returning from an orgy of murder, arson, rape, and torture, jubilant and at peace with themselves as though they had committed a fraternity prank—convinced, moreover, that the poets for a long time to come will have something to sing about and praise. . . . This 'boldness' of noble races, so headstrong, absurd, incalculable, sudden, improbable, . . . their utter indifference to safety and comfort, their terrible pleasure in destruction, their taste for cruelty,"[33] this boldness, stridently proclaimed by Nietzsche, has also taken hold of Juliette. "Live dangerously" is her message, too: "Dare henceforth to do anything without fear."[34] There are the strong and the weak, there are classes, races, and nations which dominate and others which are subjected. "Where, I ask you," cries Verneuil, "is the mortal stupid enough in face of all the evidence to claim that all men are born equal, in law and in fact? It was left to a misanthropist like Rousseau to put forward such a paradox, since, being extremely weak, he wanted to pull down those to whose level he was unable to raise himself. What effrontery did it take, I ask you, for this pygmy four feet two inches tall to compare himself to the model of stature and strength whom nature had endowed with the strength and figure of a Hercules? Is that not the same as comparing a fly to an elephant? Strength, beauty, stature, eloquence: those are the virtues which were decisive when authority passed to the rulers at the dawn of society."[35] "To expect that strength will not manifest itself as strength," Nietzsche goes on,[36] "as the desire to overcome, to appropriate, to have enemies, obstacles, and triumphs, is every bit as absurd as to expect that weakness will manifest itself as strength."—"How do you really expect" says Verneuil,[37] "a man endowed by nature with the highest predisposition for crime, whether through his superior strength, the refinement of his senses or as a result of an education fitting to his class or his wealth—how, I ask, do you expect this individual to be judged by the same law as those whom everything constrains to act virtuously and moderately? Would the law be more just if it punished both in the same way?

Is it natural for someone whom everything invites to do evil to be treated like someone whom everything impels to behave with prudence?"

Once the objective order of nature has been dismissed as prejudice and myth, nature is no more than a mass of material. For Nietzsche there is no law "which we not only recognize but recognize over us."[38] To the extent that the understanding, which was formed against the standard of self-preservation, recognizes any law of life, it is that of the stronger. While reason, because of its formalism, is unable to yield any necessary model for humanity, it has the advantage of actuality, in contrast to mendacious ideology. It is the weak who are guilty, according to Nietzsche's doctrine, since they use cunning to circumvent the natural law. "It is the diseased who imperil mankind, and not the 'beasts of prey.' It is the predestined failures and victims who undermine the social structure, who poison our faith in life and our fellow men."[39] They have spread throughout the world the Christianity which Nietzsche hates and abominates no less than Sade. "It is not the reprisals of the weak against the strong which truly conform to nature. They exist in the mental realm, not the physical. To carry out such reprisals the weak man would need strength he has not been given. He would have to assume a character which is by no means his—in a certain way he would do violence to nature. What is truthful in the laws of this wise mother is that the strong are allowed to injure the weak, since, to act in this way, they must only use the gifts they have received. The strong individual does not, like the weak, disguise himself with a character other than his own. He merely expresses in action what he has received from nature. Everything which follows from that is therefore natural: his oppression, his violence, his cruelties, his tyrannies, his injustices . . . are pure, like the hand which has imprinted them on him. And if the strong person exercises all his rights to oppress and pillage the weak, he is only doing the most natural thing in the world. . . . We should never, therefore, have scruples over what we are able to take from the weak, since it is not we who are committing the crime. Rather, it is the defense or revenge of the weak which are characteristic of crime."[40] If a weak person defends himself, he does wrong, "the wrong of stepping outside his own character of weakness, which nature has impressed on him. She created him to be a slave, and poor. He refuses to submit; that is his wrong."[41] In such magisterial speeches Dorval, the leader of a respectable Paris gang, expounds for Juliette the secret creed of all ruling classes, a creed to which Nietzsche,

proclaiming it to his own time, added the psychology of resentment. Like Juliette he admired "the beautiful terribleness of the deed,"[42] even though, as a German professor, he differed from Sade in rejecting criminality, because its egoism "is restricted to such base goals. If its goals are lofty humanity has a different standard, judging 'crime,' even when committed with the most terrible means, not to be such."[43] The enlightened Juliette is still free of such prejudice in favor of greatness, a prejudice which, indeed, is characteristic of the bourgeois world; for her the racketeer is not less admirable than the minister because his victims are fewer. For the German, however, beauty is a function of size, and amid the twilight of the idols he cannot shake off the idealistic habit of wanting to see the petty thief hanged while imperialist raids are transfigured into world-historical missions. By elevating the cult of strength to a world-historical doctrine, German fascism took it to its absurd conclusion. As a protest against civilization the master morality perversely upheld the oppressed: hatred of stunted instincts objectively exposes the true nature of the slave masters, which reveals itself only in their victims. But, in the guise of a great power and a state religion, the master morality places itself entirely in the service of the civilizing powers that be, of the solid majority, of resentment and everything it once opposed. The realization of Nietzsche's doctrines both refutes them and reveals their truth—a truth which, despite his yea-saying affirmation of life, was hostile to the spirit of reality.

If remorse was contrary to reason, pity was outright sin. Anyone who yields to it "perverts the general law; whence it follows that pity, far from being a virtue, becomes truly a vice as soon as it induces us to interfere with the inequality required by the laws of nature."[44] Sade and Nietzsche realized that once reason had been formalized pity was left behind as a kind of sensuous awareness of the identity of general and particular, as naturalized mediation. It then forms a highly compelling prejudice: "compassion . . . does not appertain to the use of reason . . . although it seems to bear in it a sort of piety," writes Spinoza,[45] and "he who is moved neither by reason nor pity to help others is rightly called inhuman."[46] *Commiseratio* is humanity in its immediate form, but at the same time "bad and useless,"[47] since it is the opposite of the manly competence which, from Roman *virtus* through the Medici to efficiency under the Fords, has always been the true bourgeois virtue. Womanish and childish, Clairwil calls pity, vaunting her own "stoicism," the "tranquility of the pas-

sions" which enables her "to accomplish and endure everything without agitation."[48] "Pity is anything but a virtue. It is a weakness, born of fear and misfortune, a weakness that must be overcome most of all if one is striving to conquer excessive nervous sensibility, which is irreconcilable with the maxims of philosophy."[49] Women are the source of "outbursts of unrestrained compassion."[50] Sade and Nietzsche knew that their doctrine of the sinfulness of pity was an old bourgeois heritage. The latter speaks of "strong times" and "aristocratic cultures," while the former refers to Aristotle[51] and the Peripatetics.[52] Pity could not withstand the scrutiny of philosophy. Nor did Kant make an exception. Pity was, he said, "a certain soft-heartedness" and lacked "the dignity of virtue."[53] He failed to notice, however, that the principle of "general benevolence toward the human race,"[54] by which, in contrast to Clairwil's rationalism, he sought to replace pity, falls under the same curse of irrationality as "this well-meaning passion" which can easily seduce a person into becoming "a tender-hearted idler." Enlightenment cannot be duped; for it the general has no advantage over the particular fact, or an all-embracing love over a limited one. Pity stands in disrepute. Like Sade, Nietzsche cites the *Ars poetica* in passing judgment. "According to Aristotle, the Greeks often suffered an excess of pity: hence its necessary discharge through tragedy. We can see how suspect this inclination appeared to them. It endangers the state, takes away the necessary hardness and discipline, makes heroes howl like women."[55] Zarathustra preaches: "I see as much weakness as goodness. As much weakness as justice and pity."[56] Pity has, in fact, a moment which conflicts with justice, although Nietzsche lumps the two together. It confirms the rule of inhumanity by the exception it makes. By limiting the abolition of injustice to fortuitous love of one's neighbor, pity accepts as unalterable the law of universal estrangement which it would like to alleviate. It is true that the person who shows pity upholds as an individual the claim of the general, that is, the claim to life, against the general in the form of nature and society, which deny it. But the unity with the general as something inward, practiced by such an individual, is shown to be deceptive by his own weakness. It is not the softness but the restrictive nature of pity which makes it questionable—it is always too little. Just as the Stoic indifference on which bourgeois coldness, the counterpart of pity, has modeled itself was more loyal, however wretchedly, to the universal it had rejected than the compassionate baseness which adapted itself to the world, so it was

those who unmasked pity who, however negatively, espoused the Revolution. The narcissistic deformations of pity, like the effusions of philanthropists and the moral complacency of the social welfare worker, are still an internalized endorsement of the difference between rich and poor. Admittedly, by imprudently confessing the joys of hardness, philosophy has put itself at the disposal of those who least forgive it the admission. The fascist masters* of the world translated the vilification of pity into that of political respect and the appeal to martial law, in which they were at one with Schopenhauer, the metaphysician of pity. For him the establishment of a humane order was the presumptuous delusion of someone who could hope only for misfortune. The enemies of pity were unwilling to equate humanity with misfortune. For them, the existence of misfortune was a scandal. With their impotent delicacy, they could not bear to see humanity pitied. In desperation their powerlessness switched to the glorification of power, while disowning it in practice whenever it gave them leave.

Kindness and good deeds become a sin, domination and suppression virtue. "All good things have at one time been considered evil; every original sin has, at some point, turned into an original virtue."[57] In the new epoch Juliette applies this principle in earnest, for the first time consciously performing the transvaluation of all values. After the destruction of all ideologies she elevates as her own morality what Christianity, in its ideology if not always in its practice, held to be abominable. As a good philosopher she remains cool and reflective. All is done without illusions. To Clairwil's proposal for a sacrilegious act she responds: "Now that we do not believe in God, my dear, . . . the desecrations you desire are no more than useless childish games. . . . I may be still firmer in my disbelief than you; my atheism is unshakable. So do not imagine that I need the childish pranks you propose to confirm it. I shall take part because it amuses you, but only for entertainment"—the American murderess Annie Henry* would have said "just for fun"—"and never as something necessary, either to strengthen my way of thinking, or to convince others of it."[58] Though swayed by momentary kindness toward her accomplice, she still upholds her principles. Even injustice, hatred, and destruction become merely operations, now that the formalization of reason has stripped all goals of the character of necessity and objectivity, which is dismissed as illusion. Magic passes into mere activity, into the means—in short, into industry. The formalization of reason is merely the intellectual expression

of mechanized production. The means is fetishized: it absorbs pleasure. Just as the goals with which the old system of rule had veiled itself are rendered illusory by enlightenment in theory, the possibility of abundance removes their justification in practice. Domination survives as an end in itself, in the form of economic power. Pleasure itself shows traces of the outdated, the irrelevant, like the metaphysics which forbade it. Juliette speaks of the motives of crime.[59] She herself is no less ambitious and avaricious than her friend Sbrigani, but she idolizes the forbidden. Sbrigani, a man devoted to the means and to duty, is more advanced. "To enrich ourselves—that is what matters. It would be the height of guilt if we failed to reach that goal. Only if one is truly on the way to becoming wealthy is one permitted to reap one's pleasures: until then one must forget them." For all her rational superiority, Juliette still clings to one superstition. While she recognizes the naivety of sacrilege, in the end it still gives her pleasure. But every pleasure betrays idolization: it is self-abandonment to an Other. Nature actually does not know pleasure: it does not go beyond the satisfaction of needs. All pleasure is social, in the unsublimated affects no less than in the sublimated. It springs from alienation. Even when enjoyment is ignorant of the prohibition it infringes, it owes its origin to civilization, to the fixed order from which it yearns to return to the very nature from which that order protects it. Only when dream absolves them of the compulsion of work, of the individual's attachment to a particular social function and finally to a self, leading back to a primal state free of domination and discipline, do human beings feel the magic of pleasure. It was the homesickness of those enmeshed in civilization, the "objective despair" of those who had to turn themselves into elements of the social order, which nourished the love of gods and demons; to them as transfigured nature this love turned in adoration. Thought arose in the course of liberation from terrible nature, which is finally subjugated utterly. Pleasure, so to speak, is nature's revenge. In it human beings divest themselves of thought, escape from civilization. In earlier societies such homecoming was provided by communal festivals. Primitive orgies are the collective origin of pleasure. "The interlude of universal confusion represented by the festival," writes Roger Caillois, "seems truly like the moment when the world's order is suspended. All excesses are permitted. Rules must be broken, everything must be turned upside down. In the mythic epoch the course of time was reversed: one was born aged, died as a child. . . . All the precepts protect-

ing the good, natural, and social order are systematically violated."[60] One abandons oneself to the transfigured powers of origin; but from the standpoint of the suspended interdiction these actions appear as dissipated and insane.[61] Only with increasing civilization and enlightenment do the strengthened self and the secure system of power reduce the festival to farce. The rulers introduce pleasure as a rational measure, a tribute paid to imperfectly subdued nature; they seek at once to detoxify it and to preserve it in higher culture; to administer it to their subjects in controlled doses where it cannot be entirely withdrawn. Pleasure becomes an object of manipulation, until it finally perishes in the administrative arrangements. This development extends from the primitive feast to the holiday. "The more dominant the complex social organism becomes, the less it tolerates interruptions of the ordinary course of life. Today as yesterday, tomorrow as today, everything must follow the same course. The general overflowing is no longer possible. The period of turbulence has been individualized. Holidays have supplanted the feast."[62] In fascism they are supplemented by the collective fake intoxication, concocted from radio, headlines, and Benzedrine.* Sbrigani has a presentiment of this. He grants himself amusements "on the road to fortune," as vacations. Juliette, by contrast, still emulates the *ancien régime*. She deifies sin. Her libertinism is in thrall to Catholicism as the nun's ecstasy is to paganism.

Nietzsche is aware of the still mythical nature of pleasure. In its abandonment to nature pleasure renounces the possible, just as pity renounces the transformation of the whole. Both contain a moment of resignation. Nietzsche tracks down pleasure in all its hiding places, as narcissism in solitude, as masochistic enjoyment in the depressions of the self-tormentor. "Against all who merely enjoy!"[63] Juliette tries to rescue pleasure by rejecting love in its bourgeois form as devotion, which, as resistance to the bourgeoisie's own shrewdness, is characteristic of that class in its last century. In love, pleasure was linked to the deification of the person who bestowed it and was the truly human passion. It is being finally revoked as a value judgment conditioned by sexuality. In the enraptured adoration of the lover, as in the boundless admiration shown in return by the beloved, the actual servitude of the woman was endlessly transfigured. Again and again, the sexes were reconciled on the basis of their recognition of this servitude: the woman seemed freely to accept her defeat, the man to grant her victory. Under Christianity the hierarchy of the sexes, the

yoke placed on the feminine character by the masculine order of property, was idealized as the union of hearts in marriage, and the memory of sexuality's better, prepatriarchal past appeased. Under big industry* love is annulled. The decline of middle-class property, the downfall of the free economic subject, affects the family: it is no longer the celebrated cell of society it once was, since it no longer forms the basis of the citizen's economic existence. For adolescents the family no longer marks out the horizon of their lives; the autonomy of the father is vanishing and with it resistance to his authority. Earlier, the girl's servitude in the paternal home inflamed in her the passion which seemed to lead to freedom but was fulfilled neither in marriage nor anywhere outside. As the prospect of a job opens for the girl, that of love is closed. The more universally the system of modern industry* requires everyone to enter its service, the more all those who do not form part of the ocean of "white trash,"* which is absorbing the unqualified employed and unemployed, are turned into petty experts, into employees who must fend for themselves. In the form of skilled work the autonomy of the entrepreneur, which is over, is spreading to all those admitted as producers, including the "working" woman, and is becoming their character. Their self-respect grows in proportion to their fungibility. Defiance of the family is no more an act of daring than the leisure-time relationship with the boyfriend is the gateway to heaven. People are taking on the rational, calculating attitude to their own sexuality long since proclaimed as ancient wisdom by Juliette's enlightened circle. Mind and body are being separated in reality, just as those indiscreet bourgeois libertines demanded: "It appears to me," Noirceuil states rationalistically,[64] "that love and pleasure are two very different things . . . because tender feelings correspond to relationships of caprice and decorum, but in no way spring from the beauty of a neck or the pretty curve of a hip. And these objects, which, in accordance with our taste, can keenly excite our physical affects, have, it seems to me, no rights over our mental affections. To complete my thought, Bélize is ugly, is forty years old, entirely lacks grace of person, is without regular features or any physical charm. But Bélize has intelligence, a precious character, a million things which attach my feelings and preferences. I shall never wish to sleep with Bélize, but I shall love her to the point of madness, whereas I shall lust after Araminthe but heartily detest her as soon as the fever of desire is past." Here, the inevitable consequence implicit in the Cartesian division

of the human being into thinking and extensive substance is expressed with total clarity as the destruction of Romantic love. The latter is taken to be a mask, a rationalization of the physical drive, "a false and always dangerous metaphysics,"[65] as Count Belmor explains in his great speech on love. For all their libertinism, Juliette's friends conceive of sexuality, as against tenderness, of earthly as against heavenly love, not just as a degree too powerful but also as oversimplified. The beauty of a neck or the curve of a hip acts on sexuality not as unhistorical, merely natural facts but as images in which the whole of social experience is contained; this experience harbors an intention toward something different to nature, a love not restricted to sexuality. But even the most incorporeal tenderness is transformed sexuality; the hand stroking the hair, the kiss on the brow, which express the rapture of spiritual love, are in pacified form the beating and biting which accompany the sexual act among Australian aborigines. The distinction is abstract. Metaphysics, Belmor teaches, falsifies the factual situation, it prevents the beloved from being seen as he or she is; it stems from magic, it is a veil. "And I am not to snatch it from our eyes? That would be weakness ... cowardice. Let us analyze her when the pleasure is over, this goddess who has just blinded me."[66] Love itself is an unscientific concept: "False definitions are always leading us astray," Dolmance declares in the memorable fifth dialogue of *La Philosophie dans le Boudoir*, "I don't know what it is—the heart. I simply use that term for weakness of mind."[67] "If we spend one moment in what Lucretius calls the 'background of life,'"—meaning, in cold analysis—"we find that neither the elevation of the beloved nor romantic feeling withstands analysis. . . . It is the body alone that I love, and it is the body alone that I lament, although I can have it again at any time."[68] What is true in all this is the insight into the dissociation of love, the work of progress. This dissociation, which mechanizes pleasure and distorts longing into a deception, attacks love at its core. By turning her praise of genital and perverted sexuality into condemnation of what is unnatural, immaterial, illusory, the libertine Juliette has thrown in her lot with the normality which belittles and restricts not only the utopian exaltation of love but physical pleasure, not only the loftiest joy but that which is nearest at hand. The cynical roué whose side she takes has metamorphosed, with the help of the sex educator, the psychoanalyst, and the hormone physiologist, into the open-minded practical man who extends his affirmation of sport and hygiene to include the sex

life. Juliette's critique contains the same inner discord as the Enlightenment itself. In so far as the criminal violation of taboos, which once made common cause with the bourgeois revolution, has not been simply absorbed into the new matter-of-factness, it lives on, with sublime love, as fidelity to the utopia brought near by the availability of physical pleasure to all.

"The ridiculous enthusiasm" which attached us to a particular individual as the only one, the elevation of woman in love, can be traced back beyond Christianity to matriarchal stages. "It is certain that our spirit of chivalrous courtship, which comically offers our homage to an object made only to satisfy our need—it is certain, I say, that this spirit stems from the reverence our ancestors once had for women because of their profession as prophetesses in town and country. Through terror, aversion became worship, and chivalry was nurtured in the womb of superstition. But this reverence never existed in nature, and it would be a waste of time to seek it there. The inferiority of that sex to ours is too well founded ever to give us a sound motive to respect it, and the love which arises from that blind reverence is, like it, a prejudice."[69] It is on power, however legalistically veiled, that the social hierarchy ultimately rests. The mastery of nature is reproduced within humanity. Christian civilization, which used the idea of protecting the physically weak to justify exploitation of the strong bondsman, never entirely won the hearts of the converted peoples. The principle of love was too strongly disavowed by the sharp intellect and the still sharper weapons of the Christian masters, until Lutheranism abolished the antithesis between state and doctrine by making the sword and rod the Gospel's quintessence. It directly equated spiritual freedom with the affirmation of actual oppression. But woman bears the stigma of weakness; her weakness places her in a minority even when she is numerically superior to men. As with the subjugated original inhabitants in early forms of state, the indigenous population of colonies, who lack the organization and weapons of their conquerors, as with the Jews among Aryans, her defenselessness legitimizes her oppression. Sade expresses as formulae the reflections of Strindberg. "Let us not doubt that there is a difference between man and woman no less certain and important than that between man and the apes of the forest. We would have just as good reason to deny woman membership of our species as to refuse to acknowledge brotherhood with the apes. Examine carefully a naked woman beside a man of

the same age, naked like her, and you will be readily convinced of the considerable difference (disregarding the sex) which exists between the two creatures and will clearly see that the woman is merely a lower degree of the man. The differences likewise exist within, and anatomical dissection of one and the other, if done with painstaking care, will bring this truth to light."[70] Christianity's attempt to compensate the suppression of sexuality ideologically by the veneration of woman, and thus to sublimate the memory of the archaic instead of merely repressing it, is annulled by its rancor against the woman thus elevated and against theoretically emancipated pleasure. The affect which corresponds to the practice of oppression is contempt, not veneration, and lurking behind the love of one's neighbor throughout the Christian centuries has been the forbidden, compulsive hatred of the object which continually brought to mind the futility of that exertion: woman. Women paid for the cult of the Madonna with the obsessive belief in witches, the revenge taken on the memory of the pre-Christian prophetess who secretly called into question the sanctified patriarchal system of power. The woman excites the savage rage of the half-converted man who is required to honor her, just as the weak in general can count on the mortal enmity of the superficially civilized strong who are supposed to spare them. Sade brings this hatred to consciousness. "I have never believed," says Count Ghigi, the Roman chief of police, "that the union of two bodies could ever give rise to the union of two hearts. I see in this physical union strong reasons for contempt . . . , for revulsion, but not a single one for love."[71] And when a girl terrorized by Saint-Fonds, the royal minister, bursts into tears, he exclaims: "That is how I like women. . . . Why cannot I reduce them all to such a state with a single word?"[72] Man as ruler refuses to do woman the honor of individualizing her. Socially, the individual woman is an example of the species, a representative of her sex, and thus, wholly encompassed by male logic, she stands for nature, the substrate of never-ending subsumption on the plane of ideas and of never-ending subjection on that of reality. Woman as an allegedly natural being is a product of history, which denatures her. But the desperate, destructive urge directed against everything which embodies the lure of nature, everything which is physiologically, biologically, nationally, or socially inferior, indicates that Christianity's attempt has failed. "*Que ne puis-je, d'un mot, les réduire toutes en cet état!*" To eradicate utterly the hated but overwhelming temptation to lapse back into nature—that is the

cruelty which stems from failed civilization; it is barbarism, the other side of culture. "Them all!" For destruction tolerates no exceptions; the will to destroy is totalitarian, and totalitarianism springs from that will alone. "I have reached the point," Juliette tells the Pope, "where I can say with Tiberius: if only the whole of mankind had only one head, so that I could have the pleasure of cutting it off with a single blow!"[73] The signs of powerlessness, hasty uncoordinated movements, animal fear, swarming masses, provoke the lust for murder. The explanation for the hatred of woman as the weaker in mental and physical power, who bears the mark of domination on her brow, is the same as for the hatred of the Jews. Women and Jews show visible evidence of not having ruled for thousands of years. They live, although they could be eliminated, and their fear and weakness, the greater affinity to nature produced in them by perennial oppression, is the element in which they live. In the strong, who pay for their strength with their strained remoteness from nature and must forever forbid themselves fear, this incites blind fury. They identify themselves with nature by calling forth from their victims, multiplied a thousandfold, the cry they may not utter themselves. "These senseless creatures!" writes President Blammont of women in *Aline et Valcour*, "How I love to see them struggling in my hands! They are like lambs in the jaws of the lion."[74] And in the same letter: "It is the same as conquering a city. You must occupy the heights . . . establish yourself at all the commanding points and then launch your attack without any fear of resistance."[75] A creature which has fallen attracts predators: humiliation of those already visited by misfortune brings the keenest pleasure. The less the danger to the one on top, the more unhampered the joy in the torments he can now inflict: only through the hopeless despair of the victim can power become pleasure and triumphantly revoke its own principle, discipline. Fear averted from the self bursts out in hearty laughter, the expression of a hardening within the individual which can only be fully lived out through the collective. Ringing laughter has always denounced civilization. "Of all the lava spewed forth from the crater of the human mouth, the most calamitous is merriment," writes Victor Hugo in the chapter headed "Storms of men are worse than storms of oceans."[76] "It is on misfortune," Juliette teaches,[77] "that the full weight of our malice must fall. The tears wrung from wretchedness have a keenness which profoundly thrills our nervous substance."[78] Rather than with tenderness, pleasure makes its pact with cru-

elty, and sexual love becomes what according to Nietzsche[79] it always was: "in its means, war; and at its basis the mortal hatred of the sexes." "With both the male and the female," zoology teaches us, "'love', or sexual attraction, is originally and preeminently 'sadic'; it is positively gratified by the infliction of pain; it is as cruel as hunger."[80] Thus, as its final result, civilization leads back to the terrors of nature. The lethal love on which Sade's work is constantly focused, Nietzsche's impudently solicitous magnanimity in seeking to spare the victim humiliation at any price: cruelty and the idea of greatness deal no less harshly with human beings on the plane of play and imagination than German fascism* was to do on that of reality. However, whereas the unconscious colossus of real existence, subjectless capitalism, inflicts its destruction blindly, the deludedly rebellious subject is willing to see that destruction as its fulfillment, and, together with the biting cold it emits toward human beings misused as things, it also radiates the perverted love which, in the world of things, takes the place of love in its immediacy. Sickness becomes the symptom of recovery. In transfiguring the victims, delusion accepts their degradation. It makes itself resemble the monster of domination which it cannot physically overcome. Imagination seeks as horror to withstand horror. The Roman proverb that harshness is true pleasure expresses not merely the brutality of slave drivers but the indissoluble contradiction of order, which, when it sanctions happiness, turns it into self-parody and creates it only through proscribing it. While they perpetuated this contradiction, Sade and Nietzsche also contributed to its clarification.

To reason, devotion to the adored creature appears as idol worship. The demise of idolatry follows necessarily from the ban on mythology pronounced by Jewish monotheism and enforced against the changing objects of adoration in the history of thought by that monotheism's secularized form, enlightenment. The decay of economic reality, which has always been at the basis of superstition, released specific forces of negation. Christianity, however, propagated love: the pure adoration of Jesus. It sought to elevate the blind sexual drive by the hallowing of marriage, as it also tried to bring the crystalline radiance of law closer to earthly life by the idea of heavenly grace. The reconciliation of civilization with nature which it sought prematurely to purchase with the doctrine of the crucified God remained as alien to Judaism as to the rigorism of the Enlightenment. Neither Moses nor Kant proclaimed emotion; their icy law knew neither

love nor sacrificial pyres. Nietzsche's attack on monotheism dealt a heavier blow to Christian than to Jewish doctrine. While he repudiated the Law he pledged himself to the "higher self,"[81] a self no longer natural but more-than-natural. He wanted to replace God by the "Overman" because monotheism, in its broken, Christian form, had transparently become mythology. But just as, in the service of this higher self, the old ascetic ideals are extolled by Nietzsche as self-overcoming in the interest of developing "dominant power,"[82] so the higher self turns out to be a desperate attempt to rescue the God who was dead. In this, Nietzsche renews Kant's endeavor to transform the divine law into an autonomous principle, to rescue European civilization from giving up the ghost in English skepticism. Kant's principle: "that everything be done from the maxim of one's will as a will that could at the same time have as its object itself as giving universal law,"[83] is also the secret of the Overman. His will is no less despotic than the categorical imperative. Both principles aim at independence from external powers, at the unconditional freedom from tutelage which defines the essence of enlightenment. However, as the fear of falsehood, a fear which even in his most "enlightened" moments Nietzsche decried as "a piece of Quixotism,"[84] replaced the Law with self-legislation, so that everything was made transparent as one great unmasked superstition, enlightenment itself, indeed, truth in any form, became an idol, and we realize that "even we knowing ones of today, the godless and antimetaphysical, still take *our* fire from the conflagration kindled by a belief millennia old, the Christian belief, which was also the belief of Plato, that God is truth, that the truth is divine."[85] Science itself, therefore, is open to the same criticism as metaphysics. The denial of God contains an irresolvable contradiction; it negates knowledge itself. Sade did not drive the idea of enlightenment to this point, where it turns against itself. The reflection of science on itself, the work of the Enlightenment's conscience, was left to philosophy, meaning German philosophy. For Sade, enlightenment was not so much an intellectual as a social phenomenon. He carried forward the dissolution of bonds—which Nietzsche idealistically believed could be overcome by the higher self—and the critique of solidarity with society, office, family[86] to the point of proclaiming anarchy. His work lays bare the mythological nature of the principles on which civilization was based after the demise of religion: those of the Decalogue, of paternal authority, of property. It is the exact inversion of the social theory elabo-

rated by Le Play a hundred years later.[87] Each of the Ten Commandments is declared void before the tribunal of formal reason. They are revealed without exception as ideologies. At Juliette's request the Pope himself pleads the case for murder.[88] He finds it easier to rationalize un-Christian acts in the light of natural reason than it had ever been to justify the Christian principles according to which those acts were devilish. The "mitered philosopher" has less need of sophistry in advocating murder than Maimonides and St Thomas Aquinas in condemning it. Roman reason is even more inclined than the god of the Prussians to side with the bigger battalions. The Law, however, has been dethroned, and the love which was supposed to humanize it is unmasked as a reversion to idolatry. It is not just romantic sexual love which has been condemned as metaphysics by science and industry but love of any kind, for no love can withstand reason: neither that between wife and husband nor between lover and beloved, nor the love between parents and children. The Duc de Blangis announces to his subjects that those related to the rulers, daughters and wives, should be treated as harshly, indeed, still more harshly, than others, "in order to show you how deeply we despise the bonds by which you may think us fettered."[89] Woman's love is abolished like that of man. The rules of libertinage passed on by Saint-Fonds to Juliette are to apply to all women.[90] Dolmance voices the materialistic disenchantment of parental love. "These latter ties originate in the parents' fear of being abandoned in old age, and the self-interested concern they show for us in our childhood is intended to earn them the same consideration in old age."[91] Sade's argument is as old as the bourgeoisie. Democritus already denounced parental love as economic.[92] Sade, however, applies the same disenchantment even to exogamy, the foundation of civilization. According to him, there are no rational grounds to oppose incest,[93] and the hygienic argument formerly used has now been invalidated by advanced science, which ratifies Sade's cold judgment. "It has by no means been proved that children born of incest have a greater tendency than others to suffer from cretinism, deaf-muteness, rickets, etc."[94] The family, held together not by romantic sexual love but by maternal love, which forms the basis of all tenderness and social feelings,[95] conflicts with society itself. "Do not imagine you will make good republicans as long as you isolate children, who should belong only to the whole community, within your families. . . . Whereas there are great disadvantages in allowing chil-

dren to be absorbed into family interests which often diverge strongly from those of the nation, very great benefits lie in separating them from them."[96] "Conjugal ties" must be destroyed for social reasons; children are to be "absolutely forbidden" knowledge of their fathers, since they are "*uniquement les enfants de la patrie*";[97] the anarchy and individualism which Sade proclaimed in the struggle against laws[98] culminate in the absolute rule of the generality, the republic. Just as the deposed god returns as a more repressive idol, the old, undemanding bourgeois state reappears in the violence of the fascist collective. Sade thought through to the end the state socialism whose first steps brought the downfall of Saint-Just and Robespierre. If the bourgeoisie sent them, its most loyal politicians, to the guillotine, it banished its most outspoken writer to the hell of the Bibliothèque Nationale. For the *chronique scandaleuse* of Justine and Juliette which, turned out as if on a production line, prefigured in the style of the eighteenth century the sensational literature of the nineteenth and the mass literature of the twentieth is the Homeric epic after it has discarded its last mythological veil: the story of thought as an instrument of power. In taking fright at the image in its own mirror, that thought opens to view what lies beyond it. It is not the harmonious social ideal, which even Sade glimpsed dimly in the future: "*gardez vos frontières et restez chez vous*";[99] it is not even the socialist utopia developed in the story of Zamé:[100] it is the fact that Sade did not leave it to its enemies to be horrified by the Enlightenment which makes his work pivotal to its rescue.

The dark writers of the bourgeoisie, unlike its apologists, did not seek to avert the consequences of the Enlightenment with harmonistic doctrines. They did not pretend that formalistic reason had a closer affinity to morality than to immorality. While the light-bringing writers protected the indissoluble alliance of reason and atrocity, bourgeois society and power, by denying that alliance, the bearers of darker messages pitilessly expressed the shocking truth. "Into hands stained by the murder of spouses and children, sodomy, killing, prostitution, and infamy, heaven has placed these riches to reward me for such abominations," says Clairwil in her summary of her brother's life.[101] She exaggerates. The justice of bad domination is not quite so consistent as to reward only infamy. But only exaggeration is true. The essential character of prehistory* is the appearance of utmost horror in the individual detail. A statistical compilation of those slaughtered in a pogrom, which also includes mercy killings, con-

ceals its essence, which emerges only in an exact description of the exception, the most hideous torture. A happy life in a world of horror is ignominiously refuted by the mere existence of that world. The latter therefore becomes the essence, the former negligible. No doubt, the ruling group in the bourgeois era did not engage in killing their own children and spouses, or in prostitution and sodomy, as frequently as their subjects, who took over the morals of the rulers of earlier times. However, when power was at stake, the rulers have piled up mountains of corpses even in recent centuries. Compared to the mentality and actions of the rulers under fascism, in which power has come fully into its own, the enthusiastic description of the life of Brisa-Testa—although those rulers are recognizable in it—pales to harmless banality. In Sade as in Mandeville, private vices are the anticipatory historiography of public virtues in the totalitarian era. It is because they did not hush up the impossibility of deriving from reason a fundamental argument against murder, but proclaimed it from the rooftops, that Sade and Nietzsche are still vilified, above all by progressive thinkers. In a different way to logical positivism, they both took science at its word. In pursuing the implications of reason still more resolutely than the positivists their secret purpose was to lay bare the utopia which is contained in every great philosophy, as it is in Kant's concept of reason: the utopia of a humanity which, itself no longer distorted, no longer needs distortion. In proclaiming the identity of power and reason, their pitiless doctrines are more compassionate than those of the moral lackeys of the bourgeoisie. "Where are thy greatest dangers?," Nietzsche once asked,[102] "In pity." With his denial he redeemed the unwavering trust in humanity which day by day is betrayed by consoling affirmation.



The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception

The sociological view that the loss of support from objective religion and the disintegration of the last precapitalist residues, in conjunction with technical and social differentiation and specialization, have given rise to cultural chaos is refuted by daily experience. Culture today is infecting everything with sameness. Film, radio, and magazines form a system. Each branch of culture is unanimous within itself and all are unanimous together. Even the aesthetic manifestations of political opposites proclaim the same inflexible rhythm. The* decorative administrative and exhibition buildings of industry differ little between authoritarian and other countries. The bright monumental structures shooting up on all sides show off the systematic ingenuity of the state-spanning combines, toward which the unfettered entrepreneurial system, whose monuments are the dismal residential and commercial blocks in the surrounding areas of desolate cities, was already swiftly advancing. The older buildings around the concrete centers already look like slums, and the new bungalows on the outskirts, like the flimsy structures at international trade fairs, sing the praises of technical progress while inviting their users to throw them away after short use like tin cans. But the town-planning projects, which are supposed to perpetuate individuals as autonomous units in hygienic small apartments, subjugate them only more completely to their adversary, the total power of capital.* Just as the occupants of city centers are uniformly summoned there for purposes of work and leisure, as producers and con-

sumers, so the living cells crystallize into homogenous, well-organized complexes. The conspicuous unity of macrocosm and microcosm confronts human beings with a model of their culture: the false identity of universal and particular. All mass culture under monopoly is identical, and the contours of its skeleton, the conceptual armature fabricated by monopoly, are beginning to stand out. Those in charge no longer take much trouble to conceal the structure, the power of which increases the more bluntly its existence is admitted. Films and radio no longer need to present themselves as art. The truth that they are nothing but business is used as an ideology to legitimize the trash they intentionally produce. They call themselves industries, and the published figures for their directors' incomes quell any doubts about the social necessity of their finished products.

Interested parties like to explain the culture industry in technological terms. Its millions of participants, they argue, demand reproduction processes which inevitably lead to the use of standard products to meet the same needs at countless locations. The technical antithesis between few production centers and widely dispersed reception necessitates organization and planning by those in control. The standardized forms, it is claimed, were originally derived from the needs of the consumers: that is why they are accepted with so little resistance. In reality, a cycle of manipulation and retroactive need is unifying the system ever more tightly. What is not mentioned is that the basis on which technology is gaining power over society is the power of those whose economic position in society is strongest.* Technical rationality today is the rationality of domination. It is the compulsive character of a society alienated from itself. Automobiles, bombs, and films hold the totality together until their leveling element demonstrates its power against the very system of injustice it served. For the present the technology of the culture industry confines itself to standardization and mass production and sacrifices what once distinguished the logic of the work from that of society. These adverse effects, however, should not be attributed to the internal laws of technology itself but to its function within the economy today.* Any need which might escape the central control is repressed by that of individual consciousness. The step from telephone to radio has clearly distinguished the roles. The former liberally permitted the participant to play the role of subject. The latter democratically makes everyone equally into listeners, in order to expose them in authoritarian fashion to the same programs put out by different

stations. No mechanism of reply has been developed, and private transmissions are condemned to unfreedom. They confine themselves to the apocryphal sphere of "amateurs," who, in any case, are organized from above. Any trace of spontaneity in the audience of the official radio is steered and absorbed into a selection of specializations by talent-spotters, performance competitions, and sponsored events of every kind. The talents belong to the operation long before they are put on show; otherwise they would not conform so eagerly. The mentality of the public, which allegedly and actually favors the system of the culture industry, is a part of the system, not an excuse for it. If a branch of art follows the same recipe as one far removed from it in terms of its medium and subject matter; if the dramatic denouement in radio "soap operas"* is used as an instructive example of how to solve technical difficulties—which are mastered no less in "jam sessions" than at the highest levels of jazz—or if a movement from Beethoven is loosely "adapted" in the same way as a Tolstoy novel is adapted for film, the pretext of meeting the public's spontaneous wishes is mere hot air. An explanation in terms of the specific interests of the technical apparatus and its personnel would be closer to the truth, provided that apparatus were understood in all its details as a part of the economic mechanism of selection.* Added to this is the agreement, or at least the common determination, of the executive powers to produce or let pass nothing which does not conform to their tables, to their concept of the consumer, or, above all, to themselves.

If the objective social tendency of this age is incarnated in the obscure subjective intentions of board chairmen, this is primarily the case in the most powerful sectors of industry: steel, petroleum, electricity, chemicals. Compared to them the culture monopolies are weak and dependent. They have to keep in with the true wielders of power, to ensure that their sphere of mass society, the specific product of which still has too much of cozy liberalism and Jewish intellectualism about it, is not subjected to a series of purges.* The dependence of the most powerful broadcasting company on the electrical industry, or of film on the banks, characterizes the whole sphere, the individual sectors of which are themselves economically intertwined. Everything is so tightly clustered that the concentration of intellect reaches a level where it overflows the demarcations between company names and technical sectors. The relentless unity of the culture industry bears witness to the emergent unity of politics. Sharp distinctions

like those between A and B films, or between short stories published in magazines in different price segments, do not so much reflect real differences as assist in the classification, organization, and identification of consumers. Something is provided for everyone so that no one can escape; differences are hammered home and propagated. The hierarchy of serial qualities purveyed to the public serves only to quantify it more completely. Everyone is supposed to behave spontaneously according to a "level" determined by indices and to select the category of mass product manufactured for their type. On the charts of research organizations, indistinguishable from those of political propaganda, consumers are divided up as statistical material into red, green, and blue areas according to income group.

The schematic nature of this procedure is evident from the fact that the mechanically differentiated products are ultimately all the same. That the difference between the models of Chrysler and General Motors is fundamentally illusory is known by any child, who is fascinated by that very difference. The advantages and disadvantages debated by enthusiasts serve only to perpetuate the appearance of competition and choice. It is no different with the offerings of Warner Brothers and Metro Goldwyn Mayer. But the differences, even between the more expensive and cheaper products from the same firm, are shrinking—in cars to the different number of cylinders, engine capacity, and details of the gadgets, and in films to the different number of stars, the expense lavished on technology, labor and costumes, or the use of the latest psychological formulae. The unified standard of value consists in the level of conspicuous production, the amount of investment put on show. The budgeted differences of value in the culture industry have nothing to do with actual differences, with the meaning of the product itself. The technical media, too, are being engulfed by an insatiable uniformity. Television aims at a synthesis of radio and film, delayed only for as long as the interested parties cannot agree. Such a synthesis, with its unlimited possibilities, promises to intensify the impoverishment of the aesthetic material so radically that the identity of all industrial cultural products, still scantily disguised today, will triumph openly tomorrow in a mocking fulfillment of Wagner's dream of the total art work. The accord between word, image, and music is achieved so much more perfectly than in *Tristan* because the sensuous elements, which compliantly document only the surface of social reality, are produced in prin-

ciple within the same technical work process, the unity of which they express as their true content. This work process integrates all the elements of production, from the original concept of the novel, shaped by its sidelong glance at film,* to the last sound effect. It is the triumph of invested capital. To impress the omnipotence of capital on the hearts of expropriated job candidates as the power of their true master is the purpose of all films, regardless of the plot selected by the production directors.

Even during their leisure time, consumers must orient themselves according to the unity of production. The active contribution which Kantian schematism still expected of subjects—that they should, from the first, relate sensuous multiplicity to fundamental concepts—is denied to the subject by industry. It purveys schematism as its first service to the customer. According to Kantian schematism, a secret mechanism within the psyche preformed immediate data to fit them into the system of pure reason. That secret has now been unraveled. Although the operations of the mechanism appear to be planned by those who supply the data, the culture industry, the planning is in fact imposed on the industry by the inertia of a society irrational despite all its rationalization, and this calamitous tendency, in passing through the agencies of business,* takes on the shrewd intentionality peculiar to them. For the consumer there is nothing left to classify, since the classification has already been preempted by the schematism of production. This dreamless art for the people fulfils the dreamy idealism which went too far for idealism in its critical form. Everything comes from consciousness—from that of God for Malebranche and Berkeley, and from earthly production management for mass art. Not only do hit songs, stars, and soap operas conform to types recurring cyclically as rigid invariants, but the specific content of productions, the seemingly variable element, is itself derived from those types. The details become interchangeable. The brief interval sequence which has proved catchy in a hit song, the hero's temporary disgrace which he accepts as a "good sport," the wholesome slaps the heroine receives from the strong hand of the male star, his plain-speaking abruptness toward the pampered heiress, are, like all the details, ready-made clichés, to be used here and there as desired and always completely defined by the purpose they serve within the schema. To confirm the schema by acting as its constituents is their sole *raison d'être*. In a film, the outcome can invariably be predicted at the start—who

will be rewarded, punished, forgotten—and in light music the prepared ear can always guess the continuation after the first bars of a hit song and is gratified when it actually occurs. The average choice of words in a short story must not be tampered with. The gags and effects are no less calculated than their framework. They are managed by special experts, and their slim variety is specifically tailored to the office pigeonhole. The culture industry has developed in conjunction with the predominance of the effect, the tangible performance, the technical detail, over the work, which once carried the idea and was liquidated with it. By emancipating itself, the detail had become refractory; from Romanticism to Expressionism it had rebelled as unbridled expression, as the agent of opposition, against organization. In music, the individual harmonic effect had obliterated awareness of the form as a whole; in painting the particular detail had obscured the overall composition; in the novel psychological penetration had blurred the architecture. Through totality, the culture industry is putting an end to all that. Although operating only with effects, it subdues their unruliness and subordinates them to the formula which supplants the work. It crushes equally the whole and the parts. The whole confronts the details in implacable detachment, somewhat like the career of a successful man, in which everything serves to illustrate and demonstrate a success which, in fact, it is no more than the sum of those idiotic events. The so-called leading idea is a filing compartment which creates order, not connections. Lacking both contrast and relatedness, the whole and the detail look alike. Their harmony, guaranteed in advance, mocks the painfully achieved harmony of the great bourgeois works of art. In Germany even the most carefree films of democracy were overhung already by the graveyard stillness of dictatorship.

The whole world is passed through the filter of the culture industry. The familiar experience of the moviegoer, who perceives the street outside as a continuation of the film he has just left, because the film seeks strictly to reproduce the world of everyday perception, has become the guideline of production. The more densely and completely its techniques duplicate empirical objects, the more easily it creates the illusion that the world outside is a seamless extension of the one which has been revealed in the cinema. Since the abrupt introduction of the sound film, mechanical duplication has become entirely subservient to this objective. According to this tendency, life is to be made indistinguishable from the sound film. Far

more strongly than the theatre of illusion, film denies its audience any dimension in which they might roam freely in imagination—contained by the film's framework but unsupervised by its precise actualities—without losing the thread; thus it trains those exposed to it to identify film directly with reality. The withering of imagination and spontaneity in the consumer of culture today need not be traced back to psychological mechanisms. The products themselves, especially the most characteristic, the sound film, cripple those faculties through their objective makeup. They are so constructed that their adequate comprehension requires a quick, observant, knowledgeable cast of mind but positively debars the spectator from thinking, if he is not to miss the fleeting facts. This kind of alertness is so ingrained that it does not even need to be activated in particular cases, while still repressing the powers of imagination. Anyone who is so absorbed by the world of the film, by gesture, image, and word, that he or she is unable to supply that which would have made it a world in the first place, does not need to be entirely transfixed by the special operations of the machinery at the moment of the performance. The required qualities of attention have become so familiar from other films and other culture products already known to him or her that they appear automatically. The power of industrial society* is imprinted on people once and for all. The products of the culture industry are such that they can be alertly consumed even in a state of distraction. But each one is a model of the gigantic economic machinery,* which, from the first, keeps everyone on their toes, both at work and in the leisure time which resembles it. In any sound film or any radio broadcast something is discernible which cannot be attributed as a social effect to any one of them, but to all together. Each single manifestation of the culture industry inescapably reproduces human beings as what the whole has made them. And all its agents, from the producer to the women's organizations, are on the alert to ensure that the simple reproduction of mind does not lead on to the expansion of mind.

The complaints of art historians and cultural attorneys over the exhaustion of the energy which created artistic style in the West are frighteningly unfounded. The routine translation of everything, even of what has not yet been thought, into the schema of mechanical reproducibility goes beyond the rigor and scope of any true style—the concept with which culture lovers idealize the precapitalist past as an organic era. No

Palestrina could have eliminated the unprepared or unresolved dissonance more puristically than the jazz arranger excludes any phrase which does not exactly fit the jargon. If he jazzes up Mozart, he changes the music not only where it is too difficult or serious but also where the melody is merely harmonized differently, indeed, more simply, than is usual today. No medieval patron of architecture can have scrutinized the subjects of church windows and sculptures more suspiciously than the studio hierarchies examine a plot by Balzac or Victor Hugo before it receives the imprimatur of feasibility. No cathedral chapter could have assigned the grimaces and torments of the damned to their proper places in the order of divine love more scrupulously than production managers decide the position of the torture of the hero or the raised hem of the leading lady's dress within the litany of the big film. The explicit and implicit, exoteric and esoteric catalog of what is forbidden and what is tolerated* is so extensive that it not only defines the area left free but wholly controls it. Even the most minor details are modeled according to this lexicon. Like its adversary, avant-garde art, the culture industry defines its own language positively, by means of prohibitions applied to its syntax and vocabulary. The permanent compulsion to produce new effects which yet remain bound to the old schema, becoming additional rules, merely increases the power of the tradition which the individual effect seeks to escape. Every phenomenon is by now so thoroughly imprinted by the schema that nothing can occur that does not bear in advance the trace of the jargon, that is not seen at first glance to be approved. But the true masters, as both producers and reproducers, are those who speak the jargon with the same free-and-easy relish as if it were the language it has long since silenced. Such is the industry's ideal of naturalness. It asserts itself more imperiously the more the perfected technology reduces the tension between the culture product and everyday existence. The paradox of routine travestied as nature is detectable in every utterance of the culture industry, and in many is quite blatant. A jazz musician who has to play a piece of serious music, Beethoven's simplest minuet, involuntarily syncopates, and condescends to start on the beat only with a superior smile. Such "naturalness," complicated by the ever more pervasive and exorbitant claims of the specific medium, constitutes the new style, "a system of nonculture to which one might even concede a certain 'unity of style' if it made any sense to speak of a stylized barbarism."[1]

The general influence of this stylization may already be more binding than the official rules and prohibitions; a hit song is treated more leniently today if it does not respect the thirty-two bars or the compass of the ninth than if it includes even the most elusive melodic or harmonic detail which falls outside the idiom. Orson Welles is forgiven all his offences against the usages of the craft because, as calculated rudeness, they confirm the validity of the system all the more zealously. The compulsion of the technically conditioned idiom which the stars and directors must produce as second nature, so that the nation may make it theirs, relates to nuances so fine as to be almost as subtle as the devices used in a work of the avant-garde, where, unlike those of the hit song, they serve truth. The rare ability to conform punctiliously to the obligations of the idiom of naturalness in all branches of the culture industry becomes the measure of expertise. As in logical positivism, what is said and how it is said must be verifiable against everyday speech. The producers are experts. The idiom demands the most prodigious productive powers, which it absorbs and squanders. Satanically, it has rendered cultural conservatism's distinction between genuine and artificial style obsolete. A style might possibly be called artificial if it had been imposed from outside against the resistance of the intrinsic tendencies of form. But in the culture industry the subject matter itself, down to its smallest elements, springs from the same apparatus as the jargon into which it is absorbed. The deals struck between the art specialists and the sponsor and censor over some all-too-unbelievable lie tell us less about internal, aesthetic tensions than about a divergence of interests. The reputation of the specialist, in which a last residue of actual autonomy still occasionally finds refuge, collides with the business policy of the church or the industrial combine producing the culture commodity. By its own nature, however, the matter has already been reified as negotiable even before the various agencies come into conflict. Even before Zanuck* acquired her, Saint Bernadette gleamed in the eye of her writer as an advert aimed at all the relevant consortia. To this the impulses of form have been reduced. As a result, the style of the culture industry, which has no resistant material to overcome, is at the same time the negation of style. The reconciliation of general and particular, of rules and the specific demands of the subject, through which alone style takes on substance, is nullified by the absence of tension between the poles: "the extremes which touch" have become a murky identity in which the general can replace the particular and vice versa.

Nevertheless, this caricature of style reveals something about the genuine style of the past. The concept of a genuine style becomes transparent in the culture industry as the aesthetic equivalent of power. The notion of style as a merely aesthetic regularity is a retrospective fantasy of Romanticism. The unity of style not only of the Christian Middle Ages but of the Renaissance expresses the different structures of social coercion in those periods, not the obscure experience of the subjects, in which the universal was locked away. The great artists were never those whose works embodied style in its least fractured, most perfect form but those who adopted style as a rigor to set against the chaotic expression of suffering, as a negative truth. In the style of these works expression took on the strength without which existence is dissipated unheard. Even works which are called classical, like the music of Mozart, contain objective tendencies which resist the style they incarnate. Up to Schönberg and Picasso, great artists have been mistrustful of style, which at decisive points has guided them less than the logic of the subject matter. What the Expressionists and Dadaists attacked in their polemics, the untruth of style as such, triumphs today in the vocal jargon of the crooner, in the adept grace of the film star, and even in the mastery of the photographic shot of a farm laborer's hovel. In every work of art, style is a promise. In being absorbed through style into the dominant form of universality, into the current musical, pictorial, or verbal idiom, what is expressed seeks to be reconciled with the idea of the true universal. This promise of the work of art to create truth by impressing its unique contours on the socially transmitted forms is as necessary as it is hypocritical. By claiming to anticipate fulfillment through their aesthetic derivatives, it posits the real forms of the existing order as absolute. To this extent the claims of art are always also ideology. Yet it is only in its struggle with tradition, a struggle precipitated in style, that art can find expression for suffering. The moment in the work of art by which it transcends reality cannot, indeed, be severed from style; that moment, however, does not consist in achieved harmony, in the questionable unity of form and content, inner and outer, individual and society, but in those traits in which the discrepancy emerges, in the necessary failure of the passionate striving for identity. Instead of exposing itself to this failure, in which the style of the great work of art has always negated itself, the inferior work has relied on its similarity to others, the surrogate of identity. The culture industry has finally posited this imitation as absolute. Being nothing other than style, it divulges style's secret: obedience to the social

hierarchy. Aesthetic barbarism today is accomplishing what has threatened intellectual formations since they were brought together as culture and neutralized. To speak about culture always went against the grain of culture. The general designation "culture" already contains, virtually, the process of identifying, cataloging, and classifying which imports culture into the realm of administration. Only what has been industrialized, rigorously subsumed, is fully adequate to this concept of culture. Only by subordinating all branches of intellectual production equally to the single purpose of imposing on the senses of human beings, from the time they leave the factory in the evening to the time they clock on in the morning, the imprint of the work routine which they must sustain throughout the day, does this culture mockingly fulfill the notion of a unified culture which the philosophers of the individual personality held out against mass culture.

The culture industry, the most inflexible style of all, thus proves to be the goal of the very liberalism which is criticized for its lack of style. Not only did its categories and contents originate in the liberal sphere, in domesticated naturalism no less than in the operetta and the revue, but the modern culture combines are the economic area in which a piece of the circulation sphere otherwise in the process of disintegration, together with the corresponding entrepreneurial types, still tenuously survives. In that area people can still make their way, provided they do not look too closely at their true purpose and are willing to be compliant. Anyone who resists can survive only by being incorporated. Once registered as diverging from the culture industry, they belong to it as the land reformer does to capitalism. Realistic indignation is the trademark of those with a new idea to sell. Public authority in the present society* allows only those complaints to be heard in which the attentive ear can discern the prominent figure under whose protection the rebel is suing for peace. The more immeasurable the gulf between chorus and leaders, the more certainly is there a place among the latter for anyone who demonstrates superiority by well-organized dissidence. In this way liberalism's tendency to give free rein to its ablest members survives in the culture industry. To open that industry to clever people is the function of the otherwise largely regulated market, in which, even in its heyday, freedom was the freedom of the stupid to starve, in art as elsewhere. Not for nothing did the system of the

culture industry originate in the liberal industrial countries, just as all its characteristic media, especially cinema, radio, jazz, and magazines, also triumph there. Its progress, however, stems from the general laws of capital. Gaumont and Pathé,* Ullstein and Hugenberg* did not follow the international trend to their own disadvantage; Europe's economic dependence on the USA after the war and the inflation also made its contribution. The belief that the barbarism of the culture industry is a result of "cultural lag," of the backwardness of American consciousness in relation to the state of technology, is quite illusory. Prefascist Europe was backward in relation to the monopoly of culture. But it was precisely to such backwardness that intellectual activity owed a remnant of autonomy, its last exponents their livelihood, however meager. In Germany the incomplete permeation of life by democratic control had a paradoxical effect. Many areas were still exempt from the market mechanism which had been unleashed in Western countries. The German educational system, including the universities, the artistically influential theatres, the great orchestras, and the museums were under patronage. The political powers, the state and the local authorities who inherited such institutions from absolutism, had left them a degree of independence from the power of the market as the princes and feudal lords had done up to the nineteenth century. This stiffened the backbone of art in its late phase against the verdict of supply and demand, heightening its resistance far beyond its actual degree of protection. In the market itself the homage paid to not yet marketable artistic quality was converted into purchasing power, so that reputable literary and musical publishers could support authors who brought in little more than the respect of connoisseurs. Only the dire and incessant threat of incorporation into commercial life as aesthetic experts finally brought the artists to heel. In former times they signed their letters, like Kant and Hume, "Your most obedient servant," while undermining the foundations of throne and altar. Today they call heads of government by their first names and are subject, in every artistic impulse, to the judgment of their illiterate principals. The analysis offered by de Tocqueville a hundred years ago has been fully borne out in the meantime. Under the private monopoly of culture tyranny does indeed "leave the body free and sets to work directly on the soul. The ruler no longer says: 'Either you think as I do or you die.' He says: 'You are free not to think as I do; your life, your property—all that you shall keep. But from this day on you will

be a stranger among us.'"[2] Anyone who does not conform is condemned to an economic impotence which is prolonged in the intellectual powerlessness of the eccentric loner. Disconnected from the mainstream, he is easily convicted of inadequacy. Whereas the mechanism of supply and demand is today disintegrating in material production, in the superstructure it acts as a control on behalf of the rulers. The consumers are the workers and salaried employees, the farmers and petty bourgeois. Capitalist production hems them in so tightly, in body and soul, that they unresistingly succumb to whatever is proffered to them. However, just as the ruled have always taken the morality dispensed to them by the rulers more seriously than the rulers themselves, the defrauded masses today cling to the myth of success still more ardently than the successful. They, too, have their aspirations. They insist unwaveringly on the ideology by which they are enslaved. The pernicious love of the common people for the harm done to them outstrips even the cunning of the authorities. It surpasses the rigor of the Hays Office,* just as, in great epochs, it has inspired renewed zeal in greater agencies directed against it, the terror of the tribunals. It calls for Mickey Rooney* rather than the tragic Garbo, Donald Duck rather than Betty Boop. The industry bows to the vote it has itself rigged. The incidental costs to the firm which cannot turn a profit from its contract with a declining star are legitimate costs for the system as a whole. By artfully sanctioning the demand for trash, the system inaugurates total harmony. Connoisseurship and expertise are proscribed as the arrogance of those who think themselves superior, whereas culture distributes its privileges democratically to all. Under the ideological truce between them, the conformism of the consumers, like the shamelessness of the producers they sustain, can have a good conscience. Both content themselves with the reproduction of sameness.

Unending sameness also governs the relationship to the past. What is new in the phase of mass culture compared to that of late liberalism is the exclusion of the new. The machine is rotating on the spot. While it already determines consumption, it rejects anything untried as a risk. In film, any manuscript which is not reassuringly based on a best-seller is viewed with mistrust. That is why there is incessant talk of ideas, novelty and surprises, of what is both totally familiar and has never existed before. Tempo and dynamism are paramount. Nothing is allowed to stay as it was, everything must be endlessly in motion. For only the universal victory of

the rhythm of mechanical production and reproduction promises that nothing will change, that nothing unsuitable will emerge. To add anything to the proven cultural inventory would be too speculative. The frozen genres—sketch, short story, problem film, hit song—represent the average of late liberal taste threateningly imposed as a norm. The most powerful of the culture agencies, who work harmoniously with others of their kind as only managers do, whether they come from the ready-to-wear trade or* college, have long since reorganized and rationalized the objective mind. It is as if some omnipresent agency* had reviewed the material and issued an authoritative catalog tersely listing the products available. The ideal forms are inscribed in the cultural heavens where they were already numbered by Plato—indeed, were only numbers, incapable of increase or change.

Amusement and all the other elements of the culture industry existed long before the industry itself. Now they have been taken over from above and brought fully up to date. The culture industry can boast of having energetically accomplished and elevated to a principle the often inept transposition of art to the consumption sphere, of having stripped amusement of its obtrusive naiveties and improved the quality of its commodities. The more all-embracing the culture industry has become, the more pitilessly it has forced the outsider into either bankruptcy or a syndicate; at the same time it has become more refined and elevated, becoming finally a synthesis of Beethoven and the Casino de Paris.* Its victory is twofold: what is destroyed as truth outside its sphere can be reproduced indefinitely within it as lies. "Light" art as such, entertainment, is not a form of decadence. Those who deplore it as a betrayal of the ideal of pure expression harbor illusions about society.* The purity of bourgeois art, hypostatized as a realm of freedom contrasting to material praxis, was bought from the outset with the exclusion of the lower class; and art keeps faith with the cause of that class, the true universal, precisely by freeing itself from the purposes of the false. Serious art has denied itself to those for whom the hardship and oppression of life make a mockery of seriousness and who must be glad to use the time not spent at the production line in being simply carried along. Light art has accompanied autonomous art as its shadow. It is the social bad conscience of serious art. The truth which the latter could not apprehend because of its social premises gives the former an appearance of objective justification. The split between them is

itself the truth: it expresses at least the negativity of the culture which is the sum of both spheres. The antithesis can be reconciled least of all by absorbing light art into serious or vice versa. That, however, is what the culture industry attempts. The eccentricity of the circus, the peep show, or the brothel in relation to society is as embarrassing to it as that of Schönberg and Karl Kraus. The leading jazz musician Benny Goodman therefore has to appear with the Budapest String Quartet, more pedantic rhythmically than any amateur clarinetist, while the quartet play with the saccharine monotony of Guy Lombardo.* What is significant is not crude ignorance, stupidity or lack of polish. The culture industry has abolished the rubbish of former times by imposing its own perfection, by prohibiting and domesticating dilettantism, while itself incessantly committing the blunders without which the elevated style cannot be conceived. What is new, however, is that the irreconcilable elements of culture, art, and amusement have been subjected equally to the concept of purpose and thus brought under a single false denominator: the totality of the culture industry. Its element is repetition. The fact that its characteristic innovations are in all cases mere improvements to mass production is not extraneous to the system. With good reason the interest of countless consumers is focused on the technology, not on the rigidly repeated, threadbare and half-abandoned content. The social power revered by the spectators manifests itself more effectively in the technically enforced ubiquity of stereotypes than in the stale ideologies which the ephemeral contents have to endorse.

Nevertheless, the culture industry remains the entertainment business. Its control of consumers is mediated by entertainment, and its hold will not be broken by outright dictate but by the hostility inherent in the principle of entertainment to anything which is more than itself. Since the tendencies of the culture industry are turned into the flesh and blood of the public by the social process as a whole, those tendencies are reinforced by the survival of the market in the industry. Demand has not yet been replaced by simple obedience. The major reorganization of the film industry shortly before the First World War, the material precondition for its expansion, was a deliberate adaptation to needs of the public registered at the ticket office, which were hardly thought worthy of consideration in the pioneering days of the screen. That view is still held by the captains of the film industry, who accept only more or less phenomenal box-office success

as evidence and prudently ignore the counterevidence, truth. Their ideology is business. In this they are right to the extent that the power of the culture industry lies in its unity with fabricated need and not in simple antithesis to it—or even in the antithesis between omnipotence and powerlessness. Entertainment is the prolongation of work under late capitalism. It is sought by those who want to escape the mechanized labor process so that they can cope with it again. At the same time, however, mechanization has such power over leisure and its happiness, determines so thoroughly the fabrication of entertainment commodities, that the off-duty worker can experience nothing but after-images of the work process itself. The ostensible content is merely a faded foreground; what is imprinted is the automated sequence of standardized tasks. The only escape from the work process in factory and office is through adaptation to it in leisure time. This is the incurable sickness of all entertainment. Amusement congeals into boredom, since, to be amusement, it must cost no effort and therefore moves strictly along the well-worn grooves of association. The spectator must need no thoughts of his own: the product prescribes each reaction, not through any actual coherence—which collapses once exposed to thought—but through signals. Any logical connection presupposing mental capacity is scrupulously avoided. Developments are to emerge from the directly preceding situation, not from the idea of the whole. There is no plot which could withstand the screenwriters' eagerness to extract the maximum effect from the individual scene. Finally, even the schematic formula seems dangerous, since it provides some coherence of meaning, however meager, when only meaninglessness is acceptable. Often the plot is willfully denied the development called for by characters and theme under the old schema. Instead, the next step is determined by what the writers take to be their most effective idea. Obtusely ingenious surprises disrupt the plot. The product's tendency to fall back perniciously on the pure nonsense which, as buffoonery and clowning, was a legitimate part of popular art up to Chaplin and the Marx brothers, emerges most strikingly in the less sophisticated genres. Whereas the films of Greer Garson and Bette Davis can still derive some claim to a coherent plot from the unity of the socio-psychological case represented, the tendency to subvert meaning has taken over completely in the text of novelty songs,* suspense films, and cartoons. The idea itself, like objects in comic and horror films, is massacred and mutilated. Novelty songs have always lived on con-

tempt for meaning, which, as both ancestors and descendants of psychoanalysis, they reduce to the monotony of sexual symbolism. In crime and adventure films the spectators are begrudged even the opportunity to witness the resolution. Even in nonironic examples of the genre they must make do with the mere horror of situations connected in only the most perfunctory way.

Cartoon and stunt films were once exponents of fantasy against rationalism. They allowed justice to be done to the animals and things electrified by their technology, by granting the mutilated beings a second life. Today they merely confirm the victory of technological reason over truth. A few years ago they had solid plots which were resolved only in the whirl of pursuit of the final minutes. In this their procedure resembled that of slapstick comedy. But now the temporal relations have shifted. The opening sequences state a plot motif so that destruction can work on it throughout the action: with the audience in gleeful pursuit the protagonist is tossed about like a scrap of litter. The quantity of organized amusement is converted into the quality of organized cruelty.* The self-elected censors of the film industry, its accomplices, monitor the duration of the* atrocity prolonged into a hunt. The jollity dispels the joy supposedly conferred by the sight of an embrace and postpones satisfaction until the day of the pogrom. To the extent that cartoons do more than accustom the senses to the new tempo, they hammer into every brain the old lesson that continuous attrition, the breaking of all individual resistance, is the condition of life in this society. Donald Duck in the cartoons and the unfortunate victim in real life receive their beatings so that the spectators can accustom themselves to theirs.

The enjoyment of the violence done to the film character turns into violence against the spectator; distraction becomes exertion. No stimulant concocted by the experts may escape the weary eye; in face of the slick presentation no one may appear stupid even for a moment; everyone has to keep up, emulating the smartness displayed and propagated by the production. This makes it doubtful whether the culture industry even still fulfils its self-proclaimed function of distraction. If the majority of radio stations and cinemas were shut down, consumers probably would not feel too much deprived. In stepping from the street into the cinema, they no longer enter the world of dream in any case, and once the use of these institutions was no longer made obligatory by their mere existence, the

urge to use them might not be so overwhelming.* Shutting them down in this way would not be reactionary machine-wrecking. Those who suffered would not be the film enthusiasts but those who always pay the penalty in any case, the ones who had lagged behind. For the housewife, despite the films which are supposed to integrate her still further, the dark of the cinema grants a refuge in which she can spend a few unsupervised hours, just as once, when there were still dwellings and evening repose, she could sit gazing out of the window. The unemployed of the great centers find freshness in summer and warmth in winter in these places of regulated temperature. Apart from that, and even by the measure of the existing order, the bloated entertainment apparatus does not make life more worthy of human beings. The idea of "exploiting" the given technical possibilities,* of fully utilizing the capacities for aesthetic mass consumption, is part of an economic system which refuses to utilize capacities when it is a question of abolishing hunger.

The culture industry endlessly cheats its consumers out of what it endlessly promises. The promissory note of pleasure issued by plot and packaging is indefinitely prolonged: the promise, which actually comprises the entire show, disdainfully intimates that there is nothing more to come, that the diner must be satisfied with reading the menu. The desire inflamed by the glossy names and images is served up finally with a celebration of the daily round it sought to escape. Of course, genuine works of art were not sexual exhibitions either. But by presenting denial as negative, they reversed, as it were, the debasement of the drive and rescued by mediation what had been denied. That is the secret of aesthetic sublimation: to present fulfillment in its brokenness. The culture industry* does not sublimate: it suppresses. By constantly exhibiting the object of desire, the breasts beneath the sweater, the naked torso of the sporting hero, it merely goads the unsublimated anticipation of pleasure, which through the habit of denial has long since been mutilated as masochism. There is no erotic situation in which innuendo and incitement are not accompanied by the clear notification that things will never go so far. The Hays Office* merely confirms the ritual which the culture industry has staged in any case: that of Tantalus. Works of art are ascetic and shameless; the culture industry is pornographic and prudish. It reduces love to romance. And, once reduced, much is permitted, even libertinage as a marketable specialty, purveyed by quota with the trade description "daring." The mass

production of sexuality automatically brings about its repression. Because of his ubiquity, the film star with whom one is supposed to fall in love is, from the start, a copy of himself. Every tenor now sounds like a Caruso record, and the natural faces of Texas girls already resemble those of the established models by which they would be typecast in Hollywood. The mechanical reproduction of beauty—which, admittedly, is made only more inescapable by the reactionary culture zealots with their methodical idolization of individuality—no longer leaves any room for the unconscious idolatry with which the experience of beauty has always been linked. The triumph over beauty is completed by humor, the malicious pleasure elicited by any successful deprivation. There is laughter because there is nothing to laugh about. Laughter, whether reconciled or terrible, always accompanies the moment when a fear is ended.* It indicates a release, whether from physical danger or from the grip of logic. Reconciled laughter resounds with the echo of escape from power; wrong laughter copes with fear by defecting to the agencies which inspire it. It echoes the inescapability of power. Fun is a medicinal bath which the entertainment industry never ceases to prescribe. It makes laughter the instrument for cheating happiness. To moments of happiness laughter is foreign; only operettas, and now films, present sex amid peals of merriment. But Baudelaire is as humorless as Hölderlin. In wrong society laughter is a sickness infecting happiness and drawing it into society's worthless totality. Laughter about something is always laughter at it, and the vital force which, according to Bergson, bursts through rigidity in laughter is, in truth, the irruption of barbarity, the self-assertion which, in convivial settings, dares to celebrate its liberation from scruple. The collective of those who laugh parodies humanity. They are monads, each abandoning himself to the pleasure—at the expense of all others and with the majority in support—of being ready to shrink from nothing. Their harmony presents a caricature of solidarity. What is infernal about wrong laughter is that it compellingly parodies what is best, reconciliation. Joy, however, is austere: *res severa verum gaudium.** The ideology of monasteries, that it is not asceticism but the sexual act which marks the renunciation of attainable bliss, is negatively confirmed by the gravity of the lover who presciently pins his whole life to the fleeting moment. The culture industry replaces pain, which is present in ecstasy no less than in asceticism, with jovial denial. Its supreme law is that its consumers shall at no price be given what

they desire: and in that very deprivation they must take their laughing satisfaction. In each performance of the culture industry the permanent denial imposed by civilization is once more inflicted on and unmistakably demonstrated to its victims. To offer them something and to withhold it is one and the same. That is what the erotic commotion achieves. Just because it can never take place, everything revolves around the coitus. In film, to allow an illicit relationship without due punishment of the culprits is even more strictly tabooed than it is for the future son-in-law of a millionaire to be active in the workers' movement. Unlike that of the liberal era, industrial no less than nationalist culture can permit itself to inveigh against capitalism, but not to renounce the threat of castration. This threat constitutes its essence.* It outlasts the organized relaxation of morals toward the wearers of uniforms, first in the jaunty films produced for them and then in reality. What is decisive today is no longer Puritanism, though it still asserts itself in the form of women's organizations, but the necessity, inherent in the system,* of never releasing its grip on the consumer, of not for a moment allowing him or her to suspect that resistance is possible. This principle requires that while all needs should be presented to individuals as capable of fulfillment by the culture industry, they should be so set up in advance that individuals experience themselves through their needs only as eternal consumers, as the culture industry's object. Not only does it persuade them that its fraud is satisfaction; it also gives them to understand that they must make do with what is offered, whatever it may be. The flight from the everyday world, promised by the culture industry in all its branches, is much like the abduction of the daughter in the American cartoon: the father is holding the ladder in the dark. The culture industry presents that same everyday world as paradise. Escape, like elopement, is destined from the first to lead back to its starting point. Entertainment fosters the resignation which seeks to forget itself in entertainment.

Amusement, free of all restraint, would be not only the opposite of art but its complementary extreme. Absurdity in the manner of Mark Twain, with which the American culture industry flirts from time to time, could be a corrective to art. The more seriously art takes its opposition to existence, the more it resembles the seriousness of existence, its antithesis: the more it labors to develop strictly according to its own formal laws, the more labor it requires to be understood, whereas its goal had been pre-

cisely to negate the burden of labor. In some revue films, and especially in grotesque stories and "funnies,"* the possibility of this negation is momentarily glimpsed. Its realization, of course, cannot be allowed. Pure amusement indulged to the full, relaxed abandon to colorful associations and merry nonsense, is cut short by amusement in its marketable form: it is disrupted by the surrogate of a coherent meaning with which the culture industry insists on endowing its products while at the same time slyly misusing them as pretexts for bringing on the stars. Biographies and other fables stitch together the scraps of nonsense into a feeble-minded plot. It is not the bells on the fool's cap that jingle but the bunch of keys of capitalist reason, which even in its images harnesses joy to the purpose of getting ahead. Every kiss in the revue film must contribute to the career of the boxer or hit-song expert whose success is being glorified. The deception is not that the culture industry serves up amusement but that it spoils the fun by its business-minded attachment to the ideological clichés of the culture which is liquidating itself. Ethics and taste suppress unbridled amusement as "naïve"—naivety being rated no more highly than intellectualism—and even restrict its technical possibilities. The culture industry is corrupt, not as a sink of iniquity but as the cathedral of higher gratification. At all its levels, from Hemingway to Emil Ludwig,* from Mrs. Miniver* to the Lone Ranger,* from Toscanini to Guy Lombardo,* intellectual products drawn ready-made from art and science are infected with untruth. Traces of something better persist in those features of the culture industry by which it resembles the circus—in the stubbornly purposeless expertise of riders, acrobats, and clowns, in the "defense and justification of physical as against intellectual art."[3] But the hiding places of mindless artistry, which represents what is human against the social mechanism, are being relentlessly ferreted out by organizational reason, which forces everything to justify itself in terms of meaning and effect. It is causing meaninglessness to disappear at the lowest level of art just as radically as meaning is disappearing at the highest.

The fusion of culture and entertainment is brought about today not only by the debasement of culture but equally by the compulsory intellectualization of amusement. This is already evident in the fact that amusement is now experienced only in facsimile, in the form of cinema photography or the radio recording. In the age of liberal expansion amusement was sustained by an unbroken belief in the future: things would stay the

same yet get better. Today, that belief has itself been intellectualized, becoming so refined as to lose sight of all actual goals and to consist only in a golden shimmer projected beyond the real. It is composed of the extra touches of meaning—running exactly parallel to life itself—applied in the screen world to the good guy, the engineer, the decent girl, and also to the ruthlessness disguised as character, to the sporting interest, and finally to the cars and cigarettes, even where the entertainment does not directly serve the publicity needs of the manufacturer concerned but advertises the system as a whole. Amusement itself becomes an ideal, taking the place of the higher values it eradicates from the masses by repeating them in an even more stereotyped form than the advertising slogans paid for by private interests. Inwardness, the subjectively restricted form of truth, was always more beholden to the outward rulers than it imagined. The culture industry is perverting it into a barefaced lie. It appears now only as the high-minded prattle tolerated by consumers of religious bestsellers, psychological films, and women's serials* as an embarrassingly agreeable ingredient, so that they can more reliably control their own human emotions. In this sense entertainment is purging the affects in the manner once attributed by Aristotle to tragedy and now by Mortimer Adler* to film. The culture industry reveals the truth not only about style but also about catharsis.

The more strongly the culture industry entrenches itself, the more it can do as it chooses with the needs of consumers—producing, controlling, disciplining them; even withdrawing amusement altogether: here, no limits are set to cultural progress. But the tendency is immanent in the principle of entertainment itself, as a principle of bourgeois enlightenment. If the need for entertainment was largely created by industry, which recommended the work to the masses through its subject matter, the oleograph through the delicate morsel it portrayed and, conversely, the pudding mix through the image of a pudding, entertainment has always borne the trace of commercial brashness, of sales talk, the voice of the fairground huckster. But the original affinity between business and entertainment reveals itself in the meaning of entertainment itself: as society's apologia. To be entertained means to be in agreement. Entertainment makes itself possible only by insulating itself from the totality of the social process, making itself stupid and perversely renouncing from the first the in-

escapable claim of any work, even the most trivial: in its restrictedness to reflect the whole. Amusement always means putting things out of mind, forgetting suffering, even when it is on display. At its root is powerlessness. It is indeed escape, but not, as it claims, escape from bad reality but from the last thought of resisting that reality. The liberation which amusement promises is from thinking as negation. The shamelessness of the rhetorical question "What do people want?" lies in the fact that it appeals to the very people as thinking subjects whose subjectivity it specifically seeks to annul. Even on those occasions when the public rebels against the pleasure industry it displays the feebleness systematically instilled in it by that industry. Nevertheless, it has become increasingly difficult to keep the public in submission. The advance of stupidity must not lag behind the simultaneous advance of intelligence. In the age of statistics the masses are too astute to identify with the millionaire on the screen and too obtuse to deviate even minutely from the law of large numbers. Ideology hides itself in probability calculations. Fortune will not smile on all—just on the one who draws the winning ticket or, rather, the one designated to do so by a higher power—usually the entertainment industry itself, which presents itself as ceaselessly in search of talent. Those discovered by the talent scouts and then built up by the studios are ideal types of the new, dependent middle classes. The female starlet is supposed to symbolize the secretary, though in a way which makes her seem predestined, unlike the real secretary, to wear the flowing evening gown. Thus she apprises the female spectator not only of the possibility that she, too, might appear on the screen but still more insistently of the distance between them. Only one can draw the winning lot, only one is prominent, and even though all have mathematically the same chance, it is so minimal for each individual that it is best to write it off at once and rejoice in the good fortune of someone else, who might just as well be oneself but never is. Where the culture industry still invites naïve identification, it immediately denies it. It is no longer possible to lose oneself in others. Once, film spectators saw their own wedding in that of others. Now the happy couple on the screen are specimens of the same species as everyone in the audience, but the sameness posits the insuperable separation of its human elements. The perfected similarity is the absolute difference. The identity of the species prohibits that of the individual cases. The culture industry* has sardonically realized man's species being. Everyone amounts only to those qualities by

which he or she can replace everyone else: all are fungible, mere specimens. As individuals they are absolutely replaceable, pure nothingness, and are made aware of this as soon as time deprives them of their sameness. This changes the inner composition of the religion of success, which they are sternly required to uphold. The path *per aspera ad astra*, which presupposes need and effort, is increasingly replaced by the prize. The element of blindness in the routine decision as to which song is to be a hit, which extra a heroine, is celebrated by ideology. Films emphasize chance. By imposing an essential sameness on their characters, with the exception of the villain, to the point of excluding any faces which do not conform—for example, those which, like Garbo's, do not look as if they would welcome the greeting "Hello, sister"—the ideology does, it is true, make life initially easier for the spectators. They are assured that they do not need to be in any way other than they are and that they can succeed just as well without having to perform tasks of which they know themselves incapable. But at the same time they are given the hint that effort would not help them in any case, because even bourgeois success no longer has any connection to the calculable effect of their own work. They take the hint. Fundamentally, everyone recognizes chance, by which someone is sometimes lucky, as the other side of planning.* Just because society's energies have developed so far on the side of rationality that anyone might become an engineer or a manager, the choice of who is to receive from society the investment and confidence to be trained for such functions becomes entirely irrational. Chance and planning become identical since, given the sameness of people, the fortune or misfortune of the individual, right up to the top, loses all economic importance. Chance itself is planned; not in the sense that it will affect this or that particular individual but in that people believe in its control. For the planners it serves as an alibi, giving the impression that the web of transactions and measures into which life has been transformed* still leaves room for spontaneous, immediate relationships between human beings. Such freedom is symbolized in the various media of the culture industry by the arbitrary selection of average cases. In the detailed reports on the modestly luxurious pleasure trip organized by the magazine for the lucky competition winner—preferably a shorthand typist who probably won through contacts with local powers-that-be—the powerlessness of everyone is reflected. So much are the masses mere material that those in control* can raise one of them up to

their heaven and cast him or her out again: let them go hang with their justice and their labor. Industry* is interested in human beings only as its customers and employees and has in fact reduced humanity as a whole, like each of its elements, to this exhaustive formula. Depending on which aspect happens to be paramount at the time, ideology stresses plan or chance, technology or life, civilization or nature. As employees people are reminded of the rational organization and must fit into it as common sense requires. As customers they are regaled, whether on the screen or in the press, with human interest stories demonstrating freedom of choice and the charm of not belonging to the system. In both cases they remain objects.

The less the culture industry has to promise and the less it can offer a meaningful explanation of life, the emptier the ideology it disseminates necessarily becomes. Even the abstract ideals of the harmony and benevolence of society are too concrete in the age of the universal advertisement. Abstractions in particular are identified as publicity devices. Language which appeals to mere truth only arouses impatience to get down to the real business behind it. Words which are not a means seem meaningless, the others seem to be fiction, untruth. Value judgments are perceived either as advertisements or as mere chatter. The noncommittal vagueness of the resulting ideology does not make it more transparent, or weaker. Its very vagueness, the quasiscientific reluctance to be pinned down to anything which cannot be verified, functions as an instrument of control. Ideology becomes the emphatic and systematic proclamation of what is. Through its inherent tendency to adopt the tone of the factual report, the culture industry makes itself the irrefutable prophet of the existing order. With consummate skill it maneuvers between the crags of demonstrable misinformation and obvious truth by faithfully duplicating appearances, the density of which blocks insight. Thus the omnipresent and impenetrable world of appearances is set up as the ideal. Ideology is split between the photographing of brute existence and the blatant lie about its meaning, a lie which is not articulated directly but drummed in by suggestion. The mere cynical reiteration of the real is enough to demonstrate its divinity. Such photological proof* may not be stringent, but it is overwhelming. Anyone who continues to doubt in face of the power of monotony is a fool. The culture industry sweeps aside objections to itself along with those to the world it neutrally duplicates. One has only the choice of con-

forming or being consigned to the backwoods: the provincials who oppose cinema and radio by falling back on eternal beauty and amateur theatricals have already reached the political stance toward which the members of mass culture are still being driven. This culture is hardened enough either to poke fun at the old wishful dreams, the paternal ideal no less than unconditional feeling, or to invoke them as ideology, as the occasion demands. The new ideology has the world as such as its subject. It exploits the cult of fact by describing bad existence with utmost exactitude in order to elevate it into the realm of facts. Through such elevation existence itself becomes a surrogate of meaning and justice. Beauty is whatever the camera reproduces. The disappointed hope that one might oneself be the employee who won the world trip is matched by the disappointing appearance of the exactly photographed regions through which the journey might have led. What is offered is not Italy but evidence that it exists. The film can permit itself to show the Paris in which the young American woman hopes to still her longing as a desolately barren place, in order to drive her all the more implacably into the arms of the smart American boy she might equally well have met at home. That life goes on at all, that the system, even in its most recent phase, reproduces the lives of those who constitute it instead of doing away with them straight away, is even credited to the system as its meaning and value. The ability to keep going at all becomes the justification for the blind continuation of the system, indeed, for its immutability. What is repeated is healthy—the cycle in nature as in industry. The same babies grin endlessly from magazines, and endlessly the jazz machine pounds. Despite all the progress in the techniques of representation, all the rules and specialties, all the gesticulating bustle, the bread on which the culture industry feeds humanity, remains the stone of stereotype. It lives on the cyclical, on the admittedly well-founded amazement that, in spite of everything, mothers still give birth to children, that the wheels have not yet come completely to a halt. All this consolidates the immutability of the existing circumstances. The swaying cornfields at the end of Chaplin's film on Hitler give the lie to the anti-fascist speech about freedom. They resemble the blond tresses of the German maidens whose outdoor life in the summer wind is photographed by Ufa. Nature, in being presented by society's control mechanism as the healing antithesis of society, is itself absorbed into that incurable society and sold off. The solemn pictorial affirmation that the trees are green, the

sky is blue, and the clouds are sailing overhead already makes them cryptograms for factory chimneys and gasoline stations. Conversely, wheels and machine parts are made to gleam expressively, debased as receptacles of that leafy, cloudy soul. In this way both nature and technology are mobilized against the alleged stuffiness, the faked recollection of liberal society as a world in which people idled lasciviously in plush-lined rooms instead of taking wholesome open-air baths as they do today, or suffered breakdowns in antediluvian Benz models instead of traveling at rocket speed from where they are in any case to where it is no different. The triumph of the giant corporation* over entrepreneurial initiative is celebrated by the culture industry as the perpetuity of entrepreneurial initiative. The fight is waged against an enemy who has already been defeated, the thinking subject.* The resurrection of *Hans Sonnenstößer,** the enemy of bourgeois philistines, in Germany, and the smug coziness of *Life with Father** have one and the same meaning.

On one matter, however, this hollow ideology is utterly serious: everyone is provided for. "No one must be hungry or cold. Anyone failing to comply goes to a concentration camp." The joke from Hitler's Germany might well shine out as a maxim above all the portals of the culture industry. With naïve shrewdness it anticipates the situation characteristic of the latest society:* that it knows how to identify its true supporters. Formal freedom is guaranteed for everyone. No one has to answer officially* for what he or she thinks. However, all find themselves enclosed from early on within a system of churches, clubs, professional associations, and other relationships which amount to the most sensitive instrument of social control. Anyone who wants to avoid ruin must take care not to weigh too little in the scales of this apparatus. Otherwise he will fall behind in life and finally go under. The fact that in every career, and especially in the liberal professions, specialist knowledge as a rule goes hand in hand with a prescribed set of attitudes easily gives the misleading impression that expert knowledge is all that counts. In reality, it is a feature of the irrationally systematic nature of this society that it reproduces, passably, only the lives of its loyal members. The gradations in the standard of living correspond very precisely to the degree by which classes and individuals inwardly adhere to the system. Managers can be relied on; even the minor employee Dagwood,* who lives in reality no less than in the comic strip, is reli-

able. But anyone who goes hungry and suffers from cold, especially if he once had good prospects, is a marked man. He is an outsider, and—with the occasional exception of the capital crime—to be an outsider is the gravest guilt. In films such a person is, at best, an eccentric, an object of maliciously indulgent humor; but mostly he is a villain and is identified as such on his very first appearance, long before the action requires it, to forestall even the momentary misapprehension that society turns against those of good will. In fact, a kind of welfare state on a higher level is being established* today. To assert their positions people keep in motion an economy in which the extreme development of technology has made the masses in principle superfluous as producers in their own country. According to the ideological illusion, the workers, the true providers, are fed by the leaders of industry,* whom they feed. Thus the position of the individual becomes precarious. Under liberalism the poor were regarded as lazy; today they are automatically suspect. Anyone who is not provided for outside the concentration camp belongs inside it, or at any rate in the hell of the most demeaning labor and the slums. The culture industry, however, reflects society's positive and negative provision* for those it administers as direct human solidarity in the world of honest folk. No one is forgotten, everywhere are neighbors, social welfare officers, Dr Gillespies, and armchair philosophers with their hearts in the right place who, with their kindly man-to-man interventions, turn the socially perpetuated wretchedness into remediable individual cases, unless even that is ruled out by the personal depravity of those concerned. The managed provision of friendly care, administered by every factory as a means of increasing production, brings the last private impulse under social control; by being given the appearance of immediacy, the relationships of people within production are returned to the private sphere. Such "winter aid"* casts its conciliatory shadow over the films and broadcasts of the culture industry long before such care is transferred in totalitarian style from the factory to society itself. The great helpers and benefactors of humanity, whose scholarly and scientific achievements have to be embellished by scriptwriters as simple acts of compassion to wring from them a fictitious human interest, function as stand-ins for the leaders of nations, who ultimately decree the abolition of compassion and succeed in preventing all infections by exterminating the last of the sick.

The emphasis on the heart of gold is society's way of admitting the

suffering it creates: everyone knows that they are helpless within the system, and ideology must take account of this. Far from merely concealing the suffering under the cloak of improvised comradeship, the culture industry stakes its company pride on looking it manfully in the eye and acknowledging it with unflinching composure. This posture of steadfast endurance justifies the world which that posture makes necessary. Such is the world—so hard, yet therefore so wonderful, so healthy. The lie does not shrink back even from tragedy. Just as totalitarian society does not abolish the suffering of its members, but registers and plans it, mass culture does the same with tragedy. Hence the persistent borrowings from art. Art supplies the tragic substance which pure entertainment cannot provide on its own yet which it needs if it is to adhere to its principle of meticulously duplicating appearance. Tragedy, included in society's calculations and affirmed as a moment of the world, becomes a blessing. It deflects the charge that truth is glossed over, whereas in fact it is appropriated with cynical regret. It imparts an element of interest to the insipidity of censored happiness and makes that interest manageable. To the consumer who has seen culturally better days it offers the surrogate of long-abolished depth, and to regular moviegoers the veneer of culture they need for purposes of prestige. To all it grants the solace that human fate in its strength and authenticity is possible even now* and its unflinching depiction inescapable. The unbroken surface of existence, in the duplication of which ideology consists solely today, appears all the more splendid, glorious, and imposing the more it is imbued with necessary suffering. It takes on the aspect of fate. Tragedy is leveled down to the threat to destroy anyone who does not conform, whereas its paradoxical meaning once lay in hopeless resistance to mythical threat. Tragic fate becomes the just punishment into which bourgeois aesthetics has always longed to transform it. The morality of mass culture has come down to it from yesterday's children's books. In the first-class production the villain is dressed up as the hysteric who, in a study of ostensibly clinical exactitude, seeks to trick her more realistic rival out of her life's happiness and who herself suffers a quite untheatrical death. To be sure, only at the top are things managed as scientifically as this. Further down, the resources are scarcer. There tragedy has its teeth drawn without social psychology. Just as any honest Hungarian-Viennese operetta must have its tragic finale in the second act, leaving nothing for the third but the righting of misunderstandings, mass culture gives

tragedy permanent employment as routine. The obvious existence of a formula is enough in itself to allay the concern that tragedy might still be untamed. The housewife's description of the recipe for drama as "getting into trouble and out again" encompasses the whole of mass culture from the weak-minded women's serial* to its highest productions. Even the worst outcome, which once had better intentions, still confirms the established order and corrupts tragedy, whether because the irregular lover pays for her brief happiness with death or because the sad end in the picture makes the indestructibility of actual life shine all the more brightly. Tragic cinema is becoming truly a house of moral correction. The masses, demoralized by existence under the pressure of the system* and manifesting civilization only as compulsively rehearsed behavior in which rage and rebelliousness everywhere show through, are to be kept in order by the spectacle of implacable life and the exemplary conduct of those it crushes. Culture has always contributed to the subduing of revolutionary as well as of barbaric instincts. Industrial culture does something more. It inculcates the conditions on which implacable life is allowed to be lived at all. Individuals must use their general satiety as a motive for abandoning themselves to the collective power of which they are sated. The permanently hopeless situations which grind down filmgoers in daily life are transformed by their reproduction, in some unknown way, into a promise that they may continue to exist. One needs only to become aware of one's nullity, to subscribe to one's own defeat, and one is already a party to it. Society is made up of the desperate and thus falls prey to rackets. In a few of the most significant German novels of the prefascistic era, such as *Berlin Alexanderplatz* and *Kleiner Mann, was nun?*, this tendency was as vividly evident as in the mediocre film and in the procedures of jazz. Fundamentally, they all present the self-mockery of man. The possibility of becoming an economic subject, an entrepreneur, a proprietor, is entirely liquidated. Right down to the small grocery, the independent firm on the running and inheriting of which the bourgeois family and the position of its head were founded, has fallen into hopeless dependence. All have become employees, and in the civilization of employees the dignity of the father, dubious in any case, ceases to be. The behavior of the individual toward the racket, whether commercial, professional, or political, both before and after admittance to it; the gestures of the leader before the masses, of the lover before the woman he woos, are taking on peculiarly

masochistic traits. The attitude all are forced to adopt in order to demonstrate ever again their moral fitness for this society is reminiscent of that of boys during admission to a tribe; circling under the blows of the priest, they wear stereotypical smiles. Existence in late capitalism is a permanent rite of initiation. Everyone must show that they identify wholeheartedly with the power which beats them. This is inherent in the principle of syncopation in jazz, which mocks the act of stumbling while elevating it to the norm. The eunuch-like voice of the radio crooner, the handsome suitor of the heiress, who falls into the swimming pool wearing his tuxedo, are models for those who want to make themselves into that to which the system* breaks them. Everyone can be like the omnipotent society, everyone can be happy if only they hand themselves over to it body and soul and relinquish their claim to happiness. In their weakness society recognizes its own strength and passes some of it back to them. Their lack of resistance certifies them as reliable customers. Thus is tragedy abolished. Once, the antithesis between individual and society made up its substance. Tragedy glorified "courage and freedom of feeling in face of a mighty foe, sublime adversity, a problem which awakened dread."[4] Today tragedy has been dissipated in the void of the false identity of society and subject, the horror of which is still just fleetingly visible in the vacuous semblance of the tragic. But the miracle of integration, the permanent benevolence of those in command,* who admit the unresisting subject while he chokes down his unruliness—all this signifies fascism. Fascism lurks in the humaneness with which Döblin allows his protagonist Biberkopf to find refuge, no less than in films with a social slant. The ability to slip through, to survive one's own ruin, which has superseded tragedy, is ingrained in the new generation; its members are capable of any work, since the work process allows them to become attached to none. One is reminded of the sad pliability of the soldier returning home, unaffected by the war, of the casual laborer who finally joins the clandestine groups and the paramilitary organizations. The liquidation of tragedy confirms the abolition of the individual.

It is not only the standardized mode of production of the culture industry which makes the individual illusory in its products. Individuals are tolerated only as far as their wholehearted identity with the universal is beyond question. From the standardized improvisation in jazz to the

original film personality who must have a lock of hair straying over her eyes so that she can be recognized as such, pseudoindividuality reigns. The individual trait is reduced to the ability of the universal so completely to mold the accidental that it can be recognized as accidental. The sulky taciturnity or the elegant walk of the individual who happens to be on show is serially produced like the Yale locks which differ by fractions of a millimeter. The peculiarity of the self is a socially conditioned monopoly commodity misrepresented as natural. It is reduced to the moustache, the French accent, the deep voice of the prostitute, the "Lubitsch touch"—like a fingerprint on the otherwise uniform identity cards to which the lives and faces of all individuals, from the film star to the convict, have been reduced by the power of the universal. Pseudoindividuality is a precondition for apprehending and detoxifying tragedy: only because individuals are none but mere intersections of universal tendencies is it possible to reabsorb them smoothly into the universal. Mass culture thereby reveals the fictitious quality which has characterized the individual throughout the bourgeois era and is wrong only in priding itself on this murky harmony between universal and particular. The principle of individuality was contradictory from the outset. First, no individuation was ever really achieved. The class-determined form of self-preservation maintained everyone at the level of mere species being. Every bourgeois* character expressed the same thing, even and especially when deviating from it: the harshness of competitive society. The individual, on whom society was supported, itself bore society's taint; in the individual's apparent freedom he was the product of society's economic and social apparatus. Power has always invoked the existing power relationships when seeking the approval of those subjected to power. At the same time, the advance of bourgeois society has promoted the development of the individual. Against the will of those controlling it, technology has changed human beings from children into persons. But all such progress of individuation has been at the expense of the individuality in whose name it took place, leaving behind nothing except individuals' determination to pursue their own purposes alone. The citizens whose lives are split between business and private life, their private life between ostentation and intimacy, their intimacy between the sullen community of marriage and the bitter solace of being entirely alone, at odds with themselves and with everyone, are virtually already Nazis, who are at once enthusiastic and fed up, or the city dwellers of

today, who can imagine friendship only as "social contact" between the inwardly unconnected. The culture industry can only manipulate individuality so successfully because the fractured nature of society has always been reproduced within it. In the ready-made faces of film heroes and private persons fabricated according to magazine-cover stereotypes, a semblance of individuality—in which no one believes in any case—is fading, and the love for such hero-models is nourished by the secret satisfaction that the effort of individuation is at last being replaced by the admittedly more breathless one of imitation. The hope that the contradictory, disintegrating person could not survive for generations, that the psychological fracture within it must split the system itself, and that human beings might refuse to tolerate the mendacious substitution of the stereotype for the individual—that hope is vain. The unity of the personality has been recognized as illusory since Shakespeare's Hamlet. In the synthetically manufactured physiognomies of today the fact that the concept of human life ever existed is already forgotten. For centuries society has prepared for Victor Mature and Mickey Rooney.* They come to fulfill the very individuality they destroy.

The heroizing of the average forms part of the cult of cheapness. The highest-paid stars resemble advertisements for unnamed merchandise. Not for nothing are they often chosen from the ranks of commercial models. The dominant taste derives its ideal from the advertisement, from commodified beauty. Socrates' dictum that beauty is the useful has at last been ironically fulfilled. The cinema publicizes the cultural conglomerate* as a totality, while the radio advertises individually the products for whose sake the cultural system exists. For a few coins you can see the film which cost millions, for even less you can buy the chewing gum behind which stand the entire riches of the world, and the sales of which increase those riches still further. Through universal suffrage the vast funding of armies is generally known and approved, if *in absentia*, while prostitution behind the lines is not permitted. The best orchestras in the world, which are none, are delivered free of charge to the home. All this mockingly resembles the land of milk and honey as the national community apes the human one. Something is served up for everyone.* A provincial visitor's comment on the old Berlin Metropoltheater that "it is remarkable what can be done for the money" has long since been adopted by the culture industry and elevated to the substance of production itself. Not only is a

production always accompanied by triumphant celebration that it has been possible at all, but to a large extent it is that triumph itself. To put on a show means to show everyone what one has and can do. The show is still a fairground, but one incurably infected by culture. Just as people lured by the fairground crier overcame their disappointment inside the booths with a brave smile, since they expected it in any case, the moviegoer remains tolerantly loyal to the institution. But the cheapness of mass-produced luxury articles, and its complement, universal fraud, are changing the commodity character of art itself. That character is not new: it is the fact that art now dutifully admits to being a commodity, abjures its autonomy and proudly takes its place among consumer goods, that has the charm of novelty. Art was only ever able to exist as a separate sphere in its bourgeois form. Even its freedom, as negation of the social utility which is establishing itself through the market, is essentially conditioned by the commodity economy. Pure works of art, which negated the commodity character of society by simply following their own inherent laws, were at the same time always commodities. To the extent that, up to the eighteenth century, artists were protected from the market by patronage, they were subject to the patrons and their purposes instead. The purposelessness of the great modern work of art is sustained by the anonymity of the market. The latter's demands are so diversely mediated that the artist is exempted from any particular claim, although only to a certain degree, since his autonomy, being merely tolerated, has been attended throughout bourgeois history by a moment of untruth, which has culminated now in the social liquidation of art. The mortally sick Beethoven, who flung away a novel by Walter Scott with the cry: "The fellow writes for money," while himself proving an extremely experienced and tenacious businessman in commercializing the last quartets—works representing the most extreme repudiation of the market—offers the most grandiose example of the unity of the opposites of market and autonomy in bourgeois art. The artists who succumb to ideology are precisely those who conceal this contradiction instead of assimilating it into the consciousness of their own production, as Beethoven did: he improvised on "Rage over a Lost Penny" and derived the metaphysical injunction "It must be," which seeks aesthetically to annul the world's compulsion by taking that burden onto itself, from his housekeeper's demand for her monthly wages. The principle of idealist aesthetics, purposiveness without purpose,* reverses the

schema socially adopted by bourgeois art: purposelessness for purposes dictated by the market. In the demand for entertainment and relaxation, purpose has finally consumed the realm of the purposeless. But as the demand for the marketability of art becomes total, a shift in the inner economic composition of cultural commodities* is becoming apparent. For the use which is made of the work of art in antagonistic society is largely that of confirming the very existence of the useless, which art's total subsumption under usefulness has abolished. In adapting itself entirely to need, the work of art defrauds human beings in advance of the liberation from the principle of utility which it is supposed to bring about. What might be called use value in the reception of cultural assets is being replaced* by exchange value; enjoyment is giving way to being there and being in the know, connoisseurship by enhanced prestige. The consumer becomes the ideology of the amusement industry, whose institutions he or she cannot escape.* One has to have seen Mrs. Miniver,* just as one must subscribe to *Life* and *Time*. Everything is perceived only from the point of view that it can serve as something else, however vaguely that other thing might be envisaged. Everything has value only in so far as it can be exchanged, not in so far as it is something in itself. For consumers the use value of art, its essence, is a fetish, and the fetish—the social valuation which they mistake for the merit of works of art—becomes its only use value, the only quality they enjoy. In this way the commodity character of art disintegrates just as it is fully realized. Art becomes a species of commodity, worked up and adapted to industrial production, saleable and exchangeable; but art as the species of commodity which exists in order to be sold yet not for sale becomes something hypocritically unsaleable as soon as the business transaction is no longer merely its intention but its sole principle. The Toscanini performance on the radio is, in a sense, unsaleable. One listens to it for nothing, and each note of the symphony is accompanied, as it were, by the sublime advertisement that the symphony is not being interrupted by advertisements—"This concert is brought to you as a public service." The deception* takes place indirectly *via* the profit of all the united automobile and soap manufacturers, on whose payments the stations survive, and, of course, *via* the increased sales of the electrical industry as the producer of the receiver sets. Radio, the progressive latecomer to mass culture, is drawing conclusions which film's pseudomarket at present denies that industry. The technical structure of

the commercial radio system* makes it immune to liberal deviations of the kind the film industry can still permit itself in its own preserve. Film is a private enterprise which already represents the sovereign whole,* in which respect it has some advantages over the other individual combines.* Chesterfield is merely the nation's cigarette, but the radio is its mouthpiece. In the total assimilation of culture products into the commodity sphere radio makes no attempt to purvey its products as commodities. In America it levies no duty from the public. It thereby takes on the deceptive form of a disinterested, impartial authority, which fits fascism like a glove. In fascism radio becomes the universal mouthpiece of the *Führer*; in the loudspeakers on the street his voice merges with the howl of sirens proclaiming panic, from which modern propaganda is hard to distinguish in any case. The National Socialists knew that broadcasting gave their cause stature as the printing press did to the Reformation. The *Führer*'s metaphysical charisma, invented by the sociology of religion,* turned out finally to be merely the omnipresence of his radio addresses, which demonically parodies that of the divine spirit. The gigantic fact that the speech penetrates everywhere replaces its content, as the benevolent act of the Toscanini broadcast supplants its content, the symphony. No listener can apprehend the symphony's true coherence, while the *Führer*'s address is in any case a lie. To posit the human word as absolute, the false commandment, is the immanent tendency of radio. Recommendation becomes command. The promotion of identical commodities under different brand names, the scientifically endorsed praise of the laxative in the slick voice of the announcer between the overtures of *La Traviata* and *Rienzi*, has become untenable if only for its silliness. One day the *Diktat* of production, the specific advertisement, veiled by the semblance of choice, can finally become the *Führer*'s overt command. In a society of large-scale fascistic rackets which agree among themselves on how much of the national product is to be allocated to providing for the needs of the people, to invite the people to use a particular soap powder would, in the end, seem anachronistic. In a more modern, less ceremonious style, the *Führer* directly orders both the holocaust and the supply of trash.

Today works of art, suitably packaged like political slogans, are pressed on a reluctant public at reduced prices by the culture industry; they are opened up for popular enjoyment like parks. However, the erosion of their genuine commodity character does not mean that they would

be abolished in the life of a free society but that the last barrier to their debasement as cultural assets has now been removed. The abolition of educational privilege by disposing of culture at bargain prices does not admit the masses to the preserves from which they were formerly excluded but, under the existing social conditions, contributes to the decay of education and the progress of barbaric incoherence. Someone who in the nineteenth or early twentieth century spent money to attend a drama or a concert, paid the performance at least as much respect as the money spent. The citizen who wanted a return for his outlay might occasionally try to establish some connection to the work. The guidebooks to Wagner's music dramas or the commentaries on *Faust* bear witness to this. They form a transition to the biographical glaze applied to works of art and the other practices to which works of art are subjected today. Even when the art business was in the bloom of youth, use value* was not dragged along as a mere appendage by exchange value but was developed as a precondition of the latter, to the social benefit of works of art. As long as it was expensive, art kept the citizen within some bounds. That is now over. Art's unbounded proximity to those exposed to it, no longer mediated by money, completes the alienation between work and consumer, which resemble each other in triumphant reification. In the culture industry respect is vanishing along with criticism: the latter gives way to mechanical expertise, the former to the forgetful cult of celebrities. For consumers, nothing is expensive any more. Nevertheless, they are dimly aware that the less something costs, the less it can be a gift to them. The twofold mistrust of traditional culture as ideology mingles with that of industrialized culture as fraud. Reduced to mere adjuncts, the degraded works of art are secretly rejected by their happy recipients along with the junk the medium has made them resemble. The public should rejoice that there is so much to see and hear. And indeed, everything is to be had. The "screenos"* and cinema vaudevilles, the competitions in recognizing musical extracts, the free magazines, rewards, and gift articles handed out to the listeners of certain radio programs are not mere accidents, but continue what is happening to the culture products themselves. The symphony is becoming the prize for listening to the radio at all, and if the technology had its way the film would already be delivered to the apartment on the model of the radio.* It is moving towards the commercial system. Television points the way to a development which easily enough could push the Warner broth-

ers* into the doubtless unwelcome position of little theatre performers and cultural conservatives. However, the pursuit of prizes has already left its imprint on consumer behavior. Because culture presents itself as a bonus, with unquestioned private and social benefits, its reception has become a matter of taking one's chances. The public crowds forward for fear of missing something. What that might be is unclear, but, at any rate, only those who join in have any chance. Fascism, however, hopes* to reorganize the gift-receivers trained by the culture industry into its enforced adherents.

Culture is a paradoxical commodity. It is so completely subject to the law of exchange that it is no longer exchanged; it is so blindly equated with use that it can no longer be used. For this reason it merges with the advertisement. The more meaningless the latter appears under monopoly, the more omnipotent culture becomes. Its motives are economic enough. That life could continue without the whole culture industry is too certain; the satiation and apathy it generates among consumers are too great. It can do little to combat this from its own resources. Advertising is its elixir of life. But because its product ceaselessly reduces the pleasure it promises as a commodity to that mere promise, it finally coincides with the advertisement it needs on account of its own inability to please. In the competitive society advertising performed a social service in orienting the buyer in the market, facilitating choice and helping the more efficient but unknown supplier to find customers. It did not merely cost labor time, but saved it. Today, when the free market is coming to an end, those in control of the system are entrenching themselves in advertising.* It strengthens the bond which shackles consumers to the big combines. Only those who can keep paying the exorbitant fees charged by the advertising agencies, and most of all by radio itself, that is, those who are already part of the system or are co-opted into it by the decisions of banks and industrial capital, can enter the pseudomarket as sellers. The costs of advertising, which finally flow back into the pockets of the combines,* spare them the troublesome task of subduing unwanted outsiders; they guarantee that the wielders of influence remain among their peers, not unlike the resolutions of economic councils* which control the establishment and continuation of businesses in the totalitarian state. Advertising today is a negative principle, a blocking device: anything which does not bear its seal of approval is economically suspect. All-pervasive advertising is certainly not needed to acquaint

people with the goods on offer, the varieties of which are limited in any case. It benefits the selling of goods only directly. The termination of a familiar advertising campaign by an individual firm represents a loss of prestige, and is indeed an offence against the discipline which the leading clique imposes on its members. In wartime, commodities which can no longer be supplied continue to be advertised merely as a display of industrial power. At such times the subsidizing of the ideological media is more important than the repetition of names.* Through their ubiquitous use under the pressure of the system, advertising techniques have invaded the idiom, the "style" of the culture industry. So complete is their triumph that in key positions it is no longer even explicit: the imposing buildings of the big companies,* floodlit advertisements in stone, are free of advertising, merely displaying the illuminated company initials on their pinnacles, with no further need of self-congratulation. By contrast, the buildings surviving from the nineteenth century, the architecture of which still shamefully reveals their utility as consumer goods, their function as accommodation, are covered from basement to above roof level with hoardings and banners: the landscape becomes a mere background for signboards and symbols. Advertising becomes simply the art with which Goebbels presciently equated it, *l'art pour l'art*, advertising for advertising's sake, the pure representation of social power. In the influential American magazines *Life* and *Fortune* the images and texts of advertisements are, at a cursory glance, hardly distinguishable from the editorial section. The enthusiastic and unpaid picture story about the living habits and personal grooming of celebrities, which wins them new fans, is editorial, while the advertising pages rely on photographs and data so factual and lifelike that they represent the ideal of information to which the editorial section only aspires. Every film is a preview of the next, which promises yet again to unite the same heroic couple under the same exotic sun: anyone arriving late cannot tell whether he is watching the trailer or the real thing. The montage character of the culture industry, the synthetic, controlled manner in which its products are assembled—factory-like not only in the film studio but also, virtually, in the compilation of the cheap biographies, journalistic novels, and hit songs—predisposes it to advertising: the individual moment, in being detachable, replaceable, estranged even technically from any coherence of meaning, lends itself to purposes outside the work. The special effect, the trick, the isolated and

repeatable individual performance have always conspired with the exhibition of commodities for advertising purposes, and today every close-up of a film actress is an advert for her name, every hit song a plug for its tune. Advertising and the culture industry are merging technically no less than economically. In both, the same thing appears in countless places, and the mechanical repetition of the same culture product is already that of the same propaganda slogan. In both, under the dictate of effectiveness, technique is becoming psychotechnique, a procedure for manipulating human beings. In both, the norms of the striking yet familiar, the easy but catchy, the worldly wise but straightforward hold good; everything is directed at overpowering a customer conceived as distracted or resistant.

Through the language they speak, the customers make their own contribution to culture as advertising. For the more completely language coincides with communication, the more words change from substantial carriers of meaning to signs devoid of qualities; the more purely and transparently they communicate what they designate, the more impenetrable they become. The demythologizing of language, as an element of the total process of enlightenment, reverts to magic. In magic word and content were at once different from each other and indissolubly linked. Concepts like melancholy, history, indeed, life, were apprehended in the word which both set them apart and preserved them. Its particular form constituted and reflected them at the same time. The trenchant distinction which declares the word itself fortuitous and its allocation to its object arbitrary does away with the superstitious commingling of word and thing. Anything in a given sequence of letters which goes beyond the correlation to the event designated is banished as unclear and as verbal metaphysics. As a result, the word, which henceforth is allowed only to designate something and not to mean it, becomes so fixated on the object that it hardens to a formula. This affects language and subject matter equally. Instead of raising a matter to the level of experience, the purified word exhibits it as a case of an abstract moment, and everything else, severed from now defunct expression by the demand for pitiless clarity, therefore withers in reality also. The outside-left in football, the blackshirt,* the Hitler Youth member, and others of their kind are no more than what they are called. If, before its rationalization, the word had set free not only longing but lies, in its rationalized form it has become a straightjacket more for longing than for lies. The blindness and muteness of the data to which posi-

tivism reduces the world passes over into language itself, which is limited to registering those data. Thus relationships themselves become impenetrable, taking on an impact, a power of adhesion and repulsion which makes them resemble their extreme antithesis, spells. They act once more like the practices of a kind of sorcery, whether the name of a diva is concocted in the studio on the basis of statistical data, or welfare government is averted by the use of taboo-laden words such as "bureaucracy" and "intellectuals," or vileness exonerates itself by invoking the name of a homeland. The name, to which magic most readily attaches, is today undergoing a chemical change. It is being transformed into arbitrary, manipulable designations, the power of which, although calculable, is for that reason as willful as that of archaic names. First names, the archaic residues, have been brought up to date either by stylizing them into advertising brands—film stars' surnames have become first names—or by standardizing them collectively. By contrast, the bourgeois, family name which, instead of being a trademark, individualized its bearers by relating them to their own prehistory, sounds old-fashioned. In Americans it arouses a curious unease. To conceal the uncomfortable distance existing between particular people* they call themselves Bob and Harry, like replaceable members of teams. Such forms of interaction reduce human beings to the brotherhood of the sporting public, which protects them from true fraternity. Signification, the only function of the word admitted by semantics, is consummated in the sign. Its character as sign is reinforced by the speed with which linguistic models are put into circulation from above. Whether folksongs are rightly or wrongly called upper-class culture which has come down in the world, their elements have at least taken on their popular form in a long, highly mediated process of experience. The dissemination of popular songs, by contrast, is practically instantaneous. The American term "fad" for fashions which catch on epidemically—inflamed by the action of highly concentrated economic powers—referred to this phenomenon long before totalitarian advertising bosses had laid down the general lines of culture in their countries. If the German fascists launch a word like "intolerable" [*Untragbar*] over the loudspeakers one day, the whole nation is saying "intolerable" the next. On the same pattern, the nations against which the German *Blitzkrieg* was directed have adopted it in their own jargon. The universal repetition of the term denoting such measures makes the measures, too, familiar, just as, at the time of the free

market, the brand name on everyone's lips increased sales. The blind and rapidly spreading repetition of designated words links advertising to the totalitarian slogan. The layer of experience which made words human like those who spoke them has been stripped away, and in its prompt appropriation language takes on the coldness which hitherto was peculiar to billboards and the advertising sections of newspapers. Countless people use words and expressions which they either have ceased to understand at all or use only according to their behavioral functions, just as trademarks adhere all the more compulsively to their objects the less their linguistic meaning is apprehended. The Minister of Public Education speaks ignorantly of "dynamic forces," and the hit songs sing endlessly of "reverie" and "rhapsody," hitching their popularity to the magic of the incomprehensible as if to some deep intimation of a higher life. Other stereotypes, such as "memory," are still partly comprehended, but become detached from the experience which might fulfill them. They obtrude into the spoken language like enclaves. On the German radio of Flesch and Hitler they are discernible in the affected diction of the announcer, who pronounces phrases like "Goodnight, listeners," or "This is the Hitler Youth speaking," or even "the *Führer*" with an inflection which passes into the mother tongue of millions. In such turns of phrase the last bond between sedimented experience and language, which still exerted a reconciling influence in dialect in the nineteenth century, is severed. By contrast, in the hands of the editor whose supple opinions have promoted him to the status of *Schriftleiter*,* German words become petrified and alien. In any word one can distinguish how far it has been disfigured by the fascist "folk" community. By now, of course, such language* has become universal, totalitarian. The violence done to words is no longer audible in them. The radio announcer does not need to talk in an affected voice; indeed, he would be impossible if his tone differed from that of his designated listeners. This means, however, that the language and gestures of listeners and spectators are more deeply permeated by the patterns of the culture industry than ever before, in nuances still beyond the reach of experimental methods. Today the culture industry has taken over the civilizing inheritance of the frontier and entrepreneurial democracy, whose receptivity to intellectual deviations was never too highly developed. All are free to dance and amuse themselves, just as, since the historical neutralization of religion, they have been free to join any of the countless sects. But free-

dom to choose an ideology, which always reflects economic coercion, everywhere proves to be freedom to be the same. The way in which the young girl accepts and performs the obligatory date, the tone of voice used on the telephone and in the most intimate situations, the choice of words in conversation, indeed, the whole inner life compartmentalized according to the categories of vulgarized depth psychology, bears witness to the attempt to turn oneself into an apparatus meeting the requirements of success, an apparatus which, even in its unconscious impulses, conforms to the model presented by the culture industry. The most intimate reactions of human beings have become so entirely reified, even to themselves, that the idea of anything peculiar to them survives only in extreme abstraction: personality means hardly more than dazzling white teeth and freedom from body odor and emotions. That is the triumph of advertising in the culture industry: the compulsive imitation by consumers of cultural commodities which, at the same time, they recognize as false.*



Elements of Anti-Semitism: Limits of Enlightenment

I

Anti-Semitism today is for some a question affecting human destiny and for others a mere pretext. For the fascists the Jews are not a minority but the antirace, the negative principle as such; on their extermination the world's happiness depends. Diametrically opposed to this is the thesis that the Jews, free of national or racial features, form a group through religious belief and tradition and nothing else. Jewish traits relate to Eastern Jews, and only to those not yet assimilated. Both doctrines are true and false at the same time.

The first is true in the sense that fascism has made it true. The Jews are today the group which, in practice and in theory, draws to itself the destructive urge which the wrong social order spontaneously produces. They are branded as absolute evil by absolute evil. In this sense they are indeed the chosen people. Now that power is no longer needed for economic reasons,* the Jews are designated as its absolute object, existing merely for the exercise of power. The workers,* who are the real target, are understandably not told as much to their faces; the blacks must be kept in their place, but the Jews are to be wiped from the face of the earth, and the call to exterminate them like vermin finds an echo among the prospective fascists of all countries. In the image of the Jew which the racial nationalists hold up before the world they express their own essence. Their craving is for exclusive ownership, appropriation,* unlimited power, and

at any price. The Jew, burdened with his tormentors' guilt, mocked as their lord, they nail to the cross, endlessly repeating a sacrifice in whose power they are unable to believe.

The other, liberal thesis is true as an idea. It contains an image of the society in which rage would no longer reproduce itself or seek qualities on which to be discharged.* But by assuming the unity of humanity to have been already realized in principle, the liberal thesis serves as an apology for the existing order. The attempt to avert the direst threat by minority policies and other democratic measures is ambiguous as is the defensive strategy of the last liberal citizens. Their powerlessness attracts the enemy of powerlessness. The mode of life and appearance of the Jews compromise the existing universal by deficient adaptation. Their inflexible adherence to their own order of life has placed them in an insecure relationship to the prevailing one. They expected to be sustained by that order without subscribing to it. Their relationship to the dominant nations was one of greed and fear. Yet whenever they sacrificed their difference to the prevailing mode, the successfully adapted Jews took on in exchange the cold, stoical character which existing society* imposes on human beings. The dialectical intertwinement of enlightenment and power, the dual relationship of progress to both cruelty and liberation, which has been brought home to the Jews no less by the great exponents of enlightenment than by democratic popular movements, manifests itself in the makeup of the assimilated Jews themselves. The enlightened self-control with which adapted Jews effaced within themselves the painful scars of domination by others, a kind of second circumcision, made them forsake their own dilapidated community and wholeheartedly embrace the life of the modern bourgeoisie, which was already advancing ineluctably toward a reversion to pure oppression and reorganization into an exclusively racial entity. Race is not, as the racial nationalists claim, an immediate, natural peculiarity. Rather, it is a regression to nature as mere violence, to the hidebound particularism which, in the existing order,* constitutes precisely the universal. Race today is the self-assertion of the bourgeois individual, integrated into the barbaric collective. The harmonious society to which the liberal Jews declared their allegiance has finally been granted to them in the form of the national community. They believed that only anti-Semitism disfigured this order, which in reality cannot exist without disfiguring human beings.

The persecution of the Jews, like any persecution, cannot be separated from that order.* Its essence, however it may hide itself at times, is the violence which today is openly revealed.

II

Anti-Semitism as a popular movement has always been driven by the urge of which its instigators accuse the social democrats: to make everyone the same. Those without the power to command must fare no better than ordinary people. From the German civil servant to the Negroes in Harlem, those avidly emulating their betters have always known that they would really gain nothing but the satisfaction of seeing others no better off than themselves. The Aryanization of Jewish property, which in any case primarily benefited those at the top, enriched the masses in the Third Reich hardly more than the wretched booty pillaged from Jewish quarters enriched the Cossacks. The real benefit it brought was a half-understood ideology. That the demonstration of its economic futility heightened rather than moderated the attraction of the racialist panacea points to its true nature: it does not help human beings but assuages their urge to destroy. The actual advantage enjoyed by the racialist comrade is that his rage will be sanctioned by the collective. The less he gains in any other way, the more obstinately, against better knowledge, he clings to the movement. Anti-Semitism has proved immune to the charge of inadequate profitability. For the common people it is a luxury.

Its usefulness for the rulers is evident. It serves as a distraction, a cheap means of corruption, a terrorist warning. The respectable rackets condone it, the disreputable ones* carry it out. But the form of the mentality, both social and individual, which manifests itself in anti-Semitism, the primeval-historical entrapment from which it is a desperate attempt to escape, remains wholly obscure. If a malady so deeply embedded in civilization is not properly accounted for by knowledge, the individual, too, though he may be as well intentioned as the victim himself, cannot mitigate it through understanding. The plausibly rational, economic, and political explanations and counterarguments—however correct their individual observations—cannot appease it, since rationality itself, through its link to power, is submerged in the same malady. Whether blindly dealing

out blows or blindly fending them off, persecutors and victims form part of the same calamitous cycle. Anti-Semitic behavior is unleashed in situations in which blinded people, deprived of subjectivity, are let loose as subjects. Their actions—for those involved—are lethal yet meaningless reactions, of the kind which behaviorists register but fail to interpret. Anti-Semitism is a well-rehearsed pattern, indeed, a ritual of civilization, and the pogroms are the true ritual murders. They demonstrate the impotence of what might have restrained them—reflection, meaning, ultimately truth. The mindless pastime of beating people to death confirms the drab existence to which one merely conforms.

The blindness of anti-Semitism, its lack of intention, lends a degree of truth to the explanation of the movement as a release valve. Rage is vented on those who are both conspicuous and unprotected. And just as, depending on the constellation, the victims are interchangeable: vagrants,* Jews, Protestants, Catholics, so each of them can replace the murderer, in the same blind lust for killing, as soon as he feels the power of representing the norm. There is no authentic anti-Semitism, and certainly no born anti-Semite. The older adults to whom the call for Jewish blood has become second nature are as ignorant of the reason as the young people who have to shed it. The high-placed instigators, who know the reason, neither hate the Jews nor love their own followers. The latter, however, who always go short, economically and sexually, hate without end; they find relaxation unbearable because they do not know fulfillment. Indeed, the organized robbers and murderers are animated by a kind of dynamic idealism. Setting out on their pillages, they construct a grandiose ideology for what they do, with fatuous talk of saving the family, the fatherland, humanity. But as they remain the dupes they secretly suspect themselves to be, their pitiful rational motive, the theft which was supposed to rationalize the deed, is finally discarded entirely, and the rationalization becomes truthful against its will. The obscure impulse which was always more congenial to them than reason takes them over completely. The rational island sinks beneath the flood, and those desperately floundering now appear only as defenders of truth, restorers of the earth, which has to be reformed to its farthest corners. All living things become material for their ghastly duty, which now flinches at nothing. Action becomes a purpose in itself, cloaking its own purposelessness. Anti-Semitism always starts with an appeal to complete the task. Anti-Semitism and totality have

always been profoundly connected. Blindness encompasses everything because it comprehends nothing.

Liberalism had granted the Jews property, but without the authority to command. The purpose of human rights was to promise happiness even where power was lacking. Because the cheated masses are dimly aware that this promise, being universal, remains a lie as long as classes exist, it arouses their anger; they feel themselves scorned. They must constantly repress the thought of that happiness, even as a possibility, an idea, and they deny it all the more fiercely the more its time has come. Wherever it appears to be realized amid the systematic deprivation, they must reenact the suppression which has been applied to their own longing. Whatever that reenactment is directed against, however unhappy it may itself be—Ahasuerus and Mignon, exoticism which evokes the promised land, beauty which summons the thought of sex, the animal whose hint of promiscuity condemns it as repulsive—draws down on itself the destructive fury of the civilized, who can never fully complete the painful process of civilization. To those who compulsively control it, tormented nature provocatively reflects back the appearance of powerless happiness. The idea of happiness without power is unendurable because it alone would be happiness. The fantasy of the conspiracy of lascivious Jewish bankers who finance Bolshevism is a sign of innate powerlessness, the good life an emblem of happiness. These are joined by the image of the intellectual, who appears to enjoy in thought what the others deny themselves and is spared the sweat of toil and bodily strength. The banker and the intellectual, money and mind, the exponents of circulation, are the disowned wishful image of those mutilated by power, an image which power uses to perpetuate itself.

III

The present society, in which primitive religious feelings, new cults, and the legacy of revolutions are peddled in the market, in which the fascist leaders barter the land and lives of nations behind locked doors while the public lulled by their radio sets calculate the cost; this society in which even the word which unmasks it doubles as an invitation to join a political racket; in which no longer is politics merely business but business is the whole of politics—this society is scandalized by the Jew with his obsolete shopkeeper's mannerisms, labeling him a materialist, a haggler, who should

make way for the pioneering spirit of those who have elevated business to an absolute.

Bourgeois anti-Semitism has a specific economic purpose: to conceal domination in production. If in earlier epochs the rulers were directly repressive, so that they not only left work exclusively to the lower orders but declared it the ignominy it always was under domination, in the age of mercantilism the absolute monarch transformed himself into the supreme master of manufactories. Production became presentable at court. Finally, as bourgeois, the masters replaced their colorful robes with civilian dress. Work is no disgrace, they said—the more rationally to take possession of* that of others. Aligning themselves with the productive elements, they remained the parasites of old.* The factory owner ventured and raked in like a great merchant or banker. He calculated, procured, bought, sold. In the market he competed with the merchants and bankers for the profit due to his capital. But he grabbed not merely from the market but from the source: as a functionary of the class system he took care not to go short of the fruits of his workers' labor. The workers had to deliver as much as possible. Like a true Shylock he insisted on his contract. By virtue of owning the machines and materials, he forced the others to produce. He called himself the producer, but he and everyone secretly knew the truth. The productive work of the capitalist, whether he justified his profit as the reward of enterprise, as under liberalism, or as the director's salary, as today, was the ideology which concealed the nature of the labor contract and the rapacity of the economic system in general.*

That is why people shout: "Stop thief!"—and point at the Jew. He is indeed the scapegoat, not only for individual maneuvers and machinations but in the wider sense that the economic injustice of the whole class is attributed to him. The factory owner has his debtors, the workers, under observation in his factory and can check their performance before he parts with his money. They only find out the true nature of the exchange only when they see what they can buy with it: the smallest magnate has access to a quantity of services and goods available to no ruler before him; but the workers receive what is called the cultural minimum. Not content with letting the market tell them how few goods can be theirs, the salesman sings the praises of those they cannot afford. Only the relationship of wages to prices expresses what is withheld* from the workers. With their wages they have accepted the principle of just remuneration. The mer-

chant presents them with the promissory note they have signed on behalf of the manufacturer. The merchant is the bailiff for the whole system, taking upon himself the odium due to the others. That the circulation sphere is responsible for exploitation is a socially necessary illusion.

The Jews had not been the only people active in the circulation sphere. But they had been locked up in it too long not to reflect in their makeup something of the hatred so long directed at that sphere. Unlike their Aryan colleagues, they were largely denied access to the source of added value. Only at a late stage and with difficulty were they allowed to gain ownership of the means of production. To be sure, in the history of Europe, and even in imperial Germany, baptized Jews had reached high positions in administration and industry. But they always had to justify this with redoubled devotion and diligence, and stubborn self-denial. They were only admitted if, through their behavior, they tacitly adopted and confirmed the verdict on the other Jews: that is the purpose of baptism. All the great achievements of their prominent members were not enough to allow Jews to be admitted to the peoples of Europe; having been prevented from putting down roots they were then criticized as rootless. They always remained the protected Jews, dependent on emperors, princes, or the absolutist state. These patrons were economically more advanced than the rest of the population. To the extent that they could make use of the Jew as an intermediary, they protected him against the masses who had to foot the bill for progress. The Jews were the colonizers of progress. Having helped as merchants to disseminate Roman civilization throughout Gentile Europe, they became, in keeping with their patriarchal religion, representatives of urban, civic, and finally industrial conditions. As bearers of capitalist modes of existence from country to country they earned the hatred of those who suffered under that system. For the sake of the economic progress which today is their downfall the Jews were from the first a thorn in the side of the craftsmen and farmers whose status capitalism undermined. Now it is their turn to bear the brunt of its exclusive, particularist character. They, who always wanted to be first, are left far behind. Even the Jewish head of an American entertainment trust is hopelessly defensive amid his wealth. The caftan was the ghostly residue of ancient civic dress. Today it is a sign that its wearers have been flung to the margins of a society* which, now wholly enlightened, is exorcising the spirits of its prehistory. They who propagated individualism, abstract law,

the concept of the person, have been debased to a species. They who were never allowed untroubled ownership of the civic right which should have granted them human dignity are again called "the Jews" without distinction. Even in the nineteenth century the Jew remained dependent on an alliance with the central authority. The general law, protected by the state, was the guarantor of his safety, and the exceptive law the specter which ensured his docility. He remained an object, dependent on grace and favor, even when claiming his rights. Trade was not his vocation, it was his fate. The Jews were the trauma of the knights of industry, who have to masquerade as productive creators.* In the Jewish jargon they detect what they secretly despise in themselves: their anti-Semitism is self-hate, the bad conscience of the parasite.

IV

Nationalist anti-Semitism seeks to disregard religion. It claims to be concerned with purity of race and nation. Its exponents notice that people have long ceased to trouble themselves about eternal salvation.* The average believer today is as crafty as only cardinals were in former times. To accuse the Jews of being obdurate unbelievers is no longer enough to incite the masses. But the religious hostility which motivated the persecution of the Jews for two millennia is far from completely extinguished. Rather, anti-Semitism's eagerness to deny its religious tradition indicates that that tradition is secretly no less deeply embedded in it than secular idiosyncrasy once was in religious zealotry. Religion has been incorporated as cultural heritage, not abolished. The alliance between enlightenment and power has debarred from consciousness the moment of truth in religion while conserving its reified forms. Both circumstances finally benefit fascism: the unchanneled longing is guided into racial-nationalist rebellion, while the descendants of the evangelistic zealots are converted into conspirators of blood communities and elite guards, on the model of the Wagnerian knights of the Grail. In this way religion as an institution is partly meshed directly into the system and partly transposed into the pomp of mass culture and parades. The fanatical faith on which leader and followers pride themselves is no other than the grim doctrine which was earlier used to discipline the desperate, except that its content has gone astray. That content lives on only as hatred of those who do not share the

faith. Among the "German Christians,"* all that remained of the religion of love was anti-Semitism.

Christianity is not only a regression beyond Judaism. The latter's God, in passing from a henotheistic to a universal form, did not entirely shed the features of the nature demon. The terror originating in remote preanimist times passes from nature into the concept of the absolute self which, as its creator and ruler, entirely subjugates nature. Despite the ineffable power and splendor in which such alienation clothes it, that ruler is still attainable to thought, which becomes universal through this very relationship to something supreme, transcendental. God as spirit is the principle opposed to nature; it not only stands for nature's blind cycle as do all the mythical gods, but offers liberation from it. But in its remote abstractness, the incommensurable has at the same time become more terrible, and the pitiless statement: "I am who am," which tolerates nothing beside itself, surpasses in its inescapable power the blinder and therefore more ambiguous judgment of anonymous fate. The God of Judaism demands what he is owed and settles accounts with the defaulter. He enmeshes his creatures in a tissue of debt and credit, guilt and merit. In contrast, Christianity emphasized the moment of grace, although that, too, is contained in Judaism, in God's covenant with men and in the Messianic promise. It softened the terror of the absolute by allowing the creature to find itself reflected in the deity: the divine mediator is called by a human name and dies a human death. His message is: fear not; the law yields before faith; love becomes greater than any majesty, the only commandment.

But by virtue of the same moments by which it lifted the spell of nature religion, Christianity is producing ideology once again, in a spiritualized form. To the same degree as the absolute is brought closer to the finite, the finite is made absolute. Christ, the incarnated spirit, is the deified sorcerer. The human self-reflection in the absolute, the humanization of God through Christ, is the *proton pseudos* [first substitution]. The progress beyond Judaism is paid for with the assertion that the mortal Jesus was God. The harm is done precisely by the reflective moment of Christianity, the spiritualization of magic. A spiritual essence is attributed to something which mind identifies as natural. Mind consists precisely in demonstrating the contradiction inherent in such pretensions of the finite. Bad conscience is therefore obliged to present the prophet as a symbol, the magi-

cal practice as transubstantiation. It is that which makes Christianity a religion, and, in a sense, the only one: an intellectual link to something intellectually suspect, a special sphere of culture. Like the great Asiatic belief systems, pre-Christian Judaism was hardly separable from national life, from collective self-preservation. The reshaping of the heathen ritual of sacrifice not only took place in worship and in the mind but determined the form of the labor process. In providing the schema for the latter, sacrifice becomes rational. The taboo is transformed into the rational organization of the work process. It regulates administration in war and peace, sowing and harvesting, food preparation and slaughter. Although the rules may not arise from rational reflection, rationality arises from them. The effort of primitive peoples to free themselves from immediate fear engendered among them the institution of ritual; this was refined by Judaism into the sanctified rhythm of family and national life. The priests were appointed to watch over the proper observance of custom. Their function within the power structure was clearly displayed in theocratic practice; Christianity, however, wanted to remain spiritual even where it aspired to power. In ideology it repudiated self-preservation by the ultimate sacrifice, that of the man-god, but thereby relegated devalued life to the sphere of the profane: it abolished the law of Moses but rendered what was theirs unto both God and Caesar. Secular authority is either confirmed or usurped, while Christianity acquires a license to manage salvation. Self-preservation is to be conquered though the imitation of Christ—by order. In this way self-sacrificing love is stripped of its naivety, severed from natural love and turned to account as credit. The love mediated by ecclesiastical knowledge is presented as immediate love, in which nature and the supernatural are reconciled. Therein lies its untruth: in the fraudulently affirmative interpretation of self-forgetting.

That interpretation is fraudulent because the church depends for its existence on people's belief that they will attain salvation by following its teaching, whether that teaching demands works like the Catholic version or faith like the Protestant, yet cannot guarantee that goal. The nonbinding nature of the religious promise of salvation, the Jewish and negative moment in the Christian doctrine, by which magic and finally the church itself are relativized, is tacitly ignored by naive believers, for whom Christianity, supranaturalism, becomes a magic ritual, a nature religion. They believe only by forgetting their belief. They convince themselves of

the certainty of their knowledge like astrologers or spiritualists. That is not necessarily worse than spiritualized theology. The old Italian lady who with devout simplicity consecrates a candle to St Gennaro to protect her grandson in the war may be closer to the truth than the high priests and pontiffs who, untainted by idolatry, bless the weapons against which St Gennaro is powerless. To the simple, however, religion itself becomes a substitute for religion. Christianity had some awareness of this from its earliest days, but it was only the paradoxical Christians, the antiofficial thinkers from Pascal through Lessing and Kierkegaard to Barth, who made it the keystone of their theology. In this awareness they were not only the radical Christians but the tolerant ones. The others, who repressed that knowledge and with bad conscience convinced themselves of Christianity as a secure possession, were obliged to confirm their eternal salvation by the worldly ruin of those who refused to make the murky sacrifice of reason. That is the religious origin of anti-Semitism. The adherents of the religion of the Son hated the supporters of the religion of the Father as one hates those who know better. This is the hostility of spirit hardened as faith in salvation for spirit as mind. What is vexatious for the Christian enemies of the Jews is the truth which withstands evil without rationalizing it, and clings to the idea of unearned beatitude in disregard of worldly actions and the order of salvation which allegedly bring it about. Anti-Semitism is supposed to confirm that the ritual of faith and history is justified by ritually sacrificing those who deny its justice.

V

"I simply can't abide you—so don't forget it," says Siegfried to Mime, who is trying to win his love. The stock reply of all anti-Semites is the appeal to idiosyncrasy. Society's emancipation from anti-Semitism depends on whether the content of that idiosyncrasy is raised to the level of a concept and becomes aware of its own senselessness. But idiosyncrasy attaches itself to the peculiar. The universal, that which fits into the context of social utility, is regarded as natural. But anything natural which has not been absorbed into utility by passing through the cleansing channels of conceptual order—the screech of stylus on slate which sets the teeth on edge, the *haut goût* which brings to mind filth and corruption, the sweat which appears on the brow of the diligent—whatever is not quite assimi-

lated, or infringes the commands in which the progress of centuries has been sedimented, is felt as intrusive and arouses a compulsive aversion.

The motifs which trigger such idiosyncrasy are those which allude to origin. They recreate moments of biological prehistory: danger signs which made the hair stand on end and the heart stop. In the idiosyncratic aversion individual organs escape the subject's control, autonomously obeying fundamental biological stimuli. The self which experiences itself in such reactions—rigidity of the skin, muscles, and limbs—is not quite master of them. For a few moments they mimic the motionlessness of surrounding nature. But as what is mobile draws closer to the immobile, more highly developed life to mere nature, it is also estranged from it, since immobile nature, which living creatures, like Daphne, seek with utmost agitation to become, is capable only of the most external, spatial relationships. Space is absolute alienation. Where the human seeks to resemble nature, at the same time it hardens itself against it. Protection as petrified terror is a form of camouflage. These numb human reactions are archaic patterns of self-preservation: the tribute life pays for its continued existence is adaptation to death.

Civilization replaced the organic adaptation to otherness, mimetic behavior proper, firstly, in the magical phase, with the organized manipulation of mimesis, and finally, in the historical phase, with rational praxis, work. Uncontrolled mimesis is proscribed. The angel which, with fiery sword, drove humans out of paradise and on to the path of technical progress, is itself the symbol of that progress. The severity with which, over the centuries, the rulers have prevented both their own successors and the subjugated masses from relapsing into mimetic behavior—from the religious ban on graven images through the social ostracizing of actors and gypsies to the education which "cures" children of childishness—is the condition of civilization. Social and individual education reinforces the objectifying behavior required by work and prevents people from submerging themselves once more in the ebb and flow of surrounding nature. All distraction, indeed, all devotion has an element of mimicry. The ego has been forged by hardening itself against such behavior. The transition from reflecting mimesis to controlled reflection completes its formation. Bodily adaptation to nature is replaced by "recognition in a concept,"* the subsuming of difference under sameness. However, the constellation under which sameness is established, both the direct sameness of mimesis and the

indirect sameness of synthesis, the adaptation of the self to the thing in the blind act of living no less than the comparison of reified elements in scientific conceptualization—that constellation remains terror. Society perpetuates the threat from nature as the permanent, organized compulsion which, reproducing itself in individuals as systematic self-preservation, rebounds against nature as society's control over it. Science is repetition, refined to observed regularity and preserved in stereotypes. The mathematical formula is consciously manipulated regression, just as the magic ritual was; it is the most sublimated form of mimicry. In technology the adaptation to lifelessness in the service of self-preservation is no longer accomplished, as in magic, by bodily imitation of external nature, but by automating mental processes, turning them into blind sequences. With its triumph human expressions become both controllable and compulsive. All that remains of the adaptation to nature is the hardening against it. The camouflage used to protect and strike terror today is the blind mastery of nature, which is identical to farsighted instrumentality.

In the bourgeois mode of production the ineradicable mimetic heritage present in all praxis is consigned to oblivion. The pitiless ban on regression appears like an edict of fate; the denial is so total that it is no longer registered consciously. Those blinded by civilization have contact with their own tabooed mimetic traits only through certain gestures and forms of behavior they encounter in others, as isolated, shameful residues in their rationalized environment. What repels them as alien is all too familiar.[1] It lurks in the contagious gestures of an immediacy suppressed by civilization: gestures of touching, nestling, soothing, coaxing. What makes such impulses repellent today is their outmodedness. In seeking to win over the buyer with flattery, the debtor with threats, the creditor with supplication, they appear to translate long-reified human relationships back into those of personal power. Any emotion is finally embarrassing; mere excitement is preferable. All unmanipulated expression appears like the grimace which the manipulated expression—of the film actor, the lynch mob, the *Führer*'s speech—always was. Undisciplined mimicry is the brand burned by the old domination into the living substance of the dominated, and is inherited through an unconscious process of imitation in early childhood from generation to generation, from the Jewish rags-and-bones man to the banker. Such mimicry provokes anger, because it puts on show, in face of the new relationships of production, the old fear

which one has had to forget in order to survive them. It is the compulsive moment in behavior, the rage of the tormentor and of the tormented, reappearing indistinguishably in the grimace, that triggers the specific rage of civilized people. Impotent appearance is answered by deadly reality, play by seriousness.

The grimace seems like play-acting because, instead of performing serious work, it prefers to portray displeasure. It appears to evade the seriousness of life by admitting it without restraint: therefore it is false. But expression is the painful echo of overwhelming power, violence which finds utterance in complaint. It is always overdone, no matter how heartfelt it may be, because, as in each work of art, the whole world seems contained in every plaintive sound. Only activity is proportionate. It, and not mimesis, can bring an end to suffering. But its consequence is the rigid, unmoved visage, culminating, at the end of this age, in the baby faces of the practical men, the politicians, priests, managing directors, racketeers. The strident voices of fascist rabble-rousers and camp commanders show the reverse side of the same social condition. The screaming is as cold-blooded as business. Even the plaintive sounds of nature are appropriated as an element of technique. The bellowing of these orators is to the pogrom what its howling klaxon is to the German flying bomb: the cry of terror which announces terror is mechanically switched on. The screamers deliberately use the wail of the victim, which first called violence by its name, and even the mere word which designates the victim—Frenchman, Negro, Jew—to induce in themselves the desperation of the persecuted who have to hit out. They are the false likeness of the terrified mimesis. They reproduce within themselves the insatiability of the power of which they are afraid. Everything must be used, everything must belong to them. The mere existence of the other is a provocation. Everyone else "gets in the way" and must be shown their limits—the limits of limitless horror. No one who seeks shelter shall find it; those who express what everyone craves—peace, homeland, freedom—will be denied it, just as nomads and traveling players have always been refused rights of domicile. Whatever someone fears, that is done to him. Even the last resting place shall be none. The despoiling of graveyards is not an excess of anti-Semitism; it is anti-Semitism itself. Those evicted compulsively arouse the lust to evict them even here. The marks left on them by violence endlessly inflame violence. Anything which merely wants to vegetate must be rooted out. The

chaotically regular flight reactions of the lower animals, the patterns of swarming crowds, the convulsive gestures of the tortured—all these express what wretched life can never quite control: the mimetic impulse. In the death throes of the creature, at the furthest extreme from freedom, freedom itself irresistibly shines forth as the thwarted destiny of matter. It is against this freedom that the idiosyncratic aversion, the purported motive of anti-Semitism, is ultimately directed.

The psychic energy harnessed by political anti-Semitism is this rationalized idiosyncrasy. All the gesticulations devised by the *Führer* and his followers are pretexts for giving way to the mimetic temptation without openly violating the reality principle—with honor, as it were. They detest the Jews and imitate them constantly. There is no anti-Semite who does not feel an instinctive urge to ape what he takes to be Jewishness. The same mimetic codes are constantly used: the argumentative jerking of the hands, the singing tone of voice, which vividly animates a situation or a feeling independently of judgment, and the nose, that physiognomic *principium individuationis*, which writes the individual's peculiarity on his face. In the ambiguous partialities of the sense of smell the old nostalgia for what is lower lives on, the longing for immediate union with surrounding nature, with earth and slime. Of all the senses the act of smelling, which is attracted without objectifying, reveals most sensuously the urge to lose oneself in identification with the Other. That is why smell, as both the perception and the perceived—which are one in the act of olfaction—is more expressive than other senses. When we see we remain who we are, when we smell we are absorbed entirely. In civilization, therefore, smell is regarded as a disgrace, a sign of the lower social orders, lesser races, and baser animals. The civilized person is allowed to give way to such desires only if the prohibition is suspended by rationalization in the service of practical purposes, real or apparent. One is allowed to indulge the outlawed drive if acting with the unquestionable aim of expunging it. This is manifested in the practical joke. It is a wretched parody of fulfillment. The mimetic function is sneeringly enjoyed as something despised and self-despising. Anyone who sniffs out "bad" smells in order to extirpate them may imitate to his heart's content the snuffling which takes its unrationalized pleasure in the smell itself. Disinfected by the civilized sniffer's absolute identification with the prohibiting agency, the forbidden impulse eludes the prohibition. If it crosses the threshold, the response is

laughter. That is the schema of the anti-Semitic reaction. The anti-Semites gather to celebrate the moment when authority lifts the ban; that moment alone makes them a collective, constituting the community of kindred spirits. Their ranting is organized laughter. The more dreadful the accusations and threats, the greater the fury, the more withering is the scorn. Rage, mockery, and poisoned imitation are fundamentally the same thing. The purpose of the fascist cult of formulae, the ritualized discipline, the uniforms, and the whole allegedly irrational apparatus, is to make possible mimetic behavior. The elaborate symbols proper to every counterrevolutionary movement, the death's heads and masquerades, the barbaric drumming, the monotonous repetition of words and gestures, are so many organized imitations of magical practices, the mimesis of mimesis. The *Führer*, with his ham-actor's facial expressions and the hysterical charisma turned on with a switch, leads the dance. In his performance he acts out by proxy and in effigy what is denied to everyone else in reality. Hitler can gesticulate like a clown, Mussolini risk false notes like a provincial tenor, Goebbels talk as glibly as the Jewish agent whose murder he is recommending, Coughlin* preach love like the Savior himself, whose crucifixion he impersonates for the sake of yet more bloodshed. Fascism is also totalitarian in seeking to place oppressed nature's rebellion against domination directly in the service of domination.

This mechanism needs the Jews. Their artificially heightened visibility acts on the legitimate son of Gentile civilization like a kind of magnetic field. In being made aware, through his very difference from the Jew, of the humanity they have in common, the rooted Gentile is overcome by a feeling of something antithetical and alien. In this way the tabooed impulses which run counter to work in its dominant form are converted into conforming idiosyncrasies. Against this the economic position of the Jews, the last defrauded fraudsters of the liberal ideology, offers no reliable protection. Because they are so eminently suited to generating these inductive psychic currents they are unresistingly allocated to such functions. They share the fate of the rebellious nature for which fascism substitutes them, being put to use with the perspicuity of the blind. It makes little difference whether the Jews as individuals really display the mimetic traits which cause the malign infection or whether those traits are merely imputed. If the holders of economic power have once overcome their fear of employing fascist agents, in face of the Jews the harmony of the national

community is automatically established. They are sacrificed by the dominant order when, through its increasing estrangement from nature, it has reverted to mere nature. The Jews as a whole are charged with practicing forbidden magic and bloody rituals. Disguised as an accusation, the subliminal craving of the indigenous population to revert to mimetic sacrificial practices is joyously readmitted to their consciousness. Once the horror of the primeval age, sent packing by civilization, has been rehabilitated as a rational interest through projection onto the Jews, there is no holding back. It can be acted out in reality, and the evil which is acted out surpasses even the evil content of the projection. The popular nationalist fantasies of Jewish crimes, of infanticide and sadistic excesses, of racial poisoning and international conspiracy, precisely define the anti-Semitic dream, and fall short of its realization. Once things have gone so far, the mere word Jew appears like the bloody grimace whose image—skull and mangled cross in one—is unfurled on the swastika flag; the fact that someone is called a Jew acts as a provocation to set about him until he resembles that image.

Civilization is the triumph of society over nature—a triumph which transforms everything into mere nature. The Jews themselves, over the millennia, have played their part in this, with enlightenment no less than with cynicism. As the oldest surviving patriarchy, the incarnation of monotheism, they converted taboos into maxims of civilization while the others were still enmeshed in magic. The Jews appeared to have successfully achieved what Christianity had attempted in vain: the disempowerment of magic by means of its own strength, which, as worship of God, is turned against itself. They have not so much eradicated the adaptation to nature as elevated it to the pure duties of ritual. In this way they have preserved its reconciling memory, without relapsing through symbols into mythology. They are therefore regarded by advanced civilization as both backward and too advanced, like and unlike, shrewd and stupid. They are pronounced guilty of what, as the first citizens, they were the first to subdue in themselves: the susceptibility to the lure of base instincts, the urge toward the beast and the earth, the worship of images. Because they invented the concept of the kosher, they are persecuted as swine. The anti-Semites appoint themselves executors of the Old Testament: they see to it that the Jews, having eaten of the Tree of Knowledge, unto dust shall return.

VI

Anti-Semitism is based on false projection. It is the reverse of genuine mimesis and has deep affinities to the repressed; in fact, it may itself be the pathic character trait in which the latter is precipitated. If mimesis makes itself resemble its surroundings, false projection makes its surroundings resemble itself. If, for the former, the outward becomes the model to which the inward clings, so that the alien becomes the intimately known, the latter displaces the volatile inward into the outer world, branding the intimate friend as foe. Impulses which are not acknowledged by the subject and yet are his, are attributed to the object: the prospective victim. For the ordinary paranoiac the choice of victim is not free; it obeys the laws of his illness. In fascism this behavior is adopted by politics; the object of the illness is declared true to reality, the system of delusions the reasonable norm in a world which makes deviation neurosis. The mechanism which the totalitarian order takes into its service is as old as civilization. The sexual impulses suppressed by humanity survived in both individuals and peoples and asserted themselves in the imaginary transformation of the surrounding world into a diabolic system. Those impelled by blind murderous lust have always seen in the victim the pursuer who has driven them to desperate self-defense, and the mightiest of the rich have experienced their weakest neighbor as an intolerable threat before falling upon him. The rationalization was both a ruse and a compulsion. The person chosen as foe is already perceived as foe. The disorder lies in the subject's faulty distinction between his own contribution to the projected material and that of others.

In a certain sense, all perception is projection. The projection of sense impressions is a legacy of animal prehistory, a mechanism for the purposes of defense and obtaining food, an extension of the readiness for combat with which higher species reacted actively or passively to movements, regardless of the intention of the object. Projection has been automated in man like other forms of offensive or defensive behavior which have become reflexes. In this way his objective world has been constituted as a product of "an art concealed in the depths of the human soul, whose real modes of activity nature is hardly likely ever to allow us to discover, and to have open to our gaze."[2] The system of things, the fixed universal order of which science is merely an abstract expression, is, if Kant's

critique of knowledge is applied anthropologically, the unconscious product of the animal tool in the struggle for existence—it is the automatic projection. In human society, however, where both the affective and the intellectual life grow complex with the formation of the individual, projection must be increasingly controlled; individuals must learn both to refine and to inhibit it. As economic compulsion teaches them to distinguish between their own thoughts and feelings and those of others, a distinction emerges between outer and inner, the possibility of detachment and of identification, self-consciousness and conscience. More precise reflection is needed to understand this controlled form of projection and its degeneration into the false projection which is essential to anti-Semitism.

The physiological theory of perception, which has been despised by philosophers since Kant as naively realistic and as a circular argument, holds the world of perception to be a reflection, guided by the intellect, of the data received from real objects by the brain. According to this view, punctual indices, or impressions, are registered physiologically and then ordered by the mind. Although the Gestalt people may insist that the physiological substance receives not merely points but structure, Schopenhauer and Helmholtz, despite or even because of the circularity of their view, knew more about the intermeshed relationship of subject and object than is reflected in the official logical consistency of the schools, whether neopsychological or neo-Kantian: the perceptual image does indeed contain concepts and judgments. Between the actual object and the indubitable sense datum, between inner and outer, yawns an abyss which the subject must bridge at its own peril. To reflect the thing as it is, the subject must give back to it more than it receives from it. From the traces the thing leaves behind in its senses the subject recreates the world outside it: the unity of the thing in its manifold properties and states; and in so doing, in learning how to impart a synthetic unity not only to the outward impressions but to the inward ones which gradually separate themselves from them, it retroactively constitutes the self. The identical ego is the most recent constant product of projection. In a process which could only be accomplished historically when the powers of the human physiological constitution were fully developed, this self has emerged as a unified and, at the same time, an eccentric function. But even as an autonomously objectified subject it is only what the objective world is for it. The inner

depth of the subject consists in nothing other than the delicacy and richness of the outer perceptual world. If this intermeshing is broken, the self petrifies. If it is confined, positivistically, to registering the given without itself giving, it shrinks to a point, and if, idealistically, it projects the world out of the bottomless origin or its own self, it exhausts itself in monotonous repetition. In both cases it gives up the ghost—in this case the mind or spirit. Only mediation, in which the insignificant sense datum raises thought to the fullest productivity of which it is capable, and in which, conversely, thought gives itself up without reservation to the overwhelming impression—only mediation can overcome the isolation which ails the whole of nature. Neither the certainty untroubled by thought, nor the preconceptual unity of perception and object, but only their self-reflective antithesis contains the possibility of reconciliation. The antithesis is perceived in the subject, which has the external world within its own consciousness and yet recognizes it as other. Reflection on that antithesis, therefore, the life of reason, takes place as conscious projection.

The pathic element in anti-Semitism is not projective behavior as such but the exclusion of reflection from that behavior. Because the subject is unable to return to the object what it has received from it, it is not enriched but impoverished. It loses reflection in both directions: as it no longer reflects the object, it no longer reflects on itself, and thereby loses the ability to differentiate. Instead of the voice of conscience, it hears voices; instead of inwardly examining itself in order to draw up a protocol of its own lust for power, it attributes to others the Protocol of the Elders of Zion. It overflows at the same time as it dries up. It invests the outside world boundlessly with what is within itself; but what it invests is something utterly insignificant, an inflated accumulation of mere means, relationships, machinations, a grim praxis unilluminated by thought. Domination itself which, even as absolute power, is inherently only a means, becomes in untrammeled projection the purpose both of oneself and of others, purpose as such. In the sickness of the individual, humanity's sharpened intellectual apparatus is turned once more against humanity, regressing to the blind instrument of hostility it was in animal prehistory, and as which, for the species, it has never ceased to operate in relation to the rest of nature. Just as, since its rise, the human species has manifested itself toward others as developmentally the highest, capable of the most terrible destruction; and just as, within humanity, the more ad-

vanced races have confronted the more primitive, the technically superior nations the more backward, so the sick individual confronts the other individual, in megalomania as in persecution mania. In both cases the subject is at the center, the world a mere occasion for its delusion; it becomes the impotent or omnipotent quintessence of what is projected on to it. The opposition of which the paranoiac complains indiscriminately at every step is the result of the lack of resistance, of the emptiness which the encapsulated subject generates around itself. The paranoiac cannot stop. The idea, having no firm hold on reality, insists all the more and becomes the fixation.

Because paranoiacs perceive the outside world only in so far as it corresponds to their blind purposes, they can only endlessly repeat their own self, which has been alienated from them as an abstract mania. This naked schema of power as such, equally overwhelming toward others and toward a self at odds with itself, seizes whatever comes its way and, wholly disregarding its peculiarity, incorporates it in its mythic web. The closed circle of perpetual sameness becomes a surrogate for omnipotence. It is as if the serpent which told the first humans "Ye shall be as gods" had kept his promise in the paranoiac. He creates everything in his own image. He seems to need no living thing yet demands that all shall serve him. His will permeates the whole universe; nothing may be unrelated to him. His systems know of no gaps. As astrologer, he endows the stars with powers which bring about the ruin of the unsuspecting, whether it is the ruin of others in the preclinical stage or of his own ego in the clinical stage. As philosopher, he makes world history the executor of inescapable catastrophes and downfalls. As completely insane or absolutely rational, he annihilates those marked down as victims either by the individual act of terror or by the well-considered strategy of extermination. In this way he succeeds. Just as women adore the unmoved paranoid man, nations fall to their knees before totalitarian fascism. The paranoid element in the devotees responds to the paranoiac as to the evil spirit, their fear of conscience to his utter lack of scruples, for which they feel gratitude. They follow the man who looks past them, who does not treat them as subjects but hands them over to the operations of his many purposes. Like everyone else, these women have made the occupation of greater or lesser positions of power their religion, and themselves the malign creatures society takes them for. And so the gaze which reminds them of freedom must strike

them as that of the over-naive seducer. Their world is inverted. But at the same time they know, like the ancient gods who shunned the gaze of the faithful, that something lifeless resides behind their veil. In the trusting look of the nonparanoid they are reminded of the spirit which has died in them, because they see outside them only the cold means of their self-preservation. To be touched in this way awakens in them shame and rage. Yet the madman does not reach them, even though he may stare them in the face like the *Führer*. He merely inflames them. His proverbial gaze straight into the eyes, unlike the free gaze, does not preserve individuality. It fixates. It binds others to one-sided loyalty, by confining them to the windowless monadic fortress of their own person. It does not awaken conscience, but prematurely imposes responsibility. The penetrating look and the one that goes past you, the hypnotic and the disregarding gaze, are of the same kind: in both, the subject is extinguished. Because in both looks reflection is absent, the unreflecting are electrified by them. They are betrayed: the women cast away, the nation incinerated. Thus, the self-encapsulated figure remains a caricature of divine power. Just as his lordly gesture is entirely without creative power in reality, so, like the devil, he lacks the attributes of the principle he usurps: mindful love and freedom secure within itself. He is malignant, driven by compulsion, and as weak as he is strong. If divine omnipotence is said to draw creation unto itself, this satanic, imagined omnipotence draws everything into its impotence. That is the secret of its rule. The compulsively projecting self can project nothing except its own unhappiness, from the cause of which, residing in itself, it is yet cut off by its lack of reflection. For this reason the products of false projection, the stereotyped schemata of both thought and reality, bring calamity. For the ego, sinking into the meaningless abyss of itself, objects become allegories of ruin, which harbor the meaning of its own downfall.

The psychoanalytic theory of pathic projection has identified the transference of socially tabooed impulses from the subject to the object as the substance of that projection. Under the pressure of the superego, the ego projects aggressive urges emanating from the id which, through their strength, are a danger to itself, as malign intentions onto the outside world, and succeeds in ridding itself of them as reactions to that outside world, either in fantasy by identification with the alleged malefactor or in reality by ostensible self-defense. The proscribed material converted into aggression is usually homosexual in nature. Through fear of castration,

obedience toward the father preempts castration by adapting the conscious emotional life to that of a little girl, and hatred of the father is repressed as endless rancor. In paranoia, this hatred is intensified to a castration wish expressed as a universal urge to destroy. The sick subject regresses to an archaic confusion between love and dominance. It is concerned with physical closeness, with taking possession, finally with relationship at any price. Because it cannot acknowledge desire within itself, it assails the other with jealousy or persecution, as the repressed sodomite hounds the animal as hunter or driver. The attraction stems from excessive attachment or develops at first sight; it can emanate from great figures, as in the case of malcontents and murderers of presidents, or from the most wretched as in the pogrom itself. The objects of the fixation are replaceable like father figures in childhood; whatever it hits on fits its purpose; the delusion of relatedness strikes out unrelatedly. Pathic projection is a desperate exertion by an ego which, according to Freud has a far weaker resistance to internal than to external stimuli: under the pressure of pent-up homosexual aggression the psychic mechanism forgets its most recent phylogenetic attainment, the perception of self, and experiences that aggression as an enemy in the world, the better to master it.

This pressure acts also, however, on the healthy cognitive process as a moment of its unreflecting naivety, which tends toward violence. Wherever intellectual energies are concentrated on an external intention, wherever it is a matter of pursuing, ascertaining, grasping—of exerting those functions which have been sublimated from the primitive overpowering of animals into the scientific methods of controlling nature—the subjective process is easily overlooked in the schematization, and the system is posited as the thing itself. Objectifying thought, like its pathological counterpart, has the arbitrariness of a subjective purpose extraneous to the matter itself and, in forgetting the matter, does to it in thought the violence which later will be done in practice. The unconditional realism of civilized humanity, which culminates in fascism, is a special case of paranoid delusion which depopulates nature and finally nations themselves. In the abyss of uncertainty, which every objectifying act must bridge, paranoia installs itself. Because there is no absolutely compelling argument against materially false judgments, the distorted perception in which they lurk cannot be healed. Every percept unconsciously contains conceptual elements, just as every judgment contains unclarified phenomenalistic

ones. Because imagination is involved in truth, it can always appear to this damaged imagination that truth is fantastic and its illusion the truth. The maimed subject lives on the element of imagination immanent in truth by ceaselessly putting it on show. Democratically, he insists on equal rights for his delusion, because, in fact, not even truth is stringent. While the citizen may admit that the anti-Semite is in the wrong, he requires the victim to be guilty too. Thus Hitler demands the right to practice mass murder in the name of the principle of sovereignty under international law, which tolerates any act of violence in another country.* Like every paranoiac he takes advantage of the hypocritical identity of truth and sophistry; the distinction between them is as uncompelling as it nevertheless is strict. Perception is only possible in so far as the thing is already apprehended as determinate—for example, as a case of a genus or type. It is a mediated immediacy, thought infused with the seductive power of sensuality. It blindly transfers subjective elements to the apparent givenness of the object. Only the self-conscious work of thought—that is, according to Leibnizian and Hegelian idealism, only philosophy—can escape this hallucinatory power. As, in the course of cognition, thought identifies the conceptual moments which are immediately posited in perception and are therefore compelling, it progressively takes them back into the subject and strips them of their intuitive power. In this process every earlier stage, including science, turns out to be, in comparison to philosophy, a kind of percept, an estranged phenomenon permeated with unrecognized intellectual elements; persistence at this stage, without negation, forms part of the pathology of cognition. The subject which naively postulates absolutes, no matter how universally active it may be, is sick, passively succumbing to the dazzlement of false immediacy.

Such blindness is, however, a constitutive element of all judgment, a necessary illusion. Every judgment, even negative, is reassuring. However much a judgment may stress its own isolation and relativity for the purpose of self-correction, it must assert its own content, no matter how cautiously formulated, as something not merely isolated and relative. That constitutes its nature as judgment, whereas the clause merely entrenches a claim. Truth, unlike probability, has no gradations. The negating step beyond the individual judgment, which rescues its truth, is possible only in so far as it takes itself to be truth and in that sense is paranoid. True derangement lies only in the immovable, in thought's incapacity for the

negation in which, unlike the fixed judgment, thought actually consists. The paranoid over-consistency, the bad infinity of never-changing judgment, is a lack of consistency in thought; instead of conceptually carrying through the failure of the absolute claim and thereby continuing to qualify his or her judgment, the paranoiac clings obdurately to the claim which has caused the judgment to fail. Instead of going further by penetrating its subject matter more deeply, thought places itself entirely in the hopeless service of the particular judgment. The latter's irresistibility is the same as its intact positivity, and the paranoiac's weakness is that of thought itself. For reflection, which in the healthy subject breaks the power of immediacy, is never as compelling as the illusion it dispels. As a negative, reflective movement not directed straight ahead, it lacks the brutality inherent in the positive. If the psychic energy of paranoia stems from the libidinal dynamic laid bare by psychoanalysis, its objective impregnability is founded on the ambiguity inseparable from the objectifying act; indeed, the latter's hallucinatory power will have been originally decisive. To clarify, it can be said in the language of natural selection theory that during the formative period of the human sensorium those individuals survived in whom the power of the projective mechanisms extended most deeply into their rudimentary logical faculties, or was least moderated by the premature onset of reflection. Just as, even today, practically fruitful scientific enterprises call for an unimpaired capacity for definition, for shutting down thought at a point designated by social need, for demarcating a field which is then investigated in the minutest detail without passing outside it, paranoiacs cannot step outside a complex of interests designated by their psychological fate. Their mental acuteness consumes itself within the circle drawn by their fixed idea, as human ingenuity is liquidating itself under the spell of technical civilization. Paranoia is the shadow of cognition.

So calamitous is the mind's tendency to false projection that, as the isolated schema of self-preservation, such projection threatens to dominate everything which goes beyond self-preservation: culture. False projection is the usurper in the realm of freedom as of culture; paranoia is the symptom of the half-educated. For such people, all words become a system of delusion, an attempt mentally to occupy the regions to which their experience does not extend, violently to give meaning to a world which makes them meaningless, but at the same time to denigrate the intellect and the experience from which they are excluded and to burden them with the

guilt really borne by the society which has brought about that exclusion. The half-educated who, unlike the merely uneducated, hypostatize limited knowledge as truth, cannot endure the breach between inward and outward, individual fate and social law, appearance and essence, which for them is heightened to unbearable levels. To be sure, their suffering does contain an element of truth, compared to the mere acceptance of the given to which superior understanding has sworn allegiance. Nevertheless, the half-educated reach out stereotypically in their fear for the formula which suits their need, now to justify the disaster which has happened, now to predict the catastrophe still to come, which is sometimes disguised as a regeneration. The explanation, in which their own desires appear as an objective power, is always as external and meaningless as the isolated event itself, at once feeble-minded and sinister. The obscurantist systems of today bring about what the devil myth of the official religion enabled people to do in the Middle Ages: to imbue the outside world with an arbitrary meaning, which the lone paranoiac now constructs according to a private schema shared by no one, and which only for that reason appears actually mad. Relief is provided by the dire conventicles and panaceas which put on scientific airs while cutting off thought: theosophy, numerology, naturopathy, eurhythmy, teetotalism, Yoga, and countless other sects, competing and interchangeable, all with academies, hierarchies and specialist jargon, the fetishized officialese of science and religion. When confronted by an educated public, they remained apocryphal and disreputable. But today, when education itself is withering for economic reasons, unprecedented conditions are created for the paranoia of the masses. The belief systems of the past, which were embraced by the populace as self-contained paranoid forms, had wider meshes. Just because they were so rationally elaborated and specific, they left room, at least above them, for culture and mind, which, conceived as spirit, were their true medium. Indeed, to an extent they counteracted paranoia. Freud calls neuroses—even rightly in this instance—"asocial formations"; "they endeavor to achieve by private means what is affected in society by collective effort."[3] Those belief systems retain something of the collectivity which preserves individuals from pathological symptoms. The sickness is socialized: in the intoxication of the communal ecstasy—indeed, as itself a community—blindness becomes a relationship and the paranoid mechanism is made controllable, without losing the power to strike terror. Perhaps that was

one of the major contributions of religions to the survival of the species. Paranoid forms of consciousness tend to give rise to leagues, factions, rackets. Their members are afraid to believe their madness on their own. Projecting it, they everywhere see proselytizing and conspiracy. The established group has always taken a paranoid stance toward others; in this the great empires, indeed, organized humanity as a whole, are no better than headhunters. Those who were excluded from humanity against their will, like those who excluded themselves from it out of longing for humanity, knew that the pathological cohesion of the established group was strengthened by persecuting them. Its normal members relieve their paranoia by participating in the collective one, and cling passionately to the objectified, collective, approved forms of delusion. The *horror vacui* with which they devote themselves to their confederacies welds them together and gives them their almost irresistible power.

With bourgeois property, education and culture spread, driving paranoia into the dark corners of society and the psyche. But as the real emancipation of humanity did not coincide with the enlightenment of the mind, education itself became sick. The less social reality kept pace with educated consciousness, the more that consciousness itself succumbed to a process of reification. Culture was entirely commoditized, disseminated as information which did not permeate those who acquired it. Thought becomes short-winded, confines itself to apprehending isolated facts. Intellectual connections are rejected as an inconvenient and useless exertion. The developmental moment in thought, its whole genetic and intensive dimension, is forgotten and leveled down to what is immediately present, to the extensive. The present order of life allows the self no scope to draw intellectual or spiritual conclusions. Thought, stripped down to knowledge, is neutralized, harnessed merely to qualifying its practitioner for specific labor markets and heightening the commodity value of the personality. In this way the self-reflection of the mind, which counteracts paranoia, is disabled. Finally, under the conditions of late capitalism, the half-educated condition has become the objective spirit. In the totalitarian phase of government its exponents reinstate the provincial charlatans of politics, and with them the system of delusion, as the *ultima ratio*, imposing it on the majority of the administered, who have already been softened up by big politics and the culture industry.* The absurdity of the present system of rule is so transparent to healthy consciousness that it needs sick

consciousness to keep itself alive. Only those suffering from persecution mania can tolerate the persecution which domination inevitably becomes, provided they are allowed to persecute others.

In fascism, where the responsibility for wife and child painfully inculcated by bourgeois civilization is being obscured by the individual's insistent conformity to regulations, conscience is being liquidated in any case. Contrary to the ideas of Dostoievski and the German apostles of inwardness, conscience consisted in the self's devotion to something substantial outside itself, in the ability to make the true concerns of others one's own. This ability involves reflection as an interpenetration of receptivity and imagination. Because the abolition of the independent economic subject by big industry*—partly by absorbing free entrepreneurs and partly by transforming the workers* into objects of trades unions—is irresistibly eroding the basis of moral decisions, reflection, too, must wither. The soul, as the possibility of guilt aware of itself, decays. Conscience is deprived of objects, since individuals' responsibility for themselves and their dependents is replaced—although still under the old moral title—by their mere performance for the apparatus. The internal conflict of drives, in which the agency of conscience is formed, can no longer be worked through. If internalized, the social injunctions would not only be made both more binding and more open but also would be emancipated from society and even turned against it; instead, the individual identifies himself or herself promptly and directly with the stereotyped scales of values. The exemplary German woman, who has a monopoly on femininity as the true German man has on masculinity, and their counterparts elsewhere, are conformist, asocial human types. Despite and because of its obvious deficiency, the system of power has become so preponderant that powerless individuals can avert their fate only through blind compliance.

In face of such power, it is left to chance—guided by the Party—to decide where despairing self-preservation is to project the guilt for its terror. The Jews are the predestined target of this guided chance. The circulation sphere, in which they once held positions of economic power, is vanishing. The liberal form of commercial enterprise once endowed fragmented wealth with political influence. Now, no sooner emancipated, its owners are merged with the state apparatus and placed at the mercy of capital powers which have outgrown competition. No matter what the makeup of the Jews may be in reality, their image, that of the defeated, has

characteristics which must make totalitarian rule their mortal enemy: happiness without power, reward without work, a homeland without frontiers, religion without myth. These features are outlawed by the ruling powers because they are secretly coveted by the ruled. The former can survive only as long as the latter turn what they yearn for into an object of hate. They do so through pathic projection, since even hatred leads to union with the object—in destruction. It is the negative of reconciliation. Reconciliation is Judaism's highest concept, and expectation its whole meaning. The paranoid reaction stems from the incapacity for expectation. The anti-Semites are realizing their negative absolute through power, by transforming the world into the hell they have always taken it to be. A radical change would depend on whether the ruled, in face of absolute madness, could master themselves and hold the madness back. Only the liberation of thought from power, the abolition of violence, could realize the idea which has been unrealized until now*: that the Jew is a human being. This would be a step away from the anti-Semitic society, which drives both Jews and others into sickness, and toward the human one. Such a step would fulfill the fascist lie by contradicting it: the Jewish question would indeed prove the turning-point of history.* By conquering the sickness of the mind which flourishes on the rich soil of self-assertion unhampered by reflection, humanity would cease to be the universal antirace and become the species which, as nature, is more than mere nature, in that it is aware of its own image. The individual and social emancipation from domination is the countermovement to false projection, and no longer would Jews seek, by resembling it, to appease the evil senselessly visited on them as on all the persecuted, whether animals or human beings.

VII*

But there are no longer any anti-Semites. The last of them were liberals who wanted to express their antiliberal opinions. By the end of the nineteenth century the old-style conservative aloofness of the nobility and the officer corps toward the Jews was merely reactionary. The people abreast of the times were the Ahlwardts and the Knüppelkunzes.* They drew their followers from the same groups as the *Führer*, but their support came from troublemakers and malcontents throughout the country. When people voiced anti-Semitic attitudes, they felt they were being bourgeois

and rebellious at the same time. Their nationalistic grumbling was still a distorted form of civil freedom. The beer hall politics of the anti-Semites exposed the lie of German liberalism, on which it fed and whose demise it finally brought about. Even though they used their own mediocrity as a license to subject the Jews to beatings in which universal murder was already latent, they were economically farsighted enough to weigh the risks of the Third Reich against the advantages of a hostile form of tolerance. Anti-Semitism was still a competing motif within a range of subjective choices. But the outcome related specifically to it. The whole chauvinistic vocabulary was implied from the start in the adoption of the *völkisch* thesis. Anti-Semitic views always reflected stereotyped thinking. Today only that thinking is left. People still vote, but only between totalities. The anti-Semitic psychology has largely been replaced by mere acceptance of the whole fascist ticket,* which is an inventory of the slogans of belligerent big business. Just as, on the ballot paper of the mass party, voters are presented with the names of people remote from their experience for whom they can only vote *en bloc*, the central ideological concepts have been codified into a small number of lists. One has to opt for one of them *en bloc* if one's own position is not to seem as futile as splinter votes on polling day in face of the statistical mammoths. Anti-Semitism has practically ceased to be an independent impulse and has become a plank in the platform: anyone who gives fascism its chance subscribes to the settlement of the Jewish question along with the breaking of the unions and the crusade against Bolshevism. The anti-Semite's conviction, however mendacious it may be, has been absorbed into the preconditioned reflexes of the subjectless exponents of a particular standpoint. When the masses accept the reactionary ticket containing the clause against the Jews, they are obeying social mechanisms in which individual people's experiences of Jews play no part. It has been shown, in fact, that anti-Semitism's prospects are no less good in "Jew-free"* areas than in Hollywood itself. Experience is replaced by cliché, the imagination active in experience by diligent acceptance. The members of each class have to absorb their quota of guidelines on pain of rapid downfall. Just as they need to be instructed on the technical merits of a particular aircraft, so do they, too, on their allegiance to one of the prescribed agencies of power.

In the world of mass production, stereotypes replace intellectual categories. Judgment is no longer based on a real act of synthesis but on blind

subsumption. If, at an early historical stage, judgment consisted in the swift decision which immediately unleashed the poisoned arrow, in the meantime exchange and the institutions of law have taken their effect. The act of judgment passed through a stage of deliberation which afforded the judging subject some protection from brutal identification with the predicate. In late-industrial society there is a regression to judgment without judging. When, in fascism, the protracted legal process was replaced by an accelerated procedure in criminal trials, up-to-date people had been economically prepared for this development. They had learned to see things unreflectingly, through ready-made thought models, the *termini technici* which provide them with iron rations following the decay of language. The perceiver is no longer present in the process of perception. He or she is incapable of the active passivity of cognition, in which categorial elements are appropriately reshaped by preformed conventional schemata and vice versa, so that justice is done to the perceived object. In the field of the social sciences, as in that of individual experience, blind intuition and empty concepts are brought together rigidly and without mediation.* In the age of the "three hundred basic words" the ability to exercise judgment, and therefore to distinguish between true and false, is vanishing. Thinking, where it is not merely a highly specialized piece of professional equipment in this or that branch of the division of labor, is suspect as an old-fashioned luxury: "armchair thinking." It is supposed to "produce" something. The more superfluous physical labor is made by the development of technology, the more enthusiastically it is set up as a model for mental work, which must not be tempted, however, to draw any awkward conclusions. That is the secret of advancing stupidity, on which anti-Semitism thrives. If, even within the field of logic, the concept stands opposed to the particular as something merely external, anything which stands for difference within society itself must indeed tremble. Everyone is labeled friend or foe. The disregard for the subject makes things easy for the administration. Ethnic groups are transported to different latitudes; individuals labeled "Jew" are dispatched to the gas chambers.

The indifference to the individual expressed in logic draws its conclusions from the economic process. The individual had become an impediment to production. The lack of synchronicity between technical and human development, the "cultural lag" which used to exercise the minds of sociologists, is beginning to disappear. Economic rationality, the

vaunted principle of the smallest necessary means, is unremittingly reshaping the last units of the economy: businesses and human beings. The most advanced form at a given time becomes the predominant one. Once, the department store expropriated the old-style specialist shop. The latter, having outgrown mercantilist regulation, had absorbed initiative, control, and organization within itself and become, like the old mill and smithy, a little factory, a free enterprise. Its mode of operation was complicated, expensive, risky. Competition therefore replaced it by the more efficient, centralized form of retail shop, the department store. The psychological small business—the individual—is meeting the same fate. It came into being as the power cell of economic activity. Emancipated from the tutelage of earlier economic stages, individuals fended for themselves alone: as proletarians by hiring themselves out through the labor market and by constant adaptation to new technical conditions, as entrepreneurs by tirelessly realizing of the ideal type of *homo oeconomicus*. Psychoanalysis has portrayed the internal small business which thus came into being as a complex dynamic of unconscious and conscious elements, of id, ego, and superego. In its negotiations with the superego, the ego, the agency of social control within the individual, keeps the drives within the limits set by self-preservation. The areas of friction are large and neuroses, the incidental expenses of such a drive economy, inevitable. Nevertheless, this complex psychical apparatus made possible the relatively free interplay of subjects which constituted the market economy. In the era of large combines and world wars, however, the mediation of the social process by innumerable monads is proving obsolete. The subjects of the drive economy are being psychologically expropriated, and the drive economy is being more rationally operated by society itself. The individual no longer has to decide what he or she is supposed to do in a given situation in a painful inner dialogue between conscience, self-preservation, and drives. For the human being as wage earner the decision is taken by a hierarchy extending from trade associations to the national administration; in the private sphere it is taken by the schema of mass culture, which appropriates even the most intimate impulses of its forced consumers. The committees and stars function as ego and superego, and the masses, stripped of even the semblance of personality, are molded far more compliantly by the catchwords and models than ever the instincts were by the internal censor. If, in liberalism, the individuation of a section of the population was neces-

sary for the adaptation of society as a whole to the state of technology, today the functioning of the economic apparatus demands that the masses be directed without the hindrance of individuation. The economically determined direction of the whole society, which has always governed the mental and physical constitution of human beings, is causing the organs which enabled individuals to manage their lives autonomously to atrophy. Now that thinking has become a mere sector of the division of labor, the plans of the authorized experts and leaders have made individuals who plan their own happiness redundant. The irrationality of the unresisting and eager adaptation to reality becomes, for the individual, more reasonable than reason. If, previously, the bourgeois had introjected the compulsions of conscience and duty into themselves and the workers, now the entire human being has become at once the subject and the object of repression. In the progress of industrial society, which is supposed to have conjured away the law of increasing misery it had itself brought into being, the concept which justified the whole—the human being as person, as the bearer of reason—is going under. The dialectic of enlightenment is culminating objectively in madness.

This is also a madness of political reality. As a dense web of modern communications, the world has become so standardized that the differences between diplomatic breakfasts in Dumbarton Oaks and Persia have to be specially devised as an expression of national character, while actual national peculiarity is experienced primarily by the millions hungering for rice who have fallen through the narrow meshes. Although the abundance of goods which could be produced everywhere and simultaneously makes the struggle for raw materials and markets seem ever more anachronistic, humanity is nevertheless divided into a small number of armed power blocs. They compete more pitilessly than the firms involved in the anarchy of commodity production ever did, and strive toward mutual liquidation. The more senseless the antagonism, the more rigid the blocs. Only the total identification of the population with these monstrosities of power, so deeply imprinted as to have become second nature and stopping all the pores of consciousness, maintains the masses in the state of absolute apathy which makes them capable of their miraculous achievements. As far as any decisions are still left to individuals, they are effectively decided in advance. The irreconcilability of the ideologies trumpeted by the politicians from the different camps is itself just one

more ideology of the blind constellation of power. Ticket thinking, a product of industrialization and its advertising, is being extended to international relations. Whether a citizen chooses the communist or the fascist ticket depends on whether he happens to be more impressed by the Red Army or the laboratories of the West. The reification by virtue of which the power structure, made possible solely by the passivity of the masses, appears to those same masses as an iron reality, has been consolidated to the point where any spontaneity, or even the ability to conceive of the true state of affairs, has necessarily become an eccentric utopia, an irrelevant sectarianism. Illusion has become so concentrated that to see through it objectively assumes the character of hallucination. To vote for a ticket, by contrast, means to practice adaptation to illusion petrified as reality, which endlessly reproduces itself through such adaptation. The reluctant voter is therefore ostracized as a deserter. Since Hamlet, hesitation was for modern people a sign of reflection and humanity. The wasted time at once represented and mediated the gap between individual and universal, as circulation does between consumption and production in the economy. Today individuals receive their tickets ready-made from the powers that be, as consumers receive their automobiles from the sales outlets of factories. Conformity to reality, adaptation to power, are no longer the result of a dialectical process between subject and reality but are produced directly by the cogs and levers of industry. The process is one of liquidation instead of sublation, of formal instead of determinate negation. The unleashed colossi of production have subdued the individual not by granting him or her full satisfaction, but by extinguishing the subject. Precisely therein lies their perfect rationality, which coincides with their insanity. The extreme disproportion between collective and individual eliminates tension, but the untroubled harmony between omnipotence and impotence is itself unmediated contradiction, the absolute antithesis of reconciliation.

For this reason the psychological determinants of the individual—which have always been the internal human agencies of wrong society—have not disappeared with the individual itself. However, these character types are now being assigned to their mathematically exact positions within the coordinates of power. Both their efficiency and their coefficient of friction are included in the calculation. The ticket acts as a gearwheel in this process. Anything in the old psychological mechanism which was compulsive, unfree, and irrational is precisely adjusted to it. The reac-

tionary ticket which includes anti-Semitism is suited to the destructive-conventional syndrome. It is not so much that such people react originally against the Jews as that their drive-structure has developed a tendency toward persecution which the ticket then furnishes with an adequate object. The "elements of anti-Semitism" once derived from experience and now rendered inoperative by the loss of experience reflected in ticket thinking, are remobilized by the ticket. Being already corrupted, these elements also provide the neo-anti-Semite with the bad conscience and thus with the insatiability of evil. Just because the psychology of the individual can now construct itself and its content only from the synthetic schemata supplied by society, contemporary anti-Semitism takes on its empty but impenetrable character The Jewish middleman fully becomes the image of the devil only when economically he has ceased to exist. Victory is thus made easy, and the anti-Semitic family man becomes the spectator, exempt from responsibility, of an irresistible historical tendency, intervening only when called to do so by his role as an employee of the Party or the Zyklon gas factories. As they designate obsolete sections of the population for extermination, the administrations of totalitarian states are merely the executors of economic verdicts passed long ago. Members of other branches of the division of labor can look on with the indifference of people reading newspaper reports on clean-up operations at the scene of yesterday's catastrophe. The peculiarities for the sake of which the victims are killed have long been effaced. Those who fall within the terms of the decree as Jews have to be identified by means of elaborate questionnaires, now that the antagonistic religions which once differentiated them have been successfully remodeled and assimilated as cultural heritage under the leveling pressure of late-industrial society. The Jewish masses themselves are no more immune to ticket thinking than the most hostile youth organization. In this sense fascist anti-Semitism is obliged to invent its own object. Paranoia no longer pursues its goal on the basis of the individual case history of the persecutor; having become a vital component of society it must locate that goal within the delusive context of wars and economic cycles before the psychologically predisposed "national comrades" can support themselves on it, both inwardly and outwardly, as patients.

The tendency according to which anti-Semitism now exists only as one item on an interchangeable ticket gives irrefutable reason to hope for its end. The Jews are being murdered at a time when the leaders could

replace the anti-Semitic plank in their platform just as easily as their followers can be transplanted from one location of wholly rationalized production to another. The development which leads to ticket thinking is based, in any case, on the universal reduction of every specific energy to the one, identical, abstract form of labor, from the battlefield to the studio. However, the transition from those conditions to a more human state cannot take place, because benign and malign tendencies suffer the same fate. The freedom on the progressive ticket is as far removed from the existing political power structures, to which progressive decisions necessarily lead, as hostility to the Jews is external to the chemical cartel. To be sure, the psychologically more humane are attracted to freedom, but the advancing loss of experience is finally turning even the supporters of the progressive ticket into enemies of difference. It is not just the anti-Semitic ticket which is anti-Semitic, but the ticket mentality itself. The rage against difference which is teleologically inherent in that mentality as the rancor of the dominated subjects of the domination of nature is always ready to attack the natural minority, even though it is the social minority which those subjects primarily threaten. The socially responsible elite is in any case far harder to pin down than other minorities. In the murky intertwinement of property, ownership, control, and management it successfully eludes theoretical definition. The ideology of race and the reality of class both equally reveal only an abstract difference from the majority. But although the progressive ticket tends to produce something worse than its content, the content of the fascist ticket is so vacuous that it can be maintained as a substitute for something better only by desperate efforts on the part of the deceived. Its horror is that of the blatant but insistent lie. While it admits no truth by which it might be measured, its absurdity is so monstrous as to bring truth negatively within reach, so that it can be kept apart from those deprived of judgment only by their total abstention from thought. Enlightenment itself, having mastered itself and assumed its own power, could break through the limits of enlightenment.

Notes

[Bracketed numbers are the page numbers on which asterisk notes appear; other numbers refer to the numbered notes. "It. tr." = from the Italian translation.]

DEDICATION

[vii] "Pollock" / 1944: Pollock for his fiftieth birthday on 22 May 1944; 1947: "Pollock for his fiftieth birthday."

PREFACES

[xiii] "Preface to the Italian Edition": Translated from the Italian by Philipp Rippel with reference to the German draft by M.H. and T.W.A.

[xiv] "When" / 1944/47: "When, two years ago."

[xiv] "a . . . of" / 1944: "renewed."

[xiv] "with an increasing" / 1944: "readily with the."

[xiv] "The tireless . . . humanity" / 1944: "The end of enlightenment by its own hand, hypocritically celebrated by crude advocates of the totalitarian order in their propaganda speeches and naively executed by the smart attorneys of the victims in their respective branches of the culture industry."

[xv] "friendship" / 1944: "friendship, in the Action Française."—"Action Française": extreme right-wing movement in France between 1898 and 1944.

[xv] "place in . . . sun": allusion to an imperialist slogan coined in Wilhelmine Germany.

[xv] "liquidating . . . completely." / 1944: "repudiating the thought to which they owe their place in the sun before it has had time to prostitute itself completely in the service of those now basking there."

[xvi] "the regression" / 1944: "its reversal."

[xvi] "headlong" / 1944: "in such a way."

[xvi] "rational" / 1944: "a rational."

[xvii] "In the . . . increase" / 1944: "The powerless and pliability of the masses increase."

[xvii] "Today, however," / 1944: "In the name of enlightenment."

[xvii] "increased sufferings" / 1944: "increased exploitation."

[xvii] "melting down . . . crucible" / 1944: "application of the national melting pot to all cultural entities."

[xviii] "Volkswagen" / 1944: "chewing gum."

[xviii] "curtain" / 1944: "veil."

[xix] "demonstrates" / 1944: "defines."

[xix] "fragmentary" / 1944: "fragmentary. Large parts, written long before, need only final editing. In them the positive aspects of mass culture will also be dealt with."—The second part of the chapter, not finally edited at that time, has now been published with the title "Das Schema der Massenkultur" as an appendix to *Dialektik der Aufklärung* in Adorno, *Gesammelte Schriften*, Vol. III, Frankfurt am Main 1981, pp. 299ff.

[xix] "empirical . . . Research" / 1944: "the research project of the Institute of Social Research."

[xix] "anthropology" / 1944: "anthropology.

In selecting the fragments from the work of the previous two years we opted for those with clear internal coherence and unity of language. We excluded all English works produced in the same period, regardless of their thematic connection to the fragments. We would mention the lecture series "Society and Reason"; the essays "Sociology of Class Relations" and "The Revival of Dogmatism"; the extensive analysis of anti-Semitic propaganda, "The Psychological Technique of Martin Luther Thomas' Radio Addresses," and our other studies in contributions to the project on anti-Semitism. Collaboration in this study carried out in New York, Los Angeles, and Berkeley took at least half our time.—Of the German preliminary studies to the whole work, which include the fragments themselves, we left out the pieces on logic, among others. The already formulated parts of the planned section concerned with a critique of sociology are also omitted.

If the good fortune of being able to work on such questions without the unpleasant pressure of immediate purposes should continue, we hope to complete the whole work in the not too distant future. We are encouraged to believe this by the confidence, undeflected by the vicissitudes of the time, of the person to whom the part completed so far is now dedicated."

"Society and Reason": under this general title Horkheimer gave five lectures at Columbia University, New York, in February and March 1944. They were later

used as the basis of *Eclipse of Reason* (New York 1947), German title *Zur Kritik der instrumentellen Vernunft*, Frankfurt am Main 1967.

"Sociology of Class Relations": essay by Horkheimer from 1943 now published with the title "Zur Soziologie der Klassenverhältnisse" in *Gesammelte Schriften*, Vol. XII, Frankfurt am Main 1985, pp. 75ff.

"The Revival of Dogmatism. Remarks on Neo-Positivism and Neo-Thomism": Horkheimer's manuscript with his title later formed the basis of Chapter 2 of *Eclipse of Reason*.

THE CONCEPT OF ENLIGHTENMENT

[1] "The concept" / 1944: "The dialectic."

[1] "disenchantment of the world": "allusion to a formulation of Max Weber's; cf. Weber, "Wissenschaft als Beruf" (1919) in *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre*, Tübingen 1968, p. 594.

1. Voltaire, *Lettres philosophiques*, ed. F. A. Taylor, London 1992, p. 36.

2. "In Praise of Knowledge," in *Francis Bacon*, ed. Arthur Johnston, London 1965, p. 15.

[2] "enslavement" / 1944: "exploitation."

[2] "economic system" / 1944: "capitalism."

[2] "exploitation . . . others" / 1944: "control of foreign work."

3. Cf. Bacon, *Novum Organum*, *The Works of Francis Bacon*, ed. Basil Montagu, London 1825, Vol. XIV, p. 31.

4. Bacon, "Valerius Terminus: Of the Interpretation of Nature." *Miscellaneous Tracts upon Human Knowledge*, *Works*, Vol. I, p. 281.

[3] "spirit-seer": allusion to Kant's dispute with Swedenborg: "Dreams of a spirit-seer elucidated by dreams of metaphysics" in Kant, *Theoretical Philosophy*, trans. David Walford, Cambridge/New York 1992.

5. Cf. *Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller, Oxford 1977, pp. 331f.

6. Xenophanes, Montaigne, Hume, Feuerbach, and Salomon Reinach are at one here. Cf. Reinach, *Orpheus*, trans. F. Simmons, London and New York 1909, pp. 6ff.

7. Bacon, *De augmentis scientiarum*, *Works*, Vol. VIII, p. 152.

8. J. de Maistre, "Les Soirées de Saint-Pétersbourg." 5ième entretien, *Oeuvres complètes*, Lyon 1891, Vol. IV, p. 256.

9. Bacon, *Advancement of Learning*, *Works*, Vol. II, p. 126.

10. *Genesis* I, 26

11. Archilochus, fr. 87, quoted by Deussen, *Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie*, Vol. II, Pt. 1, Leipzig 1911, p. 18.

12. Solon, fr. 13.25 et seq., quoted by Deussen, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

13. Cf. Robert H. Lowie, *An Introduction to Cultural Anthropology*, New York 1940, pp. 344f.

14. Cf. Freud, *Totem and Taboo*, in *The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, trans. James Strachey, London 1991, pp. 85ff.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 89.

[7] "industrial technology" / 1944: "the technology of monopoly."

[8] "insufficient righteousness": allusion to the positivists' charge that metaphysical philosophers lacked sufficient correctness, honesty, and uprightness, a charge generally leveled by "enlightened" thought against the preceding philosophical systems. (It. tr.)

[9] "doubtless" / 1944: (missing).

16. *Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*, *op. cit.*, p. 342 (where *Trupp* is translated more neutrally as "group").

17. Cf. W. Kirfel, "Geschichte Indiens," in *Propyläenweltgeschichte*, Vol. III, pp. 261ff, and G. Glotz, "Histoire Grècque," Vol. I, in *Histoire Ancienne*, Paris 1938, pp. 137ff.

[9] "subjugated people" / 1944: "objects of exploitation."

18. G. Glotz, *op. cit.*, p. 140.

19. Cf. Kurt Eckermann, *Jahrbuch der Religionsgeschichte und Mythologie*, Halle 1845, Vol. I, p. 241, and O. Kern, *Die Religion der Griechen*, Vol. I, Berlin 1926, pp. 181f.

[10] "link" / 1944: "link" (n. 20 here).

20. Hubert and Mauss describe the nature of "sympathy" or mimesis as follows: "L'un est le tout, tout est dans l'un, la nature triomphe de la nature." H. Hubert and M. Mauss, "Théorie générale de la Magie," in *L'Année Sociologique* 1902–3, p. 100.

21. Cf. Westermarck, *Ursprung der Moralbegriffe*, Leipzig 1913, Vol. I, p. 402.

[13] "total art" / an allusion to Richard Wagner's concept of the total art work (*Gesmtkunstwerk*) (It. tr.).

22. Cf. Plato, *The Republic*, Book 10.

23. Schelling, *Erster Entwurf eines Systems der Naturphilosophie*. S. 5, *Werke*, Abt. 1, Vol. II, p. 623.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 626.

[15] "twentieth century": allusion to Alfred Rosenberg's *Der Mythos des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts* (1930).

[16] "the consolidated . . . privileged" / 1944: "class domination."

25. Cf. E. Durkheim, "De quelques formes primitives de classification," *L'Année Sociologique*, Vol. IV, 1903, pp. 66ff.

26. Cf. *The New Science of Giambattista Vico*, trans. 3rd ed. Thomas Goddard Bergin and Max Harold Fisch, New York 1961.

[17] "industrial trusts" / 1944: "social upheaval caused by monopoly."

27. Hubert and Mauss, *op. cit.*, p. 118.

28. Cf. Tönnies, "Philosophische Terminologie," in *Psychologisch-Soziologische Ansicht*, Leipzig 1908, p. 31.

29. Hegel, *Phenomenology*, *op. cit.*, p. 51.

[18] "value" / 1944: "word."

30. Edmund Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, an Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy*, trans. David Carr, Evanston, 1970.

31. Cf. Schopenhauer, *Parerga and Paralipomena*, trans. E. F. J. Payne, Oxford 1974, Vol. II, §356, p. 610.

[20] "spirit-seer": Cf. note [6], p. 255.

[21] "industrialism . . . things." / 1944: "industry makes souls into things. The rule of the monopolists, as of individual capitalists earlier, is not expressed directly in the commands of the rulers."

[21] "The countless . . . culture" / 1944: "Monopoly."

[22] "value" / 1944: "exchange value."

32. Spinoza, *Ethics*, trans. A. Boyle, London/New York 1948, Part IV, Propos. XXII, Coroll.

[23] "merely an aid . . . apparatus" / 1944: "an apparatus in the perpetuating monopoly."

[23] "unitary knowledge": The "unity of knowledge" postulated by the Vienna Circle, especially Neurath and Carnap.

[24] "pleasure": allusion to the National Socialist promotion of physical culture for racial, genetic ends, which went hand in hand with the lifting of certain taboos in the private sexual sphere ("Strength Through Joy," "Lebensborn e.V," etc. Cf. Friedrich Pollock, "Is National Socialism a New Order?" in *Studies in Philosophy and Social Science*, Vol. IX, 1941, pp. 448f.

[24] "The German . . . self-contempt" / 1944: "Pleasure, which the neopagans and administrators of war fever wanted to set free, has, on its way to totalitarian emancipation, internalized meanness as self-contempt."

33. Homer, *Odyssey*, trans. E. V. Rieu (amended), Harmondsworth 1965, p. 194.

34. *Ibid.*

35. *Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit*, *op cit.*, p. 116.

[29] "society" / 1944: "class society."

[29] "rulers" [*Lenker*] / 1944: "those in control" [*Verfügende*].

[29] "of . . . injustice" / 1944: "of exploitation."

[30] "of the cliques . . . embodied" / 1944: "of monopoly, the last incarnation of economic necessity."

[30] "Intuitions," "dynamic worldview," "mission," and "fate" were common terms in "educated" National Socialist jargon.

[30] "company chairmen" / 1944: "monopoly controllers."

[30] "of those still" / 1944: "the hands needed to operate the increasing fixed capital."

[30] "Poverty" / 1944: "Increasing misery."

[30 "the economy" / 1944: "capital."

[30] "rackets": Systems for extorting protection money; in a wider sense, groups securing the system of power. Also see Editor's Afterword, pp. 233ff.

[31] "the reason of the reasonable" / 1944: "this."

[31] "industrialists . . . This" / 1944: "those in power . . . This twofold."

[31] "that thinking": Refers to the Marxian concept of the period of history preceding the socialist society.

[31] "truth": The authors are paraphrasing the scholastic formulation: "verum index sui et falsi" (It. tr.).

[32] "eternal": Cf. Marx, *Capital. A Critique of Political Economy*, trans. David Fernbach. Harmondsworth 1991, Vol. III.

[33] "unfettered technology" / 1944: "the unfettered technical forces of production."

36. "The supreme question which confronts our generation today—the question to which all other problems are merely corollaries—is whether technology can be brought under control . . . Nobody can be sure of the formula by which this end can be achieved . . . We must draw on all the resources to which access can be had . . ." (*The Rockefeller Foundation. A Review for 1943*. New York 1944, pp. 33ff).

[33] Cf. note 2, p. 255.

EXCURSUS I

1. Nietzsche, *Nachlass, Werke*, Vol. XIV, Leipzig 1904, p. 206.

2. *Ibid.*, Vol. XV, p. 235.

[37] "Borchardt": An earlier draft of the manuscript (Theodor W. Adorno Archiv) contains a reference to Borchardt's afterword to his translation of the poems of Pindar *Pindarische Gedichte*, Munich 1929/30 (private impression), pp. 99, 103, and 93; cf. "Einleitung in das Verständnis der Pindarischen Poesie," in *Gesammelte Werke*, Prosa II, Stuttgart 1959, pp. 161ff.

3. *Ibid.*, Vol. IX, p. 289.

[37] "rational" / 1944/47: "more rational."

4. Hölderlin, "Patmos," *Poems and Fragments*, trans. Michael Hamburger, Cambridge and New York 1980, p. 463.

5. Direct evidence in support of this argument is found early in Book XX. Odysseus notes the maids' nightly visits to the beds of the Suitors. "Odysseus'

gorge rose within him. Yet he was quite uncertain what to do and he debated long. Should he dash after them and put them all to death; or should he let them spend this one last night in the arms of their profligate lovers? The thought made him snarl with repressed fury, like a bitch that snarls and shows fight as she takes her stand above her helpless puppies when a stranger comes by. So did Odysseus groan to himself in sheer revolt at these licentious ways. But in the end he brought his fist down on his heart and called it to order. 'Patience, my heart!' he said. 'You had a far more loathsome thing than this to put up with when the savage Cyclops devoured those gallant men. And yet you managed to hold out, till cunning got you clear of the cave where you had thought your end had come.' But though he was able by such self-rebuke to quell all mutiny in his heart and steel it to endure, Odysseus nevertheless could not help tossing to and fro on his bed . . ." (*The Odyssey, op. cit.*, p. 304). The subject is not yet articulated to form a firm inner identity. Affects, courage, the "heart" still rise up independently. "At the beginning of this episode, his heart, *kradie* or *etor* (the two words are synonyms for "heart," 17.22), snarls and growls within him, and Odysseus beats his breast, that is, his heart, and addresses it. His heart beats violently; this part of his body is stirring against his will. That he speaks to it is not, therefore, a mere formal device, as when hand or foot is addressed in Euripides to set them in motion; his heart acts autonomously" (Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Die Heimkehr des Odysseus*, Berlin 1927, p. 189). The affect is equated with an animal which the human being is subduing: The metaphor of the bitch forms part of the same stratum of experience as the metamorphosis of Odysseus's companions into swine. The subject, still split and forced to do violence to nature both within himself and outside, "punishes" his heart, compelling it to be patient and denying it direct satisfaction in the present for the sake of a more distant future. Beating one's breast later became a gesture of triumph: What the victor really expresses is that his victory is over his own nature. The achievement is accomplished by self-preserving reason. ". . . the speaker thought first of his wildly beating heart; his *metis* [cunning], which is thus seen a separate inner force, was able to master it, and saved Odysseus. Later philosophers would have contrasted it as *nus* [mind] or *logistikon* [reasoning] to the unreasoning parts of the body" (Wilamowitz, *op. cit.*, p. 190). But the "self"—*autos*—is not mentioned until line 24, after the impulse has been successfully mastered by reason. If the choice and sequence of the words are taken as evidence, the identity-forming self is regarded by Homer as resulting from a mastery of nature within the human being. This new self trembles inwardly, as a thing, the body, when the heart within it is punished. At any rate, Wilamowitz's juxtaposing of separately analyzed moments of the psyche, which often speak to each other, seems to confirm the loose cohesion of the subject, whose substance consists only in the coordination of these moments.

6. In contrast to Nietzsche's materialistic interpretation, Klages understood sacrifice and exchange entirely in terms of magic: "The general necessity to offer sacrifices affects everyone, because everyone, as has been seen, receives his or her share of life, and all the goods of life they can obtain—the original *suum cuique*—only through the constant exchange of gifts. This, however, is not exchange in the ordinary sense of exchanging goods (although at the very beginning that, too, was consecrated by the idea of sacrifice) but of exchanging fluids or essences by abandoning one's own soul to the supporting and nurturing life of the world" (Ludwig Klages, *Der Geist als Widersacher der Seele*, Leipzig 1932, Vol. III, Part 2, p. 1409). However, the twofold character of sacrifice—the magic self-abandonment of the individual to the collective (in whatever form) and the self-preservation achieved through the technology of this magic—implies an objective contradiction which necessitates further development of the rational element in sacrifice. Still under the influence of magic, rationality, as the behavior of the performer of the sacrifice, becomes cunning. Klages himself, the zealous apologist of myth and sacrifice, came up against this contradiction and found himself obliged, even within the ideal image of Pelagianism, to distinguish between genuine and false communication with nature. However, he was unable to derive from mythical thinking itself any opposing principle to set against the illusion of the magical mastery of nature, because that very illusion constitutes the essence of myth. "It is no longer merely pagan belief but pagan superstition which compels the king of the gods, on ascending his throne, to swear that henceforth he will cause the sun to shine and the field to be covered in fruits" (Klages, *op. cit.*, p. 1408).

7. In keeping with this, human sacrifices in the literal sense do not occur in Homer. The epic's civilizing tendency is manifested in the selection of the incidents narrated. "With one exception . . . both Iliad and Odyssey are completely expurgated of the abomination of Human Sacrifice" (Gilbert Murray, *The Rise of the Greek Epic*, Oxford 1911, p. 150).

[40] "The representative character . . . deity." / 1944: "The idea of magic representation implied in sacrifice, which he affirms, cannot be separated from the victim's status as the elect. But this status results from the priests' transposition of the victim to the heaven of the gods. An element of this projection, which elevates the perishable person as the bearer of the divine substance, has always been detectable in the ego, which owes its origin to projection. It bears the features of the idolized victim: not without reason was Odysseus continually regarded as a secularized deity."

8. Probably not at the earliest stages. "The custom of human sacrifice . . . is far more widespread among barbarous and half-civilized peoples than among true savages, and it is hardly found at all at the lowest levels of culture. It has been observed that in some peoples this custom has become increasingly predominant

in the course of time"—on the Society Islands, in Polynesia, in India, among the Aztecs. "With regard to Africa Winwood Read states that 'the mightier the nation the more prominent the custom of sacrifice'" (Eduard Westermarck, *Ursprung und Entwicklung der Moralbegriffe*, Leipzig 1913, Vol. I, p. 363).

9. Among cannibal peoples like those of West Africa, "neither women nor adolescents . . . were allowed to taste the delicacy" (Westermarck, *op cit.*, Leipzig 1909, Vol. II, p. 459).

10. Wilamowitz places *nus* in "sharp opposition" to *logos* (*Glaube der Hellenen*, Berlin 1931, Vol. I, pp. 41f). For him myth is "a story one tells oneself," a fairy tale, an untruth, but also, without distinction from that, the ultimate, undemonstrable truth, as in Plato. While Wilamowitz is aware of the illusory character of myths, he equates them with poetry. In other words, he looks for myths only in significative language, which has already come into objective contradiction with its intention, and seeks to resolve it as poetry: "Myth is in the first place spoken discourse; the words are indifferent to the content" (*ibid.*). By hypostatizing this late concept of myth, which presupposes reason as its explicit counterpart, he arrives—in an implicit polemic against Bachofen, whom he dismisses as merely fashionable without mentioning him by name—at a clear distinction between mythology and religion (*op. cit.*, p. 5), whereby myth appears not as the older but the younger state: "I attempt . . . to trace the evolution, the transformations and the transition from faith to myth" (*op. cit.*, p. 1). The Hellenistic scholar's rigid departmental arrogance blocks his perception of the dialectic of myth, religion, and enlightenment: "I do not know the languages from which the currently modish words 'taboo,' 'totem,' '*mana*,' and '*orenda*' are taken but consider it legitimate to confine myself to the Greeks, and to think about Greek matters in Greek terms" (*op. cit.*, p. 10). How his unexplained contention that "the germ of the Platonic deity" was present "in the earliest Hellenic culture" is therefore to be reconciled with the historical view, put forward by Kirchhoff and taken over by Wilamowitz, that the earliest core of the Odyssey is contained in the mythical encounters of the *nostos*, remains unclear, just as the central concept of myth itself lacks adequate philosophical articulation in Wilamowitz. Nevertheless, his opposition to the irrationalism which idolizes myth and his insistence on the untruth of myths reveal unmistakable insight. His repugnance for primitive thinking and prehistory shows up all the more clearly the tension which has always existed between the deceptive word and truth. The arbitrariness of fabrication which Wilamowitz criticizes in later myths must already have been contained in the earliest ones, by virtue of the *pseudos* [substitute] of sacrifice. This *pseudos* is related to precisely the Platonic deity which Wilamowitz dates back to archaic Hellenism.

11. The conception of Christianity as a pagan sacrificial religion is fundamental to Werner Hegemann's *Geretteter Christus* (Potsdam 1928).

[43] "society's predicament" / 1944: "the predicament of the whole of class history."

12. For example, when he refrains from killing Polyphemus at once (IX, 302); when he has to endure the mistreatment of Antinous in order not to give himself away (XVII, 460ff). Also compare the episode of the winds (X, 50ff) and Teiresias's prophecy in the first visit to the Underworld (XI, 105ff), which makes his homecoming dependent on mastery of his heart. To be sure, Odysseus's renunciation is more a postponement than a final state; he usually performs the deeds of vengeance all the more thoroughly for having delayed them; his endurance is patience. His behavior still displays relatively openly, as a natural objective, something which was later concealed in total, imperative renunciation, thereby taking on the irresistible violence which subjugated everything natural. Through being transposed inside the subject and emancipated from its mythical content, this subjugation becomes "objective," confronting the special purposes of humans as an independent entity and becoming the universal rational law. In Odysseus's patience—quite clearly after the death of the Suitors—vengeance is already turning into judicial procedure: the ultimate fulfillment of the mythical impulse becomes the objective instrument of domination. Law is vengeance which is capable of renunciation. But since this judicial patience is generated by something outside itself, the longing for the homeland, it takes on human traits, almost a quality of trust, which point beyond vengeance postponed. In fully developed bourgeois society, however, both are annulled: with the idea of vengeance longing, too, is tabooed—thereby, of course, enthroning vengeance, mediated as the self's revenge on itself.

13. Max Weber, *Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, Munich and Leipzig 1924, p. 3.

14. Victor Bérard has strongly emphasized the Semitic element in the *Odyssey*, though not without some apocryphal interpretation. Cf. the chapter "Les Phéniciens et l'Odyssée" in *La Résurrection d'Homère*, Paris 1930, pp. 111ff.

[48] "capitalist economy" / 1944: "exploitation."

[48] "make use . . . worker" / 1944: "have anyone to exploit."

[48] "entrepreneur" / 1944: "capitalist."

[48] "moral . . . profit" / 1944: "moral justification for the plunder raked in by the privileged."

[49] *nostos*: Greek: "journey," "homecoming."

15. *Odyssey*, Book IX, *op. cit.*, p. 141.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 349.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 141.

18. Jacob Burckhardt, *History of Greek Culture*, trans. Palmer Hilty, London 1963, p. 180.

19. *Odyssey*, *op. cit.*, p. 141.

20. In Indian mythology Lotus is the earth goddess. (Cf. Heinrich Zimmer, *Maja*, Stuttgart and Berlin 1936, pp. 105f.) If there is a connection between this and the mythical tradition on which the old Homeric *nostos* is based, the encounter with the Lotus-eaters might be characterized as a stage in the struggle with the chthonic powers.

21. *Odyssey, op. cit.*, p. 142.

22. According to Wilamowitz the Cyclopes are "really animals" (*Glaube der Hellenen*, Vol. I, p. 14).

23. *Odyssey, op. cit.*, p. 148.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 142.

25. *Ibid.*

26. *Ibid.*, p. 150.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 151 (adapted).

28. *Ibid.*, p. 146.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 146.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 149.

31. "The mindless creature's frequent stupidities might be seen as a kind of stillborn humor" (Klages, *op. cit.*, p. 1469).

32. *Odyssey, op. cit.*, p. 148.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 163.

34. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 159. Cf. F. C. Bauer, *Symbolik und Mythologie*, Stuttgart 1824, Vol. I, p. 47.

35. Cf. Baudelaire, "Le vin du solitaire," *Les Fleurs du Mal.*

36. Cf. J. A. K. Thomson, *Studies in the Odyssey*, Oxford 1914, p. 153.

37. *Odyssey, op. cit.*, p. 161.

38. Murray refers to the "sexual expurgations" to which the poems of Homer were subjected while being edited (cf. *op. cit.*, pp. 141ff).

39. "Pigs are in general the sacrificial animals of Demeter" (Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Der Glaube der Hellenen*, Vol. II, p. 53).

40. Cf. Freud, *Complete Psychological Works*, trans. James Strachey, Vol. XXI, London 1978, p. 99, fn. 1.

41. In a note Wilamowitz points to a surprising connection between the notions of snuffling and of *noos*, autonomous reason: "Schwyzer has very convincingly linked *noos* to snorting and snuffling" (Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Die Heimkehr des Odysseus, op. cit.*, p. 191). Wilamowitz doubts, however, whether the etymological relationship contributes to elucidating the meaning.

42. *Odyssey, op. cit.*, p. 161.

43. The consciousness of her irresistibility was later expressed in the cult of Aphrodite Peithon, "whose magic brooks no refusal" (Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Der Glaube der Hellenen, op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 152).

[56] "Aeaea": Circe's island; old name for Colchis.

44. *Odyssey*, p. 164.

45. *Ibid.*

46. *Ibid.*, p. 166.

47. *Ibid.*

48. Cf. Bauer, *op. cit.*, pp. 47, 49.

49. *Odyssey*, p. 343.

50. Goethe, *Wilhelm Meister's Years of Apprenticeship*, trans. H. M. Waidson, London 1977, p. 62.

51. *Odyssey*, p. 346.

[59] "Underworld": Greek: sacrifice offered for the dead; Greek title of Book XI of the *Odyssey*.

52. Cf. Thomson, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

53. "My eyes filled with tears when I saw her there, and I was stirred to compassion. Yet, deeply moved though I was, I would not allow her to approach the blood out of turn, before I had had speech with Teiresias" (*Odyssey*, p. 173).

54. "I see the soul of my dead mother over there. She sits in silence by the blood and cannot bring herself to look her own son in the face or say a single word to him. Tell me, my prince, is there no way to make her know that I am he" (*ibid.*, p. 175)?

55. "I cannot avoid believing that the whole of Book XI, with the exception of a few passages . . . is a fragment of the old *nostos* and therefore of the oldest part of the poem" (Kirchhoff, *Die homerische Odyssee*, Berlin 1879, p. 226).

56. *Odyssey*, p. 174.

57. He was originally the "husband of the earth" (cf. Wilamowitz, *Glaube der Hellenen*, Vol. I, pp. 112ff) and only became the sea god at a late stage. Teiresias's prophecy may be an allusion to his twofold nature. It is conceivable that his propitiation by means of an earthly sacrifice far from any sea implies a symbolic restoration of his chthonic power. This restoration might reflect the superseding of the sea voyage in search of booty by agriculture: The cults of Poseidon and Demeter merged (cf. Thomson, *op. cit.*, p. 96, fn).

58. Translated from Grimm, *Kinder- und Hausmärchen*, Leipzig n.d., p. 208. Closely related motifs are passed down from antiquity, especially regarding Demeter. "Demeter came to Eleusis in search of her daughter after she had been abducted and was given lodging by Dysaules and his wife Baubo; but in her great sorrow she refused to touch food or drink. Thereupon her hostess Baubo made her laugh by suddenly lifting up her dress and exposing her body" (Freud, *Complete Psychological Works*, Vol. XIV, London 1962, p. 338; cf. Salomon Reinach, *Cultes, Mythes et Religions*, Paris 1912, Vol. IV, pp. 115ff).

[60] "up to now" / 1944: "throughout class history."

59. Hölderlin, "Autumn," *Poems and Fragments, op. cit.*, p. 595.

60. *Odyssey,* p. 340.

61. Wilamowitz considers that the execution was "carried out with satisfaction by the poet" (*Die Heimkehr des Odysseus, op. cit.*, p. 67). But when the authoritarian scholar enthuses over the simile of the snares, which "conveys the dangling of the maids' corpses in an apt and modern way" (*ibid.*, also cf. *ibid.*, p. 76), the satisfaction appears to be largely his own. Wilamowitz's writings are among the most striking documents of the German intermingling of barbarism and culture, which is fundamental to modern Philhellenism.

62. Gilbert Murray draws attention to the consoling intention of this line. According to his theory, scenes of torture have been expunged from Homer by civilizing censorship. The deaths of Melanthios and the maids have been retained (*op. cit.*, p. 146).

EXCURSUS II

1. Kant, "An answer to the question: What is Enlightenment?" *Practical Philosophy,* trans. Mary J. Gregor, Cambridge 1996, p. 17.

2. *Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason,* trans. Norman Kemp Smith, London 1973, p. 533.

3. *Ibid.*

4. *Ibid.*, p. 542.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 534.

6. *Ibid.*

7. *Ibid.*, p. 148.

8. *Kant's Critique of Judgment,* trans. J. H. Bernard, London and New York 1892, p. 24.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 25.

10. *Metaphysische Anfänge der Tugendlehre, Kants Werke. Akademie-Textausgabe,* Berlin 1968–, Vol. VI, p. 449.

11. Spinoza, *Ethics,* trans. A. Boyle, London/New York 1948, Pt. III, Pref., p. 84.

[67] "fascism" / 1944: "monopoly."

[68] [German text:] *Leistungsfähigkeit* / 1944: "efficiency."

12. *Critique of Pure Reason,* 2nd ed., *op cit.*, p. 154.

[68] "is revealing . . . form." / 1944: "monopoly is outgrowing itself in a fascistically rationalized form."

13. Translated from de Sade, *Histoire de Juliette,* Holland 1797, Vol. V, pp. 319f.

14. *Ibid.*, pp. 322f.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 324.

[71] "economic system" / 1944: "capitalism."

[71] "as . . . individuals": An allusion to Marx's formulation in *Capital* (Marx, Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. 35, London 1996, p. 89).

[71] "industrial reason" / 1944: "monopoly and its reason."

[72] "system" / 1944/47: "system, the reason of capital."

16. E.g. *Critique of Practical Reason*, Kant, *Practical Philosophy*, trans. Mary J. Gregor, Cambridge 1996, p. 165.

17. *Nouveaux Essais sur l'Entendement Humain*, ed. Erdmann, Berlin 1840, Book 1, Ch. II, § 9, p. 215.

18. Cf. Heinrich Mann's introduction to the Insel Verlag edition.

19. *Metaphysische Anfänge der Tugendlehre*, *op. cit.*, p. 408.

20. *Juliette*, *op. cit.*, vol. IV, p. 58.

21. *Ibid.*, pp. 60f.

22. Spinoza, *Ethics*, Pt. IV, Prop. LIV, *op. cit.*, p. 178.

23. Spinoza, *ibid.*

24. *Metaphysische Anfänge der Tugendlehre*, *op. cit.*, p. 408.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 409.

26. *Juliette*, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 114.

[76] "bourgeois" / 1944: "bourgeois in democracy."

27. *Ibid.*, Vol. III, p. 282.

28. Nietzsche, *Umwertung aller Werte. Werke*, Kröner, Vol. VIII, p. 213.

29. *Juliette*, *op. cit.*, Vol. IV, p. 204.

30. E. Dühren pointed out this affinity in *Neue Forschungen*, Berlin 1904, pp. 453ff.

31. Nietzsche, *op. cit.*, Vol. VIII, p. 218.

32. *Juliette*, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 315f.

33. Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy and The Genealogy of Morals*, trans. Francis Golffing, New York 1956, pp. 174f.

34. *Juliette*, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 300.

35. *Histoire de Justine*, Holland 1797, Vol. IV, p. 4 (also quoted by Dühren, *op. cit.*, p. 452).

36. *Genealogy of Morals*, *op. cit.*, p. 178.

37. *Justine*, *op. cit.*, Vol. IV, p. 7.

38. *Nachlass*, *op. cit.*, Vol. XI, p. 214.

39. *Genealogy of Morals*, *op. cit.*, p. 258.

40. *Juliette*, Vol. I, p. 208ff.

41. *Ibid.*, pp. 211f.

42. *Beyond Good and Evil*, trans. R. J. Hollingdale, London (Penguin Classics) 1990, p. 97.

43. *Nachlass*, *op. cit.*, Vol. XII, p. 108.

44. *Juliette*, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 313.

45. *Ethics*, Pt. IV, Appendix, XVI, *op. cit.*, p. 194.
46. *Ibid.*, Pt. IV, Prop. L, Note, p. 176.
47. *Ibid.*, Prop. L, p. 175.
48. *Juliette, op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 125.
49. *Ibid.*
50. *Nietzsche contra Wagner, op. cit.*, Vol. VIII, p. 204.
51. *Juliette, op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 313.
52. *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 216.
53. *Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen, op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 215f.
54. *Ibid.*
55. *Nachlass, op. cit.*, Vol. XI, pp. 227f.
56. Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, trans. R. J. Hollingdale, Harmondsworth 1984, p. 189.

[81] "fascist masters" / 1944: "masters."

57. *Genealogy of Morals, op. cit.*, p. 249.

[81] "Annie Henry": In 1940 she shot a man by whom she and a companion had been taken for a walk, after having threatened him with a pistol and humiliated him for hours; cf. *Los Angeles Examiner*, 29.11.1942.

58. *Juliette, op. cit.*, Vol. III, pp. 78f.
59. *Ibid.*, Vol. IV, pp. 126f.
60. R. Caillois, "Théorie de la fête," *Nouvelle Revue Française*, Jan. 1940, p. 49.
61. Cf. *ibid.*
62. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 58f.

[83] "Benzedrine": A strong stimulant administered by the Nazi commanders to their troops (It. tr.).

63. *Nachlass, op. cit.*, Vol. XII, p. 364.

[84] "appeased . . . industry" / 1944: "hypostatized as an accomplished reconciliation. Under monopoly."

[84] "system . . . industry" / 1944: "monopoly."

[84] "white trash"; derogatory expression for white workers.

64. *Juliette, op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 81f.
65. *Ibid.*, Vol. III, pp. 172f.
66. *Ibid.*, pp. 176f.
67. Private edition by Helpey, p. 267.
68. *Juliette, op. cit.*, Vol. III, pp. 176f.
69. *Ibid.*, pp. 178f.
70. *Ibid.*, pp. 188–99.
71. *Juliette, op. cit.*, Vol. IV, p. 261.
72. *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 273.

73. *Ibid.*, Vol. IV, p. 379.
74. *Aline et Valcour*, Brussels 1883, Vol. I, p. 58.
75. *Ibid.*, p. 57.
76. Victor Hugo, *The Laughing Man*, Book VIII, Ch. 7.
77. *Juliette, op. cit.*, Vol. IV, p. 199.
78. Cf. *Les 120 Journées de Sodome*, Paris 1935, Vol. II, p. 308.
79. *Der Fall Wagner, op. cit.*, Vol. VIII, p. 10.
80. R. Briffault, *The Mothers*, New York 1927, Vol. I, p. 119.
[89] "German fascism" / 1944: "the class society."
81. *Nachlass, op. cit.*, Vol. XI, p. 216.
82. *Ibid.*, vol. XIV, p. 273.
83. Kant, *Practical Philosophy*, trans. Mary J. Gregor, Cambridge 1996, p. 82.
84. Nietzsche, *Joyful Wisdom*, trans. Thomas Common, New York 1973, p. 279.
85. *Ibid.*
86. Cf. Nietzsche, *Nachlass, op. cit.*, Vol. XI, p. 216.
87. Cf. Le Play, *Les ouvriers européens*, Paris 1879, Vol. I, esp. pp. 133ff.
88. *Juliette, op. cit.*, Vol. IV, pp. 303ff.
89. *Les 120 Journées de Sodome, op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 72.
90. Cf. *Juliette, op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 235, n.
91. *La Philosophie dans le Boudoir, op. cit.*, p. 185.
92. Cf. Democritus, Diels Fragment 278, Berlin 1912, Vol. II, pp. 117f.
93. *La Philosophie dans le Boudoir, op. cit.*, p. 242.
94. S. Reinach, "La prohibition de l'inceste et le sentiment de la pudeur," in *Cultes, Mythes et Religions*, Paris 1905, Vol. I, p. 157.
95. *La Philosophie dans le Boudoir, op. cit.*, p. 238.
96. *Ibid.*, pp. 238–49.
97. *Ibid.*
98. *Juliette, op. cit.*, Vol. IV, pp. 240–44.
99. *La Philosophie dans le Boudoir, op. cit.*, p. 263.
100. *Aline et Valcour, op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 181ff.
101. *Juliette, op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 181ff.
[92] "prehistory": Cf. note [31], p. 258 ("that thinking").
102. Nietzsche, *Joyful Wisdom*, trans. Thomas Common, New York 1973, p. 209.

THE CULTURE INDUSTRY

[94] "The" / 1944: "The German and Russian pavilions at the Paris World Exposition (of 1937, Ed.) seemed of the same essence, and the."
[94] "the total power of capital" / 1944: "monopoly."

[95] "those whose . . . strongest" / 1944: "capital."

[95] "economy today" / 1944: "profit economy."

[96] "Soap operas": alludes to the fact that such programs were originally broadcast at times when housewives were at home doing their washing (It. tr.).

[96] "selection" / 1944: "selection. The operations of the large studios, including the quality of the highly paid human material populating them, is a product of the monopoly system into which it is integrated."

[96] "subjected . . . purges" / 1944: "expropriated even before fascism."

[98] "at film" / 1944: "at the film monopoly."

[98] "agencies . . . business" / 1944: "monopolistic agencies."

[100] "industrial society" / 1944: "the machinery."

[100] "gigantic economic machinery" / 1944: "gigantic machinery of monopoly."

[101] "tolerated" / 1944: "tolerated, used by monopoly."

1. Nietzsche, *Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen. Werke*, Leipzig 1917, Vol. I, p. 187.

[102] "Zanuck": Film producer, cofounder of 20th Century Pictures.

[104] "present society" / 1944: "monopoly society."

[105] "Pathé": French film magnates.

[105] "Hugenberg": Founders of German publishing combines.

2. A. de Tocqueville, *De la Démocratie en Amérique*, Paris 1864, Vol. II, p. 151.

[106] "Hays Office": Voluntary censorship agency (It. tr.), set up in 1934 in Hollywood.

[106] "Mickey Rooney": See note [126], p. 271.

[107] "ready-to-wear trade or" / 1944: "Jewish clothing trade or the Episcopal."

[107] "some omnipresent agency" / 1944: "a Rockefeller Institute, only slightly more omnipresent than the one in Radio City,"—"Radio City": the name given since the early 1930s to a part of the Rockefeller Center in New York containing several theatres, radio studios, and the Radio City Music Hall.

[107] "Casino de Paris": Music hall in Paris, famous for its luxurious furnishings.

[107] "society" / 1944: "class society."

[108] "Lombardo": Orchestra leader especially known for his annual musical broadcasts on New Year's Eve.

[109] "novelty songs": Hit songs with comic elements.

[110] "cruelty" / 1944: "lust for murder."

[110] "of the" / 1944: "of the kiss, but not of the."

[111] ". . . overwhelming": The idea expressed here dates from a time when television was not in widespread use (It. tr.).

[111] "possibilities" / 1944: "productive forces."

[111] "culture industry" / 1944: "mass culture."

[111] "Hays Office": See note [106], p. 269.

[112] "Laughter . . . ended": On this twofold function of laughter cf. pp. 60f (It. tr.).

[112] "*res . . . gaudium*": Seneca, Letter 23; letters to Lucilius (*Letters from a Stoic*, trans. Robin Campbell, Harmondsworth 1969).

[113] "constitutes its essence": Cf. Adorno, "Über Jazz" (1937), in *Gesammelte Schriften*, Vol. 17, Frankfurt am Main 1982, p. 98.

[113] "the system" / 1944: "prevailing in monopolistic society."

[114] "funnies": Amusement pages in newspapers with jokes and comic strips.

[114] "Ludwig": Primarily a writer of popular biographies.

[114] "Mrs. Miniver": Leading role in a radio family serial; also filmed.

[114] "Lone Ranger": Title figure in a radio western serial, the type of the lone cowboy fighting for the good; also filmed.

[114] "Lombardo": See note [108], p. 269.

3. Frank Wedekind, *Gesammelte Werke*, Munich 1921, Vol. IX, p. 426.

[115] "women's serials": Light novels in women's magazines.

[115] "Adler": Neo-Thomist popular philosopher who defended film with arguments from scholastic philosophy (It. tr.)—Cf. Horkheimer, "Neue Kunst und Massenkultur," in *Gesammelte Schriften*, Vol. 4.

[116] "the culture industry" / 1944: "the monopoly system."

[117] "planning" / 1944: "monopoly planning."

[117] "life has been transformed" / 1944: "monopoly has transformed life."

[117] "those in control" / 1944: "monopoly."

[118] "Industry" / 1944: "Monopoly."

[118] "proof": A play on the various philosophical-theological (ontological, cosmological, etc.) proofs of the existence of God.

[120] "giant corporation" / 1944: "monopoly."

[120] "the thinking subject" / 1944: "liberalism."

[120] *Hans Sonnenstößers Höllenfahrt. Ein heiteres Traumspiel.* Radio play by Paul Apel (1931), revised version by Gustaf Gründgens (1937).

[120] "*Life with Father*": Popular American radio family serial after a stage play by Clarence Day.

[120] "the latest society" / 1944: "monopoly society."

[120] "Formal freedom . . . answer officially" / 1944: "Bourgeois democracy guarantees formal freedom for everyone. No one is officially responsible to the government."

[120] "Dagwood": Character in the comic strip *Blondie*.

[121] "established" / 1944: "established by monopoly."

[121] "leaders of industry" / 1944: "monopolists."

[121] "provision" / 1944: "provision by the monopoly."

[121] "winter aid": *Winterhilfswerk*: National Socialist organization to support the unemployed and other needy persons under the direction of the Ministry of Propaganda.

[122] "even now" / 1944: "even under monopoly."

[123] "women's serial": See note [115], p. 270.

[123] "the pressure of the system" / 1944: "monopoly."

[124] "the system" / 1944: "monopoly."

4. Nietzsche, *Götzendämmerung*, *Werke*, *op. cit.*, Vol. VIII, p. 136.

[124] "those in command" / 1944: "monopoly."

[125] "bourgeois" / 1944: "German bourgeois."

[126] "Mature . . . Rooney": Well-known film actors, embodiments of the hero and the antihero.

[126] "cultural conglomerate" / 1944: "cultural conglomerate and monopoly."

[126] "Something . . . everyone" / 1944: "Monopoly serves up something for everyone."

[127] "The . . . purpose": Cf. Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, *op. cit.*, p. 68.

[128] "inner . . . commodities" / 1944: "composition of cultural commodities in terms of use value and exchange value."

[128] "What . . . replaced" / 1944: "Use value is being replaced in the reception of cultural assets."

[128] "The consumer . . . escape." / 1944: (missing).

[128] "Mrs. Miniver": See note [114], p. 270.

[128] "deception" / 1944: "swindle."

[129] "the commercial radio system" / 1944: "broadcasting."

[129] "the sovereign whole" / 1944: "monopoly as the sovereign whole."

[129] "combines" / 1944: "monopolies."

[129] "invented by the sociology of religion": Allusion to Max Weber's concept of charismatic authority; cf. *Economy and Society*, Vol. I, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, Berkeley 1978, pp. 241ff.

[130] "Even . . . use value" / 1944: "Use value."

[130] "screenos": Bingo games played by the audience between pictures.

[130] "radio": Television was still in its infancy when the authors were writing (It. tr.).

[131] "the Warner brothers": Owners of large film studios.

[131] "hopes" / 1944: "waits."

[131] "labor time . . . in advertising" / 1944: "social labor time, but saved it. Today, when the free market is at an end, monopoly is entrenching itself in advertising."

[131] "the combines" / 1944: "monopoly."

[131] "wielders of influence . . . economic councils" / 1944: "class remains among its peers, as a preliminary form of the resolutions of economic councils of industrialists."

[132] "It benefits . . . names." / 1944: "Its termination by an individual firm represents only a loss of prestige, in fact an offence against the class discipline which monopoly imposes on its members. In wartime, commodities which can no longer be supplied continue to be advertised merely in order to keep the institution, and naturally also the war economy, in operation."

[132] "the big companies" / 1944: "monopoly, the skyscrapers of Wrigley and Rockefeller."

[133] "blackshirt": A term for fascists, after the black shirts of their uniforms, especially in Italy but also in other countries.

[134] "people" / 1944: "people, which still determines life in monopoly society."

[135] "*Schriftleiter*": The term *Schriftleiter* [lit. director of writing] was preferred by the National Socialists to the "foreign" word *Redakteur* (It. tr.).

[135] "such language" / 1944: "the language of monopoly."

[136] "false." / 1944/47: "false." After paragraph break: "(to be continued)."

ELEMENTS OF ANTI-SEMITISM

[137] "Now that . . . reasons," / 1944: "In the age when political domination is obsolete."

[137] "workers" / 1944: "proletarians."

[137] "appropriation" / 1944: "exploitation."

[138] "discharged." / 1944: "discharged. That would be the classless society."

[138] "existing society" / 1944: "the class society."

[138] "the existing order" / 1944: "capitalism."

[139] "that order" / 1944: "class society."

[139] "The respectable . . . disreputable ones" / 1944: "Monopoly, the respectable rackets, condone it, and the fascists, the disreputable ones."

[140] "vagrants" / 1944: "Negroes, Mexican wrestling clubs."

[142] "take possession of" / 1944: "appropriate."

[142] "parasites of old": Allusion to the Nazis' anticapitalist propaganda distinction between "productive" [*schaffend*] and "parasitic" [*raffend*; lit. "grasping"] capital, i.e., between industrial and bank capital; cf. Franz Neumann, *Behemoth* (1942), Frankfurt/Main 1977, p. 376.

[142] "of the economic system in general" / 1944: "of all capital."

[142] "what is withheld" / 1944: "what capital withholds."

[143] "society" / 1944: "class."

[144] "knights of industry . . . creators" / 1944: "capitalist bloodsucker who has to justify himself as a creator."

[144] "salvation." / 1944/47: "salvation, now that the churches have been reduced entirely to the function of social control."

[145] "German Christians": The Protestant movement "Deutsche Christen" sought a union between Church and National Socialism.

[148] "recognition in a concept": Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason, op. cit.*, pp. 79ff [B 103].

1. Cf. Freud, "The Uncanny," *The Complete Psychological Works, op. cit.*, Vol. XVII, pp. 219ff.

[152] "Coughlin": Charles Edward Coughlin, Catholic priest, demagogic anti-Semitic radio preacher.

2. *Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, op. cit.*, p. 183 [B 180f].

[160] "any . . . country" / 1944: "even lynching."

3. Freud, *Totem and Taboo, op. cit.*, Vol. XIII, p. 73.

[163] "culture industry" / 1944: "economic and cultural monopoly."

[164] "big industry" / 1944: "monopoly."

[164] "workers" / 1944: "proletarians."

[165] "until now" / 1944: "in liberalism."

[165] ". . . turning-point of history": Allusion to Marx's "Zur Judenfrage," in *Aus den Deutsch-Französischen Jahrbüchern* 1843/44.

[165] "VII": The whole of section VII ("But . . . of enlightenment.") was not contained in the 1944 edition.

[165] "the Ahlwardts and the Knüppelkunzes": Hermann Ahlwardt: author of anti-Semitic pamphlets, Reichstag deputy at the end of the nineteenth century; for years his appearances were accompanied by uproar and scandal.

Hermann Kunze: teacher at the Cadet School, Chairman of the Deutsch-Soziale Partei, anti-Semitic demagogue; his nickname [*Knüppel*; stick, cudgel] resulted from the frequent brawls at his meetings.

[166] "ticket": single list of a party's candidates in the American electoral system.

[166] "Jew-free": From the National Socialist term *judenrein*.

[167] ". . . without mediation": Allusion to Kant's proposition: "Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind," *Critique of Pure Reason, op. cit.*, p. 93 [A 51].

NOTES AND SKETCHES

[173] "Chamberlain . . . Bad Godesberg": Chamberlain met Hitler three times in September 1938; the second meeting took place in Bad Godesberg.

[175] "In this country": In America [It. tr.].

[175] "Spoke . . . loneliness": Translated from *Die chinesische Flöte*, Nachdichtungen von Hans Bethge, Insel-Bücherei, p. 17 [It. tr.].

JACQUES DERRIDA

THE OTHER HEADING

REFLECTIONS ON TODAY'S EUROPE

TRANSLATED BY PASCALE-ANNE BRAULT
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INTRODUCTION BY MICHAEL B. NAAS

INDIANA UNIVERSITY PRESS

BLOOMINGTON & INDIANAPOLIS

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Originally published in French as *L'autre cap*,
©1991 by Les Editions de Minuit.

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The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1984.

Manufactured in the United States of America

Library of Congress
Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Derrida, Jacques.
[Autre cap. English]
The other heading : reflections on today's Europe / Jacques Derrida : translated by Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael B. Naas ; introduction by Michael B. Naas.
p. cm. — (Studies in Continental thought)
Translation of: L'autre cap.
Includes bibliographical references.
Contents: Today — The other heading — Call it a day for democracy.
ISBN 0-253-31693-6 (alk. paper)
1. Europe—Civilization—1945- 2. Discourse analysis. 3. Valéry, Paul, 1871-1945—Political and social views. 4. Press and politics—France. 5. Press and politics—Europe. 6. Public opinion—France. 7. Public opinion—Europe. I. Derrida, Jacques. Démocratie ajournée. English. 1992. II. Title. III. Series.
D1055.D4813 1992
940.55—dc20 91-47585

1 2 3 4 5 96 95 94 93 92

THE OTHER HEADING: MEMORIES, RESPONSES, AND RESPONSIBILITIES

A colloquium always tries to forget the risk it runs: the risk of being just another one of those events [*spectacles*] where, in good company, one strings together a few talks or speeches on some general subject. Just another *cultural* event, for example, or a performance, or else an exercise in what one calls, with this very obscure word, "culture." And an exercise

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Before its publication in an abbreviated form in *Liber*, this paper was delivered in Turin on May 20, 1990, during a colloquium on "European Cultural Identity." The conference was presided over by Gianni Vattimo, with the participation of Maurice Aymard, Vladimir K. Bukovsky, Agnès Heller, José Saramago, Fernando Savater, and Vittorio Strada. The notes were, obviously, added after the fact.

around a question that will always be of current interest: Europe.

If this meeting had any chance of escaping repetition, it would be only insofar as some *imminence,* at once a chance and a danger, exerted pressure on us.

What imminence? Something unique is afoot in Europe, in what is still called Europe even if we no longer know very well *what* or *who* goes by this name. Indeed, to what concept, to what real individual, to what singular entity should this name be assigned today? Who will draw up its borders?

Refusing itself to anticipation as much as to analogy, what announces itself in this way seems to be without precedent. An anguished experience of imminence, crossed by two contradictory certainties: the very old subject of cultural identity in general (before the war one would have perhaps spoken of "spiritual" identity), the very old subject of European identity indeed has the venerable air of an old, exhausted theme. But perhaps this "subject" retains a virgin body. Would not its name mask something that does not yet have

a face? We ask ourselves in hope, in fear and trembling, what this face is going to resemble. Will it still resemble? Will it resemble the face of some *persona* whom we believe we know: Europe? And if its non-resemblance bears the traits of the future, will it escape monstrosity?

Hope, fear, and trembling are commensurate with the signs that are coming to us from everywhere in Europe, where, precisely in the name of identity, be it cultural or not, the worst violences, those that we recognize all too well without yet having thought them through, the crimes of xenophobia, racism, anti-Semitism, religious or nationalist fanaticism, are being unleashed, mixed up, mixed up with each other, but also, and there is nothing fortuitous in this, mixed in with the breath, with the respiration, with the very "spirit" of the promise.

To begin, I will confide in you a feeling. Already on the subject of headings [*caps*]—and of the shores on which I intend to remain. It is the somewhat weary feeling of an old European. More precisely, of someone who, not

quite European by birth, since I come from the southern coast of the Mediterranean, considers himself, and more and more so with age, to be a sort of over-acculturated, over-colonized European hybrid. (The Latin words *culture* and *colonialization* have a common root, there where it is precisely a question of what happens to roots.) In short, it is, perhaps, the feeling of someone who, as early as grade school in French Algeria, must have tried to capitalize, and capitalize upon, the old age of Europe, while at the same time keeping a little of the indifferent and impassive youth of the other shore. Keeping, in truth, all the marks of an ingenuity still incapable of this other old age from which French culture had, from very early on, separated him.

Out of this feeling of an old, anachronistic European, youthful and tired of his very age, I will make the *first axiom* of this little talk. And I will say "we" in place of "I," another way of moving surreptitiously from the feeling to the axiom.

We are younger than ever, we Europeans, since a certain Europe does not yet exist. Has

it ever existed? And yet we are like these young people who get up, at dawn, already old and tired. We are already exhausted. This *axiom of finitude* is a swarm or storm of questions. From what state of exhaustion must these young old-Europeans who we are set out again, re-embark [*re-partir*]? Must they re-begin? Or must they *depart* from Europe, separate themselves from an old Europe? Or else depart again, set out toward a Europe that does not yet exist? Or else re-embark in order to return to a Europe of origins that would then need to be restored, rediscovered, or reconstituted, during a great celebration of "reunion" [*retrouvailles*]?

"Reunion" is today an official word. It belongs to the code of French cultural politics in Europe. Ministerial speeches and documents make great use of it; they help explain a remark of François Mitterrand, the President of the Republic, who said (perhaps while also presiding over the European Community) that Europe "is returning in its history and its geography like one who is returning home" [*chez soi*]. What does this

mean? Is it possible? Desirable? Is it really this that announces itself *today*?

I will not even try, not yet, to answer or respond to these questions. But I will venture a *second axiom.* I believe it to be preliminary to the very possibility of giving a meaning to such assertions (for example, that of a "reunion") and such questions. In spite of the inclination and conviction that should lead me to analyze genealogically the concepts of identity or culture—like the proper name of Europe—I must give this up, since the time and place do not lend themselves to it. I must nonetheless formulate in a somewhat dogmatic way, and this is my second axiom, a very dry necessity whose consequences could affect our entire problematic: *what is proper to a culture is to not be identical to itself.* Not to not have an identity, but not to be able to identify itself, to be able to say "me" or "we"; to be able to take the form of a subject only in the non-identity to itself or, if you prefer, only in the difference *with itself* [*avec soi*]. There is no culture or cultural identity without this difference *with it-*

self. A strange and slightly violent syntax: "with itself" [*avec soi*] also means "at home (with itself)" [*chez soi*] (with, *avec,* is *"chez," apud hoc*). In this case, self-difference, difference to itself [*différence à soi*], that which differs and diverges from itself, of itself, would also be the *difference (from) with itself* [*différence (d') avec soi*], a difference at once internal and irreducible to the "at home (with itself)" [*chez soi*]. It would gather and divide just as irreducibly the center or hearth [*foyer*] of the "at home (with itself)." In truth, it would gather this center, relating it to itself, only to the extent that it would open it up to this divergence.

This can be said, inversely or reciprocally, of all identity or all identification: there is no self-relation, no relation to oneself, no identification with oneself, without culture, but a culture of oneself *as* a culture *of* the other, a culture of the double genitive and of the *difference to oneself.* The grammar of the double genitive also signals that a culture never has a single origin. Monogenealogy would al-

ways be a mystification in the history of culture.

Will the Europe of yesterday, of tomorrow, and of today have been merely an example of this law? One example among others? Or will it have been the exemplary possibility of this law? Is one more faithful to the heritage of a culture by cultivating the difference-to-oneself (*with oneself*) that constitutes identity or by confining oneself to an identity wherein this difference remains *gathered*? This question can have the most disquieting effects on all discourses and politics of cultural identity.

In his "Notes on the Greatness and Decline of Europe," Valéry seems to provoke a familiar interlocutor, one at once close and still unknown. In a sort of apostrophe, like the first pitch of a question that would no longer leave him in peace, Valéry tosses out to his interlocutor the word "today." "TODAY," the word is written in *capital* letters; today heightened like the challenge itself. The great challenge, the capital challenge, is

the day of *today,* the day of this day and age: "Well! What are you going to do? What are you going to do TODAY?"*

Why would the *day of today,* the day of this day and age, deserve capital letters? Because what we find difficult to do and think today, for Europe, for a Europe torn away from self-identification as repetition of itself, is precisely the unicity of the "today," a certain event, a singular advent of Europe, here and now. Is there a completely new "today" of Europe, a "today" whose novelty would not resemble—especially not—what was called by another well-known program, and one of the most sinister, a "New Europe"? We come across traps of this sort at every step, and they are not merely traps of language; they are part of the program. Is there then a completely new "today" of Europe beyond all the exhausted programs of *Eurocentrism* and *anti-*

*Paul Valéry, "Notes sur la grandeur et décadence de l'Europe," Vol. II of *Oeuvres Complètes* (Paris: Pléiade, 1960), p. 931 ["Notes on the Greatness and Decline of Europe," in *History and Politics,* trans. Denise Folliot and Jackson Mathews (New York: Bollingen, 1962), p. 228]. Quoted translations have been slightly modified.—Trans.

Eurocentrism, these exhausting yet unforgettable programs? (We cannot and must not forget them since they do not forget us.) Am I taking advantage of the "we" when I begin saying that, in knowing them now by heart, and to the point of exhaustion—since these unforgettable programs are exhausting and exhausted—we *today* no longer want either Eurocentrism or anti-Eurocentrism? Beyond these all too well-known programs, for what "cultural identity" must we be responsible? And responsible before whom? Before what memory? For what promise? And is "cultural identity" a good word for "today"?

A title is always a heading [*cap*]. A chapter heading, a headline, even a letterhead. By proposing the title "The Other Heading" for some brief, quasi-improvised reflections, I was thinking at first, while on board a plane, of the language of air or sea navigation. On the sea or in the air, a vessel has a "heading": it "heads off," toward another continent, perhaps, toward a destination that is its own but that it can also change. One says in my language "*faire cap*" but also "*changer de*

cap''—to ''have a heading'' but also to ''change headings.'' The word ''*cap*'' (*caput, capitis*) refers, as you well know, to the head or the extremity of the extreme, the aim and the end, the ultimate, the last, the final moment or last legs, the *eschaton* in general. It here assigns to navigation the pole, the end, the *telos* of an oriented, calculated, deliberate, voluntary, ordered movement: ordered most often by the *man* in charge. Not by a woman, for in general, and especially in wartime, it is a *man* who decides on the heading, from the advanced point that he himself is, the prow, at the head of the ship or plane that he pilots. Eschatology and teleology—that is man. It is *he* who gives orders to the crew, he who holds the helm or sits at the controls; he is the headman, there at the head of the crew and the machine. And oftentimes, he is called the *captain.*

The expression ''The Other Heading'' can also suggest that another direction is in the offing, or that it is necessary to change destinations. To change direction can mean to change goals, to decide on another heading,

or else to change captains, or even—why not?—the age or sex of the captain. Indeed it can mean to recall that there is another heading, the heading being not only ours [*le nôtre*] but the other [*l'autre*], not only that which we identify, calculate, and decide upon, but the *heading of the other,* before which we must respond, and which we must *remember, of which* we must *remind ourselves,* the heading of the other being perhaps the first condition of an identity or identification that is not an egocentrism destructive of oneself and the other.

But beyond *our heading,* it is necessary to recall ourselves not only to the *other heading,* and especially to the *heading of the other,* but also perhaps to the *other of the heading,* that is to say, to a relation of identity with the other that no longer obeys the form, the sign, or the logic of the heading, nor even of the *anti-heading*—of beheading, of decapitation. The true title* of these reflections, even though a

*A *vrai titre,* a true title, may be opposed to a *faux titre,* a false or bastard title. Cf. John Leavey's introduction to Derrida's *The Archeology of the Frivolous* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1980), pp. 14ff.—Trans.

title is a heading or headline, would orient us rather toward the other *of* the heading. By selection, I will deduce the form of all my propositions from a grammar and syntax of the heading, of the *cap,* from a difference in kind and gender [*genre*], that is, from *capital* and *capitale.** How can a "European cultural identity" respond, and in a responsible way—responsible for itself, for the other, and before the other—to the double question of *le capital,* of capital, and of *la capitale,* of the capital?

Europe today, in the *today* that Valéry writes in capital letters, is at a moment in its history (*if* it has one, and indeed is *one,* i.e., identifiable), in the history of its culture (if it can ever be identified as one, as the same, and can be responsible for itself, answer for itself, in a memory of itself) when the question of the heading seems unavoidable. Whatever the answer may be, the question

*Derrida plays throughout on the relationship between the feminine *la capitale,* the capital city of a country, and the masculine *le capital,* capital in the monetary sense.—Trans.

remains. I would even say that this is necessary: it should remain, even beyond all answers. No one today in fact thinks of avoiding such a question, and this, not only because of what has started, or rather has accelerated, these past few months in the east or at the center of Europe. This question is also very old, as old as the history of Europe, but the experience of the *other heading* or of the other *of* the heading presents itself in an absolutely new way, not new "as always" [*comme toujours*], but newly new. And what if Europe were this: the opening onto a history for which the changing of the heading, the relation to the other heading or to the other of the heading, is experienced as always possible? An opening and a non-exclusion for which Europe would in some way be responsible? For which Europe *would be,* in a constitutive way, this very responsibility? As if the very concept of responsibility were responsible, right up to its emancipation, for a European birth certificate?

Like every history, the history of a culture no doubt presupposes an identifiable head-

ing, a *telos* toward which the movement, the memory, the promise, and the identity, even if it be as difference to itself, dreams of gathering itself: *taking the initiative, being out ahead,* in *anticipation* (*anticipatio, anticipare, antecapere*). But history also presupposes that the heading not be *given,* that it not be identifiable in advance and once and for all. The irruption of the new, the unicity of the other *today* should be awaited *as such* (but is the *as such,* the phenomenon, the being *as such* of the unique and of the other, ever possible?); it should be anticipated *as* the unforeseeable, the *unanticipatable,* the non-masterable, non-identifiable, in short, as that of which one does not yet have a memory. But our old memory tells us that it is *also* necessary to anticipate and to keep the heading [*garder le cap*], for under the banner—which can also become a slogan—of the unanticipatable or the absolutely new, we can fear seeing return the phantom of the worst, the one we have already identified. We know the "new" only too well, or in any case the old rhetoric, the demagogy, the psychagogy of the "new"—

and sometimes of the "new order"—of the surprising, the virginal, and the unanticipatable. We must thus be suspicious of *both* repetitive memory *and* the completely other of the absolutely new; of *both* anamnestic capitalization *and* the amnesic exposure to what would no longer be identifiable at all.

A moment ago, I alluded to the tremor that is shaking what are called Central and Eastern Europe under the very problematic names *perestroika, democratization, reunification,* entry into the *market economy,* access to political and economic liberalisms. This earthquake, which by definition knows no borders, is no doubt the immediate cause of the subject chosen for this debate on "European cultural identity." I wanted to recall what has *always* identified Europe with a cape or headland [*cap*]. Always, since day one [*depuis toujours*], and this "day one" says something about all the days of today in the memory of Europe, in the memory of itself as the culture of Europe. In its physical geography, and in what has often been called, by Husserl for example, its *spiritual geography,*

Europe has always recognized itself as a cape or headland, *either* as the advanced extreme of a continent, to the west and south (the land's end, the advanced point of a Finistère,* Europe of the Atlantic or of the Greco-Latino-Iberian shores of the Mediterranean), the point of departure for discovery, invention, and colonization, *or* as the very center of this tongue in the form of a cape, the Europe of the middle, coiled up, indeed compressed along a Greco-Germanic axis, at the very center of the center of the cape.

That is in fact how Valéry *described and defined* Europe: as a cape, a headland; and, if this *description* had the form of a *definition,* it was because the concept corresponded to the border. It is the whole history of this geography. Valéry observes, looks at and *envisages* Europe; he sees in it a face [*visage*], a *persona,* and he thinks of it as a leader [*chef*], that is, as a head [*cap*]. This head also has eyes, it is

*Finistère is a region of Brittany on the westernmost coast of France, though Derrida is also drawing attention to the more general notion of a *finis terrae* or "land's end."—Trans.

turned to one side, and it scans the horizon, keeping watch in a determined direction:

> *Out of all these achievements, most, and the most astonishing and fruitful, have been the work of a tiny portion of humanity, living in a very small area compared to the whole of the habitable lands.*
>
> This privileged place was Europe; and the European man, the European spirit, was the author of these wonders.
>
> What, then, is Europe? It is a kind of cape of the old continent, a western appendix to Asia. It looks naturally toward the west. On the south it is bordered by a famous sea whose role, or I should say function, has been wonderfully effective in the development of that European spirit with which we are concerned.[1]

A cape, a little geographical promontory, an "appendix" to the body and to the "Asian continent," such *is* in Valéry's eyes the very essence of Europe, its *real being.* And in the at once provocative and classic paradox of this grammar, the first question of being and time *will have been* teleological, or rather counter-teleological: if such *is* its *essence,* will Europe

one day become what it is (not such a big deal after all, a little cape or appendix) or will it persist in what is not its essence but its *appearance,* that is, under the cap, the "brain"? And the true *telos,* the best, would here be on the side not of essence but of appearance. Valéry likes to say, in fact, and as if in passing, that this is the "capital" question.

> Now, the present day brings with it this capital question: Can Europe maintain its preeminence in all fields?
>
> Will Europe become *what it is in reality*—that is, a little promontory [*cap*] on the Asian continent?
>
> Or will it remain *what it seems*—that is, the elect portion of the terrestrial globe, the pearl of the sphere, the brain of a vast body?[2]

I interrupt for a moment my recapitulation of all these chapter headings [*caps*] or heads, in order to note that present here at this table are mostly *men* and citizens of Western Europe, writers or philosophers according to the classic model of the European intellec-

tual: a guardian held responsible for memory and culture, a citizen entrusted with a sort of spiritual mission of Europe. There are no English here—even though the Anglo-American language is today the second universal language destined to overtake or dub all the idioms of the world; and this is one of the essential problems of culture today, of European culture in particular, of which Anglo-American both is and is not a language. (When a French intellectual goes to Moscow—and I've had this experience so common to all of us—Anglo-American remains the mediating language, as it is here at this table for two of us, Agnès Heller and Vladimir Bukovsky, who in fact come from neither Hungary nor the U.S.S.R. but from major Anglo-Saxon universities.) We are thus here in a large majority male representatives of the continental point or tip of the European headland, in what is called the European Community, which is predominantly Mediterranean. An accident or a necessity, these traits are at once discriminant and significant. They appear at least emblematic, and what I

hesitate to advance here under the title of "heading," of the *other* heading and of the other *of the heading,* would come to be inscribed, at least obliquely, under this sign.

Europe is not only a geographical headland or heading that has always given itself the representation or figure of a spiritual heading, at once as project, task, or infinite—that is to say universal—idea, as the memory of itself that gathers and accumulates itself, capitalizes upon itself, in and for itself. Europe has also confused its image, its face, its figure and its very place, its taking-place, with that of an advanced point, the point of a phallus if you will, and thus, once again, with a heading for world civilization or human culture in general. The idea of an advanced point of *exemplarity* is the *idea of the* European *idea,* its *eidos,* at once as *arché*—the idea of beginning but also of commanding (the *cap* as the head, the place of capitalizing memory and of decision, once again, the captain)—and as *telos,* the idea of the end, of a limit that accomplishes, or that puts an end to the whole point of the achievement, right

there at the point of completion. The advanced point is at once beginning and end, it is divided as beginning and end; it is the place from which or in view of which everything takes place. (When Heidegger defines place, *Ort,* he recalls that in its High or Old German idiom, *Ort* refers to the point of a spear, there where all the forces are joined and gathered in the end; and when he says that questioning is the piety of thinking, he recalls that *fromm, Frömmigkeit,* comes from *promos:* what comes first, *leads,* or directs the front line [*l'avant-garde*] in a battle.[3])

It is always in the figure of the *Western* heading and of the *final* headland or point that Europe determines and cultivates itself; it is in this figure that Europe identifies itself, identifies with itself, and thus identifies its own cultural identity, in the being-for-itself of what is most proper to it, in its own difference as difference with itself, difference to itself that remains with itself, close to itself. Yes, difference *with itself, with the self* that is maintained and gathered in its own difference, in its difference *from-with* [*d'avec*] the

others, if one can say this, as difference to itself, different *from itself* for itself, in the temptation, risk, or chance of keeping at home (with itself) [*chez soi*] the turbulence of the *with*, of calming it down in order to make it into a simple, interior border—well guarded by the vigilant sentinels of being.

I should myself interrupt these recollections and change headings. We all know this program of Europe's self-reflection or self-presentation. We are old, I say it again. Old Europe seems to have exhausted all the possibilities of discourse and counter-discourse about its own identification. Dialectic in all its essential forms, including those that comprehend and entail anti-dialectic, has always been in the service of this autobiography of Europe, even when it took on the appearance of a confession. For avowal, guilt, and self-accusation no more escape this old program than does the celebration of self. Perhaps identification in general, the formation and affirmation of an identity, self-presentation, the self-presence of identity (whether it be national or not, cultural or not—even

though identification is itself always cultural and never natural, for it is nature's way out of itself in itself, nature's difference *with itself*), always has a capital form, the figurehead [*figure de proue*] of the advanced point, and of capitalizing reserve.* It is thus not only for lack of time that I will spare you the development of a counter-program opposed to this archeo-teleological program of all European discourse about Europe. I note only that from Hegel to Valéry, from Husserl to Heidegger, in spite of all the differences that distinguish these great examples from each other—I tried to mark them elsewhere, in *Of Spirit* for example—this *traditional* discourse is *already* a discourse of the *modern* Western world. It dates, it is dated. It is the most current, nothing is more current, but already it dates back. And this currentness reveals a familiarly disquieting wrinkle, discrete but merciless, the very stigmata of an anachrony

Prou in Old French means much or many, even too much or too many. It is related to prowess and profit.—Trans.

that marks the day of all our days, of all our gestures, discourses, and affects, both public and private. It dates from a moment when Europe sees itself *on the horizon,* that is to say, from its end (the *horizon,* in Greek, is the limit), from the imminence of its end. This old discourse about Europe, a discourse at once exemplary and exemplarist, is already a *traditional discourse of modernity.* It is also the discourse of anamnesis because of this refined taste for finality,* for the end, if not for death.

Now, we must ourselves be responsible for this discourse of the modern tradition. We bear the responsibility for this heritage, right along with the capitalizing memory that we have of it. We did not choose this responsibility; it imposes itself upon us, and in an even more imperative way, in that it is, as other, and from the other, the language of our language. How then does one assume this responsibility, this capital duty [*devoir*]?

**Goût de fin,* taste for the end, is a play on *fin goût*—fine or refined taste.—Trans.

How does one respond? And above all, how does one assume a responsibility that announces itself as contradictory because it inscribes us from the very beginning of the game into a kind of necessarily double obligation, a *double bind*? The injunction in effect divides us; it puts us always at fault or in default since it doubles the *il faut,* the *it is necessary:* it is necessary to make ourselves the guardians of an idea of Europe, of a difference of Europe, *but* of a Europe that consists precisely in not closing itself off in its own identity and in advancing itself in an exemplary way toward what it is not, toward the other heading or the heading of the other, indeed—and this is perhaps something else altogether—toward the other *of* the heading, which would be the beyond of this modern tradition, another border structure, another shore.

To be faithfully responsible *for* this memory, and thus to respond rigorously to this double injunction: will this have to consist in repeating or in breaking with, in continuing or in opposing? Or indeed in attempting to

invent another gesture, an epic *gesture** in truth, that presupposes memory precisely in order to assign identity from alterity, from the other heading and the other of the heading, from a completely other shore?

This last hypothesis, the one toward which I will prefer to orient myself, is not only a hypothesis or a call, a call toward that which is given at the same time as contradictory or impossible. No, I believe that *this is taking place now.* (But it is also necessary, for this, to begin to think that this "now" would be neither present, nor current, nor the present of some current event.) Not that it arrives, that it happens or has already happened, not that it is already *presently* given. I believe, rather, that this event takes place as that which comes, as that which seeks or promises itself *today,* in Europe, the today of a Europe whose borders are not given—no more than its name, Europe being

*A play on *un geste,* a gesture, and *une geste,* a collection of epic poems—as in the *chanson de geste.* "Epic gesture" is thus a somewhat elliptical rendering of *une longue geste.*—Trans.

here only a *paleonymic* appellation. I believe that if there is any event today, it is taking place here, in this act of memory that consists in betraying a certain order of capital in order to be faithful to the other heading and to the other of the heading. And this is happening at a moment for which the word *crisis,* the crisis of Europe or the crisis of spirit, is perhaps no longer appropriate.

The coming to awareness, the reflection by which, in regaining consciousness, one again finds one's "direction" [*sens:* meaning] (*Selbstbesinnung*),* this recovery of European cultural identity as *capital* discourse, this moment of awakening, of sounding the alarm, has always been deployed in the tradition of modernity at the moment and as the very moment of what was called *crisis.* This is the moment of decision, the moment of *krinein,* the dramatic instant of a decision that is still impossible and suspended, imminent and

*Literally "self-contemplation," *Selbstbesinnung* is a common term in Protestant religious texts and in German Idealism.—Trans.

threatening. The crisis of Europe as the crisis of spirit: they all say this at the moment when the limits and contours, the *eidos,* the ends and confines, the finitude of Europe, are beginning to emerge; that is to say, when the capital of infinity and universality, which is to be found in reserve within the idiom of these limits, finds itself encroached upon or in danger.

We will later ask ourselves what this threat consists of *today.* This critical moment can take several forms, all of which, in spite of their sometimes serious differences, specify a fundamentally analogous "logic." There was, for example, the form of the Hegelian moment wherein European discourse coincided with spirit's return to itself in Absolute Knowledge, at this "end-of-history" that today can give rise to the prating eloquence of a White House advisor [this was, let me recall, before what is known as the Gulf War: is the Gulf the Headland or the Heading, or is it the negative or the other of the Heading?] when he announces with great media fanfare "the end-of-history." This, if one were to be-

lieve him, because the essentially European model of the market economy, of liberal, parliamentary, and capitalist democracies, would be about to become a universally recognized model, all the nation states of the planet preparing themselves to join us at the head of the pack, right at the forefront [*cap*], at the capital point [*pointe*] of advanced democracies, there where capital is on the cutting edge of progress [*à la pointe du progrès*].

There was also the Husserlian form of the "crisis of European sciences" or the "crisis of European humanity": the teleology that guides the analysis of history and the very history of this crisis, of the recovery of the transcendental theme in and since Descartes, is guided by the idea of a transcendental community, the subjectivity of a "we" for which Europe would be at once the name and the exemplary figure. This transcendental teleology would have, from the origin of philosophy, shown the way, indicated the heading.

There was at the same time, and what a time, in 1935–1936, the Heideggerian discourse, which deplored the *Entmachtung*

of spirit. The impotence, the becoming-impotent of spirit, that which violently deprives spirit of its potency, is nothing other than the destitution (*Entmachtung*) of the European West.* Even though he is opposed to transcendental sub-objectivism, or to the Cartesian-Husserlian tradition as its symptom, Heidegger nevertheless calls for thinking the essential danger as the danger *of spirit,* and spirit as something of the European West, there at the oppressed center of a vice, in the *Mitte* of Europe, between America and Russia.[4]

At the same time, I mean between the two world wars, from 1919–1939, Valéry defines *the crisis of spirit* as the crisis of Europe, of European identity, and more precisely of European culture. Having chosen for today the configured direction of the heading and of capital, I will pause for a while in the vicinity of Valéry, and for several reasons, all of

*On the translation of *Entmachtung* as destitution, cf. Derrida's *Of Spirit,* trans. Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), pp. 59ff.—Trans.

which touch upon the capital point [*la pointe*], upon the point [*le point*] of capital.*

Valéry is a Mediterranean spirit. When speaking of the Mediterranean lake, what are we naming? Like all the names we are invoking, like all names in general, these designate at once a limit, a negative limit, and a chance. For perhaps responsibility consists in making of the name recalled, of the memory of the name, of the idiomatic limit, a chance, that is, an opening of identity to its very future. All Valéry's works are those of a European from the Greco-Roman Mediterranean world, close to Italy in his birth and his death: I emphasize this no doubt because we are here, today, in Turin, in a Latin place of the northern Mediterranean. But this Mediterranean shore also interests me—coming as I do from the other shore if not from the other heading (from a shore that is principally neither French, nor European, nor

*The feminine *la pointe* refers, among other things, to a head, end, tip, point, or headland, while the masculine *le point* refers to a place, position, or mark.—Trans.

Latin, nor Christian)—because of this word "capital," which slowly leads me toward the most hesitant, trembling, and divided point of my remarks, a point at once undecidable and decided.

This word "capital" capitalizes in effect, in the body of the idiom, and, if I may say this, in the same body, two genres of questions. More precisely: *a question in two genres, with two genders* [*à deux genres*].

1. It comes down first *to the feminine, in the feminine:* the question of *la capitale.* We are far from being able to avoid it today. Are there grounds for this, is there from now on *a place* for a capital of European culture? Can one project a center, at least a symbolic center, at the heart of this Europe that has considered itself for so long to be the capital of humanity or of the planet and that would renounce this role today, some believe, only at the moment when the fable of a planetarization of the European model still seems quite plausible? In this form, the question may seem crude and outdated. Surely, there will be no official capital of European culture. No one is consider-

ing this and no one would accept it. But the ineluctable question of the capital does not disappear for all that. It now signals toward struggles over cultural hegemony. Through the established and traditionally dominant powers of certain idioms, of certain culture industries, through the extraordinary growth of new media, newspapers, and publishers, through the university and through techno-scientific powers, through new "capillarities," competitions—sometimes silent but always fierce—have broken out. This now happens according to new modes, in a fast-changing situation where the centralizing pulsions do not always go through states. (For it can even happen, and one can cautiously hope for this, that in certain cases the old state structures help us to fight against private and transnational empires.) Let us think about the novelty of these modes of cultural domination as if they themselves were those geographico-political domains that have become the objects of everyone's desire since *perestroika,* the destruction of the Berlin Wall, all the movements of "democra-

tization," and all the more or less potential currents that run through Europe: it is then that we witness the resurgence of the question of the capital, that is, the question of hegemonic centrality. The fact that this center can no longer be fixed in the traditional form of the metropolis no doubt obliges us to acknowledge what is happening today to the city. But this does not do away with all reference to capitals. Quite the contrary. The reference must be translated and displaced within a problematic that is profoundly transformed by techno-scientific and techno-economic givens. These givens also affect, among other things, the production, transmission, structure, and effects of the very discourses in which one tries to formalize this problematic, just as they affect the figure of those who produce or publicly hold these discourses—namely, ourselves, or those who in the past were so easily called "intellectuals."

First tension, first contradiction, double injunction: *on the one hand,* European cultural identity cannot be dispersed (and when I say "cannot," this should also be taken as "must

not''—and this double state of affairs is at the heart of the difficulty). It cannot and must not be dispersed into a myriad of provinces, into a multiplicity of self-enclosed idioms or petty little nationalisms, each one jealous and untranslatable. It cannot and must not renounce places of great circulation or heavy traffic, the great avenues or thoroughfares of translation and communication, and thus, of mediatization. But, *on the other hand,* it cannot and must not accept the capital of a centralizing authority that, by means of trans-European cultural mechanisms, by means of publishing, journalistic, and academic concentrations—be they state-run or not—would control and standardize, subjecting artistic discourses and practices to a grid of intelligibility, to philosophical or aesthetic norms, to channels of immediate and efficient communication, to the pursuit of ratings and commercial profitability. For by reconstituting places of an easy consensus, places of a demagogical and ''salable'' consensus, through mobile, omnipresent, and extremely rapid media networks, by thus immediately crossing every border, such

normalization would establish a cultural capital at any place and at all times. It would establish a hegemonic center, the power center or power station [*la centrale*], the media center or central switchboard [*le central*] of the new *imperium: remote control* as one says in English for the TV, a ubiquitous tele-command, quasi-immediate and absolute. One no longer needs to link the cultural capital to a metropolis, to a site or geographico-political city. Yet the question of the capital remains completely intact, and indeed even more intrusive in that its "politics"—which perhaps no longer constitute anything deserving this name—are no longer linked to the *polis* (city, town, acropolis, neighborhood), to the traditional concept of *politeia* or *res publica.* We are perhaps moving into a zone or topology that will be called neither political nor apolitical but, to make cautious use of an old word for new concepts, "quasi-political." This is a quasi-quotation from Valéry—once again—who gave as a general title for a series of texts devoted to the crisis of spirit as the crisis of Europe: "Quasi-Political Essays."

Neither monopoly nor dispersion, therefore. This is, of course, an aporia, and we must not hide it from ourselves. I will even venture to say that ethics, politics, and responsibility, *if there are any,* will only ever have begun with the experience and experiment of the aporia. When the path is clear and given, when a certain knowledge opens up the way in advance, the decision is already made, it might as well be said that there is none to make: irresponsibly, and in good conscience, one simply applies or implements a program. Perhaps, and this would be the objection, one never escapes the program. In that case, one must acknowledge this and stop talking with authority about moral or political responsibility. The condition of possibility of this thing called responsibility is a certain *experience and experiment of the possibility of the impossible: the testing of the aporia* from which one may invent the only *possible invention, the impossible invention.*[5]

The aporia here takes the logical form of a contradiction. A contradiction that is all the more serious in that, if these movements of

"democratization" have accelerated, it is to a large extent thanks to this new techno-media power, to this penetrating, rapid, and irresistible circulation of images, ideas, and models, thanks to this extreme *capillarity* of discourses. Capillarity: one need not split hairs to recognize in this word all the lines that interest us at this moment, at this point [*point*], at the point or end [*pointe*] where their fineness becomes microscopic; *cabled, targeted* [*cablée, ciblée*], as close as possible to the head and to the headman [*chef*], that is circulation, communication, an almost immediate irrigation. Such capillarity crosses not only national borders. For we know that a totalitarian system can no longer effectively fight against an internal telephone network once its density has exceeded a certain threshold, thereby becoming uncontrollable. Indeed, no "modern" society (and modernity is an imperative for totalitarianism) can refuse for very long to develop the technico-economico-scientific services of the telephone—which is to say, the "democratic" places of connection appropriate to operating its own destruction. The tele-

phone thus becomes, for totalitarianism, the invisible prefiguration and the imperious prescription of its own ruin. For the telephone no longer leaves in place the limit between public and private, assuming that such a limit was ever rigorous. The telephone inaugurates the formation of a *public opinion* there where the usual conditions of "publicity"*—the "written" or "spoken" press, publishing in all its forms—are denied access to it. In short, telephone lines—and soon the videophone—are inseparable from the great channels of communication, from television or teleprinters. And if it is in the name of free and open discussion with a view to consensus, in the name of traditional democracy, that these avenues of media are opened up, it would be out of the question to fight against them. It would be anti-democratic to break up, marginalize, shut off, deny access, and disconnect.

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*Derrida puts the word *publicité* in quotation marks because it means both "publicness" and, more commonly, publicity or advertising.—Trans.

Yet here as elsewhere, the injunction seems double and contradictory for whoever is concerned about European cultural identity: if it is necessary to make sure that a centralizing hegemony (the capital) not be reconstituted, it is also necessary, for all that, not to multiply the borders, i.e., the movements [*marches*] and margins [*marges*]. It is necessary not to cultivate for their own sake minority differences, untranslatable idiolects, national antagonisms, or the chauvinisms of idiom. Responsibility seems to consist today in renouncing neither of these two contradictory imperatives. One must therefore try to *invent* gestures, discourses, politico-institutional practices that inscribe the alliance of these two imperatives, of these two promises or contracts: the capital and the a-capital, the other of the capital. That is not easy. It is even impossible to conceive of a responsibility that consists in being responsible *for* two laws, or that consists in responding *to* two contradictory injunctions. No doubt. But there is no responsibility that is not the experience and experiment of the im-

possible. As we said just a moment ago, when a responsibility is exercised in the order of the possible, it simply follows a direction and elaborates a program. It makes of action the applied consequence, the simple application of a knowledge or know-how. It makes of ethics and politics a technology. No longer of the order of practical reason or decision, it begins to be irresponsible. Taking a few shortcuts, economizing on mediations, it would seem that European cultural identity, like identity or identification in general, if it must be equal *to itself and to the other,* up to the measure of its own immeasurable difference "with itself," belongs, therefore *must* belong, to this *experience and experiment of the impossible.* Nevertheless, one will always be able *de jure* to ask what an ethics or a politics that measures responsibility only by the rule of the impossible can be: as if doing only what were possible amounted to abandoning the ethical and political realms, or as if, inversely, in order to take an authentic responsibility it were necessary to limit oneself to impossible, impractical, and inapplicable

decisions. If the two terms of such an alternative translate at once an unsolvable contradiction and an unequivocal seriousness, the aporia is reflected or capitalized *in abyss* and requires more than ever thinking differently, or thinking at last, what is announced here in the enigmatic form of the "possible" (of the possibility—itself impossible—of the impossible, etc.).

It is in this direction (if one could still say and identify it) that we asked in what new terms, and according to what other topology, the question of the *place* for a capital of European culture would be asked today, the question of at least a symbolic place: a place that would be neither strictly political (linked to the establishing of some state or parliamentary institution), nor the center of economic or administrative decision making, nor a city chosen for its geographical location, for the size of its airport or for a hotel infrastructure large enough to meet the demands of a European Parliament (this is the well-known competition between Brussels and Strasbourg). Whether directly or not, the hypothesis of

this capital always concerns language, not only the predominance of a national language, tongue, or idiom, but the predominance of a *concept* of the tongue or of language, a certain idea of the idiom that is being put to work.

Refraining from giving any examples, let us emphasize for the moment a generality: in this struggle for control over culture, in this strategy that tries to organize cultural identity around a capital that is all the more powerful for being mobile, that is, European in a hyper- or supra-national sense, national hegemony is not claimed—today no more than ever—in the name of an empirical superiority, which is to say, a simple particularity. That is why nationalism, national affirmation, as an essentially modern phenomenon, is always a philosopheme. National hegemony *presents itself,* claims itself. It claims to justify itself in the name of a privilege in responsibility and in the memory of the universal and, thus, of the transnational—indeed of the trans-European—and, finally, of the transcendental or ontological. The logical

schema of this argument, the backbone of this national self-affirmation, the nuclear statement of the national "ego" or "subject," is, to put it quite dryly: "I am (we are) all the more national for being European, all the more European for being trans-European and international; no one is more cosmopolitan and authentically universal than the one, than this 'we,' who is speaking to you." Nationalism and cosmopolitanism have always gotten along well together, as paradoxical as this may seem. Since the time of Fichte, numerous examples might attest to this. In the logic of this "capitalistic" and cosmopolitical discourse, what is proper to a particular nation or idiom would be to be a heading for Europe; and what is proper to Europe would be, analogically, to advance itself as a heading for the universal essence of humanity. *To advance itself,* that is the word, for it capitalizes most of the figures we have been observing here. To advance oneself is, certainly, to *present oneself,* to introduce or show oneself, thus to identify and name oneself. To advance oneself is also to rush out ahead, looking in

front of oneself ("Europe looks naturally toward the West"), to anticipate, to go on ahead, to launch oneself onto the sea or into adventure, to take the lead in taking the initiative, and sometimes even to go on the offensive. To advance (oneself) is also to take risks, to stick one's neck out, sometimes to overestimate one's strengths, to make hypotheses, to sniff things out precisely there where one no longer sees (the nose, the peninsula, Cape Cyrano). Europe takes itself to be a promontory, an advance—the avant-garde of geography and history. It advances and promotes itself as an advance, and it will have never ceased to make advances on the other: to induce, seduce, produce, and conduce, to spread out, to cultivate, to love or to violate, to love to violate, to colonize, and to colonize itself.

Since I am speaking French, and so as not to trigger any inter-national *polemos,* I will cite the language most common to *all* the majorities of the French Republic. Without exception, they claim for France, which is to say, of course, for Paris,[6] for the capital of all

revolutions and for the Paris of today, the role of the avant-garde, for example, in the idea of democratic culture, that is, quite simply, of free culture itself, which is founded on an idea of human rights [*droits*], on an idea of international law [*droit*]. No matter what the English say today, France would have invented these human rights, among which is the "*freedom of thought,*" which means "in common usage," and I am again citing Valéry, "*freedom to publish,* or else *freedom to teach.*"[7]

I am here referring, for example, to a certain official document coming out of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (the State Secretary of International Cultural Relations). This sophisticated text defines in a competent and convincing way what is called the "European cultural construction." To do this, it first puts in exergue a sentence from the "Congress on European Cultural Space" (Stuttgart, June 18, 1988), which associates the themes of conquest, imposition, and spirit [*esprit*]. ("*Esprit*" is, moreover, next to "*Brite*" and "Race" [the English word that also means "contest"

or "competition"], the proper name for one of the European Community's programs for technological development.) "There is no political ambition that is not preceded by a *conquest of spirit(s):** it is the task of *culture* to *impose* the feeling of unity, of European solidarity" (my emphasis). The opposite page underscores "the determining role" that France plays in the "collective coming to awareness." This same document cites in its exergue a communiqué of the French Cabinet, which states that "French culture" acts "by teaching others to look to France as a creative country that is helping to build modernity." More precisely, it states (and I emphasize here the language of *response, responsibility,* and *today*), that "[France, French culture] is *responsible* for *today,* and this is what is expected of her." French cultural identity would thus be *responsible* for the European *today* and, thus, as always, for the

*For the sake of consistency and in light of Derrida's own comments in *Of Spirit,* we have translated *esprit* as spirit throughout, even though it might, as here, have been more naturally translated as "mind."—Trans.

trans-European, over-European [*outre-Européen*] *today*. It would be responsible for the universe: and for human rights and international law—which logically presupposes that it is the first to denounce divergences between the principle of these rights (whose reaffirmation must be and can only be unconditional) and the concrete conditions of their implementation, the determined limits of their representation, the abuses of or inequalities in their application as a result of certain interests, monopolies, or existing hegemonies. The task is always at once urgent and infinite. One cannot but be *unequal* to it, but there are many ways to determine, interpret, or "govern" this *inadequation:* that is what politics is all about, and always about, *today*. And France assigns herself this *exemplary* task according to the principle of the discourse that we just cited ("[France] is responsible for today, and this is what is expected of her"). Identity would thus be instituted in responsibility, which is to say—and we will come back to this—in a certain experience and experiment of the response

that here bears the whole enigma. What is it "to respond"? To respond to? To be responsible for? To respond for? To respond, be responsible, before?

The same text also recalls that France must "conserve its avant-garde position." "Avant-garde": the word is always so "attractive," whether or not it be extracted from its strategico-military code (*promos*) as projectile or missile. This word capitalizes upon the figurehead, the figure of prowess, the figure on or of the prow, of the phallic point advanced like a beak, like a quill, or like the nib of a pen—the shape of the headland or the cape, therefore, *and* of the *guard* or of memory. It adds the value of a proposed or advanced initiative to that of recollection: the responsibility of the guardian, the vocation of a remembrance that takes it upon itself to take the initiative, especially when it is in advance a matter of guarding, of anticipating in order to "conserve," as the official text says, an "avant-garde position," and thus of conserving itself as the avant-garde that advances in order to conserve what is its due, namely,

venturing forth in order to conserve what is once again its due, namely, an "avant-garde position"—of course.

This is state talk, but vigilance must be exercised not only in regard to state discourses. The best intentioned of European projects, those that are quite apparently and explicitly pluralistic, democratic, and tolerant, may try, in this lovely competition for the "conquest of spirit(s)," to impose the homogeneity of a medium, of discursive norms and models.

This can happen, surely, through newspaper or magazine consortiums, through powerful European publishing enterprises. There is a multiplication of such projects today, and we can be happy about this, provided our attention does not lapse. For it is necessary that we learn to detect, in order then to resist, new forms of cultural takeover. This can also happen through a new university space, and especially through a philosophical discourse. Under the pretext of pleading for transparency (along with "consensus," "transparency" is one of the master words of the

"cultural" discourse I just mentioned), for the univocity of democratic discussion, for communication in public space, for "communicative action," such a discourse tends to impose a model of language that is supposedly favorable to this communication. Claiming to speak in the name of intelligibility, good sense, common sense, or the democratic ethic, this discourse tends, by means of these very things, and as if naturally, to discredit anything that complicates this model. It tends to suspect or repress anything that bends, overdetermines, or even questions, in theory or in practice, this idea of language. With this concern, among others, in mind, it would be necessary to study certain rhetorical norms that dominate analytic philosophy or what is called in Frankfurt "transcendental pragmatics." These models coincide with certain institutional powers that are not restricted to England and Germany. Under these or other names, they are present and powerful elsewhere, including France. It is a question here of a common space, common, as an implicit contract might be, to the press,

to the publishing industry, to the media, and to the university, to the philosophy of the university and to philosophy in the university.

2. That was the question of the heading [*cap*] as the question of *la capitale.* One can already see how it can be linked to a new question of *le capital,* to the question of what links capital to the theme of European identity. To say it all too quickly, I am thinking about the necessity for a new culture, one that would invent another way of reading and analyzing *Capital,* both Marx's book and capital in general; a new way of taking capital into account while avoiding not only the frightening totalitarian dogmatism that some of us have known how to resist up until now, *but also, and simultaneously,* the counter-dogmatism that is setting in today, (on the) left and (on the) right, exploiting a new situation, interrogating it to the point of banning the word "capital," indeed even the critique of certain effects of capital or of the "market" as the evil remnants of the old dogmatism. Is it not necessary to have the courage

and lucidity for a *new* critique of the *new* effects of capital (within unprecedented techno-social structures)? Is not this responsibility incumbent upon *us,* most particularly upon those who never gave in to a certain Marxist intimidation? Just as it is necessary to analyze and earnestly address—and this is the whole problem of ethico-political responsibility—the disparities between law, ethics, and politics, or between the unconditional idea of law (be it of men or of states) and the concrete conditions of its implementation, between the structurally universalist pretention of these regulative ideas and the essence or European origin of this idea of law (etc.), is it not also necessary to resist with vigilance the neo-capitalist exploitation of the breakdown of an anti-capitalist dogmatism in those states that had incorporated it?

For the moment, we must focus our attention on the word "capital," or more precisely on the tenor of its idiom, in order to justify the reference to Valéry. Like the vocable "cap," but also like the "culture" words, those from "*colo,*" as in "colony" and "colo-

nization," and like "civilization," etc., the word "capital" is a Latin word. The semantic accumulation that we are now highlighting organizes a polysemy around the central reserve, itself a capital reserve, of an idiom. By giving cause to remark upon this language, the language in which even this right here is being spoken, or at least predominantly so, we are focusing attention upon the critical stakes: the question of idioms and translation. What philosophy of translation will dominate in Europe? In a Europe that from now on should avoid both the nationalistic tensions of linguistic difference and the violent homogenization of languages through the neutrality of a translating medium that would claim to be transparent, metalinguistic, and universal?

I remember that last year, in this very place, a name was chosen for an important European newspaper. Through the diffusive presence of five already existing and influential newspapers, this new newspaper would link five capitals of European culture (Turin, *L'Indice;* Madrid, *El Pais;* Paris, *Le Monde;*

Frankfurt, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung;* and London, *Times Literary Supplement*).* There would be much to say about the necessity of so many analogous projects. Let us consider only the title chosen for this newspaper. It is a Latin title, and it was accepted by the English as well as the Germans. The newspaper is called *Liber* (*Revue européenne des livres*). Those in charge of the newspaper are quite attached—and they are entitled to be so—to this name's rich polysemy, since they recall its elliptical economy in each issue. This polysemy gathers the homonyms and derivations at play in the lexical roots of a rich Latin soil: "(1) *Liber, era, erum:* free (socially), of free birth, emancipated, independent, free (morally); absolute, unbridled, free from restraint. (2) *Liber, eri:* the name of Bacchus, wine. (3) *Liber, bri:* the inner bark of a tree used for writing; a book, writing, treatise, or play; a collection, catalogue, or newspaper."

*The reader will have noticed that the preface makes no mention of the *Times Literary Supplement.* They apparently decided in the end not to participate in the project.—Trans.

By playing so seriously, and with a calculated irony, at recalling the memory of the language at the very moment of reawakening this identity of European culture, by pretending to gather this memory around freedom, the grape vine, and the book, one renews an alliance and reaffirms *at the same time* a Europeo-Mediterranean idiom. If I added the untranslatable homophone *"libère,"* "liberate yourself, you and the others" [*libère-toi, toi et les autres*], namely, a command in the familiar form [*un ordre qui tutoie*],* a familiar imperative in the form of a jussive** speech act that is possible only in the idiom of "my" own language, you would be even more sensitive to the problem that I wish to raise. It concerns an irreducible experience of language, that which *links* it to the *liaison,* to commitment, to the command or to the promise: before and beyond all theoretico-constatives, opening, embracing, or including them,

*Derrida is referring to the familiar form of address—the "tu" of the second person singular.—Trans.

**A common term in speech act theory. From the Latin *jubeo*—to order or command.—Trans.

there is the affirmation of language, the "I am addressing you, and I commit myself, in this language here; listen how I speak in my language, me, and you can speak to me in your language; we must hear each other, we must get along" [*nous devons nous entendre*]. This affirmation defies all metalanguage, even if it produces, and precisely for this, by this even, the effects of metalanguage.

Why speak today, only today, and why name today the "today" in the margins of Valéry? If this could be rigorously justified, which I doubt, it would be because of that which, in a certain text of Valéry, bears the marks of an urgency, or, more properly, an *imminence.* It is an imminence whose repetition we seem to be living, but whose irreducible singularity we should now, in an even more imperative way, recover from against the backdrop of analogy and resemblance. In what does our experience of imminence differ *today*? And, to sketch out the analysis in advance, how, in Valéry's time, did an imminence come on the scene that so much *resembles* our own, to the point where we wrongly

and too precipitately borrow from it so many discursive schema?

The Freedom of Spirit appears in 1939, on the eve of the war. Valéry recalls the *imminence* of a tremor that was not only going to reduce to rubble—among other things—what was called Europe. It was also going to destroy Europe in the name of an idea of Europe, of a Young Europe that attempted to assure its hegemony. The "Western democratic" nations, in their turn, and in the name of another idea of Europe, prevented a certain European unification by destroying nazism, allied as they were for a limited but decisive time to the Soviet Union. In 1939, the imminence was not only a terrifying cultural configuration of Europe constructed through a succession of exclusions, annexations, and exterminations. It was also the imminence of a war and a victory in the wake of which a partitioning of European culture was going to be fixed for the time of a quasi-naturalization of borders, the time in which the intellectuals of my generation have lived most of their adult lives. With the destruction of the Berlin Wall

and the unification of Germany in sight, with a *perestroika* that is still uncertain, with all the diverse movements of "democratization," and with all the legitimate but sometimes ambiguous aspirations for national sovereignty, there is in *today's* day and age the reopening and denaturalization of these monstrous partitions. There is *today* the same feeling of imminence, of hope and of danger, of anxiety before the possibility of other wars with unknown forms, the return to old forms of religious fanaticism, nationalism, or racism. There is the greatest uncertainty concerning the borders of Europe itself, its geographico-political borders (in the center, to the east and to the west, to the north and to the south), its "spiritual" borders (around the idea of philosophy, reason, monotheism, Jewish, Greek, Christian [Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox], and Islamic memories, around Jerusalem, a Jerusalem itself divided, torn apart, around Athens, Rome, Moscow, Paris, and it is necessary to add, "etc.," and it is necessary to divide yet again each of these names with the most respectful persistence).

In *The Freedom of Spirit,* this text of imminence whose stakes are indeed the destiny of European culture, Valéry makes a determining appeal to the word *capital,* precisely in order to define culture—and the Mediterranean. He evokes navigation, exchange, this "same ship" that carried "merchandise and gods . . . ideas and methods."

> That is how all that wealth came into being, to which our culture owes practically everything, at least in its origins; I may say that the Mediterranean has been a veritable *machine for making civilization.* And in creating trade, it necessarily created *freedom of the spirit.* On the shores of the Mediterranean, then, *spirit, culture, and trade* are found together (II, p. 1086 [*History and Politics,* p. 196]).

After having extended the principle of this analysis to the cities along the Rhine (Basel, Strasbourg, Cologne), to the harbors of the Hanse, which are also "strategic positions of spirit," secured by the alliance of financial institutions, the arts, and the printing indus-

try, Valéry puts to work the regulated polysemy of the word "capital." This word compounds interests, it would seem; it enriches with surplus value the significations of memory, cultural accumulation, and economic or fiduciary value. Valéry assumes the rhetoric of these tropes, the different figures of capital referring to each other to the point where one cannot nail them down into the propriety of a literal meaning. But this nonliterality does not exclude hierarchy; it does not put the whole semantic series on the same level.[8]

What is the most interesting moment in this semantic or rhetorical capitalization of the values of "capital"? It is, it seems to me, when the *regional* or *particular* necessity of capital produces or calls for the always threatened production of the *universal.* European culture is in danger when this *ideal* universality, the very ideality of the universal as the production of capital, finds itself threatened:

> Culture, civilization are rather vague terms that it may be amusing to distinguish, con-

> trast, or combine. I shall not dwell on them. For myself, as I have told you, they are a kind of capital that grows and can be used and accumulated, can increase and diminish like all the imaginable kinds of capital—the best known of which is, of course, what we call *our body* . . . (II, p. 1089 [*History and Politics,* p. 200]; Valéry's emphasis).

"Like all the imaginable kinds of capital": this analogical series is recalled in order to justify the lexicon of capital and the rhetoric thereby induced. And if I in turn insist on "our body," already emphasized by Valéry as in the end the best-*known,* the most familiar, capital, the one that gives capital its most literal or most proper meaning, thus gathering itself, as we have already seen, as close as possible to the head or to the heading, it is in order to remark that the body—as in what is called the proper body [*corps propre*], "our body," our *sexed* body or our body divided by sexual difference—remains one of the unavoidable sites of the problem. Through it also runs the question of the tongue, of language, of the idiom, and of the heading.

Valéry's diagnosis is the examination of a crisis, of the crisis *par excellence,* if one can say this, the crisis that endangers capital as cultural capital. "I say that our cultural capital is in peril." Like a doctor, Valéry analyzes the symptom of the "fever." He locates the illness in the very structure of capital. For capital presupposes the reality of the thing, that is, material culture, of course, but also human existence. The Valéryian rhetoric is here at once cultural, economic, technical, scientific, and military—i.e., strategic:

> Of what is the capital we call *Culture or Civilization* composed? In the first place, it is composed of *things,* material objects—books, pictures, instruments, etc.—having the probable lifespan, the fragility, and the precariousness of *things.* But this is not enough—any more than an ingot of gold, an acre of good land, or a machine can be capital unless there are men *who need them* and *know how to use them.* Note these two conditions. If the material of culture is to become capital, there must also be men who need and know how to use it—that is, men

who have a thirst for knowledge and for the power of inner transformation, for the creations of their sensibility; and who, moreover, know how to acquire or exercise the habits, the intellectual discipline, the conventions and methods needed to exploit the arsenal of documents and instruments accumulated over the centuries.

I say that our cultural capital is in peril (II, pp. 1089–90, [*History and Politics,* pp. 200–201]).

The language of memory (putting into reserve, into the archive, documentation, accumulation) thus intersects the economic as well as the techno-scientific language of polemology ("knowledge," "instruments," "power," "arsenal," etc.). The peril or danger that lies in wait for capital essentially threatens the "ideality" of capital: our "ideal capital," says Valéry. Ideality stems from that which in capitalization de-limits itself, that which exceeds the borders of sensible empiricity or of particularity in general in order to open onto the infinite and give rise to the universal. The maxim of maximization,

which, as we have seen, is nothing other than spirit itself, assigns to European man his essence ("All these maxima taken together are Europe").

We are quite familiar with the program of this logic—or this *analogic.* We could formalize it, experts that we are in such things, we, the old European philosophers. It is a logic, logic itself, that I do not wish to criticize here. I would even be ready to subscribe to it, but with one hand only, for I keep another to write or look for something else, perhaps outside Europe. Not only in order to look—in the way of research, analysis, knowledge, and philosophy—for what is already found outside Europe, but not to close off in advance a border to the future, to the to-come [*à-venir*] of the *event,* to that which *comes* [*vient*], which comes perhaps and perhaps comes from a completely other shore.

According to the capital logic that we see confirmed here, what threatens European identity would not essentially threaten Europe but, in Spirit, the universality for which Europe is responsible, of which it is the re-

serve, *le capital* or *la capitale.* What puts cultural capital as *ideal capital* into a state of crisis ("I have witnessed the gradual dying out of men of the greatest value for their contribution to our ideal capital . . . ") is the disappearance of these men who "knew how to read—a virtue now lost," these men who "knew . . . how to hear, and even how to listen," who "knew how to see," "to read, hear, or see again"—in a word, these men also capable of repetition and memory, prepared to respond, to respond *before,* to be responsible *for* and to respond *to* what they had heard, seen, read, and known for the first time. Through this responsible memory, what was constituted as "solid value" (Valéry emphasizes these two words) produced at the same time an absolute surplus value, namely, the increase of a universal capital: " . . . whatever they wished to read, hear, or see again was, by recapitulation, turned into a *solid value.* And the world's wealth was thus increased" (II, p. 1091 [*History and Politics,* pp. 201–202]).

Having approved this discourse while

looking elsewhere, I would like to precipitate my conclusion; for precipitation is also that movement of the head [*chef*] that propels us headlong. It is indeed a question of this capital paradox of universality. In it intersect all the antinomies for which we seem to have at our disposal no rule or general solution. We *have,* we *must* have, only the thankless aridity of an abstract axiom, namely, that the experience and experiment of identity or of cultural identification can only be the endurance of these antinomies. When we say, "it seems that we do not have at our disposal any rule or general solution," *is it* not *necessary* in effect to infer or understand by this, "*it is necessary* [*il faut*] that we do not have them at our disposal"? Not only "it is indeed necessary" [*il faut bien*], but "it need be" [*il le faut*] absolutely, and this impoverished exposition is the negative form of the imperative in which a responsibility, *if there is any,* retains a chance of being affirmed. To have at one's disposal, already in advance, the generality of a rule [*règle*] as a solution to the antinomy (that is, to the *double contradic-*

tory law and not to the opposition between the law and its other), to have it at one's disposal as a given potency or science, as a *knowledge* and a *power* that would precede, in order to settle [*régler*] it, the singularity of each decision, each judgment, each experience of responsibility, to treat each of these as if they were a case—this would be the surest, the most reassuring definition of *responsibility as irresponsibility,* of ethics confused with juridical calculation, of a politics organized within techno-science. Any invention of the new that would not go through the endurance of the antinomy would be a dangerous mystification, immorality *plus* good conscience, and sometimes good conscience *as* immorality.

The value of universality here capitalizes all the antinomies, for it must be linked to the value of *exemplarity* that inscribes the universal in the proper body of a singularity, of an idiom or a culture, whether this singularity be individual, social, national, state, federal, confederal, or not. Whether it takes a national form or not, a refined, hospitable or

aggressively xenophobic form or not, the self-affirmation of an identity always claims to be responding to the call or assignation of the universal. There are no exceptions to this law. No cultural identity presents itself as the opaque body of an untranslatable idiom, but always, on the contrary, as the irreplaceable *inscription* of the universal in the singular, the *unique testimony* to the human essence and to what is proper to man. Each time, it has to do with the discourse of *responsibility:* I have, the unique "I" has, the responsibility of testifying for universality. Each time, the exemplarity of the example is unique. That is why it can be put into a series and formalized into a law. Among all the possible examples, I will cite, yet again, only Valéry's, since I find it just as typical or archetypical as any other. Moreover, it has here, for me who is speaking to you, the advantage of accentuating in French what is most "ridiculous" and "fine"—those are Valéry's words—about Gallocentrism. We are still in the theater of imminence. It is 1939. Evoking what he calls the "title" of France, which is again to say its

capital, since the value of a title is that of a head, a hat, a heading, a capstone, or a capital, Valéry concludes an essay entitled *French Thought and Art:*

> I will end by summarizing for you in two words my personal impression of France: our special quality (sometimes our ridicule, but often our finest claim or title) is to believe and to feel that we are universal—by which I mean, *men of universality*. . . . Notice the paradox: to specialize in the sense of the universal.[9]

One will have noted that what is described here is not a truth or an essence, even less a certainty: it is Valéry's "personal impression," stated as such by him, an impression regarding a *belief* and a *feeling* ("to believe and to feel that we are universal"). But these subjective phenomena (belief, feeling, an impression concerning them by someone who then says "we") would be no less constitutive of the essential or constitutive traits of French consciousness in its "particularity." This paradox is even stranger

than Valéry could or wanted to think: the feeling of being "men of universality" is not reserved for the French. Not even, no doubt, for Europeans. Husserl said that insofar as the European philosopher is committed to universal reason, he is also the "functionary of mankind."*

From this paradox of the paradox, through the propagation of a fission reaction, all the propositions and injunctions are divided, the heading splits, the capital is deidentified: it is related to itself not only in gathering itself in the difference *with itself* and with the other heading, with the other shore of the heading, but in opening itself without being able any longer to gather itself. It opens itself, it has *already* begun to open itself, and *it is necessary* to take note of this, which means *to affirm in recalling,* and not simply to record or store up in the archives a necessity that is already at work any-

*From Husserl's *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy,* tr. David Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), p. 17.—Trans.

way. It has begun to open itself onto the *other shore of another heading,* even if it is an opposed heading, even if at war, and even if the opposition is internal. Yet it has at the same time, *and through this even,* begun to make out, to see coming, to hear or understand as well, the other *of* the heading in general. More radically still, with more gravity still—though this is the gravity of a light and imperceptible chance that is nothing other than the very experience and experiment of the other—it has begun to open itself, or rather to let itself open, or, better yet, to be affected with opening without opening *itself* onto an other, onto an other that the heading can no longer even relate to itself as *its* other, *the other with itself.*

Hence the *duty* to respond to the call of European memory, to recall what has been promised under the name Europe, to re-identify Europe—this *duty* is without common measure with all that is generally understood by the name duty, though it could be shown that all other duties perhaps presuppose it in silence.

This *duty* also dictates opening Europe, from the heading that is divided because it is also a shoreline: opening it onto that which is not, never was, and never will be Europe.

The *same duty* also dictates welcoming foreigners in order not only to integrate them but to recognize and accept their alterity: two concepts of hospitality that today divide our European and national consciousness.

The *same duty* dictates *criticizing* ("in-both-theory-and-in-practice," and relentlessly) a totalitarian dogmatism that, under the pretense of putting an end to capital, destroyed democracy and the European heritage. But it also dictates criticizing a religion of capital that institutes its dogmatism under new guises, which we must also learn to identify—for this is the future itself, and there will be none otherwise.

The *same duty* dictates cultivating the virtue of such *critique, of the critical idea, the critical tradition,* but also submitting it, beyond critique and questioning, to a deconstructive genealogy that thinks and exceeds it without yet compromising it.

The *same duty* dictates assuming the European, and *uniquely* European, heritage of an idea of democracy, while also recognizing that this idea, like that of international law, is never simply given, that its status is not even that of a regulative idea in the Kantian sense, but rather something that remains to be thought and *to come* [*à venir*]: not something that is certain to happen tomorrow, not the democracy (national or international, state or trans-state) of the *future,* but a democracy that must have the structure of a promise—*and thus the memory of that which carries the future, the to-come, here and now.*

The *same duty* dictates respecting differences, idioms, minorities, singularities, but also the universality of formal law, the desire for translation, agreement and univocity, the law of the majority, opposition to racism, nationalism, and xenophobia.

The *same duty* demands tolerating and respecting all that is not placed under the authority of reason. It may have to do with faith, with different forms of faith. It may also have to do with certain thoughts,

whether questioning or not, thoughts that, while attempting to think reason and the history of reason, necessarily exceed its order, without becoming, simply because of this, irrational, and much less irrationalist. For these thoughts may in fact also try to remain faithful to the ideal of the Enlightenment, the *Aufklärung,* the *Illuminismo,* while yet acknowledging its limits, in order to work on the Enlightenment of this time, this time that is ours—*today.* Today, today once more ("What are you going to do TODAY?").

This *same duty* surely calls for responsibility, for the responsibility to think, speak, and act in compliance with this double contradictory imperative—a contradiction that must not be only an apparent or illusory antinomy (not even a transcendental illusion in a Kantian type of dialectic) but must be effective and, *with experience, through experiment,* interminable. But it also calls for respecting whatever refuses a certain responsibility, for example, the responsibility to respond before any and every instituted tribunal. We know that it was in using the discourse of responsibility that

the most atrocious Zhdanovism* was able to be exercised against intellectuals accused of irresponsibility before Society or History, "represented" at that time, *presently,* by some determined, that is, present, state of society or history, which is simply to say, by some State.

I am going to stop because it is late. One could multiply the examples of this double duty. It would be necessary above all to discern the unprecedented forms that it is taking today in Europe. And not only to accept but to claim this putting to the test of the antinomy (in the forms, for example, of the double constraint, the undecidable, the performative contradiction, etc.). It would be necessary to recognize both the typical or recurring form and the inexhaustible singularization—without which there will never be any event, decision, responsibility, ethics, or politics. These conditions can only take a negative *form* (without X there would not be

*Andrei Alexandrovich Zhdanov (1896–1948) was an important Communist party leader who was responsible, under Stalin, for a program that censored "bourgeois deviationism" in literature and the arts.—Trans.

Y). One can be certain only of this negative form. As soon as it is converted into positive certainty ("on this condition, there will surely have been event, decision, responsibility, ethics, or politics"), one can be sure that one is beginning to be deceived, indeed beginning to deceive the other.

We are speaking here with names (event, decision, responsibility, ethics, politics—Europe!) of "things" that can only exceed (and *must* exceed) the order of theoretical determination, of knowledge, certainty, judgment, and of statements in the form of "this is that," in other words, more generally and essentially, the order of the *present* or of *presentation.* Each time they are reduced to what they must exceed, error, recklessness, the unthought, and irresponsibility are given the so very presentable face of good conscience. (And it is also necessary to say that the serious, unsmiling mask of a declared bad conscience often exhibits only a supplementary ruse; for good conscience has, by definition, inexhaustible resources, and one will always be able to exploit them.)

One last word. Like the fission reaction it propagates in our discourse, the paradox of the paradox should lead us to take the old name of Europe at once very seriously and cautiously, that is, to take it lightly, only in quotation marks, as the best paleonym, in a certain situation, for what we recall (to ourselves) or what we promise (ourselves). For the same reasons, I would use the word "capital" in a similar way: *la capitale* or *le capital.* And, naturally, the words "identity" and "culture."

I am European, I am no doubt a European intellectual, and I like to recall this, I like to recall this to myself, and why would I deny it? In the name of what? But I am not, nor do I feel, European *in every part,* that is, European through and through. By which I mean, by which I wish to say, or *must* say: I do not want to be and must not be European through and through, European *in every part.* Being a part, belonging as "fully a part," should be incompatible with belonging "in every part." My cultural identity, that in the name of which I speak, is not only European,

it is not identical to itself, and I am not "cultural" through and through, "cultural" in every part.

If, to conclude, I declared that I feel European *among other things,* would this be, in this very declaration, to be more or less European? Both, no doubt. Let the consequences be drawn from this. It is up to the others, in any case, and up to me *among them,* to decide.

NOTES

1. *La Crise de l'esprit, Note* (ou *L'Européen*), in *Essais quasi politiques, Oeuvres* (Paris: Gallimard, la Pléiade, 1957), t. I, p. 1004 [translated by Denise Folliot and Jackson Mathews as "The European," in *History and Politics* (New York: Bollingen, 1962), pp. 311–12]. (If I may be allowed to indicate in passing that with regard to Europe and Spirit, whether it be in Valéry or Husserl, more implicitly in Hegel and Heidegger, this conference develops, and thus presupposes to a certain extent, reflections published in other works, most noticeably in *De l'esprit: Heidegger et la question* [Paris: Galilée, 1987] [*Of Spirit. Heidegger and the Question,* trans. Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989)].) The long note that this book consecrates to Valéry in particular (p. 97 [pp. 122–24]) is, in the end, only expanded upon a bit here. It began a "comparative analysis of these three discourses—Valéry's, Husserl's, and Heidegger's—on the crisis or destitution of spirit as spirit of Europe," and it had already been called for by one of Valéry's questions:

> Must such phenomena as democracy, the exploitation of the globe, and the general spread of technology, all of which presage a *deminutio capitis* for Europe . . . must these be taken as absolute decisions of fate? Or have we some freedom *against* this threatening conspiracy of things? (*La Crise de l'esprit, Deuxième Lettre,* I,

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p. 1000 ["The Crisis of Spirit," "Second letter," *History and Politics,* p. 36]).

To the question, "But who, after all, is European?" [*History and Politics,* p. 316], that is, to the question of our "distinction" and that which "has most profoundly distinguished us from the rest of humanity," Valéry responds by first following the history of what he calls the "capital" or "the *City par excellence*" [*History and Politics,* p. 317], namely, Rome, after Jerusalem and Athens. He concludes these few pages by defining *Homo Europaeus* by distinctive traits other than race, language, and customs. He still defines him by spirit, but the essence of spirit manifests itself, it offers its phenomenal image to an economico-metaphysical determination (at once subjective and objective) of being as need and desire, work and will. Europe is the name of that which leads the desiring or willing subject toward his objectivizable *maximum.* Capital belongs to the series of Europe's phenomenal manifestations.

> In power and precise knowledge, Europe still, even today, greatly outweighs the rest of the world. Or rather, it is not so much Europe that excels, but the European Spirit, and America is its formidable creation. (See on this subject *"L'Amérique, projection de l'esprit européen,"* t. II, pp. 987ff. ["America: A Projection of the European Spirit," in *History and Politics,* p. 329ff.].)
>
> Wherever that Spirit prevails, there we witness the maximum of *needs,* the maximum of *labor, capital,* and *production,* the maximum of *ambition* and *power,* the maximum *transformation of external Nature,* the maximum of *relations* and *exchanges.*

All these maxima taken together are Europe, or the image of Europe.

Moreover, the source of this development, this astonishing superiority, is obviously the quality of the individual man, the average quality of *Homo Europaeus.* It is remarkable that the European is defined not by race, or language, or customs, but by his aims and the amplitude of his will. . . . Etc. (I, p. 1014 [*History and Politics,* p. 323]).

One will have noticed that by posing in this way the question of what *distinguishes* Europe and what *calls* it from its absolute singularity, Valéry is well aware that he must treat the *name* of Europe, the name *Europe,* as an absolutely proper name. In this unique and irreplaceable reference, it is a matter of an individual whose identity is personal, perhaps more personal than all European persons; for the latter participate in this absolute spirit that makes them possible. Hence the form of the definition or description: "All these maxima taken together are *Europe* . . . "—not *l'Europe.**

2. Tome I, p. 995 [*History and Politics,* p. 31]. I will have had here to limit myself merely to proposing, in passing or in the end, a program for reading (census, logical indexing, interpretation) the uses of the *capitalistic* lexicon and its stakes in Valéry's text. Be it a question of history or of historical knowledge, of the event or of the concept, it would always be necessary to recapture the "capital moment" (II, p. 915 [*History and*

*By dropping the definite article, Valéry seems to be treating Europe not as a thing—a place or continent—but as a person with a proper name.—Trans.

Politics, p. 6]). The "notion of an *event,* which is fundamental," would not have been thought or "rethought" (II, p. 920 [*History and Politics,* p. 11]) by the historian, precisely because "that capital moment when precise and specialized definitions and conventions replace meanings that are confused and statistical in origin has not yet arrived for history" (II, p. 915 [*History and Politics,* p. 6]). In other words, what has not yet happened to history, as science, is the capital *event* of a concept, of a possibility of thinking that would allow it first to think the *event* as such. Further on, it is again the expression "capital event" that describes the appearance of a configural and identifying *unity,* of a coordination or *system* of correspondence in the progress and organization of sensible knowledge. Valéry emphasizes: "Sight, touch, and act are coordinated in a sort of multiple entry table, which is the tangible world, and finally—a capital *event*—it turns out that a certain system of correspondences is necessary and sufficient for a uniform adjustment of all the visual sensations to all the sensations of the skin and muscles" (II, p. 922 [*History and Politics,* p. 13]). This event is not only capital, it is the event of *capital* itself, namely, of what is called the *head.*

And in addition, or as a result, beyond historical *knowledge,* this discourse immediately and at the same time touches upon the historical *thing,* upon the very fabric of events, first of all from Europe's point of view. What would have escaped the historians is what would have, in short, *happened to the event, come to be an event.* The "considerable event" that, because of its "essential singularity," would have escaped the his-

torians as well as the event's "contemporaries," is the saturation of the habitable earth and the fact that, "under the evil spell of the written word," everything is put into relation with everything else; and so *"the age of the finite world has begun."* Politics and history can no longer speculate upon the localization or "isolation of events." There is no longer any local crisis or war. The "Decline of Europe" (II, p. 927 [*History and Politics,* p. 19]) belongs to this "age of the finite world" that Europe itself has precipitated by exporting itself, and by Europeanizing the non-Europeans, awakening, instructing, and arming—these are Valéry's words—those who aspired only to "remain as they were." This last expression at least sets the tone. What the anti-colonialism or, if you prefer, the Euro-capitalist hyper-colonialism of Valéry, the *Great-European,* seems to condemn is not so much colonialism but rather the internal rivalry that will have divided the European colonialisms and disseminated the "immense capital of knowledge" constituted by "the efforts of the best brains in Europe":

> Now, *local* European politics, dominating *general* European policy and making it absurd, has led rival Europeans to export the methods and the machines that made Europe supreme in the world. Europeans have competed for profit in awakening, instructing, and arming vast peoples who, before, were imprisoned in their traditions and asked nothing better than to remain as they were. . . . There has been nothing more stupid in all history than European rivalry in matters of politics and economics, when compared, combined, and confronted with European unity and collaboration in matters of science. While the efforts of the best brains in Europe were amassing an im-

> mense *capital* [my emphasis, J. D.] of usable knowledge, the naive tradition of a policy based on history, a policy of covetousness and ulterior motives, was being pursued; and the spirit of *Little Europe,* by a kind of treachery, handed over to the very people it meant to dominate, the methods and instruments of power. . . . Europe will prove not to have had the politics worthy of her thought (II, p. 926 [*History and Politics,* pp. 17–18]).

The equivocity of this discourse will have never seemed so pliable, from the very best to the worst, as it seems today (I date this today, the today of this note, on the third day of what is called "The Gulf War"*).

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*A thinker of fiction, convention, relay, and telecommunication, Valéry was also in advance the thinker of the war of *today,* when "the time of the finite world has begun":

> In the future, when a battle is fought anywhere in the world, it will be a perfectly simple matter for the sound of the cannon to be heard over the whole earth. The thunders of some future Verdun will then be *received* at the antipodes. It will even be possible to see something of the fighting, to see, at an interval of only three hundredths of a second, men falling six thousand miles away.

These are the opening words of a short text entitled "Hypothesis," the title for a thought that advances itself like a hypothesis on the subject of the hypothetical character of everything, of the Ego as the Everything, as soon as, and from the very beginning, convention and relay establish the regime of the simulacrum. Here are the closing words of this "Hypothesis":

> Is not our life, insofar as it depends on what comes to spirit, on what seems to come from spirit and to impose itself first on spirit and then on our whole existence—is not our life governed by an enormous, disorganized mass of *conventions,* most of which are implicit? We should be hard put to it either to express or to define them. Society, languages, laws, *customs,*

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Especially if one considers that this was written after the fact in the "Foreword" [*Avant-propos*] to *Regards sur le monde actuel* and to the first text of this collection, "Notes on the Greatness and Decline of Europe," which, just before posing the question of "TODAY" ("What are you going to do TODAY?"), will have condemned what the politics of Europe will have done with its "capital of laws":

> Europe will be punished for her politics; she will be deprived of wines, beer, and liqueurs. And of other things. . . . Europe aspires visibly to being governed by an American Commission. Her whole policy is leading to this. Not knowing how to rid ourselves of our history, we shall be relieved of it by those happy peoples who have none, or next to none. And those happy peoples will impose their happiness on us.
>
> Europe had clearly distinguished herself from all the other parts of the world. Not by her politics but in spite of and contrary to her politics, she had developed to the utmost her freedom of spirit, had combined her passion for understanding with her will to rigorous thought, invented precise and positive speculation,

---

the arts, politics, in short, everything that is fiduciary in this world, every effect that is unequal to its cause, requires conventions—that is, *relays* or intermediaries, by the indirect means of which a second reality takes hold, blends with the perceptible reality of the moment, covers it over, dominates it—and is itself sometimes torn apart, disclosing the terrifying simplicity of rudimentary life. In our desires, our regrets, our quests, in our emotions and passions, and even in our effort to know ourselves, we are the puppets of nonexistent things—things that need not even exist to affect us (II, pp. 942-45 [*Aesthetics,* trans. Ralph Manheim (New York: Bollingen, 1964), pp. 229-33], Valéry's emphasis).

> and created, by the obstinate pursuit of results that could be accurately compared and accumulated, a *capital* of powerful *laws* and procedures. Yet, her politics remained as they had always been, borrowing from the singular riches and resources I have mentioned just enough to support her primitive political practices and to furnish them with more redoubtable and barbarous weapons (II, p. 930 [*History and Politics,* pp. 227–28], my emphasis).

3. As for *fromm* and *promos,* the "pious" that also comes in the first rank, in the avant-garde of a combat, cf. Heidegger's *"Die Frage nach der Technik,"* in *Vorträge und Aufsätze,* p. 38 ["The Question Concerning Technology," trans. William Lovitt, in *Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings,* ed. David Farrell Krell (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1976), p. 316] and the remarks that I devote to it in *De l'esprit,* p. 149 [*Of Spirit,* pp. 130ff]; concerning *Ort,* the place and the tip of the lance, cf. in particular Heidegger, *Unterwegs zur Sprache,* p. 37 [*On the Way to Language,* trans. Peter D. Hertz (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 159].

4. I take the liberty of referring once again here to *De l'esprit: Heidegger et la question* [*Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question.*]

5. It is the impossible possibility of a "logic" that I try to formulate (though it is by definition never absolutely formalizable) in *Psyché: Inventions de l'autre* (Galilée, 1987), particularly, in the first essay of that collection [*Psyche: Inventions of the Other,* trans. Catherine Porter, in *Reading de Man Reading,* ed. Wlad Godzich and Lindsay Waters (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989)].

6. Valéry the Mediterranean, Valéry the European,

wanted to be, in just as exemplary a way, the thinker of Paris. There is nothing surprising in this, and it is this logic that we are analyzing here. In *Présence de Paris* ["Paris Is Here"], of 1937, the most noble and most serious of tasks comes down not only to "thinking PARIS" but to thinking the identity of this capital (whose name Valéry writes in capital letters twenty-six times in five pages) and its identity with "spirit itself," "the awareness of an unrelenting mission of the spirit": "I fancy that to think PARIS may be compared, or may be confounded, with *thinking spirit itself*" (*Présence de Paris,* II, p. 1012 ["Paris Is Here," in *Poems in the Rough,* trans. Hilary Corke (New York: Bollingen, 1969), pp. 266–67]. Valéry had previously formulated a project that will be accomplished only by being inverted, according to the very logic of being, that is, according to the *logos* of absolute spirit (and) of the capital. Spirit and the capital are presented or represented in each other. The inhabitant of the capital is then "thought" by the habitat earlier than he thinks. First moment: "Whence is born in me this daunting and absurd desire: to think PARIS." But, after four marvelous pages comes the ultimate moment of the coming to awareness and the reversal: "To think PARIS? . . . The more one tries, the more one feels that, on the contrary, it is by PARIS that one is thought." Just before this, the "figure" of the face [*la "figure" de la figure*] had guided the analysis of this capital of capitals. One actually *looks the capital in the face.* One distinguishes the face, the head and the forehead:

> For she is the head of France, in which are sited the country's organs of perception and most sensitive re-

> actions. Her beauty and light give France a countenance on which at moments the whole intelligence of the land may be seen visibly to burn. When strong feelings seize our people, it is to this brow the blood mounts, irradiating it with a mighty flush of pride (II, p. 1015 [*Poems in the Rough,* p. 270]).

The "exemplarist" logic that we are here trying to recognize had in fact driven Valéry, ten years earlier, in the *Fonction de Paris* ["Function of Paris," in *History and Politics*] (1927), to present this capital not only as a cosmopolitical metropolis, a fate that it shares with other great *Western* cities ("Every great city in Europe or America is cosmopolitan" (II, p. 1007 [*History and Politics,* p. 397]), but as the capital of capitals. This capital "is distinguished" from all other capitals. Indeed, "distinction" will be the master word of this discourse. Paris *distinguishes itself* in two respects that are capitalized. *On the one hand,* it is the capital of the country in *every* domain, and not only, as in other countries, the political *or* economic *or* cultural capital.

> To be in itself the political, literary, scientific, financial, commercial, voluptuary, and sumptuary capital of a great country; to embody its whole history; to absorb and concentrate its whole thinking substance as well as all its credit and nearly all its monetary resources and assets, all this being both *good and bad* for the nation that this city crowns—it is in this that Paris *distinguishes itself* from all other giant cities (II, p. 1008 [*History and Politics,* pp. 398–99], my emphasis).

On the other hand, by being distinguished in this way, the *exemplary* capital, our capital, is no longer simply the capital of a country, but the "head of Europe," and thus of the world, the capital of human society in general, or even better, of "human sociability":

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> This Paris, whose character is the result of long experience and an endless number of historical vicissitudes; Paris that in the space of three hundred years has twice or three times been the *head* of Europe, three times conquered by the enemy, the theater of half a dozen political revolutions, the creator of an amazing number of reputations, the destroyer of countless stupidities, constantly summoning to herself both *the flower and the dregs of the race,* has made herself the *metropolis of various liberties and the capital of human sociability* (II, p. 1009 [*History and Politics,* p. 400], my emphasis).

We must neglect neither the insistent ambiguity of this evaluation nor the abyssal potentialities of this equivocation. In 1927, the "Function of Paris" spoke of everything in the capital that was at once "good and bad for the nation that this city crowns," [p. 399], thus for the head, and it associated "the immense advantages" with "the grave dangers of such a concentration": with "the flower" are associated, like a fatal parasite, "the dregs of the race" [*History and Politics,* p. 400]. What distinguishes, what distinguishes *itself,* is always the most threatened, the best being always right up against the worst. Privilege is by definition a delicateness in danger. The danger comes from abroad, from the foreigner, not only from the European foreigner but from a foreigner who comes from even further away to contaminate, who comes, more precisely, from other shores, from an outside of Europe—and who threatens spirit itself, the "spirit of Paris" inasmuch as it incarnates spirit itself. Shortly after having spoken about the "dregs of the race," Valéry in fact concludes:

> The mounting credulity in the world, due to boredom with entertaining clear ideas and *the rise of exotic peoples*

> *to civilized life, threatens what used to distinguish the spirit of Paris.* We have known it as the capital of quality and the capital of criticism. We have every reason to fear for these glories, wrought by centuries of delicate experiment, enlightenment, and choice [*History and Politics,* p. 400, my emphasis].

Ten years later, on the eve of the war, Valéry recalls the negative effects of capital "concentration"; he associates with it, more or less deliberately, the value of "jealousy," and—this is in 1937—uses the expression "concentration camp," a camp that "consumes" "every Frenchman who *distinguishes* himself." I emphasize:

> Yet PARIS clearly *distinguishes* herself from her fellow million-headed monsters, the NEW YORKS, LONDONS, PEKINGS . . . our BABYLONS. . . . For in none of them has every kind of élite of a nation been so *jealously concentrated,* for so many centuries, so that by her judgment alone each value takes its place in the scale of values, submitting to her comparisons, facing her criticism, *jealousy*. . . . This invaluable traffic could scarcely subsist except where, for centuries, every kind of élite of a great nation has been *jealously* called together and fenced in. To this *concentration camp* is destined every Frenchman who *distinguishes himself.* PARIS beckons him, draws him, demands him, and, sometimes, *consumes* him. (II, pp. 1014–15 [*Poems in the Rough,* pp. 269–70]).

7. "*La liberté de l'esprit,*" II, p. 1093 ["The Freedom of Spirit," in *History and Politics,* p. 186]. A few pages later, Valéry makes in passing a somewhat elliptical remark that seems to me to be of great importance, as long as one follows its implications, perhaps even be-

yond what Valéry intended by it. Valéry in effect determines *freedom* as *response:* " . . . the idea of freedom is not *instinctive* [*première*] in us; it never comes unless it is called. I mean it is always *a response*" (II, p. 1095 [*History and Politics* , p. 207]).

8. The logic of this text is also an *analogic.* In truth, it stems entirely from a dissymmetrical analogy between spirit and value. Spirit is a value among others, certainly, like gold, wheat, or oil, but it is also the source of all value, thus the exceeding value, the absolute and therefore sublime surplus value of the priceless. Spirit is one of the categories of the analogy *and* the incomparable condition, the transcendental, the transcategorial of the whole economy. It is an example and an exemplary example, the example *par excellence.* There is no other. Since Valéry says this so well in another way, I am content with gathering together a few quotations around what he himself calls, as if in passing, "the capital point":

> It is a sign of the times . . . that today it is not only necessary but imperative to interest people's spirits in the fate of Spirit—that is, in their own fate. . . . They had faith in spirit, but what spirit? . . . what did they mean by this word? . . . The word is indecipherable, since it refers to the source and value of all other words [*History and Politics,* p. 186].

Present, immanent in all that it is not, in all the values that are not as valuable as it is, this word can, from now on and without any risk, enter into analogy, into the parallelism of economy and the economy of parallelism, between capital and capital. It is "the very thing," the "capital point," the thing itself that is di-

vided between the two registers or two regimes of the analogy. For example:

> I spoke, I believe, of the decline and collapse, before our very eyes, of the values of our life; and with the word *value* I brought together under one term, one sign, values of the material and the spiritual order.
>
> *Value* is the very thing I wish to talk about, the capital point to which I should like to draw your attention.
>
> We are today witnessing a true and gigantic transmutation of values (to use Nietzsche's excellent phrase), and in giving to this lecture the title "Freedom of Spirit" I am simply alluding to one of those essential values that nowadays seem to be suffering the same fate as material values.
>
> So, in saying *value,* I mean that *spirit* is a value, just as *oil, wheat,* and *gold* are values.
>
> I said *value* because an appraisal, an assessment of importance is involved, and also because there is a price to be discussed—the price we are willing to pay for the value we call *spirit.*
>
> . . . On that market, *spirit* is "weak"—it is nearly always falling. . . . You see that I am borrowing the language of the stock exchange. . . . I have often been struck by the analogies that arise, in the most natural way in the world, between the life of spirit in all its manifestations and the various aspects of economic life. . . . In both enterprises, in the economic as in the spiritual life, you will find the same basic notions of *production* and *consumption*. . . .
>
> Moreover, in either case we may equally well speak of capital and labor. *Civilization is a kind of capital* that may go on accumulating for centuries, as certain other kinds of capital do, and absorbing its compound interest (II, pp. 1077–82 [*History and Politics,* pp. 189–91]).

Valéry emphasizes all this; and he claims not to be proposing here a "mere comparison, more or less po-

etic," not to be moving, through "mere rhetorical artifices," from material economy to spiritual economy. To make this claim, he must confirm the at once originary and transcategorial character of the concept of spirit, which while making the analogy possible, does not completely belong to it. No more than *logos,* in sum, is simply included in the analogy in which it nonetheless participates. And in fact, beyond mere rhetoric, spirit is *logos,* speech, or word—as Valéry literally explains. This original spiritualism indeed presents itself as a logocentrism. More rigorously still, as a logocentrism whose birthplace is in the Mediterranean basin. Once again, it is best to quote. Valéry has just been claiming not to have moved, through an artifice of rhetoric, from material economy to spiritual economy, and he emphasizes:

> In fact, if we look closely at the matter, we find that the opposite is true. *Spirit came first,* and it could not have been otherwise. It is the commerce of spirits that was necessarily the first commerce in the world, the very first, the one that started it all, necessarily the original: for before swapping goods, it was necessary to swap signs, and consequently a set of signs had to be agreed on. There is no market, no exchange without language; the first instrument of all trade is language. We may here repeat (giving it a suitably altered meaning) the famous saying: *"In the beginning was the Word."* It was essential that the Word should precede the *act* of trading. But the Word is no less than one of the most accurate names for what I have called *spirit.* Spirit and the Word in many of their uses are almost synonymous. The term that in the Vulgate means *word* is translated from the Greek *"logos ,"* which means at once *calculation, reason, speech, discourse, and knowledge,* as well as expression. Consequently, in saying that the

word is identical with spirit, I think I am not uttering a heresy, even in linguistics (II, p. 1084 [*History and Politics,* p. 194]).

Nothing surprising then in the fact that the "logical" and the historical are from here on homologous and indissociable: "Not only is it logically necessary that this should be so, but it can also be demonstrated historically." Those "regions of the globe" that have favored commerce are also "those regions where the production of intellectual values . . . started earliest and has been most prolific and various," those where "*freedom of spirit* has been most widely granted." And the word "market" comes back regularly (at least three times in two pages, Tome I, pp. 1005–1006 [*History and Politics,* pp. 313–14]) when it is a question of defining Europe, "this Europe of ours, which began as a Mediterranean market," Europe, "this privileged place," "the European spirit," "author of these wonders" [*History and Politics,* p. 312]. The best example, the only one in truth, the most irreplaceable, is that of the Mediterranean basin: the "example" that it "offered" is in fact unique, exemplary, and incomparable. It is therefore not an example among others, and this is why *logos* and history are no longer separated, since this example will have been "the most striking and conclusive" (II, pp. 1084–85 [*History and Politics,* p. 195]).

9. Tome II, p. 1058 [*History and Politics,* p. 436]. This should come as no surprise. It is precisely in this context that Valéry, on the subject of philosophy, links together with force two propositions that are often disjoined: the *national trait* and the *formal trait* are irreduc-

ible and indissociable in philosophy, in the discourse as well as the language of philosophy. The argumentation of these few pages is extremely intricate; it would deserve more than a note. It is still a question of "envisaging France, the role or function of France in building up the *capital* of the human spirit" (II, pp. 1047–48 [*History and Politics,* p. 426], my emphasis). Very schematically, let us say that if, on the one hand, Valéry gives the form of a concession and a *hypothesis*—"it is not impossible that," "this is quite possible"—to the proposition concerning the *national trait* that would mark all philosophy, it is precisely in looking in an exemplary way toward French philosophy that he emphasizes the *formal trait* and vigorously advances a *thesis* concerning it. One could call this thesis formalist were it not for the fear of making things more inflexible by providing an easy argument to all those who confuse attention to form, language, writing, rhetoric, or the "text" with a subjective formalism and a renunciation of the concept. One must be able to take into account the national trait and the formal trait without nationalism or formalism—and even *in order to* elaborate a strategy of refined resistance toward them. As interesting as it may be, the Valéryian strategy seems to me incapable of avoiding these two pitfalls. The national *hypothesis* inevitably precipitates itself in a *thesis* of nationalist subjectivism. The formalist thesis is there only to serve this precipitation.

First moment, the hypothesis:

> Abstract or "pure" thought, like scientific thought, endeavors to obliterate what comes to the thinker from his race or his nation, its aim being to create values

> independent of place and person. It is doubtless not impossible to discern, or think we discern, in a system of metaphysics or morals, the part that properly belongs to one race or nation: sometimes, indeed, nothing seems to define a certain race or nation better than the philosophy it has produced. It is claimed that certain ideas, though expressed in all universality, are almost unthinkable outside the climate of their origin. In a foreign land they wither away like uprooted plants, or else they look preposterous. This may well be (II, p. 1055 [*History and Politics,* pp. 431–32]).

Second moment, the thesis. Before recalling, and emphasizing, that the thesis presents itself as a "feeling" and opens with a parenthetical "apology," let us remember the date of these pages: 1939. On this eve of combat, when nationalist and racist eloquence in sweeping through Europe more violently than ever, Valéry tones down into a hypothesis his propositions on philosophy, race, and the nation. He also apologizes when, in order to speak of his "feeling" and of philosophy as a "question of form," he essentially links this form to the national language and, in a singular and exemplary way, to the French language:

> It is my feeling (and I apologize for this) that philosophy is a matter of form. It is not in the least a science, and it should free itself from any unconditional link with science. To be *ancilla scientiae* is no better for philosophy than to be *ancilla theologiae.* . . . I do not say that I am right, which in any case would be meaningless. I say . . . that anyone who speaks this language, to others and to himself, can neither go beyond its means nor escape the suggestions and associations that the said language has insidiously implanted in him. If I am French, there at the very point of my

> thought where thought takes shape and talks to itself, it takes shape in French, according to the possibilities and within the framework of French (ibid. [*History and Politics*, p. 432]).

What follows is an analysis, an interpretation, and an evaluation of these said possibilities; I will not engage myself in them here. Concerning philosophy more strictly, I will cite only the conclusion—for what it can allow us to think today, both with and against its author:

> In France, that is the price of success for any philosophy. I do not mean that systems of ideas not conforming to this principle cannot be produced here. What I mean is that they are never truly and, as it were, *organically* assimilated. Incidentally, I find analogous French reactions in politics and the arts (II, p. 1056 [*History and Politics*, p. 434], my emphasis).

Eccentric Culture

A Theory of Western Civilization

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Translated by Samuel Lester

St. Augustine's Press
South Bend, Indiana
2002

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1 2 3 4 5 6 08 07 06 05 04 03 02

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Bragues, Rémi, 1947–
[Europe, la voie romaine. English]
A theory of Western civilization / Rémi Brague ; translated by Samuel Lester.
p. cm.
ISBN 1-890318-14-0 (alk.)
1. Europe – Civilization – Roman influences. 2. Europe – Civilization – Greek influences. I. Title.
D1055 .B7313 2001
940 – dc21 2001001191

∞ *The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of the International Organisation for Standardization (ISO) – Paper for documents – Requirements for permanence – ISO 9706: 1994.*

Printed in the Czech Republic by Newton Printing Ltd. www.newtonprinting .com

V

Appropriation of the Foreign

Culture represents what a world has that is proper to it. It is what permits one to call this world, in another sense of the word, a "culture." Now what is proper is not necessarily present in the same way. I assert therefore that Europe distinguishes itself from other cultural worlds by its particular mode of relation to its own: the appropriation of what is perceived as foreign. This became a conscious fact for some. It was the case with Roger Bacon, the famous Franciscan of the thirteenth century. In the letter to Pope Clement IV that accompanied his works (1265), he pleaded among other things for the establishment of schools of languages in the Christian world. He argued thus:

> . . . the wisdom of the Latins is drawn from foreign languages; indeed, the entire sacred text and all philosophy have come down to us in external languages [sapientia latinorum tracta est ex alienis linguis; nam totus textus sacer et tota philosophia descenderunt a linguis extraneis][1]

I will translate the "wisdom of the Latins" in modern terms as "European culture." This culture is not Latin, or European, but foreign. Bacon, who took the trouble to learn some Greek and Hebrew, knew very well what his allusions

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1 R. Bacon, *Lettera a Clemente IV*, ed. P. E. Bettoni, O.F.M. (Milan: 1964), p. 190.

referred to: the Bible is not in Latin, but in Hebrew and in Greek; "philosophy" – which during that period included nearly the entirety of profane culture – was for him deposited before all else in Greek works – Aristotle – and in Arabic works whose translations, in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, had just renewed European learning. It is remarkable that Bacon should have expressed both the exteriority of the sources of European culture and the fact that they are, irreducibly, two.

One can support and deepen this intuition with a comparison between the way in which Europe on the one hand and on the other hand the Muslim and to a lesser extent the Byzantine cultural worlds conceived and practiced their relationship to the cultural heritage that preceded them.

Different Ways of Appropriating

The comparison of the processes of assimilation set in motion by the Latin world and the Arab world reveals a capital difference. It was already implicit in what I said above on the genre of works that the Arab world translated or didn't translate.[2] Very roughly, in the works that they translated, the Arabs concerned themselves with the content alone, while the Romans were in addition concerned with their literary aspect. The Arabs sought to appropriate a scientific and/or philosophical content that could constitute the truth. The Romans were also moved by aesthetic criteria. This was why the formal beauty of poetry could let through contents that conformed little to the reigning philosophical and moral orthodoxy. Thus, the atheist Lucretius was recopied by Christians; Ovid's *Art of Love* was recopied by people who had made

2 Cf., *supra*, ch. IV, p. 78. An interesting comparison between the Romans and the Arabs is sketched in W. von Humboldt, *Über die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaues und ihren Einfluß auf die geistige Entwicklung des Menschengeschlechts* (work on the Kawi), §34 in *Werke*, ed. A. Flitner and K. Giel, vol. 3 (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1963), p. 604.

vows of chastity, that is, the monks, and not necessarily Church Sunday monks, who nonetheless faithfully transcribed passages where the poet recommends synchronous orgasms . . .[3] Why? Because it was Lucretius, because it was Ovid. Ancient poetry, on the other hand, did not reach the Arab world. Or, if it was found there, it was in the form of anthologies of moral sententiae that became quite prosaic. This was the case because, as everyone knows, poetry is untranslatable. An Arabic author of the eleventh century, Al-Sijistâni, saw this clearly.[4] It was necessary, therefore, either not to read poetry at all, or to read it in the original, and consequentially, to preserve it in its original language.

Here, it seems to me, appears a decisive difference between the Arabic and the European transmission of ancient heritage. It is situated without doubt, first of all, on the linguistic level. The fundamental phenomenon was that of the presence or absence of a continuity of language. Latin and Greek survived in Christianity, which expressed itself by their means. In Islamized regions, on the contrary, Arabic caused Greek to disappear and progressively relegated Syriac and Coptic to the rank of purely liturgical languages or regional dialects. Persian would no doubt have suffered the same fate if it were not for the political and cultural renaissance begun in the eleventh century. As to Turkish and the languages of the countries Islamized later (India, Indonesia, and Africa), they entered the sphere of the Islamic world at a period after it had lost some of its original momentum.

There is an author who, even if he did not know a great deal about the Islamic religion, nonetheless saw the importance of this linguistic factor quite clearly: Machiavelli. He wrote about Christianity, for which he had little sympathy:

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3 I remember an amusing remark on this subject by E. Gilson, but I have not succeeded in finding the reference.

4 Abu Sulayman al-Sijistânî, *The Muntakhab Siwân al-hikmah* . . . (in Arabic), intro. and notes by D. M. Dunlop (The Hague: Mouton, 1979), §96, p. 68.

> It is true that they did not succeed in eliminating entirely the knowledge of the things done by its excellent men [of the pagan civilization]. This arose from having maintained the Latin language, which they were forced to do since they had to write this new law with it. For if they had been able to write with a new language . . . we would have not have any record of things past.[5]

If, in Europe, the new religion expressed itself in the vulgar language of the period, and afterward in the languages – Germanic, Slavic, Celtic, etc. – of the newly converted peoples, it has not produced any particularly normative masterpiece of literature. One may judge the New Testament however one likes. One can underline the historical importance of the story of the Passion – the highest majesty in the midst of the most ignoble degradation – in crossing the barrier that separated, until then, the elevated style from the low one.[6] But it must be noted that the texts making it up are, as literary texts, of a somewhat mediocre quality. The Christians have always known it and spoke, in allusion to the original trade of the apostles, of a "language of fishermen" (*sermo piscatorius*) or of a "humble speech."[7] And the same phenomenon can be observed on the profane level: the barbarian, pagan tribes did not possess sufficiently elaborate languages and a sufficiently rich literature to compete with those of the territories on which they settled. In consequence, Europe had to wait several centuries before literature appeared in the vulgar languages.

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5 Machiavelli, *Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio*, II, 5, in *Tutte le opere*, ed. Flora and Cordié, 2nd ed. (Mondadori, 1968), vol. 2, p. 247; English by H. C. Mansfield and N. Tarcov (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1996), p. 139.

6 Cf. E. Auerbach, *Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature*, tr. W. R. Trask (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953), ch. 2.

7 Cf. idem., "Sacrae scripturae sermo humilis" (in French) in *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur romanischen Philologie* (Berne/Munich: Francke, 1967), pp. 21–26.

On the other hand, the Arabs possessed, before the Koran, great lyric, warlike, polemical poetry. They had besides and especially, since the adoption of Islam, an awareness of possessing in the Koran the unsurpassable literary masterpiece – even unequalable, as this inimitability constituted the great miracle, actually, the only miracle, supposed to attest to the divine origin of the sacred book.[8] Yet the Koranic revelation in no way interrupted or even deeply modified the Arabic poetic tradition: the same literary genres, and even the same themes, though not always very orthodox, flourished before as afterwards. The Koranic fact has exercised at most an indirect influence on Arabic literature. Indeed, one has been able to attribute to it the absence of an artistic prose in the land of the Islam, and the division of writing, on the one hand, into a poetry that alone rises to the level of art, and on the other, a prose of factual description. For once the Koran was supposed inimitable, it was dangerous to get too close to the rhythmical prose in which it was expressed.[9] Whatever the case may be, there was, then, outside of linguistic discontinuity, a second reason why the Arabs have not sought to adopt Greco-Latin poetry, and that is, quite simply, that they had no need to look elsewhere for what their own tradition provided in abundance.

The Best of Languages?

The two facts, religious and literary, combine into a single one, both resulting in a valorization – or not – of the language in which one expresses oneself. In Europe, this language is not considered as possessing a special value.[10] The Arabs, on the contrary, believe that they speak – or in any case that they read and write – the language of God himself. Indeed, the

8 Textual foundation in the Koran, XVII, 90; X, 39. Cf. *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, "I'DJĀZ," vol. III (1971), pp. 1018a–1020b (G. E. Grunebaum).

9 Cf. A. Miquel, *L'Orient d'une vie* (Paris: Payot, 1990), pp. 109 and 120.

10 Cf. *supra*, ch. II, p. 35f.

Koran has been revealed "in clear Arabic," and presents itself as "an Arabic Koran."[11] This religious origin is the basis of the valorization of the Arabic language; the poetry that came after the Koran is even supposed to be written in a language that is more beautiful than the poetry written before it.[12] In this way, Arabic, if it is not necessarily the most ancient language, would be the definitive language,[13] and in any case the clearest, the most concise, and the truest of languages.[14] Once a work is translated into Arabic, however, it acquires an incomparable dignity. It is elevated rather than adulterated. The copy, far from "degenerating from the vivacity of the original," is, one might say, elevated to a superior level. This is what was said by Al-Biruni, himself a native of Khwarezm, and so a speaker of Arabic as a second language:

> The sciences of every region of the world have been translated into the language of the Arabs, are embellished by it, have penetrated the hearts, and the beauty of the language has circulated in the veins and the arteries.[15]

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11 Koran, XII, 2 and *passim*.

12 Cf. Ibn Khaldûn, *Muqaddimah*, IV; Q, vol. 2, p. 269 ff.; R, vol. 2, p. 303 ff. and VI; Q, vol. 3, p. 350, 1–8; R, vol. 3, p. 396 ff.

13 Cf. A. Borst, *Der Turmbau von Babel. Geschichte der Meinungen über Ursprung und Vielfalt der Sprachen und Völker* (Stuttgart: A. Hiersemann, 1957), vol. 1: *Fundamente und Aufbau*, p. 334.

14 Cf. for example, *Rasā' il Ikhwān aṣ-Ṣafā'*, III, 9 (40), ed. Bustani (Beirut: 1983), vol. 3, p. 377 and 381, or Ibn Khaldûn, *Muqaddimah*, VI; Q, vol. 3, p. 280, 1; R, vol. 3, p. 321; and Q, vol. 3, p. 300, 1 ff; R, vol. 3, p. 344. Cf. also aš-Šāfi'ī, *ar-Risāla*, §138, Sākir, p. 42, ed. A. M. cited in J. Langhade, *Du Coran à la philosophie. La langue arabe et la formation du vocabulaire philosophique de Farabi* (Damas, 1994), p. 117.

15 Preface to the *Book of Drugs* in Al-Biruni's *Book on Pharmacy and Materia Medica*, ed. and trans. into English by Hakim Mohammed Said (Karachi: Hamdard National Foundation, 1973), p. 12, 3 ff.; English translation, pp. 7b–8a. Cf. also Abū Ḥātim ar-Rāzī, *Kitāb az-Zīna fī 'l-kalimāt al-'arabiyya*, ed. Al-Ḥamdānī vol. I, p. 63, 2–4, cited in J. Langhade, *op. cit.*, p. 148.

It is not surprising, then, that the original versions of translated works have been neglected. Accordingly, one only occasionally meets an interest among the Muslims in Greek language and the culture of the Greeks, and most of the time it is only where Arabic doesn't dominate exclusively. This is the case with the Turks, for example, during the reign of Mehmed the Conqueror.[16]

One finds analogous cases at Byzantium, but for different reasons. Byzantium shared with Europe a linguistic continuity between the period that preceded and the period that followed the arrival of the dominant religion. It is what distinguished both of them from the Arab world. This continuity was, of course, the Greek language. But, on the other hand, Byzantium had a characteristic in common with the Arab world that distinguished it from Europe. For Byzantium was itself also conscious of the presence of a valorized language, one illustrated by the masterpieces of a prestigious literature – the Greek of Homer and Plato. Thus, Theodorus Metochites, in the fourteenth century, could proudly exclaim:

> The states neighboring on Hellas have not had a share in a similar tradition. Indeed, they do not possess a language triumphantly established for all time that, by its aesthetic charm, has attracted the majority of men into its world.[17]

The classical form of this language remained normative, so much so that one sometimes sought to elevate the dignity of certain texts by a paradoxical translation that made them de-evolve linguistically, from popular Greek to learned Greek. Thus, in the tenth century, Simeon Metaphrastes rewrote in

16 For clarification, cf. J. Raby, "Mehmet the Conqueror's Greek Scriptorium," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 37 (1983), pp. 15–34.

17 *Ethikos è peri paideias*, f. 205r, cited in H. Hunger, "Theodoros Metochites als Vorläufer des Humanismus in Byzanz," *Byzantinische Zeitschrift* 45 (1952), pp. 4–19, cited in a note to p. 15.

cultivated Greek all the lives of the saints which popular piety had written in its language.[18] The linguistic continuity maintained by learned Greek has maintained (though at the price of a scholarly apprenticeship) the accessibility of the ancient masterpieces. This was obtained through a fiction, that of the unity of the Greek language. And it may be that the continuity of Hellenism, from Homer (lest we go back to Linear B) to the Byzantines, is itself only a fiction.[19] As to the language, in any event, the real separation between a "purified" (*katharevousa*) and a popular (*dhimotiki*) language would not cease to increase until its latest consequences, politically overdetermined, in contemporary Greece.[20] And in any event, the cultural elites of Byzantium never felt alienated in regard to ancient Greece.

Thus, unlike Byzantium, Europe has not been able to perdure through the continuity of a language that had been the support of a very great literature, in peaceable possession of a classical heritage that assured it the feeling of cultural superiority. Nor, like the Muslim world, has it been able to compensate for its initial dependence on exterior sources through the impression of ennobling and enlarging the knowledge it inherited in making it attain the language chosen by God for His ultimately unadulterated message, and by diffusing it over the territory His definitive religion covered. Europe, therefore, had to confront a consciousness of having borrowed, without hope of restitution, from a source that it could neither regain nor surpass.

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18 Cf. *Dictionnaire de spiritualité*, "Syméon Métaphraste," col. 1383–86 (M.-H. Congourdeau).

19 Cf. C. Mango, "Byzantinism and Romantic Hellenism," *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes* XXVIII (1965), pp. 29–43. For the opposing view, cf. Ap. Vacalopoulos, "Byzantinism and Hellenism. Remarks on the Racial Origin and the Intellectual Continuity of the Greek Nation" in *Balkan Studies* IX (1968), pp. 101–26.

20 Cf. R. Fontaine, "L'Eglise grecque et la question de la langue en Grèce," *Istina* 21 (1976), pp. 412–29.

Dwarfed and Nostalgic

European culture is in this way marked by the melancholic feeling of an alienation or inferiority in relation to a source, which provokes a sense of nostalgia. One can find traces of this sentiment at different periods. Thus, in the Middle Ages, one sees the recurrent image according to which a later period perceives itself as a generation of dwarfs that need to perch on the shoulders of the giants that preceded them. This image is found probably for the first time at the beginning of the twelfth century in Bernard of Chartres (who died around 1125), for whom the giant was Aristotle.[21] It is next met among Christians from the same epoch,[22] but also among Jews for whom it permitted the illustration of the juridical principle according to which the *halakhah* is regulated by the decisions of the most recent interpreters.[23] It came to a climax, at the end of a turbulent history, with Newton.[24] But the comparison of the Ancients with the Giants and of the Moderns with the Dwarfs is also implicit in Swift who presents the former in his description of Brobdingnag and the latter in that of Lilliput. In addition, it is remarkable to note that the same image permitted the encapsulation of two different relations to the past, the profane as well as the religious: scenes of stained glass at Chartres represent the four Evangelists perched on the shoulders of the prophets of the old Covenant.

The same feeling is present at the start of modern times, for example in Montaigne, who wrote:

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21 Cited by John of Salisbury, *Metalogicon* III, 4; *Patrologiae Cursus, Series Latina* 199, 900c.

22 Cf. E. Jeauneau, "'Nani gigantum humeris insidentes.' Essai d'interprétation de Bernard de Chartres," *Vivarium* 5 (1967), pp. 79–99.

23 Cf. D. Zlotnik, "On the source of the simile 'dwarf and giant' and its avatars" (in Hebrew), *Sinai* 77 (1975), pp. 184–189.

24 Cf the both erudite and amusing book by Robert K. Merton, *On the Shoulders of Giants. A Shandean Postscript* (New York: Free Press, 1965), 290 pp.

> The productions of these great rich minds of the past are very far beyond the utmost stretch of my imagination and desire. Their writings not only satisfy and fill me, but astound me and transfix me with admiration. I judge their beauty; I see it, if not to the utmost, at least enough so that I cannot aquire to it myself.[25]

This feeling sometimes feeds on a general conception of history as decadence in relation to a primitive truth. But it cannot be reduced to that. Even after the seventeenth century and the quarrel of the Ancients and the Moderns which saw, however, the victory of the latter, and even after the eighteenth century and the accession of the idea of progress to the rank of an unassailable belief, it survived in an underground fashion in German romanticism and idealism.[26] One finds it still in Goethe who wrote:

> To maintain ourselves courageously at the height of these barbarian advantages, since no doubt we can never attain the level of the ancient advantages, such is our duty.[27]

Finally, Nietzsche formulated it in regard to the whole of German philosophy:

> German philosophy taken as a whole . . . is the gravest kind of *romanticism* and nostalgia that has ever existed: a

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25 Montaigne, *Essais*, II, 17, "De la présomption," ed. P. Villey (Alcan, 1930), vol. 2, p. 610. English tr. D. M. Frame (Stanford, Ca: Stanford University Press, 1958), p. 482 f. I owe this reference as well as the passage from Goethe that follows to the article of P. Meitinger, "De l'Europe considérée en sa littérature," *Cahiers de l'Ecole des sciences philosophiques et religieuses*, Facultés universitaires Saint-Louis, Bruxelles, 14 (1993), pp. 49–94, cited on p. 51.

26 Cf. J. Taminiaux, *La nostalgie de la Grèce à l'aube de l'idéalisme allemand. Kant et les Grecs dans l'itinéraire de Schiller, de Hölderlin et de Hegel* (La Haye: Nijhoff, 1967), 274 pp.

27 Goethe, "Notes sur 'Le neveu de Rameau'" in *Sämtliche Werke* . . . Münchner Ausgabe, vol. 7 (Munich: Hanser, 1991), p. 666.

> demand for the very best that ever existed. Since then, one is not at all at home – one demands, at bottom, to return to where one can feel at home in one way or another, because it is there alone that one would like to be at home, and that is – in the Greek world! Only all the bridges leading there are collapsed – with the exception of the rainbows of concepts! And they lead everywhere, toward all the hometowns and "fatherlands" that have ever been given to Greek souls![28]

And Leo Strauss, in our century, still recognized that "one must be swayed by a sincere longing for the past."[29]

Between Historicism and Aestheticism

It is this feeling, I would suggest, that makes "Romans" out of Europeans. And in a sense, we have remained Romans even after and despite the revolution that has taken place in our relationship to the past. One must begin by becoming aware of the extent of that revolution. It is silent, but nonetheless constitutes one of the fundamental traits of modernity, it is the revolution in our historical relationship to our past. No doubt no one saw this better than Nietzsche, in the second of the *Untimely Meditations* (1874),[30] which remains the indispensable starting point for all reflection on this subject. The historicization of the past is the fact that one preserves the past, not because it is beautiful, or pertinent, or as one would want to say – which would be to return to considering it as present – but rather for the singular reason that it is past and therefore "interesting." One can point out several signs of this fact. Witness the fantastic, even malignant production of his-

28 Nietzsche, fragment of August-September 1885, 41 [4] *Kritische Studienausgabe*, vol. 11, p. 678.

29 Leo Strauss, "On Collingwood's Philosophy of History," *Review of Metaphysics* 5 (1951–52), p. 576.

30 Nietzsche, "On the Advantage and Disadvantage of the Study of History for Life." Cf also my own sketch, "Culture et mémoire," *Grand Larousse annuel*, Le livre de l'année, 1994, pp. 29–31.

torical works. Or again, consider the phenomenon of the museum,[31] more visible still when no longer satisfied with preserving the major works of art whose beauty tears them from their dated context and confers on them some atemporal value, but goes toward a progressive museumization of all the past.[32] Or again, witness the monument to the dead, supposed to memorialize the "war to end all wars," and therefore of what never again ought to be real.. Our relationship to the Ancients has become a relationship of conservation: we edit or study ancient texts, even when their content has nothing more to do with our knowledge or beliefs.

This attitude toward the ancient texts is tied to another that compensates for it and is perhaps its antidote: the aesthetic attitude that makes one appreciate a text for its beauty. This is what explains this paradoxical gesture of appropriating what one feels has nevertheless become strange. Now what characterizes the aesthetic attitude before a reality is that the separation of form and content loses all its pertinence. It suffices to have read a poem or a novel once in one's life to know it. The impossibility of distinguishing the content quite obviously permits the protection of the form. But it is also necessary to understand that this impossibility protects the content just as well. Changing the form to keep the content (which happens in a translation) reduces the text to the understanding of the translator. At the same time, it prevents other interpreters from coming along and digging out the meaning. The work of hermeneutics is possible only if the letter is preserved. And therefore if one has read the entire text, even the most prosaic, like a poem in which each word is itself irreplaceable – or, in a sense, if one reads prose as a limited case of poetry. The advantage of an aesthetic relationship to the texts is thus that it postulates that the text is inex-

31 The essential reading on this is without doubt in Valéry, "Le problème des musées," *Œuvres*, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, vol. 2, pp. 1290–93.

32 Cf. H. Lübbe, *Zeit-Verhältnisse. Zur Kulturphilosophie des Fortschritts*, Styria, Graz *et al.*, 1983, pp. 9–32.

haustible. It is its "inexhaustibility," and not its value as a model, that gives a text the character of a "classic." As Schlegel says:

> It is not necessary that one understand a classical text completely. But those who are cultivated and who cultivate themselves must always want to draw more lessons from it.[33]

A classic text is a text from which one can always extract new ideas. Now what one might call the cultural bet of Europe is just that these ancient texts will always have something to teach us – and therefore, that they must be preserved in their literalness.

Throwing Away the Shell

The world of Islam, on the other hand, if it has translated, and it has translated extensively, and if it has prolonged the content of what it translates, has not preserved the originals. Once again it is Friedrich Schlegel who noticed it, in a passage of polemical appearance, but whose central idea seems to me right:

> The Arabs are of an extremely polemical nature, the annihilators among the nations. The mania they had (*Liebhaberei*) of erasing the originals, or of throwing them out when the translation was finished, characterizes the spirit of their philosophy. It is no doubt because of this that they were infinitely more cultivated (*kultiviert*), but, despite all their civilization (*Kultur*), purely and simply more barbarian (*barbarisch*) than the Europeans of the Middle Ages. For the barbarian is indeed he who is at the same time anti-classical and anti-progressive.[34]

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33 F. Schlegel, *Kritische Fragmente*, §20; *Kritische Ausgabe*, vol. 2, p. 149.

34 F. Schlegel, *"Athenäum"-fragmente*, §229; *Kritische Ausgabe*, vol. 2, p. 202. For mysterious reasons, I didn't remember this text, that I had nonetheless already read, at the time of the first edition of the present work. I don't know where Schlegel came by this information.

One can put the value judgment aside that, in this case, is unfavorable, but preserve the fact, which is attested elsewhere. It had besides already sparked a reflection of Ibn Khaldûn who said magnificently:

> (The Muslims) desired to learn the sciences of the (foreign) nations. They made them their own through translations. They pressed them into the mold of their own views. They peeled (*ğarrada*) off these strange tongues (*luġa*) [and make them pass] into their [own] idiom (*lisān*), and surpassed the achievements of (the non-Arabs) in them. The manuscripts in the non-Arabic languages were forgotten, abandoned, and scattered. All the sciences came to exist in Arabic. The systematic works on them were written in (Arabic) writing. Thus, students of the sciences needed a knowledge of the meaning of (Arabic) words and (Arabic) writing. They could dispense with all other languages, because they had been wiped out and there was no longer any interest in them.[35]

One has to examine each image. One will notice in particular the image implicitly contained in the verb that I have translated very etymologically as "peel," and which commonly means "skin," and even, in philosophy, "abstract": that of a fruit whose pulp one consumes and whose skin one then throws away. In any event, the consequence of this disappearance of the original texts and of the neglect of the original languages is that the Muslim world has not been able to return to what it translated and deepen their examination. Admittedly, there are examples of a retranslation of the same Greek text. But this all happened in the ninth and tenth centuries when, of course, the originals were still available. This was as true of the Muslims as, in their wake, for the Christians of Syriac culture. It has been pointed out that these latter, in the ninth century, began to reuse some Greek manuscripts

35 Cf. Ibn Khaldûn, *Muqaddimah*, VI; Q, vol. 3, p. 276, 11–19; English trans. R, vol. 3, p. 317 – modified.

whose surface they scraped in order to write on them, not out of any lack of interest in Hellenic heritage, but because the works were already available in translation.[36]

In doing this, the Islamized world made the phenomena of "renaissances" impossible – that is, of a return to the original texts against the traditions that claimed to follow them. In the European world, the presence of the originals made a constant process of appeal possible. The schools of thought could confront each other with more or less bitterness. But at least they argued around the same sources. The "renaissances" are nothing other than the challenging of an ancient reading by a new reading of the same body of texts. Thus, the Italians, for example at Padua, opposed to the Scholastic's Aristotle that of Averroes, which was supposed, and not without reason, to be closer to the historical Aristotle. Or again, the humanists played the Latin of Cicero off the supposedly "barbaric" Medieval Latin.

Inclusion and Digestion

The same example of the reception of Aristotle can help to characterize the Islamic style of reception of ancient heritage and to better perceive, in contrast, that which characterizes Europe. One can indeed distinguish two types of reception. I propose to call them inclusion and digestion. As a child, I was fascinated by the knick-knacks on sale along the coast or in the mountains in which one drowned in translucent plastic, according to the case, a sea horse or an edelweiss. This is called "inclusion." The mass that surrounds the object removes it from one's immediate grasp. On the other hand, it also maintains it in a certain position, chosen because it permits one to see it as best possible. And already it shelters it

36 Cf. S. Brock, "From Antagonism to Assimilation: Syriac Attitudes to Greek Learning," N. Garsoian *et al.* (eds,), *East of Byzantium. Syria and Armenia in the Formative Period*, Dumbarton Oaks Symposium, 1980 (Washington: Dumbarton Oaks Papers, 1982), p. 29.

from the surrounding air whose contact would cause it to decompose. In this model, the interior does not stop for all that being something other. It is rather just the fact of having become interior that maintains it in its otherness. I will therefore call *inclusion*[37] that appropriation in which the foreign body is maintained in its otherness and surrounded by the process of an appropriation whose very presence brings out its otherness. On the other hand, I will call *digestion* an appropriation in which the object is assimilated to such a point that it loses its independence. This suppresses the difference between the subject who appropriates and the object that he appropriates: the lion is made from the digested lamb.

Inclusion is a highly artificial procedure; digestion is the most elementary of natural processes. If, therefore, the relationship of Europe to its sources is, as we will have to see, not natural but artificial, it would not be surprising to discover that Europe distinguishes itself from the other daughters of the ancient world less by the content it appropriated than by the way in which it appropriated it. Nor is there anything surprising in the fact that this way is artificial rather than natural. Ancient art and literature were included, as such, by inclusion as *others* in the transparency of European culture.

Let's give some specific examples. Where what must be received is a written text, two literary genres correspond to each of these two types of reception. First, the commentary reproduces the text, lemma after lemma, and explores it while maintaining its otherness. Secondly, the text can be integrated through rewriting into a work from which the original text can no longer be distinguished – what one calls a paraphrase. If then one considers the different ways Aristotle was commented on, in localizing them by culture and setting them back in their time, one notices the following facts: the ancient Greek commentators practiced the commentary as well as the

37 I am generalizing a concept (*Einsetzung*) borrowed from K. Flasch, *Einführung in die Philosophie des Mittelalters* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1989), p. 2.

paraphrase, as Themistius (fourth century of our era) did. But the great Neo-Platonic commentators, like Simplicius (sixth century) preferred the commentary. We possess commentaries from Al-Farabi (tenth century), for example, on the *Treatise on Interpretation*, as well as shorter texts that rework certain treatises of the *Organon* by adapting their content, though under the same title.

Avicenna (eleventh century) represents a decisive turn. He systematically practiced the method of the paraphrase, a method of inclusion, notably by rewriting the whole of the Aristotelian system of the sciences in his vast encyclopedia, *The Healing* (*Kitāb aš-sifā'*). It is of little importance to point out here the evidence that, first, he added an elevated dose of Neo-Platonism, which at that time followed Aristotelianism like a shadow, and secondly, that he created, in giving the work the stamp of his own genius, something profoundly original. What is important to note here is that Avicenna perfectly represents the Islamic method of appropriation by incorporation. One can recognize some affinity between the styles of appropriation and the religious background: Avicenna was, first, consciously opposed to the Arab Christians, the Aristotelizers of Baghdad. And secondly, looking back, he is distinguished for us from an author who, like Averroes, could hardly be received except by the Jews and the Christians. Now, the enterprise of Avicenna succeeded completely. So well that, in the Muslim Orient, Aristotelianism quite simply became Avicennism.[38] The receiver absorbed what he received to the point of being confounded with him, and of making him inaccessible for a direct reception.

Averroes (twelfth century), in a sort of return to the method of Al-Farabi, proceeded in two ways, depending on the genre of the commentary he was writing. He proceeded by digestion in his epitomes (*ǧawāmi'*) and his so-called "middle" commentaries (*šarḥ*), and by inclusion in his "great"

38 Cf. D. Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition. Introduction to Reading Avicenna's Philosophical Works* (Leiden: Brill, 1988), p. 261.

commentaries (*tafsīr*). Among the Christians, unlike his master Albert the Great, who proceeded like Avicenna, Thomas Aquinas (thirteenth century) wrote only great commentaries that all went back to the method of the commentaries of Averroes. With regard to the exegetic works of Averroes, one observes a very interesting inversion between the Jewish and the Christian philosophers. The passage of the Jewish intellectual centers from the Muslim world to the Christian accompanied an evolution in the styles of appropriation: in the beginning, the Jews used epitomes and not the great commentaries; on the other hand, the Christians used the great commentaries right away, and hardly knew the epitomes before the Renaissance. It was only in the wake of Christian scholasticism that the Jews came to be interested in the great commentaries of Averroes, and therefore, in the text itself of Aristotle.[39]

Why this model of relationship to cultural borrowings? As to the written texts, one can think that the presence and the linguistic accessibility of great poetry had imposed on Europe the aesthetic model of relationship to the text. As a result, it prevented one from decanting the content of the work all at once in order to throw away the container. In this sense it was poetry that saved Europe. But it would not have been able to do it if Christianity had not already, on the level of the relationship to the Absolute, imposed the cultural model of secondarity.

39 Cf. Zonta, *op. cit.*, p. 151 and *passim*.

VI
An Eccentric Identity

Indeed, as we have seen,[1] in the Christian world, the phenomenon of secondarity is found up to and including the relationship with the Absolute (to put it clearly, religion). Now it seems to me that it is the presence of secondarity on this fundamental level that singularizes Europe. Indeed, even if other civilizations recognize themselves as heirs – as many Asian cultures recognize a heavy debt to India (Southeast Asia, Tibet) or to China (Japan, Korea) – Europe is perhaps the only one to make this secondarity a principle situated at the very center of its relationship to the Absolute.

The Religious Basis of Secondarity

The elevation of cultural secondarity to the level of the relationship with the Absolute is the accomplishment of the religion that decisively marked Europe, that is to say, Christianity. It knew itself to be second in relation to the Old Covenant. This anchorage in the Absolute gave this secondarity a unique weight, though not without modifying it. Indeed, secondarity, in the religious domain, is not a question of time: the Old Covenant is not a past from which the New one distanced itself progressively; it is rather a permanent foundation. Consequentially, the New Covenant does not

1 Cf. *supra*, ch. III, p. 64.

conceive of itself as a progress in relation to the past, nor therefore as a historicization of the past. Conversely, the relationship to the heritage of the ancient world is indeed a relation to a past, and as such, it cannot avoid these two phenomena. Cultural secondarity (toward the "Greek"), then, must be retaken in the religious secondarity (toward the "Jewish") in order to be able to provide a permanent model.

In this way, it was religious secondarity that prevented all culture inherited from Christianity, as is the case with Europe, from considering itself as its own source. The refusal of Marcionism[2] is thus, perhaps, the founding event of the history of Europe as a civilization, in that it furnished the matrix of the European relationship to the past and anchored it at the highest possible level. It may be then that Saint Irenaeus, from his polemics against Marcionism and his affirmation of the identity of the God of the Old Testament with that of the New, is not only one of the Fathers of the Church, but also one of the Fathers of Europe. Conversely, the withdrawal of Europe into its own culture, understood as being only one culture among others, would be something like cultural Marcionism.

In the religious domain as in the cultural domain, Europe had the same relation to what preceded it: it did not tear itself from the past, nor did it reject it. Europe did not pretend, as to profane culture, to have absorbed in itself everything that Hellenism contained or, in religion, everything that the Old Testament contained – in such a way that one could throw away the empty shell. At the most, what Christianity claims to possess (the term is not even right) is the key permitting the interpretation of that to which the Old Covenant tended. It claims that the recapitulation of past history is given in the event of the Christ, the plenitude of the divinity (Colossians 2:9). But the exploration of the riches that are contained there, and their refraction in the sainthood of the Church, is an infinite task, which requires nothing less than all of history to come.

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2 Cf. *supra*, ch. III, p. 57.

The Islamic religion, in contrast, is characterized by an attitude of absorption. For the Islamic religion, as we have seen,[3] the Jews and the Christians tampered with the texts of revelation that were transmitted to them. Such revelation is present in its purity only in the Koran. It follows, for the Islamic religion, that the truth of Judaism, as well as that of Christianity, is found within itself, and in it alone. This truth is situated therefore outside the two religions that have preceded it and that are thus alienated from themselves. In consequence, their study has no intrinsic interest. Now, everything happens in the Muslim world as if the same model had been applied to the anterior or external civilizations. Islamic civilization has admittedly been able to interest itself in them, and even describe them in sumptuous detail in its masterpieces of physical and human geography.[4] This is a trait that it shares with Europe,[5] and that, on the other hand, distinguishes it from Byzantium.[6] But Islamic civilization, in contrast to Europe, has hardly dreamed of using its knowledge of the foreign as an instrument that would permit it, through comparison and distancing in relation to itself, to understand itself by becoming conscious of the non-obvious character of its cultural practices.[7] It may be that its geographers made a eulogy of India and of China in order to address a discrete critique of the Islamic civilization of their time, often compensated in the last instance by an affirmation of the religious superiority of the latter.[8] The examples that one could find of

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3 Cf. *ibid.*, p. 60.

4 On the Arab geographers, see the synthesis of A. Miquel, *La géographie humaine du monde musulman jusqu'au milieu du XIe siècle*, 4 vol. (Paris: Mouton, 1967, 1975, 1980, 1988).

5 Cf. *infra.* Ch. VII, p. 139.

6 Cf. C. Mango, *Byzantine Literature as a Distorting Mirror* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), p. 17.

7 This is the central thesis of B. Lewis, *The Muslim Discovery . . .*, *op. cit.* Cf. also Grunebaum, *Islam . . .*, pp. 43, 46, 47f.

8 Cf. Miquel, *Orient . . .*, note to p. 170.

such a vision "reflected" in the mirror are exceptional and come from marginal or heretical thinkers. Thus, the contact with the Brahmin Hindu thinkers whose religion does quite well without prophecy (which the Islamic religion declares on the contrary necessary to the happiness of man and to a good social order) posed a problem for the Muslim thinkers; the real or fictitious dialogue with the Brahmins was able to serve to mask a critique of the Islamic religion in a free thinker like Ibn al-Rawandi.[9]

The only incontestable exception is without doubt the astonishing work of Al-Biruni on India.[10] This universal scholar (973–1048), astronomer, geographer, historian, mineralogist, pharmacologist, etc.,[11] had taken the trouble to learn enough Sanskrit to be able to translate in both directions between this language and Arabic (for him also a learned language). He presented a tableau of Hindu society and beliefs with perfect impartiality. The sole predecessor whom he recognized, the mysterious Eranshahri, had according to him, been able to give an undistorted image of Christianity, Judaism, and Manichaeism because he himself was attached to no existing religion.[12] Admittedly, Biruni affirmed his orthodoxy, but the fact that he had taken the care to present, in one and the same work, the bibliography of his writings

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9 Cf. P. Kraus, "Studien zur islamischen Ketzergeschichte. Das Kitāb az-Zumurrud des Ibn ar-Rawāndī" (1933–34), reprinted in *Alchemie, Ketzerei, Apokryphen im frühen Islam. Gesammelte Aufsätze* (Hildesheim: Olms, 1994), pp. 109–90; S. Stroumsa, "The Blinding Emerald: Ibn ar-Rawandī's Kitāb az-Zumurrud" *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 114–12 (1994), pp. 163–85.

10 Al-Birūnī *Tahgīg mā li-'l-Hind min magūla magbūla fī 'l-'agl aw marḏūla*, ed. 'Ali Ṣafā (Beirut, 1983), 536 pp.; English trans. E. Sachau, *Alberuni's India* (London, Kegan Paul, 1914).

11 One can form an idea of his work thanks to the very good anthology of G. Strohmaier, *In den Gärten der Wissenschaft. Ausgewählte Texte aus den Werken des muslimischen Universalgelehrten* (Leipzig: Reclam, 1991), 318 pp.

12 *Taḥqīq . . . , op. cit.*, p. 15, 12–17; Engl. Sachau, vol. I, p. 6.

and those of the free-thinker Râzî invites one to ask questions . . .[13] In any event, this grandiose exception unfortunately does nothing but confirm the rule, since Al-Biruni remained without intellectual posterity.

The Idea of a "Renaissance"

In the cultural history of Europe, what I have called cultural secondarity seems to me to govern the relationship to the other. This relationship can be summarized in a double movement, of diastole and systole. First, one observes a constant expansion toward a supposedly "barbarian" domain that was to be assimilated and integrated. One can understand, from this point of view, at the very beginning of European history, the integration of peoples whose language was not Latin; first the Germanic tribes, then the Slavic or Scandinavian, and their access to writing, and to Christianity. Or again, the expansion that followed the great discoveries, and ended in the colonial adventure and in the sharing between European or quasi-European nations almost the totality of the inhabited world.

Secondly, one witnesses a constant effort to go back up toward the classical sources. One can thus describe the intellectual history of Europe as an almost uninterrupted train of renaissances. I must first clarify this idea somewhat. It inserted itself first of all in a determined schema of intellectual history, inherited from Petrarch,[14] then taken up again in the ideology of the Enlightenment. This ternary schema, which is perhaps the result of a secularization of Joachim of Fiore, presupposed a brilliant period that would come to interrupt a period of darkness, the "dark ages," the "ténèbres." This period would come to a close, and it would be necessary to

13 *Epître de Berūni contenant le répertoire des ouvrages de Muḥammad b. Zakarīya ar-Rāzī*, ed. P. Kraus, *(Paris:* Matba'at al-Qalam, *1936), 51 pp.*

14 Cf. Th. E. Mommsen, "Petrarch's Conception of the 'Dark Ages,'" *Speculum* XVII (1942), pp. 226–42.

retrieve the initial clarity. In doing this, one spanned an empty age, supposedly empty, that was sufficiently defined by its intermediary position, the "Middle Ages." The Renaissance, therefore, became the name of the end of the medieval obscurity.

For their part, historians have shown that the phenomenon of a renaissance, as a return and recourse to the ancient, had in fact never ceased. They enlarged the concept of renaissance and described its continuity over the centuries. One can then begin with the "Carolingian Renaissance," proceed to the "Renaissance of the Twelfth Century,"[15] and continue, of course, with the series of Italian renaissances. But one could not stop there, because one finds the German cycle of Hellenism in the same line. One can make it begin with Winckelmann – unless one insists on going back to Beatus Rhenanus. Weimar classicism then followed and resulted in the dream of becoming Greeks once again. This project was first of all entertained by the Romanticism of Jena, as Schlegel put it:

> To live according to the classical fashion, and to realize Antiquity in oneself in a practical fashion – such was the summit and the goal of philology.[16]

Then it was taken up by Nietzsche in the continuation of the fragment we just cited:

> From day to day we become more Greek, first, as is well understood, in our concepts and our evaluations, as phantoms who play at being Greek; but one day, we may hope, also with our bodies! There resides (and has always resided) my hope for what is German![17]

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15 An expression launched by C. H. Haskins, *The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1927).

16 F. Schlegel, *"Athenäum Fragmente,"*§147; KA, vol. 2, p. 188.

17 Nietzsche, fragment of August-September 1885, 41 [4]; KSA, vol. 11, p. 679, *Wille zur Macht*, §419 ff. Cf. *supra*, p. 101f.

The dream of a new renaissance is still present in the thinkers of our century. Outside the somewhat foggy dreams of a "third humanism" in Werner Jaeger, Heidegger had an ambiguous attitude on this subject.[18] Leo Strauss himself dreamed of a new renaissance founded on the idea of natural right:

> At most he hoped there might someday be a third humanism, or renaissance, after those of Italy and Germany, but this time inspired neither by the visual beauty of the Greeks' statues, paintings, and buildings nor by the grandeur of their poetry, but by the truth of their philosophy.[19]

Muslim Humanism and European Humanism

Is this fact proper to Europe? What about the other cultural domains? Can one speak, for example, of a Muslim humanism? The question is debated, and all the more as the word itself is far from being univocal. Let us try to introduce a little clarity on this subject:

a) One can understand "humanism" as the attempt to create a world founded solely on the consideration of man and by setting God outside of that circuit. Thus, in modern English, *humanist* is a polite expression for "atheist." In this sense, it is clear that a Muslim humanism is contradictory, just as much as would be a Christian humanism.

b) If one understands by "humanism" the love of belles-lettres, one can find in the Arab world periods during which the social conditions necessary to the emergence of such a

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18 Cf. the references given in my essay, "La phénoménologie comme accès au monde grec . . ." in *Phénoménologie et métaphysique*, ed. J.-L. Marion and G. Planty-Bonjour (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1984), p. 249, nt. 9.

19 Allan Bloom, "Leo Strauss. September 20, 1899–October 18, 1973," *Giants and Dwarfs: Essay 1960–1990* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990), p. 252.

humanism coincided: a public for refined letters, a taste for a general and particularly literary culture, etc., and where these conditions bore fruit entirely comparable to that in Europe. Some savvy experts have thus been able to propose calling certain characteristics of the Muslim world "humanist." This is the case, following I. Guidi and A. Badawi, of L. Gardet,[20] and then of M. Arkoun.[21]

c) One can call "humanism" the valorization of man, supposedly placed at the summit of nature or, for religions, of the creation. One finds in the Islamic world some affirmations of the exceptional value of man, beginning with the passages of the Koran on the role of man as the lieutenant (caliph) of God on earth.[22] One finds analogous affirmations in a good many anterior or parallel cultural traditions, in the Bible as among the Greeks.[23] In the lands of Islamic religion, one also finds a theory of the "perfect man," alone worthy of a supreme place among the living.[24] In this way, one may speak of a humanism in Arabic thought.

But first, if its tenets are expressed in Arabic, it comes from an oriental, Iranian or Greek, source.[25] And secondly, can one attach humanism to the Islamic religion as if it were

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20 L. Gardet, *La cité musulmane* (Paris: Vrin, 1954), pp. 271–328.

21 Cf. M. Arkoun, *Contribution à l'étude de l'humanisme arabe au IVe-Xe siècle. Miskawayh philosophe et historien* (Paris: Vrin, 1970), especially the very nuanced remarks in "L'attitude humaniste," pp. 356–64.

22 Koran, II, 27–30. The text is not absolutely certain. Blachère, French trans., p. 736, suspects "creature" (*ḫalīqa*) in the place of "caliph" (*ḫalīfa*). But it has been traditionally interpreted in the sense I assume. Cf. Wadād al-Qāḍī, "The Term 'Khalifa' in Early Exegetic Literature," *Welt des Islams* 28 (1988), pp. 392–411.

23 Psalm 8; for the Greeks, cf. the references given in my *Aristote . . . , op. cit.*, pp. 205–42.

24 The fundamental work remains that of H. H. Schaeder, "Die islamische Lehre vom Vollkommenen Menschen, ihre Herkunft und dichterische Gestaltung," *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft* 79 (1925), pp. 192–268.

25 Cf. A. Badawi, "L'humanisme dans la pensée arabe," *Studia Islamica* VI (1956), pp. 67–100.

its fundamental inspiration? Can one consider that the often suspect authors who professed it, like the authors of the Jâbir alchemical corpus, or Râzî, drew it from the Muslim religion? To take a precise example, it happens that Averroes let it be understood that religious ("divine") legislation must be judged according to its greater or lesser conformity to "human laws," that is to say, to the rules defining what regime is conformant to the ultimate end of man, such as is determined by philosophy and it alone. Thus, in a spectacular way, he turned inside out the point of view according to which the human laws must on the contrary be normed by the Divine Law.[26] Is this "humanism" the act of a good Muslim?

d) The question becomes difficult, but also interesting, under two conditions. First, the word "humanism" necessarily designates an attempt to accord man, vis-à-vis what he is not – including God – the status of an autonomic partner, a dignity that permits him to enter in a free relationship with his "others." Secondly, one must understand by "Islam," not a composite culture, but a religion such as is expressed in its normative documents. Now the scholars who deny the existence of this genre of humanism other than in Judaism and Christianity are not without authority, and their reasons merit being listened to.[27]

One can indeed take as argument the differences on the level of the representation of the origins of humanity and of the action of God toward it. In this respect, a nuance in the story of Adam is very revealing. In the Old Testament, it is

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26 Cf. Averroës, *Commentary on Plato's Republic*, ed., intro., trans. and notes by E. I. J. Rosenthal, 3rd edition (Cambridge University Press, 1969), I, vii 11, p. 26, 16 ff and II, iii, 1, p. 63, 1. On the overturning of perspective, cf. S. Pinès, "On Averroes' Political Theory" *Studies in the History of Jewish Philosophy. The Transmission of Texts and Ideas* (in Hebrew) (Jerusalem: Mosad Bialiq, 1977), p. 92.

27 Cf. C. H. Becker, *op. cit.*, p. 34; Jörg Kraemer, *Das Problem der islamischen Kulturgeschichte* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1959), ch. VIII, pp. 35–40; Grunebaum, *Islam . . . , op. cit.*, p. 68.

Adam who names the things that God has not named, in particular, the animals:

> So from the soil Yahweh God fashioned all the wild animals and all the birds of heaven. These he brought to the man to see what he would call them; each one was to bear the name the man would give it.[28]

All at once, God takes the risk of having to learn something from man, and He confirms man's decisions, thus allowing him to act as legislator. According to the Koran, on the other hand, it is on the contrary God who names everything and teaches their names to Adam:

> And [the Lord] taught Adam all the names, then he had [the beings so named] parade before the Angels and He said [to the Angels]: "Advise me about the names of these beings here, if you are truthful."[29]

The superiority of man will thus be defined in relation to the angel, and it will be due to knowledge conferred by God. The idea according to which God could leave a region of liberty to man, wait for man's choice, and respect this choice, is thus removed. And with even greater reason, the idea of incarnation which, in Christianity, confers on man an incomparable dignity.

Though I do not want to enter deeply here into this vast debate, it is interesting to notice that the perhaps central difference between European humanism and what resembles it in the Arab world is also a consequence of the nature of the ancient texts that have been transmitted to the one and to the other. Ancient literature, in what it had of the truly "literary," that is, epic, tragic and lyric poetry, never reached the Arab world – unlike, as we have seen, philosophy and the ancient sciences. Now, it is just this literature that carried something

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28 Genesis, 2:19; English trans., *The New Jerusalem Bible* (New York: Doubleday, 1985).

29 Koran, II, 31; French trans. Blachère, p. 736 ff. and note 29. The source seems to be *Bereshit Rabba*, 17, 4, ed. Theodor-Albeck, vol. 1, p. 155 ff.

like an ancient conception of man, with the models of his possible excellence in his affirmation in relation to the gods, to nature, to the city, etc. The Arab world has not therefore had to confront in its full force a global conception of man anterior to that of the Islamic religion: the idea of human excellence formed by the Arabs of the pagan "age of ignorance" *(ğāhiliyya)* had no weight in the face of the gravity of the Koranic message. Besides, the philosophical and scientific texts translated later did not express the pagan conception of man except under an attenuated form. The Christian world, on the other hand, had to measure itself against a more vigorous paganism: that of the anti-Christian Neo-Platonism of Porphyry and of Proclus that had not been adapted as the texts of Plotinus or Proclus translated into Arabic had been (like the *Theology of Aristotle, The Epistle on Divine Science,* or the *Discourse on the Pure Good* [*Liber de causis*]), and especially against that of the Greek tragedians, "the true adversaries of Christian sanctity."[30] Christianity therefore had to secrete more powerful antibodies.

Humanism with or without Renaissance

In the Arab world, any possible humanism has not, in any case, taken the form of "renaissances." This is another ambiguous term that must be clarified. Admittedly, nothing prevents the classification of certain periods of the intellectual history of the Muslim world under this convenient label. Thus, A. Mez (1869–1927) called the epoch of the Buyid Emirs in the tenth century the "Renaissance of Islam" – but as his book appeared posthumously, he could not explain the reasons for this appellation. Mez insisted on the importance of the penetration of sources, Greek and Christian, anterior and external to the Islamic religion, to explain its cultural devel-

30 Cf. H. U. von Balthasar, *Rechenschaft 1965*, Einsiedeln: Johannes, 1965, p. 24; Ph. Cormier, *op. cit.*, p. 99.

opment.[31] One then understands by "renaissance" a renewal of intellectual studies made possible by a relative civil peace, by the development and the diversification of the administration, and the subsequent emergence of a class with the leisure necessary to devote themselves to the concerns of the spirit. One could still consider as renaissances, in the eleventh century, the undertaking of a "revival of the religious sciences" *(iḥyā' 'ulūm id-dīn)*, the title of *al-Ghazālī's* great spiritual encyclopaedia, or finally, the emergence of an Arabic national consciousness (*naḥḍa*) at the end of the nineteenth century, and even the movements that today are shaking up Islamic civilization.

Is it not a question, in at least some of these phenomena, of a return to the sources, and therefore of a "renaissance" in the etymological sense of the term? Actually, it is often a question of a return to the sources of the Islamic religion itself, of a desire to find again a more or less ideal purity: that of the period of Medina when Mohammed himself organized his community, that of the "well-guided" caliphs, before the schisms that tore – and still divide – the Islamic religion at the time of Ali. A reform movement that we might easily call "modernist" could even give itself the paradoxical name of *salafiyya*, that is to say, of fidelity to ancestral customs. These returns all sought to go back to the sources, precisely, to the origins of the Islamic religion. Europe presents analogous cases, such as the successive reforms of the Church and, first and foremost, the Franciscan movement that attempted to revive the life led by the apostles of Christ.

But these phenomena, in the Islamic world as in Europe, are not "renaissances" in the conceptual sense for which I propose to reserve the word. It would be better to speak of them as reawakenings or revivals. Indeed, one must note here

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31 A. Mez, *Die Renaissance des Islams* (Heidelberg, 1922). Cf. the discussion in Joël Kraemer, *Humanism in the Renaissance of Islam. The Cultural Revival During the Buyid Age* (Leiden: Brill, 1986), pp. 1–5.

a fundamental difference. In one case, that of the religious awakenings, it is a matter of going back to the source while remaining in the interior of the tradition that it originated. In the other case, in contrast, that of renaissances properly said, the source one proposes to draw on is found beyond a solution of continuity, or even has never been in continuity with us. It is then a matter of *appropriating an origin in relation to which one feels foreign, and even alienated* – and in particular, the ancient sources.

Cultural Secondarity

This "Roman" attitude allows one to formulate what seems to me to constitute a special feature of European civilization. I am speaking here of a certain relation to cultural secondarity. I understand by this last term, in the first place, the banal fact that every culture is second. This is the case with every one that bears its stamp: even if it is acquired in earliest infancy, which makes it appear "entirely natural," culture is acquired and never innate. Besides, on the collective level, every culture is the heir of the one or several that preceded it. In this sense, every culture is a land of immigration. But there is more: cultural secondarity seems to me to have, in the case of Europe and of it alone, a supplementary dimension. Europe has indeed this special feature of having, one might say, *immigrated to itself.* I mean by this that the secondary character of the culture is not only present there as a fact, but is explicitly recognized and deliberately desired.

We have just characterized the history of European civilization, from the birth of Europe, as a nearly uninterrupted series of renaissances. Now, what is remarkable, as we have seen, is that the effort of returning back aims at something other than the cultural recoveries and religious revivals that traverse every civilization. This effort does not tend toward the primitive period; it is not a return toward what is proper

to the culture and which would have existed in all its purity at the time of the founding origins. On the contrary, it tends toward a source located *outside* of European culture – in this case, in Greco-Latin antiquity. A hugely important example of this fact is Law, such as it was systematized from the "Papal Revolution" of the late Eleventh Century on. What the Bologna legists studied were not the legal rules that were actually enforced at their time, but ancient Roman law: "it was the body of law, the legal system, *of an earlier civilization* (my emphasis, R. B.) . . . that formed the object of Europe's first legal study." [32]

Let us recall here a massive social fact: for centuries, the European elites have been selected according to their capacity to assimilate ancient languages. One sometimes compares this system to that of ancient China, and in French student argot, one speaks of the great university dons as "mandarins." The analogy is tempting: there also, the mandarins were recruited through a literary competition. But one forgets the difference which is essential: the lettered Chinese were experts in *Chinese* letters; in Europe, on the contrary, one studied the classics of two *other* civilizations, and of an otherness that was sometimes painfully felt.

Husserl, in a famous conference in which Europe was an issue, spoke of what is "Greco-European."[33] The hyphen, that linking line, seems to me to pose, or conceal, as many problems as forming the adjective "Judeo-Christian."[34] It constitutes an implicit claim of continuity. As if the European were the sole heir of the Greek; as if, especially, the heritage had

32 H. J. Berman, *Law and Revolution. The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition* (Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press, 1983), p. 122.

33 Husserl, "Die Krisis des europäischen Menschentums und die Philosophie," in *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften . . .*, Husserliana, vol. VI (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1962), pp. 314–48, cited on p. 329.

34 Cf. *supra.*, p. 43.

peaceably slid from one to the other, without rupture. Now, the contrary is in fact the truth. And it is the rupture that has revealed itself as fecund.

Two Cultures without Renaissances

One can get some idea of this by examining the case of two great civilizations, both quite respectable, but in which the phenomenon I have called, in the precise sense of the term, a "renaissance," never occurred.

Byzantium

The situation of secondarity in relation to the past aimed at by the "renaissances" is proper to Europe in the narrow sense as we have defined it. Thus, Byzantium never knew it. Admittedly, one does not have any trouble locating, in the cultural history of the Byzantine world, an uninterrupted "humanist" tradition. One sees there a series of "renaissances" follow one after the other, which constitute the counterpart, and often the model or a more or less direct motor, for analogous events occurring in Europe: the reestablishment of philological and literary studies in the ninth century with Photius or in the fourteenth with John Italus and Michael Psellus, and even a dream of Neo-Paganism in George Gemistus Plethon in the fifteenth century. But the great difference is that, for the Byzantine Greeks, Hellenism was considered as their proper past. Theodorus Metochites could still affirm: "We are the compatriots of the ancient Hellenes by race and by language."[35] For the Byzantines, it was only a matter of appropriating better and better what had always been their property.

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35 Cited, without references, by C. Diehl, *Etudes Byzantines* . . . (Paris: Picard, 1905), p. 398.

I could not express the situation and its consequences better than an Austrian historian of Byzantine art, who wrote:

> One calls these epochs during which one turns in an intense way toward the ancient heritage "renaissances," and one has compared them to the renaissances and the "recoveries" of Western Europe, both rightly and wrongly. Quite rightly, because in the renaissances in the West and at Byzantium, the intention and the direction in which one went were similar. But also wrongly, because the Occidental renaissances were of shorter duration, of less intensity, and separated from each other by intervals during which the tendency went entirely in the opposite direction. The Byzantine renaissances, conversely, followed nearly without a resolution of continuity, they were only nodal points on which forces were concentrated and efforts were almost always there. This is why one is right to speak of a "permanent renaissance" in Byzantium. But as a consequence these concentrations lacked tendencies that aimed at just what characterizes an authentic renaissance: Antiquity was for the Byzantines something so near that it could not establish that feeling of estrangement which would drive creation [schöpferisches Fremdheitserlebnis] and so nothing could truly be "reborn."[36]

Islam

In the lands of Islamic faith there were some attempts to restore a knowledge perceived as having come from outside, and moreover, very explicitly and technically identified under the name of "external sciences" – as opposed to the

36 O. Demus, "Die Rolle der byzantinischen Kunst in Europa," *Jahrbuch der Österreichischen Byzantinischen Gesellschaft* 14 (1965), pp. 139–55, cited on p. 141.

"traditional sciences" grouped around the Koran and what facilitates exegesis (grammar, poetry, etc). One comes across just these sorts of attempts in the period when books treating these "external sciences" were translated.

Thus, Al-Farabi presented a schema of the history of the transmission of philosophic and scientific knowledge that presupposed this effort: the knowledge passed from the Chaldeans, ancient inhabitants of Iraq, to the Arabs by way of the Egyptians, the Greeks, and the Syrians (Christians). Moreover, Al-Farabi associated the possession of internal rules of philosophical practice with the political art permitting its restoration if it should happen to be lost or corrupted.[37] Everything leads one to believe that he conceived of his own activity as preparing a restoration of philosophy after its eclipse.

One could equally cite, also in the philosophical domain, the effort of Averroes to restore Aristotelian thought to what he believed to be its authenticity by commenting systematically on his works. He considered that Aristotle's work had been corrupted by Avicenna in a Neo-Platonic direction, which represented, however, a previous reception of the same thought. But the work of Averroes had hardly any offspring in the land of its origin, Andalusia and Morocco, or in general in the southern Mediterranean. Nothing in any event that merits comparison to the enormous reception that it knew north of the Mediterranean, first in the Jewish communities, and then among Christians.

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37 Farabi, *Taḥsīl aṣ-Ṣa'āda, ed. Yā Sīn, Dār al-Andaloss* (Beirut, 1983), §65, p. 97, or the English trans. of M. Mahdi, *Alfarabi's Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle* (Cornell University Press, 1969), IV, §63, p. 50. On the Greek origin of the philosophy of the Arabs, cf. *Kitāb al-Ḥurūf*, II, §156, ed. M. Mahdi, (Beirut: *Dār al-Machreq*, 1969), p. 159. Cf. my "Eorum praeclara ingenia. Conscience de la nouveauté et prétention à la continuité chez Farabi et Maïmonide," in D. Mallet, ed., *Etudes de philosophie arabe*, Actes du colloque de Bordeaux, June 17–19, 1994, *Bulletin d'études orientales* XLVIII (1996), pp. 87–102.

These sorts of attempts never continued over a very long period of time. They came up short, and the "traditional sciences" remained more or less alone in the lists, after the Sunni normalization in the eleventh century. Intellectual life exhausted itself by a refusal or incapacity to open up to new sources. One might then jokingly suggest a parallel to the theory of M. Lombard on the medieval Muslim world economy, which was fettered by the exhaustion, or rather the non-renewal, of internal natural resources.

Unless we will have to propose, on the contrary, a hypothesis on the whole of the cultural decline of the Muslim world, which could be placed in line with what I am trying to show here. According to this hypothesis, the cultural stagnation of the Islamic world (which besides must be nuanced, according to time and the place) would paradoxically be due, not to a rejection but, on the contrary, to an excess of assimilation. The Islamic world would have ceased to advance from not having been able to maintain a relationship of externality to the sources from which it borrowed, and precisely because they were absorbed. If one may be permitted to reuse the somewhat baroque image of the ass before which one hangs an unattainable lure, it has swallowed the carrot which made it advance. A hypothesis of this genre has in any event been suggested with regard to the history of the sciences:

> The final result of all this is an instrumentalist and religiously oriented view of all secular and permitted knowledge. . . . The decline of science occurred, not in the context of opposition (as is usually thought) but in the context of acceptance and assimilation . . . – that is, it set in when the sciences came to be accepted and practiced only to the extent that they were legitimated by the instrumentalist view.[38]

38 Cf. A. I. Sabra, "The Appropriation and Subsequent Naturalization of Greek Science in Medieval Islam: a Preliminary Statement," *History of Science* XXV (1987), pp. 223–43, especially p. 240.

Funded Scholars and Parvenus

Conversely, European culture, taken as a whole, is an effort to go back to a past that was never its own, but in relation to which there was something like an irreparable fall, a painfully perceived "estrangement." It is not necessary to pause here to consider in what way this vision of the past is artificial. I am not unaware that what has come down to us of ancient culture is the result of a work of selection practiced since the Alexandrian period, and that the image we have created for ourselves of its totality generalizes excessively in imagining an "ancient world" entirely at the level of its masterpieces. I am not unaware either, in the inverse sense, that the presence of monuments and of ancient texts in the European space, and especially in Italy, assured a minimum of continuity despite everything. But what is alone decisive for me is the consciousness taken of the situation. Now, for the Europeans, it is a consciousness of being latecomers, and of having to go back to a source that "we" are not and which has never been "us."

This consciousness is vivid from the beginning of the European project. It is even, perhaps, the motor of its history. The figure of Charlemagne, whom one nicknamed "the father of Europe" (*Pater Europae*),[39] can serve as a paradigm here. This parvenu dreamed of competing with Byzantium, in comparison with which, despite its then-weakened state, he could not help but feel inferior. Byzantium had all the signs of legitimacy: material riches ("the gold of Byzantium"), a dynasty, the Roman name (the second Rome), manuscripts and scholars to read them, and numerous saints' relics that were signs of the continuity of the Church from its apostolic foundation.

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39 In the epic "Karolus et Leo papa," ln. 504; Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Poet. I, 1 (1881), 379. I cite following K.-F. Werner, *Karl der Große oder Charlemagne. Von der Aktualität einer überholten Fragestellung* (Munich, 1995), p. 4.

In his biography of Charlemagne, Einhard recounts that the emperor had bequeathed three tables of silver and one of gold in his will. On the first were represented, respectively, the maps of Constantinople and of Rome, and a map of the entire world.[40] One will note that two maps are conspicuous by their absence: among maps of cities, that of Aachen, the capital of the Carolingian Empire. This city must at that time cut a poor figure alongside the two reference points which Europe never ceased ogling, the two Romes, the ancient and the contemporary. But also missing was the map of Europe, the newly founded empire of the Occident. Its founder could not gaze at himself complacently in the image of his creation.

Europe had to be included, of course, in the map of the world. But this was the world before Columbus, without the New World, and all the more without Oceania. The geographical center was somewhere in the Middle East. The religious center was, for the Muslims, in Mecca, and for the Jews and the Christians, in Jerusalem. The center of culture was, for the Arabs, at Baghdad, and for the Christians, at Byzantium. It was not, in any event, in what was beginning to be called "Europe." Charlemagne could thus see the place his own Occidental empire occupied, far from the centers, far from Jerusalem, far from everything – eccentric.

He tried to be linked to Byzantium first by competing with it, and even in aping it – in architecture, for example: the basilica of Aachen imitates that of Ravenna, the single accessible example of Byzantine architecture. Then, by trying to intervene in the theological debates – for example, on icons, with the *Libri Carolini*. Finally, to the great scandal of the Basileus, he dared to have himself crowned emperor of the Occident. All of this rested on an admission and a recognition: legitimacy was elsewhere, it came from elsewhere, it was nec-

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40 I am citing from the commodious little edition of Einhard, *Vita Karoli Magni / Das Leben Karls des Grossen*, Lateinisch /Deutsch, ed. E. S. Firchow (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1981), §33, p. 66 ff.

essary to have it come from elsewhere – possibly under the form of Byzantine princesses whose blood would improve that of the Carolingian heirs. As is known, politically speaking, the Carolingian project failed. At the most it fed, with hardly any possible resolution of continuity, a persistent dream of restoration. One can thus summarize the history of Europe as being that of a *translatio imperii.*[41]

More profoundly, the feeling of legitimacy of the Occidental empire remained fragile, to the point that a certain feeling of bastardy arose from time to time, even in the Occident. It was the case, for example, with Luther who, once Charles V banned him from the empire, used it as grist for his mill by contesting the legitimacy of the Occidental Empire which, according to Luther, had usurped titles valid only for Byzantium.[42] The feeling of cultural inferiority in relation to Byzantium remained quite vivid even after Charlemagne.[43]

On the other hand, the fundamental attitude that made European cultural history possible is precisely Charlemagne's. The same biographer, Einhard, tells how Charlemagne used to keep tablets and a stylus under his pillow to slog away at writing when he couldn't sleep.[44] The father of Europe was illiterate, but he was learning to write. He who, from our images at Epinal, was the father of schools was in fact himself a schoolboy, and the sort who took night classes. Such was the making of Europe: taking after its "father," it is an illiterate continent that learned to read – not Gaulish or German, etc. – but Latin and Greek.

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41 Cf. P. Sloterdijk, *Falls Europa erwacht. Gedanken zum Programm einer Weltmacht am Ende des Zeitalters ihrer politischen Absence* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1994), p. 34 ff.

42 *An Open Letter to the Christian Nobility of the German Nation. . . ,* no. 26 (added in the second edition, 1520), *Works of Martin Luther.* (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1943), vol. 2, p. 153–158.

43 Cf. M. Rentschler, "Griechische Kultur und Byzanz im Urteil westlicher Autoren des 10. Jahrhunderts," *Saeculum* 29 (1978), pp. 324–55.

44 Einhard, *Life of Charlemagne,* cited ed., §25, p. 48 ff.

One is familiar with the distinction dear to Charles Maurras between the heir and the funded scholar, a comparison that, in his spirit, was to the advantage of the former. The latter, an uncouth drudge, whose successes were only scholarly, could never compete with the heir. Had the heir not had from the cradle, even received from his ancestral line, an innate knowledge? He accomplished with ease what cost the scholar a thousand efforts that were often clumsy, always lacking grace. If the scholar "arrived," he betrayed his modest origins in a thousand ways – gestures, turns of phrase, tastes – and would always remain a parvenu. Can we apply here something conceived about individuals to the level of civilizations? Europe is entirely a continent of scholars, of parvenus, of grinds (in Latin!). That is its greatness.

An Inverse Adoption

One can accordingly characterize the cultural history of Europe as being that of an inverse adoption.[45] Usually, it is the parents who adopt the child, either from their incapacity to have one themselves or because those they have had have proved unable to play the role they expected of them. Thus, we find Roman emperors adopting adults as their successor. In Europe, the process has functioned in the other direction. Those who came later chose their ancestors for themselves. The European heritage is the object of a vast usurpation of a legacy. The Europeans are the heirs of antiquity in nothing. At the very least, they are not, if it is necessary as in most cases to understand by "heir," someone who has only taken "the trouble to be born," and who has received from the cradle all material and cultural goods, which his parents have left him. They are heirs, on the other hand, if one conceives of the fact of being an heir as nothing more than an activity of appropriation.

45 I realized that the idea is already to be found in H. J. Berman, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

An entire literary genre, in the contemporary Occident, does everything to reconstitute the genealogy of our modernity. This genealogy is taken in a paradoxical sense: indeed, it is no longer a matter of proving one's nobility by exhibiting an uninterrupted line of glorious ancestors; on the contrary, it is a matter of denouncing bastardy, of denouncing an impure origin. This is the sense that the term has taken, at least since Rousseau,[46] or in any event, certainly since Nietzsche attempted to write *The Genealogy of Morals*. There are then some people who, applying the genealogical method to the historical reality of Europe, do their utmost to show the illegitimacy of its descent. They do it either in comparison to one or another civilization considered as the source (classical Greece or Rome), in comparison to another civilization considered as an equally legitimate heir, such as Islam, or yet again in comparison to one considered even more legitimate, such as Byzantium.

These people admittedly are right about the facts, and I have besides given some arguments to shore up this idea. But they do not see that their enterprise destroys itself: believing to unmask the misery of Europe, they on the contrary present evidence of the secret of its greatness. Because, when all is said and done, the cultural poverty of Europe has been her good fortune. It obliged it to work and to borrow. On the contrary, the richness of Byzantium paralyzed it, got in its way, because it had no need to look elsewhere. This has been noticed in regard to the history of art.[47] One noticed it equally in regard to philosophy:

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46 Cf. Rousseau, *Lettre à C. de Beaumont* (1763) in *Œuvres complètes*, collection L'intégrale (Paris: Seuil, 1971), vol. 3, p. 340b.

47 Cf. A. Grabar, "L'asymétrie des relations de Byzance et de l'Occident dans le domaine des arts au Moyen Age" in *Byzanz und der Westen. Studien zur Kunst des europäischen Mittelalters*, ed. I. Hutter (Vienna: Verlag der österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1984), pp. 9–24.

> As speakers of Greek, the Byzantine world remained closed to the philosophical culture of the Islamic lands; its intellectual richness, its tradition, its heritage made it unnecessary for it to look elsewhere. The Latin world, on the contrary, was philosophically poor, and its poverty served as an opening. . . . The good fortune of the Latin speaking Occidental world was thus in its lack of philosophical culture which obliged it to make some meaning out of its problems rather than with instruments.[48]

The fact is that Byzantium has never experienced the need to borrow from the Arab world, in any event, in the philosophical domain. There was no intellectual "racism" behind that: Byzantium translated Arabic doctors, as for example, the treatises of Razi on smallpox – probably at the moment when an epidemic had reduced the doctors of pure Greek background to silence.[49] But it seems that Byzantium never knew Farabi, Avicenna, or Averroes. Or rather, if it knew them, it was, surprisingly, from translations of the works of Saint Thomas Aquinas, completed in the fourteenth century, in which the doctrines of the two latter thinkers were expounded and criticized.

The consciousness that Europe had of having its sources outside of itself had the consequence of displacing its cultural identity, such that it has no other identity than an *eccentric identity*.

It is now fashionable to hurl at European culture the adjective "eurocentric." To be sure, every culture, like every living being, can't help looking at the other ones from its own vantage point, and Europe is no exception. Yet, no culture

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48 A. de Libera, *La philosophie médiévale* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1993), p. 309 and p. 262.

49 Cf. M.-H. Congourdeau, "Le traducteur grec du traité de Rhazès sur la variole," *Storia e ecdotica dei testi medici greci*, ed. A. Garzya, Atti del 2 convegno internazionale, Paris, May 24–26, 1994 (Naples, 1996), pp. 99–111.

was ever so little centered on itself and so interested in the other ones as Europe. China saw itself as the "Middle Kingdom." Europe never did. "Eurocentrism" is a misnomer. Worse: it is the contrary of the truth.

Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics

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Theory and History of Literature, Volume 8

University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis

Publication of this book was assisted by a grant from the publications program of the National Endowment for the Humanities, an independent federal agency.

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Published by the University of Minnesota Press,
2037 University Avenue Southeast, Minneapolis, MN 55414

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Bakhtin, M. M. (Mikhail Mikhaĭlovich), 1895-1975.
Problems of Dostoevsky's poetics.
(Theory and history of literature; v. 8)
Translation of: Problemy poetiki Dostoevskogo.
Includes index.
1. Dostoevsky, Fyodor, 1821-1881—Criticism and interpretation. I. Emerson, Caryl. II. Title.
III. Series.
PG3328.Z6B2413 1984 891.73'3 83-12348
ISBN 0-8166-1227-7
ISBN 0-8166-1228-5 (pbk.)

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Chapter Two
The Hero, and the Position of the Author with Regard to the Hero, in Dostoevsky's Art

We have advanced a thesis, and in the light of this thesis provided a somewhat monologic survey of the more substantial attempts to define the basic characteristic of Dostoevsky's art. In the process of this critical analysis, we have made our own point of view clearer. Now we must move on to a more detailed and documented development of this position, based on the material of Dostoevsky's works.

We will pause, in turn, on three aspects of our thesis: on the relative freedom and independence enjoyed by the hero and his voice under the conditions of polyphonic design; on the special placement of the idea in such a design; and, finally, on those new principles of linkage shaping the novel into a whole. The present chapter is devoted to the hero.

The hero interests Dostoevsky not as some manifestation of reality that possesses fixed and specific socially typical or individually characteristic traits, nor as a specific profile assembled out of unambiguous and objective features which, taken together, answer the question "Who is he?" No, the hero interests Dostoevsky as a *particular point of view on the world and on oneself*, as the position enabling a person to interpret and evaluate his own self and his surrounding reality. What is important to Dostoevsky is not how his hero appears in the world but first and foremost how the world appears to his hero, and how the hero appears to himself.

This is a very important and fundamental feature of the way a fictional character is perceived. The hero as a point of view, as an opinion on the world and on himself, requires utterly special methods of discovery and artistic characterization. And this is so because what must be discovered and characterized here is not the specific existence of the hero, not his fixed image, but the *sum total of his consciousness and self-consciousness*, ultimately *the hero's final word on himself and on his world.*

Consequently those elements out of which the hero's image is composed are not features of reality—features of the hero himself or of his everyday surroundings—but rather the *significance* of these features for the *hero himself*, for his self-consciousness. All the stable and objective qualities of a hero—his social position, the degree to which he is sociologically or characterologically typical, his habitus, his spiritual profile and even his very physical appearance—that is, everything that usually serves an author in creating a fixed and stable image of the hero, "who he is," becomes in Dostoevsky the object of the hero's own introspection, the subject of his self-consciousness; and the subject of the author's visualization and representation turns out to be in fact a *function* of this self-consciousness. At a time when the self-consciousness of a character was usually seen merely as an element of his reality, as merely one of the features of his integrated image, here, on the contrary, all of reality becomes an element of the character's self-consciousness. The author retains for himself, that is, for his exclusive field of vision, not a single essential definition, not a single trait, not the smallest feature of the hero: he enters it all into the field of vision of the hero himself, he casts it all into the crucible of the hero's own self-consciousness. In the author's field of vision, as an object of his visualization and representation, there remains only pure self-consciousness in its totality.

Even in the earliest "Gogolian period" of his literary career, Dostoevsky is already depicting not the "poor government clerk" but the *self-consciousness* of the poor clerk (Devushkin, Golyadkin, even Prokharchin). That which was presented in Gogol's field of vision as an aggregate of objective features, coalescing in a firm socio-characterological profile of the hero, is introduced by Dostoevsky into the field of vision of the hero himself and there becomes the object of his agonizing self-awareness; even the very physical appearance of the "poor clerk," described by Gogol, Dostoevsky forces his hero to contemplate in the mirror.[1] And thanks to this fact all the concrete features of the hero, while remaining fundamentally unchanged in content, are transferred from one plane of representation to another, and thus acquire a completely different artistic significance: they can no longer finalize and close off a character, can no longer construct

an integral image of him or provide an artistic answer to the question, "Who is he?" We see not who he is, but *how* he is conscious of himself; our act of artistic visualization occurs not before the reality of the hero, but before a pure function of his awareness of that reality. In this way the Gogolian hero becomes Dostoevsky's hero.[2]

One might offer the following, and somewhat simplified, formula for the revolution that the young Dostoevsky brought about in Gogol's world: he transferred the author and the narrator, with all their accumulated points of view and with the descriptions, characterizations, and definitions of the hero provided by them, into the field of vision of the hero himself, thus transforming the finalized and integral reality of the hero into the material of the hero's own self-consciousness. Not without reason does Dostoevsky force Makar Devushkin to read Gogol's "Overcoat" and to take it as a story about himself, as "slander" against himself; this is how Dostoevsky literally introduces the author into the hero's field of vision.

Dostoevsky carried out, as it were, a small-scale Copernican revolution when he took what had been a firm and finalizing authorial definition and turned it into an aspect of the hero's self-definition. The content of Gogol's world, the world of "The Overcoat," "The Nose," "Nevsky Prospect," and "Notes of a Madman," remained quite unchanged in Dostoevsky's earliest works, *Poor Folk* and *The Double*. But in Dostoevsky the distribution of this identical material among the structural elements of the work is completelydifferent. What the author used to do is now done by the hero, who illuminates himself from all possible points of view; the author no longer illuminates the hero's reality but the hero's self-consciousness, as a reality of the second order. The dominant governing the entire act of artistic visualization and construction had been shifted, and the whole world took on a new look—although in essence almost no new non-Gogolian material had been introduced by Dostoevsky.[3]

Not only the reality of the hero himself, but even the external world and the everyday life surrounding him are drawn into the process of self-awareness, are transferred from the author's to the hero's field of vision. They no longer lie in a single plane with the hero, alongside him and external to him in the unified world of the author —and for this reason they cannot serve as causal or genetic factors determining the hero, they cannot fulfill in the work any explanatory function. Alongside and on the same plane with the self-consciousness of the hero, which has absorbed into itself the entire world of objects, there can be only another consciousness; alongside its field of vision, another field of vision; alongside its point of view on the world, another point of view on the world. *To the all-devouring consciousness of the hero the author can juxtapose only a single objective world—a*

world of other consciousnesses with rights equal to those of the hero.

One must not interpret the self-consciousness of a hero on the socio-characterological plane and see it merely as a new trait of the character—that is, see in Devushkin or Golyadkin a Gogolian hero plus self-consciousness. That is exactly how Devushkin was understood by Belinsky.*[a] He cites the passage with the mirror and the torn-off button, a passage which struck him especially, but he does not grasp its formal artistic significance: for him, self-consciousness merely enriches the image of the "poor clerk" in a humanistic direction, arranging itself alongside other features in a fixed image of the character constructed within the usual authorial field of vision. Perhaps this is what prevented Belinsky from correctly assessing *The Double* as well.

Self-consciousness, as the *artistic dominant* governing the construction of a character, cannot lie alongside other features of his image; it absorbs these other features into itself as its own material and deprives them of any power to define and finalize the hero.

Self-consciousness can be made the dominant in the representation of any person. But not all persons are equally favorable material for such a representation. The Gogolian clerk in this respect offered too narrow a potential. Dostoevsky sought a hero who would be occupied primarily with the task of becoming conscious, the sort of hero whose life would be concentrated on the pure function of gaining consciousness of himself and the world. And at this point in his work there begin to appear the "dreamer" and the "underground man." Both "dreamer-ness" and "underground-ness" are socio-characterological features of people, but here they also answer to Dostoevsky's artistic dominant. The consciousness of a dreamer or an underground man—who are not personified, and cannot be personified—is most favorable soil for Dostoevsky's creative purposes, for it allows him to fuse the artistic dominant of the representation with the real-life and characterological dominant of the represented person.

Oh, if I had done nothing simply out of laziness! Heavens, how I would have respected myself then. I would have respected myself because I would at least have been capable of being lazy; there would at least have been in me one positive quality, as it were, in which I could have believed myself. Question: Who is he? Answer: A loafer. After all, it would have been pleasant to hear that about oneself! It would mean that I was positively defined, it would mean that there was something to be said about me. "Loafer"—why, after all, it is a calling and

[a]On Belinsky's enthusiastic reception of *Poor Folk*, see Dostoevsky's own reminiscence of the event 32 years later, in *The Diary of a Writer*, January 1877, chapter II, 3 (pp. 584-87). Belinsky's review of *Poor Folk* can be found in V. G. Belinskii, *Sobranie sochinenii* (Moscow: OGIz, 1948), III, pp. 61-86 ("Peterburgskii sbornik").

an appointment, it is a career, gentlemen. [*SS* IV, 147; "Notes from Underground," Part One, VI]

The Underground Man not only dissolves in himself all possible fixed features of his person, making them all the object of his own introspection, but in fact he no longer has any such traits at all, no fixed definitions, there is nothing to say about him, he figures not as a person taken from life but rather as the subject of consciousness and dream. And for the author as well he is not a carrier of traits and qualities that could have been neutral toward his self-consciousness and could have finalized him; no, what the author visualizes is precisely the hero's self-consciousness and the inescapable open-endedness, the vicious circle of that self-consciousness. Thus the real-life characterological definition of the Underground Man and the artistic dominant of his image are fused into one.

Only among the classicists, only in Racine is it possible to find so deep and complete a concurrence between the form of the hero and the form of the man, between the dominant by which the image is constructed and the dominant of the hero's character. This comparison of Dostoevsky with Racine sounds like a paradox, for the material out of which each realizes a whole and adequate art is indeed far too diverse. Racine's hero is all objective existence, stable and fixed, like plastic sculpture. Dostoevsky's hero is all self-consciousness. Racine's hero is an immobile and finite substance; Dostoevsky's hero is infinite function. Racine's hero is equal to himself; Dostoevsky's hero never for an instant coincides with himself. But artistically, Dostoevsky's hero is just as precise as Racine's.

Self-consciousness, as the artistic dominant in the construction of the hero's image, is by itself sufficient to break down the monologic unity of an artistic world—but only on condition that the hero, as self-consciousness, is really represented and not merely expressed, that is, does not fuse with the author, does not become the mouthpiece for his voice; only on condition, consequently, that accents of the hero's self-consciousness are really objectified and that the work itself observes a distance between the hero and the author. If the umbilical cord uniting the hero to his creator is not cut, then what we have is not a work of art but a personal document.

Dostoevsky's works are in this sense profoundly objective—because the hero's self-consciousness, once it becomes the dominant, breaks down the monologic unity of the work (without, of course, violating artistic unity of a new and nonmonologic type). The hero becomes relatively free and independent, because everything in the author's design that had defined him and, as it were, sentenced him, everything that had qualified him to be once and for all a completed image of

reality, now no longer functions as a form for finalizing him, but as the material of his self-consciousness.

In a monologic design, the hero is closed and his semantic boundaries strictly defined: he acts, experiences, thinks, and is conscious within the limits of what he is, that is, within the limits of his image defined as reality; he cannot cease to be himself, that is, he cannot exceed the limits of his own character, typicality or temperament without violating the author's monologic design concerning him. Such an image is constructed in the objective authorial world, objective in relation to the hero's consciousness; the construction of that authorial world with its points of view and finalizing definitions presupposes a fixed external position, a fixed authorial field of vision. The self-consciousness of the hero is inserted into this rigid framework, to which the hero has no access from within and which is part of the authorial consciousness defining and representing him—and is presented against the firm background of the external world.

Dostoevsky renounces all these monologic premises. Everything that the author-monologist kept for himself, using it to create the ultimate unity of a work and the world portrayed in it, Dostoevsky turns over to his hero, transforming all of it into an aspect of the hero's self-consciousness.

There is literally nothing we can say about the hero of "Notes from Underground" that he does not already know himself: his typicality for his time and social group, the sober psychological or even psychopathological delineation of his internal profile, the category of character to which his consciousness belongs, his comic as well as his tragic side, all possible moral definitions of his personality, and so on—all of this, in keeping with Dostoevsky's design, the hero knows perfectly well himself, and he stubbornly and agonizingly soaks up all these definitions from within. Any point of view from without is rendered powerless in advance and denied the finalizing word.

Because the dominant of representation in this literary work coincides maximally with the dominant of that which is represented, the formal task of the author can be very clearly expressed in the content. What the Underground Man thinks about most of all is what others think or might think about him; he tries to keep one step ahead of every other consciousness, every other thought about him, every other point of view on him. At all the critical moments of his confession he tries to anticipate the possible definition or evaluation others might make of him, to guess the sense and tone of that evaluation, and tries painstakingly to formulate these possible words about himself by others, interrupting his own speech with the imagined rejoinders of others.

"Isn't that shameful, isn't that humiliating?" you will say, perhaps, shaking your heads contemptuously. "You long for life and try to settle the problems of life by a logical tangle. . . . You may be truthful in what you have said but you have no modesty; out of the pettiest vanity you bring your truth to public exposure, to the market place, to ignominy. You doubtlessly mean to say something, but hide your real meaning for fear, because you lack the resolution to say it, and only have a cowardly impudence. You boast of consciousness, but you are unsure of your ground, for though your mind works, yet your heart is corrupted by depravity, and you cannot have a full, genuine consciousness without a pure heart. And how tiresome you are, how you thrust yourself on people and grimace! Lies, lies, lies!"

Of course I myself have made up just now all the things you say. That, too, is from underground. *For forty years I have been listening to your words there through a crack under the floor. I have invented them myself. After all, there was nothing else I could invent.* It is no wonder that I have learned them by heart and that it has taken a literary form. [*SS* IV, 164-65; "Notes from Underground," Part One, XI]

The hero from the underground eavesdrops on every word someone else says about him, he looks at himself, as it were, in all the mirrors of other people's consciousnesses, he knows all the possible refractions of his image in those mirrors. And he also knows his own objective definition, neutral both to the other's consciousness and to his own self-consciousness, and he takes into account the point of view of a "third person." But he also knows that all these definitions, prejudiced as well as objective, rest in his hands and he cannot finalize them precisely because he himself perceives them; he can go beyond their limits and can thus make them inadequate. He knows that he has the *final word*, and he seeks at whatever cost to retain for himself this final word about himself, the word of his self-consciousness, in order to become in it that which he is not. His consciousness of self lives by its unfinalizability, by its unclosedness and its indeterminancy.

And this is not merely a character trait of the Underground Man's self-consciousness, it is also the dominant governing the author's construction of his image. The author does indeed leave the final word to his hero. And precisely that final word—or, more accurately, the tendency toward it—is necessary to the author's design. The author constructs the hero not out of words foreign to the hero, not out of neutral definitions; he constructs not a character, nor a type, nor a temperament, in fact he constructs no objectified image of the hero at all, but rather the hero's *discourse* about himself and his world.

Dostoevsky's hero is not an objectified image but an autonomous discourse, *pure voice*; we do not see him, we hear him; everything that we see and know apart from his discourse is nonessential and is swallowed up by discourse as its raw material, or else remains outside it as something that stimulates and provokes. We will demonstrate

below that the entire artistic construction of a Dostoevskian novel is directed toward discovering and clarifying the hero's discourse, and performs provoking and directing functions in relation to that discourse. The epithet "a cruel talent," applied to Dostoevsky by N. K. Mikhailovsky,* has some justification, although not as simple a one as it seemed at the time. The special sort of moral torture that Dostoevsky inflicts upon his heroes, in order to force out of them that ultimate word of a self-consciousness pushed to its extreme limits, permits him to take all that is merely material, merely an object, all that is fixed and unchanging, all that is external and neutral in the representation of a person, and dissolve it in the realm of the hero's self-consciousness and self-utterance.

To convince ourselves of the artistic depth and subtlety of these provocative artistic devices of Dostoevsky, it is enough to compare him with recent enthusiastic imitators of this "cruel talent"—the German Expressionists Kornfeld,* Werfel,* and others. In most cases these writers cannot get beyond provocations of hysteria and various hysterical frenzies, because they are incapable of creating around the hero that extremely complex and subtle atmosphere that would force him to reveal and explain himself dialogically, to catch aspects of himself in others' consciousnesses, to build loopholes for himself, prolonging and thereby laying bare his own final word as it interacts intensely with other consciousnesses. Those who are artistically the most restrained, such as Werfel, create a symbolic setting for the hero's self-revelation. Such, for example, is the court scene from Werfel's "Spiegelmensch," in which the hero passes judgment on himself and the judge takes minutes and summons witnesses.

This dominant of self-consciousness in the construction of the hero is correctly grasped by the Expressionists, but they are incapable of compelling self-consciousness to reveal itself spontaneously and in an artistically convincing way. What results is either a crude and deliberate experiment on the hero, or a symbolic action.

The self-clarification, self-revelation of the hero, his discourse about himself not predetermined (as the ultimate goal of his construction) by some neutral image of him, does indeed sometimes make the author's setting "fantastic," even for Dostoevsky. For Dostoevsky the verisimilitude of a character is verisimilitude of the character's own internal discourse about himself in all its purity—but, in order to hear and display that discourse, in order to incorporate it into the field of vision of another person, the laws of that other field must be violated, for the normal field can find a place for the object-image of another person but not for another field of vision in its entirety. Some fantastical viewpoint must be sought for the author outside ordinary fields of vision.

Here is what Dostoevsky says in the author's foreword to "A Meek One":

> Now for the story itself. I have called it a fantastic story, whereas I personally consider it highly realistic. There is, however, a fantastic element in it, that is, in the very composition of the story, and this, I think, needs to be explained beforehand.
>
> The fact is that this is neither a narrative nor a collection of notes. Imagine to yourself a husband whose wife has committed suicide only a few hours ago by jumping out of the window. Her body is laid out on the table. He is confused and has not arranged his thoughts. He is pacing his rooms, trying to take in what has happened, and "bring his thoughts to a focus." The man, it must be said, is an inveterate hypochondriac, one of those who talk to themselves. And so he is talking to himself, going over what has happened and trying to take it all in. Despite his seeming coherence he often contradicts himself both in his logic and his feelings. He both justifies himself and accuses her, then goes into irrelevant explanations: coarseness of heart and mind is mingled with depth of feeling. By degrees he does take it all in and "focuses his thoughts." A train of memories he has called up bring him at last irresistibly to the *truth*, and truth irresistibly ennobles his heart and mind. Towards the end the very tone of his narrative becomes different from its incoherent beginning. The truth is revealed to the poor man quite clearly and definitely, sufficiently for himself to see at least.
>
> So much for the theme. The telling of the story, of course, takes a few hours in breaks and snatches; it is disconnected in form, for he either argues with himself or addresses some unseen listener, a judge as it were. However, it is always like that in real life. If a stenographer could have listened to him and taken it all down, it would have sounded rather less smooth and finished than my account, but I do believe that the psychological sequence would have probably been the same. Now this hypothetical stenographer (whose notes I have given shape to) is what I call "fantastic" in my story. However, something of the sort has been allowed in literature before: Victor Hugo, for instance, in his masterpiece *Le Dernier Jour d'un Condamné* [The Last Day of a Man Condemned] resorted to almost the same medium, and though he portrayed no stenographer he made it even less credible by assuming that a man sentenced to death was able (and had sufficient time) to make notes not only of his last day on earth, but also of his last hour and, actually, his last minute. Were it not for this fantastic situation, however, the work itself would not have been written—the most realistic and the most truthful of all his books. [*SS* X, 378-79]

We have quoted this foreword almost in its entirety because the statements expressed there are of extraordinary importance for understanding Dostoevsky's creative method: the "*truth*" at which the hero must and indeed ultimately does arrive through clarifying the events to himself, can essentially be for Dostoevsky only *the truth of the hero's own consciousness*. It cannot be neutral toward his self-consciousness. In the mouth of another person, a word or a definition identical in content would take on another meaning and tone, and would no longer be the truth. Only in the form of a confessional

self-utterance, Dostoevsky maintained, could the final word about a person be given, a word truly adequate to him.

But how can this word be introduced into the story without destroying the individuality of the word, and at the same time without destroying the fabric of the story, without reducing the story to a simple motivating device for the introduction of the confession? The fantastical form of "A Meek One" is only one possible solution to this problem, and it is limited by the scope of a novella. But what artistic effort was required of Dostoevsky to replace the functions of a fantastic stenographer throughout an entire multi-voiced novel!

The issue here is not, of course, pragmatic difficulties or external compositional devices. Tolstoy, for example, calmly introduces the final thoughts of his dying hero, the final flicker of consciousness with its final word, directly into the fabric of the story and straight from the author (as early as the "Sevastopol Stories," but it is especially evident in the later works, "The Death of Ivan Ilych," "Master and Man"). For Tolstoy the very problem does not even arise; he has no need to stipulate the fantastic nature of his device. Tolstoy's world is monolithically monologic; the hero's discourse is confined in the fixed framework of the author's discourse about him. Even the hero's final word is given in the shell of someone else's (the author's) word; the hero's self-consciousness is only one aspect of his fixed image and is in fact predetermined by that image, even where thematically consciousness undergoes a crisis and the most radical inner revolution (as in "Master and Man"). In Tolstoy, self-consciousness and spiritual rebirth remain entirely in the realm of content and have no form-shaping significance; the ethical unfinalizability of a man before his death does not become the structural and artistic unfinalizability of the hero. The artistic structure of Brekhunov's or Ivan Ilych's image differs in no way from that of the old prince Bolkonsky or Natasha Rostova. For all their thematic importance in Tolstoy's work, a character's self-consciousness and discourse never become the dominant by which he is constructed. A second autonomous voice (alongside the author's voice) does not appear in Tolstoy's world; for that reason there is no problem of linking voices, and no problem of a special positioning for the author's point of view. Tolstoy's discourse and his monologically naive point of view permeate everywhere, into all corners of the world and the soul, subjugating everything to its unity.

In Dostoevsky, the author's word stands opposite the fully valid and pure unalloyed word of the hero. Therefore a problem does arise with the positioning of authorial discourse, the problem of its formal and artistic position with regard to the hero's discourse. This problem lies deeper than the question of authorial discourse on the superficial level of composition, and deeper than any superficially compositional

device for eliminating authorial discourse by means of the *Ich-Erzählung* form (first-person narration), or by the introduction of a narrator, or by constructing the novel in scenes and thus reducing authorial discourse to the status of a stage direction. All these compositional devices for eliminating or weakening authorial discourse at the level of composition do not in themselves tackle the essence of the problem; their underlying artistic meaning can be profoundly different, depending on the different artistic tasks they perform. The *Ich-Erzählung* form of "The Captain's Daughter" [by Alexander Pushkin, 1836] is infinitely far removed from the *Ich-Erzählung* form of "Notes from Underground," even if we abstractly think away the content that fills these forms. Grinev's story is constructed by Pushkin in a fixed monologic field of vision, even though this field is not represented externally in the composition because there is no direct authorial discourse. But it is precisely that field of vision that determines the entire construction. As a result *the fixed image of Grinev* is an image, and not a discourse; Grinev's discourse is an element of his image, that is, it is fully exhausted by functions of characterization and pragmatic development of the plot. Grinev's point of view on the world and its events is likewise only a component of his image: he is presented as a *characteristic reality*, and not as a directly signifying, fully weighted *semantic position*. The direct and unmediated power to mean belongs only to the authorial point of view lying at the base of the construction; everything else is merely its object. The introduction of a narrator may in fact not weaken the monologism of the author's position at all, which would continue to see and know all things only in one way; and it need not strengthen at all the semantic weight and independence of the hero's discourse. Of such a sort, for example, is Pushkin's narrator Belkin.[b]

Thus all these compositional devices are in themselves still incapable of destroying the monologism of an artistic world. But in Dostoevsky they do in fact perform this function, becoming a tool in the realization of his polyphonic artistic design. We will see below how and by what means they perform this function. But for our present purposes only the artistic design itself is important, and not the means for concretely realizing it.

Self-consciousness, as the artistic dominant in the structure of a character's image, presupposes a radically new *authorial position* with regard to the represented person. We repeat: what is at issue here is not the discovery of new features or new types of man, for those could be discovered, glimpsed, and portrayed in art through an

[b]Pushkin twice used the garrulous provincial squire Ivan Petrovich Belkin as his narrator: in the five *Tales of Belkin* (1830) and in the *History of the Village of Goryukhino* (1830).

ordinary monologic approach to the person, that is, without any radical change in the author's position. No, at issue here is precisely the discovery of a *new integral view on the person*—the discovery of "personality" (Askoldov) or "the man in man" (Dostoevsky)—possible only by approaching the person from a correspondingly new and *integral* authorial position.

We will try to clarify in somewhat greater detail this integral position, this fundamentally new *form* for visualizing a human being in art.

In Dostoevsky's earliest literary work one can already see something like a revolt of the hero against literature's secondhand, externalizing and finalizing approach to the "little man." As we noted above, Makar Devushkin read Gogol's "Overcoat" and was deeply offended by it *personally*. He recognized himself in Akaky Akakievich and was outraged that his poverty had been *spied upon*, that his entire life had been analyzed and described, that he had been defined once and for all, that he had been left with no other prospects.

> One hides oneself sometimes, one hides oneself, one tries to conceal one's weak points, one's afraid to show one's nose at times anywhere because one is afraid of tittle-tattle, because they can work up a tale against you about anything in the world—anything. And here now all one's private and public life is being dragged into literature, it is all printed, read, laughed and gossiped about! [*SS* I, 146; *Poor Folk*, Letter of July 8]

Devushkin was especially outraged that Akaky Akakievich had died unchanged, just the same as he had always been.

Devushkin had glimpsed himself in the image of the hero of "The Overcoat," which is to say, as something totally quantified, measured, and defined to the last detail: all of you is here, there is nothing more in you, and nothing more to be said about you. He felt himself to be hopelessly predetermined and finished off, as if he were already quite dead, yet at the same time he sensed the falseness of such an approach. This peculiar "revolt" of the hero against his literary finalization is presented by Dostoevsky in the consistent, primitive forms of Devushkin's consciousness and speech.

The serious and deeper meaning of this revolt might be expressed this way: a living human being cannot be turned into the voiceless object of some secondhand, finalizing cognitive process. *In a human being there is always something that only he himself can reveal, in a free act of self-consciousness and discourse, something that does not submit to an externalizing secondhand definition.* In *Poor Folk* Dostoevsky made his first attempt to show—although still incompletely and unclearly—*that internally unfinalizable something in man*, the thing that Gogol and the other authors of "tales about poor

government clerks" could not show from their monologic positions. Thus in his first work Dostoevsky is already beginning to grope his way toward his future radically new position with regard to the hero.

In Dostoevsky's subsequent works, the characters no longer carry on a *literary* polemic with finalizing secondhand definitions of man (although the author himself sometimes does this for them, in very subtle ironic-parodic form), but they all do furious battle with such definitions of their personality in the mouths of other people. They all acutely sense their own inner unfinalizability, their capacity to outgrow, as it were, from within and to render *untrue* any externalizing and finalizing definition of them. As long as a person is alive he lives by the fact that he is not yet finalized, that he has not yet uttered his ultimate word. We have already noted how agonizingly the Underground Man eavesdrops on all actual and potential words others say of him, and how he tries to outguess and outwit all possible definitions of his personality others might offer. The hero of "Notes from Underground" is the first hero-ideologist in Dostoevsky's work. One of his basic ideas, which he advances in his polemic with the socialists, is precisely the idea that man is not a final and defined quantity upon which firm calculations can be made; man is free, and can therefore violate any regulating norms which might be thrust upon him.

Dostoevsky's hero always seeks to destroy that framework of *other people's* words about him that might finalize and deaden him. Sometimes this struggle becomes an important tragic motif in the character's life (as, for example, with Nastasya Filippovna).

In the major heroes, in such protagonists of the great dialogue as Raskolnikov, Sonya, Myshkin, Stavrogin, Ivan and Dmitry Karamazov, the profound consciousness of their own unfinalizability and indeterminancy is realized in very complex ways, by ideological thought, crime, or heroic deed.[4]

A man never coincides with himself. One cannot apply to him the formula of identity A ≡ A. In Dostoevsky's artistic thinking, the genuine life of the personality takes place at the point of non-coincidence between a man and himself, at his point of departure beyond the limits of all that he is as a material being, a being that can be spied on, defined, predicted apart from its own will, "at second hand." The genuine life of the personality is made available only through a *dialogic* penetration of that personality, during which it freely and reciprocally reveals itself.

The truth about a man in the mouths of others, not directed to him dialogically and therefore a *secondhand* truth, becomes a *lie* degrading and deadening him, if it touches upon his "holy of holies," that is, "the man in man."

We will cite several statements by Dostoevsky's heroes that express the same thought about *secondhand analyses* of the human soul.

In *The Idiot*, Myshkin and Aglaya are discussing Ippolit's unsuccessful attempted suicide. Myshkin gives an analysis of the deeper motives behind the act. Aglaya says to him:

I find all this very mean on your part, for it's very *brutal* to *look on* and *judge a man's soul*, as you judge Ippolit. You have no tenderness, *nothing but truth, and so you judge unjustly*. [*SS* VI, 484; *The Idiot*, Part III, ch. 7]

Truth is unjust when it concerns the depths of *someone else's* personality.

The same motif sounds even more clearly, if in somewhat more complex form, in *The Brothers Karamazov*, in Alyosha's conversation with Liza about Captain Snegirev, who had trampled underfoot the money offered him. Having told the story, Alyosha analyzes Snegirev's emotional state and, as it were, *predetermines* his further behavior by *predicting* that next time he would *without fail* take the money. To this Liza replies:

. . . Listen, Alexey Fyodorovich. Isn't there in all our analysis—I mean your analysis . . . no, better call it ours—aren't we showing *contempt* for him, for that poor man—*in analyzing his soul like this*, as it were, *from above*, eh? In deciding so *certainly* that he will take the money? [*SS* IX, 271-72; *The Brothers Karamazov*, Book Five, I]

An analogous motif, that of the impermissability of some *other outside person* penetrating the depths of a personality, is heard in Stavrogin's angry words uttered in Tikhon's cell, where he had come with his "Confession":

"Listen, I don't like *spies* and *psychologists*, at least those who poke into my soul."[5]

It must be pointed out that in the given instance Stavrogin is utterly wrong in his attitude toward Tikhon: Tikhon approaches him in a profoundly *dialogic* manner, and understands fully the unfinalizability of his inner personality.

At the very end of his creative career, Dostoevsky defined in his notebook the distnguishing features of his realism in this way:

"With utter realism *to find the man in man* . . . They call me a *psychologist; this is not true*. I am merely a realist *in the higher sense*, that is, I portray all the *depths of the human soul*."[6]

We will have occasion to return more than once to this remarkable formula. But at this point it is important to emphasize three of its aspects.

First, Dostoevsky considers himself a realist, but not a subjective

romantic trapped in the world of his own consciousness. He solves his *new* task—"portraying all the depths of the human soul"—with "utter realism," that is, he sees these depths *outside* himself, in the souls of *others*.

Second, Dostoevsky believes that this *new* task cannot be adequately performed by realism in the usual sense, that is, by what is in our terminology *monologic* realism; what is needed here is a special approach to the "man in man," that is, a "realism in the higher sense."

Third, *Dostoevsky categorically denies that he is a psychologist.*

We must examine this third aspect in somewhat more detail. Toward the psychology of his day—as it was expressed in scientific and artistic literature, and as it was practiced in the law courts—Dostoevsky had no sympathy at all. He saw in it a degrading *reification* of a person's soul, a discounting of its freedom and its unfinalizability, and of that peculiar indeterminacy and indefiniteness which in Dostoevsky constitute the main object of representation: for in fact Dostoevsky always represents a person *on the threshold* of a final decision, at a moment of *crisis*, at an unfinalizable—and *unpredeterminable*—turning point for his soul.

Dostoevsky constantly and severely criticized mechanistic psychology, both its pragmatic lines based on the concepts of *natural law* and *utility*, and even more its physiological line, which reduced psychology to physiology. He ridicules it in his novels as well. It is enough to remember the "tubercles on the brain" in Lebezyatnikov's explanation of Katerina Ivanovna's spiritual crisis (*Crime and Punishment*)[c], or the transformation of Claude Bernard's name into a pejorative symbol of man's liberation from responsibility—the "Bernards" of Mitenka Karamazov (*The Brothers Karamazov*).[d]

But particularly revealing for an understanding of Dostoevsky's artistic position is his criticism of legal investigative psychology, which is at best a "double-edged sword," that is, something that permits mutually exclusive solutions to be accepted with an equal probability of being true, and at worst simply a lie degrading the individual.

In *Crime and Punishment* the remarkable court investigator Porfiry Petrovich—it was he who called psychology a "double-edged sword"—is governed not by it, that is not by legal investigative psychology, but by a special *dialogic intuition* that allows him to penetrate the unfinalized and unresolved soul of Raskolnikov. The three meetings of Porfiry with Raskolnikov are in no sense ordinary investigative interrogations; but this is not only because they do not "follow the proper form" (a point Porfiry continually emphasizes), but because

[c] *Crime and Punishment*, Part V, ch. 5

[d] *The Brothers Karamazov*, Book Twelve, IX ("Psychology at Full Steam")

they violate the very basis of the traditional psychological relationship between investigator and criminal (this Dostoevsky emphasizes). All three of Porfiry's meetings with Raskolnikov are authentic and remarkable polyphonic dialogues.

The most profound picture of false psychology in practice is provided by the scenes of Dmitry's preliminary investigation and trial in *The Brothers Karamazov*. The investigator, judges, prosecutor, defense attorney, and commission of experts are all equally incapable of approaching the unfinalized and undecided core of Dmitry's personality, for he is a man who stands, in essence throughout his entire life, on the threshold of great internal decisions and crises. In place of this living core, bursting with new life, they substitute a sort of *ready-made definitiveness*, "naturally" and "normally" *predetermined* in all its words and acts by "psychological laws." All who judge Dmitry are devoid of a genuinely dialogic approach to him, a dialogic penetration into the unfinalized core of his personality. They seek and see in him only the factual, *palpable definitiveness* of experiences and actions, and subordinate them to already defined concepts and schemes. The authentic Dmitry remains outside their judgment (he will pass judgment on himself).

This is why Dostoevsky did not consider himself a psychologist in any sense of the term. What is important for us, of course, is not the philosophical and theoretical side of his criticism in and of itself; it cannot satisfy us and in any case suffers from a misunderstanding of the dialectics of freedom and necessity in the acts and consciousness of a man.[7] What is important for us here is the striving of Dostoevsky's *artistic* energies and the new *form* of his artistic visualization of the inner man.

It is appropriate here to emphasize that the major emotional thrust of all Dostoevsky's work, in its form as well as its *content*, is the struggle against a *reification* of man, of human relations, of all human values under the conditions of capitalism. Dostoevsky did not, to be sure, completely understand the deep economic roots of reification; nowhere, as far as we know, did he use the actual term "reification," but it is this term precisely that best expresses the deeper sense of his struggle on behalf of man. With great insight Dostoevsky was able to see how this *reifying devaluation* of man had permeated into all the pores of contemporary life, and even into the very foundations of human thinking. In his criticism of this reifying mode of thought he sometimes "addresses the wrong social party," as Ermilov expressed it[8]; he accused all the representatives of the revolutionary democratic movement and Western socialism, considering them outgrowths of the capitalist spirit. But, we repeat, what is important for

us is not the abstractly theoretical and not the journalistic side of his criticism, but rather the *larger sense of his artistic form*, which liberates and de-reifies the human being.

Thus the new artistic position of the author with regard to the hero in Dostoevsky's polyphonic novel is a *fully realized and thoroughly consistent dialogic position*, one that affirms the independence, internal freedom, unfinalizability, and indeterminacy of the hero. For the author the hero is not "he" and not "I" but a fully valid "thou," that is, another and other autonomous "I" ("thou art"). The hero is the subject of a deeply serious, *real* dialogic mode of address, not the subject of a rhetorically *performed* or *conventionally* literary one. And this dialogue—the "great dialogue" of the novel as a whole—takes place not in the past, but right now, that is, in the *real present* of the creative process.[9] This is no stenographer's report of a *finished* dialogue, from which the author has already withdrawn and *over* which he is now located as if in some higher decision-making position: that would have turned an authentic and unfinished dialogue into an objectivized and finalized *image of a dialogue*, of the sort usual for every monologic novel. The great dialogue in Dostoevsky is organized as an *unclosed whole* of life itself, life poised *on the threshold*.

Dostoevsky realizes a dialogic relationship toward his characters at every moment of the creative process and at the moment of its completion; this is part of his general design, and thus remains in even the most finished novel as an indispensable element for shaping form.

In Dostoevsky's novels, the author's discourse about a character is organized as discourse about *someone actually present*, someone who hears him (the author) and is *capable of answering him*. Such organization of authorial discourse in Dostoevsky's works is no conventional device, but rather the unconditional *ultimate* position of the author.[e] In the fifth chapter of our work we will try to show that the distinctiveness of Dostoevsky's verbal style is due to the overriding importance of precisely such dialogically oriented discourse, and to the negligible role played by monologically closed-off discourse, by words that expect no answer.

In Dostoevsky's larger design, the character is a carrier of a fully valid word and not the mute, voiceless object of the author's words. The author's design for a character is a *design for discourse*. Thus the author's discourse about a character is discourse about discourse. It is oriented toward the hero as if toward a discourse, and is therefore dialogically *addressed* to him. By the very construction of the novel, the author speaks not *about* a character, but *with* him. And it

[e]"Conventional" and "conditional" are rendered by the same word [*uslovnyi*] in Russian; in English, the parallelism of this sentence is lost.

cannot be otherwise: only a dialogic and participatory orientation takes another person's discourse seriously, and is capable of approaching it both as a semantic position and as another point of view. Only through such an inner dialogic orientation can my discourse find itself in intimate contact with someone else's discourse, and yet at the same time not fuse with it, not swallow it up, not dissolve in itself the other's power to mean; that is, only thus can it retain fully its independence as a discourse. To preserve distance in the presence of an intense semantic bond is no simple matter. But distance is an integral part of the author's design, for it alone guarantees genuine objectivity in the representation of a character.

Self-consciousness as the dominant in the construction of a character's image requires the creation of an artistic atmosphere that would permit his discourse to reveal and illuminate itself. Not a single element in this atmosphere can be neutral: everything must touch the *character* to the quick, provoke him, interrogate him, even polemicize with him and taunt him; everything must be directed toward the hero himself, turned toward him, everything must make itself felt as *discourse about someone actually present*, as the word of a "second" and not of a "third" person. The semantic point of view of a "third person," on whose territory a stable image of the hero is constructed, would destroy this atmosphere, and therefore such a point of view does not enter into Dostoevsky's creative world; and this is not because such a viewpoint is unavailable (due to the characters' autobiographical origins, or to Dostoevsky's extreme polemicism), but because it does not enter into Dostoevsky's creative design. This design requires a thorough dialogization of all elements in the construction. Here is the source of that apparent nervousness, that extreme overstrain and agitation of the atmosphere in Dostoevsky's novels that superficially conceal the most subtle artistic calculations, the balance and necessity of each tone, each accent, each unexpected turn of events, each scandal, each eccentricity. Only in the light of this artistic project can one understand the authentic function of such compositional elements as the narrator and his tone, the compositionally expressed dialogue, and the peculiarities of narration direct from the author (in those places where it exists).

Such is the relative independence of characters within the limits of Dostoevsky's creative design. Here we must warn against one possible misunderstanding. It might seem that the independence of a character contradicts the fact that he exists, entirely and solely, as an aspect of a work of art, and consequently is wholly created from beginning to end by the author. In fact there is no such contradiction. The characters' freedom we speak of here exists within the limits of the artistic design, and in that sense is just as much a created thing as is

the unfreedom of the objectivized hero. But to create does not mean to invent. Every creative act is bound by its own special laws, as well as by the laws of the material with which it works. Every creative act is determined by its object and by the structure of its object, and therefore permits no arbitrariness; in essence it invents nothing, but only reveals what is already present in the object itself. It is possible to arrive at a correct thought, but this thought has its own logic and therefore cannot be invented, that is, it cannot be fabricated from beginning to end. Likewise an artistic image, of whatever sort, cannot be invented, since it has its own artistic logic, its own norm-generating order. Having set a specific task for himself, the creator must subordinate himself to this order.

Dostoevsky's hero is likewise not invented, just as the hero of the ordinary realistic novel, and the romantic hero, and the hero of the classicists are not invented. But each has his own order, his own logic, which enters into the realm of the author's artistic intention but is not infringed upon by the author's whim. Once he has chosen a hero and the dominant of his hero's representation, the author is already bound by the inner logic of what he has chosen, and he must reveal it in his representation. The logic of self-consciousness permits only certain artistic means for revealing and representing itself. Self-consciousness can be interrogated and provoked into revealing and representing itself, but not by giving it a predetermined or finalizing image. Such an objectified image is precisely what is inadequate to the very thing that the author has selected as his subject.

Thus the freedom of a character is an aspect of the author's design. A character's discourse is created by the author, but created in such a way that it can develop to the full its inner logic and independence as *someone else's discourse*, the word of the *character himself*. As a result it does not fall out of the author's design, but only out of a monologic authorial field of vision. And the destruction of this field of vision is precisely a part of Dostoevsky's design.

In his book *On the Language of Artistic Literature* V. V. Vinogradov* refers to a very interesting, almost *polyphonic* plan for an unfinished novel by N. G. Chernyshevsky.* He cites it as an example of the impulse toward a maximally objective construction of the *author's image*. Chernyshevsky's novel in manuscript had several titles, one of which was *The Pearl of Creation*. In his foreword to the novel Chernyshevsky reveals the essence of his design in this way:

To write a novel without love—without a single female character—is a very difficult thing. But I felt the need to try my strength at a task even more difficult: *to write a purely objective novel, in which there would be no trace not only of my personal attitudes, but also of my personal sympathies. In Russian literature*

there is not a single such novel. Onegin and *A Hero of Our Time* are unabashedly subjective things; *Dead Souls* contains no portrait of the author nor portraits of his acquaintances, but the personal sympathies of the author have certainly been incorporated; they are in fact the source of that strong impression the novel produces. It seems that for me, a man of strong and fixed convictions, the most difficult thing would be to write as Shakespeare wrote: *he portrays people and life without saying what he himself thinks on the questions that are resolved by his characters in a way appropriate for each.* Othello says "yes," Iago says "no," Shakespeare says nothing, he has no desire to state his love or lack of love for a "yes" or a "no." It is understood that I am speaking of the manner, and not of the strength, of the talent . . . *Try to discover whom I sympathize with and whom I don't . . . You won't find out . . .* In *The Pearl of Creation* each poetic position is examined from all four sides—try to discover which opinion I sympathize with, which I do not. *Try to discover how one point of view passes over into another completely incompatible with it.* This is the true meaning of the title "The Pearl of Creation"—here, as in mother-of-pearl, are all the shades of colors in the rainbow. But as in mother-of-pearl all these shades slide by one another, and play against a background of snowy whiteness. It is thus to my novel that the lines of verse in the epigraph refer:

Wie Schnee, so weiss,
Und Kalt, wie Eis,

The second line refers to me.

There is "whiteness, like the whiteness of snow" in my novel, "but coldness, like the coldness of ice" in its author . . . to be cold, like ice, this was difficult for me, for a person who loves ardently what he loves. But I succeeded. Thus I see that I have the necessary power of artistic creativity to become a novelist . . . *My characters are very diverse in the expressions their faces must assume* . . . Think of each what you will: *each says for himself: "The full right is on my side"—you be the judge of these conflicting claims. I do not judge.* These characters praise one another, condemn one another—all that is none of my business.[10]

Such is Chernyshevsky's intention (insofar, naturally, as we can judge from his foreword). We see that Chernyshevsky was groping here toward the essentially new structural form of an "objective novel," as he calls it. Chernyshevsky himself emphasizes the utter novelty of the form ("In all of Russian literature there is not a single such novel") and contrasts it to the ordinary "subjective" novel (we would have said "monologic").

What, according to Chernyshevsky, is the essence of this new novelistic structure? The subjective point of view of the author must not be represented in it; neither must the author's sympathies and antipathies, his agreement or disagreement with the individual characters, nor his personal ideological position ("without saying what he himself thinks on the questions that are resolved by his characters . . .").

This does not mean, of course, that Chernyshevsky had in mind a novel without an authorial position. Such a novel is in general impossible. Vinogradov is absolutely correct when he writes: "The tendency toward 'objectifying' the artistic reproduction and the various devices for 'objective' construction are all merely special, but correlative, principles for constructing an *image of the author.*"[11] The issue here is not an absence of, but a *radical change in, the author's position*, and Chernyshevsky himself emphasizes that this new position is considerably more difficult than the ordinary position and presupposes an enormous "power of poetic creativity."

This new "objective" authorial position (whose realization Chernyshevsky finds only in Shakespeare) permits the characters' points of view to unfold to their maximal fullness and independence. Each character *freely* (without the author's interference) reveals and substantiates the rightness of his own position: "each says *for himself*: 'the full right is on my side'—you judge these conflicting claims. I do not judge."

Precisely in this *freedom for others' points of view to reveal themselves* without any finalizing evaluations from the author does Chernyshevsky see the chief advantage of the new "objective" form of novel. We emphasize that Chernyshevsky saw in this no betrayal of "his strong and fixed convictions." Thus we can say that Chernyshevsky came very close indeed to the idea of polyphony.

What is more, Chernyshevsky also comes close here to the concepts of counterpoint and the "image of an idea." "*Try to discover*," he says, "*how one point of view passes over into another completely incompatible with it.* This is the true meaning of the title 'The Pearl of Creation'—*here, as in mother-of-pearl, are all the shades of colors in the rainbow.*" This is in fact a splendid graphic definition of counterpoint in literature.

Such is the interesting conception of new novelistic structure by one of Dostoevsky's contemporaries, who keenly sensed, as Dostoevsky himself did, the extraordinary multi-voicedness of his epoch. True, this conception cannot be called polyphonic in the full sense of the word. The new authorial position in it is characterized as something essentially negative, as an absence of the usual authorial subjectivity. There is no mention of the author's dialogic activity, without which a new authorial position cannot be realized. But nevertheless Chernyshevsky clearly felt the need to go beyond the limits of the prevailing monologic form of the novel.

Here it is again appropriate to emphasize the *positive and active quality* of the new authorial position in a polyphonic novel. It would be absurd to think that the author's consciousness is nowhere expressed in Dostoevsky's novels. The consciousness of the creator of a

polyphonic novel is constantly and everywhere present in the novel, and is active in it to the highest degree. But the function of this consciousness and the forms of its activity are different than in the monologic novel: the author's consciousness does not transform others' consciousnesses (that is, the consciousnesses of the characters) into objects, and does not give them secondhand and finalizing definitions. Alongside and in front of itself it senses others' equally valid consciousnesses, just as infinite and open-ended as itself. It reflects and re-creates not a world of objects, but precisely these other consciousnesses with their worlds, re-creates them in their authentic *unfinalizability* (which is, after all, their essence).

The consciousnesses of other people cannot be perceived, analyzed, defined as objects or as things—one can only *relate to them dialogically*. To think about them means to *talk with them; otherwise they immediately turn to us their objectivized side*: they fall silent, close up, and congeal into finished, objectivized images. An enormous and intense dialogic activity is demanded of the author of a polyphonic novel: as soon as this activity slackens, the characters begin to congeal, they become mere things, and monologically formed chunks of life appear in the novel. Such chunks, which fall out of the polyphonic design, can be found in all of Dostoevsky's novels, but they do not of course determine the nature of the whole.

The author of a polyphonic novel is not required to renounce himself or his own consciousness, but he must to an extraordinary extent broaden, deepen and rearrange this consciousness (to be sure, in a specific direction) in order to accommodate the autonomous consciousnesses of others. This was a very difficult and unprecedented project (something Chernyshevsky apparently understood very well when he devised his plan for the "objective novel"). But it was essential if the polyphonic nature of life itself was to be artistically recreated.

Every *true* reader of Dostoevsky, who perceives his novels not in the monologic mode and who is capable of rising to Dostoevsky's new authorial position, can sense this peculiar *active broadening* of his consciousness, not solely in the sense of an assimilation of new objects (human types, character, natural and social phenomena), but primarily in the sense of a special dialogic mode of communication with the autonomous consciousnesses of others, something never before experienced, an active dialogic penetration into the unfinalizable depths of man.

The finalizing activity of the author of a monologic novel is, indeed, especially evident in the fact that such authors cast a mantle of objectivity over every point of view they do not share, turning it, to one degree or another, into a thing. In contrast to this, Dostoevsky's

authorial activity is evident in his extension of every contending point of view to its maximal force and depth, to the outside limits of plausibility. He strives to expose and develop all the semantic possibilities embedded in a given point of view (Chernyshevsky, as we have seen, strove for the same thing in his *Pearl of Creation*). This Dostoevsky knew how to do with extraordinary power. And this activity, the intensifying of someone else's thought, is possible only on the basis of a dialogic relationship to that other consciousness, that other point of view.

We see no special need to point out that the polyphonic approach has nothing in common with relativism (or with dogmatism). But it should be noted that both relativism and dogmatism equally exclude all argumentation, all authentic dialogue, by making it either unnecessary (relativism) or impossible (dogmatism). Polyphony as an *artistic* method lies in an entirely different plane.

The new position of the author in the polyphonic novel can be made clearer if we juxtapose it concretely with a distinctly expressed monologic position in a specific work.

We shall therefore analyze briefly, from the vantage point most relevant to us, Leo Tolstoy's short story "Three Deaths" [1858]. This work, not large in size but nevertheless tri-leveled, is very characteristic of Tolstoy's monologic manner.

Three deaths are portrayed in the story—the deaths of a rich noblewoman, a coachman, and a tree. But in this work Tolstoy presents death as a stage of life, as a stage illuminating that life, as the optimal point for understanding and evaluating that life in its entirety. Thus one could say that this story in fact portrays three lives totally finalized in their meaning and in their value. And in Tolstoy's story all three lives, and the levels defined by them, are *internally self-enclosed and do not know one another*. There is no more than a purely external pragmatic connection between them, necessary for the compositional and thematic unity of the story: the coachman Seryoga, transporting the ailing noblewoman, removes the boots from a coachman who is dying in a roadside station (the dying man no longer has any need for boots) and then, after the death of the coachman, cuts down a tree in the forest to make a cross for the man's grave. In this way three lives and three deaths come to be externally connected.

But an internal connection, *a connection between consciousnesses,* is not present here. The dying noblewoman knows nothing of the life and death of the coachman or the tree, they do not enter into her field of vision or her consciousness. And neither the noblewoman nor the tree enter the consciousness of the dying coachman. The lives

and deaths of all three characters, together with their worlds, lie side by side in a unified objective world and are even *externally* contiguous, but they know nothing of one another and are not reflected in one another. They are self-enclosed and deaf; they do not hear and do not answer one another. There are not and cannot be any dialogic relationships among them. They neither argue nor agree.

But all three personages, with their self-enclosed worlds, are united, juxtaposed and made meaningful to one another in the *author's* unified field of vision and consciousness that encompasses them. He, the author, knows everything about them, he juxtaposes, contrasts, and evaluates all three lives and all three deaths. All three lives and deaths illuminate one another, but only for the author, who is located *outside* them and takes advantage of his *external position* to give them a definitive meaning, to finalize them. The all-encompassing field of vision of the author enjoys an enormous and fundamental "surplus" in comparison with the fields of vision of the characters. The noblewoman sees and understands only her own little world, her own life and her own death; she does not even suspect the possibility of the sort of life and death experienced by the coachman or the tree. Therefore she cannot herself understand and evaluate the *lie* of her own life and death; she does not have the dialogizing background for it. And the coachman is not able to understand and evaluate the wisdom and truth of his life and death. All this is revealed only in the author's field of vision, with its "surplus." The tree, of course, is by its very nature incapable of understanding the wisdom and beauty of its death—the author does that for it.

Thus the total finalizing meaning of the life and death of each character is revealed only in the author's field of vision, and thanks solely to the advantageous "surplus" which that field enjoys over every character, that is, thanks to that which the character cannot himself see or understand. This is the finalizing, monologic function of the author's "surplus" field of vision.

As we have seen, there are no dialogic relationships between characters and their worlds. But the author does not relate to them dialogically either. A dialogic position with regard to his characters is quite foreign to Tolstoy. He does not extend his own point of view on a character to the character's own consciousness (and in principle he could not); likewise the character is not able to respond to the author's point of view. In a monologic work the ultimate and finalizing authorial evaluation of a character is, by its very nature, a *second-hand evaluation*, one that does not presuppose or take into account any potential *response* to this evaluation on the part of the character himself. The hero is not given the last word. He cannot break out of

the fixed framework of the author's secondhand evaluation finalizing him. The author's attitude encounters no internal dialogic resistance on the part of the character.

The words and consciousness of the author, Leo Tolstoy, are nowhere addressed to the hero, do not question him, and expect no response from him. The author neither argues with his hero nor agrees with him. He speaks not with him, but about him. The final word belongs to the author, and that word—based on something the hero does not see and does not understand, on something located outside the hero's consciousness—can never encounter the hero's words on a single dialogic plane.

That external world in which the characters of the story live and die is the *author's world*, an objective world vis-à-vis the consciousnesses of the characters. Everything within it is seen and portrayed in the author's all-encompassing and omniscient field of vision. Even the noblewoman's world—her apartment, its furnishings, the people close to her and their experiences, the doctors, and so forth—is portrayed from the author's point of view, and not as the noblewoman herself sees and experiences that world (although while reading the story we are also fully aware of her *subjective* perception of that world). And the world of the coachman (the hut, the stove, the cook, etc.) and of the tree (nature, the forest)—all these things are, as is the noblewoman's world, parts of one and the same objective world, seen and portrayed from *one and the same authorial position*. The author's field of vision nowhere intersects or collides dialogically with the characters' fields of vision or attitudes, nowhere does the word of the author encounter resistance from the hero's potential word, a word that might illuminate the same object differently, in its own way—that is, from the vantage point of its own *truth*. The author's point of view cannot encounter the hero's point of view on one plane, on one level. The point of view of the hero (in those places where the author lets it be seen) always remains an object of the author's point of view.

Thus, despite the multiple levels in Tolstoy's story, it contains neither polyphony nor (in our sense) counterpoint. It contains only *one cognitive subject*, all else being merely *objects* of its cognition. Here a dialogic relationship of the author to his heroes is impossible, and thus there is no "*great dialogue*" in which characters and author might participate with equal rights; there are only the objectivized dialogues of characters, compositionally expressed within the author's field of vision.

In the above story Tolstoy's monologic position comes to the fore very distinctly and with *great external visibility*. That is the reason

we chose this story. In Tolstoy's novels and in his longer stories, the issue is, of course, considerably more complex.

In the novels, the major characters and their worlds are not self-enclosed and deaf to one another; they intersect and are interwoven in a multitude of ways. The characters do know about each other, they exchange their individual "truths," they argue or agree, they carry on dialogues with one another (including dialogues on ultimate questions of worldview). Such characters as Andrei Bolkonsky, Pierre Bezukhov, Levin, and Nekhlyudov have their own well-developed fields of vision, sometimes *almost* coinciding with the author's (that is, the author sometimes sees the world as if through their eyes), their voices sometimes *almost* merge with the author's voice. But not a single one ends up on the same plane with the author's word and the author's truth, and with none of them does the author enter into dialogic relations. All of them, with their fields of vision, with their quests and their controversies, are inscribed into the *monolithically monologic whole* of the novel that finalizes them all and that is never, in Tolstoy, the kind of "great dialogue" that we find in Dostoevsky. All the clamps and finalizing moments of this monologic whole lie in the zone of authorial "surplus," a zone that is fundamentally inaccessible to the consciousnesses of the characters.

Let us return to Dostoevsky. How would "Three Deaths" look if (and let us permit ourselves for a moment this strange assumption) Dostoevsky had written them, that is, if they had been structured in a polyphonic manner?

First of all, Dostoevsky would have forced these three planes to be reflected in one another, he would have bound them together with dialogic relationships. He would have introduced the life and death of the coachman and the tree into the field of vision and consciousness of the noblewoman, and the noblewoman's life into the field of vision and consciousness of the coachman. He would have forced his characters to see and know all those essential things that he himself—the author—sees and knows. He would not have retained for himself any *essential* authorial "surplus" (essential, that is, from the point of view of the desired truth). He would have arranged a face-to-face confrontation between the truth of the noblewoman and the truth of the coachman, and he would have forced them to come into dialogic contact (although not necessarily in direct compositionally expressed dialogues, of course), and he would himself have assumed, in relation to them, a dialogic position with equal rights. The entire work would have been constructed by him as a great dialogue, but one where the author acts as organizer and participant in the dialogue without retaining for himself the final word; that is, he would have reflected in

his work in the dialogic nature of human life and human thought itself. And in the words of the story not only the pure *intonations of the author* would be heard, but also the intonations of the noblewoman and the coachman; that is, words would be double-voiced, in each word an argument (a microdialogue) would ring out, and there could be heard echoes of the great dialogue.

Of course Dostoevsky would never have depicted three *deaths*: in his world, where self-consciousness is the dominant of a person's image and where the interaction of full and autonomous consciousnesses is the fundamental event, death cannot function as something that finalizes and elucidates life. Death in the Tolstoyan interpretation of it is totally absent from Dostoevsky's world.[12] Dostoevsky would have not depicted the deaths of his heroes, but the *crises* and *turning points* in their lives; that is, he would have depicted their lives *on the threshold*. And his heroes would have remained internally *unfinalized* (for self-consciousness cannot be finalized *from within*). Such would have been a polyphonic treatment of the story.

Dostoevsky never left anything of any real consequence outside the realm of his major heroes' consciousness (that is, outside the consciousness of those heroes who participate as equals in the great dialogues of his novels); he brings them into dialogic contact with everything essential that enters the world of his novels. Whenever someone else's "truth" is presented in a given novel, it is introduced without fail into the *dialogic field of vision* of all the other major heroes of the novel. Ivan Karamazov, for example, knows and understands Zosima's truth, as well as Dmitry's truth, and Alyosha's truth, and the "truth" of that old sensualist, his father Fyodor Pavlovich. Dmitry understands all these truths as well; Alyosha, too, understands them perfectly. In *The Possessed*, there is not a single idea that fails to find a dialogic response in Stavrogin's consciousness.

For himself Dostoevsky never retains any essential "surplus" of *meaning*, but only that indispensable minimum of pragmatic, purely *information-bearing* "surplus" necessary to carry forward the story. For if any essential surplus of meaning were available to the author, it would transform the great dialogue of the novel into a finalized and objectivized dialogue, or into a dialogue rhetorically performed.

We shall cite some excerpts from Raskolnikov's first great interior monologue (at the beginning of *Crime and Punishment*); the issue is Dunechka's decision to marry Luzhin:

It's clear that Rodion Romanovich Raskolnikov is the central figure in the business, and no one else. Oh yes, she can ensure his happiness, keep him in the university, make him a partner in the office, make his whole future secure; perhaps he may even be a rich man later on, prosperous, respected, and may even end his

life a famous man! But my mother? It's all Rodya, precious Rodya, her firstborn! For such a son who would not sacrifice such a daughter! Oh, loving, over-partial hearts! Why, for his sake we would not shrink even from Sonya's fate. Sonya, Sonya Marmeladova, the eternal victim so long as the world lasts. Have you taken the measure of your sacrifice, both of you? Is it right? Can you bear it? Is it any use? Is there sense in it? And let me tell you, Dounia, Sonya's life is no worse than life with Mr. Luzhin. 'There can be no question of love,' mother writes. And what if there can be no respect either, if on the contrary there is aversion, contempt, repulsion, what then? So you will have to 'keep up your appearance,' too. Is not that so? Do you understand what that smartness means? Do you understand that the Luzhin smartness is just the same thing as Sonya's and may be worse, viler, baser, because in your case, Dounia, it's a bargain for luxuries, after all, but with Sonya it's simply a question of starvation. It has to be paid for, it has to be paid for, Dounia, this smartness. And what if it's more than you can bear afterwards, if you regret it? The bitterness, the misery, the curses, the tears hidden from all the world, for you are not a Marfa Petrovna. And how will your mother feel then? Even now she is uneasy, she is worried, but then, when she sees it all clearly? And I? Yes, indeed, what have you taken me for? I won't have your sacrifice, Dounia, I won't have it, mother! It shall not be, so long as I am alive, shall not, it shall not! I won't accept it!" [. . .]

"Or throw up life altogether!" he cried suddenly, in a frenzy—"accept one's lot humbly as it is, once for all and stifle everything in oneself, giving up all claim to activity, life and love!"

"Do you understand, sir, do you understand what it means when you have absolutely nowhere to turn?" Marmeladov's question came suddenly into his mind, "for every man must have somewhere to turn." . . . [*SS* V, 49-51; *Crime and Punishment*, Part I, ch. 4]

This interior dialogue, as we have said, takes place at the very beginning, on the second day of the novel's action, before the final decision to murder the old woman has been made. Raskolnikov has just received his mother's detailed letter with the history of Dounia and Svidrigailov and the news about the engagement to Luzhin. The evening before, Raskolnikov had met Marmeladov and had learned from him the whole history of Sonya. And all these future major characters of the novel are already reflected here in Raskolnikov's consciousness, they have entered into a thoroughly dialogized interior monologue, entered with their own "truths," with their own positions in life, and Raskolnikov has entered into a fundamental and intense interior dialogue with them, a dialogue of ultimate questions and ultimate life decisions. From the very beginning he already knows everything, takes everything into account, anticipates everything. He has already entered into dialogic contact with the whole of life surrounding him.

The excerpt we cited from Raskolnikov's dialogized interior monologue is a splendid model of the *microdialogue*; all words in it are double-voiced, and in each of them a conflict of voices takes place. In the beginning of the passage Raskolnikov actually re-creates

Dounia's words with her evaluating and persuading intonations, and over her intonations he layers his own—ironic, indignant, precautionary; that is, in these words two voices are sounding simultaneously—Raskolnikov's and Dounia's. In the subsequent words "It's all Rodya, precious Rodya, her firstborn!" etc.) one can already hear the mother's voice with her intonations of love and tenderness, and at the same time there is Raskolnikov's voice with its intonations of bitter irony, indignation (at the gesture of sacrifice), and sorrowful reciprocal love. Further we hear in Raskolnikov's words both Sonya's voice and Marmeladov's voice. Dialogue has penetrated inside every word, provoking in it a battle and the interruption of one voice by another. This is microdialogue.

Thus, at the very beginning of the novel the leading voices in the great dialogue have already begun to sound. These voices are not self-enclosed or deaf to one another. They hear each other constantly, call back and forth to each other, and are reflected in one another (especially in the microdialogues). And outside this dialogue of "conflicting truths" not a single essential act is realized, nor a single essential thought of the major characters.

In the subsequent course of the novel, nothing incorporated into its content—people, ideas, things—remains external to Raskolnikov's consciousness; everything is projected against him and dialogically reflected in him. All possible evaluations and points of view on his personality, his character, his idea, his acts are extended to his own consciousness and addressed to him in dialogues with Porfiry, Sonya, Svidrigailov, Dounia, and others. All others' perception of the world intersects with his perception. Everything that he sees and observes—both Petersburg slums and monumental Petersburg, all his chance encounters and trivial happenings—everything is drawn into dialogue, responds to his questions and puts new questions to him, provokes him, argues with him, or reinforces his own thoughts. The author retains for himself no essential "surplus" of meaning and enters on an equal footing with Raskolnikov into the great dialogue of the novel as a whole.

This is the new position of the author with regard to the hero in Dostoevsky's polyphonic novel.

NOTES

1. Devushkin, on his way to the General, sees himself in a mirror:

I was so flustered that my lips were trembling, my legs were trembling. And I had reason to be, my dear girl! To begin with, I was ashamed; I glanced into the looking-glass on the right hand and what I saw there was enough to send one out of one's mind. . . . I remembered what I had seen in the looking-glass: I flew to catch the button! (*SS* I, 186; *Poor Folk*, Letter of Sept. 9)

Devushkin sees in the mirror exactly what Gogol, when he described the coat and appearance of Akaky Akakievich, had depicted, but Devushkin sees what Akaky Akakievich himself could not see or become aware of; the constant agonizing reflection of the heroes on their external appearance is the function, for them, of the mirror; for Golyadkin, it is his double.

2. Dostoevsky often gives external portraits of his heroes, directly from the author, or from the narrator, or through other characters. But in Dostoevsky these external portraits do not perform the function of finalizing the hero; they do not create a fixed and predetermining image. The functions of one or another of a character's traits do not, of course, depend solely upon the elementary artistic methods used to reveal this trait (self-characterization by the hero, or directly from the author, or by some indirect route, etc.).

3. "Prokharchin" also remained within the boundaries of this same Gogolian material, and also the piece "The Shaved-off Sideburns" [Sbritye bakenbardy], which Dostoevsky destroyed. But here Dostoevsky began to sense that his new principle applied to the same Gogolian material was already becoming a repetition, and that it was imperative to tackle material essentially new in content. In 1846 he wrote to his brother: "I'm not writing 'The Shaved-off Sideburns' either. I threw everything out. Because all of it is nothing but a repeat of the old things I finished saying long ago. Now brighter, more original and alive thoughts are begging me to put them down on paper. As soon as I had finished writing 'Shaved-off Sideburns' this all came to me spontaneously. In my position, monotony is ruin." [Letter to Mikhail Dostoevsky, end of October 1846; *Pis'ma*, 1, p. 100.] Then he began work on *Netochka Nezvanova* and "The Landlady"; that is, he sought to apply his new principle to another area of the same Gogolian world ("The Portrait," and somewhat in "The Terrible Vengeance").

4. This inner unfinalizability of Dostoevsky's characters was correctly understood and identified by Oscar Wilde as their single most important feature. In her work *Dostoevskii i mirovaia literatura* [Dostoevsky and World Literature] T. L. Motyleva says of Wilde: "Wilde saw the greatest merit in Dostoevsky the artist in the fact that he 'never completely explains his characters.' Dostoevsky's heroes, in Wilde's words, 'always astound us by what they say and do, and preserve within themselves to the end of the eternal secret of existence.'" [In *Tvorchestvo F. M. Dostoevskogo* (Moscow: AN SSSR, 1959), p. 32].

5. *Dokumenty po istorii literatury i obshchestvennosti* [Documents on the History of Literature and Society], Issue I: "F. M. Dostoevskii" [Moscow: Izd Tsentrarkhiv RSFSR, 1922], p. 13. [This chapter, known as "At Tikhon's: Stavrogin's Confession," was intended by Dostoevsky as Chapter 9 of Part Two of *The Possessed*. It was not included in the first serialized appearance of the novel, ostensibly because of the editor's objections, and Dostoevsky did not include it in any edition of the novel published during his lifetime. The English version used here (and elsewhere) is by F. D. Reeve, and appears as an appendix to the Garnett translation.]

6. *Biografiia, pis'ma i zametki iz zapisnoi knigi F. M. Dostoevskogo* [Biography, Letters and Notes from the Notebook of F. M. Dostoevsky] (St. Petersburg, 1883), p. 373.

7. In his "Diary of a Writer" for 1877 Dostoevsky says this apropos of *Anna Karenina*: "It is clear and evident to the point of being obvious that evil lurks deeper in mankind than the socialist-healers suppose, that no matter how you arrange society you will not avoid evil, that the human soul will remain the same, that abnormality and sin originate in the soul itself, and that, finally, the laws of the spirit are still so unfamiliar, so unknown to science, so *undefined* and so mysterious, that there is not and cannot yet be any healers, or even any *definitive* judges, but there is one who says: 'Vengeance is mine, I will repay.'" [*PS* IX, 210]; *The Diary of a Writer*, July-August 1877, ch. 11, 3 ("*Anna Karenina* as a Fact of Special Significance"), p. 787.

8. See V. Ermilov, *F. M. Dostoevskii* (Moscow: Goslitizdat, 1956). [See the English version, V. Yermilov, *F. M. Dostoyevsky*, trans. J. Katzer (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1957), p. 13.]

9. Because *meaning* "lives" not in that type of time that has a "yesterday," a "today,"

and a "tomorrow," that is, not in that time in which the heroes "lived" and in which the biographical life of the author unfolds.

10. Cited from V. V. Vinogradov, *O jazyke khudozhestvennoi literatury* [On the Language of Artistic Literature] (Moscow: Goslitizdat, 1959), pp. 141-42.

11. V. V. Vinogradov, *ibid.*, p. 140.

12. Characteristic for Dostoevsky's world are murders (portrayed from within the murderer's field of vision), suicides, and insanity. Normal deaths are rare in his work, and he usually notes them only in passing. [See the eloquent expansion of this idea in Bakhtin's notes for the 1963 edition, "Toward a Reworking of the Dostoevsky Book," Appendix II, pp. 289-91, 300.]

Chapter Four
Characteristics of Genre and Plot Composition in Dostoevsky's Works

Those characteristics of Dostoevsky's poetics investigated by us in the preceding chapters presuppose, of course, a completely new treatment in his work of generic and plot-compositional elements. Neither the hero, nor the idea, nor the very polyphonic principle for structuring a whole can be fitted into the generic and plot-compositional forms of a biographical novel, a socio-psychological novel, a novel of everyday life or a family novel, that is, into the forms dominant in the literature of Dostoevsky's time and developed by such of his contemporaries as Turgenev, Goncharov, and Leo Tolstoy. In comparison with those writers Dostoevsky's work clearly belongs to a completely different generic type, one quite foreign to them.

The plot of the biographical novel is not adequate to Dostoevsky's hero, for such a plot relies wholly on the social and characterological definitiveness of the hero, on his full embodiment in life. Between the character of the hero and the plot of his life there must be a deep and organic unity. The biographical novel is built on it. The hero and the objective world surrounding him must be made of one piece. But Dostoevsky's hero in this sense is not embodied and cannot be embodied. He cannot have a normal biographical plot. The heroes themselves, it turns out, fervently dream of being embodied, they long to attach themselves to one of life's normal plots. The longing for embodiment by the "dreamer," born of the idea of the "underground

man" and the "hero of an accidental family," is one of Dostoevsky's important themes.

Dostoevsky's polyphonic novel is constructed on another plot-compositional base, and is connected with other generic traditions in the development of European artistic prose.

In the literature on Dostoevsky, very often the characteristics of his work are linked with the traditions of the European adventure novel. And there is a certain measure of truth in this.

Between the adventure hero and the Dostoevskian hero there is one formal similarity, very fundamental to the structure of the novel. As regards the adventure hero also, it is impossible to say who he is. He has no firm socially typical or individually characterological qualities out of which a stable image of his character, type, or temperament might be composed. Such a definitive image would weigh down the adventure plot, limit the adventure possibilities. To the adventure hero anything can happen, he can become anything. He too is not a substance, but a pure function of adventures and escapades. The adventure hero is, to the same degree as Dostoevsky's hero, not finalized and not predetermined by his image.

To be sure, this is a very external and very crude similarity. But it is sufficient to make Dostoevsky's heroes potential carriers of an adventure plot. The circle of connections that heroes can establish, the circle of events in which they participate, is not predetermined and not limited by their character, nor by any social world in which they might actually have been embodied. Therefore Dostoevsky could calmly make use of the most extreme and consistent devices not only of the respectable adventure novel, but even of the boulevard novel. His hero excludes nothing from his life except one thing—the social respectability of a fully embodied hero of the family or biographical novel.

Thus Dostoevsky would be the least likely to follow, or find any significant kinship with, Turgenev, Tolstoy, or the Western European representatives of the biographical novel. On the other hand, the adventure novel, in all its many guises, left a deep mark on his work. As Grossman says:

> His most important contribution was to reproduce—and this is the single instance of it in the entire history of the classic Russian novel—the typical story lines of adventure literature. The traditional patterns of the European novel of adventure often served Dostoevsky as models for the construction of his intrigues.
>
> He even made use of the clichés of that literary genre. In the heat of hurried work he was seduced by the types of adventure stories then current, which were grist for boulevard novelists and writers of feuilletons . . .
>
> It seems there is not a single attribute of the old novel of adventure that Dostoevsky failed to use. Alongside secret crimes and mass catastrophes, titled

personages and unexpected fortunes, we find that feature most typical of melodrama—aristocrats who wander through slums and fraternize with the dregs of society. Stavrogin is not the only one of Dostoevsky's heroes with this trait. It is equally characteristic of Prince Valkovsky, Prince Sokolsky, and even in part Prince Myshkin.[1]

But what need did Dostoevsky have for the adventure world? What functions does it fulfill in the whole of his artistic design?

In answering that question, Leonid Grossman points to three basic functions of the adventure plot. The introduction of an adventure world, first of all, guaranteed narrative interest, thus facilitating the reader's difficult journey through the labyrinth of philosophical theories, images, and human relationships all packed into a single novel. Secondly, Dostoevsky found in the novel-feuilleton[a] "a spark of sympathy for the insulted and the injured, which is felt behind all the adventures of beggars-made-happy and redeemed outcasts." Finally, the adventure world gave expression to a "primordial trait" of Dostoevsky's art: "the impulse to introduce the extraordinary into the very thick of the commonplace, to fuse into one, according to Romantic principles, the sublime with the grotesque, and by an imperceptible process of conversion to push images and phenomena of everyday reality to the limits of the fantastic."[2]

One cannot help agreeing with Grossman that all the functions he has pointed out are indeed essential to adventure material in the Dostoevskian novel. But these functions, it seems to us, far from exhaust the matter. For Dostoevsky, entertainment was never a goal in itself, nor did he ever set for himself as an artistic goal the Romantic principle of interweaving the sublime with the grotesque, the extraordinary with the commonplace. Even if the authors of adventure novels had indeed paved the way for the social novel by introducing slums, forced labor, and hospitals, Dostoevsky nevertheless had before him examples of the genuine social novel—the social-psychological, everyday, and biographical novel—which, however, he scarcely heeded at all. Grigorovich and others who began with Dostoevsky arrived at the same world of the insulted and injured, following completely different models.

The functions Grossman has pointed out are peripheral ones. What is most fundamental and important is not contained in them.

In a social-psychological novel, a family

[a]The *feuilleton* was that section of a French newspaper, usually detachable, devoted to serials, light literature, and criticism. The *roman-feuilleton* or serialized novel was, in its heyday (1830-50), a major genre of such authors as Sue, Soulié, Balzac, and George Sand.

For an excellent discussion of Dostoevsky and the *feuilleton*, see Gary Saul Morson, *The Boundaries of Genre: Dostoevsky's Diary of a Writer and the Traditions of Literary Utopia* (Austin: U. of Texas Press, 1981), pp. 14-30.

or biographical novel, the modes for plotting the story link one character to another not as one person to another person but as father to son, husband to wife, rival to rival, lover to beloved, or as landlord to peasant, property-owner to proletarian, well-to-do-bourgeois to déclassé tramp, and so forth. Relationships of family, of life-story and biography, of social status and social class are the stable all-determining basis for all plot connections; contingency has no place here. The hero is assigned to a plot as someone fully embodied and strictly localized in life, as someone dressed in the concrete and impenetrable garb of his class or social station, his family position, his age, his life and biographical goals. His *humanness* is to such an extent made concrete and specific by his place in life that it is in itself denied any decisive influence on plot relationships. It can be revealed only within the strict framework of those relationships.

Characters are distributed according to plot, and they can interact with one another in a meaningful way only on this well-defined and concrete ground. Their interrelationships are created by the plot and by that same plot are finalized. Their self-consciousnesses and consciousnesses as persons cannot establish any connections of even the slightest significance exterior to the plot. The plot here can never become simple material for "extra-plot" communication among consciousnesses, because the hero and the plot are made of a single piece. Heroes as heroes are born of the plot itself. The plot is not merely their clothing, it is their body and their soul. And conversely: their body and soul can be revealed and finalized in essence only within the plot.

The adventure plot, on the contrary, is precisely clothing draped over the hero, clothing which he can change as often as he pleases. The adventure plot relies not on what the hero is, not on the place he occupies in life, but more often on what he is not, on what (from the vantage point of the reality at hand) is unexpected and not predetermined. The adventure plot does not rely on already available and stable positions—family, social, biographical; it develops in spite of them. The adventure position is a position in which any person may appear as a person. What is more, the adventure plot uses any stable social localization not as a finalizing real-life form but precisely as a "position." Thus, a boulevard-novel aristocrat has nothing in common with an aristocrat of a social-family novel. Being an aristocrat in a boulevard novel is simply a position in which a person finds himself. The person functions, in the clothing of an aristocrat, as a person: he shoots, commits crimes, flees from enemies, overcomes obstacles, and so forth. All social and cultural institutions, establishments, social states and classes, family relationships are no more than positions in which a person can be eternally equal to himself. Problems dictated

by his eternal human nature—self-preservation, the thirst for victory and triumph, the thirst for dominance or for sensual love—determine the adventure plot.

True, this eternal man of the adventure plot is (so to speak) a corporeal and corporeal-spiritual man. Outside the plot he is therefore quite empty, and consequently he can establish no extra-plot connections with any other characters. The adventure plot cannot therefore be the ultimate binding force in Dostoevsky's world, but as a plot it offers favorable material for the realization of Dostoevsky's artistic design.

In Dostoevsky, the adventure plot is combined with the posing of profound and acute problems; and it is, in addition, placed wholly at the service of the idea. It places a person in extraordinary positions that expose and provoke him, it connects him and makes him collide with other people under unusual and unexpected conditions precisely for the purpose of *testing* the idea and the man of the idea, that is, for testing the "man in man." And this permits the adventure story to be combined with other genres that are, it would seem, quite foreign to it, such as the confession and the saint's Life.

Such a combination of adventurism (often of the boulevard-novel sort) with the idea, with the problematic dialogue, with the Life and the confession, seemed, from the vantage point of these concepts about genre dominant in the nineteenth century, something quite out of the ordinary; it was perceived as a crude and absolutely unjustified violation of the "aesthetics of genre." And indeed, in the nineteenth century these genres and generic elements were sharply delimited and presented as alien and unrelated to one another. We recall the excellent characterization of this "foreignness" given by Grossman (see chapter 1, pp. 14-15). We have tried to show that this generic and stylistic foreignness is made meaningful and even surmounted in Dostoevsky, through the consistent polyphonism of his work. But the time has now come to consider this question from the viewpoint of a *history* of genres, that is, to shift the question onto the plane of *historical poetics*.

The fact is that a combination of adventurism with the posing of acute problematic questions, with a dialogic approach, with the confession, with the Life and the sermon was by no means something absolutely new and never before existing. The only new thing was Dostoevsky's polyphonic use and interpretation of generic combinations. Its roots reach back into the most remote antiquity. The adventure novel of the nineteenth century is only one of the branches —and a rather impoverished and deformed branch at that—of a powerful and multi-branched generic tradition, reaching, as we have said, into the depths of the past, to the very sources of European

literature. We consider it essential to trace back this tradition precisely to its sources. One must not limit oneself to an analysis of the generic phenomena closest to Dostoevsky. We even intend to concentrate our main attention precisely on the sources. Therefore we must take leave of Dostoevsky for a time and leaf through some ancient pages, as yet almost totally unexamined in our scholarship, in the history of genres. This historical digression will help us to understand, in a deeper and truer way, the generic and plot-compositional characteristics of Dostoevsky's works which to this day remain essentially unexplored in the literature on him. In addition, we believe this question has broader significance for the theory and history of literary genres.

A literary genre, by its very nature, reflects the most stable, "eternal" tendencies in literature's development. Always preserved in a genre are undying elements of the *archaic*. True, these archaic elements are preserved in it only thanks to their constant *renewal*, which is to say, their contemporization. A genre is always the same and yet not the same, always old and new simultaneously. Genre is reborn and renewed at every new stage in the development of literature and in every individual work of a given genre. This constitutes the life of the genre. Therefore even the archaic elements preserved in a genre are not dead but eternally alive; that is, archaic elements are capable of renewing themselves. A genre lives in the present, but always *remembers* its past, its beginning. Genre is a representative of creative memory in the process of literary development. Precisely for this reason genre is capable of guaranteeing the *unity* and *uninterrupted continuity* of this development.

For the correct understanding of a genre, therefore, it is necessary to return to its sources.

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At the close of classical antiquity, and again in the epoch of Hellenism, a number of genres coalesced and developed, fairly diverse externally but bound together by an inner kinship and therefore constituting a special realm of literature, which the ancients themselves very expressively called *σπουδογέλοιον*, that is, the realm of the serio-comical.[b] Here the ancients assigned the mimes of Sophron*,

[b]For a summary of Bakhtin's position on the *spoudogeloios* ("serious-smiling") genres, see Philip Holland, "Robert Burton's *Anatomy of Melancholy* and Menippean Satire, Humanist and English," Ph.D. dissertation, University of London, 1979, pp. 36-37:

". . . the seriocomic genres are united not only from within but from without, through their common opposition to the serious genres. . . . The serious genres, in Bakhtin's terms, are monological, i.e. they presuppose (or impose) an integrated and stable universe of discourse. The seriocomic genres, by contrast, are dialogical; they deny the possibility, or more precisely, the experience of such integration. As tragedy and epic enclose, Menippean forms

the "Socratic dialogue" (as a special genre), the voluminous literature of the Symposiasts* (also a special genre), early memoir literature (Ion of Chios,* Critias*), pamphlets, the whole of bucolic poetry, "Menippean satire"* (as a special genre) and several other genres as well. Precise and stable boundaries within the realm of the serio-comical are almost impossible for us to distinguish. But the ancients themselves distinctly sensed its fundamental uniqueness and counterposed it to the serious genres—the epic, the tragedy, the history, classical rhetoric, and the like. And in fact the differences between this realm and the rest of the literature of classical antiquity are very substantial.

What are the distinguishing characteristics of the genres of the serio-comical?

For all their motley external diversity, they are united by their deep bond with *carnivalistic folklore*. They are all—to a greater or lesser degree—saturated with a specific *carnival sense of the world*, and several of them are direct literary variants of oral carnival-folkloric genres. The carnival sense of the world, permeating these genres from top to bottom, determines their basic features and places image and word in them in a special relationship to reality. In all genres of the serio-comical, to be sure, there is a strong rhetorical element, but in the atmosphere of *joyful relativity* characteristic of a carnival sense of the world this element is fundamentally changed: there is a weakening of its one-sided rhetorical seriousness, its rationality, its singular meaning, its dogmatism.

This carnival sense of the world possesses a mighty life-creating and transforming power, an indestructible vitality. Thus even in our time those genres that have a connection, however remote, with the traditions of the serio-comical preserve in themselves the carnivalistic leaven (ferment), and this sharply distinguishes them from the medium of other genres. These genres always bear a special stamp by which we can recognize them. The sensitive ear will always catch even the most distant echoes of a carnival sense of the world.

Literature that was influenced—directly and without mediation, or indirectly, through a series of intermediate links—by one or another variant of carnivalistic folklore (ancient or medieval) we shall call *carnivalized literature*. The entire realm of the serio-comical constitutes the first example of such literature. In our opinion the problem of carnivalized literature is one of the very important problems in historical poetics, and in particular of the poetics of genre.

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open up, anatomize. The serious forms comprehend man; the Menippean forms are based on man's inability to know and contain his fate. To any vision of a completed system of truth, the menippea suggests some element outside the system. Seriocomic forms present a challenge, open or covert, to literary and intellectual orthodoxy, a challenge that is reflected not only in their philosophic content but also in their structure and language."

However, the problem of carnivalization itself we shall address somewhat later (after an analysis of carnival and the carnivalistic sense of the world). Here we shall pause on several external generic features of the serio-comical realm which are in fact already a result of the transforming influence of a carnival sense of the world.

The first characteristic of all genres of the serio-comical is their new relationship to reality: their subject, or—what is more important—their starting point for understanding, evaluating, and shaping reality, is the living *present*, often even the very day. For the first time in ancient literature the subject of *serious* (to be sure, at the same time comical) representation is presented without any epic or tragic distance, presented not in the absolute past of myth and legend but on the plane of the present day, in a zone of immediate and even crudely familiar contact with living contemporaries. In these genres, the heroes of myth and the historical figures of the past are deliberately and emphatically contemporized; they act and speak in a zone of familiar contact with the open-ended present. In the realm of the serio-comical, consequently, a radical change takes place in that time-and-value zone where the artistic image is constructed. Such is its first characteristic.

The second characteristic is inseparably bound up with the first: the genres of the serio-comical do not rely on *legend* and do not sanctify themselves through it, they *consciously* rely on *experience* (to be sure, as yet insufficiently mature) and on *free invention*; their relationship to legend is in most cases deeply critical, and at times even resembles a cynical exposé. Here, consequently, there appears for the first time an image almost completely liberated from legend, one which relies instead on experience and free invention. This is a complete revolution in the history of the literary image.

A third characteristic is the deliberate multi-styled and hetero-voiced nature of all these genres. They reject the stylistic unity (or better, the single-styled nature) of the epic, the tragedy, high rhetoric, the lyric. Characteristic of these genres are a multi-toned narration, the mixing of high and low, serious and comic; they make wide use of inserted genres—letters, found manuscripts, retold dialogues, parodies on the high genres, parodically reinterpreted citations; in some of them we observe a mixing of prosaic and poetic speech, living dialects and jargons (and in the Roman stage, direct bilingualism as well) are introduced, and various authorial masks make their appearance. Alongside the representing word there appears the *represented* word; in certain genres a leading role is played by the double-voiced word. And what appears here, as a result, is a radically new relationship to the word as the material of literature.

These are the three basic characteristics common to all genres that

enter the realm of the serio-comical. From this it is already clear what enormous significance this realm of ancient literature has for the development of the future European novel, and for that branch of artistic prose gravitating toward the novel and developing under its influence.

Speaking somewhat too simplistically and schematically, one could say that the novelistic genre has three fundamental roots: the *epic*, the *rhetorical*, and the *carnivalistic* (with, of course, many transitional forms in between). It is in the realm of the serio-comical that one must seek the starting points of development for the diverse varieties of the third, that is the carnivalistic, line of the novel, including that variety which leads to Dostoevsky.

In shaping that variety in the development of the novel, and in shaping that artistic prose which we will provisionally call "dialogic" and which, as we have said, leads to Dostoevsky, two genres from the realm of the serio-comical have definitive significance: the *Socratic dialogue* and *Menippean satire*. They must be treated in somewhat greater detail.

The Socratic dialogue was a special and, in its time, very widespread genre. Socratic dialogues were written by Plato, Xenophon,* Antisthenes,* Aeschines,* Phaedo,* Euclid,* Alexamenos,* Glaucon,* Simias,* Crito,* and others. Only the dialogues of Plato and Xenophon have survived; of the others we have only reports and a few fragments. But on the basis of all this we can create for ourselves some idea of the character of this genre.

The Socratic dialogue is not a rhetorical genre. It grows out of a folk-carnivalistic base and is thoroughly saturated with a carnival sense of the world, especially, of course, in the *oral* Socratic stage of its development. But to the carnivalistic base of this genre we will return below.

Originally the genre of the Socratic dialogue—already at the literary stage of its development—was almost a memoir genre: it consisted of reminiscences of actual conversations that Socrates had conducted, transcriptions of remembered conversations framed by a brief story. But very soon a freely creative attitude toward the material liberated the genre almost completely from the limitations of history and memoir, and retained in it only the Socratic method of dialogically revealing the truth and the external form of a dialogue written down and framed by a story. The Socratic dialogues of Plato are of just such a freely creative sort, as are, to a lesser extent, the dialogues of Xenophon and those of Antisthenes, known to us only through fragments.

We shall pause on those aspects of the genre of Socratic dialogue that have special significance for our understanding of the genre.

1. At the base of the genre lies the Socratic notion of the dialogic nature of truth, and the dialogic nature of human thinking about truth. The dialogic means of seeking truth is counterposed to *official* monologism, which pretends to *possess a ready-made truth*, and it is also counterposed to the naive self-confidence of those people who think that they know something, that is, who think that they possess certain truths. Truth is not born nor is it to be found inside the head of an individual person, it is born *between people* collectively searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction. Socrates called himself a "pander": he brought people together and made them collide in a quarrel, and as a result truth was born; with respect to this emerging truth Socrates called himself a "midwife," since he assisted at the birth. For this reason also he called his method "obstetric." But Socrates never called himself the exclusive possessor of a ready-made truth. We emphasize that Socratic notions of the dialogic nature of truth lay at the folk-carnivalistic base of the genre of Socratic dialogue, determining its *form*, but they did not by any means always find expression in the actual content of the individual dialogues. The content often assumed a monologic character that contradicted the form-shaping idea of the genre. In Plato's dialogues of his first and second periods, the dialogic nature of truth is still recognized in the philosophical worldview itself, although in weakened form. Thus the dialogue of these early periods has not yet been transformed into a simple means for expounding ready-made ideas (for pedagogical purposes) and Socrates has not yet been transformed into a "teacher." But in the final period of Plato's work that has already taken place: the monologism of the content begins to destroy the form of the Socratic dialogue. Consequently, when the genre of the Socratic dialogue entered the service of the established, dogmatic worldviews of various philosophical schools and religious doctrines, it lost all connection with a carnival sense of the world and was transformed into a simple form for expounding already found, ready-made irrefutable truth; ultimately, it degenerated completely into a question-and-answer form for training neophytes (catechism).

2. The two basic devices of the Socratic dialogue were the syncrisis (σύγκρισις) and the anacrisis (ἀνάκρισις). Syncrisis was understood as the juxtaposition of various points of view on a specific object. The technique of juxtaposing various discourse-opinions on an object was accorded very great importance in the Socratic dialogue; this derived from the very nature of the genre. Anacrisis was understood as a means for eliciting and provoking the words of one's interlocutor, forcing him to express his opinion and express it thoroughly. Socrates was a great master of the anacrisis: he knew how to force people to *speak*, to clothe in discourse their dim but stubbornly preconceived

opinions, to illuminate them by the word and in this way to expose their falseness or incompleteness; he knew how to drag the going truths out into the light of day. Anacrisis is the provocation of the word by the word (and not by means of plot situation, as in Menippean satire, of which more below). Syncrisis and anacrisis dialogize thought, they carry it into the open, turn it into a *rejoinder*, attach it to dialogic intercourse among people. Both of these devices have their origin in the notion of the dialogic nature of truth, which lies at the base of the Socratic dialogue. On the territory of this carnivalized genre, syncrisis and anacrisis lose their narrow, abstractly rhetorical character.

3. The heroes of the Socratic dialogue are *ideologists*. The prime ideologist is Socrates himself, but everyone he converses with is an ideologist as well—his pupils, the Sophists, the simple people whom he draws into dialogue and makes ideologists against their will. And the very event that is accomplished in a Socratic dialogue (or, more precisely, that is reproduced in it) is the purely ideological event of seeking and *testing* truth. This event sometimes unfolds with genuine (but peculiar) dramatic effect, for example the peripetations of the idea of the immortality of the soul in Plato's *Phaedo*. The Socratic dialogue was thus the first to introduce into the history of European literature the hero-ideologist.

4. In the Socratic dialogue, the plot situation of the dialogue is sometimes utilized alongside anacrisis, or the provocation of the word by the word, for the same purpose. In Plato's *Apology* the situation of the trial and expected death sentence determines the special character of Socrates' mode of speaking; it is the summing-up and confession of a man standing *on the threshold*. In *Phaedo* the discussion of the immortality of the soul, with all its internal and external peripetations, is determined directly by the situation of impending death. In both of these situations there is a tendency to create the *extraordinary* situation, one which would cleanse the word of all of life's automatism and object-ness, which would force a person to reveal the deepest layers of his personality and thought. Of course, the freedom to create extraordinary situations, situations provoking a profound word, are very limited in the Socratic dialogue, due to the historical and memoirist nature of the genre (in its literary stage). Nevertheless we can already speak of the birth, even on this soil, of a special type of "dialogue on the threshold" (*Schwellendialog*), which became very widespread in Hellenistic and Roman literature and, ultimately, in the literature of the Renaissance and the Reformation.

5. In the Socratic dialogue the idea is organically combined with the image of a person, its carrier (Socrates and other essential participants in the dialogue). The dialogic testing of the idea is simultaneously

also the testing of the person who represents it. We may therefore speak here of an embryonic *image of an idea*. We should also note that this image is treated freely and creatively. The ideas of Socrates, of the leading Sophists and other historical figures are not quoted here, not paraphrased, but are presented in their free and creative development against a dialogizing background of other ideas. As the historical and memoir basis of the genre is weakened, the ideas of others become more and more plastic; people and ideas which in historical reality never entered into real dialogic contact (but could have done so) begin to come together in dialogues. This is only one step away from the future "Dialogue of the Dead," in which people and ideas separated by centuries collide with one another on the dialogic plane. But the Socratic dialogue did not take that step. To be sure, in the *Apology* Socrates seems almost to predict that future dialogic genre when, in a premonition of his death sentence, he speaks of those dialogues he will conduct in the nether world with the shades of the past, as he had conducted them here on earth. It must be emphasized, however, that in contrast to the *image of an idea* in Dostoevsky, the image of an idea in the Socratic dialogue is of a *syncretic* sort: in the epoch of the Socratic dialogue, the process of differentiation between the abstractly scientific or philosophical *concept* and the artistic *image* had not yet been completed. The Socratic dialogue remained a syncretic philosophical-artistic genre.

Such are the basic characteristics of the Socratic dialogue. They justify our considering this genre one of the starting points for that line of development in European artistic prose and the novel that leads to the work of Dostoevsky.

As a well-defined genre the Socratic dialogue did not exist for long, but in the process of its disintegration other dialogic genres were formed, including Menippean satire. But Menippean satire cannot of course be considered a pure product of the decomposition of the Socratic dialogue (as is sometimes done), since its roots reach *directly* back into carnivalized folklore, whose decisive influence is here even more significant than it is in the Socratic dialogue.

Before analyzing Menippean satire in its essence, we offer here some details of a purely informational sort.[c]

The genre took its name from the philosopher Menippus of Gadara* (third century B.C.) who fashioned it into its classical form[3], although the term itself as signifying a specific genre was first introduced by the Roman scholar Varro* (first century B.C.), who called his satires

[c]For a good discussion of Menippean satire—its motives, history, and generic vigor—see Eugene P. Kirk's Introduction to his *Menippean Satire: An Annotated Catalogue of Texts and Criticism* (New York: Garland Publishing, 1980). Information on many of the texts cited by Bakhtin can be found conveniently in this catalogue.

"saturae menippeae." But the genre itself arose considerably earlier: its first representative was perhaps Antisthenes, a pupil of Socrates and one of the authors of Socratic dialogues. Menippean satires were also written by Aristotle's contemporary Heraclides Ponticus,* who, according to Cicero, was also the creator of a kindred genre, the logistoricus (a combination of the Socratic dialogue with fantastic histories). We already have an indisputable representative of Menippean satire in Bion Borysthenes,* that is, "the man from the banks of the Dniepr" (third century B.C.). Then came Menippus, who gave the genre more definitive form, and then Varro, of whose satires numerous fragments have survived. A classical Menippean satire is the *Apocolocyntosis*, that is, the "Pumpkinification," of Seneca.* The *Satyricon* of Petronius* is nothing other than a Menippean satire extended to the limits of a novel. The fullest picture of the genre is of course provided by the Menippean satires of Lucian,* which have come down to us intact (although not representing all varieties of the genre). The *Metamorphoses* (*The Golden Ass*) of Apuleius* (and also its Greek source, known to us though Lucian's brief summary) is a full-blown Menippean satire. A very interesting example of Menippean satire is the so-called "Hippocratic Novel"* (the first European epistolary novel). The development of Menippean satire in its ancient phase culminates in *De Consolatione Philosophiae* of Boethius.* We find elements of Menippean satire in several varieties of the "Greek novel," in the ancient utopian novel, and in Roman satire (Lucilius and Horace). Within the orbit of Menippean satire various kindred genres developed, genetically linked with the Socratic dialogue: the diatribe, the above-mentioned genre of the logistoricus, the soliloquy, aretological genres,[d] and others.

Menippean satire exercised a very great influence on old Christian literature (of the ancient period) and on Byzantine literature (and through it, on ancient Russian writing as well). In diverse variants and under diverse generic labels it also continued its development into the post-classical epochs: into the Middle Ages, the Renaissance and Reformation, and modern times; in fact it continues to develop even now (both with and without a clear-cut awareness of itself as a genre). This carnivalized genre, extraordinarily flexible and as changeable as Proteus, capable of penetrating other genres, has had an enormous and as yet insufficiently appreciated importance for the development of European literatures. Menippean satire became one of the main carriers and channels for the carnival sense of the world in literature, and remains so to the present day. We shall return to its importance below.

Now after our brief (and of course far from complete) survey of

[d]Aretological genres: narratives about the miraculous deeds of gods or heroes.

the ancient Menippean satires, we must examine the basic characteristics of this genre as they were defined in the epoch of antiquity. From now on we shall call the "menippean satire" simply the *menippea*.

1. As compared with the Socratic dialogue, the specific weight of the comic element is generally increased in the menippea, although this vacillates significantly in the diverse varieties of this flexible genre: the comic element is very great in Varro, for example, but it disappears, or rather is reduced,[4] in Boethius. The specifically *carnival* nature (in the broad sense of the word) of the comic element we shall deal with in more detail below.

2. The menippea is fully liberated from those limitations of history and memoir that were so characteristic of the Socratic dialogue (although externally the memoir form is sometimes preserved); it is free of legend and not fettered by any demands for an external verisimilitude to life. The menippea is characterized by an *extraordinary freedom of plot and philosophical invention*. The fact that the leading heroes of the menippea are historical and legendary figures (Diogenes, Menippus and others) presents no obstacle. Indeed, in all of world literature we could not find a genre more free than the menippea in its invention and use of the fantastic.

3. The most important characteristic of the menippea as a genre is the fact that its bold and unrestrained use of the fantastic and adventure is internally motivated, justified by and devoted to a purely ideational and philosophical end: the creation of *extraordinary situations* for the provoking and testing of a philosophical idea, a discourse, a *truth*, embodied in the image of a wise man, the seeker of this truth. We emphasize that the fantastic here serves not for the positive *embodiment* of truth, but as a mode for searching after truth, provoking it, and, most important, *testing* it. To this end the heroes of Menippean satire ascend into heaven, descend into the nether world, wander through unknown and fantastic lands, are placed in extraordinary life situations (Diogenes, for example, sells himself into slavery in the marketplace, Peregrinus* triumphantly immolates himself at the Olympic Games, Lucius the Ass finds himself constantly in extraordinary situations). Very often the fantastic takes on the character of an adventure story; sometimes it assumes a symbolic or even mystical-religious character (as in Apuleius). But in all these instances the fantastic is subordinated to the purely ideational function of provoking and testing a truth. The most unrestrained and fantastic adventures are present here in organic and indissoluble artistic unity with the philosophical idea. And it is essential to emphasize once again that the issue is precisely the testing of an *idea*, of a *truth*, and not the testing of a particular human character, whether

an individual or a social type. The testing of a wise man is a test of his philosophical position in the world, not a test of any other features of his character independent of that position. In this sense one can say that the content of the menippea is the adventures of an *idea* or a *truth* in the world: either on earth, in the nether regions, or on Olympus.

4. A very important characteristic of the menippea is the organic combination within it of the free fantastic, the symbolic, at times even a mystical-religious element with an extreme and (from our point of view) crude *slum naturalism*. The adventures of truth on earth take place on the high road, in brothels, in the dens of thieves, in taverns, marketplaces, prisons, in the erotic orgies of secret cults, and so forth. The idea here fears no slum, is not afraid of any of life's filth. The man of the idea—the wise man—collides with worldly evil, depravity, baseness, and vulgarity in their most extreme expression. This slum naturalism is apparently already present in the earliest menippea. Of Bion Borysthenes the ancients were already saying that he "was the first to deck out philosophy in the motley dress of a hetaera." There is a great deal of slum naturalism in Varro and Lucian. But slum naturalism could develop to its broadest and fullest extent only in the menippea of Petronius and Apuleius, menippea expanded into novels. The organic combination of philosophical dialogue, lofty symbol-systems, the adventure-fantastic, and slum naturalism is the outstanding characteristic of the menippea, and it is preserved in all subsequent stages in the development of the dialogic line of novelistic prose right up to Dostoevsky.

5. Boldness of invention and the fantastic element are combined in the menippea with an extraordinary philosophical universalism and a capacity to contemplate the world on the broadest possible scale. The menippea is a genre of "ultimate questions." In it ultimate philosophical positions are put to the test. The menippea strives to provide, as it were, the ultimate and decisive words and acts of a person, each of which contains the whole man, the whole of his life in its entirety. This feature of the genre was apparently especially prominent in the early menippea (in Heraclides Ponticus, Bion, Teles,* and Menippus), but it has been preserved, although sometimes in weakened form, as the characteristic feature in all varieties of the genre. Under menippean conditions the very nature and process of posing philosophical problems, as compared with the Socratic dialogue, had to change abruptly: all problems that were in the least "academic" (gnoseological and aesthetic) fell by the wayside, complex and extensive modes of argumentation also fell away, and there remained essentially only naked "ultimate questions" with an ethical and practical bias. Typical for the menippea is syncrisis (that is,

juxtaposition) of precisely such stripped-down "ultimate positions in the world." Take, for example, the carnivalistic-satirical representation of the "Vitarum auctio," that is, the sale of ultimate life positions, in Lucian, the fantastic sailings over ideological seas in Varro (*Sesculixes* [A Ulysses and a Half]), travels through all the philosophical schools (apparently already in Bion), and so forth. Everywhere one meets the stripped-down *pro et contra* of life's ultimate questions.

6. In connection with the philosophical universalism of the menippea, a three-planed construction makes its appearance: action and dialogic syncrisis are transferred from earth to Olympus and to the nether world. This three-planed construction is present with great external visibility in, for example, Seneca's *Apocolocyntosis*; here also "dialogues of the threshold" are presented with great external clarity: at the gates of Olympus (where Claudius was not admitted) and on the threshold of the underworld. The three-planed construction of the menippea exercised a decisive influence on the corresponding structure of the medieval mystery play and mystery scene. The genre of the "threshold dialogue" was also extremely widespread in the Middle Ages, in the serious as well as the comic genres (the famous fabliau of the peasant arguing at the gates of heaven, for example), and is especially well represented in the literature of the Reformation—the so-called "literature of the heavenly gates" (*Himmelspforten-Literatur*). The menippea accorded great importance to the *nether world*: here was born that special genre of "dialogues of the dead," widespread in European literature of the Renaissance, and in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

7. In the menippea a special type of *experimental fantasticality* makes its appearance, completely foreign to ancient epic and tragedy: observation from some unusual point of view, from on high, for example, which results in a radical change in the scale of the observed phenomena of life; Lucian's *Icaromenippus*, for example, or Varro's *Endymiones* (observations of the life of a city from a great height). This line of experimental fantasticality continues, under the defining influence of the menippea, into the subsequent epochs as well—in Rabelais, Swift, Voltaire (*Micromégas*) and others.

8. In the menippea there appears for the first time what might be called moral-psychological experimentation: a representation of the unusual, abnormal moral and psychic states of man—insanity of all sorts (the theme of the maniac), split personality, unrestrained daydreaming, unusual dreams, passions bordering on madness,[5] suicides, and so forth. These phenomena do not function narrowly in the menippea as mere themes, but have a formal generic significance. Dreams, daydreams, insanity destroy the epic and tragic wholeness of a person and his fate: the possibilities of another person and

another life are revealed in him, he loses his finalized quality and ceases to mean only one thing; he ceases to coincide with himself. Dreams are common in the epic as well, but there they are prophetic, motivating, cautionary—they do not take the person beyond the bounds of his fate and his character, they do not violate his integrity. Of course, this unfinalizability of a man, his noncoincidence with himself, are still rather elementary and embryonic in the menippea, but they are openly there and permit us to look at a person in a new way. This destruction of the wholeness and finalized quality of a man is facilitated by the appearance, in the menippea, of a dialogic relationship to one's own self (fraught with the possibility of split personality). Very interesting in this respect is Varro's menippea *Bimarcus*, that is, *The Double Marcus*.[e] As in all the menippea of Varro, the comic element here is very strong. Marcus had promised to write a work on tropes and figures, but he does not keep his promise. The Second Marcus—that is, his conscience, his double—constantly reminds him of it, gives him no peace. The First Marcus tries to fulfill the promise but cannot concentrate: he distracts himself by reading Homer, he begins to write poems himself, and so on. This dialogue between the two Marcuses, that is between a person and his conscience, is in Varro presented comically, but nevertheless as a sort of artistic discovery it exercised crucial influence on the *Soliloquia* of Augustine. We should mention in passing that Dostoevsky too, when representing the phenomenon of the double, always preserved alongside the tragic element an element of the *comic* as well (in *The Double*, and in Ivan Karamazov's conversation with the devil).

9. Very characteristic for the menippea are scandal scenes, eccentric behavior, inappropriate speeches and performances, that is, all sorts of violations of the generally accepted and customary course of events and the established norms of behavior and etiquette, including manners of speech. These scandals are sharply distinguished by their artistic structure from epic events and tragic catastrophes. They are also different in essence from comic brawls and exposés. One could say that in the menippea new artistic categories of the scandalous and the eccentric emerge which are completely foreign to the classical epic and to the dramatic genres (on the carnivalistic character of these categories we shall speak in more detail below). Scandals and eccentricities destroy the epic and tragic wholeness of the world, they make a breach in the stable, normal ("seemly") course of human affairs and events, they free human behavior from the norms and motivations that predetermine it. Scandals and eccentric scenes fill the meetings of the gods on Olympus (in Lucian, Seneca, Julian the Apostate,* and others) as well as scenes on earth (in

[e]Also known in English as "The Double Varro" and "Varro Split."

Petronius, for example, the scandals on the public square, in the hotel, in the bath). The "inappropriate word"—inappropriate because of its cynical frankness, or because it profanely unmasks a holy thing, or because it crudely violates etiquette—is also very characteristic for the menippea.

10. The menippea is full of sharp contrasts and oxymoronic combinations: the virtuous hetaera, the true freedom of the wise man and his servile position, the emperor who becomes a slave, moral downfalls and purifications, luxury and poverty, the noble bandit, and so forth. The menippea loves to play with abrupt transitions and shifts, ups and downs, rises and falls, unexpected comings together of distant and disunited things, mésalliances of all sorts.

11. The menippea often includes elements of *social utopia* which are incorporated in the form of dreams or journeys to unknown lands; sometimes the menippea grows outright into a utopian novel (*Abaris* by Heraclides Ponticus). This utopian element is organically combined with all the other elements of the genre.

12. Characteristic for the menippea is a wide use of inserted genres: novellas, letters, oratorical speeches, symposia, and so on; also characteristic is a mixing of prose and poetic speech. The inserted genres are presented at various distances from the ultimate authorial position, that is, with varying degrees of parodying and objectification. Verse portions are almost always given with a certain degree of parodying.

13. The presence of inserted genres reinforces the multi-styled and multi-toned nature of the menippea; what is coalescing here is a new relationship to the word as the material of literature, a relationship characteristic for the entire dialogic line of development in artistic prose.

14. Finally, the last characteristic of the menippea: its concern with current and topical issues. This is, in its own way, the "journalistic" genre of antiquity, acutely echoing the ideological issues of the day. The satires of Lucian, taken as a group, are an entire encyclopedia of his times: they are full of overt and hidden polemics with various philosophical, religious, ideological and scientific schools, and with the tendencies and currents of his time; they are full of the images of contemporary or recently deceased public figures, "masters of thought" in all spheres of societal and ideological life (under their own names, or disguised); they are full of allusions to the great and small events of the epoch; they feel out new directions in the development of everyday life; they show newly emerging types in all layers of society, and so on. They are a sort of *Diary of a Writer*, seeking to unravel and evaluate the general spirit and direction of evolving contemporary life. Just such a *Diary of a Writer* (with,

however, a sharp preponderance of the carnivalistic-comic element) are the satires of Varro, taken in their entirety. We find the same characteristic in Petronius, in Apuleius and others. A journalistic quality, the spirit of publicistic writing or of the feuilleton, a pointed interest in the topics of the day are characteristic to a greater or lesser extent of all representatives of the menippea. And this final characteristic is organically combined with all the other traits of the genre.

Such are the basic generic characteristics of the menippea. We must again emphasize the organic unity of all these seemingly very heterogeneous features, the deep internal integrity of this genre. It was formed in an epoch when national legend was already in decay, amid the destruction of those ethical norms that constituted the ancient idea of "seemliness" ("beauty," "nobility"), in an epoch of intense struggle among numerous and heterogeneous religious and philosophical schools and movements, when disputes over "ultimate questions" of worldview had become an everyday mass phenomenon among all strata of the population and took place whenever and wherever people came together—in marketplaces, on the streets and highroads, in taverns, in bathhouses, on the decks of ships; when the figure of the philosopher, the wise man (the cynic, the stoic, the epicurean) or of the prophet or wonder-worker became typical and were encountered more often than one met the figure of the monk in the Middle Ages during the greatest flowering of the monastic orders. It was the epoch of preparation and formation of a new world religion: Christianity.

The other side of this epoch was a devaluation of all external positions that a person might hold in life, their transformation into *roles* played out on the stageboards of the theater of the world in accordance with the wishes of blind fate (there is a profound philosophical awareness of this in Epictetus* and Marcus Aurelius, and on the literary plane in Lucian and Apuleius). This led to the destruction of the epic and tragic wholeness of a man and his fate.

Thus the genre of the menippea is perhaps the most adequate expression of the characteristics of the epoch. Here, the content of life was poured into a stable form that possessed an *inner logic*, insuring the indissoluble linking up of all its elements. Thanks to this, the genre of the menippea was able to wield such immense influence—to this day almost entirely unappreciated in scholarship—in the history of the development of European novelistic prose.

While possessing an inner integrity, the genre of the menippa simultaneously possesses great external plasticity and a remarkable capacity to absorb into itself kindred small genres, and to penetrate as a component element into other large genres.

Thus the menippea absorbs into itself such kindred genres as the diatribe, the soliloquy, the symposium. These genres are all akin to

one another in the external and *internal dialogicality* of their approach to human life and human thought.

The diatribe is an internally dialogized rhetorical genre, usually structured in the form of a conversation with an absent interlocutor—and resulting in a dialogization of the very process of speech and thought. The founder of the diatribe was considered by the ancients to be that same Bion Borysthenes who was also a founder of the menippea. It should be noted that it was precisely the diatribe, and not classical rhetoric, that exercised a defining influence on the generic characteristics of the ancient Christian sermon.

A dialogic relationship to one's own self defines the genre of the soliloquy. It is a discussion with oneself. Already Antisthenes (a pupil of Socrates and perhaps already a writer of menippea) considered the greatest achievement of his philosophy "the ability to communicate dialogically with one's self."[f] Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, and Augustine were remarkable masters of this genre. At the heart of the genre lies the discovery of the *inner man*—"one's own self," accessible not to passive self-observation but only through an *active dialogic approach to one's own self*, destroying that naive wholeness of one's notions about the self that lies at the heart of the lyric, epic, and tragic image of man. A dialogic approach to oneself breaks down the outer shell of the self's image, that shell which exists for other people, determining the external assessment of a person (in the eyes of others) and dimming the purity of self-consciousness.

Both genres—the diatribe and the soliloquy—developed within the orbit of the menippea, were interwoven with it and permeated it (especially on Roman and early Christian soil).

The symposium is a banquet dialogue, already in existence during the epoch of the Socratic dialogue (there are examples of it in Plato and Xenophon), but receiving its full and diverse development only in subsequent epochs. Dialogic banquet discourse possessed special privileges (originally of a cultic sort): the right to a certain license, ease and familiarity, to a certain frankness, to eccentricity, ambivalence; that is, the combination in one discourse of praise and abuse, of the serious and the comic. The symposium is by nature a purely carnivalistic genre. Menippea were sometimes formulated directly as symposia (apparently as early as Menippus; three of Varro's satires are formulated as symposia, and there are elements of the symposium in Lucian and Petronius).

The menippea, as we have said, was capable of infiltrating the large

[f]From Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers*, VI. 6-8 Antisthenes. The R. D. Hicks translation (Loeb, vol. II) renders this Greek phrase as "the ability to hold converse with myself," but the verb can also mean to consort with, associate with, join battle with, and be a disciple of.

genres, subjecting them to a certain transformation. Thus elements of the menippea can be detected in the "Greek novels." Certain images and episodes from the *Ephesian Tales* of Xenophon of Ephesus,* for example, have the distinct scent of the menippea about them. The dregs of society are represented in the spirit of slum naturalism: prisons, slaves, thieves, fishermen, and so forth. Other novels are characterized by an internal dialogicality, by elements of parody and reduced laughter. Elements of the menippea also penetrate the utopian works of antiquity, as well as works belonging to the aretological genre (*The Life of Apollonius of Tyana* by Philostratus,* for example). The menippea's transforming power to penetrate other genres has great significance for the narrative genres of ancient Christian literature as well.

Our descriptive characterization of the generic features of the menippea, and of kindred genres connected with it, is extraordinarily close to the characterization one might give of the generic features of Dostoevsky's work (see, for example, that given by Grossman, cited by us on pp. 14-15). Essentially all of the defining features of the menippea (with, of course, the appropriate modifications and complications) we will find also in Dostoevsky. This is in fact one and the same generic world, although present in the menippea at the *beginning* of its development, in Dostoevsky at its very *peak*. But we know that the beginning, that is the archaic stage of a genre, is preserved in renewed form at the highest stages of the genre's development. Moreover, the higher a genre develops and the more complex its form, the better and more fully it remembers its past.

Does this mean that Dostoevsky proceeded *directly* and *consciously* from the ancient menippea? Of course not. In no sense was he a *stylizer* of ancient genres. Dostoevsky linked up with the chain of a given generic tradition at that point where it passed through his own time, although the past links in this chain, including the ancient link, were to a greater or lesser degree familiar and close to him (we shall return later to the question of Dostoevsky's generic sources). Speaking somewhat paradoxically, one could say that it was not Dostoevsky's subjective memory, but the objective memory of the very genre in which he worked, that preserved the peculiar features of the ancient menippea.

The generic characteristics of the menippea were not simply reborn, but also *renewed*, in Dostoevsky's work. In his creative utilization of this generic potential, Dostoevsky departed widely from the authors of the ancient menippea. In its posing of philosophical and social problems, in its artistic qualities, the ancient menippea seems in comparison with Dostoevsky primitive and pale. And the most important difference is that the ancient menippea does not yet know

polyphony. The menippea, like the Socratic dialogue, could only prepare certain generic conditions necessary for polyphony's emergence.

We must now move on to the problem of carnival and the carnivalization of literature, already mentioned by us earlier.

The problem of *carnival* (in the sense of the sum total of all diverse festivities, rituals and forms of a carnival type)—its essence, its deep roots in the primordial order and the primordial thinking of man, its development under conditions of class society, its extraordinary life force and its undying fascination—is one of the most complex and most interesting problems in the history of culture. We cannot, of course, do justice to it here. What interests us here is essentially only the problem of carnivalization, that is, the determining influence of carnival on literature and more precisely on literary genre.

Carnival itself (we repeat: in the sense of a sum total of all diverse festivities of the carnival type) is not, of course, a literary phenomenon. It is *syncretic pageantry* of a ritualistic sort. As a form it is very complex and varied, giving rise, on a general carnivalistic base, to diverse variants and nuances depending upon the epoch, the people, the individual festivity. Carnival has worked out an entire language of symbolic concretely sensuous forms—from large and complex mass actions to individual carnivalistic gestures. This language, in a differentiated and even (as in any language) articulate way, gave expression to a unified (but complex) carnival sense of the world, permeating all its forms. This language cannot be translated in any full or adequate way into a verbal language, and much less into a language of abstract concepts, but it is amenable to a certain transposition into a language of artistic images that has something in common with its concretely sensuous nature; that is, it can be transposed into the language of literature. We are calling this transposition of carnival into the language of literature the carnivalization of literature. From the vantage point of this transposition, we will isolate and examine individual aspects and characteristic features of carnival.

Carnival is a pageant without footlights and without a division into performers and spectators. In carnival everyone is an active participant, everyone communes in the carnival act. Carnival is not contemplated and, strictly speaking, not even performed; its participants *live* in it, they live by its laws as long as those laws are in effect; that is, they live a *carnivalistic life*. Because carnivalistic life is life drawn out of its *usual* rut, it is to some extent "life turned inside out," "the reverse side of the world" (*"monde à l'envers"*).

The laws, prohibitions, and restrictions that determine the structure and order of ordinary, that is noncarnival, life are suspended during

carnival: what is suspended first of all is hierarchical structure and all the forms of terror, reverence, piety, and etiquette connected with it—that is, everything resulting from socio-hierarchical inequality or any other form of inequality among people (including age). All *distance* between people is suspended, and a special carnival category goes into effect: *free and familiar contact among people*. This is a very important aspect of a carnival sense of the world. People who in life are separated by impenetrable hierarchical barriers enter into free familiar contact on the carnival square. The category of familiar contact is also responsible for the special way mass actions are organized, and for free carnival gesticulation, and for the outspoken carnivalistic word.

Carnival is the place for working out, in a concretely sensuous, half-real and half-play-acted form, a *new mode of interrelationship between individuals*, counterposed to the all-powerful socio-hierarchical relationships of noncarnival life. The behavior, gesture, and discourse of a person are freed from the authority of all hierarchical positions (social estate, rank, age, property) defining them totally in noncarnival life, and thus from the vantage point of noncarnival life become eccentric and inappropriate. *Eccentricity* is a special category of the carnival sense of the world, organically connected with the category of familiar contact; it permits—in concretely sensuous form—the latent sides of human nature to reveal and express themselves.

Linked with familiarization is a third category of the carnival sense of the world: *carnivalistic mésalliances*. A free and familiar attitude spreads over everything: over all values, thoughts, phenomena, and things. All things that were once self-enclosed, disunified, distanced from one another by a noncarnivalistic hierarchical worldview are drawn into carnivalistic contacts and combinations. Carnival brings together, unifies, weds, and combines the sacred with the profane, the lofty with the low, the great with the insignificant, the wise with the stupid.

Connected with this is yet a fourth carnivalistic category, *profanation*: carnivalistic blasphemies, a whole system of carnivalistic debasings and bringings down to earth, carnivalistic obscenities linked with the reproductive power of the earth and the body, carnivalistic parodies on sacred texts and sayings, etc.

These carnivalistic categories are not *abstract thoughts* about equality and freedom, the interrelatedness of all things or the unity of opposites. No, these are concretely sensuous ritual-pageant "thoughts" experienced and played out in the form of life itself, "thoughts" that had coalesced and survived for thousands of years among the broadest masses of European mankind. This is why they were able to exercise such an immense *formal, genre-shaping* influence on literature.

These carnival categories, and above all the category of free familiarization of man and the world, were over thousands of years transposed into literature, particularly into the dialogic line of development in novelistic prose. Familiarization facilitated the destruction of epic and tragic distance and the transfer of all represented material to a zone of familiar contact; it was reflected significantly in the organization of plot and plot situations, it determined that special familiarity of the author's position with regard to his characters (impossible in the higher genres); it introduced the logic of mésalliances and profanatory debasings; finally, it exercised a powerful transforming influence on the very verbal style of literature. All this already shows up quite clearly in the menippea. We shall return to this later, but first we must touch upon several other aspects of carnival, most importantly *carnivalistic acts*.

The primary carnivalistic act is the *mock crowning and subsequent decrowning of the carnival king*. This ritual is encountered in one form or another in all festivities of the carnival type: in the most elaborately worked out forms—the saturnalia, the European carnival and festival of fools (in the latter, mock priests, bishops or popes, depending on the rank of the church, were chosen in place of a king); in a less elaborated form, all other festivities of this type, right down to festival banquets with their election of short-lived kings and queens of the festival.

Under this ritual act of decrowning a king lies the very core of the carnival sense of the world—*the pathos of shifts and changes, of death and renewal*. Carnival is the festival of all-annihilating and all-renewing time. Thus might one express the basic concept of carnival. But we emphasize again: this is not an abstract thought but a living sense of the world, expressed in the concretely sensuous forms (either experienced or play-acted) of the ritual act.

Crowning/decrowning is a dualistic ambivalent ritual, expressing the inevitability and at the same time the creative power of the shift-and-renewal, the *joyful relativity* of all structure and order, of all authority and all (hierarchical) position. Crowning already contains the idea of immanent decrowning: it is ambivalent from the very start. And he who is crowned is the antipode of a real king, a slave or a jester; this act, as it were, opens and sanctifies the inside-out world of carnival. In the ritual of crowning all aspects of the actual ceremony—the symbols of authority that are handed over to the newly crowned king and the clothing in which he is dressed—all become ambivalent and acquire a veneer of joyful relativity; they become almost stage props (although these are ritual stage props); their symbolic meaning becomes two-leveled (as real symbols of power, that is in the noncarnival world, they are single-leveled, absolute, heavy, and

monolithically serious). From the very beginning, a decrowning glimmers through the crowning. And all carnivalistic symbols are of such a sort: they always include within themselves a perspective of negation (death) or vice versa. Birth is fraught with death, and death with new birth.

The ritual of decrowning completes, as it were, the coronation and is inseparable from it (I repeat: this is a dualistic ritual). And through it, a new crowning already glimmers. Carnival celebrates the shift itself, the very process of replaceability, and not the precise item that is replaced. Carnival is, so to speak, functional and not substantive. It absolutizes nothing, but rather proclaims the joyful relativity of everything. The ceremonial of the ritual of decrowning is counterposed to the ritual of crowning: regal vestments are stripped off the decrowned king, his crown is removed, the other symbols of authority are taken away, he is ridiculed and beaten. All the symbolic aspects of this ceremonial of decrowning acquire a second and positive level of meaning—it is not naked, absolute negation and destruction (absolute negation, like absolute affirmation, is unknown to carnival). Moreover, precisely in this ritual of decrowning does there emerge with special clarity the carnival pathos of shifts and renewals, the image of constructive death. Thus the ritual of decrowning has been the ritual most often transposed into literature. But, we repeat, crowning and decrowning are inseparable, they are dualistic and pass one into the other; in any absolute dissociation they would completely lose their carnivalistic sense.

The carnivalistic act of crowning/decrowning is, of course, permeated with carnival categories (with the logic of the carnival world): free and familiar contact (this is very clearly manifest in decrowning), carnivalistic mésalliances (slave-king), profanation (playing with the symbols of higher authority), and so on.

We shall not dwell here on the details of the crowning-decrowning ritual (although they are very interesting), nor on its diverse variations from epoch to epoch and in the various festivities of the carnival type. Nor shall we analyze the various accessory rituals of carnival, for example, disguise—that is, carnivalistic shifts of clothing and of positions and destinies in life; nor carnival mystifications, bloodless carnival wars, verbal agons[g] and cursing matches, exchanges of gifts (abundance as an aspect of carnivalistic utopia), and so on. These rituals too were transposed into literature, imparting symbolic depth and ambivalence to the corresponding plots and plot situations, imparting a joyful relativity, carnival levity and rapidity of change.

But of course an extraordinarily great influence on literary-artistic

[g] *Agon*: in Greek, "contest." An agon is that part of a Greek drama in which two protagonists, each aided by half of the chorus, engage in verbal conflict.

thinking was exercised by the ritual of crowning/decrowning. This ritual determined a special *decrowning type* of structure for artistic images and whole works, one in which the decrowning was essentially ambivalent and two-leveled. If carnivalistic ambivalence should happen to be extinguished in these images of decrowning, they degenerated into a purely negative *exposé* of a moral or socio-political sort, they became single-leveled, lost their artistic character, and were transformed into naked journalism.

We must consider again in more detail the ambivalent nature of carnival images. All the images of carnival are dualistic; they unite within themselves both poles of change and crisis: birth and death (the image of pregnant death), blessing and curse (benedictory carnival curses which call simultaneously for death and rebirth), praise and abuse, youth and old age, top and bottom, face and backside, stupidity and wisdom. Very characteristic for carnival thinking is paired images, chosen for their contrast (high/low, fat/thin, etc.) or for their similarity (doubles/twins). Also characteristic is the utilization of things in reverse: putting clothes on inside out (or wrong side out), trousers on the head, dishes in place of headgear, the use of household utensils as weapons, and so forth. This is a special instance of the carnival category of *eccentricity*, the violation of the usual and the generally accepted, life drawn out of its usual rut.

Deeply ambivalent also is the image of *fire* in carnival. It is a fire that simultaneously destroys and renews the world. In European carnivals there was almost always a special structure (usually a vehicle adorned with all possible sorts of gaudy carnival trash) called "hell," and at the close of carnival this "hell" was triumphantly set on fire (sometimes this carnival "hell" was ambivalently linked with a horn of plenty). Characteristic is the ritual of "moccoli" in Roman carnival: each participant in the carnival carried a lighted candle ("a candle stub"), and each tried to put out another's candle with the cry "Sia ammazzato!" ("Death to thee!"). In his famous description of Roman carnival (in *Italienische Reise*)[h] Goethe, striving to uncover the deeper meaning behind carnival images, relates a profoundly symbolic little scene: during "moccoli" a boy puts out his father's candle with the cheerful carnival cry: "Sia ammazzato il Signore Padre!" [that is, "death to thee, Signor Father!"]

Deeply ambivalent also is carnival *laughter* itself. Genetically it is linked with the most ancient forms of ritual laughter. Ritual laughter was always directed toward something higher: the sun (the highest god), other gods, the highest earthly authority were put to shame

[h] J. W. Goethe, *Italian Journey*, trans. W. H. Auden and Elizabeth Mayer (London: Collins, 1962). See Part Three (January 1788), "The Roman Carnival," and especially the section "Moccoli," pp. 467-69.

and ridiculed to force them to *renew themselves*. All forms of ritual laughter were linked with death and rebirth, with the reproductive act, with symbols of the reproductive force. Ritual laughter was a reaction to *crises* in the life of the sun (solstices), crises in the life of a deity, in the life of the world and of man (funeral laughter). In it, ridicule was fused with rejoicing.

This ancient ritualistic practice of directing laughter toward something higher (a deity or authority) defined the privileges of laughter in antiquity and in the Middle Ages. Much was permitted in the form of laughter that was impermissible in serious form. In the Middle Ages, under cover of the legitimized license of laughter, "parodia sacra" became possible—that is, parody of sacred texts and rituals.

Carnivalistic laughter likewise is directed toward something higher —toward a shift of authorities and truths, a shift of world orders. Laughter embraces both poles of change, it deals with the very process of change, with *crisis* itself. Combined in the act of carnival laughter are death and rebirth, negation (a smirk) and affirmation (rejoicing laughter). This is a profoundly universal laughter, a laughter that contains a whole outlook on the world. Such is the specific quality of ambivalent carnival laughter.

In connection with laughter we shall touch upon one more question—the carnivalistic nature of *parody*. Parody, as we have already noted, is an integral element in Menippean satire and in all carnivalized genres in general. To the pure genres (epic, tragedy) parody is organically alien; to the carnivalized genres it is, on the contrary, organically inherent. In antiquity, parody was inseparably linked to a carnival sense of the world. Parodying is the creation of a *decrowning double*; it is that same "world turned inside out." For this reason parody is ambivalent. Antiquity parodied essentially everything: the satyr drama, for example, was originally the parodic and laughing aspect of the tragic trilogy that preceded it. Parody here was not, of course, a naked rejection of the parodied object. Everything has its parody, that is, its laughing aspect, for everything is reborn and renewed through death. In Rome, parody was an obligatory aspect of funeral as well as of triumphant laughter (both were of course rituals of the carnivalistic type). In carnival, parodying was employed very widely, in diverse forms and degrees: various images (for example, carnival pairs of various sorts) parodied one another variously and from various points of view; it was like an entire system of crooked mirrors, elongating, diminishing, distorting in various directions and to various degrees.

Parodying doubles have become a rather common phenomenon in carnivalized literature. They find especially vivid expression in Dostoevsky—almost every one of the leading heroes of his novels has

several doubles who parody him in various ways: for Raskolnikov there are Svidrigailov, Luzhin, and Lebeziatnikov; for Stavrogin—Peter Verkhovensky, Shatov, and Kirillov; for Ivan Karamazov—Smerdyakov, the devil, Rakitin. In each of them (that is, in each of the doubles) the hero dies (that is, is negated) in order to be renewed (that is, in order to be purified and to rise above himself).

In the narrowly formal literary parody of modern times, the connection with a carnival sense of the world is almost entirely broken. But in the parodies of the Renaissance (in Erasmus, Rabelais, and others) the carnival fire still burned: parody was ambivalent and sensed its bond with death/renewal. Thus could be born in the bosom of parody one of the greatest and at the same time most carnivalistic novels of world literature: Cervantes' *Don Quixote*. Here is how Dostoevsky assessed that novel: "There is nothing in the world more profound and powerful than this work. It is the ultimate and greatest word yet uttered by human thought, it is the most bitter irony that a man could express, and if the world should end and people were asked there, somewhere, 'Well, did you understand your life on earth and what conclusions have you drawn from it?' a person could silently point to Don Quixote: 'Here is my conclusion about life, can you judge me for it?'"[i]

It is characteristic that Dostoevsky structures his evaluation of *Don Quixote* in the form of a typical "threshold dialogue."

To conclude our analysis of carnival (from the vantage point of carnivalized literature), a few words about the carnival square.

The main arena for carnival acts was the square and the streets adjoining it. To be sure, carnival also invaded the home; in essence it was limited in time only and not in space; carnival knows neither stage nor footlights. But the central arena could only be the square, for by its very idea carnival *belongs to the whole people*, it is *universal, everyone* must participate in its familiar contact. The public square was the symbol of communal performance. The carnival square —the square of carnival acts—acquired an additional symbolic overtone that broadened and deepened it. In carnivalized literature the square, as a setting for the action of the plot, becomes two-leveled and ambivalent: it is as if there glimmered through the actual square the carnival square of free familiar contact and communal performances of crowning and decrowning. Other places of action as well (provided they are realistically motivated by the plot, of course) can, if they become meeting- and contact-points for heterogeneous people —streets, taverns, roads, bathhouses, decks of ships, and so on—take on this additional carnival-square significance (for all the naturalistic

[i]The comment on Quixote occurs in *The Diary of a Writer*, 1876, March, Ch. II, 1: "Don Carlos and Sir Watkin. Again, Symptoms of 'the Beginning of the End,'" p. 260.

qualities of the representation, the universal symbol-system of carnival is in no danger of naturalism).

Festivities of the carnival type occupied an enormous place in the life of the broadest masses of the people in ancient times—in Greek and even more in Roman life, where the central (but not the sole) festival of the carnival type was the *saturnalia*. These festivals had no less (and perhaps, even more) significance in medieval Europe and during the Renaissance, where they were in part a direct living continuation of Roman saturnalia. In the realm of carnivalistic folk culture there was no break in tradition between antiquity and the Middle Ages. In all epochs of their development, festivities of the carnival type have exercised an enormous influence—as yet insufficiently appreciated and researched—on the development of culture as a whole, including literature, several of whose genres and movements have undergone a particularly intense *carnivalization*. In the ancient period, early Attic comedy and the entire realm of the serio-comical was subjected to a particularly powerful carnivalization. In Rome, the many diverse varieties of satire and epigram were linked, and were designed to be linked, with the saturnalia; they were either written for saturnalia, or at least were created under cover of that legitimized carnival license enjoyed by the festival (all of Martial's* work, for example, was directly connected with the saturnalia).

In the Middle Ages the vast comic and parodic literature in vernacular languages and in Latin was, one way or another, connected with festivals of the carnival type—with carnival proper, with the "Festival of Fools," with free "paschal laughter" (*risus paschalis*), and so forth. Essentially every church holiday in the Middle Ages had its carnivalistic side, the side facing the public square (especially those holidays like Corpus Christi). Many national festivities, such as the bullfight, for example, were of a clearly expressed carnivalistic character. A carnival atmosphere reigned during the days of a fair, on the festival of the harvesting of grapes, on the performance days of miracle plays, mystery plays, *soties*[j] and so forth; the entire theatrical life of the Middle Ages was carnivalistic. The large cities of the late Middle Ages (such cities as Rome, Naples, Venice, Paris, Lyon, Nuremberg, Cologne) lived a full carnival life on the average of three months out of the year (and sometimes more). It could be said (with certain reservations, of course) that a person of the Middle Ages lived, as it were, *two lives*: one was the *official* life, monolithically serious and gloomy, subjugated to a strict hierarchical order, full of terror, dogmatism, reverence, and piety; the other was the *life of the carnival square*, free and unrestricted, full of ambivalent laughter,

[j] *Soties*: French satirical farces of the medieval period, in which actors (in fool's costume) ridiculed social manners and political events.

blasphemy, the profanation of everything sacred, full of debasing and obscenities, familiar contact with everyone and everything. Both these lives were legitimate, but separated by strict temporal boundaries.

Without taking into account the alternation and mutual estrangement of these two systems of life and thought (the official and the carnivalistic), one cannot understand correctly the peculiar nature of medieval man's cultural consciousness, and cannot make sense of many phenomena in medieval literature—such as, for example, the "parodia sacra."[6]

This epoch also witnessed the carnivalization of the *speech life* of European peoples: whole layers of language, the so-called *familiar speech of the public square*, were permeated with a carnival sense of the world; there came into being an enormous fund of unrestrained carnivalistic gesticulations. The familiar speech of all European peoples is to this day filled with relics of carnival, especially speech of abuse and ridicule; the symbol-system of carnival also fills the abusive, ridiculing gesticulations of today.

During the Renaissance, one could say that the primordial elements of carnival swept away many barriers and invaded many realms of official life and worldview. Most importantly, they took possession of all the genres of high literature and transformed them fundamentally. There occurred a deep and almost total carnivalization of all artistic literature. The carnival sense of the world, with its categories, its carnival laughter, its symbol-system of carnival acts of crowning/decrowning, of shifts and disguises, carnival ambivalence and all the overtones of the unrestrained carnival word—familiar, cynically frank, eccentric, eulogistic-abusive and so on—penetrated deeply into almost all genres of artistic literature. On the basis of this carnival sense of the world, the complex forms of the Renaissance worldview came into being. Even antiquity, as assimilated by the humanists of the epoch, was to a certain extent refracted through the prism of the carnival sense of the world. The Renaissance is the high point of carnival life.[7] Thereafter begins its decline.

Beginning with the seventeenth century, folk-carnival life is on the wane: it almost loses touch with communal performance, its specific weight in the life of people is sharply reduced, its forms are impoverished, made petty and less complex. As early as the Renaissance a *festive court masquerade* culture begins to develop, having absorbed into itself a whole series of carnivalistic forms and symbols (mostly of an externally decorative sort). Later there begins to develop a broader line of festivities and entertainments (no longer limited to the court) which we might call the *masquerade line* of development; it preserved in itself a bit of the license and some faint reflections of the carnival sense of the world. Many carnival forms were completely

cut off from their folk base and left the public square to enter this chamber masquerade line, which exists even today. Many ancient forms of carnival were preserved and continue to live and renew themselves in the *farcical* comic antics of the public square, and also in the *circus*. Certain elements of carnival are also preserved in the life of the theater and spectacle in modern times. It is characteristic that the subculture of the theater has even retained something of carnivalistic license, the carnivalistic sense of the world, the fascination of carnival; this was very well illustrated by Goethe in *Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre*, and for our time by Nemirovich-Danchenko* in his memoirs.[k] Something of the carnival atmosphere is retained, under certain conditions, among the so-called bohemians, but here in most cases we are dealing with the degradation and trivialization of the carnival sense of the world (there is, for example, not a grain of that carnival spirit of communal performance).

Alongside these later branchings from the basic carnival trunk—branchings that had emaciated the trunk—there continued and still continues to exist a public-square carnival in the proper sense, as well as other festivities of the carnivalistic type, but they have lost their former significance and their former wealth of forms and symbols.

As a consequence, there occurred a deterioration and dissipation of carnival and the carnival sense of the world; it lost that authentic sense of a communal performance on the public square. And thus a change also occurred in the nature of the carnivalization of literature. Until the second half of the seventeenth century, people were *direct participants* in carnivalistic acts and in a carnival sense of the world; they still *lived* in carnival, that is, carnival was one of the forms of life itself. Therefore carnivalization was experienced as something unmediated (several genres in fact directly serviced carnival). *The source of carnivalization was carnival itself.* In addition, carnivalization had genre-shaping significance; that is, it determined not only the content but also the very generic foundations of a work. From the second half of the seventeenth century on, carnival almost completely ceases to be a direct source of carnivalization, ceding its place to the influence of already carnivalized literature; in this way carnivalization becomes a purely literary tradition. Thus in Sorel* and Scarron* we already observe, alongside the direct influence of carnival, the powerful effect of the carnivalized literature of the Renaissance (primarily Rabelais and Cervantes), and this latter influence predominates. Carnivalization, consequently, is already becoming a literary and generic tradition. Carnival elements in this literature—already cut off

[k]See, in English, Vladimir Ivanovich Nemirovich-Danchenko, *My Life in the Russian Theatre*, trans. John Cournos (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1936).

from their direct source, carnival—change their appearance somewhat and are reconceptualized.

It is of course true that carnival in the proper sense as well as other festivities of the carnival type (bullfights, for example), the masquerade line, farcical street antics, and other forms of carnivalistic folklore continue to exercise a certain direct influence on literature even to this day. But in the majority of cases this influence is limited to the content of works and does not touch their generic foundation; that is, it is deprived of any genre-shaping power.

We can now return to the carnivalization of genres within the realm of the serio-comical—a realm whose very name already sounds ambivalent, after the manner of carnival.

The carnivalistic base of the Socratic dialogue, despite its very complicated form and philosophical depth, is beyond any doubt. Folk-carnival "debates" between life and death, darkness and light, winter and summer, etc., permeated with the pathos of change and the joyful relativity of all things, debates which did not permit thought to stop and congeal in one-sided seriousness or in a stupid fetish for definition or singleness of meaning—all this lay at the base of the original core of the genre. This distinguishes the Socratic dialogue from the purely rhetorical dialogue as well as from the tragic dialogue; but this carnivalistic base also brings Socratic dialogue close in several respects to the agons of ancient Attic comedy and to the mimes of Sophron (there have even been attempts to reconstruct the mimes of Sophron after certain Platonic dialogues). The Socratic discovery of the dialogic nature of thought, of truth itself, presumes a carnivalistic familiarization of relations among people who have entered the dialogue, it presumes the abolition of all distance between them; moreover, it presumes a familiarizing of attitudes toward the object of thought itself, however lofty and important, and toward truth itself. Several of Plato's dialogues are constructed along the lines of a carnival crowning/decrowning. Characteristic for a Socratic dialogue are unrestrained mésalliances of thoughts and images. "Socratic irony" is reduced carnival laughter.

The image of Socrates himself is of an ambivalent sort—a combination of beauty and ugliness (see the characterization of him by Alcibiades in Plato's *Symposium*); Socrates' own characterizations of himself as a "pander" and "midwife" are also constructed in the spirit of carnival debasings. And the personal life of Socrates was itself surrounded by carnivalistic legends (for example, his relationship with his wife Xanthippe). Carnivalistic legends in general are profoundly different from traditional heroicizing epic legends: carnivalistic

ends debase the hero and bring him down to earth, they make him familiar, bring him close, humanize him; ambivalent carnival laughter burns away all that is stilted and stiff, but in no way destroys the heroic core of the image. It should be pointed out that novelistic images of heroes (Gargantua, Eulenspiegel, Don Quixote, Faust, Simplicissimus and others) also coalesced in the atmosphere of carnivalistic legends.

The carnivalistic nature of the menippea is even more pronounced. Carnivalization permeates both its external layers and its deepest core. Certain menippea directly portray festivals of the carnival type (Roman festivals are depicted in two of Varro's satires, for example; in one menippea by Julian the Apostate, there is a depiction of the celebration of saturnalia on Olympus). This is a purely external (so to speak, thematic) connection, but it too is characteristic. More essential is the carnivalistic treatment of the three planes of the menippea: Olympus, the nether world, and earth. The representation of Olympus is clearly carnivalistic: free familiarization, scandals and eccentricities, crownings and decrownings are characteristic for the Olympus of the menippea. Olympus is, as it were, transformed into a carnival square (as, for example, in Lucian's *Juppiter tragoedus*). Olympian scenes are sometimes presented as carnivalistic debasings and bringings-down-to-earth (also in Lucian). Still more interesting is the consistent carnivalization of the nether world. The nether world equalizes representatives of all earthly positions in life; there the emperor and the slave, the rich man and the beggar come together on equal terms and enter into familiar contact; death decrowns all who have been crowned in life. Representation of the nether world often applied the carnivalistic logic of "a world upside down": an emperor in the nether world becomes a slave, a slave an emperor, and so forth. The carnivalized nether world of the menippea determined the medieval tradition of representations of *joyful hell*, a tradition which found its culmination in Rabelais. Characteristic for this medieval tradition is a deliberate confusion of the ancient nether world and Christian hell. In the mystery plays, hell and devils (in the "diableries") are also consistently carnivalized.

The earthly plane in the menippea is also carnivalized: behind almost all scenes and events of real life, most of which are portrayed in a naturalistic manner, there glimmers more or less distinctly the carnival square with its specific carnivalistic logic of familiar contacts, mésalliances, disguises and mystifications, contrasting paired images, scandals, crownings/decrownings, and so forth. Behind all the slum-naturalism scenes of the *Satyricon*, more or less distinctly, the carnival square is glimmering. And in fact the very plot of the *Satyricon* is

thoroughly carnivalized. We notice the same thing in Apuleius' *Metamorphoses* (*The Golden Ass*). Sometimes carnivalization lies buried at deeper levels and permits us to speak only of *carnivalistic overtones* to individual images and events. But sometimes it surfaces, for example in the purely carnivalistic episode of the supposed murder *on the threshold*, when instead of humans Lucius stabs wineskins filled with wine, mistaking the wine for blood, and in the subsequent scene of carnival mystification surrounding his trial. Carnivalistic overtones are heard even in a menippea of so serious a tone as Boethius' *De Consolatione Philosophiae*.

Carnivalization even penetrates the deepest philosophical and dialogic core of the menippea. Characteristic for the genre, as we have seen, is a naked posing of ultimate questions on life and death, a universalism of the most extreme sort (personal problems and elaborate philosophical argumentation are unknown to it). Carnivalistic thought also lives in the realm of ultimate questions, but it gives them no abstractly philosophical or religiously dogmatic resolution; it plays them out in the concretely sensuous form of carnivalistic acts and images. Thus carnivalization made possible the transfer of ultimate questions from the abstractly philosophical sphere, through a carnival sense of the world, to the concretely sensuous plane of images and events—which are, in keeping with the spirit of carnival, dynamic, diverse and vivid. A carnival sense of the world also made it possible to "deck out philosophy in the motley dress of a hetaera." A carnival sense of the world is the drive-shaft between the *idea* and the *artistic image of adventure*. A vivid example of this in European literature of modern times are the philosophical novellas of Voltaire, with their universalism of ideas, their carnivalistic dynamism and motley colors (*Candide*, for example); in very graphic form these novellas reveal the traditions of the menippea and carnivalization.

Carnivalization thus penetrates to the very philosophical core of the menippea.

The following conclusion can now be drawn. We have uncovered in the menippea a striking combination of what would seem to be absolutely heterogeneous and incompatible elements: philosophical dialogue, adventure and fantasticality, slum naturalism, utopia, and so forth. We can now say that the clamping principle that bound all these heterogeneous elements into the organic whole of a genre, a principle of extraordinary strength and tenacity, was carnival and a carnival sense of the world. In the subsequent development of European literature as well, carnivalization constantly assisted in the destruction of all barriers between genres, between self-enclosed systems of thought, between various styles, etc.; it destroyed any attempt on the part of genres and styles to isolate themselves or ignore one

another; it brought closer what was distant and united what had been sundered. This has been the great function of carnivalization in the history of literature.

Now a few words about the menippea and carnivalization on Christian soil.

The menippea and kindred genres developing within its orbit exercised a defining influence on emerging ancient Christian literature—Greek, Roman, and Byzantine.

The basic narrative genres of ancient Christian literature—"Gospels," "Acts of the Apostles," "Apocalypse," and "Lives of Saints and Martyrs"—are linked with an ancient aretology which in the first centuries A.D. developed within the orbit of the menippea. In the Christian genres this influence was sharply increased, especially at the expense of the *dialogic element* of the menippea. In these genres, and especially in the numerous "Gospels" and "Acts," the classical Christian dialogic syncrises are worked out: that of the tempted (Christ or a righteous man) with the tempter, the believer with the nonbeliever, the righteous man with the sinner, the beggar with the rich man, the follower of Christ with the Pharisee, the apostle (the Christian) with the heathen, and so forth. These syncrises are familiar to everyone through the canonical Gospels and Acts. The corresponding anacrises are also developed (that is, provocation through discourse or plot situation).

In the Christian genres as in the menippea, enormous organizing significance is alloted to the *testing of an idea and its carrier*, testing by means of temptations and martyrdom (especially, of course, in the hagiographic genre). As in the menippea, rulers, rich men, thieves, beggars, hetaerae come together here on equal terms on a single, fundamentally dialogized plane. Here, as in the menippea, considerable importance is given to dream visions, insanity, obsessions of all sorts. And finally, Christian narrative literature also absorbed into itself kindred genres: the symposium (the gospel meals) and the soliloquy.

Christian narrative literature (independently of the influence of carnivalized menippea) was also subjected to direct carnivalization. It is enough to recall the scene of crowning and decrowning the "King of the Jews" in the canonical Gospels. But carnivalization is even more powerfully present in apocryphal Christian literature.

Thus ancient Christian narrative literature (including that which was canonized) is also permeated by elements of the menippea and carnivalization.[8]

These are the ancient sources, the "origins" (the "archaic portion") of that generic tradition, one of whose high peaks was to be the work of Dostoevsky. These "origins" are preserved, in a renewed form, in his work.

But Dostoevsky is separated from these sources by two thousand years, during which time the generic tradition continued to develop, to become more complex, to change its shape and be reconceptualized (while preserving throughout its unity and continuity). A few words now on the further development of the menippea.

We have seen that on ancient soil, including the earliest Christian period, the menippea already manifested an extraordinary "protean" capacity for changing its external form (while preserving its inner generic essence), a capacity to grow into whole novels, to combine with kindred genres, to infiltrate other large genres (for example, the Greek and ancient Christian novel). This capacity manifests itself in the subsequent development of the menippea, in the Middle Ages as well as in modern times.

During the Middle Ages, certain generic features of the menippea continue to live and be renewed in several genres of Latin ecclesiastical literature, directly continuing the tradition of ancient Christian literature, especially in certain varieties of hagiographic literature. In more free and original form the menippea lives on in such dialogized and carnivalized medieval genres as "arguments," "debates," ambivalent "panegyrics" (*desputaisons, dits, débats*),[1] morality and miracle plays, and in the later Middle Ages mystery plays and *soties*. Menippean elements are felt in the intensely carnivalized parodic and semiparodic literature of the Middle Ages: in parodic visions from beyond the grave, in parodic "Gospel readings," and so forth. And finally, as a very important moment in the development of this generic tradition, there is the novelistic literature of the Middle Ages and the early Renaissance—a literature thoroughly permeated with elements of the carnivalized menippea.[9]

The entire medieval development of the menippea is permeated with elements of *local* carnival folklore and reflects the specific features characteristic of various periods in the Middle Ages.

During the Renaissance—an epoch of deep and almost complete carnivalization of literature and worldview—the menippea infiltrates all the large genres of the epoch (the works of Rabelais, Cervantes, Grimmelshausen* and others); there develop at the same time diverse Renaissance forms of the menippea, in most cases combining ancient and medieval traditions of the genre: Des Périers' *Cymbalum mundi**, Erasmus' *The Praise of Folly*, *Novelas ejemplares* of Cervantes*, *Satyre Ménippée de la vertu du Catholicon d'Espagne** (1594, one of the greatest political satires of world literature), the satires of Grimmelshausen, Quevedo,* and others.

[1] In medieval literature, the *dit* is a flexible verse composition, either descriptive or didactic. The *débat* is a didactic *dit* in the form of a dialogue, often between personifications (of the seasons, etc.) and frequently on religious themes.

In modern times, while infiltrating deep into other carnivalized genres, the menippea continues its own independent development, in diverse variants and under diverse names: the "Lucianic dialogue," "dialogues of the dead" (varieties in which ancient traditions predominate), the "philosophical tale" (a variety of menippea characteristic for the Enlightenment), the "fantastic story" and "philosophical fairy tale" (forms characteristic for Romanticism—Hoffmann, for example), and others. Here it should be noted that in modern times the generic characteristics of the menippea have been used by various literary movements and creative methods, renewing them, of course, in a variety of ways. Thus, for example, the rationalistic "philosophical tale" of Voltaire and the romantic "philosophical fairy tale" of Hoffmann share common generic features of the menippea and are equally intensely carnivalized, for all the profound differences in artistic intention, the content of their ideas, and, of course, their individuality as creative works of art (it suffices to contrast, for example, *Micromégas* with *Klein Zaches*). It must be said that the menippea has been, in the literature of modern times, the primary conduit for the most concentrated and vivid forms of carnivalization.

In conclusion we consider it necessary to emphasize that the generic label "menippea," like all other generic labels—"epic," "tragedy," "idyll," etc.—is, when applied to the literature of modern times, a means of designating the *essence of a genre*, and not any specific genre canon (as in antiquity).[10]

With this we conclude our digression into the realm of the history of genres and return to Dostoevsky (although throughout this entire digression we have not for a single moment lost sight of him).

We already noted in the course of our digression that the characterization we offered of the menippea and its kindred genres also applies, and almost in its entirety, to the generic features of Dostoevsky's work. We must now illustrate this concretely with an analysis of several of his works that are *key* from the generic standpoint.

Two "fantastic stories" of the late Dostoevsky—"Bobok" (1873) and "The Dream of a Ridiculous Man" (1877)—may be called menippea almost in the strict ancient sense of the term, so precisely and fully manifest in them are the classical characteristic features of the genre. A number of other works ("Notes from Underground," "A Meek One," and others) constitute variants, freer and more distant from the ancient models, of the same generic essence. Finally, the menippea infiltrates all of Dostoevsky's larger works, especially his five mature novels, and infiltrates, moreover, precisely the most fundamental and decisive aspects of the novels. Therefore we can say

outright that the menippea essentially sets the tone for Dostoevsky's entire work.

We would hardly be mistaken in saying that "Bobok," in all its depth and boldness, is one of the greatest menippea in all word literature. But the depth of its content will not detain us here; here we are interested only in the particular generic characteristics of the work.

Characteristic first of all is the image of the narrator and the *tone* of his story. The narrator—a "certain person"[11] —is on the *threshold* of insanity (delirium tremens). But that aside, he is already a person *not like everyone else*; that is, he is one who has deviated from the general norm, who has fallen out of life's usual rut, who is despised by everyone and who himself despises everyone—that is, we have before us a new variety of the "underground man." His tone is unstable, equivocal, full of muffled ambivalence, with elements of infernal buffoonery (similar to the devils of mystery plays). Despite the external form of short, "choppy" categorical sentences, he conceals his final word, evades it. He himself quotes a characterization of his style, given by a friend:

> "Your style is changing," he said; "it is choppy: you chop and chop—and then a parenthesis, then a parenthesis in the parenthesis, then you stick in something else in brackets, then you begin chopping and chopping again." [*SS* X, 343]

His speech is internally dialogized and shot through with polemic. The story in fact begins directly on a polemic with one Semyon Ardalionovich, who has accused him of being a drunkard. He also polemicizes with the editors who refuse to print his words (he is an unrecognized author), and with the contemporary public not capable of understanding humor; in fact he polemicizes with all of his contemporaries. And later, when the main action of the story unfolds, he indignantly polemicizes with "contemporary corpses." Such is the dialogized and equivocal verbal style and tone of the story, so typical of the menippea.

At the beginning of the story there is discussion on a theme typical for the carnivalized menippea: the relativity and ambivalence of reason and madness, intelligence and stupidity. Then follows the description of a cemetery and a funeral.

The entire description is permeated with a markedly *familiar* and *profaning* attitude toward the cemetery, the funeral, the cemetery clergy, the deceased, the very "sacrament of death" itself. The entire description is built on oxymoronic combinations and carnivalistic mésalliances; it is full of *debasing* and *bringings-down-to-earth*, full of the *symbol-system* of carnival and at the same time a crude naturalism.

Here are some typical excerpts:

I went out in search of *diversion*, I hit upon a *funeral*. . . . It's been twenty-five years, I think, since I was at the cemetery; *what a wretched place!*

To begin with, the *odor*. About fifteen corpses *arrived*. *Shrouds at various prices*; there were even two catafalques.

One was a general's and one some lady's. There were many *mourners*, a great deal of feigned mourning and a great deal of *open gaiety*. The clergy have nothing to complain of; it brings them a good *income*. But the *odor*, the *odor*. I should not like to be *in the holy orders* here. [A profanatory pun typical for the genre.][m]

I kept glancing at the faces of the dead cautiously, distrusting my impressionability. Some had a mild expression, some looked unpleasant. As a rule the *smiles* were disagreeable, and in some cases very much so . . . I went out while the *service* was going on and strolled *outside the gates*. Close by was an almshouse, and a little further off there was a *restaurant*. It was not a bad little restaurant: one could have a snack and everything. There were lots of the *mourners* there. I noticed a great deal of *gaiety* and *genuine heartiness*. *I had something to eat and drink*. [*SS* X, 343-44]

We have italicized the most striking overtones of familiarization and profanation, the oxymoronic combinations, the mésalliances, bringings-down-to-earth, naturalism and symbolic elements. We see that the text is very strongly saturated with them. Before us is a somewhat condensed model for the style of a carnivalized menippea. We recall the symbolic significance of the ambivalent combination: death—laughter (here, gaiety)—feasting (here, "I had something to eat and drink").

This is followed by a short and vacillating meditation by the narrator, who has sat down on a gravestone, on the theme of *wonder* and *respect*, which his contemporaries have rejected. This meditation is important for an understanding of the author's conception. And then follows this simultaneously naturalistic and symbolic detail:

A half-eaten sandwich was lying on the tombstone near me; stupid and inappropriate. I threw it on the ground, as it was not bread but only a sandwich. Though I believe it is not a sin to throw bread on the earth, but only on the floor. I must look it up in Suvorin's calendar. [*SS* X, 345]

This particularly naturalistic and profaning detail—a half-eaten sandwich on the grave—gives us occasion to touch on a symbolic attribute of the carnival type: throwing bread on the ground is permitted, for that is sowing, fructification; throwing it on the floor is forbidden, for that is barren soil.

Further on begins development of the fantastic plot, which creates

[m]The Russian root *dukh* ["animus"] is found in the Russian words for breath, air, spirit, and odor. The pun to which Bakhtin refers here is Dostoevsky's juxtaposition of *dukh* (odor) with *dukhovnoe litso* (spiritual personage or member of the clergy.) There is an additional pun on *dokhody* (income) and perhaps a hidden one on *dokhnut'* (to die, as an animal dies; to croak.)

an *anacrisis* of extraordinary power (Dostoevsky is a great master of the anacrisis). The narrator listens in on a conversation of the dead beneath the earth. It so happens that their lives in the grave continue for a certain time. The deceased philosopher *Platon* Nikolaevich (an allusion to the Socratic dialogue) explained it in this way:

"He [Platon Nikolaevich—M. B.] explains this by a very simple fact, namely that when we were living on the surface we mistakenly thought that death there was death. The body revives, as it were, here; the remains of life are concentrated, but only in consciousness. I don't know how to express it, but life goes on, as it were, by inertia. In his opinion everything is concentrated somewhere in consciousness and goes on for two or three months . . . sometimes even for half a year. . . . There is one here, for instance, who is almost completely decomposed, but once every six weeks he suddenly utters one word, quite senseless of course, about some *bobok*, 'Bobok bobok,' but even in him, that means, life is still glimmering with an imperceptible spark . . ." [*SS* X, 354]

This creates an extraordinary situation: the *final life of the consciousness* (the two or three months before it falls asleep forever), freed from all the conditions, positions, obligations, and laws of ordinary life, as it were a *life outside of life*. And how will it be used by the "contemporary corpses"? As anacrisis, provoking the consciousnesses of the corpses to reveal themselves with *full*, absolutely unlimited *freedom*. And reveal themselves they do.

What unfolds is the typical carnivalized nether world of the menippea: a rather motley crew of corpses which cannot immediately liberate themselves from their earthly hierarchical positions and relationships, giving rise to comic conflicts, abuse, and scandals; on the other hand, liberties of the carnival type, the awareness of a complete absence of responsibility, open graveyard eroticism, laughter in the coffins (". . . the general's *corpse* shook with agreeable *laughter*"), and so on. The marked carnivalistic tone of this paradoxical "life outside of life" is set from the very beginning, with a game of cards being played in the grave on which the narrator sits (it is of course a make-believe game, played "by heart"). All these are typical traits of the genre.

The "king" of this carnival of the dead is a "scoundrel of pseudo-high society" (as he characterizes himself), one baron Klinevich. We will quote his words, which cast much light on the anacrisis and its use. Having dispensed with the moral interpretations of the philosopher Platon Nikolaevich (paraphrased by Lebezyatnikov), Klinevich declares:

"Enough; all the rest of it, I am sure, is nonsense. The great thing is that we have two or three months more of life and then—bobok! I propose to spend these two months as agreeably as possible, and so to arrange everything on a new basis. Gentlemen! *I propose to cast aside all shame*."

Once he obtains the general approval of the dead, he develops his thought somewhat further along these lines:

Though meanwhile *I don't want us to be telling lies*. That's all I care about, for that is one thing that matters. *One cannot exist on the surface without lying, for life and lying are synonymous*, but here we will *amuse ourselves* by not lying. Hang it all, the *grave* has some value after all! *We'll all tell our stories aloud, and we won't be ashamed of anything*. First of all I'll tell you about myself. I am one of the predatory kind, you know. *All that was bound and held in check by rotten cords up there on the surface*. Away with cords and let us spend these two months in *shameless truthfulness! Let us strip and go naked!*"

"Let us go naked, naked!" cried all the voices. [*SS* X, 355-56]

This dialogue of dead people was unexpectedly interrupted in a carnival manner:

And here I suddenly *sneezed*. It happened suddenly and unintentionally, but the effect was striking: all became as silent as a *grave*, it all vanished like a dream. A real silence of the tomb set in.

I shall also quote the narrator's concluding comments, which are interesting for their tone:

No, that I cannot admit, no, I really cannot! It's not bobok that bothers me (so it did turn out to be bobok!).

Depravity in such a place, depravity of the last aspirations, depravity of sodden and rotten corpses—and not even sparing the *last moments of consciousness*! Those moments have been granted, vouchsafed to them, and . . . and, worst of all, in such a place! No, that I cannot admit. [*SS* X, 357-58]

Here the almost pure words and intonations of a completely different voice, that is, the author's voice, break in on the narrator's speech; they break in, but then are immediately broken off on the word "and . . .".

The ending of the story is journalistic, feuilletonistic:

I shall take it to the *Citizen*; the editor there has had his portrait exhibited too. Maybe he will print it.

Such is Dostoevsky's almost classical menippea. The genre is sustained with remarkable integrity. One could even say that the genre of the menippea reveals here its greatest potential, realizes its maximum. Least of all is this a *stylization* of a defunct genre. On the contrary, in Dostoevsky's piece the genre of the menippea *continues to live* its full generic life. For the life of a genre consists in its constant rebirths and renewals in *original* works. Dostoevsky's "Bobok" is, of course, profoundly original. Dostoevsky was not writing a parody on the genre; he was using it in its straightforward sense. However, it should be noted that the menippea—and this includes also its oldest

antique forms—to some extent always parodies itself. That is one of the generic characteristics of the menippea. This element of self-parody is one of the reasons for the extraordinary vitality of the genre.

Here we must touch upon the question of Dostoevsky's possible generic sources. The essence of every genre is realized and revealed in all its fullness only in the diverse variations that arise throughout a given genre's historical development. The more accessible all these variants are to the artist, the more richly and flexibly will he command the language of the given genre (for the language of a genre is concrete and historical).

Dostoevsky understood subtly and well all the generic possibilities of the menippea. He possessed an extraordinarily deep and well-differentiated feeling for this genre. To trace all of Dostoevsky's possible contacts with different varieties of the menippea would be a very important task, both for a deeper understanding of the generic characteristics of his works and for a more complete idea of the development of the generic tradition itself, before Dostoevsky.

Dostoevsky was linked with varieties of the ancient menippea most directly and intimately through ancient Christian literature (that is, through the Gospels, the Apocalypse, the Lives of Saints, and so on). But he was doubtless also familiar with the classic models of the ancient menippea. It is very likely that he knew Lucian's menippea *Menippus, or a Journey to the Kingdom of the Dead*, as well as his *Dialogues of the Dead* (a group of small-scale dialogic satires). These works illustrate various types of *behavior of dead people* under the conditions of the Kingdom beyond the Grave, that is, in the carnivalized nether world. It should be pointed out that Lucian—"the Voltaire of antiquity"—was widely known in Russia beginning with the eighteenth century[12] and inspired numerous imitations, and the generic situation of "meetings beyond the grave" became a common one in literature, right down to the level of school exercises.

Dostoevsky was quite possibly also acquainted with Seneca's menippea *Apocolocyntosis*. We find in Dostoevsky three aspects that recall that satire. (1) The "open gaiety" of the mourners at the cemetery in Dostoevsky is, perhaps, evoked by an episode in Seneca: Claudius, flying from Olympus to the nether world via Earth, comes upon his own funeral on Earth and satisfies himself that all the mourners are very cheerful (except the contentious ones); (2) the make-believe game of cards, played "by heart," is perhaps evoked by Claudius' game of dice in the nether world, which is also make-believe (the dice tumble out before they are thrown); (3) the naturalistic decrowning of death in Dostoevsky recalls an even cruder depiction of the death of Claudius, who dies (gives up the ghost) at the moment of defecation.[13]

There is no doubt about Dostoevsky's familiarity—more or less intimate—with other ancient works of the genre: *The Satyricon, The Golden Ass*, and others.[14]

Dostoevsky's European generic sources, those that might have revealed for him the richness and diversity of the menippea, are very numerous and heterogeneous. He probably knew Boileau's literary-polemical menippea *Dialogue des héros de romans*,* and perhaps also Goethe's literary-polemical satire *Götter, Helden und Wieland*.* He was probably familiar with the "dialogues of the dead" of Fénelon* and Fontenelle* (Dostoevsky had an excellent knowledge of French literature). All these satires are linked through their depiction of the kingdom beyond the grave, and all of them externally sustain the ancient (predominantly Lucianic) form of the genre.

Of fundamental significance for understanding Dostoevsky's generic traditions are the menippea of Diderot, free in their external form but typical in their generic essence. Of course the tone and style of telling in Diderot (sometimes in the spirit of eighteenth-century erotic literature) differs from Dostoevsky. In *Le neveu de Rameau* (also in essence a menippea, but without the fantastic element) the motif of extremely frank confessions without a single grain of remorse recalls "Bobok." And the very image of Rameau's nephew, an openly "rapacious type," who like Klinevich considers social morality "rotten cords" and who recognizes only the "shameless truth," recalls the image of Klinevich.

Dostoevsky was acquainted with another variety of the free menippea through Voltaire's *Contes philosophiques.*[n] This type of menippea was very close to certain sides of his own creative talent (Dostoevsky even had a plan to write the "Russian Candide").

We should keep in mind the enormous significance for Dostoevsky of the *dialogic culture* of Voltaire and Diderot, which had its roots in the Socratic dialogue, the ancient menippea, and somewhat in the diatribe and the soliloquy.

Another type of free menippea, with a fantastic and fairy-tale element, was represented in the work of Hoffmann, who already exercised a significant influence on the early Dostoevsky. Dostoevsky's attention was also attracted by the tales of Edgar Allan Poe, close in essence to the menippea. In his prefatory note "Three Tales of Edgar Poe," Dostoevsky quite correctly noted the characteristics of that writer, so similar to his own:

"He almost always takes the most extraordinary reality, *places his hero in the most extraordinary external or psychological position*,

[n]A "conte" is a short fictitious narrative, often didactic, relying on wit, allegory, or titillation to attract the reader and drive home the moral. It was a popular eighteenth-century form. Voltaire's *Candide* is perhaps the most famous example.

and with what power of penetration, with what stunning accuracy does he tell the story of the state of that person's soul!"[15]

To be sure, this definition singles out only one aspect of the menippea—the creation of an extraordinary plot situation, that is, a provocative anacrisis—but precisely this aspect was consistently singled out by Dostoevsky himself as the major distinguishing feature of his own creative method.

Our survey (far from complete) of Dostoevsky's generic sources indicates that he knew, or could have known, diverse variants of the menippea, a genre of very rich and plastic possibilities, extraordinarily well-suited for penetrating into the "depths of the human soul" and for a keen and naked posing of "ultimate questions."

The story "Bobok" demonstrates to what an extent the generic essence of the menippea answered to all the fundamental creative aspirations of Dostoevsky. From the generic standpoint, this story is one of his key works.

Let us attend first to the following observation. Little "Bobok"—one of Dostoevsky's shortest plotted stories—is almost a microcosm of his entire creative output. Very many, and including the most important, ideas, themes and images of his work—both preceding and following "Bobok"—appear here in extremely keen and naked form: the idea that "everything is permitted" if there is no God and no immortality for the soul (one of the leading idea-images of his work); the related theme of confession without repentance and of "shameless truth," which runs through all of Dostoevsky's work beginning with *Notes from Underground*; the theme of the final moments of consciousness (connected in other works with the themes of capital punishment and suicide); the theme of a consciousness on the brink of insanity; the theme of sensuality, penetrating the highest spheres of consciousness and thought; the theme of the total "inappropriateness" and "unseemliness" of life cut off from its folk roots and from the people's faith, and so on—all these themes and ideas, in condensed and naked form, are fitted into the seemingly narrow confines of this story.

The leading images of the story (there are not, to be sure, many of them) also recall other images in Dostoevsky's work: Klinevich in a simplified and intensified form repeats Prince Valkovsky, Svidrigailov, and Fyodor Pavlovich; the narrator ("a certain person") is a variant of the Underground Man; General Pervoedov[16] is also somewhat familiar to us, as are the sensual old official who had squandered a huge sum of public funds earmarked "for widows and orphans," the sycophant Lebezyatnikov, and the engineer and believer in progress who wishes to "arrange life down here on a rational basis."

A special place among the dead is occupied by "*prostoliudin*"

(a "simpleman," a well-to-do shopkeeper); he alone has preserved a bond with the common people and their faith, and thus behaves properly even in the grave, accepts death as a sacrament, interprets what is going on around him (among the debauched dead) as "a visitation of tribulations upon their souls," impatiently awaits the *sorokoviny*° ("May our forty days pass quickly, then I shall hear tearful voices over my head, my wife's lament and my children's soft weeping . . ."). The seemliness and highly reverent style of speech of this "simpleman," juxtaposed to the impropriety and familiar cynicism of all the others (both living and dead), anticipate in part the future image of the pilgrim Makar Dolgoruky, although here, under conditions of the menippea, the "seemly" simpleman is presented with a slight overtone of comicality, as if he were somewhat inappropriate.

In addition, the carnivalized nether world of "Bobok" is *internally* profoundly resonant with those scenes of scandal and catastrophe that have such crucial significance in almost all of Dostoevsky's works. These scenes, usually taking place in drawing rooms, are of course considerably more complex, more motley, more full of carnivalized contrasts, abrupt mésalliances and eccentricities, fundamental crownings and decrownings, but their inner essence is analogous: the "rotten cords" of the official and personal lie are snapped (or at) least weakened for the moment), and human souls are laid bare, either terrible souls as in the nether world, or else bright and pure ones. People appear for a moment outside the usual conditions of their lives, on the carnival square or in the nether world, and there opens up another—more genuine—sense of themselves and of their relationships to one another.

Of such a sort, for example, is the famous scene at Nastasya Filippovna's name-day party (*The Idiot*). Here there are also external resonances with "Bobok": Ferdyshchenko (a petty mystery-play devil) proposes a *petit-jeu*—everyone is to tell the worst action of his life (cf. Klinevich's proposal: "We'll all tell our stories aloud, and we won't be ashamed of anything"). To be sure, the stories that are told do not justify Ferdyshchenko's expectations, but this *petit-jeu* helps prepare the way for that carnival-square atmosphere in which abrupt carnivalistic changes in the fates and appearances of people can occur, where cynical calculations are exposed, where Natasya Filippovna's familiar and decrowning speech can take on the sound of the carnival square. We are not concerned here, of course, with the profound moral-psychological and social meaning of this scene—what interests us is precisely its generic aspect, those *carnivalistic overtones* that sound in almost every image and word (however realistic and motivated), and that second plane of the carnival square (and the carnivalized

°*Sorokoviny*: a commemorative service in the Orthodox Church forty days after a death.

nether world) which, as it were, glimmers through the actual fabric of the scene.

One could also mention the sharply carnivalized scene of scandals and decrownings at the funeral feast for Marmeladov (in *Crime and Punishment*). Or the even more complicated scene in Varvara Petrovna Stavrogina's grand drawing room in *The Possessed*, with the part played by the mad lame girl, the entry of her brother Captain Lebyadkin, the first appearance of the "devil" Pyotr Verkhovensky, the triumphant eccentricity of Varvara Petrovna, the exposure and banishment of Stepan Trofimovich, Liza's hysterics and fainting fit, Shatov's slap in Stavrogin's face, and so on. Here everything is unexpected, out of place, incompatible and impermissible if judged by life's ordinary, "normal" course. It is absolutely impossible to imagine such a scene in, say, a novel by Leo Tolstoy or Turgenev. This is no grand drawing room, it is the public square with all the specific logic of carnivalized public-square life. And finally one must mention the extraordinarily vivid carnivalistic-menippean coloration of the scandal scene in Father Zosima's cell (*The Brothers Karamazov*).

These scandal scenes—and they occupy a very important place in Dostoevsky's works—almost always met with negative criticism from his contemporaries,[17] and continue to do so today. They seemed then, and still seem today, improbable in terms of life and unjustified in terms of art. They were often explained by the author's fondness for purely external and false effects. But in fact these scenes are in the spirit and the style of Dostoevsky's whole work. And they are deeply organic, there is nothing contrived in them: in their entirety as well as *in each detail* they are a result of that consistent artistic logic of carnivalistic acts and categories characterized above—and absorbed over the centuries into the carnivalized line of artistic prose. At their base lies a profound carnivalistic sense of the world, which gives meaning to and unites all the seemingly absurd and unexpected things in these scenes and creates their artistic truth.

"Bobok," thanks to its *fantastic* plot, can present this carnival logic in a somewhat simplified form (as required by the genre), and yet keenly and nakedly, and can therefore serve as a sort of commentary to more complicated but analogous phenomena in Dostoevsky's work.

In the story "Bobok," rays issuing from preceding and subsequent works of Dostoevsky come to a focus. "Bobok" could become such a focus precisely because it is a menippea. All aspects of Dostoevsky's creativity feel in their element here. The narrow framework of that story, as we see, has turned out to be quite spacious indeed.

We remember that the menippea is the *universal genre* of *ultimate questions*. Its action takes place not only in the "here" and the "now,"

but throughout the world and for all eternity: on earth, in the nether world, and in heaven. In Dostoevsky the menippea is brought close to the mystery play. The mystery play is, after all, nothing other than a modified medieval dramatic variant of the menippea. In Dostoevsky, the participants in the act stand *on the threshold* (on the threshold of life and death, falsehood and truth, sanity and insanity). And they are presented here as *voices*, ringing out, speaking out "before earth and heaven." The central figurative idea here is also that of the mystery play (to be sure, in the spirit of the Eleusinian mysteries): "contemporary dead men" are as sterile seed, cast on the ground, but capable neither of dying (that is, of being cleansed of themselves, of rising above themselves), nor of being renewed (that is, of bearing fruit).

The second key work from the generic standpoint is Dostoevsky's "Dream of a Ridiculous Man" (1877).

In its generic essence this work can also be traced to the menippea, but to different varieties of it: to the "dream satire" and to "fantastic journeys" containing a utopian element. In the subsequent development of the menippea, these two varieties are often combined.

The dream, as something with its own (nonepic) artistic interpretation, first entered European literature, as we have said, in the genre of Menippean satire (and in the realm of the serio-comical in general). Dreams in the epic did not destroy the unity of a represented life and did not create a second plane; they also did not destroy the *simple* integrity of the hero's image. The dream was not counterposed to ordinary life as *another* possible life. Such an opposition (from one or another viewpoint) appears for the first time in the menippea. The dream is introduced there precisely as the *possibility* of a completely different life, a life organized according to laws different from those governing ordinary life (sometimes directly as an "inside-out world"). The life seen in the dream makes ordinary life seem strange, forces one to understand and evaluate ordinary life in a new way (in the light of another glimpsed possibility). The person in a dream becomes another person, reveals in himself new possibilities (both worse and better), tests himself and verifies himself by means of the dream. Sometimes the dream is constructed directly as a crowning/decrowning of the person in life.

Thus an extraordinary situation is created in the dream quite impossible in ordinary life, a situation that serves here the same purpose it serves in the menippea—the testing of an idea and the man of an idea.

The traditional way of using menippean dreams in art continues to live on in the subsequent development of European literature,

in diverse variations and with diverse nuances: in the "dream visions" of medieval literature, in the grotesque satires of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (especially vividly in Quevedo and Grimmelshausen), in its fairytale-symbolic use by the Romantics (including the highly original dream lyrics of Heinrich Heine), in its psychological and socio-historical application in realistic novels (in George Sand and Chernyshevsky). Special note should be made of the important variation known as *crisis dreams*, which lead a person to rebirth and renewal (the crisis variant was used in dramaturgy as well: in Shakespeare, Calderón, and in the nineteenth century in Grillparzer).

Dostoevsky made very wide use of the artistic possibilities of the dream in almost all its variations and nuances. Indeed, in all of European literature there is no writer for whom dreams play such a large and crucial role as Dostoevsky. We recall the dreams of Raskolnikov, of Svidrigailov, Myshkin, Ippolit, the Adolescent, Versilov, Alyosha and Dmitry Karamazov, and the role which they play in realizing the ideational design of their respective novels. Predominant in Dostoevsky is the crisis variation of the dream. To such a type belongs the dream of the "ridiculous man."

Concerning the generic variety of "fantastic journeys" used in "The Dream of a Ridiculous Man," Dostoevsky may have been acquainted with Cyrano de Bergerac's work *Histoire comique des états et empires de la Lune* [Comical History of the States and Empires of the Moon] (1647-50).* This is a description of an earthly paradise on the moon, from which the narrator has been banished for disrespectfulness. He is accompanied on his journey about the moon by the "demon of Socrates," thus permitting the author to introduce a philosophical element (in the spirit of Gassendi's* materialism). In its external form de Bergerac's work is an entire philosophical-fantastic novel.

Also interesting is Grimmelshausen's menippea *Der fliegende Wandersmann nach dem Monde* (c. 1659), which shares a common source with Cyrano de Bergerac's work. Here the utopian element is of foremost importance. There is a description of the extraordinary purity and truthfulness of the Moon's inhabitants; they know no vices, no crimes, no falsehood; in their country it is eternal spring, they live a long time and greet death with cheerful feasting amid a circle of friends. Children born with evil tendencies are sent off to Earth to prevent them from corrupting society. The precise date of the hero's arrival on the moon is indicated (just as the date of the dream is given in Dostoevsky).

Dostoevsky was undoubtedly familiar with Voltaire's menippea *Micromégas*, belonging to the same fantastic line in the development of the menippea, the line that estranges earthly reality.

In "The Dream of a Ridiculous Man" we are struck, first of all, by the maximal universalism of this work and at the same time by its maximal terseness, its remarkable artistic and philosophical laconicism. There is no developed discursive argumentation in it whatsoever. There is clear evidence here of Dostoevsky's extraordinary capacity to *see and feel an idea*, a trait we mentioned in the previous chapter. We have before us an authentic *artist of the idea*.

"The Dream of a Ridiculous Man" presents us with a full and complete synthesis of the universalism of the menippea—a genre of ultimate questions of worldview—with the universalism of the medieval mystery play portraying the fate of mankind: earthly paradise, the Fall, redemption. In "The Dream of a Ridiculous Man" this internal kinship between the two genres emerges very clearly; the genres are, of course, also akin to each other historically and genetically. But from the generic standpoint, the ancient type of menippea is dominant here. And in general what dominates in "The Dream of a Ridiculous Man" is not the Christian but the ancient spirit.

In its style and composition, "The Dream of a Ridiculous Man" differs rather significantly from "Bobok": it contains crucial elements of the diatribe, the confession, and the sermon. Such a complex of genres is in general characteristic of Dostoevsky's work.

The central part of the work is the story of a dream vision. Here we are given a splendid character-sketch, so to speak, of the peculiar compositional nature of the dream:

> . . . everything was happening the way it usually happens in dreams when you leap over space and time, over all laws of life and reason, and only pause where your heart's desire bids you pause. [*SS* X, 429]

This is in fact a completely true characterization of the compositional method used for constructing a fantastic menippea. And, with certain limitations and reservations, these characteristics can be applied to Dostoevsky's entire creative method as well. In his works Dostoevsky makes almost no use of relatively uninterrupted historical or biographical time, that is, of strictly epic time; he "leaps over" it, he concentrates action at *points of crisis, at turning points and catastrophes*, when the inner significance of a moment is equal to a "billion years," that is, when the moment loses its temporal restrictiveness. In essence he leaps over space as well, and concentrates action in two "points" only: on the *threshold* (in doorways, entrance ways, on staircases, in corridors, and so forth), where the crisis and the turning point occur, or on the *public square*, whose substitute is usually the drawing room (the hall, the dining room), where the catastrophe, the scandal take place. Precisely this is his artistic conception of time and space. He often leaps over elementary empirical

norms of verisimilitude and superficial rational logic as well. This is why he finds the genre of the menippea so congenial.

These words of the Ridiculous Man are also characteristic for the artistic method of Dostoevsky, as an artist of the idea:

> . . . I have seen the truth, it was not a figment of my imagination or my mind, I have seen it, seen it, and its **living image** has taken hold of my soul for ever. [*SS* X, 440]

In its subject matter "The Dream of a Ridiculous Man" is practically a complete encyclopedia of Dostoevsky's most important themes, and at the same time all these themes, as well as the means for elaborating them in art, are very characteristic of the carnivalized genre of the menippea. We shall pause on several of them.

1. In the central figure of the Ridiculous Man there are clear traces of the *ambivalent*—serio-comical—image of the "wise fool" and "tragic clown" of carnivalized literature. But such ambivalence—to be sure, usually in more muffled form—is characteristic for all of Dostoevsky's heroes. It might be said that Dostoevsky's mode of artistic thinking could not imagine anything in the slightest way humanly significant that did not have certain elements of *eccentricity* (in all its diverse variations). This is revealed most clearly in the image of Myshkin. But in all other major Dostoevskian heroes—in Raskolnikov, Stavrogin, Versilov, Ivan Karamazov—there is always "something ridiculous," although in a more or less reduced form.

We repeat: Dostoevsky, as an artist, could not imagine human significance as a *single-toned* thing. In the preface to *The Brothers Karamazov* ("From the Author") he even makes a case for the special and vital *historical* importance of eccentricity:

> For not only is an eccentric "not always" an isolated case and an exception, but, on the contrary, it happens sometimes that such a person, I dare say, carries within himself the very heart of the whole, and the rest of the men of his epoch have for some reason been temporarily torn from it, as if by a gust of wind . . . [*SS* IX, 9]

In the image of the Ridiculous Man this ambivalence is, in keeping with the spirit of the menippea, laid bare and emphasized.

Also very characteristic for Dostoevsky is the *fullness of self-consciousness* in the Ridiculous Man: he himself knows better than anyone that he is ridiculous (". . . of all the people in the world, I knew best how ridiculous I was . . ."). When he begins to preach *paradise* on earth, he himself understands perfectly that it can never be realized: "I shall go further: let it never, never come true, let paradise never be (after all, I do realize that!), I shall anyway go and spread the word" [*SS* X, 441]. This is an eccentric who is keenly

conscious of both himself and everything else; there is not a grain of naiveté in him; it is impossible to finalize him (since there is nothing located external to his consciousness).

2. The story opens with a theme most typical for the menippea, the theme of a person who is *alone* in his knowledge of the truth and who is therefore ridiculed by everyone else as a madman. Here is that splendid opening:

I am a ridiculous man. They call me a madman now. That would be a promotion, if it were not that I remain as ridiculous to them as ever. But I no longer mind—they are all dear to me now, even when they are laughing at me—indeed, something endears them to me particularly then. I would laugh with them—not at myself, that is, but because I love them—I would laugh if I did not feel so sad watching them. What saddens me is that they do not know the Truth, and I do. Oh, how hard it is to be the only one to know the Truth! But they will not understand this. No, they will not. [*SS* X, 420]

This is the typical position of the wise man in the menippea (Diogenes, Menippus, or Democritus from the "Hippocratic novel"). the carrier of truth vis-à-vis all other people who consider the truth either insanity or stupidity; but here this position is, when compared with the ancient menippea, both more complicated and more profound. At the same time this position is, in different variations and with various nuances, characteristic for all of Dostoevsky's major heroes from Raskolnikov to Ivan Karamazov: being possessed by their "truth" defines their relationship to other people and creates the special sort of loneliness these heroes know.

3. Further along in the story there appears a theme very characteristic for the menippea of the Cynics and the Stoics, the theme of absolute indifference to everything in the world:

. . . that hopeless sadness that was mounting in my soul about something that was infinitely greater than myself: this something was a mounting conviction that **nothing mattered.** I had begun to suspect this long ago, but positive conviction came to me all at once, one day last year. I suddenly knew that **I would not have cared** if the world existed at all or if there was nothing anywhere. I began to know and feel with all my being that **nothing in my lifetime had existed.** [*SS* x, 421]

This universal indifference and the premonition of nonexistence leads the Ridiculous Man to thoughts of suicide. Before us is one of Dostoevsky's numerous variations on the theme of Kirillov.

4. There follows the theme of the final hours of life before suicide (one of Dostoevsky's major themes). Here this theme—in keeping with the spirit of the menippea—is laid bare and intensified.

After the Ridiculous Man makes the final decision to kill himself, he meets a little girl on the street who begs him to help her. The

Ridiculous Man shoves her away rudely, since he already feels himself to be outside all norms and obligations of human life (like the dead in "Bobok"). Here are his reflections:

> But if I was going to kill myself in a couple of hours from then, why should I be concerned with the girl and what did I care for shame or anything else in the world? . . . Why, the reason I had stamped my feet and shouted so brutally at the poor child was to assert that "far from feeling pity, I could even afford to do something inhumanly vile now, because two hours hence everything would be snuffed out."

This is moral experimentation, characteristic for the genre of the menippea and no less characteristic of Dostoevsky's work. Further along the reflections continue:

> For instance, a strange notion like this occurred to me: supposing I had once lived on the moon or Mars and had committed there the foulest and most shameful deed imaginable, and had been put to such shame and disgrace as can be experienced and imagined only sometimes in dreams, in nightmares, and supposing I later found myself on the earth, with the crime committed on that other planet alive in my consciousness and, moreover, knowing there was no return for me, ever, under any circumstances—would I **have cared** or not as I gazed at the moon from this earth? Would I have felt shame for that deed or not? [*SS* X, 425-26]

In a conversation with Kirillov, Stavrogin puts to himself an absolutely analogous "experimental" question about an act on the moon [*SS* VII, 250; *The Possessed*, Part Two, ch. 1, 5]. All this is the familiar problematic posed by Ippolit (*The Idiot*), Kirillov (*The Possessed*), by the graveside shamelessness in "Bobok." In fact they are all merely various facets of a leading theme of all Dostoevsky's work, the theme that "all is permitted" (in a world where there is no God and no immortality of the soul) and, linked with it, the theme of ethical solipsism.

5. Further on there unfolds the central (and one might say genre-shaping) *theme of the crisis dream*; more precisely, it is the theme of a man's rebirth and renewal through a dream vision, permitting him *to see* "with his own eyes" the possibility of an entirely different human life on earth.

> Yes, I dreamed that dream then, my 3rd of November dream! They all tease me now, telling me it was nothing but a dream. But surely it makes no difference whether it was a dream or not since it did reveal the Truth to me. Because if you have come to know it once and to see it, you will know it is the Truth and that there neither is nor can be any other, whether you are dreaming or awake. Very well, it was a dream—let it be a dream, but the fact remains that this real life which you so extol I was going to snuff out by suicide, whereas my dream, my dream—oh, it revealed to me another life, a great, renewed and powerful life! [*SS* X, 427]

6. In the "dream" itself there is detailed development of the utopian theme of heaven on earth, experienced by the Ricidulous Man and seen with his own eyes on a distant unknown star. The very description of this earthly paradise is sustained in the spirit of the ancient Golden Age, and is thus thoroughly permeated with a carnival sense of the world. The portrayal of this earthly paradise recalls in many ways Versilov's dream (*The Adolescent*). Very characteristic here is the purely carnivalistic faith professed by the Ridiculous Man in the unity of mankind's aspirations and in the goodness of human nature:

> And yet everyone is going towards the same thing, at least all strive for the same thing, all—*from the wise man to the meanest wretch*—only all follow different paths. It's an old truth, but here's something new: I cannot flounder too badly, you know. Because *I have seen the Truth, I have seen it* and I know that people can be beautiful and happy without losing their ability to dwell on this earth. I cannot and will not believe that evil is man's natural state. [*SS* X, 440]

We emphasize again that truth, according to Dostoevsky, can only be the subject of a living vision, not of abstract understanding.

7. At the end of the story there sounds a theme very characteristic for Dostoevsky, the theme of the *instantaneous* transformation of life into paradise (it finds its most profound expression in *The Brothers Karamazov*):

> And yet it could be done so simply: in a single day, in a **single hour** everything would be settled! One should love others as one loves oneself, that is the main thing, that is all, nothing else, absolutely nothing else is needed, and then one would instantly know how to go about it. [*SS* X, 441]

8. We note also the theme of the mistreated little girl, which runs through a series of Dostoevsky's works: we meet her in *The Insulted and the Injured* (Nelly), in Svidrigailov's dream before his suicide, in "Stavrogin's Confession," in "The Eternal Husband" (Liza); the theme of the suffering child is one of the leading themes in *The Brothers Karamazov* (the images of suffering children in the chapter "Rebellion," the image of Ilyushechka, "the babe weeping" in Dmitri's dream).

9. Also present here are elements of slum naturalism: the debauched captain begging for alms on Nevsky Prospect (the image is familiar to us from *The Idiot* and *The Adolescent*), drunkenness, a card game and fighting in the room next door to the little closet where the Ridiculous Man has spent his sleepless nights in the Voltairian armchair, absorbed in solving ultimate questions, and where he dreams his dream about the fate of mankind.

Of course we have not exhausted all the themes in "The Dream of a Ridiculous Man," but even these are sufficient to demonstrate the

enormous ideational spaciousness of this particular variety of the menippea and its suitability to Dostoevsky's subject matter.

In "The Dream of a Ridiculous Man" there are no compositionally expressed dialogues (except one half-expressed dialogue with the "unknown being"), but the narrator's entire speech is permeated with interior dialogue: all words are addressed to himself, to the universe, to his creator,[18] to all people. And here, as in a mystery play, the word rings out before heaven and before earth, that is, before the entire world.

Such are the two key works of Dostoevsky that reveal most clearly the generic essence of his creative work, one with great affinity for the menippea and genres kindred to it.

We have offered our analyses of "Bobok" and "The Dream of a Ridiculous Man" from the vantage point of an historical poetics of genre. Of primary interest to us has been the way in which these works manifest the generic essence of the menippea. But at the same time we have tried to show how the traditional features of the genre are organically combined, in Dostoevsky's use of them, with an individual uniqueness and profundity.

We shall touch on several other works of his which are also in their essence close to the menippea, but of a somewhat different type and without the direct fantastic element.

One of the best examples is the story "A Meek One." Here the sharp plot-line anacrisis characteristic for the genre, with its abrupt contrasts, its mésalliances and moral experimentation, is formulated as a soliloquy. The hero of the tale says of himself: "I am a past master at speaking silently, I have spent a lifetime speaking in silence and I have lived through whole dramas by myself and in silence." The image of the hero is revealed precisely through this dialogic relationship to his own self. And he remains almost until the very end by himself, in utter loneliness and hopeless despair. He does not acknowledge any higher judgment on himself. He generalizes from his own loneliness, universalizes it as the ultimate loneliness of the entire human race:

> Stagnation! Nature! Men are alone on earth—that's the horror! . . . Everything is dead, and the dead are everywhere. Men are alone, and around them is silence—that is the earth!

Another work close in its essence to the menippea is *Notes from Underground* (1864). It is constructed as a diatribe (a conversation with an absent interlocutor), saturated with overt and hidden polemic, and contains important elements of the confession. A story with an acute anacrisis is introduced into the second part. In *Notes from*

Underground we also find other familiar signs of the menippea: abrupt dialogic syncrises, familiarization and profanation, slum naturalism, and so on. This work too is characterized by an extraordinary ideational spaciousness: almost all the themes and ideas of Dostoevsky's subsequent work are outlined here in simplified and stripped-down form. The verbal style of this work will be dealt with in the following chapter.

We shall touch upon one more work of Dostoevsky with a very characteristic title: "A Nasty Story" (1862).[P] This *deeply carnivalized* story is also close to the menippea (but of the Varronian type). Serving as plot-center for the ideas is an argument among three generals at a name-day party. Afterwards the hero of the story (one of the three), in order to test his liberal-humanistic idea, drops in on the wedding feast of one of his lowliest subordinates—where, due to inexperience (he is a nondrinker), he gets thoroughly drunk. Everything is built on the extreme *inappropriateness* and *scandalous nature* of all that occurs. Everything is full of sharp carnivalistic contrasts, mésalliances, ambivalence, debasing, and decrownings. There is also an element here of rather cruel moral experimentation. We are not, of course, concerned here with the profound social and philosophical idea present in this work, which even today is not adequately appreciated. The tone of the story is deliberately unsteady, ambiguous and mocking, permeated with elements of hidden socio-political and literary polemic.

Elements of the menippea can be found in all early (that is, pre-exile) works of Dostoevsky (influenced for the most part by the generic traditions of Gogol and Hoffmann).

The menippea, as we have said, also infiltrates Dostoevsky's novels. We shall cite only the most essential instances (without any particular supporting argumentation).

In *Crime and Punishment*, the famous scene of Raskolnikov's first visit to Sonya (with the reading of the Gospel) is an almost perfect Christianized menippea: sharp dialogic syncrises (faith vs. lack of faith, meekness vs. pride), sharp anacrisis, oxymoronic combinations (the thinker-criminal, the prostitute-righteous woman), a naked statement of ultimate questions and a reading of the Gospels in a slum setting. Raskolnikov's dreams are also menippea, as is Svidrigailov's dream before his suicide.

In *The Idiot*, Ippolit's confession ("An Essential Explanation") is a menippea, framed by a carnivalized scene of dialogue on Prince Myshkin's terrace and ending with Ippolit's attempted suicide. In *The Possessed* it is Stavrogin's confession, together with the dialogue

[P] "*Skvernyi anekdot*." The story is variously translated into English as "An Unpleasant Predicament," "A Most Unfortunate Incident," "A Nasty Predicament."

between Stavrogin and Tikhon which frames it. In *The Adolescent* it is Versilov's dream.

In *The Brothers Karamazov* there is a remarkable menippea in the conversation between Ivan and Alyosha in "Metropolis" tavern on the market square of a godforsaken provincial town. Here, to the sounds of the tavern organ, the clacking of billiard balls and uncorking of beer bottles, monk and atheist solve ultimate universal questions. Into this Menippean satire a second satire is inserted—"The Legend of the Grand Inquisitor," which has its own independent significance and is constructed on the syncrisis in the Gospels between Christ and the Devil.[19] Both these interconnected Menippean satires are among the most profound artistic and philosophical works of all world literature. And finally, there is an equally profound menippea in the conversation between Ivan Karamazov and the devil (the chapter: "The Devil. Ivan Fyodorovich's Nightmare").

Of course, all these menippea are subordinated to the polyphonic design of the novelistic whole encompassing them, are determined by it and are inseparable from it.

But in addition to these relatively independent and relatively finalized menippea, all of Dostoevsky's novels are permeated with menippean elements, and with elements of other kindred genres as well—the Socratic dialogue, the diatribe, the soliloquy, the confession. Of course these genres all reached Dostoevsky after thousands of years of intense development, but throughout all changes they retained their generic essence. Sharp dialogic syncrises, extraordinary and provocative plot situations, crises and turning points and moral experimentation, catastrophes and scandals, contrasts and oxymoronic combinations are what determine the entire plot and compositional structure of Dostoevsky's novels.

Without further thorough research into the essence of the menippea and other kindred genres, without research into the history of these genres and their diverse varieties in the literatures of modern times, it is impossible to arrive at a correct historico-genetic explanation of the generic characteristics of Dostoevsky's works (and not only Dostoevsky's works; the problem is of much broader significance).

Analyzing the generic characteristics of the menippea in Dostoevsky, we simultaneously uncovered in it elements of carnivalization. And this is fully understandable, since the menippea is a profoundly carnivalized genre. But the phenomenon of carnivalization in Dostoevsky's work is of course much broader than the menippea; it has additional generic sources and therefore requires special attention.

To say that carnival and its later derivatives (the masquerade line of development, the farcical street comedy, and so on) exercised a

direct and vital influence on Dostoevsky is difficult (although real experiences of a carnival type did certainly exist in his life).[20] Carnivalization acted on him, as on the majority of other eighteenth- and nineteenth-century writers, primarily as a literary and generic tradition whose extraliterary source, that is, carnival proper, was perhaps not even perceived by him in any clearly precise way.

But over the long course of centuries carnival, its forms and symbols, and above all a carnival sense of the world, seeped into many literary genres, merged with their features, shaped them, became somehow inseparable from them. Carnival was, as it were, *reincarnated in literature*, and precisely into one specific and vigorous line of its development. Carnival forms, transposed into the language of literature, became a *powerful means* for comprehending life in art, they became a special language whose words and forms possess an extraordinary capacity for *symbolic* generalization, that is, for *generalization in depth*. Many essential sides of life, or more precisely its *layers* (and often the most profound), can be located, comprehended, and expressed only with the help of this language.

In order to master this language, that is, in order to attach himself to the carnivalistic generic tradition in literature, a writer need not know all the links and all the branchings of that tradition. A genre possesses its own organic logic which can to a certain extent be understood and creatively assimilated on the basis of a few generic models, even fragments. *But the logic of genre is not an abstract logic.* Each new variety, each new work of a given genre always enriches it in some way, aids in perfecting the language of the genre. For this reason it is important to know the possible generic sources of a given author, the literary and generic atmosphere in which his creative work was realized. The more complete and concrete our knowledge of an artist's *generic contacts*, the deeper can we penetrate the peculiar features of his generic form and the more correctly can we understand the interrelationship, within it, of tradition and innovation.

All this obliges us—insofar as we are touching here upon questions of *historical* poetics—to characterize at least those basic links in the carnivalistic generic tradition with which Dostoevsky was directly or indirectly connected and which defined the generic atmosphere of his work, in many ways so fundamentally different from the generic atmosphere of Turgenev, Goncharov, or Leo Tolstoy.

One basic source of carnivalization for literature of the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was the writers of the Renaissance—above all Boccaccio, Rabelais, Shakespeare, Cervantes, and Grimmelshausen.[21] Another such source was the early picaresque novel (directly carnivalized). An additional source of carnivalization for the writers of these centuries was, of course, the carnivalized

literature of antiquity (including Menippean satire) and of the Middle Ages.

All the above-named basic sources for the carnivalization of European literature were very well known to Dostoevsky, except, perhaps, Grimmelshausen and the early picaresque novel. But the characteristic features of this type of novel were familiar to him from Lesage's *Gil Blas*,* and he took an intense interest in them. The picaresque novel portrayed life drawn out of its ordinary and (as it were) legitimized rut, it decrowned all hierarchical positions people might hold, and played with these positions; it was filled with sudden shifts, changes and mystifications, it perceived the entire represented world in a zone of familiar contact. As concerns Renaissance literature, its direct influence on Dostoevsky was considerable (especially Shakespeare and Cervantes). We are speaking here not of the influence of individual themes, ideas, or images, but rather of the deeper influence of *a carnival sense of the world itself*, that is, the influence of the very *forms* for visualizing the world and man, and that truly *godlike freedom* in approaching them which is manifest not in the individual thoughts, images, and external devices of construction, but in these writers' work as a *whole*.

The literature of the eighteenth century was of essential importance for Dostoevsky's assimilation of the carnival tradition, and above all Voltaire and Diderot. Characteristic for both was a combination of carnivalization with high dialogic culture, culture raised on antiquity and on the dialogues of the Renaissance. Here Dostoevsky found an organic combination of carnivalization with the rationalistic philosophical idea, and, in part, with the social theme.

The combination of carnivalization with the adventure plot and with pressing social themes of the day was found by Dostoevsky in the social-adventure novels of the nineteenth century, primarily in Frédéric Soulié* and Eugène Sue* (also somewhat in Dumas *fils* and in Paul de Kock*). Carnivalization in these authors is of a more external sort: it is manifested in the plot, in external carnivalistic antitheses and contrasts, in abrupt changes of fate, in mystifications, and so on. A deep and free carnival sense of the world is almost entirely absent. The most essential feature in these novels is an application of carnivalization to the portrayal of contemporary reality and contemporary everyday life; *everyday life* is drawn into the carnivalized action of the plot; the ordinary and constant is combined with the extraordinary and changeable.

A more profound assimilation of the carnival tradition Dostoevsky found in Balzac, George Sand, and Victor Hugo. Here there are considerably fewer external manifestations of carnivalization, but there is a deeper carnival sense of the world, and, most importantly,

carnivalization permeates the very construction of the major strong characters and the development of the passions. The carnivalization of passion is evidenced first and foremost in its ambivalence: love is combined with hatred, avarice with selflessness, ambition with self-abasement, and so forth.

A combination of carnivalization with a sentimental perception of life was found by Dostoevsky in Sterne and Dickens.

Finally, the combination of carnivalization with an idea of the romantic type (rather than a rationalistic idea, as in Voltaire and Diderot) Dostoevsky found in Edgar Allan Poe and even more in Hoffmann.

A special place is held by Russian tradition. In addition to Gogol, mention must be made here of the huge influence exercised on Dostoevsky by the most carnivalized works of Pushkin: *Boris Godunov, The Tales of Belkin*, the *Little Tragedies* and *The Queen of Spades*.

Our brief survey of the sources of carnivalization does not pretend in any way to be complete. For our purposes it was important to trace only the basic lines of the tradition. We emphasize again that we are not interested in the influence of separate individual authors, individual works, individual themes, ideas, images—what interests us is precisely the influence of the *generic tradition itself* which was transmitted through the particular authors. Throughout this process the tradition is reborn and renewed in each of them in its own way, that is, in a unique and unrepeatable way. This constitutes the life of the tradition. What interests us—we use a comparison here—is the discourse of a *language*, and not its *individual use* in a particular *unrepeatable context*, although, of course, the one cannot exist without the other. It is certainly possible to study individual influences as well, that is, the influence of one individaul writer on another (for example, Balzac on Dostoevsky), but this is already a special task and one which we do not set for ourselves here. We are interested only in the tradition itself.

In Dostoevsky's work too, of course, the carnivalistic tradition is reborn in a new way: it takes on its own meaning, combines with other artistic elements, furthers its own particular artistic goals, precisely those goals that we have tried to point out in the preceding chapters. Carnivalization is combined organically with all the other characteristics of the polyphonic novel.

Before moving on to an analysis of the elements of carnivalization in Dostoevsky (we shall concentrate on a few works only), we must first touch upon two additional questions.

To understand correctly the problem of carnivalization, one must dispense with the oversimplified understanding of carnival found in

the *masquerade* line of modern times, and even more with a vulgar bohemian understanding of carnival. Carnival is past millennia's way of sensing the world as one great communal performance. This sense of the world, liberating one from fear, bringing the world maximally close to a person and bringing one person maximally close to another (everything is drawn into the zone of free familiar contact), with its joy at change and its joyful relativity, is opposed to that one-sided and gloomy official seriousness which is dogmatic and hostile to evolution and change, which seeks to absolutize a given condition of existence or a given social order. From precisely that sort of seriousness did the carnival sense of the world liberate man. But there is not a grain of nihilism in it, nor a grain of empty frivolity or vulgar bohemian individualism.

One must also dispense with that narrow theatrical-pageantry concept of carnival, so very characteristic of modern times.

For a proper understanding of carnival, one must take it at its *origins* and at its *peaks*, that is, in antiquity, in the Middle Ages and finally in the Renaissance.[22]

The second question concerns literary movements. Carnivalization, once it has penetrated and to a certain extent determined the structure of a genre, can be used by various movements and creative methods. It is quite wrong to see it as no more than a specific characteristic of Romanticism. In fact, every movement and creative method interprets and renews it in its own way. To be persuaded of this, it is enough to contrast carnivalization in Voltaire (Enlightenment realism), the early Tieck* (Romanticism), Balzac (critical realism), and Ponson du Terrail* (pure adventure). The degree of carnivalization in each of the above authors is almost identical, but each is subordinated to its own special artistic tasks (connected with its literary movement) and therefore each "sounds" differently (we are not speaking here of the individual characteristics of these writers). At the same time the presence of carnivalization defines them as belonging to one and the same *generic* tradition and creates, from the point of view of a poetics, a very *fundamental common ground* between them (we repeat, even given all the differences in literary movement, individual personality and artistic merit).

In "Petersburg Visions in Verse and Prose" (1861) Dostoevsky recalls the unique and vivid carnival sense of life experienced by him at the very beginning of his career as a writer. This was above all a special sense of Petersburg, with all its sharp social contrasts, as "a fantastic magical daydream," as "dream," as something standing on the boundary between reality and fantastic invention. An analogous carnival sense of a great city (Paris) can be found in Balzac, Sue,

Soulié, and others, but not as strong or as deep as it is in Dostoevsky; the sources of this tradition go back to the ancient menippea (Varro, Lucian). Building on this sense of the city and the city crowd, Dostoevsky proceeds to give a sharply carnivalized picture of the emergence of his own first literary projects, including a plan for *Poor Folk*:

> And I began to look around and suddenly I saw some strange faces. They were all strange, queer, totally prosaic figures, in no way a Don Carlos or a Posa, nothing more than titular counselors, but at the same time they somehow seemed to be fantastic titular counselors. Someone *grimaced* in front of me, hiding behind that *fantastic crowd*, and *jerked at some strings and springs*, and these *puppets* moved, and he guffawed, how he guffawed! And then another story occurred to me, in some dark corners, some titular heart, honest and pure, moral and loyal to the authorities, and alongside it some little girl, mistreated and melancholy, and this whole story rent my heart deeply. And if one could gather together that whole crowd which I dreamed of then, it would make a wonderful *masquerade* . . .[23]

In this way, according to Dostoevsky's own reminiscences, his creative art was born—born, as it were, out of a vivid carnival vision of life ("I call the feeling I had on the Neva a vision," Dostoevsky tells us). Here we have the characteristic accessories of a carnival complex: guffaw and tragedy, a clown, comical street farces, a crowd of masqueraders. But the most important thing here, of course, is that very carnival sense of the world, which thoroughly permeates "Petersburg Dreams." In its generic essence this work is a variety of carnivalized menippea. One should emphasize the central *guffaw* accompanying the vision. We shall see further that Dostoevsky's entire work is in fact permeated with it, though in a reduced form.

The carnivalization of Dostoevsky's early work will not be dealt with in detail. We shall examine only certain elements of carnivalization in some of the individual works published after his exile. Here we set ourselves a limited task—to prove the presence of carnivalization and to uncover its basic functions in Dostoevsky. A deeper and fuller study of the problem, based on all of Dostoevsky's work, is beyond the limits of the present book.

The first work of the second period—"Uncle's Dream"—is remarkable for its vividly expressed, but somewhat simplified and *external*, carnivalization. At its center lies a scandal-catastrophe with a double decrowning—of Moskaleva and the prince. Even the very tone of the story told by Mordasov's chronicler is ambivalent: there is an ironic glorification of Moskaleva, that is, a carnivalistic fusion of praise and abuse.[24]

The scene of the scandal and decrowning of the prince—the carnival king, or more accurately the carnival bridegroom—is consistenly

portrayed as a *tearing to pieces*, as a typical carnivalistic "sacrificial" dismemberment into parts:

". . . If I'm a tub, then you are a *one-legged cripple*!"
"Me—one-legged—"
"Yes, yes, one-legged and *toothless* into the bargain, that's what you are!"
"And one-eyed, too!" shouted Marya Alexandrovna.
"You have a corset instead of ribs," added Natalya Dmitriyevna.
"Your *face* is on springs!"
"You have no *hair* of your own!"
"And the old fool's *moustache* is artificial, too," screeched Marya Alexandrovna.
"At least leave me my *nose*, Marya Alexandrovna!" cried the Prince, flabbergasted by such unexpected *revelations*. . . .
"Good God," said the unfortunate Prince, ". . . take me away, my good fellow, take me away, or they'll *tear me to pieces* . . ." [*SS* II, 398-99]

We have here a typical "carnival anatomy"—an enumeration of the parts of the dismembered body. Such "enumerations" were a widespread comic device in the carnivalized literature of the Renaissance (it is met very often in Rabelais, and in a somewhat less developed form in Cervantes).

The role of a decrowned carnival king was also played by the heroine of the tale, Mary Alexandrovna Moskaleva:

The guests dispersed with squeals and abuse, and Marya Alexandrovna was at last alone amidst the ruins and fragments of her former glory. Alas! Power, glory, distinction—all had vanished in a single evening. [*SS* II, 399]

But after the scene of the *comic* decrowning of the *old* bridegroom, the prince, there follows a *paired* scene of the tragic self-decrowning and death of the young bridegroom, the schoolteacher Vasya. Such a *pairing* of scenes (and individual images) that reflect one another or shine through one another—one given in the comic plane and the other in the tragic (as in this instance) or one on a lofty and the other on a low plane, or one affirming, the other repudiating, and so forth—is characteristic of Dostoevsky; taken together, these paired scenes create an ambivalent whole. It is evidence of an even deeper influence of the carnival sense of the world. To be sure, in "Uncle's Dream" this characteristic is still expressed somewhat externally.

Carnivalization is much deeper and more substantial in the tale *The Village of Stepanchikovo and its Inhabitants*,[q] although here,

[q]One of Dostoevsky's early post-exile works (1859); translated by Constance Garnett as "The Friend of the Family."

too, there is still much that is external. All life in Stepanchikovo is concentrated around Foma Fomich Opiskin, former *hanger-on* and *buffoon*, who has become the *unlimited despot* on Colonel Rostanev's estate; that is, all life is concentrated around a *carnival king*. Thus all life in the village of Stepanchikovo assumes a carnivalistic character, vividly expressed. This is life that has left its normal rut, almost a "world turned inside out."

And it cannot be otherwise, insofar as the tone is set by a carnival king—Foma Fomich. All the other characters, participants in this life, take on carnival coloration as well: the *mad* rich lady Tatyana Ivanovna, suffering from an erotic mania for falling in love (in the banal-romantic style) and who is at the same time the purest and kindest of souls; the *mad wife of the general* with her adoration and cult of Foma; the little *fool* Falalei with his persistent dream about the white bull and his Kamarinskaya[r]; the *mad lackey* Vidoplyasov, who is constantly changing his name to one more noble—such as "Tantsev," "Esbuketov" (this he must do because the house servants find an indecent rhyme for each new name); the *old man* Gavrila, who is forced in his old age to study French; the malicious *buffoon* Ezhevikin; the *"progressive" fool* Obnoskin who dreams of a wealthy bride; the *bankrupt hussar* Mizinchikov; the *eccentric* Bakhcheev, and others too. These are all people who for one reason or another have left the normal rut of life, who are denied the position in life normal and appropriate for them. The entire action of the tale is an uninterrupted series of scandals, eccentric escapades, mystifications, decrownings and crownings. The work is saturated with parodies and semiparodies, including a parody on Gogol's *Selected Passages from a Correspondence with Friends*; these parodies are organically linked with the carnival atmosphere of the tale as a whole.

Carnivalization allows Dostoevsky to glimpse and bring to life aspects in the character and behavior of people which in the normal course of life could not have revealed themselves. Especially deeply carnivalized is the character of Foma Fomich: he does not coincide with himself, he is not equal to himself, he cannot be given a monosemantic finalizing definition, and he anticipates in many ways the future heroes of Dostoevsky. He is, incidentally, presented in a carnivalistic contrasting pair with Colonel Rostanev.

We have concentrated on carnivalization in two works of Dostoevsky's second period because there it is more or less external and consequently very visible, obvious to all. In subsequent works carnivalization

[r]"Kamarinskaya," native Russian dance, made famous by Glinka's orchestral fantasy of the same name (1848).

recedes into the deeper levels and its nature changes. In particular, the *comic* aspect, here rather loud, is later muffled and reduced almost to the minimum. We must treat this point in somewhat more detail.

We have already made reference to the phenomenon of reduced laughter, so important in world literature. Laughter is a specific aesthetic relationship to reality, but not one that can be translated into logical language; that is, it is a specific means for artistically visualizing and comprehending reality and, consequently, a specific means for structuring an artistic image, plot, or genre. Enormous creative, and therefore genre-shaping, power was possessed by ambivalent carnivalistic laughter. This laughter could grasp and comprehend a phenomenon in the process of change and transition, it could fix in a phenomenon both poles of its evolution in their uninterrupted and creative renewing changeability: in death birth is foreseen and in birth death, in victory defeat and in defeat victory, in crowning a decrowning. Carnival laughter does not permit a single one of these aspects of change to be absolutized or to congeal in one-sided seriousness.

When we say that birth is "foreseen" in death, we inevitably make logical, and thus somewhat distort, carnival ambivalence: for in so doing we sever death from birth and distance them somewhat from each other. In living carnival images, death itself is pregnant and gives birth, and the mother's womb giving birth becomes a grave. Precisely such images are produced by creative ambivalent carnival laughter, in which mockery and triumph, praise and abuse are inseparably fused.

When the images of carnival and carnivalistic laughter are transposed into literature, they are transformed to a greater or lesser degree in keeping with specific artistic and literary tasks. But regardless of the degree or nature of the transformation, ambivalence and laughter remain in the carnivalized image. Under certain conditions and in certain genres, however, laughter can be reduced. It continues to determine the structure of the image, but it itself is muffled down to the minimum: we see, as it were, the track left by laughter in the structure of represented reality, but the laughter itself we do not hear. Thus in Plato's Socratic dialogues (of the first period) laughter is reduced (although not entirely), but it remains in the structure of the image of the major hero (Socrates), in the methods for carrying on the dialogue, and—most importantly—in authentic (not rhetorical) dialogicality itself, immersing thought itself in the joyful relativity of evolving existence and not permitting it to congeal in abstractly dogmatic (monologic) ossification. But here and there in the dialogues of the early period laughter goes beyond the structure of the image

and, so to speak, bursts out in a loud register. In the dialogues of the later period, laughter is reduced to a minimum.

In the literature of the Renaissance, laughter is generally not reduced, but certain gradations of "volume" do, of course, exist even here. In Rabelais, for example, it rings out loudly, as is fitting on a public square. In Cervantes there is no longer that public-square intensity of sound, although in the first book of *Don Quixote* laughter is still quite loud, and in the second it is significantly (when compared with the first) reduced. This reduction is also linked with certain changes in the structure of the major hero's image, and with changes in the plot.

In carnivalized literature of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, laughter is as a rule considerably muffled—to the level of irony, humor, and other forms of reduced laughter.

Let us return to reduced laughter in Dostoevsky. In the first two works of the second period, as we have said, laughter can still be distinctly heard, for elements of carnival ambivalence are of course still preserved in it.[25] But in Dostoevsky's subsequent great novels, laughter is reduced almost to the minimum (especially in *Crime and Punishment*). In all his novels, however, we find a trace of that ambivalent laughter, absorbed by Dostoevsky together with the generic tradition of carnivalization, performing its work of artistically organizing and illuminating the world. We find such traces in the structure of images, in numerous plot situations, and in certain characteristics of verbal style. But the most important—one could say, the decisive—expression of reduced laughter is to be found in the ultimate position of the author. This position excludes all one-sided or dogmatic seriousness and does not permit any single point of view, any single polar extreme of life or of thought, to be absolutized. All one-sided seriousness (of life and thought), all one-sided pathos is handed over to the heroes, but the author, who causes them all to collide in the "great dialogue" of the novel, leaves that dialogue open and puts no finalizing period at the end.

It should be pointed out that the carnival sense of the world also knows no period, and is, in fact, hostile to any sort of *conclusive conclusion*: all endings are merely new beginnings; carnival images are reborn again and again.

Certain scholars (Vyacheslav Ivanov,[s] Komarovich) apply to Dostoevsky's works the ancient (Aristotelian) term "catharsis" (purification). If this term is understood in a very broad sense, then one can agree with it (without catharsis in the broad sense there is no art at all). But tragic catharsis (in the Aristotelian sense) is not

[s]In English, see Vyacheslav Ivanov, *Freedom and the Tragic Life: A Study in Dostoevsky*, pp. 12-14.

applicable to Dostoevsky. The catharsis that finalizes Dostoevsky's novels might be—of course inadequately and somewhat rationalistically—expressed in this way: *nothing conclusive has yet taken place in the world, the ultimate word of the world and about the world has not yet been spoken, the world is open and free, everything is still in the future and will always be in the future.*

But this is, after all, also the *purifying sense* of ambivalent laughter.

It would not, perhaps, be superfluous to emphasize again that we speak here of Dostoevsky the artist. Dostoevsky the journalist was by no means a stranger to cramped and one-sided seriousness, to dogmatism, even to eschatology. But these ideas of the journalist, once introduced into the novel, become there merely one of the embodied voices of an unfinalized and open dialogue.

In Dostoevsky's novels, everything is directed toward that unspoken and as yet unpredetermined "*new word*," everything waits tensely on that word, and the *author* does not block its path with his own one-sided and monosemantic seriousness.

Reduced laughter in carnivalized literature by no means excludes the possibility of somber colors within a work. For this reason the somber coloration of Dostoevsky's works should not confuse us: it is not their final word.

Sometimes in Dostoevsky's novels reduced laughter rises to the surface, especially in those places where a narrator or a chronicler is introduced whose story is almost always constructed in parodic-ironic ambivalent tones (for example, the ambivalent glorification of Stepan Trofimovich in *The Possessed*, very close in tone to the glorification of Moskaleva in "Uncle's Dream"). This laughter comes to the fore in open or half-concealed parodies that are scattered throughout all of Dostoevsky's novels.[26]

We shall pause on several other characteristics of carnivalization in Dostoevsky's novels.

Carnivalization is not an external and immobile schema which is imposed upon ready-made content; it is, rather, an extraordinarily flexible form of artistic visualization, a peculiar sort of heuristic principle making possible the discovery of new and as yet unseen things. By *relativizing* all that was externally stable, set and ready-made, carnivalization with its pathos of change and renewal permitted Dostoevsky to penetrate into the deepest layers of man and human relationships. It proved remarkably productive as a means for capturing in art the developing relationships under capitalism, at a time when previous forms of life, moral principles and beliefs were being turned into "rotten cords" and the previously concealed, ambivalent,

and unfinalized nature of man and human *thought* was being nakedly exposed. Not only people and their actions but even *ideas* had broken out of their self-enclosed hierarchical nesting places and had begun to collide in the familiar contact of "absolute" (that is, completely unlimited) dialogue. Capitalism, similar to that "pander" Socrates on the market square of Athens, brings together people and ideas. In all of Dostoevky's novels, beginning with *Crime and Punishment*, there is a consistent *carnivalization* of dialogue.

We find other instances of carnivalization in *Crime and Punishment*. Everything in this novel—the fates of people, their experiences and ideas—is pushed to its boundaries, everything is prepared, as it were, to pass over into its opposite (but not, of course, in the abstractly dialectical sense), everything is taken to the extreme, to its outermost limit. There is nothing in the novel that could become stabilized, nothing that could justifiably relax within itself, enter the ordinary flow of biographical time and develop in it (the possibility of such a development for Razumikhin and Dounia is only indicated by Dostoevsky at the end of the novel, but of course he does not show it: such life lies outside his artistic world). Everything requires change and rebirth. Everything is shown in a moment of unfinalized transition.

It is characteristic that the very setting for the action of the novel —*Petersburg* (its role in the novel is enormous)—is on the borderline between existence and nonexistence, reality and phantasmagoria, always on the verge of dissipating like the fog and vanishing. Petersburg too is devoid, as it were, of any internal grounds for justifiable stabilization; it too is on the threshold.[27]

The sources of carnivalization for *Crime and Punishment* are no longer provided by Gogol. We feel here in part a Balzacian type of carnivalization, and in part elements of the social-adventure novel (Soulié and Sue). But perhaps the most vital and profound source of carnivalization for this novel was Pushkin's "Queen of Spades."

We shall pause for analysis on only one small episode of the novel, which will permit us to investigate several important characteristics of carnivalization in Dostoevsky, and at the same time clarify our claim concerning Pushkin's influence.

After the first meeting with Porfiry and the appearance of the mysterious artisan with his one word, "Murderer!", Raskolnikov has a *dream* in which he *again* commits the murder of the old woman. We quote the end of this dream:

He stood over her. "She is afraid," he thought. He stealthily took the axe from the noose and struck her one blow, then another on the skull. But strange to say she did not stir, as though she were made of wood. He was frightened, bent down nearer and tried to look at her; but she, too, bent her head lower. He bent right down to the ground and peeped up into her face from below, he peeped

and turned cold with horror; the old woman was sitting and *laughing, shaking with noiseless laughter*, doing her utmost that he should not hear it. Suddenly he fancied that the door from the bedroom was opened a little and that there was *laughter* and whispering within. He was overcome with frenzy and he began hitting the old woman on the head with all his force, but at every blow of the axe and the *laughter* and whispering from the bedroom *grew louder* and the old woman was simply shaking with mirth. He was rushing away, but the *passage was full of people, the doors* of the flats stood open and *on the landing, on the stairs* and everywhere below there were people, rows of heads, *all looking*, but huddled together in silence and expectation. Something gripped his heart, his legs were rooted to the spot, they would not move. . . . He tried to scream and woke up. [*SS* V, 288; *Crime and Punishment*, Part III, ch. 6]

Several points are of interest here.

1. The first point is already familiar to us: the fantastic logic of dreams employed here by Dostoevsky. We recall his words: ". . . you *leap over* space and time, *over all laws of life and reason*, and only pause where your *heart's desire* bids you pause" ("Dream of a Ridiculous Man"). This same dream logic made it possible to create here the image of a *laughing murdered old woman, to combine laughter with death and murder*. But this is also made possible by the ambivalent logic of carnival. Before us is a typical carnival combination.

The image of the laughing old woman in Dostoevsky echoes Pushkin's image of the old Countess winking from the coffin, and the winking Queen of Spades on the card (the Queen of Spades is, incidentally, a *carnival double* of the old Countess). We have here a *fundamental* resonance between two images and not a chance external similarity, for it occurs against the background of a general resonance between these two works ("The Queen of Spades" and *Crime and Punishment*). This is a resonance both in the atmosphere of images and in the basic content of ideas: "Napoleonism" on the specific terrain of early Russian capitalism. In both works this concretely historical phenomenon receives a second *carnivalistic plane*, one which recedes into infinite semantic space. The motivation for these two echoing images (the laughing dead woman) is also similar: in Pushkin it is *insanity*, in Dostoevsky, the *delirious dream*.

2. In Raskolnikov's dream it is not only the murdered woman who laughs (in the dream, to be sure, it proves impossible to murder her). Other people are also laughing, elsewhere in the apartment, in the bedroom, and they laugh louder and louder. Then a crowd appears, a multitude of people on the *stairway* and *down below* as well, and in relation to this crowd passing *below*, Raskolnikov is located at the *top of the stairs*. Before us is the image of communal ridicule on the public square decrowning a carnival king-pretender. The public square is a symbol of the communal performance, and at the end of

the novel, Raskolnikov, before going to give himself up at the police station, comes out on the square and bows low to the earth before the whole people. This communal decrowning, which "came to Raskolnikov's heart" in a dream, has no *direct* echo in the "The Queen of Spades," but a distant echo is nevertheless there: Hermann's fainting spell in the presence of the people at the Countess' grave. A fuller echo of Raskolnikov's dream can be found in another of Pushkin's works, *Boris Godunov*. We have in mind the thrice-recurring prophetic *dream* of the Pretender (the scene in the cell of Chudovo Monastery):

> I dreamed I climbed a *crooked stair* that led
> Up to a tower, and there upon that *height*
> I stood, where Moscow like an ant hill lay
> *Under* my feet, and in the *marketplace*
> The *people* stared and pointed at me *laughing;*
> *I felt ashamed, a trembling overcame me,*
> I fell headfirst, and in that fall I woke.[t]

Here is the same carnival logic of self-appointed *elevation*, the communal act of comic *decrowning on the public square*, and a falling *downward*.

3. In Raskolnikov's dream, *space* assumes additional significance in the overall symbol-system of carnival. *Up, down*, the *stairway*, the *threshold*, the *foyer*, the *landing* take on the meaning of a "point" where *crisis*, radical change, an unexpected turn of fate takes place, where decisions are made, where the forbidden line is overstepped, where one is renewed or perishes.

Action in Dostoevsky's works occurs primarily at these "points." The interior spaces of a house or of rooms, spaces distant from the boundaries, that is from the threshold, are almost never used by Dostoevsky, except of course for scenes of scandals and decrownings, when interior space (the drawing room or the hall) becomes a substitute for the public square. Dostoevsky "leaps over" all that is comfortably habitable, well-arranged and stable, all that is far from the threshold, because the life that he portrays does not take place in that sort of space. Dostoevsky was least of all an estate-home-room-apartment-family writer. In comfortably habitable interior space, far from the threshold, people live a biographical life in biographical time: they are born, they pass through childhood and youth, they marry, give birth to children, die. This biographical time Dostoevsky also "leaps over." On the threshold and on the square the only time possible is *crisis time*, in which a *moment* is equal to years, decades,

[t]Translation by Paul Schmidt in his *Meyerhold at Work* (Austin: U. of Texas Press, 1980), p. 85.

even to a "billion years" (as in "The Dream of a Ridiculous Man").

If we now turn from Raskolnikov's *dream* to what happens in the waking life of the novel, we will be persuaded that the threshold and its substitutes are the fundamental "points" of action in the novel.

First of all, Raskolnikov lives, in essence, on a threshold: his narrow room, a "coffin" (a carnival symbol here) opens directly onto the *landing of the staircase*, and he never locks his door, even when he goes out (that is, his room is unenclosed interior space). In this "coffin" it is impossible to live a biographical life—here one can experience only crisis, make ultimate decisions, die or be reborn (as in the coffins of "Bobok" or the coffin of the Ridiculous Man). Marmeladov's family lives on the threshold as well, in a walk-through room leading directly onto a staircase (here, on the threshold, while bringing home the drunken Marmeladov, Raskolnikov meets the members of the family for the first time). Raskolnikov experiences terrible moments at the threshold of the murdered pawnbroker's when, on the other side of the door, on the stairway landing, her visitors stand and tug at the bell. It is to this place that he returns and himself rings the bell, in order to relive those moments. The scene of his half-confession to Razumikhin takes place on the threshold in the corridor by a lamp, without words, only in glances. On the threshold, near the doors leading to a neighboring apartment, his conversations with Sonya occur (with Svidrigailov eavesdropping on the other side of the door). There is certainly no need to enumerate further all the "acts" that take place on the threshold, near the threshold, or that are permeated with the living sensation of threshold in this novel.

The threshold, the foyer, the corridor, the landing, the stairway, its steps, doors opening onto the stairway, gates to front and back yards, and beyond these, the city: squares, streets, façades, taverns, dens, bridges, gutters. This is the space of the novel. And in fact absolutely nothing here ever loses touch with the threshold, there is no interior of drawing rooms, dining rooms, halls, studios, bedrooms where biographical life unfolds and where events take place in the novels of writers such as Turgenev, Tolstoy, and Goncharov. Of course, we can uncover just such an organization of space in Dostoevsky's other works as well.

We find a somewhat different nuance of carnivalization in "The Gambler."

It portrays, first of all, the life of "Russians abroad," a special category of people that attracted Dostoevsky's interest. These are people cut off from their native land and folk, whose life ceases to be determined by the norms of people living in their own country;

their behavior is no longer regulated by that position which they had occupied in their homeland, they are not fastened down to their environment. The General, the tutor in the General's house (the hero of the tale), the scoundrel de Grieux, Polina, the courtesan Blanche, the Englishman Astley, and all the others who have come together in the little German town of Roulettenburg make up a sort of *carnival collective*, which seems to a certain extent itself outside the norms and order of ordinary life. Their behavior and their relationships with one another become unusual, eccentric, and scandalous (they live constantly in an atmosphere of scandal).

Secondly, the center of the life portrayed in the tale is the *game of roulette*. This second aspect is a decisive one and determines the special nuance of carnivalization in the work.

Gambling (with dice, cards, roulette, etc.) is by nature carnivalistic. This was clearly recognized in antiquity, the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. Symbols of gambling were always part of the image system of carnival symbols.

People from various (hierarchical) positions in life, once crowded around the roulette table, are made equal by the rules of the game and in the face of fortune, chance. Their behavior at the roulette table in no way corresponds to the role they play in ordinary life. The atmosphere of gambling is an atmosphere of sudden and quick changes of fate, of instantaneous rises and falls, that is, of crownings/decrownings. The *stake* is similar to a *crisis*: a person feels himself *on the threshold*. And the time of gambling is a special time: here, too, a minute is equal to years.

The game of roulette spreads its carnivalizing influence over all life that comes in contact with it, over almost the whole town, which Dostoevsky for good reason called Roulettenburg.

The personalities of the main heroes of the tale also unfold in an intense carnivalized atmosphere—Alexei Ivanovich and Polina, ambivalent and crisis-ridden characters, unfinalized, eccentric, full of unexpected possibilities. In one of his letters from 1863, Dostoevsky characterized in this way the *concept* underlying Alexei Ivanovich's image (considerably changed in the final version of 1866):

"I am taking a direct spontaneous nature, a man however of considerable development, but *in everything incomplete*, a man *who has lost faith* and yet who does not dare not to believe, *who rebels against the authorities while fearing them* . . . the main point is that all his vital juices, strength, rebelliousness and daring have gone into roulette. He is a gambler, but not an *ordinary gambler*, just as *Pushkin's miserly knight is not an ordinary miser* . . ."

As we have said, the final image of Alexei Ivanovich differs rather considerably from this concept, but the ambivalence mentioned in it

not only remains but is even sharply intensified, and incompleteness becomes a consistent and crucial *open-endedness*; in addition, the character of the hero is revealed not only in gambling and in carnival-type scandals and eccentricities, but also in his deeply ambivalent and crisis-ridden passion for Polina.

Dostoevsky's reference to Pushkin's "Miserly Knight," pointed out by us above, is of course no accidental juxtaposition. "The Miserly Knight" exercises a very fundamental influence on all of Dostoevsky's subsequent works, especially on *The Adolescent* and *The Brothers Karamazov* (a maximally profound and universalized treatment of the theme of parricide).

We cite another excerpt from the same letter of Dostoevsky's:

"If *House of the Dead* attracted the public's attention because it portrayed convicts, whom no one had graphically portrayed prior to *House of the Dead*, then this story will be sure to attract attention as a graphic and highly detailed *portrayal of the game of roulette . . . House of the Dead* was indeed curious. But this is a *description of a sort of hell*, a unique sort of 'prison bathhouse.'"[28]

At superficial glance it may seem strange and far-fetched to juxtapose the game of roulette with penal servitude, and "The Gambler" with "House of the Dead." But in fact the juxtaposition is profoundly appropriate. Both the life of convicts and the life of gamblers—for all their differences in content—are equally *"life taken out of life"* (that is, taken out of common, ordinary life). In this sense both convicts and gamblers are carnivalized collectives.[29] And the *time* of penal servitude and the *time* of gambling are—for all their profound differences—an identical *type of time*, similar to the "final moments of consciousness" before execution or suicide, similar in general to the time of crisis. All this is time on the *threshold*, and not biological time, experienced in the interior spaces of life far from the threshold. It is remarkable that Dostoevsky equates both gambling at roulette and penal servitude equally to *hell*, or as we would say, to the carnivalized nether world of Menippean satire (the "prison bathhouse" is an extraordinary externally visible symbol of this). Dostoevsky's juxtapositions here are to the highest degree characteristic of him, and at the same time have the sound of a typical carnival mésalliance.

In the novel *The Idiot*, carnivalization is present simultaneously with great external visibility, and with the enormous inner depth of a carnival sense of the world (this is in part due to the direct influence of Cervantes' *Don Quixote*).

At the center of the novel stands the carnivalistically ambivalent figure of the "Idiot," Prince Myshkin. This person, in a special and *higher sense*, does not occupy any *position* in life that might define

his behavior and limit his *pure humanness*. From the point of view of life's ordinary logic, the entire behavior and all the experiences of Prince Myshkin appear incongruous and eccentric in the extreme. Such, for example, is his brotherly love for his rival, a person who made an attempt on his life and who has become the murderer of the woman he loves; this brotherly love toward Rogozhin in fact reaches its peak immediately after the murder of Nastasya Filippovna and fills Myshkin's "final moments of consciousness" (before he falls into complete idiocy). The final scene of *The Idiot*—the last meeting of Myshkin and Rogozhin beside Nastasya Filippovna's corpse—is one of the most striking in all of Dostoevsky's art.

Just as paradoxical from the point of view of life's normal logic is Myshkin's attempt to *combine in life* his simultaneous love for Nastasya Filippovna and Aglaya. Also outside the logic of ordinary life are Myshkin's relationships to the other characters: to Ganya Ivolgin, Ippolit, Burdovsky, Lebedev, and others as well. One might say that Myshkin is not able to enter into life completely, cannot become completely embodied, cannot accept any definitiveness in life that would limit a personality. He remains, as it were, on a tangent to life's circle. It is as if he lacks the necessary *flesh of life* that would permit him to occupy a specific place in life (thereby crowding others out of that place), and therefore he remains on a tangent to life. But precisely for that reason is he able to "penetrate" through the life-flesh of other people and reach their deepest "I."

In Myshkin this detachment from the ordinary relationships of life, the constant *inappropriateness* of his personality and his behavior impart to him a certain integrity, almost a naiveté; he is precisely an "idiot."

The heroine of the novel, Nastasya Filippovna, also falls out of the ordinary logic and relationships of life. She, too, always and in everything acts *in spite of* her position in life. But characteristic for her is the *violent emotional response*. She is "mad."

And around these two central figures of the novel—the "idiot" and the "madwoman"—all of life is carnivalized, turned into a "world inside out": traditional plot situations radically change their meaning, there develops a dynamic carnivalistic play of sharp contrasts, unexpected shifts and changes; secondary characters in the novel take on carnivalistic overtones, form carnival pairs.

A carnivalistic-fantastic atmosphere permeates the entire novel. But around Myshkin this atmosphere is *bright*, almost *joyful*. Around Nastasya Filippovna it is *gloomy, infernal*. Myshkin is in carnival *paradise*, Nastasya Filippovna in carnival *hell*; but this hell and paradise in the novel intersect, intertwine in various ways, and are reflected in each other according to the laws of a profound carnival

ambivalence. All this permits Dostoevsky to expose a different side of life to himself and to the reader, to spy upon and depict in that life certain new, unknown depths and possibilities.

But what interests us here is not those depths of life that Dostoevsky *glimpsed*, but only the *form of their visualization*, and the role played in that form by elements of carnivalization.

We shall pause a while longer on the carnivalizing function of the image of Prince Myshkin.

Wherever Prince Myshkin appears, hierarchical barriers between people suddenly become penetrable, an inner contact is formed between them, a carnival frankness is born. His personality possesses the peculiar capacity to relativize everything that disunifies people and imparts a *false seriousness* to life.

The action of the novel begins in a third-class railway car, where "two passengers found themselves opposite each other by the window"—Myshkin and Rogozhin. We have already had occasion to point out that the third-class railway car, like the deck of a ship in the ancient menippea, is a substitute for the *public square*, where people from various positions find themselves in familiar contact with one another. Thus there is a coming together of the *beggar prince* and the *merchant millionaire*. The carnivalistic contrast is emphasized even in their clothing: Myshkin is in a sleeveless cloak of foreign make with an enormous hood, and in gaiters; Rogozhin is in a sheepskin coat and boots.

> The fell into talk. The readiness of the *fair* young man in the Swiss cloak to answer all his *swarthy* companion's inquiries was remarkable. He betrayed no suspicion of the extreme impertinence of some of his misplaced and idle questions. [*SS* VI, 7; *The Idiot*, Part, I, ch. 1]

This remarkable readiness of Myshkin to open himself up calls forth a reciprocal frankness on the part of the suspicious and withdrawn Rogozhin, and prompts him to relate the story of his passion for Nastasya Filippovna with absolute carnivalistic frankness.

Such is the first carnivalized episode of the novel.

In the second episode, already in the Epanchin's house, Myshkin, waiting to be received, carries on a conversation *in the foyer* with the *butler*, on the inappropriate theme of capital punishment and the final moral torments of the condemned. And he succeeds in entering into inner contact with this stuffy and limited servant.

In the same carnivalistic manner does he penetrate social barriers in his first meeting with General Epanchin.

Of some interest is the carnivalization of the following episode: in Madame Epanchin's living room, Myshkin tells of the *final moments of consciousness* of a man condemned to death (an autobiographical

account of something that Dostoevsky had himself experienced). The theme of the threshold intrudes here into the interior space of the drawing room, a space far from the threshold. No less inappropriate here is Myshkin's amazing story about Marie. This whole episode is full of carnivalistic frankness; an odd and in fact suspicious *stranger*—the Prince—is, as swiftly and unexpectedly as in carnival, transformed into an intimate and a friend of the family. The Epanchin household is drawn into Myshkin's carnival atmosphere. Of course, this is facilitated by the childlike and eccentric character of Madame Epanchin herself.

The subsequent episode, which takes place in the Ivolgins' apartment, is remarkable for its even more pronounced external and internal carnivalization. It unfolds from the very beginning in an atmosphere of scandal, which exposes the soul of almost all the participants. Such externally carnivalistic figures as Ferdyshchenko and General Ivolgin make their appearance. The typical carnival mystifications and mésalliances occur. Characteristic is the short, acutely carnivalized scene in the foyer, on the *threshold*, when Nastasya Filippovna, who has appeared unexpectedly, mistakes the prince for a servant and rudely curses him out ("Oaf," "you should be fired," "what an idiot!"). This abuse, which contributes to a thickening of the carnival atmosphere of the scene, is completely out of keeping with Nastasya Filippovna's actual treatment of servants. The scene in the foyer prepares for the subsequent scene of mystification in the living room, where Nastasya Filippovna plays out the role of a heartless and cynical courtesan. Then occurs the exaggeratedly carnivalistic scene of the scandal: the appearance of the tipsy general with his carnivalistic story, his exposure, the appearance of Rogozhin's motley and drunken crew, Ganya's clash with his sister, the slap in the prince's face, the provocative behavior of the petty carnival demon Ferdyshchenko, and so forth. The Ivolgins' living room is transformed into a carnival square, where for the first time Myshkin's carnival paradise intersects and intertwines with Nastasya Filippovna's carnival hell.

After the scandal, there is the Prince's penetrating conversation with Ganya and the latter's frank confession, then a carnivalistic journey through Petersburg with the drunken general, and, finally, the evening at Nastasya Filippovna's with the culminating scandal-catastrophe, which we have already analyzed in its place. Thus ends the first part, and with it the first *day* of the novel's action.

The action of the first part began at dawn and ended late in the evening. But this is not, of course, the day of tragedy ("from the rising to the setting of the sun"). The time here is neither tragic time (although it is close to it in type), nor is it epic time, nor biographical time. This is a day in special carnival time, excluded, as it were, from

historical time, flowing according to its own special carnival laws and finding room in itself for an unlimited numer of radical shifts and metamorphoses.[30] Precisely this sort of time—to be sure, not carnival time in the strict sense but rather carnivalized time—was necessary to Dostoevsky for the fulfillment of his special artistic tasks. Those events that Dostoevsky portrayed on the *threshold* or on the *public square*, with their profound inner meaning, and likewise such heroes of his as Raskolnikov, Myshkin, Stavrogin, Ivan Karamazov, could not have been explored in ordinary biographical and historical time. And in fact polyphony itself, as the event of interaction between autonomous and internally unfinalized consciousnesses, demands a different artistic conception of time and space; to use Dostoevsky's own expression, a "non-Euclidian" conception.

On this we may conclude our analysis of carnivalization in Dostoevsky's works.

In the subsequent three novels we will find the same features of carnivalization,[31] although in a more complex and intensified form (especially in *The Brothers Karamazov*). In concluding the present chapter we will touch upon one aspect only, which is most vividly expressed in the later novels.

We have already spoken of the structural characteristics of the carnival image: it strives to encompass and unite within itself both poles of becoming or both members of an antithesis: birth-death, youth-old age, top-bottom, face-backside, praise-abuse, affirmation-repudiation, tragic-comic, and so forth, while the upper pole of a two-in-one image is reflected in the lower, after the manner of the figures on playing cards. It could be expressed this way: opposites come together, look at one another, are reflected in one another, know and understand one another.

And in just this way could one define the basic principle of Dostoevsky's art. Everything in his world lives on the very border of its opposite. Love lives on the very border of hate, knows and understands it, and hate lives on the border of love and also understands it (the love-hate of Versilov, the love of Katerina Ivanovna toward Dmitri Karamazov; to a certain extent also both Ivan's love for Katerina Ivanovna and Dmitri's love for Grushenka). Faith lives on the very border of atheism, sees itself there and understands it, and atheism lives on the border of faith and understands it.[32] Loftiness and nobility live on the border of degradation and vulgarity (Dmitri Karamazov). Love for life neighbors upon a thirst for self-destruction (Kirillov). Purity and chastity understand vice and sensuality (Alyosha Karamazov).

We are, of course, simplifying and coarsening somewhat the very

complex and subtle ambivalence of Dostoevsky's later novels. In Dostoevsky's world all people and all things must know one another and know about one another, must enter into contact, come together face to face and *begin to talk* with one another. Everything must be reflected in everything else, all things must illuminate one another dialogically. Therefore all things that are disunified and distant must be brought together at a single spatial and temporal "point." And what is necessary for this is carnival *freedom* and carnival's artistic conception of space and time.

Carnivalization made possible the creation of the *open* structure of the great dialogue, and permitted social interaction between people to be carried over into the higher sphere of the spirit and the intellect, which earlier had always been primarily the sphere of a single and unified monologic consciousness, a unified and indivisible spirit unfolding within itself (as, for example, in Romanticism). A carnival sense of the world helps Dostoevsky overcome gnoseological as well as ethical solipsism. A single person, remaining alone with himself, cannot make ends meet even in the deepest and most intimate spheres of his own spiritual life, he cannot manage without *another* consciousness. One person can never find complete fullness in himself alone.

Carnivalization, in addition, makes it possible to extend the narrow scene of a personal life in one specific limited epoch to a maximally universal *mystery play scene*, applicable to all humanity. Dostoevsky strove for this in his later novels, especially in *The Brothers Karamazov*.

In *The Possessed*, Shatov tells Stavrogin before the beginning of their heart-to-heart conversation:

> . . . we are two *beings*, and have come together *in infinity* . . . for the *last time in the world*. Drop your tone, and speak like a *human being*! Speak, if only for once in your life, with the voice of a man. [*SS* VII, 260-61; *The Possessed*, Part Two, ch. 1]

All *decisive* encounters of man with man, consciousness with consciousness, always take place in Dostoevsky's novels "in infinity" and "for the last time" (in the ultimate moments of crisis), that is, they take place in *carnival-mystery play* space and time.

The aim of our entire work has been to explore the inimitable uniqueness of Dostoevsky's poetics, "to show the Dostoevsky in Dostoevsky." But if such a *synchronic* task is properly resolved, then it should help us feel out and trace Dostoevsky's generic tradition back to its sources in antiquity. We have tried to do just that in the present chapter, although, to be sure, in a somewhat general and almost schematic form. We believe our diachronic analysis confirms

the results of the syncrhonic one. Or more precisely, the results of both analyses mutually verify and confirm one another.

Having linked Dostoevsky with a specific tradition, it goes without saying that we have not in the slightest degree limited the profound originality and individual uniqueness of his work. Dostoevsky is the creator of *authentic polyphony*, which, of course, did not and could not have existed in the Socratic dialogue, the ancient Menippean satire, the medieval mystery play, in Shakespeare and Cervantes, Voltaire and Diderot, Balzac and Hugo. But polyphony was prepared for in a *fundamental* way by this line of development in European literature. This entire tradition, beginning with the Socratic dialogue and the menippea, was reborn and renewed in Dostoevsky in the uniquely original and innovative form of the polyphonic novel.

NOTES

1. Leonid Grossman, *Poetika Dostoevskogo* [The Poetics of Dostoevsky] (Moscow: GAKhN, 1925), pp. 53, 56-57.

2. Ibid., pp. 61, 62.

3. His satires have not survived, but their titles are mentioned by Diogenes Laertius.

4. The phenomenon of reduced laughter is of considerable importance in world literature. Reduced laughter is denied direct expression, which is to say "it does not ring out," but traces of it remain in the structure of an image or a discourse and can be detected in it. Paraphrasing Gogol, one can speak of "laughter invisible to the world." We shall meet it in the works of Dostoevsky.

5. In *Eumenides* (fragments) Varro portrays as insanity such passions as ambition, acquisitiveness, and so on.

6. Two lives—the official and the carnivalistic—also existed in the ancient world, but there was never such a sharp break between them (especially in Greece).

7. My work *Rabelais and the Folk Culture of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance* (1940), at the present time [1963] being prepared for publication, is devoted to the carnivalistic folk culture of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. It provides a special bibliography on the question. [Bakhtin's book on Rabelais, submitted as a doctoral dissertation in 1940, was not published until 1965. It exists in English as Mikhail Bakhtin, *Rabelais and His World*, trans. Hélène Iswolsky (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1968).]

8. Dostoevsky was very familiar not only with canonical Christian literature, but with the apocrypha as well.

9. Mention must be made here of the enormous influence exerted by the novella "The Widow of Ephesus" (from the *Satyricon*) on the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. This inserted novella is one of the greatest menippea of antiquity. [See Bakhtin's extensive analysis in "Forms of Time and Chronotope in the Novel," *The Dialogic Imagination*, pp. 221-24.]

10. The application of such terms as "epic," "tragedy," "idyll" to modern literature has become generally accepted and customary, and we are not in the least confused when *War and Peace* is called an epic, *Boris Godunov* a tragedy, "Old-World Landowners" an idyll. But the generic term "menippea" is not customary (especially in our literary scholarship), and therefore its application to works of modern literature (Dostoevsky, for example), may seem somewhat strange and strained.

11. In *Diary of a Writer* he appears again in "A Certain Person's Half-letter." [See *The Diary of a Writer*, 1873, pp. 65-74.]

12. In the eighteenth century, *Dialogues of the Dead* were written by Sumarokov and even by A. V. Suvorov, the future Field Commander (see his *Razgovor v tsarstve mertvykh mezhdu Aleksandrom Makedonskim i Gerostratom* [A Conversation in the Kingdom of the Dead Between Alexander the Great and Herostratus], 1755).

13. It is true that juxtapositions of this sort cannot decisively prove anything. All these similar elements could have been engendered by the logic of the genre itself, particularly by the logic of carnivalistic decrownings, debasings, and mésalliances.

14. The possibility cannot be discounted, although it is doubtful, that Dostoevsky was familiar with the satires of Varro. A complete scholarly edition of Varro's fragments was published in 1965 (Riese, *Varronis Saturarum Menippearum relinquiae*, Leipzig, 1865). The book aroused interest beyond the narrow philological circles, and Dostoevsky might have gained a secondhand acquaintance of it during his stay abroad, or perhaps through his Russian philologist friends.

15. *PS* XIII, 523. [The note was published in Dostoevsky's journal *Vremia* (Time) in January, 1861, as an editor's foreword to a Russian translation of three Poe stories ("The Black Cat," "The Tell-tale Heart," "The Devil in the Belfry"). Contrasting Poe and Hoffmann, Dostoevsky distinguishes between two types of fantasticality: the direct reproduction of the otherworldly realm, and—more his own practice—an indirect, external and "materialized" form of fantasticality that functions as a literary device, and as a principle for structuring the plot or image. The Russian text can be found in *F. M. Dostoevskii ob iskusstve* (Moscow: Iskusstvo, 1973), pp. 114-17.]

16. General Pervoedov ["he who eats first"] even in the grave could not renounce the consciousness of his general's dignity, and in the name of that dignity he categorically protests against Klinevich's proposal ("to cease to be ashamed"), announcing, "I have served my monarch." In *The Possessed* there is an analogous situation, but on the real-life earthly plane: General Drozdov, finding himself among nihilists, for whom the very word "general" is a word of abuse, defends his dignity as a general with the very same words. Both episodes are handled in a comic way.

17. Even from such well-meaning and competent contemporaries as A. N. Maikov.*

18. "And suddenly I called out, not with my voice for I could not move, but with the whole of my being, to the master of all that was befalling me" [*SS* X, 428].

19. On the generic and thematic sources of the "Legend of the Grand Inquisitor" (*Histoire de Jenni, ou L'Athée et le Sage* of Voltaire, Victor Hugo's *Le Christe au Vatican*), see the works of L. P. Grossman.

20. Gogol was still subject to the direct and vital influence of Ukrainian carnivalistic folklore.

21. Grimmelshausen is already beyond the limits of the Renaissance, but his work reflects the deep and direct influence of carnival no less than does the work of Shakespeare and Cervantes.

22. It cannot be denied, of course, that a certain degree of special fascination is inherent in all contemporary forms of carnivalistic life. It is enough to name *Hemingway*, whose work, on the whole deeply carnivalized, was strongly influenced by contemporary forms and festivals of a carnival type (especially the bullfight). He had a very keen ear for everything carnivalistic in contemporary life.

23. *PS* XIII, pp. 158-59. ["Petersburg Dreams in Verse and Prose" was published as a feuilleton in Dostoevsky's journal *Vremia (Time)* in 1861.]

24. Here the model for Dostoevsky was Gogol, namely the ambivalent tone of "The Story about how Ivan Ivanovich Quarreled with Ivan Nikiforovich."

25. During this period Dostoevsky was working on a large comic epic, of which "Uncle's Dream" is an episode (according to his own statement in a letter). As far as we know, Dostoevsky never subsequently returned to a plan for a large, purely comic work.

26. Thomas Mann's novel *Doktor Faustus*, which reflects the powerful influence of Dostoevsky, is also thoroughly permeated with reduced ambivalent laughter, sometimes

breaking through to the surface, especially in the narrator Zeitblom's story. Thomas Mann himself, in his history of the creation of the novel, writes of it this way: "Therefore I must introduce as much jesting, as much ridicule of the biographer, as much *anti-self-important mockery as possible*—as much of that as was humanly possible!" (T. Mann, "Istoriia *Doktora Faustusa*. Roman odnogo romana," *Sobranie sochinenii* [The History of Doktor Faustus. The Novel of a Novel, Collected Works] [Moscow: Golitizdat, 1960], vol. 9, p. 224). Reduced laughter, primarily of the parodic type, is in general characteristic of all of Mann's work. In comparing his style with that of Bruno Frank, Mann makes a very characteristic admission: "He [that is, B. Frank—M. B.] uses the humanistic narrative style of Zeitblom with *complete seriousness* as his own: In *matters of style I really no longer admit anything but parody*" (ibid., p. 235). It should be pointed out that Thomas Mann's work is profoundly carnivalized. Carnivalization occurs in most vivid external form in Mann's novel *Die Bekentnisse des Hochstaplers Felix Krull* (where Professor Kuckuck becomes the mouthpiece for a sort of philosophy of carnival and carnival ambivalence). [See, in English, Mann's discussion of Zeitblom as narrator in Thomas Mann, *The Story of a Novel: The Genesis of Doctor Faustus*, trans. Richard and Clara Winston (New York: Knopf, 1961). The passages Bakhtin cites occur on p. 38 and 54.]

27. A carnivalized sense of Petersburg first appears in Dostoevsky in his novella *A Faint Heart* (1847), and was later powerfully developed, in ways applicable to all of Dostoevsky's early works, in "Petersburg Visions in Verse and Prose."

28. *Pis'ma*, I, 333-34 [Dostoevsky to N. N. Strakhov, from Rome, 18/30 September 1863].

29. In penal servitude too, people of various positions find themselves in familiar contact who under conditions of normal life would not have been able to meet on equal terms on a single plane.

30. For example, the beggar prince, who in the morning had nowhere to lay his head, becomes by the end of the day a millionaire.

31. In the novel *The Possessed*, for example, all life that is penetrated by devils is portrayed as a carnival nether world. The entire novel is thoroughly permeated by the theme of crowning-decrowning and pretendership (for example, Stavrogin's decrowning by the lame woman and Pyotr Verkhovensky's idea to crown him "Ivan the Tsarevich"). For an analysis of external carnivalization, *The Possessed* offers very rewarding material. *The Brothers Karamazov* is also very rich in external carnival accessories.

32. In his conversation with the devil, Ivan Karamazov asks him:

"Fool! did you ever tempt those holy men who ate locusts and prayed seventeen years in the wilderness till they were overgrown with moss?"

"My dear fellow, I've done nothing else. One forgets the whole world and all the worlds, and sticks to one such saint, because he is a very precious diamond. *One such soul, you know, is sometimes worth a whole constellation. We have our arithmetic, you know.* The conquest is precious! And some of them, on my word, are not inferior to you in culture, though you won't believe it. *They can contemplate such depths of belief and disbelief at the same moment* that sometimes it really seems that they are within a hairsbreadth of being 'turned upside down,' as the actor Gorbunov says." [*SS* X, 174; *The Brothers Karamazov*, Book Eleven, ch. IX]

It should be noted that Ivan's conversation with the devil is full of images of cosmic space and time: "quadrillions of kilometers" and "billions of years," "whole constellations," etc. All these cosmic magnitudes are mixed together here with elements of the most immediate present-day reality ("the actor Gorbunov") and with details of local setting and everyday life—all that is organically combined under the conditions of carnival time.

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玫瑰门

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

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出版发行：作家出版社　　电话：5005588转
社址：北京农展馆南里10号
印刷：煤炭工业出版社印刷厂
经销：新华书店北京发行所
开本：850×1168　1/32
字数：364千
印张：16.25　　插页：10
版次：1989年6月北京第1版第1次
ISBN 7-5063-0228-4/I·227(平)
ISBN 7-5063-0229-2/I·228(精)
定价：7.25元(平)　10.25元(精)

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些人类的耳髓的积攒，一些淡黄的、淡灰的块状和片状物。姑爸对着阳光仔细辨认，看来她要根据它们的形象和成色确认出它们的出处。

这是一个大千世界的花名册，一个人类的博物馆。她提取了人之精华，人，仅此而已。原来人和他们生存的世界都装在了这个小瓶里。

姑爸终于从瓶里找出了眉眉。她高兴地笑了，那笑容里分明还有几分歉意。

“找到了，你在这儿。你看你看。”她把小瓶举到眉眉眼前，“看见了吧，那一小块发白的，看见了吗？”

眉眉看着小瓶，但她看不见自己。也许她看见了自己却又不敢确认。人长得太像了，她想。

姑爸深信眉眉找到了自己。她舒心地望着眉眉，将小瓶放进荷包，将荷包揣进裤腰，然后抱歉似地端起裤子盆交给眉眉：“洗吧，就坐在这儿。我喜欢自家人。”

眉眉站在院里的铅丝下开始晾裤子，她踮起脚尖，双手举着它们向上蹦跳，布片终于在铅丝上排成了一串。晚夏的晨风把它们鼓动起来，它们在她头顶上飘泊，散发着隐约可见的丝丝热气。太阳温柔着它们，也温柔着眉眉微红的双手。

7

司猗纹是出来买早点的。她原打算买完早点就回家，却在早点铺里改变了主意。

现在八点刚过，早点铺已清静下来，柜台上只剩几个零散的焦圈和蜜麻花。豆浆还有，也见了锅底，散发出糊锅味儿。但她还是买了一个焦圈儿两个蜜麻花，又要了一碗甜豆浆，坐在

临街窗前忍着焦糊味儿细细地喝起来。

从前她没有上街吃早点的习惯，早晨铺子里的人摩肩擦踵你进我出，仿佛使人连食物也来不及咽。赶上人少坐在这儿就更扎眼。今天她的举动连她自己也有点意外。这举动有点像躲着谁背着谁：是儿子庄坦儿媳竹西？他们早就自顾自地吃了排骨汤烩饭推车出了门；是宝妹？用不着。那么是外孙女眉眉。

眉眉的到来无论如何总要迫使她改变点什么的——虽然她首先要迫使眉眉改变。在饭桌上她不顾竹西的反对给她讲"能"与"不能"，连洗脸的姿势也得给她纠正。这孩子洗脸太不讲究，大捧大捧地往脸上捧水，洗起来扑噜扑噜地弄得满屋子响。刷牙也不文明，牙膏沫子溢一脸。那么，她的那些不讲究和她对她的纠正，也用不着使她躲躲闪闪地坐在这里喝浆吃焦圈。她吃着，喝着，终于找出了原因：她愿意自己清静一会儿。现在她觉得全北京、全中国实在都失去了清静。大街小巷，商业店铺，住家学校，机关单位……都翻了个过儿，一向幽静的公园也成了批斗黑帮的场所。坐在理发馆你面前不再是镜子里的你自己，镜子被一张写着"小心你的发式，小心你的狗头"的红纸盖住。连中档饭庄"同和居"也被小将们砸了牌子，限令他们只卖两样菜：熬小白菜和"蚂蚁上树"。现在司猗纹觉得全北京全中国只有这个小门脸还没人注意，早晨照样是油饼儿糖饼儿，焦圈豆浆；中午和晚上照样是馄饨和豆包。只有进入这个小门脸你才会感到原来世界一切都照常，那么你自然而然地就会端着破边儿的碗盘坐下了。

司猗纹图个清静却没有忘记外孙女，她准备给她剩一个蜜麻花带回去，这不能不算圆满。

司猗纹端起碗小口喝着豆浆，忘记用勺子搅起沉在下面的

白糖。白糖在碗底汪着，糊锅味儿总也遮不下去。直到快喝完时，豆浆才变得齁儿甜。这时她也才发现原来她独占的这张方桌很脏，到处是芝麻粒、烧饼渣，用过的碗筷也没人收。而她就好像正在别人遗留下的汤汤水水和仰翻的碗盘里择着吃，这使她自己这份吃食也变成了残渣余孽，连这份残渣余孽也像是谁给她的一份许可。也许这就是一个小铺的风度人们的一种习以为常。但司猗纹不行，司猗纹在眼前这个"许可"里感到的是一份狼狈，刚才心中那些许的安静就立刻变成了桌上那一片覆地翻天。

那么，干脆就再来一碗。

多年来司猗纹练就了这么一身功夫：如果她的灵魂正厌弃着什么，她就越加迫使自己的行为去爱什么。她不能够在她正厌恶这脏桌子时就离开它，那就像是她的逃跑她的不辞而别。现在她需要牢牢地守住这桌子，守住她的狼狈，继续喝她的糊豆浆。这是一场争斗，一场她和脏桌子糊豆浆的争斗。她终于战胜了它们，成了这场争斗的胜利者。过量的豆浆使她有点恶心，使她那从来都很健康的胃有点发胀。她松垮着自己，又挺起胸作了一个"拔高"，让豆浆在肚里尽快下沉。然后她掏出手绢掸掸嘴和手，扭头打量起窗外街上的行人。

整个北京现在才真正苏醒。像每天一样，年轻人绿的军装红的袖章又猛然在大街小巷汹涌起来。它们正打破一切人的美梦一切人的图安静，它们也正在提醒司猗纹：你别以为这个背静得与世隔绝的小铺有什么与众不同，你面前这张又脏又可爱的桌子你的焦圈蜜麻花和外边只隔着一层玻璃，这玻璃只需轻轻一击就会粉碎，就会和外边变为一个世界。现在我们不打破它是顾不上它的存在，顾不上它的存在就等于顾不上你的存在，

但顾不上并不等于这儿没有你。

司猗纹分明看见几个小将冲这玻璃轻蔑地瞥了一眼，她相信他们看见了她的存在，看见她正拿着手绢在这儿旁若无人地掸嘴。她躲开了那眼光，迅速作了个侧身动作将自己背到一个那眼光所达不到的地方。

如果前些天他们的抄家、破旧只给她带来了惊恐和一丝苟且偷安的幻想，那么此刻这眼光已经告诉她，她将在劫难逃。今天你坐在这儿喝豆浆嫌糊嫌桌子脏，明天我们就会打碎这块玻璃把你拽出来让你跟我们在街上"散散步"。那时的你就不再是拿着手绢掸嘴的你，这块破玻璃将把你划个满脸花，你就带着这满脸花去跟我们经经风雨、见见世面。

司猗纹懵了。

司猗纹恍然大悟了。

司猗纹从桌前站起，待一队红绿人马走过去之后，才把留给眉眉的那只蜜麻花包起来走出店门。她听见前边又传来了"要革命的站出来，不革命的滚他妈蛋"的口号声。那口号很瘆人，就像她听见小将们抄家破旧时有人被打得惨叫时那样瘆人。然而司猗纹到底有"功底"，面对这瘆人的口号她需要的是洗耳恭听，听出些滋味听出点感情。果然，听着听着她就觉出了它的几分可爱；原来他们喊的正是她的日夜梦想，也许不仅是梦想，那应该是她的发明，她的一个被别人盗用了的发明。

在旧社会刚告结束、新社会尚在开始阶段，司猗纹就在心里默念这口号了。像她，一个旧社会被人称作庄家大奶奶的、在别人看来也灯红酒绿过的庄家大儿媳，照理说应该是被新社会彻底抛弃和遗忘的人物。然而她憎恨她那个家庭，憎恨维护她那个家庭利益的社会，她无时无刻不企盼光明，为了争得一

份光明一份自身的解放，她甚至诅咒一切都应该毁灭——大水、大火、地震……毁灭得越彻底越好。于是新中国的诞生与她不谋而合了。

但是新政权并不是属于她的，“受压迫”“求解放”这些概念用于她也不尽贴切。那么她要生存得合情合理她要与新社会同步，必得另辟蹊径。于是她苦思冥想便想出了一个最适用自己的新口号：站出来。站出来是面对这政权的一个新姿态，站出来是面对从前那个庄家大奶奶的一次脱胎换骨，站出来又意味着你必须先付出点什么。不久她找到了这种付出的形式，她发现这个政权最最欢迎最最提倡的便是劳动。好像当时报上登的、会上讲的、书上写的、歌中唱的都是劳动：劳动生产，生产劳动，劳动光荣，劳动神圣，人类解放靠劳动，劳动能把人类解放。“发动了机器轰隆隆地响，举起铁锤响丁当，造成犁锄好生产，造成枪炮送前方……”都是劳动。于是劳动使人脸上放出了红光，脸上淌下了汗水。于是全新的人，全新的形象出现了。她就在那个脸上淌着汗水放着红光的队伍里发现了自己。

那么她“站出来”了。

其实劳动对于庄家这位大奶奶也并不新鲜，她从来没在劳动面前偷闲认输，从前连下人老妈子干的活儿她也没少干。为了拯救几经沉沦的庄家，司猗纹表现了少有的忘我精神。自然，聪明的司猗纹并没有把那时的劳动和现时新政权的号召划等号。那时你劳动了，并不等于你现在就是个名副其实的劳动者了，为了变成一个全新的劳动者你还得“站出来”去表现一点什么。你的劳动不该再是关起门来为拯救庄家而费劲耗力，也不该再是仅仅为了自己的糊口。是为了什么？对，解放全人类，为了解放全人类才必得先去糊口。现在你要走出家门处处像个

普通劳动者，像个街道老娘儿们那样去亮相，甚至用她们的口音她们的说话方式去说："有缺人手的地方就言语声儿，为新中国出力我什么活儿都愿意干，闲着能把人闷死。"

司猗纹站出来了。

新中国接纳了司猗纹这个劳动者。

糊纸盒。她手下是点心盒，火柴盒，粉笔盒，鞋盒，粉盒。洋钉、大头针、螺丝杆螺丝帽、子母扣都得有盒。

锁扣眼儿。洋布、卡其布、华达呢、褡裢绒、人造棉，做成的衣服都要有扣眼儿。海军呢、凡尔丁、派拉蒙、嘎别丁都要变成衣服，扣眼儿都得由人来锁。

砸鞋帮。她手下是大人鞋，小孩鞋，老头鞋，小脚鞋……尖口的，圆口的，礼服呢的，冲服呢的，小帆布的，双道梁的，骆驼鞍儿的——是鞋就得有帮儿。

突然，她面前出现一个革命首长家庭，那是坐落在一条高深胡同里的一个高深院子。现在她不是这院子的主人她也不姓司，她姓吴，叫吴妈。这是她给自己的改名换姓，一个必要的改名换姓。"吴"音为"无"，此刻没有真的她自己，她从来都是一个专在有身分人家做用人的有身分的用人。她的料理家务的风度很快就赢得了这院子的男女主人——男女首长的称赞，他们放心地把院子把各个房间亮给她，那女主人范同志领她在院里参观，告诉她这院子是多么幽深。她毕恭毕敬地跟着范同志"开眼"，心想，没见过世面的土八路，不就是个两进的四合院么。可他们相信她。

可惜不久范同志就交给她一个大而薄的信封，并告诉她，有了它她就不必来"上班"了。她被辞退了，那信封里有多给她一个月的工资。辞退的原因当然不是她缺乏料理才能；干部们

都懂得哪种问题只能传达到哪个范围，那么她的问题自然不便于传达到她这个范围。但吴妈(不，她又成了司猗纹)——司猗纹心里明白，对于革命阵营内级别不低的首长来说，用人政治方面的可靠比业务方面的内行更为重要。

现在她正站在黑板前、讲桌后。她面前是背手端坐的小学生，她正教他们读笔顺写字。

“横、竖、勾、撇、横、横折勾、捺。”

“撇、点、竖、竖勾、横折竖、勾。”

她抑扬顿挫地朗读着这些不连贯的代表着汉字笔顺和形象的汉字，就像在朗读自己解放自己的颂歌。至今司猗纹每每回忆起她和孩子们的那些朗读，还总觉得那是她一生中最纯净、最美好的日子。虽然短暂，但印象深刻。从孩子们的眼光里，从那些听课老师们的眼光里她得到的安慰胜过了她一生中所有的安慰。放学后她捧回一摞摞作业本，在饭桌上摊开，一手握笔一手随便抓点什么吃着，彻夜批改着孩子们的作业。她字迹秀丽工整，批语准确。她还提倡孩子们读好书，她最提倡的一本课外读物就是《红孩子爱红旗》。

也许就是从那些信赖的眼光里，从自己那秀丽工整的字迹里，从她提倡的《红孩子爱红旗》里，司猗纹看到了自己更光明的前景。她觉得已经彻底“站出来”的她自己，能力远不是这些“横、撇、点、捺”，远不是手下这摞作业本。在那个童声奶气的小天地里，她应该是班主任，应该是教导主任，应该是校长。对，权且就先是校长吧。她决心和一位刚脱下二尺半军装、把“孤注一掷”念成“抓住一扔”的军转干校长较量一番。那工夫她像是着了魔，为了表现她的领导才能，她甚至时时事事抢先，抢先到有点可疑地走在校长前面，提前进入了“角色”。但是她

失败了。她不仅没有占领这块在她看来也许是鸡毛蒜皮的天地，就连站在黑板前的她也消失了。她再次得到一个大信封（比上次厚些），回了响勺胡同。信封里是她一年的薪水，一年是三百六十五天。

她沉默了，或者说暂时强迫自己沉默了。她从前是什么现在还是什么。从前是一个家庭妇女，现在仍然是一个妇女在家庭中；从前是一个单个儿，现在还是单个儿一个。

一个做过大奶奶的家庭妇女没有从那个大奶奶所在的家庭里站出来，因此她最惧怕的是"家庭妇女"这四个字。

庄晨送来眉眉的那天就勾起过她的无名火。

现在她又面对"站出来"这个口号了。这口号使她忽然觉悟：原来最应该和这场运动亲近的还是她，而运动的对象应该是扔给她大信封的范同志的丈夫和范同志，是那个把"孤注一掷"念成"抓住一扔"的校长。现在他们叫什么？他们叫黑帮叫走资本主义道路的当权派，为了叫起来方便最近已简称为走资派。原来不允许她站出来的不是别人正是他们，是他们不许她成为一个劳动者，不许她把一颗热忱的心奉献给新社会。原来世上的事物不是一成不变，目前黑帮、走资派既然已划定范围，范同志和她丈夫以及那"二尺半"校长，说不定早就被刚才走过的那些小将打翻在地踏上一只脚了。和时代同步的和前边那些红绿颜色同步的原来还是司猗纹。她感谢这个小铺这个脏桌子给了她启示。

前些天她还一边听着隔壁院里一位达先生的惨叫，一边魂不附体地从她那带廊子的大北屋搬进南屋，等着小将们也来抄她的家然后也把她踏上一只脚呢。原来她错了，既然那北屋、那北屋里所有家具，不应再归她所有，那么她就应该让它们走

得光明磊落，这才是"站出来"做事的一种气概，一种气派，一种气势。

由小铺回家的路上，司猗纹又走过了许多被堆放在胡同里暂时未能抬走的家具。司猗纹想：笨。她诅咒着家具，也诅咒着那家具的主人：笨。她知道这些家具都是在小将们对其主人制造过一场腥风血雨之后被抄到街上的。她看见深更半夜被打得嗷嗷叫的达先生门前就堆放着一张大漆八仙桌和两把红木太师椅，她想：笨。

司猗纹一路骂着人的笨和家具的笨，终于又迈进自家那高高的门坎，回到了自己的家中。她站在院里最后看了一眼房门紧闭的北屋，她觉得这应该是最后一眼，尽管北屋不会被人搬走。她回到她那稳妥的南屋。

眉眉正在里屋哄宝妹，司猗纹叫过眉眉，把蜜麻花递给她。

现在司猗纹要坐下来做两件事：她首先要给附近的小将写一封言辞谦恭、语气恳切的信，恳切要求他们在方便的时候来响勾胡同没收她的几间房子和一点属于她祖上的不劳而获的财物。她说这房子这财物本来早就应该回归制造过它们的阶级所有，然而她一直没有机会使它们归属它们的真正主人，这些东西早已成了压在她背上的沉重的包袱。这一天终于来到了，她时刻在恭候。写完信，她为上缴的东西开具了一纸详细清单，从房屋到家具件件明细。她相信她的行为是走在时代前面的。

在开列财物清单时，她遗漏了一对很有分量的金如意。这遗漏并非偶然，是她有意的安排。她遗漏它是为了让它更加出其不意地发光。

信和清单都发出去了，司猗纹在激动和不安中开始等待。

"要革命的站出来，不革命的滚他妈蛋！"

街上又有了口号。

8

司猗纹在焦急地等待来人，她把她等待的来人称作"他们"。

"他们来过吗？"司猗纹问眉眉。

其实司猗纹才去买了一趟早点，才去买了一趟菜，她知道在这点时间里他们不会来。

眉眉的回答便在预料之中了。

司猗纹一阵失望。

原先她本打算将家具们留在北屋随他们挑捡、随他们搬。现在她忽然觉得这种形式太含混，缺少应有的辉煌和分量。她就卖水果的都把水果高高摆在筐上，卖布头的打开包袱边倒腾边唱，都是为了给人一种感觉。感觉卖了你那货物的价值也就变了。现在她的大北屋就像是卖布头的不解包袱，卖水果的不打筐。

司猗纹想得合情合理想得情不自禁，就越发觉得行动宜早不宜迟，说不定他们一会儿就会闪电般地冲到你跟前，让你连个解包袱打筐的时间都没有。她大步流星奔进北屋，首当其冲地奔向那只巨大的紫檀木大理石面写字台，她想先把它调出屋去亮在明处。她双手兜住一个桌角奋力向上撬，才发觉她的力量和写字台的分量原来有着那么大的差别。那么，要实现她的计划她还需要人，她需要一批听她指挥的人。

司猗纹原本就有指挥一支队伍的气魄，她常常幻想着需要有人来帮她实现她那变幻多端的计策和她那时时冒着火花的"灵机一动"。过去她那几次和社会的较量，手头若是有了一把

“那是你只知道有一对，好像就不能有第二对。”

“那是怎么回事？”姑爸疑惑起来，把身子转向司猗纹。

“就不兴老太爷交给我一对，再埋一对？”

姑爸不说话了，狐疑地看着司猗纹，司猗纹又蜷曲着身子躺下来。那支“光荣”已抽到最后阶段，长长的一段烟灰仍然挺伸在上面，迟迟不往下落。姑爸觉得那烟灰就要掉在床上或者司猗纹身上，她最盼望的是掉在司猗纹的脖子里让司猗纹浑身一激灵。然而司猗纹那只夹着烟的手向着床外伸了过来，她轻轻弹着那段不长的香烟，烟灰落在了床前。姑爸心中一阵遗憾。她觉得床上这个蜷着身子的女人像个女妖，一个总能堵住她的嘴的女妖。而她需要的正是这样的女妖，时时、处处、事事都需要这样的女妖。她恨这女妖但她的手却不自主地在裤腰上摸索起来。

她摸索着，那个“月花月友”的小荷包又当啷了出来。她打开荷包又捏出了那套小玩意儿，她翘着小拇指捏紧它，蹑手蹑脚地向司猗纹走来。小玩意儿丁当地响着，她冲司猗纹弯下腰说：“掏掏吧！”

司猗纹的耳朵朝姑爸的大手凑了上去。

眉眉站在里屋的暗处向她们张望着，她听见自己的耳朵里有隆隆的风声。

13

人有时候愿意图清静，有时候愿意听动静。

在小饭铺图过清静的司猗纹，交了家具之后又在听动静了，这次她比等待“他们”的到来还迫不及待。现在她什么动静都需要，需要得简直有点像饥不择食。她最无法忍受的便是这

院子经过一场人声鼎沸之后的沉寂，这再也无人光顾的沉寂。原来这沉寂比运动本身更骇人。

目前响勺胡同的居民大多各有各的去处：有些人被通知参加街道的读报学习会，那些撇着八字脚的妇女们自备板凳、马扎优越地往居委会走，她们不交头不接耳不议论学习内容，好像彼此一开口就能走漏什么风声。这种超然的风度显出一种超然的高傲，高傲得使你不知她们的深浅。也有人在经历了一阵挂牌子游街之后，被通知去扫胡同扫厕所了。达先生和一位德国老太太各包了一个厕所，达先生包了一个男厕，德国老太太包了一个女厕。

德国老太太是一个中国地毯商的遗孀，那商人过早地去世，她却没再离开北京，既无后代也无亲人。

胡同和厕所被达先生和德国老太太摸索得异常干净。司猗纹每每看见这些开会读报的或者扫胡同扫厕所的男女们，就发现原来只有她什么也不是。她既不是那些提着板凳、马扎的优越者，也不是手持扫帚、簸箕的不优越者。这才使她又生出新的企盼：哪怕让这胡同里再多点比扫厕所更低下的活计，让干这活计的就是她呢，也比什么都不是好受。难道姑爸的话真应了验么，她看了许久风水(形势)却真没落着什么好下场。没人理你，搁着你，撂着你，还有比这下场更坏的下场吗？就像一句俗话："先搁那儿吧"，"先撂那儿吧"，司猗纹正在品尝这"搁"和"撂"的滋味儿，等着动静。

庄坦带来了动静。一天，他举回一方红袖章，并且告诉司猗纹这袖章就是属于他的——庄坦的，是庄坦的组织名正言顺地发给庄坦的。司猗纹接过了(差不多是夺过了)那袖章开始分析、辨认。这确是一方袖章，像所有袖章一样，红布黄字。那

字体也摹仿着现时最富时代感的毛体大草，字体奔放萧洒，布局合理又非凡。一切的一切都告诉司猗纹这是真的，它真就真在有色有字，真就真在这是一个被革命接纳了的证明，被革命验收过的一个标志。司猗纹一边掂量这红布，一边又在心里妒嫉着骂庄坦：这小子，看着不起眼儿，不知怎么搞的竟超过了你娘。这么说你在单位肯定不像你在家里这表现，让你搬家具你都避重就轻。

司猗纹展开袖章，双手把它举到明处，辨认那袖章上的大草字体。

袖章这东西作为一个特殊时代的特殊象征，开始出现时内容单纯、形式一致：一块红布三个黑字，开头一个“红”，当中一个繁写的“卫”，后面一个“兵”。那“兵”的双腿跨得很远，像在跑步。

如今的袖章名堂越来越多了，单在这三个字上就出了不少点缀。“八·一八”自不必说，那是正统。继“八·一八”之后又出现了在三个字之前冠以“主义”和“思想”的新样式，即人们常说的“主义兵”和“思想兵”。这类袖章尽管又有标新立异，但仍属正统，佩戴它们的仍是那些“老子英雄儿好汉”的“儿好汉”们。近来因适应革命形势发展的需要，这红布上的内容越来越复杂了。有的，在那堂堂正正三个大字的下方居然又出现了纽扣大的两个小字“外围”。若连起来读便是“红卫兵外围”，读简单点便是“红外围”。这当然就越出了正统，两个小字多少露出了鱼目混珠。这种东西自然不被“儿好汉”们放在眼里，可也无人干预。谁知革命形势还在发展，领袖还在不断挥手。形势越发展袖章的形式就越多，近来在有些红布上，那三个堂堂正正的大字竟然不见了，连纽扣大的两个小字也用不着了，毛体大草

摹仿得依然认真，但名称、内容却是人的新发明："从头越"、"虎山行"、"西风烈"、"南飞雁"、"缚苍龙"、"征腐恶"、"卫东彪"、"险峰"、"敢峰"、"卫东"、"红革"以及"傲霜雪"。司猗纹手中这块就是"傲霜雪"，这是她在经过这一阵仔细辨认之后确定的。

"傲霜雪"使司猗纹先是心里一沉，继之便又觉出这"傲霜雪"的合情合理。莫非司猗纹的儿子还能拿到一块最最纯正的、只有"儿好汉"们才能佩戴的物件？她应该满足。何止是满足，这也该换来一片欢腾了。这座像死了一样的小院因了这"傲霜雪"的光临，不是已经欢欣鼓舞起来了么。司猗纹又开始嘲弄自己的短见了：刚才还巴不得和德国老太太去扫什么厕所，甚至比扫厕所更低的活儿她都想干呢。现在好了，她可以举着它亮在这朗朗蓝天之下，当着苍天高呼：这已经用不着了，她手里有一方红袖章。在那高呼中，她自然也不会忘记这时运的转来也连着她那交出的房子、家具和那对神奇的金如意。她不相信儿子的天文馆不经调查他母亲的政治表现，就会把这方红布用别针别在儿子胳膊上。现在说这方东西属于儿子倒不如说是属于她。

司猗纹把它举进了院子，举给了苍天，举给了她那被封住门窗的北屋和院里的青砖漫地。她愿意让它们都知道，它们没有白白从司猗纹手中离去，司猗纹没有让它们白白地走，它们和她一样光荣。

她还应该做点什么？对，她最应该把它举到姑爸眼前，哪怕晃一下也好（也只能一晃而过），让这块红布使姑爸那双总在眯缝着的眼彻底睁开。我让你再说关于"下场"什么的话，要说下场，这红布就是下场。你快看看吧，看看这是什么下场吧，皇帝的坟茔里有它吗？



通常司猗纹的语录本摆在床头柜，后来她突然改放在迎门的饭桌上。

正好姑爸站在西屋门口捅炉子，捅着炉子，炉灰扑散一世界。她也不看身后站的是谁，手里拿的是什么，炉灰会往什么上面落。

司猗纹高举着它从姑爸头顶上一晃而过。见好就收——她就这么过去了。

姑爸仿佛觉出脑袋顶上有红光闪现。她原以为是炉中的火苗蹿过了头顶，可是她又意外地扫见了正迈着俏丽碎步走过去的司猗纹，原来是她手里那块红东西。姑爸看见司猗纹故意把手背在身后，让那红东西冲着她，就像戏台上旦角儿下台时手里捏着的手绢。就差给你配上小锣：呔呔呔呔……姑爸想。但姑爸深信那不是手绢，它不及手绢柔软，上面还有几个花哨的大黄字。莫非这是对司猗纹上缴家具的奖赏？今后她就将戴着它人前人后地蹿腾？却又不可能，目前关于一个无业游民老娘儿们戴袖章的事毕竟她还不曾得见。那么，这种极大的光荣也不会从她这里开始。这一定是她儿子庄坦的或者儿媳竹西的，这还差不多。可，他们？就他们？姑爸又否定了自己的肯定。谁不知道谁的家门儿？他们要有了那东西，全北京城的人不就都有了。那么，这是捡的，骑车在街上捡的。只有捡的才能落到你们南屋。

司猗纹身后飘着的红布就要在南屋门口消失了，姑爸不客气地指出了那东西的来历：

“捡的，街上捡的！”

她对东西对人都不加称谓，仅这六个字，对司猗纹一下子作了否定。司猗纹处事讲彻底，姑爸也讲彻底处事。

司猗纹听见了这斩钉截铁的六个字，这六个字也使她捌了一口气。但这次她没再生出和姑爸争论的欲望，她看见了里屋

的庄坦，也看见了里屋的竹西，她相信他们也听见了姑爸对这红布带有明显贬意的用语。她想把它抖落给他们，让他们去替自己屋里的事说句公道话。

司猗纹站在里屋门口，用力抖落那红布。

庄坦正在床上打盹儿，没发现母亲的举动。竹西正把宝妹大便，只向那红布轻瞥了一眼。这轻瞥顿时使司猗纹丧失了对这屋里人的指望，她已觉出竹西对她手中那东西的看法了。你们的事。她想。她把那红布往桌上一摔，眼前又出现了"傲霜雪"，那不折不扣的"傲霜雪"。她还意外地发现那字也根本不是什么郑重其事印上去的，那就像谁拿支毛笔蘸点黄色摹仿着毛体大草胡乱划上去的。这哪儿是什么正经草书，她自己信手划拉也不会划拉成这模样。那么，这个"傲霜雪"的组织也就可想而知了。戴上它到隆福寺去挤一圈还差不多，那儿人多都是买东西的，没人注意你胳膊上那是不是字。她想不出儿子怎么戴着它去上班。

"唉。"司猗纹长出了一口气。这是她许多天来第一次发出这种标志着自己不景气的感叹。

感叹之中她发现竹西还在里屋冲着门把宝妹大便，宝妹的屁股眼儿就正对着外屋的她。

宝妹从下生的那天起大便就不痛快。开始常常是几天不拉屎，一旦拉起屎来竟困难得四脚朝天、通宵达旦。小儿缓泻药什么都用过了；连大人用的硫酸镁也无济于事。后来竹西便想起用塞甘油栓的办法解决宝妹大便的难处。塞上那东西确能解决一点临时性问题，但每塞一次都是一场你死我活的战斗。一个小拇指粗细的栓塞进一个婴孩的屁股眼儿，那确是一种人间的惨无人道，但你为了对一个婴儿屁股眼儿的人道，还必得施

行一点必要的惨无人道。

眉眉来北京前，每逢宝妹大便都是竹西把"盆"司猗纹塞栓。那时司猗纹一做这事无名火便不打一处来。她觉得这就像竹西专给她添的一份不可多得的负担，摆弄宝妹的屁股她究竟要摆弄到何时？后来眉眉来了，这塞栓的任务就落在眉眉头上了。

现在竹西就坐着马扎把宝妹。她劈着她的两条腿，眉眉正给她塞栓。

宝妹不间歇地在竹西怀里哀号，汗水泪水濡湿了她那稀疏的头发。然而那栓还是因了那地方的干涩难以行进。眉眉面对宝妹，脸上也淌着汗水。她手软，每当这个时刻她总有一种感觉，她觉得那东西根本不存在塞到那里边去的可能，可她还是得闭眼狠心地往里塞。

"塞，使劲。"竹西催她。就像那被塞的不是一个人，而是一个人的模型。

面对这个什么都有的"模型"，眉眉还是手软。

"来，我扒着，你塞。"竹西为了减轻眉眉的困难又作了新的设计。

竹西终于为眉眉的塞创造了一个先决条件，眉眉手里那个小东西终于不见了。她庆幸着自己，还是觉出自己的残忍。她觉得舅妈使用的字很刺耳，手下的动作也太狠。但这又正是舅妈的果断——宝妹毕竟停止了嚎啕。竹西又熟练地将她的两腿并紧，使那东西在人体内稍作停留。片刻，宝妹那个干旱的机关果然变得润滑起来，堆积在里面的被人体抛弃的固体才随之崩出。它们弹球一般噼里啪啦落进便盆，一场战斗和一场战斗的配合才算告一段落。

过后竹西总是夸眉眉配合得默契。眉眉一面恐惧着自己一

面又企盼着下次配合的再次到来。因为舅妈夸了她。

如果说庄坦的"傲霜雪"扫了司猗纹的兴，那么刚才里屋的一切倒给她的生活又增添了点新的动机新的生机。她想，人活着就不容易。一个小孩尚且如此，何况她呢。如果人的一切非得用"塞栓"打比方，那么该塞就得塞。交家具她无疑是提前"塞"了一步，那么她现在为什么非要等动静，等一个屎到屁股门儿的动静呢？她应该做的是亲自把自己"塞"到那个可疑的街道上去，去打探去润滑那个滞塞了的部位。

于是她决定把自己塞进街道一次。她还找到了这塞的理由：她决定带眉眉去报户口。再说户口也该报了——每月的口粮，还有那珍奇的为人羡慕的半斤平价花生油。

不久她和眉眉就同时出现在街道办事处了。临行前她还是利用了一下庄坦的"傲霜雪"，她把它折好和户口本一起攥在手中。

那天办事处负责人不在，只有两个办事员在"办公"。司猗纹信手将红袖章和户口本都摆在桌上，恭恭敬敬地对他们说明来意。两位办事员什么也没说，很快就给她填好了一张临时户口卡。司猗纹从那块红布下面抽出户口本，办事员又在户口本上写上了暂住人口的一切，然后连本带卡一起交到她手中。一位办事员有意无意地扫了一眼司猗纹的红布，司猗纹不失时机地告诉他们说，这是庄坦的，刚才他出门时忘记带，她想追出去交给他，没追上。办事员像是听见了她的话，又像是根本没听，因为眉眉发现，就在司猗纹说袖章时，两个办事员正说着别的。

司猗纹走出居委会，觉得刚才的一切还是很值得回味一番的。她追忆着自己的谈吐，追忆着由她的谈吐所引起的办事员的每一个眼神每一个表情。后来她还是想到"傲霜雪"并没有白

带，她“塞”得顺利“崩”出的利索也许都和这个“傲霜雪”有关。原来“傲霜雪”就是甘油栓，有了它，才使她没在那个干涩的地方滞住。它怎么也是块红，眼下是红就是块润滑剂。

由此她又想到，你别以为那张小小的临时户口卡就是一张遍通卡片，你也别以为它就只趁半斤花生油；那不是眉眉的什么临时户口证明，那是司猗纹本人的一个“良民证”。它的到来才彻底证明了她在响勺的身分，原来她毕竟不是德国老太，她毕竟不是达先生。她为什么非要当他们？德、达二位，你们也去办一张“良民证”我看看。

司猗纹的回味到这里并没有结束，她还在为了弄清一个问题走得东摇西晃：既然那“傲霜雪”是甘油栓，那么谁是干屎蛋儿呢？她一时觉得干屎蛋儿应该是她，因为是她被顺利地“崩”出来了。可她又觉得为什么要这样对自己大不敬？那么干屎蛋儿应该是那两位办事员，有了她的“塞”才有了他们的松动；他们松动了那“良民证”才顺利地开出来了，那么干屎蛋儿是他们。可他们并没有被“崩”出来，于是她必得作出新的假设。那么，她的“良民证”才是干屎蛋儿。她需要从那里“崩”出来的是这个小纸片式的“良民证”，对，小纸片就是干屎蛋儿。她想确切了，走正确了。

眉眉的户口卡毕竟也给眉眉带来几分愉快，现在她才是一个北京人了。虽然她是临时的，还靠了那个半真半假的红袖章——但她是了。你总不能说婆婆不应该让她变成一个北京人吧。

路过胡同的公厕时司猗纹和眉眉都拐了进去，她们距离很远地蹲下来。眉眉发现婆婆的溺尿得很间断很散乱，像是没有什么东西可尿，又像是精神没有集中在这件事情上，她看见婆

婆的眼睛正在四处扫射，目光犀利地扫视着每个犄角旮旯。眉眉很快就办完了自己的事，她先走了出来站在门口等婆婆。

司猗纹是在扫视这间由德国人打扫的厕所。确切点说她不是在扫视，她是在审查、检查。她想，干净是干净，由此也看出了你们这些人在改造中的老实程度。可你们的劳动原来还是为了我们，我，这个揣着"良民证"的人。既是为了我，那么这里就得有我一份自由，在这里给你制造一点麻烦也就不算什么过分。想到这些，刚才她那个本无什么排泄欲望的自己，就生出了比刚才还要复杂的欲望。她带着这欲望，两条腿稍微向一边挪动了一点，只一小点，她感到自己的臀部挪到那个坑儿之外了……

她走出厕所，捋捋头发，仔细地抻着衣服，和眉眉一起回到家中。

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通常司猗纹的语录本摆在床头柜，后来她突然改放在迎门的饭桌上，并一再嘱咐眉眉不要动。

这是那次她们从街道办事处回来的事。

司猗纹的语录是大三十二开本，是语录尚不算热门时庄坦从他的天文馆带回的。司猗纹注意到了它的前途。不久这东西果真成了全社会的热门，版本形式越来越多，烫金的、镀膜的……但司猗纹还是守住了这本老三十二开，虽然这老三十二开连"再版前言"都没有。

司猗纹守着它是因为用旧了它。它被她翻卷了角，翻毛了边儿，每页都留下了司猗纹的气味。现在她更加热爱它了，因为她知道今后用它的时候会越来越多——从那天起她自信已经

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再也没有比你更适合听我说话的人了。但你在我眼前常常是模糊的你捕捉不定，我对你充满了猜测因为我无法靠近你。你离我不远不近的总是一声不吭，这就使你对我永远充满了魅惑。有时候我自以为很了解你说"眉眉那时候可真傻"什么的，但我并没真正弄明白一些事就好像有时候我根本就不知道我。

大约五岁时——你也许还记得，爸教我认闹钟，这对我来说是太困难了我好像天生的不识数，时针、分针和秒针怎么也弄不明白。爸教了我许多遍我一点也不懂，以至于我都为我不好意思了——那时候我还不知道那种心情叫不好意思。

苏眉你说的这事我记得。

你无法形容出你当时的心情，总之你是不愿意再不会下去于是你就说你会了。可是你没给自己留下退路你还不会给自己留退路，这常常使我嫉妒你又羡慕你。你没想到爸会立刻考你，他轻易地扭了一下哪个针问你你回答不出来，因为回答不出来你就故意含混不清地小声嘟囔像在说会了就是不告诉爸。爸却一眼看穿了你，他拍了一下桌子说你骗人你根本就不会。你那一片混沌的小脑袋瓜被吓开了窍，你哭着抽嗒着居然认准了钟点从此时间就走进了你的生活。

眉眉你别伤心我在揭你的短，这不是你的过错也许这是人类的过错。人类大声疾呼着灵魂的工程师们大声疾呼着真诚，正说明这世界的谎言太多欺骗太多伎俩太多。我常常觉得人类在呼唤什么想必就是什么已经穷尽，可我却又常常怀疑那呼吁者本身的真诚能有几分。我仿佛看见了那些煞有介事地怕受孩子欺骗的大人，你企盼着别人的真意好在那一片真情之上顺利

用好看形容，有的可以形容为漂亮，有的简直就是完美的化身。但一个裸体的竹西再也没有出现过，因为那裸体终未被眉眉想出合情合理的比喻。

她觉得作家写不出人体的美，就因为想不出最恰如其分的比喻，他们大多去就"事"论"事"。

历代画家那仅有的几幅人体成功之作，或许都有人体之外的一个比喻吧。真正的比喻是不容易的，苏眉想。

里屋撩水，外屋的司猗纹就睡不着。她最不愿听见里屋这轻快、惬意的撩水声，她觉得她们的合作本身就是对她的一种轻蔑。每逢竹西容光焕发地端盆出屋后，司猗纹就开始喊眉眉。

司猗纹喊眉眉说让眉眉睡觉，其实她知道眉眉从来不睡午觉。她喊她是为了告诉竹西、是她那不可少的卫生澡妨碍了别人的午睡。尽管竹西不是每天中午回家、但司猗纹还是觉得竹西一回来家里一切都得翻个过儿：那盆，那水，眉眉眼前那一切……

竹西很快就上班去了，现在才是司猗纹正式午睡的时候。

司猗纹躺下了，眉眉搬把小椅子来到院里。她坐在枣树下，膝盖上摊着一团乱毛线，开始她那没有名堂的编织。竹签子在手里笨拙地扭动着，她从来也不知道她究竟要织什么。她只是愿意在枣树下坐着，看看枣树，想点自己愿意想的事。或许她还有点为婆婆着想：万一再有点动静呢——婆婆所希望的动静，有了枣树下的她，婆婆就不再措手不及了，省得她再找鞋拿语录地手忙脚乱。

青枣在一股股树枝上很沉，把树枝压得很低，有的垂到房顶，有的垂过屋檐。

不时有青枣从枝上掉下来溅在青砖地上，很响。

完成你的欺骗。特别是当我在猜测你的时候眉眉，我不能不觉得撒谎才是人类后天不可逆转的捍卫自己的本性，或者说是人类捍卫自己的武器，是人类灵魂铺张在人类眼前的永远的屏障。

大人拼命地要求孩子别撒谎多半是怕自己受孩子骗；孩子有时候不撒谎是没料到不撒谎会给他带来怎样的恶果。当你站在"红卫"副食店丧失了记忆耽误了"好多年"的时候你首先想到告诉婆婆你跑了好多好多商店。说这是一个谎还不如说是对你那常人所不知的"记忆空白"的遮挡那原本就用不着公诸于众。

你在肯定撒谎吧苏眉。

肯定或者否定对于撒谎本身并无意义，我只说它是人类后天的创举是流在人类命脉中的永不衰竭的血。它的源远流长使人们常常弄不清自己是在说真话还是说假话，有时候人们向社会向亲朋拼命剖白自己剖白得越淋漓尽致的时候正是他的谎言隐匿得越深的时刻。那虚假的透明和造作的坦荡欺侮着真切的混沌逼它就范，好像那些纸花蜡果，那些在科技高度发达的今天脱颖而出的假鼻子假头发假睑假睫毛，那些特别特别明净漂亮的、反映着大街上一切五光十色的行人、车辆、门窗和道路的钢化玻璃的建筑物们。你冲着一扇四敞的大门走去结果你被撞在钢化玻璃上，你被撞疼时才知道那不是门。要是你没撞在玻璃上而是撞在"玻璃棉花"上你一点儿也不疼，你还会拼命往里进么？

要是你的触觉麻木了碰在玻璃上不觉得疼，没准儿你会认为你本来就是朝着门里进，你没能进去那不怪眼前的"门"那怪你，只有怪你。也许是你的姿势不对，也许是第一步迈错了腿，也许是没找着进门的要领。总之毛病出在你身上你不能怀疑眼前

是门不是门。你拿起一个蒙着白霜的真极了的蜡柿子咬一口真是味同嚼蜡，但这不怪柿子也只有怪你，想必是你没咬对地方，没咬出技巧所以你的嘴有毛病，你得好好查查舌苔是不是太厚，味觉系统嗅觉系统是不是已经老化。也许是牙齿不帮忙其实没经咀嚼就把蜡柿子吞咽了下去。任何食物囫囵吞咽也不可能出味儿——注意：尽管你在自己身上找原因已经找得相当彻底，但你的叙述语言还是有致命的缺陷：你管蜡柿子叫蜡柿子。既然毛病出在你嘴里你就不能说柿子是蜡的。那么我立刻修正我的口误：它不可能是蜡柿子，不再是蜡柿子，如同玻璃墙面不是反映对面的门，而是：它本身就是对面的门。因为它们假得太真了，这种由虚假锻造出的真实太圆满太坚硬，你不可怀疑你别无他路。你的一切忏悔、内疚和自责只能建立在对这些假得都真了的真实的捍卫上。于是你管蜡柿子叫蜡柿子就是撒谎，你得时时磨砺你的味觉才是。

苏眉你说让我们都把蜡柿子当真柿子，那真柿子谁去吃？要是让我吃一肚子蜡我就不敢喝粥喝热汤了。我知道蜡遇热就会熔化，蜡汁在我的胃和肠子里流动起来当粥和汤冷却之后蜡又凝固了，我没有缝隙我该怎么呼吸！

你可以撒谎这时你只有撒谎。当蜡汁就要冷却就要封闭你呼吸的缝隙时为什么你还不敢撒谎呢？所有的人都告诉过你撒谎是世界上最恶劣的品质，可是蜡汁就要封闭你的呼吸了就要弥漫你赖以生存的五脏六腑，你必须偷偷吃一点——我们暂且不叫它真柿子，叫它有柿子味儿的柿子或者我们干脆说它是假柿子。你必须偷着吃一点这种假柿子这种偷吃就是撒谎。但这个谎使你的肠道通畅了，这种偷偷的品尝是多么令人厌恶又令人陶醉。你陶醉着就更加厌恶，你厌恶着就更加陶醉。你把你藏

了起来给你的灵魂留下一痕缝隙，为了捍卫这一痕缝隙的存在权利你必须在大庭广众之下拼命吃蜡柿子以表示你太爱那蜡的。你的胃难受了膨胀了横膈膜痉挛着，你不正视这是蜡的缘故却认为这恰是撒谎带给你的惩罚。于是你又心安理得起来：蜡柿子的惩罚与偷吃真柿子的"谎"相抵销了谁也不欠谁。

你自己并不明白这一切，通常你的那个你并不知道你自己。

还记得二年级时听一个抗日的儿童团长讲打鬼子的故事，他说他们村儿离公路八里地，他不用望远镜凭闻味儿就知道鬼子的汽车正从公路上过。因为汽车一过就有汽油味儿，汽油味儿越过七、八里地飘进村，半天也散不去。这可真是乡村的嗅觉。如今大小汽车大小拖拉机整天在村里跑，我真想再问问那老团长他还能闻见什么味儿。信息时代把人都变成了人精可是人精的嗅觉味觉都不灵。不过也可以不这么说，信息时代的嗅觉早就不靠儿童团长那老一套了，不靠那站在八里地之外闻味儿的原始的、愚昧的、蠢笨的、滑稽的经验之谈。

还记得你短暂的小学时代是一个充满着发现坏人、报告警察抓坏人的时代，许许多多少先队员与坏人作斗争的故事激励着你，鼓舞着你去注意大街上每一个可疑的行人。什么是可疑？在你看来最可疑的人就是镶着金牙的人，因为在电影和小说里镶金牙的都是坏人，好人怎么会镶金牙呢好人的牙完美无缺。有一次在妈带你去北京的火车上，你一路扭着脸不回答对面座位上那个大人的问话就因为他嘴里有颗金牙。你简直差点就去报告乘务员了可直到下车你也没吭声，你和镶金牙的人分了手那时你真恨自己胆小为什么不去报告？说不定就因为你没报告那人在北京又做了什么坏事。一个小小的你对大大的北京生出

了那么多真切的焦虑，可也说不定那焦虑的背后藏着报告了警察就能得到表扬的渴望呢，但是你不知道。你不知道想报告是真还是想表扬是真，也许都是真的那镶金牙的人真地给你带来了恐惧和不愉快。只是人类无法澄清自己，任何时代也无法使人类澄清自己。

让我们还说金牙。有一次丁妈从农村来虽城（那时我知道丁妈是谁了）在家里住了好几天。她带来了农村的大枣、核桃、嫩玉米，这些都是你爱吃的东西同时丁妈又那么勤快，给你们拆洗被褥做棉袄，给你们煮玉米砸核桃。她嘴里就有一颗金牙那时你没想到她可能是坏人么？

我没想到，我喜欢丁妈所以我没想到她是坏人。我只盼望她隐藏那金牙比如笑的时候别咧那么大嘴。我还不愿意在那些日子有同学来家里不愿让她们看见丁妈的牙，因为她们不一定喜欢她说不定就会去报告。每逢这时我就想也许是我坏了，我这么轻易就背弃了有金牙就是坏人的主张。我甚至还盼她笑时别咧嘴这不是包庇么？可我为什么喜欢她？因为我喜欢她我就得跟人说不喜欢她我必得否定那真正让我眼馋的东西。

到底是你的灵魂欺骗了你的精神眉眉，幸亏你的灵魂还会还能欺骗你的精神。有个名人说假使我们从小就被告知豆子便是肉，于是我们没完没了地吃豆子还以为是在吃肉。但豆子只能使你的胃膨胀却不能给你营养；你挺着一只膨胀的胃走来走去却仍然感到饿，你需要营养你的胃营养你的心灵你总得找点真正的肉——关键是你寻找真正营养的欲望没有泯灭，这欲儿望便是你灵魂的渴求。我庆幸你没有彻头彻尾地认为胃原本就该膨胀，而且在偷偷寻找那解脱膨胀的办法。所以偷偷地寻找是因为“豆子便是肉”是当时的真理。你游离了真理于是你偷偷了

你鬼祟了你阴暗了你不忠诚。灵魂真实了精神就得受折磨，再说人的精神的力量虽然强大却常常笼罩着灵魂的阴影，灵魂是精神的阴影的确是个阴影。

你的话很混乱甚至前后矛盾。你鼓励我撒谎但我从来不觉得撒谎是好事，有时我说谎是迫不得已苏眉。

可是从来没人鼓励、强迫你撒谎啊，相反人们千遍万遍警告你的句子是"别骗人"，这种消极的规则或者说禁令为什么会使你觉出迫不得已？我不想听什么关于伟大的谎言和卑下的谎言的那种分析，谎与谎之间的确有本质的不同。我想说的是藏匿灵魂的谎那种捍卫灵魂自由的谎，也许它本不该被称作谎它是灵魂勇猛的卫士；也许它才是不折不扣的最纯最地道的谎，它欺骗一切有时候也迈着怯怯的步子想蒙骗灵魂却总是败下阵来，它不是灵魂的对手。而灵魂之所以那么顽固是因为它太自爱，它无视世界的存在所以你必须扼制你的灵魂。那首歌是怎么唱的：

从前的一切我可以不再提起，
但我却永远不会忘记。

(苏)新登字 007 号

树 与 石

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责任编辑:黄小初

出版发行:江苏文艺出版社(邮政编码:210009)
经　　销:江苏省新华书店
印 刷 者:扬州印刷总厂

850×1168 毫米　1/32　印张 10.75　插页 2
字数:240,000　1996 年 1 月第 1 版第 1 次印刷
印数:1—10,000 册

标准书号:ISBN 7—5399—0890—4/I・853
定　　价:13.00 元

(江苏文艺版图书凡印刷、装订错误可随时向承印厂调换)

迷 舟

一九二八年三月二十一日，北伐军先头部队突然出现在兰江两岸。孙传芳部守军 31 师不战而降。北伐军迅速控制了兰江和涟水交接处的重镇榆关。孙传芳在临口大量集结部队的同时，抽调精锐之师驻守涟水下游棋山要塞。棋山守军所属 32 旅旅长萧在一天深夜潜入棋山对岸的村落小河，七天后突然下落不明。萧旅长的失踪使数天后在雨季开始的战役蒙上了一层神秘的阴影。

引 子

萧接到师部给他的秘密指令是四月七日的上午。师部

让他率32旅驻守棋山对岸的小河村落。这个仅有几十户农家的村落像犄角一样突出在涟水拐道的河口，是一个理想的防御地点。按照师部的命令他必须于九日凌晨潜入小河村，尽快查明那里可以知道的一切详细情况。师部提醒他：既然我部已注意到这片没有遮掩的神秘区域，同样，北伐军对它也不会无动于衷。就在萧准备渡船出发的前夕，发生了一件意想不到的事。

四月八日，闷热的午后阳光使人恹恹欲睡。萧在涟水岸边的柳林里骑马独行。他经过棋山北坡谷底一片炫目的军用帐篷时，一匹枣红色的马追上了他。

警卫员拽住马的缰绳斜侧在萧的左边。阳光正对着他，他的双眼不能完全睁开，警卫员在还没有完全安静下来的枣红马上挺了挺身体，迅疾地举起右手掠过帽沿：

有一位老太在旅部等着见你。

萧继续稳稳地朝前遛了几步才拨回马头。天太闷热了，凉风越过山脊，从他的头顶上滑过，北坡谷底的空气是凝固的。警卫员还站在原地，他没有伸手捋掉脸上不断滚动的汗珠，而是怔怔地看着萧，等待着他的答复。

“你想个法把她支走——”萧不耐烦地挥了挥手，警卫员驱马朝前走了几步，压低嗓门怯怯地说：

“她，说是从小河来的。”

萧漫不经心地扫了他一眼，没有答腔。他已经策马朝旅部疾走，警卫员在离他十丈左右的尘土中紧紧跟随着。战争使他厌倦了那些令人心烦的琐事。他知道，因为战争中的阵亡，士兵的家属突然出现在指挥部里是司空见惯的，这些捏着写有儿子和丈夫姓名字条的陌生面孔会提出一些荒

唐的要求：索取遗物或打听士兵临终前的种种细节。由于这支没有番号的部队从来没有保留任何阵亡将士的名册，这些可怜的百姓常常在下级军官的叱骂声和枪托的威逼下悻悻离去。尽管萧所在的师是一支精锐的嫡系部队，他也不得不常在供给奇缺的情况下在前沿阵地作战。他的部下有时像夜与昼一样更替得非常彻底，一群仅玩过鸟枪的庄稼人也被临时招募来履行最艰巨的狙击使命。在这几乎和以前一样寂静的午后，对即将开始的大战的某种不祥的预感紧紧地困扰着他。



萧捏着马鞭走进旅部临时指挥所时，一眼就认出了这位来自故乡的老人。她是村子里的媒婆马三大婶。他离开家从军只有短短的几年，这位风流热情充满活力的女人一下子变老了。马三大婶对于村里大部分青壮男人的诱惑和慷慨大度曾引起女人间无穷无尽的纠纷。在战争的间隙中，

她常常成为萧对故乡往事回忆的纽结。马三大婶是来向他报告他父亲的死讯的。

他的父亲一天傍晚在灶下生火，呛鼻的回烟使他想起很久没有捅一下烟囱了。这位七十八岁的老人颤巍巍地拿着一根绑满稻草的竹竿爬上了屋顶。他在踩碎了三片瓦和两根烂椽后，摔死在灶屋的水缸里。萧在媒婆尖细的嗓门几乎是滑稽地描述了父亲的死之后，显得格外的平静。他没有丝毫突兀的恐惧和悲痛的感觉。他简略地回忆了一下父亲生前的时光，就向警卫员要来一支烟抽。他划火柴的手指有些颤抖，他知道，那不是源于悲痛而是睡眠不足。萧旁若无人地走出了指挥所，朝着系马的一棵老杨树走去，萧在解马缰的时候听到了身后脚步踩乱草丛的声响。那是警卫员不安地跟了出来。萧回过头狠狠地瞪了他一眼，警卫员不由得止住了脚步。

已是黄昏时分，他独自一个人骑马从北坡登上了棋山的一个不高的山头。连日梅雨的间隙出现了灿烂的阳光。浓重的暮色将涟水对岸模糊的村舍染得橙红。谷底狭长的甬道中开满了野花。四野空旷而宁静。他回忆起往事和炮火下的废墟，涌起了一股强烈的写诗的欲望。他的父亲是小刀会中为数不多的幸存者，也是绝无仅有的会摆弄洋枪的头领之一，他的战争经历和收藏的大量散失在民间的军事典籍使萧从小便感受到了战火的气氛。萧的梦中常常出现马的嘶鸣和隆隆的炮声。终于有一天，他走到父亲身边询问他为什么投身于一支失败的队伍，父亲像是被碰到了痛处，他的回答却是漫不经心的：从来就没有失败或者胜利的队伍，只有狼和猎人。母亲是一个谨小慎微的女人。对

她来说，连绵不断的战争和孩子们突然长大使她寝食不安。他哥哥去黄埔军校的前夕，母亲哭得死去活来，她大声叱骂丈夫的放纵和对于战争的荒唐的预料而将儿子送上绝路。她突然变得专横和坚强起来。她将瘦弱的兄长和两只山羊一起关了三天。第三天深夜萧偷来了坚固的木栅栏门锁上的钥匙。他哥哥几乎没跟他说什么话就踏着月光走了，当时他的父母正在熟睡。后来，母亲担心萧会走上他兄长相同的道路，就雇来一只小船将他送到了繁华的榆关镇，让萧跟他的一位表舅学医。那是一个炎热的夏季。萧从哥哥出走的一连串麻烦中积蓄了经验。当萧准备跟孙传芳的一位部将当勤务兵时，他穿着浆得笔挺的衣衫回到村子里。他的无声的告别使母亲误以为他是去邻村相亲。

暮色四合。凉爽的晚风吹来了涟水河潮湿的气息。他的白马在山头不安地躁动着，四蹄刨着泥土。和他遥遥相对的村子已经淹没在黑暗之中了。他的白马在跃下山坡的时候，他想起了前些日子在师部开会时听到的战报：三月二十一日攻占榆关的恰恰是他哥哥的部队。

第一天

萧和警卫员是拂晓渡河的。他们的船到达对岸时听到了村中传出的第一声鸡叫。萧将小船划向岸边垂落下来的枝叶繁盛的晚茶花丛，那是藏船的好地方。汩汩的流水轻轻地摇动着小船，一只黑色的水鸟倏地飞出，沿河岸低飞

而去。萧在挂满露珠的藤蔓中觉察到了一丝凉意，浓郁的花香和水的气息使他心中充满了宁静的美妙遐想。他对这个美丽的村落不久以后给他带来的灾难一无察觉。

萧上岸后经过一片密密的竹林进入他所熟悉的村舍。村子的背后是西沉的弦月，东方曙河欲晓。在井边打水的女人没有认出他来。偶尔也有一些早起的老人咳嗽着从他身边走过，消失在薄雾里。村民对陌生人早已没有了兴趣，他们只是对补锅的风箱、弹棉花的马头木弓和换麦芽糖人的笛声感到亲切。萧横穿过那些狭长的弄堂和茅舍，没有人打量他，只是引起了经久不息令人颤栗的狗的狂吠。萧的平静的心中泛起了一层涟漪，但他很快又在桃花和麦苗的清香中陶醉了。

萧家的宅子在村子的最西边。他远远地看见屋子的门是关着的，走近才发觉开着的门上挂着一匹黑色的孝布。他掀开孝布走进院子时，他的母亲正巧手里擎着一盏煤油灯，两个黑影突然挑起门帘闯了进来把她吓了一跳。不过，那盏煤油灯她还是紧紧地握着。当她认出长着一撮漂亮胡子的儿子时，才把灯扔在了离她大约有一丈远的阴沟里。母亲足足打量了一袋烟工夫，她发现儿子完全地变了。他的眼神和丈夫临终前的眼神一模一样。深陷在眼眶里的眼球没有丝毫新鲜的光泽。丈夫从屋顶上摔进水缸在她心中引起的不祥的预感又开始泛滥起来。她将儿子领进灵堂的时候又烧掉了三叠黄纸。她的举动不是出于对丈夫的哀悼而是为儿子消灾。萧在父亲的棺木前重重地跪下了。他宁静的心绪没有被灵堂的肃穆气氛扰乱，在他看来，父亲在他的那支队伍消失后隐居在涟水之北的村舍之日起就已经死

了。他唯一感到内疚的就是离家前对母亲的欺骗和轻蔑。他凝望着母亲瘦削的肩膀，大梦初醒似地意识到了战争带给他的变化。他感觉到像是有一根纤细的鹅毛在拨动内心深处隐藏的往事，这种感觉转瞬即逝。他站了起来，深深地吸了一口气，空气中弥漫了一股香灰和黄纸的气味。

母亲发现儿子面容苍老，头发蓬乱，就给他找来了一把木梳和剪刀，强迫他将胡子收拾干净了。萧若有所思地问起父亲的灵堂为何这样冷清，母亲说，父亲后半生几乎足不出户，不爱结交俗人。由于战争，远近的亲戚早都没有了音讯。家中空余的房屋和后院她只是在重阳节才去赶一次耗子。现在潮湿的地面上也许已经长满了水草和苔藓。萧对母亲说话时的啜泣无动于衷。萧又询问母亲关于葬仪的一些事，母亲像是没有听见，半晌没有回答，萧深深地吸了一口气，就此沉默了。

这是他和母亲最长的一次谈话。

午后，萧和警卫员查遍了村子的每一个角落，没有发现一个异乡人，他暗自庆幸北伐军还没有注意到这个涟水之北偏僻的村落。这个村子至少已有一千年没有受到战火的侵扰了，村民们相信它的宁静会像日复一日流逝的涟水向远处延续。他们丝毫没有联想到在清晨引动狗叫的两个陌生人和战争的瓜葛。在傍晚牧童的牛蹄声中，在屋檐下的阴影逐渐拉长的井边，人们只是传说着经年未改的往事。太阳快落山的时候，萧准备去涟水河面察看地形，警卫员向他报告说，一个来历不明的道人在村子中央的扇形晒场上，他算卦灵验使那里的人越聚越多。

萧和警卫员从人群中挤进去的时候，晒场上的人出于

对陌生人的恭敬，给他们让开了一条缝。老道正在预测村子的凶吉。他的牙齿几乎全脱落了，说话含糊不清。他的打满补丁的长衫上积了一层厚腴的油垢。他的面前铺着一张旧黄的旗子。由于墨迹的渗透，旗子上爻、兑、震、巽的字样已经模糊不清。老道盘腿曲膝坐在沙地上，他的脚边堆放着龟壳和蛇皮以及跌打损伤的膏药。另外还有二座可以转动的轮盘和一只洒满黄米的畚箕。

老道沉吟了片刻，然后咕哝了一阵谁也无法听懂的话，朝等着预知村舍未来的虔诚的村民挥挥手：天蝎南游，双鱼北走，摩羯安西，处女嫁东——战争已经过去。

萧的腮边挂着轻蔑的不易察觉的笑意。他觉得人们总是生活在幻觉里。对于他来说，未来已经悄悄地向现在延伸，战争已经开始了。对村民的怜悯并没有扫除萧对自身迷惑的阴影。他同样也生活在一种幻觉里。今天拂晓他踏上薄雾中的小船，遥望对岸熟睡的村子，曾涌起一种莫名其妙的激动。他不知急于回家是因为父亲的死，还是对母亲的思念，或者是对记载着他童年的村子凭吊的渴望。他觉得像是有一种更深远而浩瀚的力量在驱使他。

晒场上的人陆续散去了，天慢慢地黑了下来。萧觉得老道不像是北伐军的密探，在老人收拾包裹和杂物的时候，萧不经意地在道人脚下扔了一枚铜板。道人没有理会那枚在沙地上无声滚动的铜板，也没有停止拾掇，他抬头瞥了萧一眼：客官莫非有意算一卦？是婚姻还是财路？

生死。

萧说。他点燃了一支烟。越过那些低矮的紫穗槐树丛，他的目光注视着远处涟水河面弥漫着的空蒙的蜃气，道人

在掐算萧的生辰八字时，天已经完全黑了下来。

当心你的酒盅。

道人含糊地说了一句。

当天晚上，警卫员拎来了二瓶土烧和一包牛肉。像往常一样，警卫员在萧的面前放了一双竹筷，一只陶瓷酒杯。他坐在萧的侧面，两手垂放在桌沿上。萧将酒杯推到警卫员的面前并给他斟了一杯酒，自己点上了一根烟。

警卫员像个姑娘一样翻动着细长的睫毛，偷觑了他的长官一眼，迟疑地端起了酒杯。萧又从警卫员的眼睛里看到了道人诡谲双目的光芒。

警卫员一定看穿了自己的胆怯，萧想。尽管他的警卫员是一个未谙世事的孩子，他还是感到了一种按捺不住的烦闷和惆怅。

母亲推门进来的时候，萧看见母亲身后一个女人秀颀的身影迅速踅入灵堂冥幽的暗光中。

第二天

昨天在母亲身后消失的那个女人激起了萧无穷的联想，当时他像是在夏季的热风中闻到了一阵果香那样贪婪地吸了一口气。在第二天举行的他父亲的葬仪上他们再次相遇时，他才认出她来。

那天晚上，萧在灵堂喧嚷的哭泣声中进入了梦乡。午夜之后，一只调音的胡琴将他惊醒。村子很久没有死人了，

这些为死人吹奏丧曲的乐师们失去了往日的默契。技艺的荒废使他们只能摆弄出一些断断续续的嘈杂的音响。萧从床上坐起来的时候，不协调的音乐使他一连打了好几个喷嚏。萧借着从朽蚀的窗骨中泻进来的月光，发现怀表的指针指向三点。葬仪正式开始的时候，萧就紧跟在那些乐师的后面。他还没有完全从睡眠中醒来。月光被疾速移动的乌云遮住了，他的脚步有些蹒跚。晚风中混杂的刺树和青草的气息在他周围酝酿着。他注视着远处影影绰绰的山影，回忆起他在表舅家度过的那个炎热的夏季。

由于哥哥的猝然从军，在母亲的威逼下，他随一只过路的小船来到了涟水和兰江交接处的榆关，跟他的表舅学医。他的表舅是一个温良敦厚的中医。他平素四乡浪迹，行医谋生，妻子在一次难产中死去，他苦于女儿无人照料在榆关临江的街面上开有一爿药铺。萧来到榆关的最初一段日子里，总是处在极度的不安和焦躁之中，他在临江而筑的竹楼里翻阅一本本发黄的医药典籍时，只有人体的插图偶尔能引起他模糊的兴趣。在夏季炽热的阳光的辐射下，他从窗口远眺江面静止的帆影，耳畔常常响起杂乱而急促的马蹄声。随着日规的长短伸缩，时间悄悄地流走了，他的舅父发现他对药理和书籍的兴趣不大，就让他学习针灸。这天晌午，天空突然布满了阴云，隆隆的雷声使他在竹楼里坐立不安。他的表舅出诊未归，萧正在一只冬瓜上练习扎针的时候，表舅的女儿走上了竹楼的书斋。她是上来找一把红纸的雨伞的。在她拿了伞要下楼的时候，她看见萧一针接一针地将冬瓜戳出一汪汪清水，就走进萧的身旁，给他示范针灸的扎法。萧那天从渡船上踏上榆关码头的时候，

她和表舅来接他。他错过了一次认识她的美丽的机会。由于他对母亲的怨恨和炎炎烈日的蒸烤，他看都没有看她一眼。现在，这个叫杏的姑娘用食指、拇指、中指捻动那根细长的银针，萧忽然觉得喉头涌出了一股咸涩的味道。他的眼睛无法从她那白皙细长的手上挪开了，那根针像是扎在了他的脉上，他闻到了屋子里越来越浓的清新的果香。杏几乎没有和他说上几句话就离开了竹楼。她走后留下的气味像是凝固在这个竹楼内。在萧度过的这个夏季漫长的独坐中，这种气味一直没有消失。

表舅按照他行医的经验苦心孤诣地给萧安排了一次次的练习。他扎了两个星期的冬瓜后，表舅让他试着在一只兔子身上进行练习，他觉得心绪突然变得比先前还要糟。手里活蹦乱跳的这种动物要比冬瓜难以伺候。他当着表舅的面，只能小心翼翼地将针插入它的颈脖和肚子，表舅一旦走开，他立刻不知轻重地乱捅一气，他几乎每天都要弄死一只兔子。表舅在萧面前的摇头叹气越来越频繁。他终于放弃了让萧学针灸的念头，开始让他学习搭脉。使他的表舅感到意外的是，萧只用了两个小时就学会了。

夏末的一个中午，表舅在书屋午休的时候，他来到了竹楼下的院子里。杏在银杏树下的一只躺椅上睡着了。她手里拿着一本关于节气传说的书。那本翻开的书在她胸脯上起伏着。萧痴呆地坐在离她很近的竹凳上，凳子发出的吱吱嘎嘎的响声使他吓出了冷汗。她另一只手在椅背上无力地垂着。萧能听见自己粗重的呼吸，涟水的河面上传过来划船的桨声。一只困倦的白蝴蝶在他眼前飞过，他轻轻地碰了一下她纤柔的指尖，然后将手搭在她的脉上。他觉

得她乳白的皮肤下血流得很快。她一定不会醒来的，他想。

她真的就没有醒来。

在以后动荡的戎马生涯中，他躺在静谧的山洼里注视满天星斗、吞嚼草根和树叶苦涩的汁水时，他也偶尔记起了那天午后令人窒息的空气中飘飞的时间，他回想起他的指尖轻轻抚过她光滑的手臂，解开她领口的第一只钮扣时令人心醉的一幕，突然觉得杏也许是醒着的。这个念头从此一直没有离开过他。

现在，他又闻到了那股果香。

当棺木在墓地上停稳后，送葬的队伍缓缓朝这个开满梨花的低矮的土坡围过来。萧似乎觉得杏就在这个稀稀落落的人群中。他的脊椎骨上像是爬上了一条冰凉的水蛇。葬仪之后，他从母亲的口中知道，杏已于月前嫁到了小河村，她的丈夫三顺是一个兽医。这个能掀翻一头黄牛的青年对兽医这一职业有着发狂的嗜好。他通读《医学词典》、《本草纲目》，另外还专门研究过很少有人读懂的《黄帝内经》，他在榆关镇的街上和萧的表舅邂逅之后，老人立刻被他渊博的学识吸引住了。当这位老中医得知三顺将给人治病的方法移植到畜生身上取得成功后，不由得感慨相见恨晚。他们在街角的一爿茶馆里谈到深夜，这次偶然的相遇便促成了他美满的婚姻。

父亲的棺木轻轻地安放在洒满铜钱和黄纸的墓穴中。一个拄杖的老司仪递给萧一把铁锹。萧铲了一块泥土撒在父亲的棺盖上。萧突然觉得背后有一种灼人的目光在打量他。他稍稍地偏转了一下视角，转过身，看见杏穿着孝服站在母亲身边。杏的背后是空空荡荡的田野。一棵孤零零

的合欢树上憩息着一只喜鹊和一只绿头翁鸟。

墓地上参加葬仪的人陆续散去。杏和母亲在墓前栽下几棵湘妃竹和一棵雪松。萧站在一片黄灿灿的油菜地旁，杏和母亲之间无言的亲密使萧的心头掠过一阵宽慰的意味。萧从口袋里掏出一盒火柴走到墓前，把剩下的被露珠打湿的黄纸烧掉。他用一根棍子将那些在灰烬中卷缩的纸片挑起来。四月的风吹起了这些纸片，有几团灰白的纸烬随风滚到了新栽的雪松旁和杏的脚下。杏正弯下腰用脚踏平树根的新土，她将那些吹过来的纸灰踩进土里，顺着纸团滚过来的方向，她抬头瞥了他一眼，很快。萧蹲在杏不远处的侧面，除了杏秀颀的身体轮廓外，他的眼前一片空白。

他们回村的时候，母亲和杏走在萧的前面。警卫员也许还在熟睡，萧听不到背后跟随着的熟悉的脚步声，有点不习惯。但他眼前的天空却陡然变得开阔起来，他似乎觉得一切都在他的视野之下。

他们谁都没有说话，在他的背后，太阳刚刚升起。

第三天

葬仪结束后，村子又恢复了往日的宁静。清新的阳光在中午前后渐渐地增加了它的热度。眼前正在农闲季节，麦苗还没有抽穗，柳树的稚嫩的叶子还没有完全舒展开，耐不住闲暇的农人漫不经心地给桃树和桑木剪枝。午后，村子比夜晚更加宁静。杏去村后的茶林采摘雨前茶，她瘦削

的身影在远处闪闪发亮的沟渠旁成为一个静止的黑点时，另一个人也走过村后的木桥，依她的原路朝茶林走去。

这是漫长而又短暂的一天。萧依旧起得很早。马三大婶来到他家院子里的时候，萧正蹲在阴沟旁用盐巴刷牙。警卫员还在熟睡。由于前天晚上的贪杯，出殡的时候，嘹亮的号声和人群的嘈杂没有惊醒他，眼下战情急转直下，部队的每一个将士都感到空前的疲倦。萧平素对下属总是极其严厉，但他性情温怜的一面总是被深深地藏匿着。萧曾一度对这位不谙世事的年轻人的反应迟钝表现出极度的恼怒，但战争使他周围的一些熟悉的面孔相继离去之后，一直跟随在他身边的警卫员就成了他纷飞战火中唯一的伙伴。他在渐渐容忍了警卫员的愚钝的同时，发现自己和这位沉默寡言的下属的关系日见亲密。马三大婶是来借一只细眼的筛子的。她说去年积陈的菜籽生满了白虫，她准备把这些菜籽筛净后送到油坊去。马三大婶拿了筛子没有立即离开，她正想对萧说些什么，萧的母亲从地里锄草回来，她的头巾上落满了湿漉漉的花瓣。马三大婶忙着和母亲搭讪。从院子里盛开的木槿说到了涟水的涨落。马三大婶和母亲说话的时候，不时地朝萧瞥过来几眼，尽管这位昔日的媒婆已经失去了往常的秀丽姿容，但她的诡秘的眼风依然使萧回想起了她年轻时的模样。马三大婶从遥远的山村嫁到小河村来的那一年秋天，她的丈夫突然跟一只过路的船走了，从此一去没有了音讯。村里人都在传说他是看上了船上的一个洗碗碟的女佣人才走的。知道底细的告诉她，她男人是耐不住眼下越来越紧的饥荒去投了军。这样的猜测被证实是在三年以后，她丈夫的尸首被几个陌生人送了

回来。村里的女人用眼泪来安慰这个本分的小媳妇的同时，村里的男人也用另外的一种方法来安慰她。没过多久，村里的女人就和她反目为仇。这个几乎和村里的所有女人结下了怨仇的年轻寡妇和母亲却相敬如宾。萧记得他的母亲常常带他到河边她的孤零零的小屋里来。女人间的许多事萧当时没法理解。一天深夜，母亲大口大口地吸着纸烟卷和马三大婶相对而泣。她们低低地叙说着早已消逝的往事，大部分时间，她们彼此不说话，各自揣着心事，陷入了冗长的回忆。墙根油虫的鸣叫陪伴着她们。萧在这两个羊羔子一般亲近的女人的静默中感到无聊。他伏在母亲的膝上进入了梦乡。天快亮的时候，巡夜人的敲更声音提醒了她们。萧清晰地记得马三大婶俯身吹灭桌上摇摇欲灭的油灯时垂向桌面的软软乎乎被青衫包着的乳房，以及黎明中的晨光渐渐渗入小屋的情景。

马三大婶替母亲掸了掸头巾上的花瓣，母亲回里屋去了。马三大婶把萧带到屋外。他们站在墙旮旯的一株盛开的杏花树前，马三大婶朝四周扫了一眼，压低了声音说：

三顺今天去涟水上游很远的水域捕鱼去了。二天后才能回来。

马三大婶说完，就提着竹筛走了。萧感到一种难言的羞涩。这种羞涩在他模糊地懂得了男女之事后母亲在一个澡盆里给他擦身时也感到过。女人们往往把复杂的事情想得太简单，而把简单的事想像得过于复杂。萧伫立在墙角，他渴望从媒婆那里得到更多的关于杏的消息。马三大婶的背影逐渐消失了。他悻悻地回到屋里。他坐在院内的两盆天竹旁，注视着天空缓缓移动的流云，处在一个极度兴奋

和茫然不知所措的心境中。这种心境一直到他瞥见杏提着竹篮从河边的柳林里往村后走去才消失。

小河的村后是一大片辽阔的平原。平原的尽头被一线黑魆魆的防风林遮住了。杏的茶林在离村子很远的一个土丘上，土丘的东边是一条深陷的大沟壑。沟壑水底长满了青草。萧远远地看见杏的身影在茶林里湮没了。四下里空旷而寂静，正午的阳光使草尖和麦苗的叶子微微卷起垂落着，追逐野鸡的猎人和黄狗在涟水河弯曲的河道上懒懒地走，萧看见猎人在一个捡牛粪的老人身边停住了，像是向老人借火。那条黄狗就举起前足舔老人的裤管。他们聊了几句，就各自走开了。微弱得几乎使人难以觉察的风吹过来浓郁的茶香。

萧重新陷入了马三大婶早上突然来访所造成的迷惑中。他觉得马三大婶的话揭开了他心中隐藏多时的谜团，但它仿佛又成了另外一个更加深邃的谜的谜面。他想像不出马三大婶怎么会奇迹般地出现在鲜为人知的棋山指挥所里，她又是怎样猜出了他的心思？另外，杏是否去过那栋孤立的涟水河边的茅屋？在榆关的那个夏天的一幕又在他的意念深处重新困扰他。

褐黄色的土丘像是清澄的水中露出的光秃秃的沙洲。萧在接近土丘的时候，杏几乎没有觉察到。从沟底贴水而飞的雨燕惊动了她。

萧轻轻地将她扳倒了。

在墨绿茶垄阴凉的缝隙中，他闻到了泥土的气息。他的激动不安突然消失了。他匍匐在被太阳烤得恹恹欲睡的大地上，听到了由远及近轻轻搏动的浑厚的地声。一阵和

煦的风吹过，他默默地记起了一支古老的民谣。这种静谧安详的感觉没有维持多久，萧又重新被一种漫无际涯的深深孤独溶解了。杏在他怀里啜泣着。萧觉得这哭声和她紧紧扣在他腰间的双手仿佛将他的骨髓都吸尽了，他浑身冰凉。她紧闭着双眼，就像熟睡了一般。他越是用力抱紧她，她就仿佛离他越远。他觉得自己深陷在一个巨大的泥潭里，他的挣扎只会耗尽他的生命。他浑身被热气笼罩着，与生俱来的分离的经验在年轻女人的怀中迅速地蔓延了。萧体味到了一种从未有过的紧张和疲惫。

一只水牛的犄角在沟壑的拐弯处出现了。随后出现了另一只角。牧童坐在牛背上，用光着的脚丫驱赶着牛虻。

放牛的少年没有注意到他们。

第四天

这天，萧像是梦游一般地走到了杏的红屋里去。

三顺还没有回来。傍晚的时候，涟水河上突然刮起了大风。

第五天

雨是深夜下的。萧在梦中听到了预示着涟水春讯的雷

声。他醒来的时候，到处都是鸟叫。吸饱了雨水的硕大的刺树花蕾沉甸甸地落满了被骤雨冲刷得净朗的沙地。诱人的花香和雨后的骄阳使萧有了钓鱼的渴望。他将父亲久已不用的鱼竿从床底下翻了出来。用燕竹做成的鱼竿已经发霉，它的衔接处的铁皮也已经布满了潮湿 的黄锈。萧从院里找来了鸡毛，将它剪成漂在水面上的鱼符。萧在整理鱼线的时候，警卫员从屋外的树根下找来了一小瓶蚯蚓作鱼饵。很快，他们来到了涟水河边。

小河位于涟水的下游。涟水在汇入兰江之前的拐弯处，水势并不平稳，那些飘浮在水面上的菜叶和柳絮静静地顺流而下，只是在经过一些水底布满凸凹石块的水面时，才突然被卷进漩涡。在涟水的石码头洗衣的妇女看见萧在对岸的一处流水很急的地方垂下鱼竿，都忍不住地笑出声来。她们说：萧离家才有几年，竟连钓鱼的本领也忘得一干二净，在那样的水面只能钓到水草。

萧没有听到妇女们的议论，却听到了一向沉默少言的警卫的忠告：

“这里水很急。我们还是往下游走走，找一块平静的水域。”

“在流水很急的地方能钓到箭鱼和梭子。①”萧说。

警卫员不再吱声。萧点了一根烟，他知道在这样的水域钓鱼需要很大的耐心。他记得父亲生前常在涟水河边这块水面垂钓，从日出到日暮，他几乎天天空竿而归。萧坐在那片被榛树覆盖的浓荫之下，凝视着从村子上空飞过的

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① 梭子：体呈狭长形的一种凶猛鱼类，鹦鹉嘴。

雁阵和静止不动的云朵。他的视线渐渐移到了村西的一堵成直角的红墙上。那是杏的家。萧知道他只有坐在这个位置才能让目光越过那堵红墙，清楚地看见院内的一切。

太阳已经升高了。空阔的院子里寂然无声。堂屋的门关闭着，有几只雏鸡在廊下啄食。昨天夜里，萧离开杏的院子时，杏依在门边痴痴地看着他。南风掠过水面，在竹林里引起了一阵簌簌的喧响。遥远而冷清的星群中是一弯朦胧的晕月。杏衬衣的钮扣没有扣上，头发披散在肩头。萧凝望着她，料峭的春夜使他一连打了好几个寒噤。杏将黑漆大门掩上的时候对萧说：如果三顺今夜不回来，她明天就在院里晾衣服的绳上挂一只竹篮。

春阳温和地照临水面。萧不安地眺望雨后的院落。他没有看见院内晾衣服绳上挂上竹篮，却突然发现马三大婶正在河对岸村子的柳丛里向他招手。

“你找来的鱼饵太小了，而且是黑色的，”萧对警卫员说，“在这片水域鱼走得快，很难发现黑色的蚯蚓，走吧，我们回去。”

警卫员迷惑地看了萧一眼，他也正呆得无聊，无风的天气使他昏昏欲睡。他帮助萧收拾鱼线的时候，像是对旅长的反复无常感到茫然不解，又像是丝毫没有猜透旅长的心思。来到小河的短短的几天里，萧所经历的一切，他也似乎毫无察觉。

简直是个孩子。萧一边往回走，一边平静地想。

马三大婶咕咚咕咚地吸着水烟，将萧拉到一处无人的地方，好久没有说话。萧看到了她畏缩胆怯的目光正处处躲闪他，她踮着的小脚也有些颤抖。媒婆压低了粗哑的嗓

门神色慌张地告诉萧：他和杏的事发了，昨晚杏的哭叫声惊动了四邻。

三顺是昨天深夜回来的。那是萧刚刚离开后不久。姗姗来迟的梅雨开始零星地下了。这个深夜归来的精明的兽医几乎是一踏进院门就嗅出了气氛的异常。他身上散发出来的浓烈的鱼腥气和连日捕鱼带来的疲惫并没有妨碍他的细心的揣测。他将笨重的鱼网搁在院里的鸡埘上，没有理会杏给他端来的烫脚的水盆。杏蹒跚的脚步和脸上还未消失的红晕激起他心中狐疑的涟漪。他将杏带到里屋，放下了窗帘。杏的双腿轻轻地颤栗着，她温爱地摸了摸他长满粗硬胡须的两腮，推说去灶下生火做饭，正要离开卧室，三顺一把拽住了她。他轻轻地用手一推，杏倒退了几步就坐在了床沿上。三顺麻利地给杏脱掉了衣服和鞋子，将她抱起来扔在床上，随手放下了帐子，吹灭了桌上的油灯。杏在黑暗中听到了解皮带的声音，这种声音没能给她带来往日的兴奋，却使她预感到了灾祸的来临，她不由自主地哭了起来。当三顺潮湿的身体一接触到她的肌肤，杏的身体立刻就像触电一样变得僵硬。

萧从口袋里掏出了所有的铜板放在马三大婶手里，他并不是想付给这位连日奔波的老人酬劳，而是为了让她在说话的时候能安定下来。马三大婶 的手握不紧这些铜板，她的手指像小兽一样跳跃着，有两枚从指缝中落到了沙地上。

三顺用粗麻绳将杏吊在了梁柱上，他打断了六根柳条之后，杏说出了萧的名字。邻人被杏的哭叫声惊醒，已是子夜时分。他们涌进了那堵红墙的院内，里屋的门上了闩，

他们从门缝里看见杏赤裸的身体被吊着，就开始砸门。门是新银杏木做成的，他们砸扁了门上两个巨大的铁环，门上裂开了一道口子，有人想从门上的豁口伸手进去拨动门闩，但他们突然停住了。从门缝中和裂口朝里看的人都屏住了呼吸。人群圈外的人根本不知道屋子里发生的一切：三顺用一把劁猪用的小刀在油灯上淬了淬火，在杏的下腹处迅速地剜了一下。动作熟练得像从木瓜中往外掏瓤。杏已经无力叫喊了。她的身体剧烈地抽搐了几下，就昏过去了。

马三大婶 的水烟早已吸完了。她像是被自己的叙述惊得目瞪口呆，又像是对这位一向老实巴脚的年轻人荒唐的举动感到永远的意外。今天清晨，好心的几个女人将昏迷不醒的杏用小船送到了她娘家——榆关。对于这件事，村里人并不感到新鲜，将不贞的女人阉了送回娘家是常有的事。马三大婶没有告诉萧更多的实情。其中最重要的一点就是：

已经在村里失踪的三顺曾四处扬言要杀死他。

第六天

尽管萧知道了三顺已经在村里失踪了，昨天下午，他还是拎着手枪到杏原先居住的红墙内转了一圈。院内依旧空阔。就在他准备离开这幢散发着奇异果香的红屋时，他发现有一个人影在竹林里闪了一下，他下意识地捏紧了手枪。枪内共有六发子弹，他现在变得异常的暴躁，直想找

个人将这六发子弹射出去。竹林的稠密的叶子像是打了个寒噤似地动了一下，警卫员从里面走了出来，萧长长地舒了一口气。

当他们回到家里时，警卫员极其小心地提醒萧是不是该回棋山了，因为大战即将开始。萧愤怒地将手枪的枪柄重重地敲了一下桌子。母亲被屋里的声音惊动了，推门走了进来。她已经知道了村子里发生的一切，她想找个机会和儿子谈一谈。她惊恐地看见萧愤怒地瞪着警卫员，她走到桌边将手枪抓过来顺手塞进离她最近的一只抽屉内。

萧站起来，一言不发地走了出去。母亲小心翼翼地跟出来。她觉得一定得和儿子谈一次，因为她相信：既然三顺扬言要杀死她儿子，他一定会做到的。她深知这位异姓家族后代的秉性。三顺的父亲原来也是一个本分的打渔人，他曾经为一次微不足道的口角挑起了一场三四十人的格斗。萧没有意识到母亲跟着他。他走进父亲生前的书房，就将房门关上了。

在父亲葬仪之后，从来没有人走进这间阴暗的尘封的屋子。萧点亮了桌上的油灯，挑亮了灯芯，灯芯上积满了灰尘。萧坐在父亲的写字桌前，凝望着父亲的那张挂在墙上的半身像。画像的边缘糊上了一圈黑框。黑框是用一方幔布精心剪成的。他仿佛看见了母亲在油灯下细心缝制的身影。这个村子里的人还不知道世上早已发明了照像术，他父亲的像是请一位卖膏药的郎中画的，这位江湖画师把父亲的眼眶画得浅了一些。另外那套马褂也似乎太不合身。他能够从这张走了样的画像中看出画师在他父亲的眼神上耗费了匠心。这种深邃而坦然的眼神是他曾经非常熟悉的，他

在离家出走的前夕，父亲正躺在院子里的藤椅上阅读一个姓梅的古行吟诗人的诗抄。父亲的后半生几乎天天都要捧起这本诗抄。他知道哥哥去黄埔军校曾得到父亲无言的赞许，他渴望父亲能像往日一样看穿他要从军的意图，从而给他指点。那天他围在父亲的身边踯躅了好久。父亲没有注意到他。这时，他从庭院的门中看见了远远的被太阳照得炫目的涟水河，河滩赭黄的沙地，沙地上搁浅的小船，和他一起去投军的一个同伴正在向他招手。那是黄昏时分。他一直没有弄清他给孙传芳的一个部下当勤务兵的时候，父亲也是否表示了默许。后来在频繁的战事中，他越来越怀疑自己是不是在无意之中违背了父亲的意愿。

父亲的褐红色的坐椅被磨成了浅黄，雕花红木制成的高大的书架依然明澈得能照见人影。他随手拿起桌上的一本父亲临终前的手稿翻着，那手稿压在一柄刻有“涟水糯墨”的砚台下。在他翻阅的一瞬间他突然看到这本父亲用来临摹汉魏碑帖的毛边纸簿中抄录了父亲写给兄长的一封书信。由于毛笔吸墨不多，字迹显得过于苍劲、粗砺。萧在这封信的最后几行发现了自己的名字。

至于萧父亲写到：我不再奢望能见他一面，他的军队不久就要覆没，我现在不像以前一样担心，担心听到他的死讯。

萧觉得自己的脊椎像是被针刺了一下。尽管他的父亲在字里行间并没有多少责备他的意味。他还是感觉到了耻辱。他在父亲的桌前呆呆地坐着。下午的时光像沙子一样流走了。他天生的高傲和倔强使他强迫自己镇定起来，他像是第一次从小河的这些天浑浑噩噩的梦魇中苏醒过来，

本来他已不再期待什么了，现在，强烈的好胜的欲望使他想立即赶回部队。他回忆起不久前看到的一份前线的战报，孙传芳的部队在北伐军的攻击下已濒于彻底崩溃的边缘。72师、31师的不战而降在本来就军心涣散的将士中投下了无法消除的阴影。萧似乎感觉到了一种不祥的预感正向他袭来，但这种感觉很快就消失了，他的任性和醉心于幻想的秉性使他寄希望于不久后开始的战役。他想，既然自己已没有其他出路，他只有铤而走险。他不知道这种荒唐的愿望是出于对父亲的怨恨和嘲笑还是乞求父亲的在天之灵对自己的错误抉择给予原宥。他决定立刻赶回棋山。

就在他站起身准备离开父亲书房的瞬间，他意念深处滑过的一个极其微弱的念头使他又一次改变了自己的初衷。

他想到了杏。

他的眼前出现了杏那温柔而迷惘的目光。像是一阵清冽的果香在他面前飘拂而过。他回忆起在榆关过的那个炎热的夏天，临水而筑的药房竹楼。他想起了在纷飞的战火中她影子重重叠叠地闪现的时刻，想起了他来到小河的这些天给她带来的灾难。一种深深的原罪感在他的心头暗暗滋长了。

傍晚的时候，萧告诉母亲他今夜将去榆关。母亲对儿子的话没有感到意外。她知道自从萧去榆关学医的时候起，他的灵魂就被那个表舅的女儿悄悄地偷走了。她坐在桌边没有说话，无神地看着萧，身体有些颤抖。警卫员喝得酩酊大醉，他像是朦朦胧胧地知道了萧要去榆关，他挣扎着伸直了双腿，准备从床上坐起来，但他刚刚微微抬起了头

又重重地摔在床上，沉沉地睡去了。

榆关离小河有二十哩水路，一个晚上来回足够了。萧走出院门的时候，天已经快黑了。他走过村子中间的空空荡荡的扇形晒场，看到了上灯时分涟水河边零星的渔火。他深深地吸了一口气，加快了步子，他的耳畔传来了渐深的夜色中舂米的木桩敲击石臼的声音。

他来到涟水河边，正要去那片洒满夜露的晚茶花丛解开船缆的时候，黑夜中像是有几十个黑影迅速地在他身后闪了一下。萧回过头，看到了三顺和几个他不相识的人手持杀猪刀朝他逼过来。

黑影慢慢地朝前挪动着步子，九寸长的刀子在他们手里跳跃着。萧已经退到了河边，他能够清晰地听见涟水河静静地流淌的水声。他徒然地将手按在腰中空空的手枪皮套上。由于一阵忙乱，他出门时竟忘了带手枪。那支装有六发子弹的手枪此刻正关在卧室桌子的抽屉里。三顺没有走上来，他倚在一棵刺树下，嚼着树叶，冷静地看着他手下的人将萧围起来捅死。突然，他吐掉了嘴里嚼烂的碎叶，迅速地朝萧走过来，他像是突然想起了什么：

你的那个警卫员呢？

围着萧的几个黑影也像是猛然醒悟过来，他们立刻撇下萧钻入丛林，四下小心地搜索起来。他们现在相信，警卫员似乎应该就在附近。三顺用刀尖支起萧的下巴：

你的那个警卫员在哪儿？

他喝醉了——萧平静地说。三顺从鼻子里轻轻地哼了一声，没有再说什么。不一会儿，钻进丛林里去的人又一个个闪了出来，他们身上沾满了蛛网和露水。这时，月亮

从云层里出现了，他们彼此能够看清对方的脸，三顺知道他手下的人没有搜出什么。

他满心狐疑地打量了一下萧，他对萧回部队不带警卫员感到茫然不解。他的目光紧盯着萧的脸，忽然他的嘴角浮现出一丝不易为人察觉的神色：

你是去榆关看那个婊子吧？

萧没有答腔。他安详地看着眼前已经发生的一切，同时，他也明白那个阴冷恐怖的将来已经悄悄地来临了。

沉默又重新包围了他们。过了许久，萧听到了一声轻微的长叹，三顺已经将手里的那把杀猪刀扔进了涟水河，转过身径自走了。他在进入丛林前又回过头来朝他手下的几个人摆摆手：

放了他。

也许是萧对于一个已经废掉的女人的迷恋感染了他，也许是他内心深处莫名其妙的喜怒无常，三顺放弃了杀死萧的想法。

当萧朦朦胧胧地想到了这一切的时候，那些人已经在夜幕中消失了。

第七天（结局）

萧从榆关赶回小河已是次日凌晨。在天边泛出的紫红色熹微的光亮中，他依旧在那片晚茶花丛拴好了小船。迷蒙的水雾遮住了村子的轮廓，水牛在河边的柳树林里喷着

响鼻。这是一个凉爽的黄梅天。萧轻轻地穿过弄堂的时候，狭窄的深巷里回荡着他的脚步声，蜷缩在村里竹篱旁的狗没有吠叫，它们显然把他当成了熟人。萧不禁回忆起第一天来到这个村子时几乎是完全相同的清晨。昨晚的河边幸免遇难使他在黎明的和风中感觉良好。

萧来到自家的院门前，母亲已经起来了，她正在清扫院子。萧和母亲打了个招呼，径直朝里屋走去。

他跨进房门的时候，警卫员坐在桌边等他。他正在感叹这个一贯贪睡的年轻人第一次起得这么早，警卫员迅速地拉开抽屉，抓起那支手枪对准了他。

萧起先还以为警卫员在和他开玩笑。但是他立刻从警卫员嘴角的一丝冷笑中感到了情况的不妙。接着他听到了这位一向不善言谈的警卫员迄今为止最冗长的一段话：

31师弃城投降后，我就一直奉命监视你。攻陷榆关的是你哥哥的部队，如果有人向他传递情报，整个涟水河流域的防御计划就将全部落空。在离开棋山来小河的前夕，我接到了师长的秘密指令：如果你去榆关，我就必须把你打死。

萧似乎已经闻到了火药硫磺的气味。他强迫自己镇静下来，但由于连夜奔波的疲惫和突如其来的死亡威胁造成的紧张，他的双腿失去控制地剧烈颤动起来。他觉得自己的所有神经都绷紧了。喉咙几乎像被一团棉絮塞住了，他要说的话全被堵死在意识深处，这无异于是自己承认了背叛。最后他用不连贯的声调说了一句：

你可以把我押回去，让师部审问我。

警卫员狡黠地一笑：在你的军营里枪毙一个旅长会扰

乱军心的。再说，大战即将开始——已经没有时间了。

萧没等警卫员说完，敏捷地蹬翻了那只桌子，一侧身跳出了里屋。他冲到院子里的时候，他的母亲正在把院子门关紧准备抓鸡。萧像是一只疲狼窜到了院门外，已经来不及拔闩了。他无可奈何地转过身。

警卫员握着手枪走近了他。

天已经突然亮了。黎明的暗红的光消失之后，天空飘飘洒洒地下起了小雨。面对那管深不可测的枪口，萧的眼前闪现的种种往事像散落在河面上的花瓣一样流动、消失了。他又一次沉浸在对突如其来的死亡的深深的恐惧和茫然的遐想中。他回忆起道人闪烁其辞的忠告，现在，迫使他跨入地狱之门的似乎不是盛满美酒的酒盅，而是黑乎乎的枪口，他莫名其妙地感到了一丝遗憾。他看见母亲在离他不远的鸡埘旁吃惊地望着他。她已经抓住了那只母鸡。萧望着母亲矮小的身影——在抓鸡的时候她打皱的裤子上粘满了鸡毛和泥土，突然涌起了强烈的想拥抱她的欲望。他在听到枪声的一刹那，感到有一股湿乎乎的液体贴着他的肚皮和大腿往下流。

警卫员站在离萧只有三步远的地方，非常认真地打完了六发子弹。

〈金色秘密叢書〉

臧棣

低頭時，我只看見這菊花，
金色嚮導，小小的手臂曲張著，像軟體動物的觸鬚。
粗心看，才貌合成豔黃的花瓣。

而我現在心細得就像一根斷弦。
養得這麼好，一定懂政治，
於是，植物的禮貌就有了宇宙的深意。

一抬頭，我瞥見了給它澆水的人。
她不是園丁，不過看起來她有更好的方法，
知道如何把水澆到點子上。

稍一比較，多數人的背後都有無數的秘密。
而她的秘密不在她身後，在我和菊花之間，
沒錯，她的秘密永遠在她的前面。

〈舊京三首〉（之三）

蕭開愚

胡辣湯辛酸無度，哲學王
當農業銀行分行長，收支不已。

女兒有狂風形狀，跟媽貌合神離，
夢嫁一門嗷牙的外語。
媽不能主動了，牙線的光陰滋味
佇候各樣聰明的填空。

切忌換在旁觀的座位，
吃金銀花救入局的邊緣情緒。

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發　行／城邦文化事業股份有限公司
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電話：(603)2060833　傳真：(603)2060633
印　刷／凌晨企業有限公司
初版一刷／一九九七年五月一日
初版七刷／二〇〇〇年七月十五日
售　價／二一〇元
版權所有・翻印必究(Printed in Taiwan)

Ancient Capital
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Professor of Chinese Literature, Columbia University.
Published by Rye Field Publications,
(A division of Cité Publishing Ltd.)
11F, No. 213, Sec. 2, Hsin-Yi Rd., Taipei, Taiwan.

古都

✻我在聖馬可廣場，看到天使飛翔的特技，摩爾人跳舞，但沒有你，親愛的，我孤獨難耐。

——I. V. Foscarini

難道，你的記憶都不算數……

那時候的天空藍多了，藍得讓人老念著那大海就在不遠處好想去，因此夏天的積亂雲堡雪砌成般的顯得格外白，陽光穿過未有阻攔的乾淨空氣特強烈，奇怪並不覺其熱，起碼傻傻的站在無遮蔭處，不知何去何從一下午，也從沒半點中暑跡象。

那時候的體液和淚水清新如花露，人們比較願意隨它要落就落。

那時候的人們非常單純天眞，不分黨派的往往爲了單一的信念或愛人，肯於捨身或赴死。

那時候的樹，也因土地尚未商品化，沒大肆開路競建炒地皮，而得以存活得特別高大特別綠，像赤道雨林的國家。

那時候鮮有公共場所，咖啡館非常少，速食店泡沫紅茶ＫＴＶ、ＰＵＢ更是不用說，少年的只好四處遊盪猛走，但路上也不見人潮洶湧白老鼠一般。

那時候的夏天夜晚通常都看得到銀河和流星，望之久久便會生出人世存亡朝代興衰之感，其中比較傻的就有立誓將來要做番大事絕不虛度此生。

那時候的背景音樂，若你有個唸大學的哥哥或姊姊，你可能多少還在聽披頭四。要是七〇年代的第一年，那麼不分時地得聽 Candida，以及第二年同一個合唱團的敲三下，若是六九年末，你就一定聽過 Aquarius，電視節目《歡樂宮》裏每播三次準會出現一次的那個黑人合唱團 The 5th Dimension。再早一點的話，你一定聽過學士合唱團的 Can't take my eyes off you，錯過這首的人，十年之後可以再在《越戰獵鹿人》裏的那場酒吧戲聽到。

雖然你喜歡的是 Don McLean 的 Vincent 和 American Pie，爲此我們只好把時間延後兩年——且讓我確定一下資料，Vincent 是七二年五月十三日登上排行榜，那麼，這就是七二年的夏天吧，你充耳不聞舞會裏的熱場第一名三犬夜的 Joy to the world，自然也不理夏天過後三犬夜會更紅的 Black & White，你專心一意的翻查剛買不久的東華英文字典，找尋歌詞中的生字意義。

Starry starry night……，同樣一個星星的夜晚，你和A躺在一張木床上，你還記得月光透過窗上的藤花、窗紗、連光帶影落在你們身上，前文忘了，只記得自己說：「反正將來我是不結婚的。」A黑裏笑起來：「那×××不慘了。」×××是那時正勤寫信給你的男校同年級男生，一

張大鼻大眼溫和的臉浮在你眼前，半天，A說：「不知道同性戀好不好玩。」你沒回答，可能白天玩得太瘋了，沒再來得及交換一句話就沉沉睡去，貓咪打呼一般，兩具十七歲年輕的身體。

✻咸豐七年春正月、淡水大雪

你們從來沒機會知道同性戀好不好玩，太忙了，一兩年間的事兒，所動用的情感和不一定是傷心才掉的眼淚遠遠超過其後二十年的總和。

你們總是說出城就出城，坐那世紀第一年就完工的鐵路的話，有座位不坐的一定坐在車門階梯上，迎風高唱剛又背好歌詞的歌，次年夏天的話，你們一定會唱繫條黃絲帶在老橡樹上。有時搭客運，那時的北門尚未被任何高架路凌虐，你們輕鬆行經它旁邊，便像百年前的先民一般有出城的感覺，經鐵道部門口，在泉町一丁目搭車，一刻鐘不到就到差不多十五年後飆車揚名的大度路。

車速以時速一百公里衝越關渡宮隘口，大江就橫現眼前，每次你們都會非常感動或深深吸口河海空氣對初次來的遊伴說：「看像不像長江？」

車過竹圍，若值黃昏，落日從觀音山那頭連著江面波光直射照眼，那長滿了黃槿和紅樹林的沙洲，以及棲於其間的小白鷺牛背鷺夜鷺，便就讓人想起晴川歷歷漢陽樹，芳草萋萋鸚鵡洲。

你們並不每一次都是去找A的男孩子朋友們。儘管那些男生爲數不少，但都頗難找到，他們有些人民公社似的同寢同飲在田野間的四合院農舍，只差沒有自耕自食。也有一人住在鎮郊的油車口，就理直氣壯不用去上課，但因此更難找，據說大部分時間他都在山服社，有空的時候就在興化店一帶寫生梯田或在重建街上素描一間間的老街屋。也有一人住在鎮裏尋常的彈子房樓上，晝伏夜出邋遢得費解，他屋裏的四牆掛滿了他拍的照片，大部分是風霜的沒有性別的老人的臉，但你也看過A裸著肩，胸前只圍了什麼織品的相片，不知道A什麼時候給拍的等等……

不管找不找得到他們，你們最終一定會走到清水街，穿越你們那時非常害怕的傳統市場，不去龍山寺，儘管A的其中一名建築系男友最喜歡請你們在廟前廊柱下邊吃鹽水帶殼花生邊講該廟的歷史和建築給你們聽；既好奇又同情的走過老鴇們坐鎮的小旅社，就是清水巖了。你們從不求籤，也對廟裏的善男信女毫無興趣，你們只管走過終年白煙瀰漫的金爐，橫過山丘腰的窄窄小徑，右手邊是生滿了野草青苔的石壁或民房的磚牆，另一邊，就又是大江海口了，你們都故意忽視腳下單脊兩屋坡的閩南式斜屋頂不看，彼此一致同意眼前景色很像舊金山，雖然你們誰也沒去過。

山腰小路的盡頭，得穿過別人家的廚房，回到重建街，然而你們走避不及離開這條最老的街道，忍受著重回現實穿過魚鮮攤豬肉鋪、終年炸魚酥的大油鍋、雍正年間建廟的福佑宮，小心別被客運撞到的走在窄小的中正路上，不會太遠，你們像回到家似的熟門熟路拾級而上渡船口正對的窄巷，石階縫裏永遠長著潤青應時的野草，只差沒向二號和四號的人家喊一聲：「タダイマ！」

回來啦。

你們回家的紅樓的圍牆和鐵柵門時鎖時開，不管如何你們都進得去，兩人在庭前臨江的短垣坐定，頭上有一株苦楝、鳳凰、一叢亂竹，都擋不了任何陽光海風，有時那鳳凰像著了火一樣爆開一樹花海，你們又覺得像在西班牙或某些地中海小鎮了。

紅樓是幢米白色殖民風的建築，是上個世紀末的某名大船商的宅邸，後人不知如何處理的，其中也像人民公社似的住有一窩男生，都是附近大學和工專的，有些不去上課睡到下午才起床，裸著上身站在陽台上愣愣的看著你們，有剛做完春夢的就向你們吹聲口哨或語帶威脅：「喂你們沒看到大門上的牌子閒人勿進！」

你冷冷的看回那男生，陽台上曬晾著他們的內衣褲，迎風獵獵作響旗幟一樣。

你們坐在短牆上，像坐在一艘即將出航的船，你彷彿看到船長在航海日誌上寫道：AM6:30，N34° 26' E17°28'，二十節強勁西風，抓三三〇度航向……

同樣心情的A永遠比手劃腳講著話，你多想和A一樣的身裁，高一米七，游泳選手的平肩，長手長腳，雖然也有胸脯，但更像運動員的結實胸肌，你不滿意自己，窄窄的腰，如何都藏不住的圓潤的胸，女孩子氣極了的手腳……，很矛盾的你有時又更想像宋，A口裏常常提到國中時期最要好的宋，宋最愛哪本書、哪科老師、哪部電影，宋最怕什麼食物、最討厭哪種男生，宋是獨生女，宋和A約定了一起得考上同一個高中，宋考前病了整個月，只考上城南的女中……，沒見

過宋，卻沒有一人比她還清楚分明的存在這世上。

一次你和A蹺課去青康看二十元兩部的電影，因其中一部是A那時最迷的喬治卻克里斯。散場時你聽到有人喊A的名字，聲音很小卻異常清晰，你直覺是宋，果然是宋，穿著萊姆黃的學校制服，個子纖小到A可以很戲劇化的輕易一把抱起凌空轉兩圈。A向宋介紹你的時候，你只覺得宋的眼睛正注視著你，好大好黑好空洞。

A隨後毫不猶豫的便陪宋去搭車送她回家。

你不能獨自一人走在沒有球賽又寂靜又灰色的棒球場外，怕會想到啊那些與你年紀相仿的球員英雄們都老了，便只好穿過馬路到對岸，對岸不料也荒草長長，五年後這裏會豎立起巨大廣告看板，號稱將在此建蓋全東南亞最大的旅館商場，鬼才相信。再五年後旅館商場建成，你隨後的婚禮竟就在那鬼才相信的五星級旅館某宴會廳舉行的。

你一人走在荒草長長的路上，看著通紅的晚霞，心裏寧靜的微小聲音唱著學校合唱團正練習的〈當晚霞滿天〉，唱到我愛、我愛，讓我祝福你……，眼前嘩嘩嘩的降起漫天大雪。

✻可憎的綠，濕滑的城，總督垂垂老矣，有著遠古的雙眼。

——D•H•勞倫斯

然而百花曆裏言及農曆七月是這樣：七月葵傾赤、玉簪搔頭、紫薇浸月、木槿朝榮、蓼花紅、

菱花乃實。

總之爲了襯那陽曆九月格外才有的 Wedgwood 藍的天空，所有紅色系的花都開了，南美紫茉莉、珊瑚刺桐、大花紫薇、仙丹、鳳仙、朱槿、美人蕉……，尤其那總從牆頭簷角探出頭來的朱槿，四九年來的那批青壯漢子和三百多年前爲了解救靈魂和取得胡椒而來的葡萄牙人西班牙人，都因此印象良深，尤以離鄉多時的後者，忍著發狂的回想眞是何其相似的藍天、白牆、綠樹、紅花、黑髮、黑眉睫、以及類此情歌：讓我注視著你，利馬來的女孩，讓我向你敍述夢的榮耀，那些喚醒古老橋梁、河流與樹林記憶的夢……，歌名很可能叫〈肉桂花〉之類。

其實也有並非紅色的白瓣黃心俗名雞蛋花的緬梔花盛開（例如四條通基督長老教會庭院和泰安街三巷二號……），那略帶藥味兒的幽甜，屢屢勾起好多清晨匆匆趕著通勤和送小孩上學的媽媽們的惆悵，好想能像曾經的好些年的九月一樣有學可上噢，新制服、新同學、新教室、新老師……，一切都是新的未知的因此充滿了無限可能，儘管有人規定你必須這樣不許那樣，但是規定之外卻全都可以全都自由，眞正的自由，不是你目前以爲的可以選擇月薪四萬二或四萬五的工作的那種自由，也絕非是替孩子選擇蒙特梭利或福祿貝爾幼稚園或奧福美式學園的那種自由。

你們就充分使用著這種自由——二十年後有政治正確意識的作者若言及此段時日，必得讓你們加入釣運及退出聯合國後續發展的百萬小時奉獻運動或山服社，要不，得爲你安排有個當年事變受難者的父祖輩、或去偷偷幫康寧祥發傳單、或認眞閱讀《自由中國》、《大學雜誌》並因而啓

蒙、或至不濟該爲年底即將登場的中日斷交而摩拳擦掌——，你們與周遭大多數的人一樣對上述種種一無所知，西元四百年左右，人們停止信仰宙斯，一六五〇年左右，不再相信巫師術士，一七〇〇年，始對神的啓示產生普遍的懷疑，不也如此嗎，每一個時代的光彩和苦難老是只屬於那少數幾名先知先覺、巫師術士。

才不管開學了，你們像每一代死愛玩的那些個一樣，總有辦法離開上學中的學校，學校在文武町，出門就是總督府，總督府大你們不到四十歲，卻給人垂垂老矣之感，你們從不考慮的以爲它起碼有一兩百年歷史，有時又以爲它是父輩隨來的國府蓋的。

走過時而停滿了交通車黑頭車、時而空曠的府前廣場，就是本町書街了，通常你們都無暇一顧，尤其幽黯陰涼如中藥行的老書局毋寧更像你們才逃脫的國文課、歷史課。

你們通常坐火車，坐在門口梯階上，毫無所覺的擋人路，上上下下的怎麼那麼多買菜的婦人。火車走的是城市最醜陋的一面，家家都說好了似的賭氣把後門、違建、公廁、菜圃、垃圾堆面朝它，起著濃濃的農村味，儘管行經的是舊日最繁華的建成町、御成町、蓬萊町。

你們有時在宮ノ下下車，話若說過頭了便在士林下，宮ノ下駅的小車站類同於沿線的其他小站。十年後沒拆建的大約都多少被用來拍過咖啡廣告和政府宣揚經濟成果的短片，它們通常在月台和站房前的空地上鋪滿有異香的朝鮮草坪，其上植著南國印象的冶豔小花，例如各種顏色的馬齒莧、馬纓丹、有毒的射干和長春花，有時還試圖種著根本不可能開花的芍藥、牡丹，同樣勉強

的還有南洋杉、羅漢松，當這類溫帶植物被襯著粉白牆和上了瀝青的杉木站房時，便能撫慰很多想念故國的征人。

爲了同樣的理由，他們曾在戰爭期間發起種植一萬棵櫻花運動，希望島國人民能跟他們一樣愛上那花特有的絕美慘烈，他們在草山、霧社、南方澳大量種植吉野櫻、大島櫻、八重櫻、緋寒櫻，這車站照例便有一棵緋寒櫻，除了農曆年左右草草開花一星期，平日都蒼白瑟索缺乏自信的自閉在一排船桅似的檳榔樹下，是的，一定有檳榔樹，如同征人們上個世紀末的一幀照片：幾株剪影般迎風招搖的樹姿間，一輛緩緩行經的牛車，照片角上的題字是「南國の印象」，叫人好想黃昏浴罷穿著浴衣木屐納涼其中。

不能不有檳榔，凡是在大正、昭和初期建造的公學校、郵局、公家機關、教會都有檳榔，或起碼也有樹態風情相近的蒲葵、大王椰、海棗類，不是嗎，你曾唸過的世紀初第五年就建校的小學，危樓教室前就種著十來棵蒲葵，你隱約也感覺學校的古老，不然何以一下課就跑到榕樹下憑靈感擇一空地挖掘，相信挖到古物寶藏後一定能讓避難海隅家無長物的父母發財。你非常有毅力的持續挖掘整個三年級，成果卻不怎麼令你滿意，只有幾片看不出年代的青花陶碗碎片，你陸續交給母親央她保管——那被幾十年的光腳丫踩磨出的黃泥土地好冰涼結實、那看來再美麗飽滿的榕樹子剝開都有蟲，你只得用舌尖小心舔舔它無蟲部位的甜味、那用來做蒲扇的蒲葵樹刷刷刷的湧動聲好睏人、那亮綠光硬的蒲葵子太結實了，你用瓦片切它、用磚頭砸它、用牙齒啃它，急欲

知道它珍藏著什麼——也不能不有海棗、台灣海棗，否則三百多年前那些漢子們如何得以遙望著長滿台灣海棗的海岸而喊出：「Ilha Formosa！」雖然據說這是他們東行以來所命名的第十二個美麗之島。

婆娑之洋，美麗之島。

你多麼想念在那即將待拆的幽黯紅磚大禮堂裏，數百名小學生大聲喊唱校歌「白露山、內湖陂是我們的好屏壁！」因爲用喊的，失去旋律，那時你並不知道大正七年歐戰告終後，接任的第七任校長小堀吉平對這個七星郡內湖陂的公學校除了白露山以外一無所知，你也不知道更早的校長赤羽操後來如此描述過「山紫水明の內湖」，你只耿耿在意最要好的班上兩個朋友放學都不跟你同路隊，沒辦法走出糾察隊的勢力範圍就一路玩回家，冬天出太陽的下午，比賽從田埂躍身縱入農人堆妥的稻草堆裏。你的一個好朋友在港墘路隊，一個在十四分，十四分路隊本來有差不多十個人，可是隨著高年級得留下課後補習，低年級中午就走人，十四分路隊竟只剩她一人！她告訴你從家到學校要走兩小時的山路，冬天時，天沒亮就得出門，兩小時，不都可以走到台北城了嗎？

後來你漸會看大人報紙，她晚來的日子，你都無心聽課，好害怕她是在白露山裏遇到壞人被強姦了，天啊十四分是哪裏！同樣天啊的還有東湖，聽說東湖走來也要兩小時以上，還有東湖的都是班上最晚繳學費的，往往學期一半了，每天因此被老師一頓好打的才繳，但是校慶運動大會時便不能沒有東湖的，你讀過的班級不時就有東湖的男生，他們都牛似的又黑又沉默，被老師大

力打時都不流淚不叫痛，早晚會被老師這樣罵：「你吃啞巴藥了！」你同情極了他們，卻從沒跟其中一人戀愛過。

二十年內他們的田地沒賣掉的話，現在大約都是億萬富翁了。

✲穿過林投與黃槿，便是海

二十幾年後的一場忘了原因的大醉裏，你趴在黑暗無聲的臥室裏，兩眼失焦卻神志再不可能清明的看著你們十七歲、穿著校服背著書包的身影，驚險的橫過一個農家養滿了雞鴨的後院絲瓜棚（因爲都不會說台語，害怕屆時無法向屋主辯解你們的瓜田李下只是借路），腳下這時已是黃軟的細沙地，緩坡顯得難走，開滿了大花的髒兮兮黃槿擋掉了飄了一會兒的冷毛雨，還沒換季的短袖校服也不覺冷，那時候不都是這樣嗎，也不覺冷，也不覺熱，也不覺餓，也不覺累，只要心滿滿的。

你們便心滿滿的穿過黃槿，行過林投與瓊麻間，有時被它們鋸子一樣的刃葉給劃傷，也不覺痛，其中的瓊麻有的從心中抽出一柱高有兩三公尺、綴滿大白咕嘟花的花柱，海平面隱約不遠，因此那花柱也給襯得船桅一樣，與整整一百年前的加拿大安大略省人馬偕初抵此時所看到的情景無異。

穿過林投與黃槿便是海，你們謹記著A的某名男友第一次帶你們走那祕密通道時再三重複的口訣，只因夏日結束的海邊重又被海防駐軍管制，只有那麼走才能躲過守軍碉堡的瞭望，你們並不知道八十八年前的同一天同一個時辰、法軍在同一地點發動攻擊，以船砲掩護八百名陸戰隊登陸沙崙，守軍在沿岸臨時堆砌的城岸上以射擊誘敵深入，法軍果然進入長滿林投與黃槿的密林，無法施展機槍火炮的優勢，只得與守軍揮刀白刃。你們熟讀有清歷史爲了考試，你們知道道光年間開始的每一大小戰役和條約，唯不記得這場林投黃槿密林的生死惡鬥及輸贏。

並不像八十八年前的法軍亡魂們迷失於此，你們在他們充滿羨慕的注視下輕易的穿過林投與黃槿。

大多時候只有你們兩人同來，開著紫花平鋪於地的馬鞍藤盡頭便是海，明灰色的海，海天交接處因水氣顯得迷離，你們早已淋濕透了，並肩走在沙灘上，心裏各唱著心愛的歌，各自跌入喜愛的某部電影中的類似場景，因此你們言語激楚全無交集，誰叫你們一直以爲眼前的大海是全世界第一大洋，因此和數百年前那些海寇冒險家一樣對之充滿無限想像。

壓到眉睫的雲天通常讓人想到《雷恩的女兒》，再晚十年，就得想的是《法國中尉的女人》，是沉鬱、壓抑、內裏卻波濤洶湧的英國，與夏天的海灘完全不同。

夏天的海灘，尤其是日落之後，充滿了鹽分的海風吹得人著魔似的無法離開，餘熱的沙地溫存著你，四周流盪著樂聲，有時是眞的，是尚未離去的遊人帶著手提錄音機的樂聲被海風吹得有

一下沒一下懶極了，若不巧放的是Frankie Avalon唱的Why就再好不過，當年錯過的人二十年後可以在電影《牯嶺街少年殺人事件》中反覆聽到，總之，這些個因素加一起，若再有勤快的拾了浮木生了野火一堆，便好叫人想有個男孩在身邊，兩人不顧形跡的躺在沙灘上，他把你擁抱得好溫暖好安全，於是你甘心如此甜蜜的變成一個女人，不管他是誰。

你看看身畔的A，奇怪這一類的幻想對象從來沒有過是她。

海天一色的讓你們不辨方向的往往不知不覺就走到公司田溪口，被阻攔了，才回頭，於是照眼便會看到觀音山了。天氣再好時，山頂常常有雲靉，風強的時候，雲走得疾，就很像觀音靜靜的在練吐納。那時的山上沒什麼人家，只山腰上一戶農家夜黯了上燈，像觀音盈盈的一滴珠淚寂寞的流至腮頰，如同你忘了原因的一場大醉的那個夜晚。

你冷靜自持的聽A說這說那，說她那些男孩子們，毫不在意，只除了宋，不能說宋，一說你就立時感覺到那濕冷的衣衫直透脊梁，然後一顆心，小拳頭似的緊縮成小小小小一顆孤懸在那兒，誰也解救不了。

秋天的海灘上一個人影也沒有，你對往來絡繹的亡魂們都視而不見，包括早一兩年冬泳被鯊魚吞噬的，包括幾年後在興化店救人喪生的，包括你自己的。

✲清人得台、廷議欲墟其地

感覺有一點秋天味道的時候，你們便只乘到宮ノ下駅下車，搭公車的話便到劍潭——劍潭在北淡大浪泵社二里許，番划艋舺以入，水甚闊，有樹名茄冬，高聳障天，大可數抱，崎於潭岸，相傳荷蘭人插劍於樹，生皮合劍在其內，因以爲名——

當然你對劍潭所知全非如此，你五歲時，穿戴整齊的由父母第一次帶你去動物園兒童樂園，下了公共汽車，你哪兒都不想去，眼前現成一個又大又繁華的嘉年華廣場，其歡樂氣氛勝過三十年後你帶女兒去過的迪斯耐樂園所全力營造的，只覺滿天都是五彩氣球和吹泡泡和音樂，各式各樣小吃攤的香味和叫賣，幾個大看板遮住了整個圓山山頭，看板想來挺素樸，沒什麼圖案只有大字幾枚，做廣告的是當時僅有的幾家民族工業如大同電扇或白花油或達新牌雨衣或政府的一些砥礪口號之類，幾個票亭似的小屋掛滿了現在想來廉價難看的玩具，難怪當時父母不願意買給你。

其後兩三年，山上清除神社遺跡，建起中國宮殿飯店，專門用來接待國賓，山下的違建因此被清除一空，好像馬戲團班子表演結束一夕遷移他地，要到二十年後你旅行開羅，坐在冷氣充足的觀光巴士裏，發現塞車的街頭有好多販賣醜透了的零食、塑膠玩具、不明物、簡直不知什麼人會去買的亭子，你看到一對深膚巨眼的年輕父母牽著小孩在認眞的喂老闆這個多少錢，你又駭異又恍然大悟，原來他們遷徙到這兒來了，你臉貼在窗玻璃上，流戀不已。

一點點秋天的味道，你們那時誰也沒離開過這冬天也不肯下雪的小島，如何知道秋天該是什麼味道。

農曆九月菊有英、芙蓉冷、漢宮秋毛、菱荷化爲衣、橙橘登、山藥乳，不，不，絕不是菊花木樨（如果你父親是外省人），不是芙蓉樹蘭（如果你父親是本省人），不是紫藤羅漢松（若你祖上是國語家庭），不是油加利麵包樹（若祖上曾代表皇軍出征南洋甚至澳洲）……秋天的時候，你們一站在十川嘉太郎設計的明治橋上就知道，只覺那風從很遠很遠不知哪裏長長的吹過來，眞眞愁煞人也，晴天的話，天就顯得格外曠遠，灰色的時候，便有人會想起日前剛讀過的詩句或某個哲人的聰明語，你們便因此言語鑿空，足可證明海島確有秋天。

此外還能證明的便是夾道而去的楓香，儘管它們只肯焦黃絕不嫣紅，可以了，你們走在世紀初便建成的勅使街道上，幻想置身在新英格蘭十三州，誰叫前行不遠便是美軍顧問團宿舍，五〇年代好萊塢電影裏典型的白牆大窗煙囪綠草坪，誰叫路上三不五時就有休假中的美軍，看到你們還會紳士風度的寒暄兩句，誰叫你們有幾人正著迷於電視影集《*Peyton Place*》小城風雨，不閒盪的放學日子，回家準時可以收看得到，漏看幾集也不打緊，因爲已經播了兩年多，劇情毫無進展的你從十四五歲都長到十七歲了，你並不著迷稍後才走紅的雷恩歐尼爾，你隱約覺得自己比較像劇中那個一心想離開小城到波士頓、到紐約去圓作家夢的米亞法蘿所飾名叫艾莉的女孩，你覺得自己毫無道理一意想離開生長地方的心情與她像透了。

儘管楓香不紅，你們依然懷著秋天的心情走到樂馬飯店，就得過對角線的街了，樂馬飯店門前往往站著好多在等計程車的美國大兵，你不好多看飯店的立面爲什麼浮雕著兩個小貝比在吃狗奶，差不多要到二十年後，你唸希臘羅馬神話給女兒聽時，才恍然那是羅馬城源起的神話故事，所以樂馬的原名是羅馬，樂馬的對角線是敦煌書店，你們都不進去，不僅僅它，另還有金山書店、林口圖書公司也都是只賣原文書，你們只覺那是租借區，華人與狗不得進入，租借區還有聖多福教堂旁的那幾家明顯專賣給老外的東方藝品店，租借區還有晴光市場，還有福利麵包，還有美而廉，還有美琪飯店，還有夢咖啡，還有飛虎遺孀陳香梅的ＣＡＴ，還有圓桌，還有嘉新大樓前的噴水池。

有次Ａ爲了買一條據說是ＰＸ流出的眞正的Levis牛仔褲而進過晴光市場，裏面迷宮一樣，你覺得所見到的每一個女人都是酒吧女，便來不及賦予同情的睜大眼睛研究她們，吃驚她們長得如此平凡，而且都好愛吃米粉湯和大腸肝連肉。你們也一定進福利麵包店，翻譯小說裏才能看到的糕點糖果，讓你們有置身異國之感，例如年末時的聖誕布丁、加了奇怪香料的麵包、豐盛的肉類製品和牛油、各種果醬、紅茶……，足供你們幻想一種十倍於你們國民所得的生活，雖然你們的零用錢往往在買了一顆含堅果的巧克力便告傾家蕩產，難怪你們其中一人會說，發誓我將來賺了第一筆薪水要來買個夠。

奇怪這一切，完全無涉於民族主義。

該年底，日本就快與你們斷交了，政府各種爲圖安定人心的口號紛紛出籠，你們被說動了，決定在一次班會上發起捐獻，你捐出了一顆巧克力糖的錢，你們還發動捐血寫血書，做公共服務例如從學校門口起掃街並協助指揮交通，不過後兩樣都被導師阻止打消了。

只捐出了一顆巧克力著實讓你們的精力和愛國心無處發洩，於是你隨A去大學裏找她的男朋友們，輕易的也割破手指頭貢獻了一大幅白布血書中的某個字的一勾，你們且熱血澎湃的隨他們聚集在學校的福利社，那老舊陰涼可能是日治時代留下的倉庫建築給你一種好想趕快長大的感覺，可能是窗上爬滿了你以爲叫長春藤的爬牆虎，可能是四周高大似溫帶國家的白千層樹，空氣也溫帶國家似的又涼又乾，你注意到其中一名有點像雷恩歐尼爾的男生不時偷偷打量你，你靜靜的一笑，沒來由的同情他。

但奇怪這些與眞實的生活全不衝突，你們仍然走在租借區，看著白膚高鼻的人繼續以鴉片戰爭之後的列強姿態抄著一名你們的女同胞，邊走邊搔得她怪叫連連，你們未有異樣之感，似乎忘了曾貢獻一些血的那幅血書上所控訴抗議的。

不衝突的大大不只這些。

二十年後，同一個日子同一個晚上，你和丈夫參加一個號稱十萬人的聚會，你完全想不起來這麼好大一個足球場是哪來的，未建之前原是哪裏？困惑的不只這些，你本來只是想去捐些款，略盡能否把執政黨藉此拉下台的棉薄之力，像血書上的那一字的那一勾，後來當然你們出不去了，

最重要的，你結婚近二十年的丈夫決計不會走了，你看到他與周遭幾萬張模糊但表情一致的羣衆的臉，隨著聚光燈下的演說者一陣呼喊一陣鼓掌，陌生極了，終於有名助講員說了類似你這種省籍的人應該趕快離開這裏去中國之類的話，你丈夫亂中匆忙望你一眼，好像擔心你會被周圍的人認出並被驅離似的。

當晚，你丈夫亢奮未歇的積極向你，用異於平常的動作和節奏，你被撥弄著，黑裏仍然不肯掉眼淚，好多年了你都不肯掉眼淚，因爲眼淚太鹹了，汗也好鹹，從什麼時候開始，身上逐漸釀成一股陌生但不好聞的氣味，起初以爲是生過小孩的緣故，從醫院住了一星期回家，帶著醫院裏清爽乾淨的消毒水、Baby oil、藥香、奶香混成的好味道，好味道沒多久就不再有了，初次你發現了陌生的味道緊釘你不去，你趕忙努力重拾以前的洗髮精、香皂、洗衣粉……，二十幾年的味道再也沒有了，跟了二十幾年你不知道的體味卻在消失之後你才知道，只剩下可以輕易結晶成鹽的鹹味，肯定與海的鹽分不同分子結構的髒兮兮鹹味，別的無法避免無法改變例如體液和汗水，但淚，是絕不肯流了。

不得不令人想到天人五衰，耳不聰，目不明，嗅覺不靈，神色枯槁，連華美的衣裳也蒙塵埃。

因爲不肯承認耳不聰目不明，於是投票日次日的那個額外假日，你決定獨自去一趟白天的足球場，因爲非常驚慟如何可能想不起原先那是哪裏，儘管你長年居住城東，二十年來未曾須臾離開過此海島。

你像十七歲時的尋常一個冬日下午在劍潭下車，除了缺了一起蹺課的友伴，不然那撲面而來的空氣和深秋的味道眞動人呢，你幾乎對那更高更綠的樹們說，好久不見，隨即忍住驚駭不去看那醜怪龐大到極點的捷運車站，它徹底破壞了天際線！你十七歲時的天空，與四千多年前沿著淡水河來此漁獵農耕的先民所看到的相去不大，與三百三十年前某暗夜溯河而上並首次發現凱達格蘭人的西班牙人所見無異。它和它新建好的鐵路們破壞了所有可能的想像，原址那條世紀初建妥的鐵路，好一長段與紅磚人行道平行不遠，你做行人時，老忍著想揮手的衝動目送火車而去，羨慕其中的旅人好像他們正要遠行，沒車時，寂靜的鐵軌也好平易近人，隨時可跨越，隨時可臥軌，鐵道那一頭平疇四野，與一百二十年前郊拚落敗逃來的同安人所見差不多，雖然看不到河，但知道河就在那不遠處，隨時可以順流出海，叫人心生遠意。

你簡直不明白爲什麼打那時候起就從不停止的老有遠意、老想遠行、遠走高飛，其實你不曾有超過一個月以上時間的離開過這海島，像島夷海寇們常幹的事。好些年了，你甚至得時時把這個城市的某一部分、某一段路、某一街景幻想成某些個你去過或從未去過的城市，你才過得下去，就像很多男人，必須把不管感情好壞的妻子幻想成某個女人，才能做得了男女之事。

你從未試圖整理過這種感覺，你也不敢對任何人說，尤其在這動不動老有人要檢查你們愛不愛這裏，甚至要你們不喜歡這裏的就要走快走的時候。

要走快走，或滾回哪哪哪，彷彿你們大有地方可去大有地方可住，只是死皮賴臉不去似的。

……有那樣一個地方嗎？

✻不必登岸，不必薙髮，不必易衣冠，稱臣入貢可也

——秀男曾在四條大橋上見過不知是「千重子化身的苗子」，還是「苗子化身的千重子」，因此他想到四條大橋走走，於是就朝那邊走去。烈日當頭，十分炎熱，秀男憑依在橋欄杆上，閉上眼睛，想傾聽那幾乎聽不見的潺潺流水聲，而不是人潮或電車的轟轟作響——

與秀男不同的，你站在附近大樓頂電子螢幕顯示4°C寒風中的四條橋上，俯望著鴨川畔一對對不怕凍的情侶，彷彿從未離開過。

唯令人難以決定的是，你的下午茶要到高島屋地下一樓的Fauchon，還是高台寺參道口旁的洛匠。Fauchon的午茶，一塊英式鬆餅和一盅當店的熱咖啡或紅茶，五百yen，其間無論日圓暴走或暴跌，數年不變，你非常想念那沒幾個座位因此常得排長龍的咖啡座，常有穿戴考究少說七十歲以上的老夫妻在那兒進行某種儀式般的莊嚴用餐，低聲交談，表情舉止不像一般日本老人，你幾乎肯定他們大約是青年鄧小平的留法同學們。

但你更想念洛匠的蕨涼糕，只好往祇園走去。橋頭化緣的行腳僧仍凝立著，不知是不是同一

人，穿得與夏天時的裝束一樣，你都不給他錢，從來不。

南座的戲碼仍是坂東玉三郎，因此不用看，綠燈已閃了幾下，你突然決定趕過街，看看上回正鋪石板路的白川南通。白川南通平行四條，是你和女兒一次尾隨出客的藝妓時行過，白川流過家家戶戶的後門，在台灣的話，一定正好用來傾倒垃圾廢水，眼前寬不過兩公尺深不及半尺的川裏卻養著錦鯉，兩岸植柳和垂櫻，店家於是把景觀調到這一頭，隨陽光強弱打起或放下竹簾，你告訴女兒，江南就是這個樣子。你哪兒去過江南。

石板路鋪好了，要不是上次你親眼見它正施工中，會以爲這條路與東山那些清水坂三年坂二年坂一樣有百年歷史。你曾經把與女兒在白川某小橋上的合照寄給A，回應她幾年前給你而你未回的聖誕卡。

和很多人一樣，發誓永不分開永不嫁娶的你和A，離開大學再沒見過，最後一次見到A是在大學畢業典禮結束後的遊園，你們身邊各有家人和男伴，A向男伴介紹你，邊匆匆掃過你男伴一眼，你不知A想的和你一不一樣：噢，原來你離開了就是爲了這麼一個人。

寄行李的時候，旅店經理曾告訴你今年反常的冷，花期可能會延後一星期，難怪石板小路顯得如此淒冷，垂櫻楊柳礦灰色的枝條毫無生意，儘管如此，社區店家已獻了燈獻了大甕的酒，路燈桿上也斜插了桃紅柳綠，幾株較老較大的垂櫻下也已牽來了電線照明燈且擺妥了角度。

你不知A在想什麼，二十年沒回過台灣，研究的卻是台灣，這回爲了交一篇論文要跑一趟日

本，輾轉聽人說起你此段時間會來，便託人傳眞給你，簡單交代要你替她訂旅館，而且頂好能與高中時一樣共寢一室抵足而眠，其餘見面再聊。

爲此，你沒帶女兒，也未邀丈夫同行。

走在通往清本町的巽橋上，馬上你就後悔了，因爲陰冷而提早上燈的地燈把清澈的水面照得極清楚，魚們逆水停著，一動都不動，愛魚的女兒在的話，一定會細心的掏出早餐預留的麵包餵魚吧。你清楚記得第一次帶女兒來此時，女兒才會說話不久，不解魚事，看到魚兒爭食便大爲緊張的搖著手掌大聲喝止：「魚兒，ㄅㄚˋ ㄅㄚˋ打架！」ㄅㄚˋ ㄅㄚˋ本是台語「不要」的發音，丈夫教她的台語只剩這一句。洗把臉吧，「ㄅㄚˋ ㄅㄚˋ！」強迫她孔融讓梨，「ㄅㄚˋ ㄅㄚˋ！」該睡覺了，「ㄅㄚˋ ㄅㄚˋ！」女兒就要小學畢業了，這些年與洛匠庭園裏的數隻大錦鯉們結成好友，要你這次代她摸摸日本國旗那隻，日本國旗錦鯉通身雪白，只大頭上一丸紅，爭食特慢，女兒注意到，每想辦法把其他魚用手撥開，另手餵它，摸摸魚頭，它也不走。

你好幾次坐在室內喝咖啡，隔窗看她蹲踞在池邊，因太過熱心餵魚，整個人俯身水面只剩個穿著小花內褲的屁股蹶朝天。

你不由加緊腳步並決定走捷徑，彷彿只要夜黯前趕到洛匠，你仍可以看到五歲時、蹲踞池邊餵魚摸魚的女兒。

拾級上八坂神社，神社境內幽黯無人，樹潮森森湧動，你提醒自己並非在台灣，便放心穿越，

不忘神前匆匆參拜祈福，擲一枚銅板，拍拍手，神明請醒來聽你心事，你合掌閉目，但願此行不致是一場災難。

——春天和熙的斜陽柔和的照在古老招牌的舊金字上，反而給人一種寂寞的感覺，店鋪那幅厚布門帘，也已經褪色發白，露出了粗縫線。唉，平安神宮的緋色垂櫻正競相吐豔，我的心卻如此寂寞……千重子暗想。——

爲什麼會想到「災難」這個詞呢？

除了魯莽和以往一樣，你簡直不知A在想什麼，最後一次接到A的信息是她寄來的一張西式婚禮卡，上印著與某某某（你試圖拼出可能的中文名字）於某月某日在新澤西州的某郡某教堂結婚，那是A在法律上的第一次與人共同生活。你甚至不知道她目前是否還在婚姻狀態，當然這些都與隱約的災難感無關。

那不然是什麼呢？你把咖啡趁涼前喝完，仍打呵欠，早上的一場折騰、中午三小時的飛行、傍晚低溫加上低血壓，不須照鏡子，你清楚看到自己的模樣，冰風造出的細紋在原本上妝甚佳的白瓷臉上冰紋一樣的展開，髮絲瑟乾蓬亂，眼下暈黑，嘴唇發白或發紺，你沒有精力再瘋狂，你每天得睡飽九小時，服三種維他命丸和深海魚油和貝塔胡蘿蔔素，你且勤於洗澡洗頭，害怕日復一日加深的鹹味被人嗅出，你不知道A變成什麼模樣，她足有發胖的條件，一米七平肩的骨架加上二十年的美式飲食習慣，可以掛上好多斤肉。

你無法再如十七歲時一樣，結伴出遊外宿數日甚至可以不帶任何行李盥洗用具，你們常常約了在公路局東站或西站見，兩手空空只拿一本詩集或其實讀不懂的叔本華，少少的盤纏塞在牛仔褲臀袋裏。奇怪那時好像不用洗臉刷牙，甚至不用洗澡，一覺起來好漢一條，眼睛發亮，口氣清新，如何亂吃都無法長肉。

儘管因此你猶豫了好久該不該照A要求的共寢一室預訂一間twin，你不能想像必須在僅容旋馬的狹小日式商務旅館裏與A相對好些個夜晚，你不能面對必定會留在浴室裏的鹹味和毛髮，當然更沒辦法接受肯定A也已出現的體味，你一定會背對著她睡，夢裏也要小心睡著，不可囈語不可亂作夢，以往的貓咪呼嚕也許不見增大，但比較像是鬆了某顆螺絲釘零件欠修理的機器，鬆鬆的震動，內含金屬聲。

A的鼾聲一定變得好大。

你從來沒再存念頭與A還有見面的一天。A出國之後的讀書就業一直不脫Peyton Place艾莉來來去去的那些小城，頭幾年，她給你寄過楓葉，辣椒紅玫瑰紅的美麗楓葉，可是眞大，大到必須用十六開的封套郵寄，你竟有些失望，因爲眞的太大了，與你曾隨意的幻想非常不同，但你仍收藏好，一直到女兒上小學有收集標本的功課時，你大方的全捐給她，十年了，鮮麗依舊，塑料或緞帶做的一樣。女兒也很驚訝怎麼葉子那麼大，可以遮住她整個臉，和她好些個秋天來此撿拾收藏的纖緻的高雄楓不同，也和她在島上撿過的楓香不同。

女兒忽大忽小、殘疾之姿的字跡在標本下寫著，楓香，金鏤梅科……

你懊悔非常，爲什麼會在寶貴的假期選擇與A見面而捨棄女兒？

——路程很遠，但是千重子和眞一決定躲開電車道，從南禪寺那邊繞遠路走，穿越知恩院後面，通過圓山公園，踏著幽雅的小路，來到清水寺前，這時，恰好天空披上了一層春天的晚霞——

你結了帳，老闆娘姊妹倆提醒你穿妥外套再出門，好冷呀，親切得不知道是否記得你。你都沒有替女兒摸國旗魚，因爲門窗緊閭且下了厚帘子。斜對不遠的文の助茶屋的大黑天燈籠已上燈，門前仍有幾名不怕冷的遊人在排隊待位。你從沒進去過，可能因爲每次行此都必定想起蹲踞洛匠池畔熱心餵魚餵得屁股朝天的五歲女兒吧，儘管每思念女兒的同時，女兒根本就在身邊。

你決定與眞一和千重子逆向而行，從西行庵、菊溪亭的巷子左轉東大谷祖廟前攔腰進圓山公園，那條路上的大貓咪最多。

與女兒不同的是，你第一次來圓山公園時很驚訝他們怎麼公然用了你們圓山的名字。女兒卻在一次幼稚園戶外教學去圓山河濱公園回家後問你，奇怪怎麼學人家日本人的地名呢。你突然迷惑起來不能回答，丈夫笑女兒數典忘祖。

公園中心的那百年枝垂櫻仍在蓓蕾堅硬的階段，因此你像很多不死心的夜遊人一樣，買了一罐滾燙的飲料握著取暖，不忍離去。

大垂櫻像一株未抽芽的垂柳，聚光燈早已打好，只等它醒來。曾經某一年春天，你和女兒在

靠坂本龍馬和中岡愼太郎雕像那隅的櫻花樹下席地讌飲，那盛開的百年老垂櫻遠遠仍望得見，被聚光燈烘托得浮在高空中、煙火停格一般，也像劇毒美麗的水母，不敢多看，害怕成精怪的它會攝人魂魄。

你邊吃喝邊講坂本龍馬和中岡愼太郎的事蹟給女兒聽，白日裏，你們且曾尋著龍馬在京城裏的活動路線例如三年坂近清水坂巷口的茶屋，龍馬與幕末志士們祕密開會的地點，高居東山三十六峯之一，可遙望二條的將軍幕府城門一開警備組要來逮人了，志士們情急常翻窗跳走；行經三條河原町，路邊有石碑上刻字：坂本龍馬、中岡愼太郎遭難之地；而龍馬的墓在二年坂臨靈山觀音上坡不遠處，女兒在那兒撿拾過一枚摩斯拉也似的大蟲繭，印象太深了，後來每回走在三年二年坂就開始催促你要去龍馬墓前看看可有大蟲繭，因爲你老愛立在二年坂口竹久夢二寓居舊跡門前眺望腳下的市井閭弄，遲遲不捨離開。

其實你對坂本龍馬哪有什麼特殊情感，就如同有次要回那政爭慘烈醜陋的海島的前一天，你有感而發跟女兒講起西鄉隆盛的事蹟，明治天皇與西鄉隆盛，政敵可如此相待，像康熙皇帝的理解鄭成功：明室遺臣，非朕之亂臣賊子。

小學二年級的女兒，聽了好動容。

……

土番狉榛，未知耕稼，射飛逐走，以養以生，猶是圖騰之人爾。

首先西班牙人荷蘭人如此描述台北：草莽瘴濃，居者多病。

康熙台北湖。

其後，來採硫磺的郁永河在《稗海紀遊》形容台北：非人所居。但那早在一六九七年，不能怪它，同時期的嘉南平原乘牛車行經其間，如在地底（多令人神往！）。

康熙末年，隨軍來台平朱一貴亂的藍鼎元說：台人平居好亂，既平復起。

連沈葆楨也說：台北瘴癘地。

李鴻章：鳥不語，花不香，男無情，女無義。

不滿那地方的，不自你始。

你眞不想回去呀。

——「千重子，咱們乾脆把這家批發店賣掉，搬到西陣去好啦，再不然，就到寂靜的南禪寺或岡崎一帶找間小屋住下，咱倆設計一張和服和腰帶圖案好不好？」——

你想起那趟大選日後的未竟之旅，你走到圓山，只見空中地底條條是路，你迷失其間，不知該如何走到你十七歲時走過百遍的路。明治橋——你後來知道它原來叫明治橋，橋上的銅燈早在一場拆建時給李梅樹買了放置在三峽的祖師廟了。平直美麗的橋被一座新橋壓著待拆毀，批評以往是外來政權的新統治者人馬已執政四年，所作所爲與外來政權一樣，只打算暫時落腳隨時走人似的，不然他們何以去掉那兩排在你們所有現存的人出生前就已在著的楓香呢？難怪你幾乎忘了

原本濃蔭中若隱若現的招牌：Fortune Teller，那是當時初中學生的你所學會二十六個字母後所學的第一個長單字，你曾經立過小小的心願，長大的有一天要去那兒算命，從不加思索的固執以爲圍牆裏是個神祕美豔的吉甫賽女人，會用水晶球爲你解開宇宙大祕密。

兒童樂園居然還在，深秋的蕭條之感不知尙有營運否，你很想入園，假使那充滿了尿騷和腐爛朽木的龍船還在，你一定能看到船上那一個爲了傾身觸水而內褲朝天的五歲時的自己，你不知道去過多次迪斯耐樂園的女兒肯不肯跟你來這裏，來這個你與她同樣年紀時的樂園，你試著告訴她，在你們幼年的時代裏，它眞的和迪斯耐樂園一樣好玩，不只如此，你曾經帶她試圖搜尋你小時候住過的村子，不遠，在城北郊區，結果你在連幢的改建國宅中依遠遠的山勢定位，大約估算出原先的家可能在哪兒，在一家便利超店的門前花壇；你帶女兒去你們童年瘋野的山裏，吃驚它被連綿的五六幢醜公寓給吞噬到僅剩一小山巔，幾步路就可輕易跨越它；你站在山丘崗徑上，指著高速公路的涵洞告訴女兒那是你們的埋狗之地。你想辦法重建那個秋日裏五節芒淹沒的原野和農人們焚草木的荒煙直上，和你惆悵極了的心境，奇怪狗都死在秋天。

消逝了的不只這些……

有一次你和友伴們在秋收後的田裏烤地瓜，地瓜偷挖自農家，引火的火柴輪流每人不辭勞苦的跑回村子偷自家裏，技術太差了，五、六盒自由牌火柴點光了，只燒掉一堆枯草，紅爍爍的地瓜仍好好的在坑底，百無聊賴起來，長日漫漫，你們決定往村子反方向無目的的亂走，越走發現

凌空而過的飛機異常的大，你們興奮極了，判斷田野盡頭應該是飛機場，一致決定要走去那裏，走到那一百零一個飛機場，就等於出國了。出國，什麼意思？那隱約表示比起你們不時想挖條地道到美國去，飛機場是條捷徑多了。

你們走到後來都不再說話了，因爲怎麼會那麼遠，有時要經過個大糞坑，有時得穿過有狗鬼叫的農家，有時甚至必須走鋼索似的通過絲瓜棚旁的半朽獨木橋……，要不是久久一架簡直快壓到你們頭上的飛機飛過因而鼓舞你們，你們簡直要放棄了，這時有那最小的跟屁蟲從說話發出哭包聲，你們不准他哭，害怕士氣從此瓦解，哭聲到底引來遠處幾名小孩，其中有一人竟是你的同班同學，坐倒數第二排，你們從沒說過一句話，路隊排在什麼鬼地方的北勢湖——天啊，難道走到北勢湖了？

同學家及其親族們家都開磚窯廠，野風曠地裏一堵堵已燒未燒的蟹紅灰青的磚牆堆，大好現成的殺手刀場地，你們當場兵分兩國，北勢湖國和精忠新村國，殺到天黑北勢湖國被罵回去吃飯才散。

你們回村後異口同聲向父母和大孩子說你們走到飛機場邊了。描述所看到的龐然大物，要不是基隆河的阻斷，你們就都出國了，眞的，就差一米米，就差一滴滴，反覆強調，因爲猜想他們可能都不相信。

北勢湖其後三十年，你在協助小學三年級的女兒做鄉土報告時，才又見到這個地名，北勢湖

事關清末台北建城的材料，有說石材部分採掘大直北勢湖山的岩塊，磚瓦係北勢湖和枋寮庄的磚窯，石灰來自大稻埕河溝頭的石灰窯；但另一說是石材來自淇哩岸的安山岩，磚向廈門採購，黏石用紅毛土，就是糯米蒸混紅糖石灰，如同赤崁和其他古城的構成。

其後十年，日人拆城。

夢境一樣的北勢湖，再也沒去過的北勢湖。

日人跟清人一樣，不是「廷議欲墟其地」就是「一億元台灣賣卻論」。他們拆了北勢湖辛苦燒成的磚瓦，闢成三線道路，植上一五〇株（愛國西路）一〇〇株（信義路）南島遍見的茄冬和代表南國風情的檳榔樹。

茄冬半世紀後長成綠色城牆，是你們女校與男校最常議和的楚河漢界，你和A就常跟他們約在那裏見，開闊的安全島上鋪著紅磚，有繞樹一匝的白鐵椅，再亮的路燈也穿透不了濃密的樹蔭，便於男生們抽菸，便於你們躲過跟蹤而來的好事教官，大多時候是男生拿書或新出的校刊給你們或相反，你們以高出對待教科書數倍的熱情背誦著艱澀的句子並甘之如飴，告別時候不忘敲定該月末的班與班的郊遊。

那時候的車真少，整個晚上男孩把你熱情擁抱並試著探索你的身體都不虞被車燈曝光，你沒意見的合作著，希望男孩趕快告一段落恢復正常，你好回夜讀教室把第二天要考的歷史給背完。汗水體熱和茄冬樹的樹味兒鮮烈一致，當場你不知神遊到哪兒去，男孩整好你的衣衫，替你肩起

書包，眼裏閃著星芒，這一場，一定會被傳到A那裏，於是你放心了。

——千重子受到莫大的衝擊。她那麼喜歡到村子去，又那麼喜歡仰望那美麗的杉山。說不定是被父親的靈魂召喚的吧。另外據這位山村姑娘說，她是孿生兒。那麼，難道這位親生父親在杉樹梢上還牽掛著被遺棄的雙生兒千重子，才不愼摔下來的？——

動過一億元賣台念頭的日人不只在北杉山植滿了樹，在南島上也努力遍植，不只是一年生的小花小草，還安然篤定的植下註定一世紀以後才會有點樣子的樹種，奇怪他們並沒打算吃乾抹淨就走人的樣子。

吃乾抹淨，你想起那個因反抗集權政府去國海外三十年不能回來的異議人士，時移勢易，他一旦當上縣長以後，照樣把南島最後一塊濕地挪做高汚染高耗能源的重工業用地。

他跟他以往批判甚而欲推翻的的外來政權做的一模一樣。不然何以他們敢如此做呢，當有一日你路過你們的綠色城牆，發現天啊那些百年茄冬又因爲理直氣壯的開路理由一夕不見，你忽然大慟沮喪如同失了好友。

你簡直無法告訴女兒你們曾經在這城市生活過的痕跡，你住過的村子、你的埋狗之地、你練舞的舞蹈社、充滿了無限記憶的那些一票兩片的郊區電影院們、你和她爸爸第一次約會的地方、你和好友最喜歡去的咖啡館、你學生時常出沒的書店、你們剛結婚時租賃的新家……，甚至才不久前，女兒先後唸過的兩家幼稚園（園址易主頻頻，目前是「鵝之鄉小吃店」），都不存在了……

這一切，一定和進步有勢不兩立的關係嗎？

太冷了，你回旅館正式辦 check in 手續，當下決定先住進單人房，等A眞到了，再決定一起遷入雙人房或她另住單人房。

這個極其簡單的決定一掃你幾日來的猶豫焦慮，行李放進住房裏，餓意立時湧上。

你依往常的習慣，先到新京極通的錦天滿宮合掌祈福，宮前掛滿了酒缸大的燈籠，不知供的什麼神。循宮正對著的錦小路，此時的錦小路，九成的店家都打烊了，尚亮燈的幾家魚鋪子正忙沖洗枱面走廊，見你行經仍口上響亮的喊聲「イラッシャイ！イラッシャイ！」招呼著。

你握緊錢夾加緊腳步顯得行色匆匆，彷彿是商社下班趕回家做晚餐的職業婦女。一直走到武田市小店，買兩雙過季名牌厚襪，天氣比往常冷，店裏仍點著煤油暖爐，漫著柴魚湯的香味。老闆夫婦的孫女好大了，擠在收銀台邊看電視邊做功課。當然令你想到女兒。

後半段的錦市場此時已寂靜無聲，你只好從柳馬場通穿回四條大街。很多地方可以吃飯，但你選了對街通常用來吃早餐的 Doutor 咖啡。

你點了一杯當日熱咖啡和一份高原熱狗三明治，臨窗的位置給占滿了，你只好到裏間的大圓桌去。暖氣和菸霧使你心跳加快，不過也可能是以爲會看到女兒做功課的背影。

女兒學期裏來的時候得帶功課以保持進度。旅館裏太擠了，常到這裏的大圓桌寫功課，你教她算術，教到三年級就不會了。你們不同的語言並沒引起同圓桌人的注意，或該說，並未引起他

們任何異樣的表情，他們都練就一副見怪不怪、不動聲色的面膜，因爲人太多，空間太小，擠通勤電車，擠百貨公司，擠咖啡館，時時超過人與人之間堪忍受的距離界限，便都得練就漠無表情的面膜，面膜出門時與衣帽一起穿戴上，不然何以自處？

但你十分喜歡這種人不理我我不理人的狀態，其中想必有不少的精神病患也不讓你覺得危險，你技巧的打量衣冠楚楚的中年歐幾桑，嚴重菸癮一身香奈兒的兩名年輕女子，金城武兄弟的上班族帥哥……，你啜口熱咖啡，莫名所以的暗暗說聲：「タダイマ。」回來啦。

✲那兒有像樹一樣高大的亞述國王、色彩鮮麗的埃及浮雕、巨大的國王雕像、眞正的獅身人面像，就像個夢幻世界。

——佛洛伊德

有一種天氣是你喜歡的，草木鮮烈，天空蔚藍，陽光眩目，而你恰巧在空調涼颼颼的室內、車內或咖啡館或臨窗的屋裏，便容易讓人失去現實感，以爲外面也是如此的氣溫，冷，再加上反差極大的光影，就以爲自己置身在某個你想去或曾去過的國度。

例如搭乘你曾誓死不搭的捷運，三層樓的車行高度，所有醜怪的五樓老舊公寓當場被削去大半，立時變回了平房的那個時代，天空因此大量的露出來，竟有曠遠之意，令你好久不曾有的想起原來這是一個海洋國家，而海就在那天際不遠處令人神往；有時車行攔腰穿過幾座盆地邊緣的

小丘陵，你若成功的沒被其下的廢料場亂葬崗干擾，而只管被陽光翻飛的相思樹林，會叫你立時想起深秋時的某地中海植滿橄欖樹的小島；有時車停某站，正凌駕於某失勢權貴但仍占住不走的深宅大院，想辦法忽視赤道雨林味道的第倫桃叢不看，那襯著海洋色天空的小笠原松會召喚起好多人少年時必定有過的金山海濱露營；但十幾層的大廈仍舊擋去天空遮住你的視野，陰鬱的天氣，車行在更顯灰敗無色的大樓與低矮違建之間穿梭而過時，你心底、你甚至以爲別人心底也都會自然響起一段小喇叭樂聲，伍迪艾倫在《安妮霍爾》中回憶他幼年住在高架橋下時的配樂，Sleeping Lagoon，情調相反於它的歌詞，赤道的月亮，沉睡的珊瑚礁，和你……，奇怪爲什麼會是一首描述熱帶島嶼的歌？

這樣的經驗，愈來愈珍稀了，除了平日不得不的生活動線之外，你變得不願意亂跑，害怕發現類似整排百年茄冬不見的事，害怕發現一年到頭住滿了麻雀和綠繡眼的三十尺高的老槭樹一夕不見，立了好大看板，賣起一坪六十萬以上的名門宅第，它正對的金華街二四三巷一列五十年以上的桉樹也給口口聲聲愛這島愛這城的市長大人給砍了，並很諷刺的當場建了個種滿小樹的社區小公園。

你再也不願走過這些陌生的街巷道，如此，你能走的路愈來愈少了。

你走過羅斯福路一銀背後的晉江街一四五號，木門上對聯般的寫著：公有土地、禁止占用。第一次，你希望這個政府繼續保持低落的行政效率，無能無暇處理公產，就讓鳥兒和豐沛生長的

樟樹大王椰占用下去吧。類此的美麗廢墟還有浦城街二二巷一號和七號（它們共同的隔鄰三號是國大圖書館書庫，但意義上並無不同）、中山北路一段八三巷三十弄五條通華懋飯店的對門，占住者是香樟怪、九重葛精、芒果婆婆……，長春路二四九號，雀榕趴在牆頭，桑和大桉杵門前，隔鄰的二五一和二五三倒是被人占住，二五五號的絲瓜正黃花大開，此外尚有臨沂街六三巷十八號斜對門，構樹、榕、麵包樹三國鼎立，謙卑向隅的羅漢松，可以想像種植者寓居南國的曾經一個秋日的心情。

也有屋子一角被做違建好久了，羅斯福路三段一四〇巷二號；也有被野貓仔們盤據，泰順街二六巷三號，三毛貓和花狸貓敢出來接受你的餵食，小黑貓咪貓頭鷹似的坐在暗處；也有房屋已塌了一半的剖面屋，可清楚看出昭和型家屋的建材和構成，如和平東路一段二四四號和潮州街一四三、一四五號；也有一整條巷子數十年如一日不變、護城河功能的用來隔離國民黨宣傳機關中廣中視，建國南路一段二一二巷，五九號住著一家狗，狗媽媽機警膽小，典型的雜種狗，但笑容可掬十分親人的麥色白色等五隻小奶狗卻照眼就知爸爸一定有秋田血統（此段文字絕無任何寓意）；四九號住一羣鬼，五三號一家人，三七號一園小孩，再過去一家的占住者是你見過最技巧的占住者，無門牌無信箱，人耶狐耶？庭園裏修剪整齊的梔子柚子枇杷烏桕告訴你，種植花木者定是外省人狐。

也有屋子早荒朽成齏粉遭風吹眇只存庭園和圍牆門台，門台上，小型森林似的長著不灰不綠

從恐龍時代就有的木賊，如師大路九二巷古莊公園正對的七號。

當然也有保存完好、至今仍有人居，可能是官家或傭人，或二者的後人居住著的，例如長安東路一段二十號，位在主後一九三七年奠基的基督長老教會後門的小蔣故居，圍牆外的牆根散發著夜夜在×條通飲讌的日人所遺的尿騷味；圍牆頭防盜鐵絲網上纏滿粉紅的珊瑚藤和川七的杭州南路一段七五號；有未戰死未失蹤的男主人在終戰回來第一年種的巨大麵包樹如臨沂街六一巷九號；也有男主人種的是肯氏南洋杉的臨沂街四四巷一號；也有一樣從南洋回來卻選擇緬梔的泰安街三巷二號之一；也有一家你無從猜測身分、幅員面抵整排公寓的泰安街二巷三號，與它平行隔巷的銅山街六巷一號探出含笑和芒果好像你外公家；但更像外公家的應該是浦城街二四巷十一號，很多人的老相簿裏都有那麼一張站在平戶杜鵑和桂圓樹前的小塊水泥地上騎三輪腳踏車載妹妹弟弟的黑白發黃照片；也有像瑞安街二六四巷二三號、七號和一號，你幼時看國聯電影公司拍的瓊瑤電影《菟絲花》裏女主角循址找尋位於羅斯福路的深宅大院應該是這裏比較對，要不唯一有可能的也該是青田街一一巷十號或九巷的四號和對門一號。

也有住者認眞維護其原貌，沒用水泥糊了山牆上的牛眼窗或屋頂的老虎窗的，如仁愛路二段九一巷七號和九號、濟南路二段六二巷四號、仁愛路三段二四巷一弄七一號，他們甚至連植物都嚴格護持住，只種櫻和羅漢松和南洋杉，不讓鳥兒們四處播種的雀榕和大小葉桑衍生，有些完好如新生南路一段九七巷三四號，煉瓦、黑杉木壁襯一株羅漢松，活活一項某某流的插花作品，也

像你在東山五條慣見的町屋，再大一些的話，就可用來做社區小型博物館如信濃大町的鹽の博物館。

但無論牛眼窗糊不糊掉、大葉桑小葉桑種或不種、川七摘是不摘來吃……，這些人家都有一個共通點，漆或不漆的木質大門上都用粉筆寫著：聯、央、聯央、聯國或國民，從來不見自、不見台，整條巷子無一例外，不得不令人想到阿里巴巴四十大盜以門上記號做爲日後殺或不殺與否的故事，有朝一日。

有朝一日，這些人家巷弄將被也愛台灣的新朝政府給有效率的收回產權並建成偷工減料的郵政宿舍、海關宿舍、××大學教師宿舍、首長官舍……，就如同除了五二巷之外的溫州街曾經的每一條巷弄，屆時你將再無路可走，無回憶可依憑，你何止不再走過而已，你記得一名與你身分相同的小說作者這樣寫過，「原來沒有親人死去的地方，是無法叫做故鄉的。」你並不像他如此苛求，你只謙畏的想問，一個不管以何爲名（通常是繁榮進步偶或間以希望快樂）不打算保存人們生活痕跡的地方，不就等於一個陌生的城市？一個陌生的城市，何須特別叫人珍視、愛惜、維護、認同……？

——除了如意峯外，還有金閣寺附近大北山的「左大文字」，松崎山的「妙法」、西賀茂明見山的「船形」、上嵯峨山的「牌坊形」等五座山相繼焚起火來。在約莫四十分鐘的焚火時間裏，市內的霓虹燈、廣告燈都一起熄滅了。千重子看見火光映照的山色和夜空，不由得感受到這是初秋

了。——

一覺起來，大廈間振翼穿梭的烏鴉的啊啊喊聲，使你恍若在深山古剎，你的旅館房間臨窗正可遠眺東山，八月裏來的話，不需到鴨川的納涼床，晚上依窗喝著涼清酒就可看到如意峯上燃點的大文字送鬼篝火吧。

水沸了，你沖了一杯旅館供應的宇治綠茶袋，按開電視，一句也不懂的語言，混著茶香，是你深濃記憶裏氣味的一部分，有時還有百貨公司匯集的所有名牌香水味，有時是冷清沒有半點食物跡象的和果子老鋪所點的京香和煎茶香，有時是密閉空間如車廂咖啡館裏酷愛乾淨的男人女人身上所散發的皂香乳液古龍水，或甚至就是中央空調裏放置的芳香劑……，整個城市上空盤桓不去的氣味，也許還得加上不能缺少的烏鴉味，令你，死前一定會想念吧，最熟悉的氣味。

你站在御旅所左轉寺町通口的丹波屋，猶豫不決該買哪一種糲糬，外裹滿小倉豆、滾滿黃豆粉的或餡子是小倉豆的綠色草餅？以往你都買六個一盒的，和女兒各吃三枚，走到哪兒吃到哪兒，伏見稻荷大社前的、七條京阪驛的、祇園繩手通口的……，女兒不在，一定吃不完，只好等A來再買了分食吧。

麩屋町通口，你決定過街去ALBA買幾把咖啡匙叉，盤算曾經讚美過你那彎刀造形的刀叉匙的有哪幾個人，此外，你終於決定買那一張義大利Taitu的大碟子，上面布滿了各式各樣落葉喬木秋天的葉子，圖鑑的畫法，你曾在志賀直哉故居巷口的茶論咖啡館見老闆用同樣花色的小碟盛

手工製餅乾，你看了好幾年，因爲有點貴，回島上去時，島上難有秋天，那幾片秋色十足的葉子老會鮮明的浮在你眼前。

店員聽出你是異國人，格外仔細的替你包紮以免飛行途中打破。好久以來你沒這麼快樂過，有了這幾片不會改變、快樂的青剛櫟葉、毛栗葉、山毛欅、橡樹葉、白楊赤楊葉……，回去以後的很多個冬天你都敢過了。

島上的冬天據描述是這般：十二月臘梅坼、茗花發、水仙負冰、梅青綻、山茶灼、雪花大出。然而事實是，那日，省市長選後的次日，你徘徊在蕭條的舊日兒童樂園前決定不了進不進園，倒發現榕鬚、薜荔、紗草夾纏下有一石碑，上刻大字：太古巢舊址。太古巢，台灣名儒陳維英頤神養生之地也。碑上大意說，陳維英（一八一一—一八六九），清嘉慶年間生，大龍峒港仔墘人。博通羣史，廣涉百家。咸豐九年中了舉人，做過閩縣教諭、內閣中書，歸台後主持仰山、學海兩所書院，弟子千餘人。五十歲時，陳維英遷入依山傍水的太古巢隱居。日據時代相傳，這是取「山靜如太古」之意。也有人說，太古巢最早是原住民的一個發源地名。較可信的說法則是，嘉慶、道光年間，該處原爲「台哥寮」，也就是痲瘋病患的集中所，「台哥」台語發音正近似「太古」。陳維英死後，太古巢逐漸傾圮沒落。一九〇六年，日人自其北端開山架橋，太古巢首當其衝，遂難逃坼毀的命運。

你望望身旁並肩在讀碑文的陳維英老鬼魂，說不出一句話。像是一則各種年老民族必定會有

的那類寓言，你們曾經不具任何知識、歷史知識，與它愉悅自然的相處過活，待有一天你具備了了解它的知識，並略覺愧疚的重新善待它（雖然你以往對它也傾心相待），但它再也不一樣了，與過往不一樣了，這，難道又只是人或民族必定會有的中年懷舊？你不願意承認，相信陳維英也一樣，更相信此刻在你們腳底十八層地獄不見天日的明治橋也一樣，因爲與勅使街道同年歲的楓香不見了大半，美麗的宮ノ下參道變成長了無數腫瘤羣醫束手的景象，醜透了，你帶著哀悼的心情走避，死去的，當然包括你的一部分。

同樣討厭的知識告訴你，原來憑空多出的那大足球場原址是一九二三年建的運動場，爲了做歡迎還是太子的昭和南巡之用，國府初期給第七艦隊美軍顧問團使用，剛當選的市長在足球之夜繪過未來市政藍圖，足球場也許做爲巨蛋球場用地，屆時，你與更多的老年楓香都將加入陳維英隊伍了。

美琪飯店什麼時候成了上海商銀？

城市，銀行和嫖妓的基地，摩天大樓雜草式的亂長。設計帝國飯店的萊特(Frank Lloyd Wright)早說過。

你像一個去國多年的人一樣，由衷的喟歎著，奇怪想不起那一家接一家的婚紗攝影禮服公司原來是些什麼地方，卻見聖多福教堂老樣子的在那裏，鐵欄杆圍牆上掛著同樣匠氣的外銷油畫，老樣子的透過路樹的冬天光影仍把油畫染得變成風景不可少的部分，那曾是你們幻想走天涯的一

部分，在路邊賣畫或演奏擅長的樂器。

這裏賣畫的人都是啞巴聽障（你們到很後來才想到可能他們僅只是賣畫人）。當初那些發誓與你要浪跡天涯賣藝過活的好友們倒都全在國外，有的做賢妻良母，有的在電腦公司做高級主管，也有隨名廚老公一州一州的中國餐館過吉普賽人的生活，也有像A一去從沒回過國，另有每年暑假回國的，帶著的孩子與你女兒的語言不通，無法像上一代一樣變成好友很令你們失望。

你們吃頓飯，喝個下午茶，聊遍眼前事，獨獨不再提過往，過往很像那些被移植或砍掉的茄冬和楓香。

因此你都不願意和別人回憶過往，並非因爲新的事情太多，新的店、新的偶像、新的醜聞、新的賺錢機會、新的誰誰誰老公的情人、新朝新貴……，你猜想他們正因爲能夠不記得曾經存在的，才能迅速與新的好壞事物相處無間吧。這你無法做到，你甚至半點不肯感慨「舊情綿綿」變成那樣，誠品變成芝蔴婚紗，它們相較於過往對你來說都曾是太新的東西，你不願與它有任何關係，哪怕只是買本雜誌喝杯咖啡，因爲那又將種下一場流逝的開端，否則你如何能全心慨歎奇怪晴光市場要如何才能進入，你依稀記得的位置如今布滿了麥當勞佐丹奴三商巧福尼采精品或溫蒂7—11米雪兒服飾HANG—TEN，你彷彿晉太元中武陵人捕魚爲業……

——千重子一邊回想這些往事，一邊漫步在通往野野宮的小路上。這條小路有塊不太舊的路牌，上面寫著「通往竹林深處」幾個字。原來比較幽暗的地方如今明亮多了。門前的小賣店也揚

起吆喝聲。然而，這《源氏物語》提到過的小小神社如今依然如故——

不僅依然如故，自從幾年前明仁天皇次子禮宮夫妻來植過樹後，香火更加鼎盛，全是祈良緣，你並無良緣可祈。過了鐵道，人跡仍少，可能太冷了，你早上看ＮＨＫ的氣象報告，日中也只有攝氏五六度，因此櫻花祭可能會破往年紀錄的延後一星期，你不禁擔心Ａ短短的假期會等不到櫻花正唉——天啊你晚上回旅館可能就會看到Ａ，你但願她不會像很多去國多年的人一樣滿口英文，那樣會增加你們溝通的緊張度，你也希望Ａ不要像美國人那樣不修邊幅引人注目，當然你不能想像Ａ穿得規規矩矩例如西裝式外套繫絲巾什麼的，你不知道她是短髮還長髮，你們這個年紀，頭髮如何精心整理通常只有兩種款式，短髮歐巴桑頭和長髮歐巴桑頭。天啊你們眞是好些年沒見了，Ａ後來也不再寄相片給你，你最後一次寄給她就是與女兒坐在祇園白川巽橋上的。你不免害怕，你們會坐在旅館大廳各一隅，互瞄個半天然後心裏喊著：老天難道我也像她一樣如此難認了嗎！

出了竹林，只是平常住家，向陽的庭園裏勉強有開拆之意的是很像梨花的透白的大島櫻。太冷了，料想沒有遊客，近落柿舍的人形藝品小賣店閉門未開，只店前鋪著紅氈的長木板凳未收，你決定從「去來之墓」那條路走去，記憶中，四月的某一個土曜或日曜日，清涼寺會有嵯峨大念佛狂言上演。

去來之墓在一片年紀至多八九十年的小杉林中，女兒常在林間摘採不知有毒沒毒的菇和野

莓，也常有不怕人的野斑鳩，女兒就更不肯走了。

杉林前的田裏有時長滿了鵝黃色的油菜花，那種時候連田畔的桃花都開了；有時農人在焚草葉，焚草時落柿舍院裏的柿子樹通常葉已落盡，墨黑的枝幹上星星點點懸著落日紅的柿子，應該跟數百年前詩人芭蕉所見的景色無異吧……。你每次都忍不住立誓，若你家附近也有那麼一小片五十年不會改變的杉樹林，那麼女兒一輩子在其中終日廝混、不識字、不事生產……，你都絕對支持。

這會是一個非常嚴苛的心願嗎？

二尊院門前的竹器店倒是營業中，密閉玻璃屋裏生著暖暖的煤油爐，你不忘記替討厭日本人但覺得小耙子實在便利爬梳園藝的父親買了一隻，店主可能見你嘴唇凍得紺青，禮貌的說聲好冷呀，你聽得懂，但答不出，只好朝他傻笑。

二尊院到清涼寺的橫巷是你最喜歡的一條路，你且用拉鍊式走法，不放過繞進每一更小的巷弄。

除了四時的色調不同，每一戶人家都是恆久記憶中的那個樣子，泡沫經濟那幾年曾有比較大的變化，有些人家買了車，便把庭院一部分挪做車位，還好僅止於此。砌石牆的人家高處爬滿豐沛的長春藤、近山溝處則鋪滿了馬齒莧，你忍不住摘一瓣泛著澀澀霧光的肉質葉莖，冰涼肥厚的觸感很像女兒最愛跟你手牽手年紀時候的手指頭；院子大的人家，有在焚燒修斫下的杉樹枝葉，

馨烈的魔煙險些把你催眠不去，你仍得保持步履，不願前面不遠兩名雙頰凍紅各懷一孫在聊天的歐巴桑認出你只是遊客；臨著竹林土塀牆上長年懸飾著幾把乾蘆葦的大戶人家的秋田犬，老樣子只望著你，不吠；沒有一家的櫻花在堅硬蓓蕾以上的狀態，有花的話，也都只是海碗大的白木蓮和血紅的椿花，椿花往往開至盛極，整朵花連蒂栽倒於茸綠苔地，慘麗非常。

古都的大小寺廟神社不知多少，每個人獨鍾某寺某院都有不同的理由，你喜歡來這個有些旅遊書上甚至沒提及推介的清涼寺。

起先是同情的理由，這清涼寺如同它的名一般不分四季都好蕭條冷清，此外它本堂旁有一「秀賴首塚碑」，當日火燒大阪城，豐臣秀賴在天守閣自盡，遺體失蹤成謎，而今數十年前，附近女子學校興建宿舍，挖到愼重包裹良好的人首，根據包巾上的家徽圖樣判斷是秀賴首，便重新葬在清涼寺。清涼寺除了本堂和靈寶館參拜須付費外，境內自由無料，便見居民大門側門穿進穿出走捷徑，當然你也看過趕上課的大學男生持一盒鮮奶專程來餵境內的一隻大貓，也看過上班族中年男人下班途中匆匆拐進來合掌參拜，不過騎單車來此的嵯峨野小學校的學生比較多，他們寒天也穿著短褲短裙，兩頰又紅又鼓像富士蘋果，搶著大聲說話吹牛爭論，很像藤子不二雄手下那幾名小鬼，此外尚有穿蕾絲邊圍裙來遛狗的少婦以及大量的老人們。

久了，你比較是感同其情，你常坐在簡陋的木條凳上，任女兒放野小狗四下跑，來的時節若是梅雨剛過，古鐘樓旁潦草的梅樹林便可摘到熟透的黃梅，梅子在樹上熟透時，向陽的那面會泛

著很美的嫣紅，但仍舊酸透了，你難卻女兒盛情，吃得牙都倒了。

是這樣吧，在死之前，若還有一點點時間，還有一點點記憶，你還可以選擇去哪裏，就像很多人急著無論如何要離開醫院而回到他熟悉之地通常是所謂的家，你，會選擇這裏吧，因爲，因爲唯有在你曾經留下點點滴滴生活痕跡的地方，所有與你有關的都在著，那不定它們就會一直一直那樣在下去，那麼你的即將不在的意義，不就被稀釋掉了嗎？

你曾讀過某人記憶他在死牢裏的自傳，他說，看到窗外如常的陽光，聽到警衛在聽收音機傳出的熟悉小調，只要這些明天如常在著，他的死，就顯不出來了。

爲什麼不是選擇你出生、成長、生育子女並初老的城市呢？

爲什麼不是你來自的城市？……你坐在木條凳上，冰得像坐在水裏。

告示木牌上寫著，四月的第二個日曜日和第三個土曜日才有嵯峨大念佛狂言。

大概，那個城市所有你曾熟悉、有記憶的東西都已先你而死了。

此刻隔著大洋想起來，它更像一條陌生、沒有航標的大河，你生活其上，時不時做些妄想撈月或做些刻舟求劍之類的傻事。例如你來的前一個月，某鄰國在你們島的南北海域連續飛彈演習，整個島便有很多人搗了蜂巢似的衆聲嘈雜沸騰。你是屬於相信或會戰起但並不害怕的那類人，緣此，當然另外尚有相信會戰並且很怕、不相信會有戰爭因此不怕、不相信會戰但還是很怕的……幾類人。

你不怕，是不過因爲早早發現面臨重大、尤其生死存亡時，人所能做的實在不多，例如某國火山爆發，方圓好危險範圍內的居民奇怪怎麼都不跑人；你早弄不清的中非或巴爾幹半島現在到底是誰打誰，但那些戰區百姓怎麼傻傻的不趕快去國；登革熱發生率如此高的高雄，怎麼還有幾百萬人面不改色的照住不誤；一年有一半時間泡在水裏的東石鄉民怎如此認命？……

你終於明白，其實你們啥事也無法做，你們二十四小時的生活規律如常，無房地可變賣，無餘錢去銀行排長龍擠兌美金，你只得和很多人一樣首度希望某國國防的科技水準能和山姆大叔在波灣戰役表現的同樣好，射得準一點，準準的把飛彈定點射到他們認爲是禍首的那人家裏就好，千萬別殃及無辜。眞的有人這樣相信，起碼你丈夫一個賃屋的同事便因此遷出離官邸五百公尺方圓的租住。

那些充滿了笑話和聰明主意多空交戰的日子裏，有時你站在街口等紅燈（有一次等好久，因爲閣揆要回家吃晚餐），看著街景，忍不住想，這，會是最後一眼嗎？那就記下它吧……，發覺好難記，不特別提醒自己的話，向左望向右望，無一例外被各種醜怪市招包裹著、住商不分的五層七層十三層樓幢，騎樓人行道擠滿了摩托車檳榔攤消防栓垃圾桶，天啊老年癡呆提早病發這是哪裏!?三重？中永和？新莊？台中重劃區？台南重劃區？……

是一條沒有航標的大河，偏你不信，老想不止兩次揷足同一條河流，三千年了，不改。

✻當我死時，你會發現白橡樹印在我的心版上。

——梭羅

白橡樹最高可達三十五公尺，葉子呈裂齒狀，美極了的溫帶喬木，季節正巧的時候，樹下常落一地造型可愛的橡子，女兒在迷トトロ龍貓的年紀，每天撿拾一衣口袋把它當作ドングリ栗子，旅館桌子堆不下了掉在地氈上，清潔工倒也從未把它們當垃圾清掉。

誠實的說，印在你死前心版上的，當然不會是白橡樹。

會是什麼呢？

走過尋常的燒烤店，你被薰得熱淚盈眶，或許，或許是那××食堂吧。××有時是老闆的名字，阿水，阿旺，有時是小鎮的鎮名，銅鑼食堂什麼的，食堂的看板店招從南到北一律漆著原意可能是海洋的褪色的藍，四周畫著紅色的魚、彎曲身軀的蝦，一絲不差的好像現在遍見的各種加盟店。食堂大多位於小鎮熱鬧的中心，通常在縱貫線火車站旁，你外公去遠處出診或北上開帝大醫學專科同學會的日子，外婆就拋開先生娘的身分，揣著私房錢，挑一個最疼的第三代，很長一段時間是你，去食堂切半隻白斬黃油雞和麻油腰花，這些都是外公平日嚴格控制外婆的高血壓不准多吃的。你哪愛吃這些，一心只想吃金剛糖球或是醃芭樂，因此火車站廊下的小筱仔店才是你的聖地。你掙脫外婆，口裏含著嚥不下的肥油皮，溜到火車站廊下玩耍，你抱著它光滑檜香的廊柱，臉頰親愛的偎著它，很小時候就感覺出火車站的莊嚴和那單調不興旺的小鎮不成比例。

同樣不成比例的還有郵局，你有時跟屁蟲必定要隨你外公的司藥去郵局辦事，郵局特高的屋頂、陰涼森嚴如故事裏官府的氣氛叫你自動收了哭鬧，你的直覺眞是半點沒錯，百年前治台的第三任民政長官後藤新平引唐詩「不睹皇居壯，安知天子尊」，說到做到，此後十年，你們或親愛或畏懼的駅站郵便局在全島陸續完工。儘管你外公家不在舊日的府州廳，車站仍有個文藝復興式的三角形山頭，駅站內有著具體而微光滑無槽的托次坎柱子，不看廊下和式的木柱和木窗和粉彩藍的窗櫺的話，是典型的樣式建築。

本質上，它們混亂的風格，和你分不出是三重永和桃園的那些非洋非閩非台非違建的混亂樣貌有很大的差別嗎？爲何前者的拆毀重建曾令人如此驚慟，難道只因爲附加了記憶嗎？那麼女兒的時代，必定也有屬於她充滿溫暖回憶的事物了，難道你只是像很多初老的人一樣，不知不覺掉進懷舊的陷阱罷了？

……應該還是不一樣吧，你隔著大洋，化繁爲簡的清楚看著女兒的生活動線，學校（校齡六年的學校只因更換兩位校長而徹底動工兩次，毫無必要的玄關挪這兒銅像移那兒，可憐的校樹非戰之罪的被掘起來改植他種）、家（附近的山坡被財團建成十來幢大廈空屋）、朋友家（玩電腦）、同學家（玩電腦）、堂哥家（玩電腦）、速食店、百貨公司……，當你們在鳥不生蛋的國家都可以在布置、色調、空調溫度一樣的速食店裏輕易點到口味價位一樣的速食時，女兒會對這家麥當勞移到隔條街口或那家31冰淇淋關門有若何不可取代的記憶嗎？

當這塊土地沒有了無可取代的東西能夠黏住人民時，人民只能無可奈何而非心甘情願的留下……，新的統治者一定也察覺這一點了吧，難怪把社區主義高喊入雲，希望藉此人民能夠不看佛面（國家機器、統治者）看僧面（鄉土、同胞），後者的政治正確性哪兒有人敢挑戰，你何曾見過無所不批判的反對黨敢對土地人民有過任何微詞。

屬於女兒的時代，她會記得的，或她會爲它的不在而驚慟的，會是什麼？會是什麼印在她的心版上？

美麗的白橡樹？嫣紅熟透的黃梅？龍馬墓前的金龜子幼蟲繭？上廁所時懸夾在褲腰上的計步器掉進便池因而哇哇大哭的知恩院？哲學の道琵琶湖疏水道裏的野蛤？洛匠庭園池裏的太陽旗錦鯉？醍醐寺院牆口那株奧村土牛畫過的大垂櫻？河原町三條寶塚五樓每年一部的小叮噹長篇映畫？聖護院八橋的和餅？東大寺境內的鴿羣和拾銀杏葉？做功課的 Doutor 咖啡？還是嵯峨駅對面的和紙店？……她都好放心，每次還在前去的車上就盤算著，這次可以買些什麼什麼紙，街角轉個彎就到，永遠在那兒開著，從來不曾讓她失望，和紙店隔幾家有家叫廣瀨的小咖啡館，家庭式的不超過十五個人座位，咖啡菸霧中到處散置著報紙雜誌比誰家都亂，女兒總在那裏迫不及待的打開新買的和紙摺起來，你透著米色蕾絲窗紗的窗口望望街景，覺得從未離開過，不論這次距上次已過了一年或好幾季，無論你已經從二十歲到四十一歲。

大概是這個原因吧，清涼寺永遠會在那裏，世界文化遺產十七社寺的天龍寺清水寺延曆寺永

遠會在那兒，有著多種文化指定財和國寶的東本願寺南禪寺東福寺永遠會在那兒，二條城野野宮永遠會在那兒……，但凡在有一點點人活過的地方，這，稀奇嗎？

島內這些年不也有許多一級二級三級古蹟嗎，例如你和A會流連不去建於咸豐八年的龍山寺、以落鼻示警幫過淡水人打贏過法國人的清水祖師廟、眞理街淡江中學對面的傳教士宿舍洋樓……，有一年夏天，A穿著削肩T恤牛仔褲，你穿著涼鞋白短裙，兩人坐在雪白洋樓的陽台短垣上不知說什麼說得那樣開心，不察A的某名建築系男朋友拍下照片。

很長一段時間的每一個夏天，你總要抽空去一趟，清水街英專路口吃一碗石花冰或綠豆湯，好像你今天走到三年坂一定會到聖護院總鋪去吃碗拉麵和店家免費供應的和餅抹茶；有時你在渡船口下車，擠在一堆買魚網釣具魚丸鐵蛋的觀光客中，不過你一點也不煩躁，拾級而上到山腰的白屋去，苦楝樹下一個人都沒有，你坐在那裏一下午就像你坐在冰如水裏的清涼寺一樣，眼下是靜靜躺著的觀音山、右邊是長老會教堂尖頂和微露屋頂的偕醫館、一八八〇年建的偕醫館旁的大榕樹和緬梔花，與呂基正、楊三郎數十年前寫生時所見無異，你又覺得你好像從未離開過一樣。

一直到某一年，你帶著確定要結婚的丈夫拜訪你的祕密花園。如同往常一樣，熟門熟路逕穿過偕醫館旁的大榕樹下，你拉著他的手，邊提醒他注意腳下綠苔的濕滑，穿過斜坡濃蔭，豁然開朗，眼前的眞理街，不是了，是一條所有城鎮縣市都有的八線道寬的中山路，剎那間你竟然也想不起來原來該是什麼，你像個發現屍體報了警回現場卻見屍體也沒了血跡也沒了一切完好如常的

目擊者，你哽咽的告訴未來的丈夫，這裏原來不是如此如此，應該好像是那樣那樣，慌張的漫空指東指西，總之，你迷路了。

晉太元中，武陵人捕魚爲業，緣溪行，忘路之遠近……

你再也沒去了。

大概是這樣吧，你跨出這個管它什麼兩顆星或一級古蹟或指定文化財什麼的清涼寺古山門，不會令你失望駭異的，再冷的天，老鋪森嘉的門口仍羣聚著幾名買豆腐的附近居民。有一天，當你死後，他們一定還是一樣傍晚在這兒排隊買豆腐，死後的活人世界是如此的可預期，好令人放心呀。並不是只有你這麼想，一個自傳寫在死前兩三年的老導演說，對於所有老年人天天都得眞實面對的死亡問題，他唯一的心願只想能每十年從棺材裏坐起來讀讀報紙，知道這個世界仍運行如昔就足矣。

不是只有冰冷冷不染塵埃保存良好的古蹟就足矣……

你忽然很想見A，單單純純的想見她，忘情的想著眞的是親愛的十五歲時候比父母比什麼都與你要親的朋友呀。

天黯欲雪，平日擠滿了觀光客的渡月橋，現下一個人影都沒，橋顯得好長好遠，你把圍巾重新圍攏，瑟縮趨步的身姿令你想起好些年前電影《阿寒》裏吉永小百合走在同樣的渡月橋的一張劇照，但平闊的溪山和夾岸的人家燈火和燈籠式的路燈和橋上特有的又長又冷的風，好像五歲之

前的某一刻，外公外婆牽著你站在一條同樣空氣的大橋上，原先你睡熟的，被喊醒下車，外公指著要你看中部最大的河流大甲溪，你們立在大甲溪上新建好的大橋上，外婆用日語向外公感歎著什麼，可能是好大呀或好美呀或好冷呀，你全身罩著外婆剛剛懷抱過你暖暖的粉香，不知在憂傷什麼，可能是怕黑、怕外公。

果然飄雪了，你慢慢走在渡月橋上，戀戀憂傷的心情與近四十年沒再想起過的五歲前的某一刻一模一樣。

旅館會英語的辦事人員回答你，並沒有任何給你的留言、電話或傳眞。

你回房間看了一會兒新聞，並無任何空難的快報，不怪你神經質，像A她們美國人，應該是很守時守信的。

第一次你才覺得你們這種約法十分奇怪，農業社會式的，甚至尾生時代的，首先，你連她打算飛來的航空公司班次都不知道，全憑那一紙傳眞，A也沒問你從關西空港到旅館大致該如何接駁，只留了你傳給她的旅館址，大概，她也以爲這只是個小小的古城，比起她這些年待過的大都會，這確實比你們少年時愛跑的小鎭大不了太多。

這你才想，這一切，可是A在一時興起下的邀約罷了？例如工作上不愉快，或與丈夫同居者的一次嚴重爭吵……，這些都非常可能，不過一兩小時前你不是才忘情的極想見A，以爲她親愛過你的父母、丈夫、女兒？

你穿上最暖的裝備，臉上厚厚的敷一層防風的隔離霜，決定去吃寺町通和六角通交口的道樂螃蟹拉麵，儘管五點早已過了，五點之前，一大碗螃蟹拉麵加一盅鮭魚親子丼的套餐，只要八百九十圓。

吃完麵，飽了，暖了，整個黃昏的戀戀憂傷遙遠極了，原來是血壓低的關係，傍晚時，血醣血壓低，身體感到危險，就逼人去想生死大問題。

走到本能寺，才折回頭，燈火輝煌的三條通，好多國內各地來春季旅遊的高校生在買土產。女孩子們制服裙穿得短短的都不怕冷，擠在大西京扇堂店裏大概打算替母親挑一把美麗的京扇子吧，像很多年前你做的一樣。

你已經過門不入好多回了，但它總是在那兒，眞叫人放心。

三條穿到木屋町通了，你猶疑該走進去，還是走下一條平行臨鴨川的先斗町。木屋町的楊柳已抽芽飛綠了，讓路燈照得翠生生的。如此叫人愛不釋手難以抉擇的町路在你生長的城市曾經也不少，你們就往往走在最老的重建街上，邊下石階邊左顧右盼，每一條交叉而去的渺遠小巷都讓你們覺得錯失了不知會是多大的遺憾，還有A住過的雲和街、潮州街、廈門街、杭州南路等，A家在中部，中學大學就都在外租屋，房東常是已出國的政府退休官員所遺下專門負責收租的副官或傭人夫婦，依住所大小有時同時分租給好幾個學生。你偶爾留宿A的住處，有時一起聽也出去唸書的房東子女留下的老你們少說十年以上的唱片，那時候的歌好像喜歡在一間空洞洞的大空房

裏的錄音效果，好比 Nat King Cole 唱的 Too Young 和 When I fall in Love，錯過後者的四十年後可以在《西雅圖夜未眠》裏再度聽到，眞的是空空的房間，連 Paul Anka 唱 Dance on Little Girl 都顯得好生淒涼，你們坐在老傭人太太擦得冰亮的檜木地板上跟著唱片套上的歌詞唱，庭院的樹太密了，帶著蟬聲的夏天陽光都照不進來，木屋子有些部分快朽了，冒著微甜的香菇木耳味，混合著窗前的青苔地和鳳凰木彷彿有毒的刀形豆莢味，你和A交換過的一閃即逝不結婚的誓言，哪一樣，A可能不會忘記？

大學時，A雖在學校登記到宿舍，可是仍然保留最後在金華街的租處，正好堆放她過多的衣物和書籍，不過更重要的是，很快的那裏彷彿成了你們好幾個正戀愛昏頭的約會處。你在文學院某教室前等到A，問她今天回不回金華街，不回的話就鑰匙借你，A說鑰匙在誰誰誰另一名女孩那裏，並說誰誰誰老不摺被子、吃個東西也不收拾招一堆螞蟻，你回答A，你和×××一定會收拾好再離開，×××是你當時的男朋友，A看你一眼，咸豐七年春正月，大雪。

你和×××心存僥倖並且不大熟悉避孕的技術，×××體外射精在木質地板上，你拭了又拭，它融入木縫裏去，×××亂翻著A的書，沒興趣，遂放起房東子女的唱片，是坂本久的 Sukiyaki，又是在一間空盪盪的大房子錄的，二十歲的坂本久吹著悠揚的口哨，都不知道他會在二十三年後的八月十二日的國內空難裏死掉。

✲台民喜亂，如撲燈之蛾，死者在前，投者不已。

——仍是藍鼎元

A不借你鑰匙的話，你們就沒地方可去，煎熬不已的徘徊在街角，只好假裝去看電影，假裝去公園散步，假裝談點童年或哲學。

也曾經本來在等公車，後來情不自禁交纏到一間老公寓昏闇的樓梯間，結果被一住戶老頭打一對野狗似的趕出來。

後來眞的有點愛上其中一個男孩子了，就想過著想像中的夫妻生活，希望A能讓你住一段時間，你告訴父母你在學校抽到宿舍，至於原本只肯租給女生住的老傭人夫婦，錯覺你是主人驕橫的女兒，只得莫可奈何的忍耐著。

十年後再經過它，門上釘著寫有字的木牌，它變成某個泡沫政黨的島內支黨部，與你的愛情命運差不多。再十年後，它的命運遠不如泰順街五十巷五號的被做爲原住民旅北同鄉會，已經看不出有沒人住，門封死了，鳳凰木、芒果、後來追上的桐類密密遮了它的黑色煉瓦。前年，路拓寬，削掉一半，鄰人們的廢料垃圾得以堆棧。年初，夷爲平地，圈起工程圍籬。

清人得台，廷議欲墟其地。

——千重子：「養父母既然那麼疼愛我，我就不想我親生父母了。他們大概早已成了化野附近無人憑弔的遊魂了吧？那塊石碑都已經破舊不堪了……」春天，溪山柔和的暮色，幾乎把京都

的半邊天染上了一層淡淡的霞光——

祇園街上卻滿滿都是人，全往八坂神社走，花見小路口的一力亭茶屋門前站著好些等看藝妓的日本觀光客，好幾年前，你也曾和女兒坐在對門的科羅拉多咖啡館，隔著透明大窗等待藝妓。一力亭長年垂著布帘，隔著庭園可以見到空曠無人無擺設無聲響的玄關廣間，彷彿正待演出的舞台。

你也隨著人潮走，從神社到圓山公園夾道擺滿了小攤，有吃有玩的，小時候過年的氣氛，人潮流到大垂櫻前的廣場就滯淤了，儘管每天新聞都報了花訊，大家還是照來，這個季節不來也不好去哪兒。店家也一樣，每棵櫻樹下都早鋪了紅氈，隔段距離就燃起一竿庭燎，隔一會兒不知燃到什麼，爆起星散的火光，路人就又驚險又興奮的推擠鬼叫一陣，廣場邊，多了幾攤平日沒見過的街頭表演，可能都是外籍學生，有拉小提琴的，有穿燕尾服表演吞劍的，還有一名高個子金髮女子，希臘女神打扮，露著雪白的手膀演奏豎琴，冰藍色的眼珠凍得又結了一層薄冰。有電視公司正打強光照著大垂櫻，無非爲了再次說明今年眞是冷得還沒半點開花的跡象呢。

我在聖馬可廣場，看到天使飛翔的特技，摩爾人跳舞，但沒有你，親愛的，我孤獨難耐。

你邊走邊欣賞著樹下一攤攤的醉態，有上班族男生扯鬆了領帶，對女同事忽然操著蠻橫的口氣，女同事們奇怪都不生氣，像媽媽一樣的微笑忍受，老先生們喝得比較徹底，早就衣冠不整，汗巾綁在額頭上唱起演歌來，很像你的外公，其中一人亂中見到你，醉態可掬的喊住你：「ネエ

サン！」叫你大姊，也很像你外公，喝了些酒時會這樣喊你外婆。那時被喊「ネエサン」的外婆是什麼樣子？傻笑著？在外公面前永遠傻笑著但同時不忘帶領傭人和你的舅媽她的媳婦們在搓湯圓，做綠色的蟻粄，若第二天是上元節，次日你們得去公太的墓前掛紙的話。你最怕吃蟻粄，綠綠冰冰黏黏的用一截月桃葉片托著，天知道月桃最愛長在墳地，辛烈的氣味根本就是長年吸食死人骨髓的結果。

因爲害怕吃沾了死人氣的蟻粄就不上墳，因爲逃上墳就要求在上元節前回父母家……，好些年後，成了忘記自己原先也是有墳可上的人。

粵人祀三山國王，漳人祀開漳聖王，泉人祀保生大帝。

依歲時，大晦日除夜，你於清水寺前靜穆心情聆聽僧侶們撞那一四七八年造迄今的古鐘；次日，平安神宮初詣，神宮境內前日的篝火餘煙給凍得直直的；七日內還沒離去的話，便去上賀茂神社觀看單調的白蒼馬奏覽神事，神前供養著七草和七草粥；花祭第二個日曜日，醍醐寺的太閤花見行列，重現慶長三年暮年的豐臣秀吉最後一次偕妻北政所、妾淀君和百官在醍醐寺的賞花大會；月末，伏見稻荷大社的稻荷祭，朱塗飛簷梁柱襯著墨綠的黑松，鼓笛尺八終日不歇；五月葵祭，爲了躲梅雨季，你從未參加過；夏末，愛宕山下化野念佛寺的千燈供養；九月杪，本能寺僧在大堰川施餓鬼法會；十月終，北野天滿宮余香祭；二十二日，A的生日。

二十二日，時代祭，你尾隨人潮和鼓笛音從御所、烏丸通、三條、到神宮道，遊行行列皆做

著名朝代人物的服飾妝扮，古都秋天一幅優雅的歷史風俗繪卷，向你緩緩展開……，有幕末志士桂小五郎、坂本龍馬，江戶時代名女人吉野太夫、出雲阿國，桃山時代的秀賴和織田信長，鎌倉時代的大原女、桂女、淀君、靜御前，藤原時代的紫式部、清少納言，殿後的是延曆時代公卿諸臣的上朝情景與平安神宮遷都時警護的丹波弓箭組。

至於島上的歲時節慶，三月十五迎保生大帝，三月二十三媽祖生，五月十三霞海城隍祭，五月六日清水祖師得道升天之日，十月十日水仙尊王祭……，你常常被迫參加的是金母娘娘的婚喪喜慶，眞的是婚喪喜慶，不然何以一年裏那麼好些次，巷口的慈惠宮鋪天蓋地一夕間搭起醜怪的鐵棚架，當路口好大一尊汽油桶，上漆著要求車輛改道的小學三年級字跡，然後就連擺至少三日的十幾桌信衆們，嚼蠟似的無甚表情在看改黃版的歌仔戲或朱延平電影。平日，廟祝及其執迷者都在門首勤練乩童技藝，它是六合彩組頭收放彩金處，也是該里大小選舉的投開票點，和某某農會來推銷花粉蒜精的說明會場所。

你每走過九十分貝誦經聲和金爐紙煙繚裊的宮前，見廟祝穿件印著××金獅團汗衫和街坊幾個有名的遊民一起泡茶摳癢看豬哥亮錄影帶，迷惑它在本質上與同樣被町民們充分使用的清涼寺眞的有天差地別嗎？不然爲什麼你會願意在清涼寺無所事事坐一下午，而走避不及的逃離你天天得行經的慈惠宮？

——舍祖宗之丘墓、族黨之團圓，隔重洋而渡險，竄處於天盡海飛之地——

近三百年前的《諸羅縣志》曾經如此描述你的母系祖先。

你的祖先在「片板不許下水，粒貨不許越疆」的年代，僅攜著一根扁擔就渡海，扁擔至今供在祠堂。關於這名祖先的傳奇，版本很多，有成功有失敗，端視後代子孫教訓子女時所需。你比較喜歡的是矢內原忠雄的說法：青年爲土匪、壯年成富豪（與現今多麼的一模一樣）。

扛根扁擔、羅漢腳的祖先，曾經一心想，甚至眞的成功當過土匪……，這樣想著，你不禁從心底一路笑到嘴角……

夠了，你覺得夠了，今晚足夠了，可以回旅館，不管A在不在、來不來。

四條大橋頭的巡旅僧仍杵著，不知是否是同一人。鴨川畔，規定似的每隔五公尺就一對緊緊相擁的戀人。氣溫只有攝氏兩度。

木屋町通的阪急電車地下道口圍著一大羣人，是一名一人樂隊演唱的老外，短袖T恤仍唱得渾身大汗，歌是你年輕時的流行歌繫條黃絲帶在老橡樹上，點歌的日本女孩拉著女伴很樂的就地隨意起舞，桃精柳鬼一般。你也駐足在人羣裏，高瀨川畔的楊柳美透了，記憶中，只有詩詞描述的蘇州和大學時學校側門瑠公圳畔的情景可比。

樂聲結束，圍觀的年輕人一陣鼓掌口哨騷動，有人遞了張鈔票，又點了一首你年輕時流行過的歌，有意讓唱者歇息似的，是節奏較慢的Alone Again，你喜歡得不得了的，因此不忍卒聽，漸行漸遠。

晉太原中，武陵人捕魚爲業，緣溪行，忘路之遠近，忽逢桃花林——

應該是，清康熙年間，漳州南靖人郭錫瑠自大坪林引水做灌溉渠道，造木筧引青潭溪水橫過景美溪，經公館折向大加蚋堡，自乾隆五年到二十五年，是爲瑠公圳。

你打算好好睡一場覺，放棄了四條街上一家家美麗咖啡館的又濃又香的熱咖啡。

——千重子抓住紅格子門，目送孿生姊妹苗子遠去。苗子始終沒有回頭。千重子的額髮上飄落了少許細雪，很快就消融了。整個市街也還在沉睡著。(全文完) ——《古都》

飛機是上午十點起飛，因此你離開旅館時仍是清晨，整個市街也還在沉睡著。你回頭望望，目送你的只有早起的旅館經理，你無法向他解釋爲何不等花祭，並且取消原先預訂的一星期的住房。

你直覺A不會來了——自始至終你都沒相信她會來對不對？——她比較像三線道的那些茄冬，比較像坂本久悠揚的口哨，比較像曾經的很多個夏天，你們相約在火車站前，你等她的時候多，烈日當空照得你一無所覺，心臟太新，血管夠韌，汗水濕透前胸後背都未有任何異味，那時天人還未五衰，你是四條大橋橋頭四時不動如清涼地的巡旅僧，心如止水。

不知打從什麼時候開始，飛機著陸島上震動的那一剎那，你都會默唸「土番所處，海鬼所踞，未有先王之制」，咒語似的唸一次以後，就比較能接受一出機場的黏熱和逃難一般的混亂瘋狂場面。

果然便有個開九人巴的中年司機用日語向你遊說招攬，並頻頻催促你決定。你猜想他是在推銷他的車位和旅館。你不開口，決定當一名異國人，便頷首答應，於是你被俘虜似的掠上車，車裏的標幟告訴你，原來是火車站附近的旅館，記得以前一個住南部的好友北上考聯考時就是住在那一家。

旅館應該距本町書街不遠，你掏出在祇園書坊買的一本介紹島國的旅遊書，書內且附有殖民地時代的地圖和景點。司機先生臨闔上車門際瞄到了，指戳著你手上的地圖忽然啞巴一樣急切熱心的示意你將住的旅館坐落位置，表情十足是書裏描述島民的「笑顏、親切」，你禮貌的向他微笑點頭，新奇的打量車內和車外的一切。

不急，你的假期還有一星期。才開始。

在時時擔心會失火的淺眠中醒來，你帶著地圖，穿上行囊中最薄的衣衫，乖乖依旅遊書的建議，從旅館不遠的摩天大樓展望台開始當日的散策路徑。

摩天大樓高二四四公尺，台灣第一高，與東京都廳足可匹敵。

你從來沒有過這個角度看你生長三十多年的地方，大概老天爺城隍爺就差不多這種距離看吧，不太遠也不太近，如此那些前日你曾在高速公路九人巴上感歎「天啊要醜到這種地步也眞不容易……」的房子才不致那麼明顯，連每隔五分鐘就降落松山機場的航機們也大冠鷲似的優美的緩緩掠過劍潭山腰——啊找到台灣神社了，那麼接下去ビル建物谷間就應該是勅使街道，往南

延伸，找到了台北州廳，東線的三線道路就清清楚楚了，書上說，常夏的台灣，夾道的並木大王椰充滿了南國風情，景觀之美有東洋小巴黎之稱。州廳旁羅列南去的是第二高等女學校、蒲葵海棗掩映的幸町教會、台灣總督府研究所、外公唸的帝大醫學專門部、帝大附屬醫院、赤十字本部（得把那棟醜怪特權破壞天際線的十幾層某黨部大樓抹掉）、小丑樣的可憐的景福門、東門町不介壽路不凱達格蘭大道上、台灣總督官邸，你總算看到它的後園了。

高中時，那是你們常流連晃盪的地方，總奇怪它占地如此大的石塀牆內是什麼，不須知道它是世紀第一年建的，你們就已很滿意它文藝復興的味道，穿著校服，坐在石塀牆外潔淨的紅磚道上，好幾人咧著嘴在笑什麼的留下過這樣一張相片。隔馬路是近藤十郎設計、也是文藝復興風格的帝大附屬病院，後來你在外公的大學畢業紀念册上也看過那麼一幀黑白相片，幾名五四青年打扮的大男生坐在常德街上，旁邊的日文望漢字生義大約說，這是朝朝暮暮他們最常行經、最將永遠思念的一條路。

相隔半世紀以上的這巧合，眞令人失去現實感。

日後，這些也會輕易成爲女兒牢牢不去白橡樹的印象吧，從這個角度俯看這城市。

如同高架捷運穿越過參差灰敗的大樓會如伍迪艾倫的電影一樣響以 Sleeping Lagoon 的小喇叭聲，你低眉俯看腳下的城市，不由響起的仍是常被拿做紐約襯景音樂的蓋希文的藍色狂想曲，不過你很快就想起你在哪兒，因爲身旁不時發出驚歎的遊人都操著日語，手持殖民地地圖。

你離開大樓，大樓原址是鐵道ホテル，你記得的是，原先在目前電扶梯出口處是你們每個月得來一次排長龍辦公車月票的地方。

你擇表町走，遙遙朝南可望見新公園的兒玉總督、後藤民政長官紀念博物館，書裏用了大量篇幅描述這幢樣式建築全盛期最典型的作品。公園你大概有一百年沒來了，才知道原先花鐘處是兒玉總督的銅像台座，二二八紀念碑建後給改種成樹，原來陳納德的銅像是後藤新平，當初協力出資的有辜顯榮李春生。

二二八紀念碑區弄亂了你記憶中的新公園，天啊難道那幾株橄欖又礙誰惹誰了！你尋它們不著，只得先走出林區，找到那幢美麗的西班牙房子。美麗的房子現在才知道是六十幾年前建妥的放送局，你們常在它旁邊的楓香林子拾落葉做大夢時，它是中廣舊舍，現在，是市政府工務局公園路燈管理處的辦公室。

楓香林子還在，你又懷疑它給裁截過，不然區區幾株樹如何可以讓你們藏身並擔負你們數人的傻話癡夢，你們仰著頭，藍色潔淨的天空襯著勉強斑黃的溫帶秋葉，看久了不知置身何處，就可以編織將來要去哪裏哪裏、大多是天涯海角之地的夢想，舍祖宗丘墓、族黨的團圓、隔重洋渡險、竄處於天盡海飛之地的哪裏只是一直被指摘的你這種父輩四九年來台的族羣。

從公園靠榮町的側門出去，書上向你推介新高堂書店，你還清楚記得陰涼如神仙洞府的一樓大廳，沿壁而上的弧形樓梯，磨石梯階給經年踏得光滑冰涼，隔壁「三六九」每有新蒸松糕出籠，

那發酵的香味便穿牆過來，逼使你們棄書而去。神仙洞府一九八〇年拆毀重建成玻璃帷幕大樓至今。

台灣銀行，一九〇三年野村一郎設計的木造 Mansard Style 建築。一九三四嚴重蟻害，一九三八改建至今。你以前和A最喜歡大步走過這裏，奇怪從沒抬頭像你現在這樣細看它整個建築，那時候你們曾一致同意，這家銀行（你們甚至分不出它與其他銀行的不同）若肯把它的窗子全改成透明櫥窗，放上美麗的珠寶首飾什麼的，就非常像電影《第凡內早餐》裏奧德麗赫本心情不好時就會去流連的地方了。

台灣總督府，一九一九年依公開競圖獲勝者長野宇平治的設計建成，原設計圖中央塔較低，有圖爲證，眞的比較怪，後改爲九層，是你們記憶中絕無可能再更動的、什麼呢？

十月三十一日，忘了是否出於學校的規定，總督府優先開放給你們這些做鄰居的，你們大都好開心的排長龍進府，行禮祝壽完可得壽桃一，孫女似的天眞無邪，可能要到二十年後國際新聞報導裏你看到爲金日成衷心祝壽祈福的那些裝不來的人民的笑靨，才恍然並感歎不已。

你眞羨慕那些從來不曾去排隊領壽桃的（印象裏，班上確有那麼幾人），從來不會被統治者的愛國教育所感動所激勵所洗腦，甚至看一眼黨旗就會悚然驚懼，而非你們大多數的熱血沸騰當下想到陸皓東黃花崗……，同樣十幾歲的年紀，她們是如何做到的？以至在日後的啓蒙成長和獨立自主人格的養成上，省了好大一段冤枉路。二十年後政治正確的寫作者也許不難替她們安排一兩

位二二八受難親族、或耕者有其田政策下被合法掠奪過家財的、或在牯嶺街買到《自由中國》或《大學雜誌》並因此啓蒙的，不然就有個替康寧祥郭雨新偷偷發宣傳單的姊姊或男友……，但是你的同學們，你試圖回憶著，她們是如何辦到的？你記得的幾名或頭腦清楚或凡事淡漠或眞可能有受難家屬的，其中一人二十幾年音信斷絕的在省市長選前與你聯絡，匆匆寒暄不及敍舊，便推介某政黨某候選人；也有父親是大稻埕的雜貨商，大學和出國後都是唸政治，她的獨立主張在你們學生時代是十分鮮明罕見的，她的曾經認眞考慮要不要應教官的邀約入國民黨和唸書回來即進政府機關工作也是極爲讓你吃驚的，你想她可能只是要去臥底或走體制內改革的路，可是同樣選前她約你喝下午茶，希望你投票支持她目前工作的老闆連任，你也吃驚不已。

——她們這些當年不肯領壽桃的，在想什麼？

繞過總督府，書院町上註明的景點有遞信部、台灣電力株式會社、總督府圖書館……，你站在書院町一丁目，左望桃源街，乾麵店羣給拆光了，圍上工程圍籬；右手邊，書上說是淡水館，之前是登瀛書院，一八九八年辜顯榮買了改爲台北新舞台，戰爭末期毀於美軍轟炸。屬於你的記憶是中華婦女反共聯合會，但凡名字長到這種地步，你們照例就搞不清那是幹什麼的，只每學期的其中一堂護理課全班會被帶到這裏替前方戰士做、不是征衣、是療傷的棉花球。棉花球在女工們談笑間或大或小或鬆或緊或歪扭或灰髒，將士們敢用才有鬼。

乃木町。被榕樹和楓香掩蓋的大戶人家門口停著一輛越野吉甫車，車身上貼滿軍國主義味道

的貼紙，與隔巷的周至柔的西班牙式房子一般數十年來無任何改變。像這種從未有任何改變，只任憑庭園樹種肆意怒長（通常是原住者植的南國風情的、對、椰子檳榔芒果榕樹……）好遮掩住煉瓦屋頂和石塀牆，免遭人注意。如此的人家呼之欲出的還有好些，之所以不想惹人注意，大多是因爲前朝遺老退隱了還占住官舍之故，有那操守清廉的，更是謙抑難捱，惟恐子孫招搖惹事，子孫偏不少三更半夜開個越野吉甫或跑車在門口大按喇叭，要也退休的副官或傭人老夫婦來給開門。有二代子孫唸了書還肯回國的，便想法偷偷拓建施工，有貼了面磚如復興南路一段二九五巷子裏種了十四棵大王椰的、新生南路一段九七巷裏長滿玉蘭茄冬樟樹的人家，然後他們都會在八〇年代末的幾年間，應回國無聊過暑假的第三代要求，砍幾株樹，鋪塊水泥地，立個籃球架，肥滿的孫子們就都以爲自己是ＮＢＡ的英雄好漢們，不信的話，搭一趟捷運，復興南路大安路的兩岸官舍人家可資證明。

也有相形之下令人大爲不平的如瑞安街一三五巷長滿油加利和洋紫荊的大院落（整戶人家的幅員可抵正對門數十戶和平東村的一半），和信義路三段一四七巷師大附中旁的和安里……，上述可能住著的是資政和有給國策顧問級，因爲配有警衛崗哨，尤以後者，區區一四七巷之隔，大家約好了似的單數十七弄一、二、三、四號你做大官，雙數十二弄裏我做亂世小民一口氣擠了二三十家老眷區違建。和安里的布告欄上早先張貼的淨是激勵小民們的愛國標語口號，近年爲配合新統治者生命共同體的口號，較溫暖多了，舉辦種種尋求社區居民建立認同感的軟性活動……，你

總好奇著，只要一四七巷這條楚河漢界一天如此清楚分明的在著，雙數小民們的生命和單數大官如何可能一同？

這些人家也有早早想法解決了土地產權問題的，便依二代子孫回國的年代、所學、駐外的地區而改建成不同風貌的房子，有宗法格羅培斯(Gropius)的哈佛箱型屋，有密斯(Mies)的玻璃鋼鐵風格，有貝聿銘成爲大師前在波士頓 Stone & Webster Engineer 公司設計的，有邁爾(Mier)的大框架玻璃牆，大師洛易斯・康、乃至另一位大師，蓋帝國飯店、和一九二三年關東大地震一起結束日本樣式建築時代、說過城市是銀行和嫖妓的基地和摩天大樓雜草式亂長的萊特，則無法在地窄人稠的基地有所施展。

這些改建的房子們，後來被未體原意的租房買賣人給改得讓人難以窺其原意，鐵窗、冷氣、甚至市招把立面徹底毀容，混凝土顯得髒兮兮的令人想到樓梯間一定有一堆吸毒針管；難得退縮設計所保留的空間，被停滿摩托車和黃昏水果攤和鹽酥雞；還剩一點點味道的，與濟南路平行的忠孝東路三段十巷，清水混凝土好佳在沒被貼馬賽克或二丁掛，並保留了會帶來光影變化的植物羣，只窗子換成透明櫥窗，開起一家家的 boutique，很像原宿表參道上的那一排老公寓；也有單純的十樓公寓如新生南路一段九七巷，兩株楓香與樓齊高，公寓信守 Brick is humanist，磚即人文，貼了赭紅色的溫暖的面磚，冷冷的天氣，下午提早上燈，Peyton 小鎮後來若是蓋了公寓，艾莉若是結果哪兒都沒去成，就像你一樣只乖乖的結了個婚，那大概就是在這樣的燈光下記記帳，

讀一本小說，等女兒放學回家。

*林中分歧爲兩條路，我選擇旅蹤較稀之徑，未來因而全然改觀。

—Robert Frost

西門町，日本人の歡樂街。殖民地圖上這麼說。

西門町，位於早拆掉的西門舊址，附近有末廣町、壽町、築地町、新起町、若竹町。

你上一次來，可能是大學畢業後與服兵役休假的男友約了看電影。男友告訴你，在他等候你的十分鐘裏，有兩批人馬分別來向他拉過客，其中一人見他穿軍裝，好心的安慰他：「嘿排仔無關係啦，樓底還一個中校仔。」要他這小小的少尉軍官放心。

你沒告訴男友，你晚到的十分鐘爲了要擺脫一個老頭的殷殷邀約，他不死心的從要收你做乾女兒到吃餐中飯到不然送你一雙鞋就好等等等。你覺得西門町可憐透了。不再是你們做學生時候的歡樂街，第一次，你才看到它的衰敗，髒兮兮、臭哄哄、小攤的零嘴看了就很難吃，滿街都是Bee Gees的週末狂熱，服飾店裏亮閃閃的劣質狄斯可舞衣更凸顯得它像個塗了濃妝看能不能拐兩個客人的老妓女，你同情極了，不願再去，這是你唯一能爲它做的。

你讀著書上的漢字，原來你從未進去過的萬國戲院是純日式的演劇館「昭日座」；台灣劇場是現在的中國戲院；芳之館光復後是美都麗戲院，後來是你們看了好幾遍《教父》的國賓戲院；新

世界戲院原來就是新世界館，你記得外公外婆在那兒看過《大菩薩峠》、《愛染桂》，館後的片倉通橫町上有壽司屋、烟煮屋、蒲燒屋、燒鳥屋，你看不懂平假名部分，不知它是說以前或現在有這些店，你仍像最後一次來此一樣，不願涉足其中。像一名觀光客一樣，被太多新奇事物弄得神形疲乏，你擇一株路樹的花壇磚垣坐下，紙上神遊。

路樹是小葉欖仁，整條街都是，隔著透光效果甚好的樹影望去，起著綠煙似的，像剛剛抽芽時候的欅樹或溫帶樹種，難以令人相信它是來自非洲。植有這種樹和黑板樹的行道和建物，年齡大約不超過十年，就如同種有木棉的地方大約發展近三十年，最顯見的是大量的國中校舍周遭（除非使用的校舍是以老校舍權充，那就是、對、榕樹、北部楓、南部鳳凰、和南國の風情的你也會背了的檳榔、蒲葵、大王椰）。選這樹種者的原意一定是希望長勢頗猛的木棉能讓那些大量興建的新樓新牆快快擺脫樹小牆新的印象，彷彿在此已落地生根好長好久了，同時期政治上蔣經國時代的大量起用台籍人士，不也是同樣的用意？

清康熙四十八年，泉州移民陳賴章墾號獲准開墾大加蚋堡之野，艋舺漸成村落……

晉太元中，武陵人捕魚爲業，緣溪行，忘路之遠近，忽逢桃花林，芳草鮮美，落英繽紛，漁人甚異之……

漁人甚異之，復前行，欲窮其林，林盡水源，便得一山，山有小口，髣髴若有光……，有一刻恍惚，你不知置身何處，阡陌交通，其中往來男女衣著悉如日人，黃髮垂髫，怡然自樂。

於是你擇末廣町走回西門市場，漢字告訴你，那一棟總是掛滿了色情電影看板和充滿同性戀故事的建築是一九〇八年建成，也是近藤十郎設計，之所以設計成八角形是取八卦意，望能鎮邪祟，因爲西門城郊原是台人墓地，時有山野小獸竄出嚇人，便遠從京都伏見四月杪你會去看稻荷祭的稻荷大社迎了狐仙神魂來鎮祟。髣髴一則寓言故事。寓言故事裏吸引你的是那與你一樣流落在此的狐仙神魂，避秦時亂，率妻子邑人來此絕境，不復出焉，遂與外人間隔，問今是何世，乃不知有漢，無論魏晉。

如此複雜混亂的心情，你不再循書上建議去尋訪公會堂或布政使司衙門舊跡，也過巡撫衙門跡、舊台灣總督府、南警察署不停。現在的警察局總局也有高達數層樓的小葉欖仁，一副也是落地生根很久的樣子。實則一定不超過十年。

南望京町，你猶疑要不要回旅館歇息——熟悉的麥田黃上巧克力的圓嘟嘟的字，Doutor。

Doutor，你的祕密花園，你的小小租界，你喝著連價位都差不多的咖啡，環顧四周，難以挑剔它有何不同，甚至店裏還有你和女兒說的大便燈，但凡店面大一點的Doutor，都會懸吊那樣一座主燈，透明和茶黃的不規則狀玻璃片堆砌成大蜂巢似的燈身，你和女兒曾看過一則國際新聞，某家航空公司正飛行中的航機艙儲出了問題，冰塊狀的排泄物從萬呎高空直墜進美國中西部某小鎮的一戶人家臥房，一對正熟睡的夫妻被破屋而降的不明物給驚醒的應該就是這個模樣吧，你們叫它大便燈，常常在大便燈下的大圓桌做算術，七八歲打兩隻毛辮子圓圓臉肯跟你手牽手的女兒，

你兩眼熱熱的，太多人抽菸了。

旅館的人還沒發現你是哪裏人，說著腔調不標準但你依然聽不懂的日語，你猜想他是告訴你可以和他換比銀行划得來的匯率的台幣，你禮貌的含笑婉拒他，決定繼續做異國人。

他日禍台者，必倭也。

再次確定了逃生路線，包括窗口的緩降梯，你放心的憑窗佇立，腳下的商店人家早已上燈，城西的天空還亮得很，城西總是那樣，可能是臨河故。高中你們放學不想回家，又急著說話，往往順著學校門前的大路直直走，糊里糊塗穿過大馬路都不知覺，一直走到祖師廟一定不約而同回頭或右轉他去，因爲覺得前面是另一國，儘管盡頭不遠隱隱大河在望，都算了不去，後來讀到「夙盜藪也」四個字，也不論實際含義的就認爲是指近在咫尺從未去過的河碼頭那裏。

夙盜藪也。

不知櫻花進展如何，你打開旅館電視，不難找到ＮＨＫ的新聞，一個字也不懂的熟悉語調好催眠人……，你好想念圓山公園大垂櫻廣場。

沒看到花訊，沒看到空難，你和衣睡倒，連隱形眼鏡都忘了摘。

農曆三月薔薇蔓、木筆書空、棣萼韡韡、楊入大水爲萍、海棠睡、繡球落。

南國假期第三天。你起得早，亟想融入你旅行的這個國度。你隨上班上學的人潮在本町一陣亂走，書店只剩三分之一，你想不起峨嵋餐廳、美心士多原來在哪兒？你也想不起聖瑪莉、肯德

基炸雞原來是什麼？你只得退避租界三越百貨某一層的喫茶室，邊用洋式早餐 set 邊流覽早報。頭幾版看完，不想繼續，夙盜藪也。

拿出殖民地地圖，你考慮今日的行程。

中正第一分局，清代考棚，秀才考的隨意詩題「自來水與德律風」。一八九五年領有台灣改做步兵第二連隊醫局使用，其中相當於大佐的陸軍軍醫監森林太郎隨北白川宮親王自澳底登陸後，即隨軍駐此，森的從軍紀錄後由岩波書店發行，筆名森鷗外。

你尾隨森鷗外每日的散策步徑，……但願五號的老知事占住者請繼續，一號不知占住者誰，和你外公一樣未戰死未失蹤自南洋回來的屋主曾經植下的麵包樹，這曾被達爾文描述爲「由於它那闊大、光滑且掌痕深切的葉片，使得它格外搶眼」的麵包樹，嚴密的籠罩著美麗完好的煉瓦屋頂。不禁使你猜想，當年在此附近求學實習的外公，是否在此遊盪時見過同樣的景象，因此暗暗發誓日後也要建一幢一模一樣的家園。你外公家的東北角邊就也有好大的一株麵包樹，遮蔭整座蓮池、蘭花棚、葡萄架，唯蔭覆不過李子樹和樹下專看守側門的歷代狗狗。好大的麵包樹落葉你們撿拾來以芒草莖拴綁做靴，趁外公出診時下池塘摸魚，可防螞蝗吸附。麵包果從不吃，但鄰人會來討去燉肉湯用。

當然也可能外公立志模仿的是學校另一頭的徐州路五號，外公家門前也有一模一樣的玄關車寄，前有接應室，旁有書房作外公看病的診療間；廣間經廊下可通起居間與子供室，後有食堂和

炊事間、女中室、風呂間……，很典型的具和洋混合風的昭和住宅。

你尾隨森鷗外和外公的散策路徑穿越三線道路的東線，一輛不耐煩等紅燈的髒舊客運車占了半道斑馬線，車首寫著開往淡海。你敲敲車門，他讓你上去。

大正町。左側是照安市場，詔安厝，漳州詔安人捕魚爲業——

三橋町。仿文藝復興式的銀行，噴漿材料顯得髒兮兮的，它占著的位置原來是芳草鮮美落英繽紛的社區小公園，從你們喜歡而不在了的三家咖啡館（ＣＡＴ、圓桌、夢咖啡）臨窗望街景，都得依靠它的綠意盎然。

宮前町。砌以紅磚的閩南式餐廳奇怪原先是哪裏？……沒什麼感情記憶但已習慣它的存在了的台泥大樓夷爲平地怎麼了？……聖多福教堂前羣聚著外勞和菲傭。

圓山町。車行橫跨基隆河仿皇居二重橋或一說宇治橋的明治橋上——大正十二年，皇太子參拜台灣神社時以「色美、青田續、白鷺の遊、風情」字眼讚歎過的明治橋——腥風一陣，尋向所誌，遂迷不復得路。

台灣神社，若非毀於戰爭末期日軍飛行機墜落所引發的大火，應該等同於你常參拜的八坂神社吧。乃木總督時代，帝國議會接受建議把神社設於台灣的統治中心台北，前此台南、基隆都曾經是考慮地點，最終決定的原因是，若把台北古城當作皇居御所，那基隆河便是鴨川，劍潭山是東山，整個台北盆地在地理位置上便與京都相髣髴了。

你不知道這客運會走哪條路，山腳下的淇哩岸、嗄嘮別？或從王家廟左轉大度路而去？

司機酒後駕車似的猛超車狂按喇叭，數十年如一日，似乎是這家客運公司招考駕駛的資格限定之一，你且見他一直吃票，頻頻催促上車投錢的乘客動作快些，並好心揮手叫他們趕快找座位坐穩且乾脆由他代爲投錢好了。他果然把銅板投入票箱擲地鏗鏘有聲，紙鈔卻給捲到手心裏，待車行某個紅燈，你見他摸摸鼻子搔個癢，就把紙鈔塞入襪子內了。年輕的時候，你一定會熱心腸冒著被扁的危險當場糾正揭發他，此刻你只別過頭去，窗外是被衆財團自耕農買光了的關渡平原，竊國者侯，竊鉤者誅，賊來迎賊，賊去迎官，稱大清良民村。

你希望走的路線會是大度路，因書上說三線道路西線的那些百年茄冬都移植到大度路了。車飛過大度路口不入，平疇四野的路口幾家大展示場大市招TOYOTA、SUBARU、CRYSLER……，很像美國的某些小鎮。

車飛過關渡隘口，眞眞是久違了。

司機又吃了三人份的票，夙盜藪也。你迷茫起來，路齡一百整歲的公路面貌竟像所有新市鎮的重劃區，夾道的油加利樹也移到大度路了嗎？捷運北淡線的水泥圍牆完全擋掉紅樹林和江面。主政的，無論中央或地方首長，無論是執政黨或在野黨，天天比賽誰才最愛這個島，把它愛到這種地步也眞不容易。

車速更加的瘋快，愈近目的你愈認不出路，儘管驚疑不定，也未曾想求助正專心吃票的司機

大人，你眞正像一個異國人，料定別人無法聽懂你的問話。

慌亂中，你瞥見黃槿——穿過林投與黃槿便是海——便果決的在下一個停靠站下車。是油車口，一九三九年，日本神社在此完工。

你往回走，這段短短的河灣，你們最喜歡在這裏看人釣魚，看潮水漲落，看觀音吐納，看星星，看漁船進出海也好想出航。也偶有A的男生朋友拿到家教費或攝影作品被雜誌採用，就請你們去榕園喊瓶啤酒炒盤蚵仔，講不遠處的紅毛城國恥直到哽咽難言。

現在的榕園咖啡好貴，你在心底匯兌了一番，貴過你在其他國家所喝過的（只除了萊特蓋的帝國飯店的藍山），不過你需要坐一會兒以便整理你的殖民地地圖。

天氣仍很冷，只你一人坐在室外的大榕樹下，腳下的木頭地板架空於河面，好像夏天鴨川畔的納涼床。

眼前的景致，大河入海處，與十六歲的你初見時無異，與一九三九年那個十六歲的少年所見呢？你好奇著那十六歲的少年日復一日目睹神社的興建和完工是何等樣的心情？就如同他每天中學下課時遙望日籍高官貴族出入的高爾夫球場是何等樣的心情？……大概是大丈夫當如是耳吧，不然他日後何以以元首之尊對所有諍言充耳不聞並如此樂在其中。

你沿河堤岸走，料想十六歲少年岩里政男放了學也喜歡來此散策，黃槿掩抱著煉瓦屋頂的是清代的官有地租借區、日人領有後的行政機關和官舍。仍然是大丈夫當如是耳吧。

你居然尋到十一巷正對的巷子，你心跳加速的拾級而上，便被鐵柵門阻斷，你害怕記憶有誤，便退回中正路，從福佑宮旁的巷子上去，至重建街左轉，穿過人家前庭，來到山腰小徑，你見紅樓在你腳下，但實堵堵個灰牆把你又阻斷，莫非它現在成了幾級古蹟不能與你相濡了。苦楝樹還在，樹下坐著一架望著海的十六歲白髑髏你一點也不吃驚。

你只得循山腰小徑往記憶中的清水巖去，江面被正午太陽照得迷離難直視。「長崎の情調，鹿兒島の風光」，日人如此描述過你眼前的古城，那應該是岩里政男少年時代吧。

第一次看到沒有香煙瀰漫的金爐，原來清水祖師廟正整修中，鷹架擋住門面，老工人騎在屋脊上，你眞可憐它遭禁閉坐監，以前視野開闊的廟埕，現被左右兩棟醜陋的公寓擋得只剩峽谷一道得窺江上波光。你早已打定主意不去偕醫館、眞理街、頂埔一帶，不願面對註定的遂迷不復得路。

鑽過鷹架，進廟，座上的黑面祖師嘿無言，兩側分別陪坐著蕭府王爺和西秦王爺，你便拜拜他，求籤，一卜就得，是第四十六首，籤云：物態何曾改，江山一古今，欲求心下事，流水奏佳音。

他何能豁達如此？

你拾級敗走，渡船口遊人不多，你假意混跡其中不知何從何去，也想渡江到八里坌，江上時不時有金幣也似亮度大小的鯧魚羣凌空飛灑，甚令人想念。畢竟你決定搭乘另條路線渡輪逆流而

上像昔年先民們像西班牙人荷蘭人到大稻埕，書上漢字目錄告訴你，大稻埕去完，你的古都巡禮便告完成。

你屢望渡輪，髣髴三百年前鄭成功登樓西望澎湖，「有糧船來否？」

你等待的糧船名摩訶薩，大菩薩。大菩薩卻不渡你，經驗豐富的打香腸小攤老闆見你徘徊良久怕要尋短，便好心搭訕，你告訴他你是在等候渡輪摩訶薩，他告訴你渡輪生意太差已停駛好久了。

不是說地獄不空、誓不成佛？

你只得覓回福佑宮前的市場等客運，市場收了早市，尚未處理的魚血魚鱗遭日頭曬得泛著冤魂味。擠在沸騰喧囂的魚魂們裏，料想對街高齡兩百多歲的福佑宮也不肯受理你們……，有一個剎那，你幾乎要捕捉到十六歲時的官能感覺，陽光熱水一樣當頭澆下，你衣服穿得過多，已經一身大汗，你在全心全意等待一個什麼，百毒不侵。

✻無主之地，無緣之島

你選了一輛直達客運，料想它可能會走大度路，你不死心的想看一看那些十六、七歲的好多夜晚曾蔭覆過你們、聽了無數傻言傻語卻都不偷笑的老茄冬，那些老樹們在著的話，很多東西就

都還會在，見不見面也沒有關係，像A，像清涼寺門前的老森嘉豆腐鋪，像印在死前的梭羅心版上的白橡樹。

在另一名同樣專心吃票的司機的酒後駕車狀態中，車過大度路。大度路沒有站牌沒有紅綠燈，車速快得給插兩張翅膀就可以起飛了。那樣的速度裏，你看到那些老傷兵似的老樹們，裹繃帶般以稻草綑紮截肢後的枝幹，書上說它們是平成三年移來這裏的，如何沒有半點打算落地生根的樣子，除了少數還有小簇的綠葉，大多根本已經變成標本模型了，就像紅樓那株苦楝樹下的白髑髏。

司機發現你目擊他的吃票，幾度猛煞車，大概想把坐在前座的你給撞昏滅口——四月出太陽的暖和日子，古都的某些向陽角落會有雪白的銀籠草，雄日芝也會在路邊竄出；五月梅雨前，檸檬黃花的大待宵草將會怒放，陰涼的山壁石牆縫會不管有沒有人欣賞的暗自綻放羊齒大唐米；六月紫花褁萩，荒地上可遍見亞美利加根無葛，大阪自動車道畔則是整坡谷黃菊似的豚菜；七月，紫花軍配畫顏登場，其實就是穿過林投黃槿海濱沙地上常見的馬鞍藤——司機沒能撞昏你，放你跌跌撞撞在日新町近太平町下車。

結果你把殖民地地圖給忘在車上了，車早揚長跑掉，你清點一下，丟的還有那頂使你看起來很像異國人的帽子，在錦市場的武田市買的過季DAKS，便也罷了。

市街看起來像所有的重劃新興區，唯遠遠天際敞亮那方有橋，應該是淡水河上的台北橋，你依著腦裏重點地圖和一年三節會去辦南北貨的迪化街，緣街行。

甘州街上，紅磚洋樓夷爲平地，不管它前身是光復大陸設計委員會或領有時期給人戒鴉片煙毒的更生院。你只得從四九巷入，巷子單側全是小攤，坐滿了吃客，都一齊從四神湯蚵仔煎裏抬臉望你，眼神既漠然又好奇，大約像你坐在 Douton 裏打量香奈兒女郎的眼神。你手既未持地圖，裝束也平常，何以他們見漁人乃大驚，你硬起頭皮，閱兵似的逃到慈聖宮，廟埕寬闊但仍有好多攤子都抬眼望你，你只好假意流覽此廟，天啊半點不想入內，覺得它太醜了，好大一塊壓克力黃底紅字招牌好像它是一家店，雖然你很同情它的命運坎坷，百年來從艋舺逃械鬥逃到永樂町，再被市區改正遷至此，廟前被鐵柵圈住唯恐遭竊的石柱上的捐贈日是同治六年丁卯端午日。

走回太平町上，二一〇巷口的大稻埕唱片行廢著，可能住著貓或鬼；第一劇場成了樓高十來層的大安銀行（城市，銀行嫖妓的基地，摩天大樓雜草式的亂長，萊特說）；你回頭去走北街，午後斜陽黃黃的漫進店裏，老闆假人似的坐著，賣著的無論農具、發粿、燈籠、金紙、菜籽也變得假假的，比較像什麼の博物館；虎標鼓亭前有人在洗刷好大的一頭古代英國牧羊犬，活的；三二一號大廢，被成了精怪的腎蕨雀榕牢牢吸附住；三四二巷過了的拱廊段，人去樓空，貼滿了痛罵新市長的標語，矢言「寧願任其倒塌，絕不配合保留」如三五八號。

回到熟悉的中街，你極力忍著不被騎樓下的南北貨干擾（除了在鴻川行買了半斤干貝和愛玉子，天啊隔壁的郭怡美難道又被搬去大度路了!?），努力欣賞瀏覽每家店面或巴洛可式或現代主義風格的立面設計，想辦法把整個市街看作六十多年前郭雪湖畫的《南街殷賑圖》。你尋到畫裏的乾

元元丹本鋪，原來就是常買參鬚和宋陳的乾元行，立面三樓的牛眼窗上環刻著人參圖樣，面磚洗石子壁縫裏抽長著開花中的馬纓丹、蕨和構樹幼苗，對門的八八號新集益是二樓的列柱頭有外捲的葉片狀的柯林斯式，華麗的巴洛可風味留不住人，屋主是牆縫裏生意盎然的雀榕。

同樣的，你保存著世紀初立石鐵臣繪的「永樂市場小吃攤」印象，從霞海城隍對面的巷子轉往港町，因爲二二八聖地現在是黑美人酒家，無法憑弔。

你行經舊時的六館街，想像著板橋林本源家阿舍出了大門就有人抬轎侍候，雙腳從未沾過街面。貴德街口，昔年兵庫縣人稻垣藤兵衛在此辦「人類之家」、「稻江義塾」，免費教育被殖民的貧苦兒童，現在是合作金庫（城市，銀行嫖妓……），復前行，欲窮其林，林盡水源，有倉庫也似的空屋一幢，二〇年代林獻堂蔣渭水領導的文化協會每週六在此舉辦文化講座，現下灰泥牆上小孩們以粉筆畫著好幾盤的井字〇×遊戲，其中一人不耐煩他的對手，寫著：莊家有個跟屁蟲……，廊下給遊戲的光腳們磨得好冰涼光滑。

你懷著好想脫光腳走路的心情走過李臨秋家，覓著茶香前往。勉強與隔鄰醜公寓一般高的是昔日大茶商陳天來仿巴洛克式的宅邸，往昔日本貴族來台必參觀之地，因被稱作「台灣人模範住家」，其二樓陽台可望見淡水河日落和船桅如林，如今得把對面兩三幢公寓抹平、把環河快速道路和堤防拆除，才能明白陳天來當年怎麼會斥鉅資把寶貝房子建在這裏。總督垂垂老矣，有遠古的雙眼，它最發達的後人陳守山已退隱，料它能像黑面祖師一般物態何曾改、江山一古今這樣豁達

嗎？

走出建昌千秋貴德街，一邊是砂石車和統聯客運轟然狂馳的環河快速道路，前行不遠可到現爲幼稚園的辜顯榮宅；若回頭溯民生西路可到波麗路、江山樓，外公的黑白相簿裏，曾有一張同班同學的合照，二十幾人都著日式浴衣，相片下寫著攝於江山樓、昭和某年某月日，當時不知怎麼就感覺那是酒家之類的，好難爲情向來嚴肅的外公怎麼會上酒家，而且和照片中人一般掩不住的大丈夫當如是耳。

江山樓，泉州府晉江縣人吳江山所經營，大正六年以台灣總督府和博物館的相同材料建成的四階料亭，現下是江山釣蝦場。

晉太元中，武陵人捕魚爲業，緣溪行，忘路之遠近，忽逢桃花林，夾岸數百步，中無雜樹，芳草鮮美，落英繽紛，漁人甚異之，復前行……

然而你冒死穿過環河路（砂石車照例遇紅燈沒有半點減速煞車的意思），不知穿過小小的堤防水門外會是哪裏？

……山有小口，髣髴若有光，便捨船從口入，初極狹，纔通人，復行數十步，豁然開朗，土地平曠，原來是摩訶薩渡船的大稻埕碼頭，你很想借碼頭小辦公室上廁所，但見連條狗影都沒有，無論人影。你便朝江畔走去。

江畔並無良田美池桑竹之屬，阡陌交通，遠處可聞雞犬，但是這是哪裏？月迷津渡，霧失樓

台，江上波光被偏西的太陽照得人眼睜不開，你便偏離岸邊向有桑竹處走去，因爲害怕會見到浮屍。

桑竹處其實全是黃槿榕樹之屬，樹蔭下未有決心的東一處球場西一塊溜冰場，場邊貼滿白瓷磚公廁似的小廟拜著不明名號的神鬼，便敬鬼神遠之，儘管同時發現小廟隔牆確有一間寫著便所的公廁，你都不去上，也不解救其間正發生著的老頭強暴女童雞姦男童或壯婦誘惑少年等等排列組合的不倫罪行。於是你往遠處有種作男女人跡處行，種作男女衣著悉如外人，黃髮垂髫，怡然自樂，其實他們大多坐在樹下別人或自己棄置的破藤椅上，拍扇泡茶剔牙摳腳聽你分辨不出戲種的戲曲，任頭頂黃槿樹叢的毛蟲懸絲降落，黃槿樹的缺點就是這樣，老不時高高低低懸掛些毛蟲蜘蛛之屬，難怪一直給人髒兮兮的感覺。

男女見漁人大驚，雖未問所從來，你檢點自己已丟了殖民地地圖，臉上也無刺青紅字，他們何能認出你是異國之人？好幾年前，你帶著尚幼小的女兒去尚未拆遷的大安公園址，想告訴女兒你幼時生長的就是類此環境。才進村子，立即一雙雙像你父親同樣年紀的眼睛驚怒向你，問所從來，你自覺與村中同樣攜帶小孩的尋常少婦無異，不知他們爲何照眼認出你是外人？你只好老實回答。原來村中刻正如火如荼進行抗爭拆遷活動，以爲你是記者或類此獵奇者，待明白了，便紛紛向你抒發訴苦，只是走前再再叮囑此中人語云，不足爲外人道也。

但你確實與樹下男女不同語言，怕被認出，便蹣跚前行，因未鋪水泥地的地上大概不久前被漲潮氾濫的河水淹沒過，軟泥踩下可陷兩吋，肥潤的泥淖其味離薄，上有招潮蟹所吐的圓球擬糞

殘渣，你果然聽到身後不遠有男女向你發言聲，你不理，執意往有陽光並有幾名少年在鬥牛的籃球場走去，不理他們是因爲可能會便要還家，設酒殺人作食，你一點也不意外，陽光明迷飽含水氣，不是有這樣的電影場景，一羣絕不兇狠也並不良善的住民，漫長無聊的午後只好把一個闖入者、狗或人，給聯手宰殺了解悶兒，然後復又打個呵欠，繼續拍扇泡茶剔牙摳腳聽你分辨不出戲種的戲曲，並任毛蟲蜘蛛懸絲掉落頭頂。

先世避秦時亂，率妻子邑人來此絕境，不復出焉，遂與外人間隔，問今是何世，乃不知有漢，無論魏晉……

天空有直升機盤旋，大概在找江上浮屍；歐幾桑騎著老歐都拜嘟嘟嘟放著黑煙迎面擦身而過，大概也是接到通知去認屍；黃槿樹下換成一家野狗，俱仰臉望著你，既不吠，也不搖尾，連向來不存戒心的小奶狗也漠然望著你；大江對岸隱有高亢的送葬嗩吶聲；某處在焚草葉，散著人類懂得用火以來亙古的味道；籃球場上的鬥牛少年眨眼全都不見，一顆橘色的球還彈跳在水泥地上；近高架道路了，愈發高聳如監獄圍牆似的灰牆，肅淨得沒有半點塗鴉，沒有半點！

這是哪裏？……，你放聲大哭。

……

婆娑之洋，美麗之島，我先王先民之景命，實式憑之。

一九九六・十二月

INK PUBLISHING 文學叢書 068

我們

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發 行 人　張書銘
出　　版　INK 印刻出版有限公司
台北縣中和市中正路 800 號 13 樓之 3
電話：02-22281626
傳真：02-22281598
e-mail:ink.book@msa.hinet.net
法律顧問　漢全國際法律事務所
林春金律師

總 經 銷　成陽出版股份有限公司
訂購電話：03-3589000
訂購傳真：03-3581688
http://www.sudu.cc
郵政劃撥　19000691 成陽出版股份有限公司
印　　刷　海王印刷事業股份有限公司

出版日期　2004 年 10 月 初版
2004 年 10 月 20 日 初版二刷
ISBN 986-7420-23-3
定價　280 元

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Published by INK Publishing Co., Ltd.
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Printed in Taiwan

國家圖書館出版品預行編目資料

我們／駱以軍 著.--初版.
--臺北縣中和市：INK 印刻，
2004［民 93］面；　公分（文學叢書；68）

ISBN 986-7420-23-3（平裝）

857.63　93018299

版權所有・翻印必究
本書如有破損、缺頁或裝訂錯誤，請寄回本社更換

老家

後來我對人說起「回永和」，都不再說「回家」了，而拗口地說「回我父母的家」或是「回我小時候的家」。說來這個「童年小鎮」與台北僅一橋之隔，我無法如一些朋友，年節後總說「回了老家一趟」：老家者，銅鑼、小港、大甲、馬公、頭份……，這些遙遠而陌生之地名也。我如今仍每週兩三趟，開車載著妻小，在那夢境也似的灰色腔腸巷弄裡旋繞，苦於找不到停車位，所有的倚牆空位全被人用鐵鍊栓著輛破腳踏車破摺疊鋁梯板凳破瓦爛花盆給占住了，另一端是個鉚釘釘入柏油路面裡。或有時車子陷困在那腔腸裡，堵死在小巷弄裡前後各五、六輛車，靜默停頓互不相讓。我會暈眩抬頭看著頭頂像《銀翼殺手》裡那個未來之城的廢墟景觀：奇怪不過是一些六、七層高的公寓樓房，因爲如此架拐搭肩向上堆蓋，且人家框格一律塞掛著各式花紋鐵窗、冷氣機及下面的水漬牆面，亂七八糟的盆栽植物或一些捨不得丟棄的建材……使得那困陷其中的悠漫時刻，像置身於一遮蔽天空的金屬峽谷之中。

那是我的「昨日之鎮」。有時我會恰好遇見我父親像一隻頭部碩大而身體萎小的古代化石

魚，坐在輪椅上，由印傭莉雅推著（他們要去巷口的跌打損傷店去扎針），困惑但認命地和其他路人一塊兒候在巷裡的美容院門口（那已不是我童年時就兩張躺椅的家庭理髮店了，而是鏡面琳瑯，染紅染金頭髮的美少年設計師們在十數張座椅間翩翩穿梭的，同步於台北的美髮沙龍），因爲路全被這些車子給占住了。

有一、兩個午后，我獨自從古亭站搭捷運（穿過新店溪河床底部？）在頂溪站下車，經過那些我童年時就對他們的臉孔如許熟悉的賣獎券老婦、賣山東大餅烙餅的老兵或是攤車上有個馬達支著兩個布袋戲偶咯啦咯啦賣糲薯和洋菜凍的白面中年人（只不過我小時候他們都聚集在中信百貨公司的戲院售票口前，現在他們像吉普塞人遷移至捷運出口），到中興街口的郵局去繳交通罰單（我的戶籍仍在永和）。我在郵局裡和那些老人、老婦和大著肚子的潑辣婦人挨靠在一塊等叫號碼，聞著他們身上的氣味，心裡安定而懷念。我不知道身邊這些人是自我童年就待在這個小鎮，還是後來陸續搬遷進來的，因爲住不起台北高房價而委屈落腳在此的下港人。但我比他們任何一個看去都像是異鄉人。

我不止一次地在我的小說中勾描我童年的小鎮。那些迷宮般的巷中之弄，弄或未成死弄則又如腸內指突狀絨毛連結上另一條巷子。少年們順著這些末端指突不認輸地往繁錯深處鑽，以爲最終總會在這些石綿瓦防雨篷、磚牆上倒插著破酒瓶的日式矮平房陣遮蔽的迷宮世界突圍而出，豁然開朗走到主動脈的大馬路吧？但往往會被一幅截斷的，無法理解「爲何這便是世界的盡頭」之景觀給絕望地擋住。那幅圖景通常是巨大的，繞不過去的：一座高牆再

加上鐵絲網的變電所、一道布滿芒草間或直立幾株木瓜樹在其上的古舊河堤、一大片被圈圍起來、似乎是私人財產的竹林……。

那樣的地貌構成了我理解或描述世界的潛藏結構：腔腸般的、熟悉又陌生的狹窄巷弄，沒有一條主街道上可供作永久性坐標的歷史建築物（很不幸地，從我童年開始，我和家人或玩伴如此確定辨識地標之機關，它們的名字同時存在於全省所有鄉鎮上：鎮公所、國父紀念館、消防隊、以鎮爲名之國中國小……，唯一異於他鄉之大型建築卻數度易名：中信公司或金銀百貨）。我的小鎮沒有通往遠方的鐵道及讓人懷念的小車站（那些如今成爲 7-11 便當的月台站名），在我童年時它只有一條橋通往台北，這條橋舊名螢橋後來改名中正橋。橋下據說曾爲槍斃死刑犯的法場。我小學一、二年級時架了第二座橋（福和橋）：童年有一段記憶是每週日我父母會帶我們小孩，牽著狗，走過長長河堤上橋，再漫步過橋至河對岸一家軍公教福利中心，買足一禮拜份家用之衛生紙醬油沙拉油洗衣粉什麼……。

我的小鎮是一個具體而微的封閉世界：它有戲院（雖然它們大多在我國中時期因經營不善而先後淪爲「六十元放兩片」的三、四輪舊片之電影院）；有百貨公司（雖然後來大樓裡的遊樂場和保齡球館淪爲滿地檳榔渣和黏膩可樂漬，迢迢仔混聚之處所）；有整條街巷的傳統市場（很怪的是你在這市場裡可以找到和萬華龍山寺對面同樣古老年代的佛像雕刻師傅、堆滿各式草藥的青草茶鋪、或是買賣贓車的二手腳踏車店）；也有一整條街的小舶來品店（後來這條街在我離家多年後突然變成了小有名氣的「韓國街」）、有夜市（你可以在此吃到不

道地的台南碗粿、基隆廟口豬腳、彰化肉圓……之類的全省小吃）；在金石堂出現之前，它亦有一些除了參考書亦兼賣文學書的文具行，還有一些藏匿在巷弄裡的漫畫出租店（奇怪的是我是在那些出租店陰暗的燈光下讀了司馬中原的《失去監獄的囚犯》和瓊瑤的一些小說）。

它像是對著一橋之隔的那座大城市，捏皺了的，一個便宜許多的模仿。但這模仿似乎只到某一個年代便停止了。小鎮裡的人恍然大悟，他們只要搭車進城，便可以混跡在那座大城市的居民之中，毋需將自己的小鎮打扮成大城的縮影或贋品。我的小學、中學時光，幾乎我身邊所有的同齡少年，全和我一樣困居在這座封閉的小鎮裡，所有人的家像小紅光點散布在最精微的衛星照片，那張地圖是繁瑣狹仄像擠在一團的豬下水。沒有人能提供給你一個遙遠陌生、蒙著霧光的，「遠處的他鄉」。這使我的少年時光，既缺乏一種遠眺的想像力——那種鐵道少年或港口孩子的想像力；也不幸地失去了另一種，置身於某一古街、歷史城樓、老教堂或老廟宇……所描勒出時間感飽滿之城街地圖，那樣的「大城市教養」。

國家圖書館出版品預行編目資料

月球姓氏／駱以軍著. -- 初版. -- 臺北市：
聯合文學. 2000〔民89〕
面；　公分. --（聯合文叢；205）
ISBN 957-522-304-7（平裝）

857.7　　89015407

聯合文叢 205

月球姓氏

作　　者／駱以軍
發 行 人／張寶琴

總 編 輯／初安民
主　　編／江一鯉
編　　輯／張清志
美術編輯／周玉卿　戴榮芝
校　　對／呂佳真　駱以軍　張清志

法律顧問／理律法律事務所
陳長文律師、蔣大中律師

出 版 者／聯合文學出版社有限公司
地　　址／台北市基隆路一段180號10樓
電　　話／27666759・27634300轉5107
郵撥帳號／17623526聯合文學出版社有限公司
登 記 證／行政院新聞局局版臺業字第6109號
網　　址／http://unitas.udngroup.com.tw
E-mail:unitas@ms4.hinet.net
unitas@udngroup.com.tw

印 刷 廠／世和印製企業有限公司
總 經 銷／聯經出版事業公司
地　　址／台北縣汐止鎮大同路一段367號三樓
電　　話／（02）26422629

版權所有・翻版必究

出版日期／2000年11月　初版
2001年1月5日　初版三刷
定　　價／350元

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Printed in Taiwan.

ISBN 957-522-304-7（平裝）

（本書如有缺頁、破損、裝幀錯誤，請寄回調換）

中正紀念堂

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在那一整片溝壑起伏，陣形難窺其秘的空闊曠野的中央，是一座搭蓋到一半，鋼樑裸露，巨石塊堆疊而上的，像太空基地一樣怪異、高聳的巨大建築。



那一切像《聊齋》裡的狐神花鬼一般，太陽出來了，偌大的建築、歌舞笙簫的排場，衣帶鬢影觥籌交錯或是一些主僕、父女、女童老婦、官爺暨清客們……這些在一夜間流轉迴旋的人際關係，全轟然一下在白光裡蒸騰消失。

你不知道那些建築、那些街道以及在那些街道上和你擦身而過的那些人都到哪去了？因爲他們眞的統統都不見了，所以你便相信那一切都是假的，像是臨時搭建的一個巨大片場，那些攤販，在巷道走動臉色漠然的行人，那個在堆滿紙箱的木板車旁吸菸的老人，那些跨坐在停放機車上哈啦等人的男孩女孩，甚至還有穿梭在這些人物道具之間的郵差……你後來世故地想：也不是不可能有人願意花一個人二百元請上千個臨時演員來虛擬這個場面。他們煞有其事地在你四周走位，「生活」，等你穿過這條街，導演喊卡，所有的人便收工回家。

譬如我曾經載過一個女孩的便車。那女孩叫張庭，是W的女人小惠的朋友。我之所以知道那女孩叫張庭，是因爲那次便車，聽見小惠和那女孩在後座有一句沒一句地：「張庭，後來那個洪老師又有打電話來，問我們怎麼就沒再去了，好恐怖耶。」「張庭那妳男朋友後來有沒有跟妳道歉？」（我認識的一百個女人裡有一百個會在和她的女伴一起搭你便車時，若無其事地詢問起她女伴的男友近況，或是問候你的妻子的近況，讓你和她的女伴，知道你們彼此都是他媽死會就是了。）「張庭，怎麼辦？我最近變好胖噢。」……

那個張庭則是在一旁心不在焉地應著：「是啊，」「欸喲，不會啦。」「妳別理他嘛。」一邊對著小圓鏡補妝，然後突然擠出一個好禮貌的笑臉（你從後視鏡看到的）。「喂，那個誰……對不起我不知道你的名字，反正你是小惠的朋友嘛……我可不可以把車窗

打開，抽根菸？好悶噢。」你當然非常紳士地說可以可以，對不起我這輛破車，沒有電動車窗，得要麻煩妳自己把窗搖下……

然後過了新生北路高架，那個女孩用招呼計程車司機的優雅口吻，對不起前面信義路那邊左轉，欸開到新生南路那邊右轉，沒有，再往前開，到前面紅綠燈那裡靠邊停……我是在對面，可是和平東路這邊禁止迴轉沒關係啦，我過個馬路就好了……眞的嗎？會不會害你麻煩呀……哎，眞是……小心噢，常常有警察躲在那天橋上偷拍違規迴轉的車噢……

我記得車停在一片拼裝鐵皮搭成的修車場前，那個張庭又客氣地說了一聲謝謝你嘍，小惠妳要再打電話給我喲，然後砰一聲關上後車門。我記得我們停在車上，看著她穿著窄皮裙高跟鞋的背影（她的腿眞好看），穿過一個布告欄，然後穿過一座社區籃球場，消失在一片高高矮矮的屋簷牆廓之間……

那是我唯一一次和這個叫張庭的女人遭遇（或短暫地說了幾句話）。

那時W在追小惠，小惠長我們三歲，有個男友還要切不切地拖著。那個男人是個爛人，在新竹另外搞了個小馬子，每個月還上山到小惠住處打一次炮，平時則完全不見人影。

那時我和W都非常爲小惠義憤塡膺。我們都還是處男。常到小惠的宿舍泡茶聊天，聽她用雙魚座女人那種頹廢泥淖的腔調自怨自艾。後來小惠的經濟陷入絕境，就是這個張庭拉她去後火車站批一些仿外國名牌的皮包，在南京東路鴻源百貨旁邊的人行道上擺地攤。我和W是窮學生，只能藉口去那附近一家叫「影廬」的ＭＴＶ店看一些法國電影或日本新導演的片子，看完後則賴在小惠的地攤旁幫她吆喝賣皮包。

那個晚上，張庭的地攤搭在小惠的地攤旁，小惠說張庭是空姐，沒飛國外的時候就來一起擺。可是一個晚上就看見張庭在那人群來往的騎樓裡唱作俱佳地表演，她把小惠的客人全拉去了她的攤子上。我和W非常氣憤地看著不成材的小惠縮在騎樓角落的暗影裡，整個晚上挪挪搞搞地把她鋪著那張塑膠片上的假名牌皮包換位置排整齊……

我記得後來張庭搭我便車時，在後座和小惠說她那晚賣了七個還八個皮包，而小惠則咕噥著唉我一個都沒賣掉怎麼辦呢張庭……

後來有一次我在小惠房裡喝醉睡倒時，W終於上了小惠。事後他告訴我那一次的性體驗：「很濕，很暖，很緊，像用嘴巴緊緊含住一樣，跟打手槍絕對不同的感受……」W還告訴我小惠在興奮的時候，乳頭拉得好長好長，嚇死人是你想像不出有那種延展度的長……

我亦曾經暗自愁沮，同樣是兩個襪子有騷臭味的單身漢，同樣以我們童話故事的腔調哀憐的落難公主，爲何最後輕解羅衫以那華麗豐腴女體犒賞的是W，而不是我呢？

在我刻意疏遠了這一對關係改變的朋友許多年後，有一次無意間和W在難得只有我們兩人的酒叙中，不知怎麼提起張庭這個人。W對我說：你知道嗎？小惠說，她那時就一直覺得：我和你的關係，就像她和張庭一樣。

什麼意思？我記得那時我恍如夜間行車，被對面車道的遠光強燈曝灼得睜不開眼。因爲我是外省人？而W和小惠一樣是本省人？我和張庭一樣語言溜利外場漂亮，處處占盡便宜，而W和小惠，則像被一層果凍般的透明膠塊隔在語言的另一邊，他們害羞、怯懦、心思幽微而閉俗。

那是我第一次巍巍顫顫感受到自己從一張什麼椅子上被人踢下來，而兩手亂摸想抓住什麼便不致摔倒。我開始哀傷地看待我父親被從計程車上趕下來這件事，而不是當作笑話說給我視爲同族的W聽（我對W說：「你知道多好笑嗎？我爸昨天被人家從計程車上趕下來，因爲他不會說台語。」）後來我父親的台語已經說得非常ㄌㄧˋㄎㄚˋㄌㄜ了，事實上他已經說得比我要好了。但還是常被人從計程車上趕下來，他一開口人家就認出他來了。他總是納悶著人家是從哪一點認出他是老芋仔？他總是問我：「兒啊，我這不變成爲好好搭一趟車而學台語嗎？他們怎麼就是嗅得出來？」

這也是我想問W的（或是問小惠的）。她們是怎麼嗅出來的？她們怎麼找得出來我和張庭之間的共同性？我記得那女孩臉上撲了厚粉畫了濃妝（她是空姐嘛），我記得她滿臉疲色可一嘴客套話熟練之極招呼到小惠、W和我一個不漏。她好像和小惠是姊妹淘，但你分明嗅得出由她那邊散放的疏離倨傲，她不斷感激我載她這一趟便車，但你就是覺得她是紆尊降貴臨幸你才搭你這破車。我記得她的背影穿過了修車場旁的破籃球架，是轉過了一處破木板釘成的違建矮房和從那瓦片屋頂穿出的一株樹影。但你就是朦朧地覺得：這個高貴勢利的女孩，正穿巷繞弄走進去的神秘地方，一定是一處極高級昂貴有錢人住的高級社區吧。

後來有一陣子我和一位空姐交往，那個空姐是我小學班上一個長得很甜美的女孩。她有一個固定的男友。我總是在她不飛而男友又叫不出來的空隙裡，像個塞墊那樣陪她吃飯，並且暈眩地聽她說一個接一個空姐之間流傳的黃色笑話。

有一次我開車帶她上陽明山看夜景。這個空姐一路又說了好幾個關於洗衣店還是洗衣機

的黃色笑話。後來我們看著夜景看著看著，我發現我的手伸在她的襯衫裡解開她的胸罩釦釦。

女孩喘著氣突然問我，你認不認識一個叫張庭的？

張庭？

少來了。裝得眞像，女孩背對著我，重新紮她後腦勺的馬尾辮，並整一整她的襯衫。那種時候，你清楚地知道，有些女孩是從小就注定要當空姐的。她們身上總是有一種長期置身在空調裡的乾燥劑氣息，她們總是可以在一個窄小的空間裡，有效率地補妝，把衣服整理好，然後把所有東西有條不紊地收拾進一個有輪子有拉手的小行李箱裡……

我告訴那個空姐我眞的不認識張庭。喔。後來我想起來了。我說，我想起來了，她也是妳們空姐嘛！那是我一個朋友的馬子的朋友，搭過我一次便車。

眞的？女孩眞的就補起妝來。沒騙我？

眞的。我說，到底怎麼了？

那個張庭哦，女孩冷笑說，有一次和我排同一班。提起你（當然她還提了其他一大堆的男人名字），說得好像跟你多熟哦。我心裡就一直偷笑，這個男的，我昨天才和他吃過飯，而且她說了一大堆你的事，好多都說錯了……

許多年後，我操著流利的台語，一邊敷衍著應答著那個建國黨的計程車司機幹ㄍㄧㄠˊ著民進黨，一邊告訴他信義路左轉新生南路右轉……（相同的路線是否使你想起載張庭的那

晚），欸頭前靠邊就好，勿免勿免轉過去，這邊攏有警察呷人攝相，我自己走過去就好啦……那個運將他鄉遇故知罵得酣爽，義氣地說嗨，警察、警察攏要抓去關啦，無知！

便嘎嘰一個迴轉停在七號公園的人行道旁。我渾渾噩噩地下車（這不正是當初張庭下車的地方），是啊新生南路和和平東路交叉口，幾年前張庭在夜間裡穿過那鐵廠搭成的修車場，那個公告欄，那個社區籃球場，那一間一間破瓦頹垣的眷村違建，暗影裡窄巷間隨意停放的三輛攤販車，沒有招牌的家庭理髮店，那些兩百元找來的臨時演員僞扮成的平頭白髮老人和邋遢的小孩，他們一臉茫然地瞪著你……

從前有一個叫張庭的女孩，她是個空姐。她在一個夜裡搭你的便車，下車後踩著高跟鞋走進一個破鐵皮屋挨擠的違建區裡。她熟門熟戶地穿過那些低矮的屋簷和圍籬，然後開門走進其中一間差不多破爛的鐵皮屋裡。三坪大的空間擠滿了電視冰箱鋁辦公桌電扇和吉他空酒瓶，牆上則掛滿總統玉照獎狀和很多不同年份的月曆及吊著塑膠袋裝的鞋子（？）。她的老爸她媽還有她三個燙了米粉頭的哥哥們正在看電視，沒有人回頭看她……

許多年後我在一個白日裡來到她當初下車的地點，發覺那是一處數十公頃的森林公園。那個臨時搭建的片場完全不見了！你在那些柳蔭步道間，和那些戴頭盔護具滑直排溜冰鞋的小孩和推著嬰兒車的少婦們錯身而過，忍不住想抓住其中一人來問：這是你們收了多少錢的臨時演員費來表演的另一幕外景？

那些人到哪去了？我發狂地想著：張庭到哪去了？

另一次是更多年之前，大約是我國一或國二吧？有一個周日的午後，我母親要我自己搭

公車到後火車站或圓環一帶的一家老舊眼鏡行取配好的眼鏡（我不記得爲何母親要帶我千里迢迢坐公車過橋到一個老舊社區裡去配眼鏡？是否那時永和尚沒有眼鏡行？我記得現在在竹林路中興街口轉角那家櫥窗明亮頗具規模的眼鏡公司，在中興街拓寬之前，那裡只是一間停了輛破板車搭著帆布篷用木板搭疊的小麵攤，我記得我們稱呼那老兵老闆爲「麵店老闆」，我們小時候父母去吃喜酒時，就叫我們小孩去那麵攤一人一碗十二塊錢榨菜肉絲麵加滷蛋）。

那時我們仍使用黏了學生照六十格用票夾剪票的公車票（那些公車票放在男孩子的學生襯衫口袋裡常常不是被洗衣機洗爛，就是被汗漬醃得暈糊落軟）。我不記得那時公車聯營化了沒？天哪，那條路線的公車，就是我那個年紀對橋另一頭的城市，唯一能綴連成完整動線的連環畫面的播放空間。另一條路線的公車，我們簡直熟得不能再熟。我記得每個星期六早晨，我和我哥哥便拖著菜籃車，一路坐過橋，民衆活動中心、廣播站、師專附小、北一女，然後彎進博愛路……我母親有時會在ＹＡＭＡＨＡ的騎樓前朝車上張望，若是看見我們，她便會上車來。隨我們再坐兩站，過郵政總局繞個迴彎到中華路北站。我們在那兒下車，和我們母親拉著菜籃車到**如今已消失不見的中央市場**去買一整禮拜的菜。我記得我小時候就是在那個廣闊無邊的市場裡，看見穿制服的警察一路踢翻四處逃竄的菜販的菜簍，或是和那些年老骯髒的菜販們拉扯他們的秤桿？對那些一出場即造成衆人騷動、口耳相告，或是哀哀求饒的角色的亮相方式印象深刻。

那原是我再熟悉不過的路線。每次買完菜，我母親便囑咐我和我哥自己坐原路線公車回

永和，而她則走路回銀行上班。

但是那個周日午後，我搭了另一路公車，過了橋即轉進植物園，走大埔街穿過小南門直直穿進中華路南站。那是我熟悉極了的停泊點——巴而可吃大芹菜的外國女人看板，國軍英雄館，對面是點心世界——問題是這個停泊點被串在另一組我較不熟悉的動線上。車一過中華路北站，我發現下車的人亦把票伸給司機（我上車時已剪過票）。

這路公車繞過火車站即算第二段票，我口袋裡的票卡只剩最後兩格（且紙層翻起，上面的印花模糊起毛）——我熟悉的另一綠公車穿過這一段只要一程的車票。車繞進圓環後，我照著母親交代的站名下車，剪了票（只剩下一格了）。之後也找到那家眼鏡行拿了眼鏡。

十三、四歲的我那時盤算著：我身上除了那剩下的一格車票之外，一塊錢也沒帶，現在是無法搭車直接坐回永和了，且我在一處我極不熟悉的地方（那一帶的商家騎樓建築的色澤氣氛，完全和我習慣自車窗外所見的台北市截然不同）。而把我載來此處的公車，可能一上車便要剪去我最後的那一格。

我作了一個最壞的判斷：我自作聰明地在那幾個站牌上找了幾輛在串聯鏈的前幾個站名相同，可是之後鏈接著是一些怪異陌生地名的公車，隨意跳上先來的那一輛。我是這麼想的：反正我不過坐個幾站，到某一站我知道的地名下車，然後沿著我熟悉的那條路線的公車的站牌，一站一站地走回永和。

（多麼像一則家族神話遷移之初的悲劇性暗喻呵。我的父親。妻的父親。像是遺傳基因裡騷捺不住的遷移慾望。鼓搏著翅翼，頭冠和囊袋漲得通紅。他們狡猾、精於分析，自信於

自己胸臆裡那一套遷移過程中藉以定位標記的記憶系統。一開始他們一定確定自己之後絕對有辦法再找路回去。）

許多年後我曾遇見一位學弟，瘦削的臉留著一小撮山羊鬍子，我記得他在閒聊中苦笑地告訴我：他從小學到大學，各種身分資料的籍貫欄皆是填寫著「察哈爾」。他說：「我是察哈爾人。」他是到很後來才知道：現在中國的行政區裡，已經沒有「察哈爾」這個地方了。察哈爾省早已被併入松花江省還是嫩江省裡去了。我充滿興趣地問他：那你父親當初爲什麼會輾轉跑來台灣？從那麼大老遠的地方。我記得在我讀小學的時候，凡有籍貫欄填寫著一些怪地名的傢伙，你若私下和他們熟稔起來，他們絕對有一海票稀奇古怪的關於他們父親當初逃難的故事。什麼全軍圍的人被共軍圍堵在四平街上，活活餓死了四、五萬人，只有他父親，因爲每次部隊開伙吃剩的包穀梗子，他都捨不得，把它們埋藏在一處地方。於是到了全部的人被戰術圍堵一個個餓死倒下，他父親即是靠挖出那坑裡的幾十枝包穀梗子，嚼得牙肉瘡血，卻保下命來。

我還曾遇過一個姓那的女孩，她說她父母是正黃旗的滿人。當然我從她那聽了一狗票落拓格格怎樣在台灣這個濕熱的地方，變成一個人人嫌惡喜歡找兒孩麻煩、留長指甲的老太婆（她的祖母）的複雜瑣事。

他們（或他們的父親）皆有著一段這樣如舊木箱上描金畫裡似眞似假、幻異若夢的身世。那些故事皆隱晦離題，其實關鍵環扣的皆是某一次的決定，一般逃亡的旅程，以及一次失之交臂卻永遠訣別的最親愛之人的最後一面。

諸如此類。

但是那個學弟（察哈爾人）卻苦笑地告訴我：「我不記得了。」

他說他的父親在他高一那年就病死了。現在想想其實一個十五、六歲的高一學生根本還是個孩子嘛。他說他父親臨死之前的那半年，確曾抓著他像要迫他記下他（他父親）這個人這一生全部的故事。他說他印象中他父親在那半年裡，總是眼神晶亮，不斷地談著自己的身世。

他說他那時只是覺得煩。也許是因爲他父親那一口鄉音。後來這麼多年過去，他發覺無論他怎麼回想，他都想不起一絲一毫他父親當初究竟曾對他說過些什麼了。

這是一個弄錯地圖的故事。

我如今如何努力覷眼回想，也不記得許多年前，我迷路的那個周日午後，我自作聰明上的那班公車，究竟是走哪一條路線？窗外的那個年代的街景是如何？以及我撐著在內心決定「好，就在這一站下車。」用掉我最後一格車票的那一站究竟叫什麼站名？

我記得我下車的地方，幽僻而寧靜，我彷彿闖入了一個時空靜止的陌生國度。隔著濃蔭密遮的大樹群，在我面前是一條寬得彷彿你不可能橫渡過去的馬路。以一個習慣在永和的羊腸小徑死巷窄弄穿梭尋路的少年來說，眼前的那條暈晃著綠光的大馬路，無異於置身在想像中外國的大城中央。路上沒什麼行人，一切如此悠閒鬆散，人行道寬得讓你想躺在上面睡個

午睡。連想找個人問路都遇不到人。若不是馬路中央偶爾行駛過去的車輛，以及遙遠馬路對面路邊停放的幾輛戰車和三三兩兩圍著戰車的野戰服軍人，我眞要以爲從小到大的願望終於實現了。即是外星人入侵，以一種特殊的方式殲滅了全地球的人類，只倖存剩下了我一個人……我記得那個午後我走了許久許久的路。後來我在一條巷底有一座既像鐘樓又像城門的破爛老廟（我記得它黑色的瓦簷下插滿了天線和晾衣竿）的巷口，問一個在一家外省餃子館前聽平劇的老頭。永和怎麼走？

我記得他胡亂指了個方向，然後閉著眼睛（他正搖頭晃腦和著那收音機裡平劇的響板）說：「沒幾步路就到了。」

後來我發現他指的是公車站牌，沒錯那上面確實有一班車開往永和。那時我尚不知道恐懼，天色已漸漸暗斂。我試著分段穿越了那一條寬闊不見對岸的大河馬路（我記得我橫渡了那條馬路後，還喘了口大氣，心裡想：沒想到眞的穿越過來了）。然後我發現馬路的這一邊，是用綠漆鋼板護圍著的，延伸了好遠好遠的一整面牆，牆裡面似乎是一個工地。一個很大的工地。

我不記得我曾不曾提及：我是成長於這座城市瘋狂地拆除它自身擁有的許多黑瓦木牆的日式平房，而處處有拆毀的廢墟或工地可去遊蕩或拾撿寶物的那一代。穿過一座工地或廢墟對我而言，充滿了無以名狀的神秘吸引力，那天我作了第二個錯誤的決定，家族血液裡喜好冒險任意編纂路線的衝動突然湧起：我決定找到一塊鋼板和鋼板的接縫空隙，鑽進那座工地裡。在我的想法裡，這一大片鋼牆圈圍的工地，大概不過是一間正在拆除的學校。我告訴自

己：我正在抄近路。只要穿過了這座校園，我就可以找到較靠近永和的路段了（事實上以當時的方位判斷，這個想法並沒有錯）。

後來我才發現，那個「工地」，占地絕對有三十間國民學校那麼大。

那時天已全黑。我爬進鋼牆之後，發現自己正在一座小土丘上，遠遠近近有十來處這樣凹凸縱橫的小土丘。遠處有一些怪手在挖掘著，有一些工程用的閃光紅燈亮著，且從那極遠的地方傳來工人之間的吆喝聲。讓我試著描述許多年前我遭遇的狀況：即是我莫名地闖進了一處，以我當時的空間經驗，完全沒有檔案可以調尋參考的，我第一次嚐到所謂的「曠野恐懼」的，空曠無邊的一處巨大陌生的迷陣。

沒錯那是一個工地。但似乎是放大了數十倍的巨人的工地，我不記得自己攀爬了多少座的土丘，後來我根本是手腳並用四肢插在土裡攀爬（那些土丘是一般建築工地裡堆的土堆的一百倍放大）。我也跌跌絆絆地爬過一大堆巨大的石塊和一整堆一整堆（和我平常在工地裡踩來踩去的鋼筋條不同）的粗厚的鋼樑。我在這之間至少尿了四泡尿。我又渴又餓。事實上那時我完全相信外星人已占領地球。但我就是沒有辦法從這黑暗遍布的機關和地形的巨人迷魂陣裡脫身出去。好幾次我以爲自己只要朝著天邊高樓燈光那兒走去，一定可以找到這座迷陣的邊界。結果卻一籌莫展地被困在一大片無法渡過的湖泊前面。

後來我在那座巨大無邊的空地裡哭了起來。我眞的完全沒辦法走出去了。在那一整片溝壑起伏，陣形難窺其秘的空闊曠野（我眞的覺得自己被困在一個離那座城市好遠好遠的郊外）的中央，是一座搭蓋到一半，鋼樑裸露，巨石塊堆疊而上的，像太空基地一樣怪異、

高聳的巨大建築。

許多年後我才知道：那天傍晚至深夜，我困在其內四、五個小時找不到路出來的「巨人的工地」，是當時仍在興建中的，中正紀念堂。

我不記得後來我是如何走出那片巨人的迷宮。且我是如何回到永和的家中。倒是我哥記得那個我迷路的午後。他說那是他高一那年的國慶日前後，他那天傍晚騙我母親說去老師家補習，其實他坐著我們熟悉的那條路線的公車，由博愛路過衡陽路，到郵政總局左拐到中華路北站，然後他在中華路南站下車。他說他清楚記得那天是國慶日前後乃因於沿路從車窗望去，中華路沿路皆停了一輛一輛正在保養的坦克。

我哥說他那天跑去來來獅子林廣場混了一個晚上，後來他又跑去萬年大樓，一時手癢，ㄎㄧㄤ了一盒模型。他說他混到很晚才回家（他把模型藏在夾克和肚子之間），我母親憂心忡忡地來開門，說：

「你弟弟去拿眼鏡，怎麼到現在還沒回來？」

不過隔了一年，喜事和喪事穿廊過弄經過這間房子。

我們好像在那黑魆中的金箔和爆竹花裡，低頭匆促地笑著跨進門檻，經過那許多張親人的臉，他們西裝筆挺衣著華麗，發現我們即笑著趨上前來。但我們像急著趕赴什麼約會，抱歉地向他們回笑答禮，手牽手另一手將擠在客廳的人群推開，從另一扇門出去。

遲了就來不及了呢。

妻的二嬸在廚房油炸著一種叫「寸金祖」的甜花生餡麻糬。她的臉自耳際到鼻下，全用一條碎花布巾包覆起來。我一路從這條錯落著咕咾石老房子的巷弄穿過，發覺屋簷陰影下蹲著紮魚網或是剖海貝的婦人，一逕是這樣用布巾覆遮著臉。妻的母曾向我抱怨，案山這邊的街坊婦人特喜嚼舌根道人是非長短。實在這海港邊強光曝曬裡，擠靠曲折的窄小弄道和帽簷下裹覆藏在暗影中的臉，似乎本來就極魅惑著人窺臆別人家後院嘴舌編派一些故事的慾望。妻的母親之前和二嬸，爲了阿嬤臨終前住誰那兒這件事，鬧得很僵。

二嬸拿了一盤剛起鍋的「寸金祖」讓了讓我，我囫圇吞下兩粒下肚，淚眼汪汪直誇好吃，一回頭卻見妻的母親半倚在冰箱壁，深深地看我一眼。

原來你是這麼嘴甜的人。

之前也有過夾在妻家的廚房，訕訕不知所措左右品鑑著妻的母親和大嫂捋袖操拳各顯本領端上桌的拿手菜，稱讚這個得罪了那個，兩邊都巴結，結果全部都得罪。

我每回從外頭像所有景物皆被糊焦煮沸褪去顏色的熾白強光裡，走進他們這種三層透天的陰涼屋宅，都有一種瞳仁緊縮，而將屋裡當時存在之人與不存在之人重疊混淆的幻覺。有幾次我甚至看見妻的阿嬤像從前一般縮著身子靠在牆邊熟睡。像經過某種將水分烘盡的乾屍程序，她的身軀變得又黑又小，像曬乾的香蕉，但頭顱仍是原來尺寸，所以乍看去像是一具頭部發疳的孩童屍體。

但眞的定睛看去，那個乾縮老人的影像像洞穴壁畫快速蒸發褪成那片牆壁角落的陰影。

妻的阿嬤那時已死去半年了。

妻說阿嬤對她說過，她與阿公是三世姻緣。第一世阿嬤是人家的童養媳，阿公跑來纏她，還把她原先的那個男人害死。第二世阿公變作女人，替阿嬤做了一輩子牛馬。第三世就是這一生嘍，換作阿嬤來當女人，替阿公做牛做馬。

阿公一生游手好閒，整日在廟社鬼混。

那時是我與妻相戀之初，妻年不滿二十五，年輕美若春花，我記得她第一次帶我來這幢屋子看阿嬤，就先帶我上透天厝頂樓的祖先神龕燒香拜拜。在那座放了媽祖神像、關帝君和妻家族祖先牌位小桌上，還放了一張阿公的畫像。

我那時或許太年輕了。也許是一種無人在場卻強烈感覺自己闖入別人世界而泛在周身皮膚的冰冷感。也許是眞正難得找到這一處只有我和她獨處的幽僻空間。我竟然魯莽地在那個點著兩盞紅塑膠殼小神燈的陰暗房間裡，緊緊抱住正在點香的妻，並且把手游進她的衣衫夾裡，握住她那年輕小巧的乳房。

那是妻第一次認眞用身體劇烈地斥拒我在無人處突如其來的撫愛。她用力掙開了我（其間甚至用手肘幹了我肋骨一拐子），恍如夢遊一般，從喉頭浮出一種我陌生不已、近乎男人的腔調：

「祖先在看著。」

另一次是妻騎著五十ＣＣ機車載我到這個屋子來看阿嬤，那天二叔去跑計程車了，二嬸包著花布頭巾和一干婦人在後門窄巷裡「刺網」（即像刺繡般細細織縫著一種潔白如海沙的玻璃纖維魚網）。整個屋子只有阿嬤一個人。

那時阿嬤已經有一隻眼瞎了。白色的眼珠浮在其他器官皆沈陷下去的一張皺褶老臉上。那張臉和後來她的遺照上電腦修過的那張臉已極近似。我和年輕的妻陪著尚未死去的阿嬤坐在那光陰互相侵吞的寂靜客廳裡。

我記得那天妻像個裝大人的小女孩東一句西一句和阿嬤搭話。大多數時候阿嬤是靜靜笑著不回答。她有時會向妻詢問一兩句關於我的事。但她總是在提到我時用「伊」來稱謂，像是我並不在她倆的身邊，並且——我想是害羞吧——從頭到尾低著眼笑，沒有正面看我一

眼。

我記得那天也是妻帶我上頂樓祖先神龕燒香拜拜。然後她帶我到二樓樓梯轉角的一個房間，說這個房間是一個叫雅蜜的表妹的房間，後來這個表妹跑到台北，在大葉高島屋當化妝品專櫃小姐。妻要我把包包放著，可以先歇一歇，她下去陪阿嬤。

那個房間就像我小時候闖進我阿嬤的房間。它比台北的一般公寓卧房都要挑高。擺放了一張大床。床上堆放著好幾件尺寸怎麼都不對，內裡塞的棉絮極緊實，而被套是一種像棉襖布面冰冰軟軟的暗紅花布的小棉被。房裡且堆著幾座漆畫了八仙或麒麟送子故事的暗色木頭櫥櫃。還有一把吉他歌譜。有一張書桌，桌上堆著一些美髮用品和一些心靈小品的書籍。你完全無法從這個房間，去猜臆這個叫雅蜜的表妹，這個澎湖女孩，在她去台北做美容化妝品專櫃小姐之前，她在這個漁港小島的青春期是怎麼度過的。

後來妻又跑了上來。我記得我那時把她按在張大床上剝她的衣服。我記得她全身的衣服都汗濕了。她不斷低聲抗議著，阿嬤就在樓下啊。但後來我們還在那個我不知該用陰暗或是燦亮去形容的房間裡性交了。且後來年輕的妻還高仰著她那白皙優美的喉頸，低低呻吟地高潮了。

而那整個過程，我們放著那個靜靜微笑的阿嬤，一個人坐在樓梯轉角下去，像是因爲光照的密度太大，所以所有的家具、沙發、卡拉ＯＫ電視，皆輕微晃動地漂浮起來（當然還包括當時仍活著的阿嬤）的那麼一間客廳裡。

那一切像是發生在許久之前的事。但阿嬤過世似乎不滿一年，或許才幾個月而已，這個

客廳，旋即擠滿了衣裝華麗的客人。他們看見我們進來，即笑著圍了上來。我們被那麼多不同稱謂不同輩分的親族包圍在客廳中央。

這天是在幫二叔的大兒子友陸娶媳婦。新娘子是印尼新娘，據說前前後後花了三十萬新台幣。妻的一位遠房姑丈告訴我：這個離島上的年輕人愈來愈苦悶了，攏娶不到老婆。女孩子高中一畢業（有的是國中一畢業）就往台灣跑。沒有人想留在澎湖，以前他們那年代還常有阿兵哥和澎湖的女孩戀愛，然後退伍後留下來結婚定居，不回台灣。

現在都沒這種事了。整個馬公的女孩都缺貨嘛。案山這一條弄里街坊，現在坐在門前曬小卷乾的，全是大陸妹、越南妹、泰國、寮國、印尼妹……根本是八國聯軍，他說友陸人老實，每天只知道工作，再不給他轉個辦法娶某，眞正是別想娶了。

我問他友陸現在在做些什麼？他說好像是到望安、桶盤、虎井甚至一些無人小島去做什麼打井工程。

這時從那個房間——即是樓梯上去彎角上去的那個，叫雅蜜的女孩的房間——門打開走出了個留長髮的年輕人，他穿著深藍色寬寬的西裝褲，打著赤腳，和屋內氣氛非常不協調那樣神情委頓地扶著樓梯木扶手晃下樓來。

我有一種時光錯置顚倒的幻覺。

我聽見他們喊他弟（ㄉㄧˋ），我聽見那些阿姑阿嬤和妻的母親在輕聲碎嘴地討論著。

弟有卡好莫？

講昨日去海軍醫院吊了兩筒點滴命才撿回來？

講是伊阿嬤最疼伊，講蓋棺彼時伊沒回來，阿嬤放不下他。

伊阿伯講這個孩子是否有吸安非他命喔？

那個弟（ㄉㄧˋ）坐在我面前的板凳，喊了我一聲姊夫。我發現他其實是個極害羞之人。他靜靜啜著他母親端給他的一碗魚湯。我看見他的左手手腕上有一條口子拉得極長的傷痕，黏在上面的紗布膠帶上結了黑色的血塊。

我突然想起這男孩的面容，長得極像那三樓上面，點著紅蓮燈的神案上，那張肖像畫裡的妻的阿公。

後來我們兩個攀談起來，他告訴我他本來在台灣是開貨櫃車的，高雄—台中—台北這樣跑。有時也跑東部。一天白天夜裡連著跑，常常連著二十幾個小時沒睡覺。我問他那他們會不會邊開邊睡覺？他說會啊，怎麼不會。我讚嘆說欸貨櫃車駕照很難考不是？好像要先考自小客，然後小客車，然後小貨車，然後大貨車，然後大客車……這時他的眼睛一亮。他說有啊，大客車執照我也有，我也去開過統聯，跑高速公路，太累了。後來就不去了。然後他告訴我一些考大貨車或大客車的駕照時，比較高難度一些的測試過程。

他且說他連怪手的駕照都有。

但是這時前廳的人騷動起來，人們喊著：去娶新娘嘍，去看新娘嘍。原來新娘是前一天就（自己一個人）從印尼坐飛機到桃園，二叔他們再一路走高速公路，然後從台北把她帶到澎湖來，新娘子下榻在隔了一條街的經國紀念館，由一些妻的學姊妹們陪著，權充女方的親

人，等著扮演男方的這一組人馬簇擁著新郎去迎娶。

我丟下弟（ㄉㄧˋ），也跟著那群穿著正式西裝的人們興匆匆地鑽進那熾烈燦白的日光裡。有些年輕人，煞有其事地拿著大哥大在對時調整兩邊的狀態。我覺得這一切像極了在演戲。他們雖然都穿著西裝，但頭髮卻蓬亂油膩，有的腳下還穿著球鞋，一看即知平日裡是打赤膊賣力氣的一群討海人。有一個阿伯遞給我一些黑色的圓顆粒，他告訴我那是炮仔，「待會放給他鬧熱啦。」後來我認出那是一種我小時候玩過的叫作「蛇炮」的玩意，這種炮你一點火，它會噗滋噗滋冒出嗆鼻的臭味和一種黃色的煙霧，然後像是從那燃放的焰花裡，歪歪扭扭長出一條像大便一樣黑黑的東西。

我認爲在迎娶這樣重要的場面，放這種突梯古怪充滿猥褻感的炮似乎不很恰當（說不定還會遭我岳父痛斥一頓呢）。

但是那一對新郎（友陸）和新娘（那個印尼女孩）就這樣在兩邊台階皆燃放著那種冒著黃煙和臭味，且噗噗長出一條條黑色物事的詭異氣氛下，歪歪跌跌被衆人推擁走出經國紀念館。二叔請來的一隊鼓號樂隊七零八落地演奏著一些進行曲。你一開始可能會被這個場面唬住，但是待你靠近些看，你會發現這些穿著有兩排金釦筆挺水藍制服（肩膀還有金色垂穗的墊肩哩）摺縫的白水兵長褲的隊員們，全是一些老人，一些閃著金牙在嚼檳榔的老先生和可能剛喝醉酒硬被拉來臉還紅紅的老阿嬤。之前在妻的阿嬤的喪禮上我就看過他們了。可能那時演奏的樂曲有些不同罷了。

友陸看起來樂歪了，他的一隻手從後面摟住新娘穿著一身白紗蓬裙的腰（那個印尼女孩

的腰眞是細），另一隻手向周圍圍觀的這一堆親族鄰人揮手致意。天哪他眞是笨拙害羞得可以了。他的細框眼鏡鏡片的周邊還沾著一些小點小點的油漆星沫。我不曉得爲什麼沒有人注意到這點而替他把眼鏡摘下來擦乾淨。

這時我注意到那個新娘正大把鼻涕大把眼淚哭著。那是一種極傷心的哭法。她臉上的濃妝全給哭花了。但她身邊那些花枝招展的妯娌表姊妹們沒有一個人安撫她一下，譬如摟她肩膀一下或作個鬼臉逗她笑之類的。我只有在婚前和妻一次毀滅性的怨毒爭吵後，才看過妻出現這種把整張臉都崩潰掉的哭法。

她究竟是個異鄉人呵。我心裡難過地想著，就和我一樣。那樣隻身站在這一大群人裡面，他們的面容模糊但全善意地笑著。你聽不懂他們快速談話裡的細節，但你只能一直保持著微笑，有時你的丈夫（或妻）就當著你的面用他們的語言和他的母親交談起來，你隱隱猜臆他們其實正在評論著你，有時他們會突然放開喉嚨大笑起來，你只能皺著眉頭跟著傻笑；有時他們會低聲地爭執著，然後用陌生的急速的語句互相咒罵著。

那個印尼新娘其實相當美麗，我甚至猜測她可能是她那個村子裡最美的女人，她的頸子上掛滿了像迎神建醮被宰殺的豬公頭頸上掛著的那些粗粗的金鍊子。她身邊一個親人也沒有，代表女方主婚人的，是一個二嬸她們尊稱爲「張老師」的禿頭男子。那人眞正的頭銜是什麼「人力資源仲介公司主任」，說穿了就是「人肉販子」。

我記得前一天晚上，我還侷坐在那種房子陰涼的飯廳裡，聽著二嬸一邊處理一種叫做海臭蟲的鱟蟹類海產，一邊輕聲對妻的母親談論這個叫「張老師」的男子。她說今嘛澎湖到處

都是外籍新娘了。馬公那裡說還開班了一個什麼「外籍新娘教室」，教她們一些手藝或可用在擺攤販的簡單廚藝。妻的母親說那不是很好嗎？二嬸卻說不好，「張老師」說不能給去，去會學壞。講今嘛的規定是每年這些外籍太太們要回她們原籍地半年（二嬸說他們另外花了筆錢，把友陸的媳婦改註爲什麼「特殊人士」，所以一年只要回去一個月，其實只要出境個把個月，轉轉再回來就好了）。「許多女人偷光了金子、家裡的現金，一回去就不再回來了。」主要是吃不了苦，像嫁去西嶼那些地方，比在她們故鄉要辛苦，有的甚至更壞，拿了訂金就說那女兒病死了什麼的。「張老師」這一方面很精明，我跟伊爸爸去揀，一眼就相中這個女孩，主要是笑面款……訂金付很少，日子定好了，「張老師」去帶人，一手交錢一手交人。「張老師」說：我做這生意是做好事，是做長久的，你們今天娶得滿意，下回哪個堂兄弟也想要娶水某，就會想到我張老師了……

二嬸說：「不是說台灣那邊有一對父子，娶了人家一對越南的姊妹花麼？夭壽喲。」他們掩嘴笑得像是少女聽見什麼誇張的黃色笑話一樣。

在我這樣怔忡感傷的瞬刻，友陸早已摟著他那一身白紗的新娘（這時我已看不清她的臉了），坐上一輛二叔他們租來的黑頭車上。原先圍觀的親戚妯娌們也紛紛跳上從各處調來借來的轎車（也包括了二叔的黃色計程車），那一批鼓號樂隊們則是爬上一輛小貨卡的後車廂，他們仍是興高采烈地吹奏著。剛才拿蛇炮給我的阿伯（後來我才知道，按輩分我應喊他叔公）告訴我，他們這一批「車隊」，是要去馬公市遊一遊街，秀一下，「給伊風騷一下

啦。」

那時我幾乎是第一次感覺到，站在那個幾乎沒有任何蔭影可躲的強光裡，一個眨眼，突然所有的景物全逆光反差成一種底片膠卷上面的暗褐色。

我站的位置（經國紀念館前的空曠馬路）恰是一塊高高隆起的台地，站在那裡眺目遠望，可以看見較遠處被拉成一條海平面的漁港，但那條藍色的水平線被較近處的一排咕咾石舊厝和三層水泥洋房交錯的建築群給切斷了。再更近一點則是一間豬肝紅漆底的城隍廟金漆彩繪的飛簷廟頂。

我記得妻曾告訴我：原來這裡一直延伸到現在的漁港，全是海。後來是海埔新生地填起來了。現在從這裡走幾步路便可到東文（妻的母親的娘家），從前我岳父在追妻的母親時，兩個村子中間隔了一片大海，必須繞好遠的路才能走到心上人的家。

我岳父亦曾告訴過我：他年輕時曾和漁村裡的浮浪子弟，在媽祖生辰那天，赤膊著上身「過火」。他說那是兩人一組扛著載有配享小神像的神轎，兩人搖晃擺動像酒醉夢遊，弄得好像兩個凡間青壯男子和那小小神轎的神力在抗搏。然後一組一組赤足跳踩過上面不斷覆鹽覆生米的火炭。等過完火後（我岳父說，他記得確曾有人腳底被那火炭燎傷潰爛），所有的（一組一組的兩人一轎）人，皆要佯裝成再也壓制不住那神佛想要洗洗澡的強烈渴望，全部連人帶轎衝跳入海中。

照這樣說，那時到這間城隍廟為止，在它前面的一切民居、小學、十字路口的紅綠燈、保齡球館、青年活動中心……應當全是岩礁拍浪、景色一片枯槁的內海了。

我記得妻曾告訴過我一個奇怪的念頭：即是她極懷疑她的母系那一支的家族上溯，可能曾經混過荷蘭人的血液。

妻舉證鑿鑿地說：她和她妹妹的頭髮，從小就是惱人地在陽光下會泛著一種紅棕色的光澤，且仔細盯著她們的眼睛看，會發現她們的眼瞳是藍色的。如果你留意她母親的雙眼皮的話，她說她母親年輕時有一次上馬公買布，被一個外省老兵攔下，驚異地說我跑遍大江南北，就沒見過一個人的雙眼皮這麼深的，像用刀刻過一樣……

妻說如果你看過大舅的臉，「根本就像外國人」，完全不是漢人的輪廓。確實妻的皮膚，就澎湖女孩來說是白皙得過分了，日照過久鼻翼兩側會泛起粉紅的淡斑，且鼻樑確比大學時班上其他的女生要挺些。

而妻的父系這族與母系這族，都是上溯幾世紀前的遷移之初，即世代住在澎湖。不可能混有平埔族的血統。

也許是像那屋簷陰影層遮蔽的咕咾石老巷弄，在隱蔽難透光的家族史的某頁，曾有一次沒被記錄下來的恥辱的混血。曾經占領過這座島的紅毛番？或是漂流擱淺的荷蘭海盜？

我就那樣站在曝光反差的暗色暈眩裡，困惑地猜疑著這一切移進移出的遷移與配種，不過是一個隱藏在和諧的對應和儀式（我與妻的相遇與婚禮）之下，藤蔓錯雜且暴力相加的族裔譜系不斷被污染、歧出的悲歌。

妻的父系家譜祖先來自滎陽，他們是從宋代即自福建遷移到澎湖的純種漢人。妻的母系

是可能混了荷蘭人血統的漢人。我父親的父系（據我父親說）是三國時吳武將駱統的後裔，我祖母項氏據說是從山東遷至安徽的一族。我母親是在台北大龍峒長大的養女。生父母世系不詳。養母（阿嬤）亦是人家的養女，且有一些證據顯示她繼承了平埔族的血統……這還不提後來持續加入的印尼人、泰國人、越南人……

但是那天傍晚，在擺桌喜宴開始之前，發生了一件小小的事情，我才確定：白日裡我站在經國紀念館之前，那片浮石虛土硬填起的、消失的海灣上，所有的一切關於家族譜系的顛倒妄想，所有對於那印尼新娘的物傷其類的情感，眞是大錯特錯地離譜了……

那天傍晚，我走進屋裡（我總有一種穿廊過弄，分開許多陌生人才得以走到那屋子的內廳的印象），經過我的岳父。他正單腿盤起直挺挺閉目坐在一只板凳上，上身輕微晃動著，口中念念有辭。所以他並沒有搭理我。

我走進廚房，妻的母親和二嬸各坐在張小木几上撿菜葉，旁邊圍坐著這附近街坊的婦人和阿婆們。她們一邊幫忙撿菜葉，一邊小聲急促地用一種腔口很重，我無法聽懂每一句話內容的古老河洛話在交談著。

「阿蘭呢？」我問妻的母親。我這時才想起我恐怕有一整天沒看到妻子。我這一天總是處在這種一開口說話便和周圍的人格格不入的苦惱裡（因爲我操的語言）。

勿知咧？妻的母親說，然後她回頭用河洛話問她身旁一個背對著我穿著一件銀紅色旗袍

的女孩（那女孩也蹲坐在這群阿巴桑之間幫著撿菜）。

那女孩側過頭來的時候，我才發現她不就是白日裡在友陸懷裡哭得一塌糊塗的新娘麼？

那女孩臉上畫著濃妝（她眞是個美人），眨著睫毛想了一會，然後，從她的嘴裡說出了一串標準得不能再標準的河洛話：

「伊一大陣人好像跟著阿嫂去（她說ㄎㄨ）觀音亭攝相。」

（她不是印尼人嗎？）

（原來這裡唯一的異鄉人就只有我而已？）

晚宴時在臨時搭起的辦桌帆布篷下，妻告訴我：新娘的祖父一輩才從廈門遷至印尼，算起來是第三代移民後裔（我則自我算起爲第二代），說漁港那裡一個叔公居然和新娘認出是同一宗譜的遠親，叙輩分那個叔公還要喊新娘子阿姑咧。妻說二嬸他們和張老師去新娘家提親時，招待他們吃的發粿、黑糖粿和咱澎湖同款傳統。一些祭神的方法，也是較像咱澎湖……

這時我們的談話被一陣碰弄麥克風從音箱發出的割裂或拖磨什麼的音爆聲打斷，原來是我岳父正滿面通紅地跳上原先準備給辦桌助興的卡拉ＯＫ女郎表演歌舞用的組合式舞台。

今天蒙各位鄉親賢達來給我們友陸的這個喜事添光……我的岳父開始在舞台上講一些場面話……這是我與舍弟舍妹莫大的榮幸……

原來之前他坐在板凳上搖頭晃腦地就是在默誦此刻的台詞。我心裡想著。但是這時我岳父話鋒一轉……這裡有一件喜上加喜的消息要跟大家講，就是友陸伊阿公，也就是我爸爸，昨天託咱案山城隍廟底厚道仙來傳話，這裡把伊講，抄下讀給各位鄉親聽，也算是爲今天這個喜事錦上添花啦……

然後我岳父自他的西裝內口袋掏出他的老花眼鏡戴上，然後把一張摺得小小張的紙攤開。用一種咬字、腔韻皆極難辨認的古老閩南話讀將起來。

茲承鈞命爲帶貴堂亡故生鄭柳墝反梓與其兒孫媳婦等聚會，茲准降筆，敘談衷情，以此暫退，奉命調升上海市城隍廟褒善司鄭降即鄭柳墝。

然後他讀了一段詩：

一路欣欣玉山歸　土地職守無違虧
天心厚澤吾柳墝　刻骨銘心盡善爲

這整個古漢話的念誦過程，我皆是需要妻在一旁逐字推敲翻譯才隱約弄懂我岳父手中那張稿子的內容。在那過程中，我竟然發現，隔著客人尚未坐滿空空落落的酒席圓桌（上面鋪了紅色的薄塑膠紙並壓著一瓶瓶的紹興酒）望去，在我岳父講台上方最靠近的那張圓桌，新

娘子，就是那個一身白紗的輪廓美麗的印尼女孩，一個人坐在那兒。她專注地聽著我岳父口中冒出的那些，對我而言如同藏密咒語一般嗡嗡發聲的古老漢語。像是她眞聽得懂一樣，也隨著那詩文的韻律而搖晃著。我在放棄理解那和這個古老漁村古老巷弄屋子裡的古老家族血裔支系一樣撲朔難辨的冗牙贅舌之語符的內容之前，最後聽到的句子是：

……幸生前知覺修身方有今日六司之職佳音傳聞不勝歡喜歸途承馬將軍示白內人歐氏作故使不才柳墝含淚痛不欲生哀哉今隨馬將軍由玉山縣千里路而返承蒙恩典會堂前兒女媳婦歡聚一堂，何等歡心……

我問妻這說的到底是什麼，妻以一種對異族人解釋不清的懶懶和虛無，似喜似嗔地說：「就是說我阿公升官了啦。」

據說妻的祖父，死後多年，曾經託夢給他們案山一座小廟的廟祝，說有事要告訴他的兒孫，託他在某月某日把他們找來，那個廟祝依約去找了，我岳父他們三兄弟，在那一天聚在那廟裡，焚香燒金紙，祝禱請占他們的父親有什麼話要說。

果然那個受託的廟祝，幾巡誦咒灑酒，便翻了白眼起了乩，作出我妻阿公生前醉酒時神態，用他老人家生前那樣聽不出悲喜底濃痰嗓音說：「以後，我的墳，汝就免去上了，我已經不在位了。」

包括我岳父，衆人皆驚問是怎麼回事？

那阿公說：「免驚！我要作官去了。」原來他老人家在陰間被派了個小官，官職是對面大陸淮陰縣一個什麼地方的土地公。這天把兒孫族親找來一聚，即日就要上任去了。

我聽妻說著當時的場面，覺得滑稽又詭異。一個死去的親人，借託了個陌生人的身體，這般靠近地和活著的人說話，且告訴他們自己是要去赴任陰間裡，遙遠他鄉的一個小地方官。

妻說當時我岳父諸人聽了這消息，悲喜交集，拉著那附了他們父親鬼魂的廟祝，嚎啕大哭。老人大約是被哭得心煩，皺了皺眉說：「賣擱嚎啊啦！」便拂袖而去。

後來我岳父他們，還在案山當地，擺了幾十桌的流水席，算是慶賀老人家在陰曹地府，掛了個官職，雖說不上是位列仙班，但也算是善終了。

不過淮陰究竟在什麼地方呢？那裡眞的有土地廟供人祭拜嗎？我初聽這個故事，對妻的家人，那種曖昧模糊缺乏尋根問柢想像力的精神頗不以爲然。自己的親人在死亡的那個世界裡當了官了，且還有個地名可考，難道就從來沒有人起過念頭，到對岸的「淮陰」這地方去尋尋。看看眞的有這座廟否？或者給老人家上上香鬆鬆漆什麼的？

後來我聽我父親講到他逃難時，曾經在淮陰發生的一段奇妙因緣，使我不能不駭嘆，偌大的一張中國地圖，我會和妻這個女人，經過多少陰錯陽差，看不出其線索的遷移和終而相遇，不能不說在冥冥之中，有所謂緣法這個玩意。

關於「阿公在淮陰縣當土地公」這件事，在我的想法裡，應當也就和一個大家族（尤其是像妻他們這樣一個澎湖人的家族）在祖厝一個屋廊轉角就隨手帶上一扇門一樣，總有一個陰晦的故事被關在某一個房間，沒有下文。誰想到這個故事，在妻的阿嬤過世的頭七喪家謝宴上，又聽到了另一段串延接上的版本。

妻的阿公過世時，妻猶是小學五年級的孩子（我問過妻可記得那許多年前的葬禮場面，誰知她一臉茫然，說：「不記得了。」），到她的阿嬤終於離世時，已經是我們結婚前一年，這年妻二十七歲。也就是說這一對阿公阿嬤，他們相繼謝世，中間隔了近十五載。

這個阿嬤的喪禮，我從遽傳噩耗，隨妻坐飛機趕去澎湖，擦洗身子、換衣、小殮、大殮、釘棺，到葬禮及送往火化場火化，幾乎是全程參與。那時我和妻是男女朋友關係，妻在我之前有一個相處七年的男友，在這次喪禮之前，妻的父親對我始終不假顏色，而在喪禮之後，他開始會用一種台灣男人矜持含蓄的方式，像對已被視爲家族內成員的態度，對我表達他的感情（譬如說他不准我去幫忙女眷們洗碗，他的想法認爲男人不應進廚房去；他會念一些不知從哪抄來的門聯或詩句給我聽）。

在那個人影幢幢動員如此多親族的大陣仗裡（我時常在那間闇幽的祖厝裡，微笑著和各種我並不相識的妻的親族打招呼，心底爲我找不到妻在哪裡，而慌張恐懼），常可以片段地聽到廚房角落、停車場搭的喪棚裡，掩嘴低聲的一群婦人講的，我弄不清關係網路的人名和人名之間的是非或醜事。

這之間我亦聽到了許多婦人們繪形繪狀捉神弄鬼的神秘故事。譬如她們說阿嬤肖鼠，頭七那天她們由大門鋪細沙（是山水海灘的白沙）一直鋪至棺木旁，據說第二天眞的有人發現一列細細索索的老鼠爪印，從大門門檻淺淺踩到棺木那邊，便說阿嬤眞的有回來耶。

我還聽一位阿妗（據妻後來告訴我，這個遠房阿妗和我岳母交惡，要我以後不要阿妗阿妗喊那麼親熱）說，阿公在過世的前幾年早就「肖去」了。他還曾經在大庭廣衆之前，硬把阿嬤的衣服剝光。阿嬤她老人家一絲不掛哭啼啼地求旁邊的晚輩借一件衣衫給她披著，都被阿公威嚴地大聲喝阻。

我不知道這些怪誕的故事，牽延上妻的身世有何意義。但似乎它們從此便與我有關了，後來我聽到更多關於妻的這個家族玄靈古怪的往事，我總會嗟嘆著自己的身世：我在很小很小的時候，似乎關於我的身世的故事便已固定，往後的時光只是由我父親一次又一次重複地重說——我的身世便是我父親的故事，在他的故事裡，爲了源頭和開啓，會提到一些我祖父的事和祖母的事，但我父親是這一大套故事裡唯一的說書人，連我母親偶爾提到一些家族史的片段，也全是從我父親那兒聽去的版本。

我想像著這樣的畫面：我精赤著身子和妻相對而立，她同樣也是全身一絲不掛，我好奇而色情地盯著她一身優美安靜的裸體，因爲是這樣站立的姿勢，使得她如白色牛奶的軀幹中央下方的那撮黑毛顯得有些突兀。我忍不住伸手去撥弄了一番，沒想到她紅著臉低垂著眼也好奇地伸出手撫弄我下面的卵蛋，這使我的那個硬梆梆地翹立起來。

這時我突然發現有兩條腿掛在我的胸前，上面覆滿白色的腿毛，原來是我父親赤身裸體

採騎馬打仗的姿勢跨騎在我的脖子上，他的卵囊舒愜地置放在我髮漩的中央，像一隻蘆稈巢裡睡著的肥鵪鶉，他的胖肚子垂掛下來，蓋住我的前額，弄得我滿頭大汗。後來我發現有許多汗是由我父親的肚子上淌下來的，我稍稍歪頭往上瞧，發現我父親的肩項上，以同樣的姿勢跨騎著我祖父（雖然我從未見過我祖父長啥模樣）。我祖父的頭上，便一無所有了。所以我和我父親、我祖父，是三人一組的疊羅漢（我們三個都光著身子）。

但是待我一看對面，裸身的妻的頭上，我岳父、岳母、妻的阿公、阿嬤、外公、外嬤、阿祖、祖嬤，還有旁岔歧出的阿叔阿嬸阿舅阿妗叔公嬸婆舅公親母……有的人赤身裸體，有的人穿著古代的寬大官服，像小時候我看過的李棠華特技團在一輛行進中的腳踏車上，以各種姿勢各種角度各種部位向上疊堆鏈接著蚜蟲或者說葡萄球鏈菌一樣的人們。而且愈往上疊，枝枒分岔得愈多……

我被眼前這個倒插金字塔的龐大家譜給嚇得卸了勁，小雞雞垂頭喪氣地再也不肯舉起來了。

相較於我父親那一回待續著一向單口相聲般的家族史詩，妻的澎湖家族，常在我不熟識的親族間，掩嘴低聲地傳遞著一些殘破不全的畫面（譬如妻的阿嬤，裸著兩粒枯癟癟的老人奶袋，哭啼啼地央求晚輩借她件衣服披上）；而我的岳父反倒鮮少開口描述他那雜駁冥晦、魔幻且無厘頭的家族史。

法蘭克學派

Frank-----

孫梓評

孫梓評作品集 8
法蘭克學派 | Frank-

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100台北市中正區信義路二段213號11樓
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香港發行所　城邦（香港）出版集團有限公司
香港北角英皇道310號雲華大廈4樓504室
電話：25086231　傳真：25789337
馬新發行所　城邦（馬新）出版集團有限公司
Cite (M) Sdn. Bhd. (458372U)
11, Jalan 30D / 146, Desa Tasik, Sungai Besi,
57000 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
電話：603-90563833 傳真：603-90562833
E-mail: citekl@cite.com.tw
印　　刷　凌晨企業有限公司
初版一刷　2003年9月29日
售價：220元
ISBN：986-7691-69-5
版權所有・翻印必究（Printed in Taiwan）
*本書如有缺頁、破損、裝訂錯誤，請寄回更換

我們在下雨

想要有一雙美麗的腳
才能走過他給的痛
在模糊的輪廓裡找一首歌
眼淚，在線譜上升降

想要預購一扇耳朵
打開，能聽得見陽光的手
就像海洋始終守候
一艘船的經過

啦啦啦，我們在下雨
下雨了，天氣是垂直的



我們不下雨的時候，也可以晴朗地聽一首Beth Orton的「Sugar Boy」。但我們多半是下雨的，或許因爲晴朗比較費力。

我是薄的，但是很多線索
眼睛放進河流
比時間還像石頭
下雨了，雲被折磨
再來一口迷魂的懷舊

想要，有一雙平安的腳
才能走過他給的承諾
掩上，打烊的耳朵
我們下雨了



陳克華詩集

我撿到一顆頭顱

漢光文庫 015

我撿到一顆頭顱

著作者⊙陳克華
發行人⊙宋定西
印刷出版⊙漢光文化事業股份有限公司
地　　址⊙台北市信義路四段一號三樓
電　　話⊙(〇二)七〇四九六三三(十線)
郵政劃撥⊙第〇一〇七三六九—六號
出版登記⊙局版台業第一三八七號
Telex ⊙二六二二九號　HILIT
漢光編號⊙00141　分類編號⊙M015
中央圖書館分類編號⊙
著作權⊙台內著字第　　號
初版⊙中華民國七十七年九月十五日

定價⊙新台幣一五〇元

版權所有・翻印必究

婚禮

我出生時，
她發亮的鞋尖正在試探
剛鋪上的，紅色的軟氈

當他才取出戒指
衆人早已敲打著木槌
釘好我的棺木

送葬的行列裏
有孩童偷偷地嘻笑，牽拉着手
把哀傷的花瓣拆下
黏在紅通通的鼻尖上

是了，我的一生
見證了儀式，中間的那一部份——
遊戲的部份。

一九八五・八・十四

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零雨◎著

ISBN 957-13-0506-5

人間叢書(185)

消失在地圖上的名字

著　者——零　雨
發行人——孫思照
出版者——時報文化出版企業有限公司
台北市108和平西路三段240號四樓
發行專線—(〇二)三〇六六八四二
讀者服務專線—(〇二)三〇二四〇九四
(如果您對本書品質與服務有任何不滿意的地方，請打這支電話。)
郵撥——〇一〇三八五四～〇時報出版公司
信箱——台北郵政七九～九九信箱

主編——吳繼文
版面規畫—吳勝天
校對——王美琴
排版——鴻霖電腦排版公司
製版——源耕印刷有限公司
印刷——華展印刷有限公司

初版一刷—一九九二年九月十五日
定價——新台幣一五〇元

ISBN 957-13-0506-5
Printed in Taiwan

◎行政院新聞局局版台業字第〇二一四號
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你感到幸福嗎

遠遠地，有一口箱子
朝我滾來。我要
在它到來之前滾開

（你感到幸福嗎）

在閃開那一剎那
躲了箱子
也避開幸福

再給我一口箱子吧

夏宇詩集

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●摩擦● 無以名狀

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出版　現代詩季刊社
地址　台北市羅斯福路三段76號12F之2
電話　(02)351-5045
印刷　鴻霖設計印刷有限公司
電話　(02)7400511
郵政劃撥　05846850張素貞帳戶
出版日期　1995年5月
定價　250元

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一個好的開始

燉我的燉我豆腐
我的嘎嘎
燉凍豆腐
我的燉凍
嚇啦啦豆腐
他們嗚嗚啦的燉凍
凍燉豆腐

我們唱他們完全燉不壞的
燉凍燉豆腐
如果你會燉你就燉壞了
如果你不會燉你就
克制自己不去
燉
我的　曖昧的凍豆腐
嚇啦啦啦啦
潰爛凍壞了的豆腐

找到一個主題規避地燉
你的燉凍豆腐我
做空中滾翻交叉燉你的
完整的救贖的你的
燉凍豆腐我的拴著的
爲著前程就燉你的詭異的
絕無僅有的燉凍
燉你的燉凍豆腐

豆豆我的燉燉
腐腐我的凍凍
暱稱所有暱稱
嘆息一切嘆息
崩潰一再崩潰
我的
我燉的
燉我的
燉我的燉

凍我的凍
燉凍不要凍
燉凍不會燉
我就不可自拔
你的壞
你就奮不顧身
我的燉
我的燉的燉

摩擦●無以名狀

貓咪　今天　聽到
你叫我　回到　一個
廝混的　巴洛克式
的了解　貓咪　問題
是　我的　遺忘

像　幽靈　我的
罪惡　像　歌劇　我
的　失　眠　遠足
曠野　問　題　是
貓咪　我的　旋轉
如果　是　無謂
我的柔軟　是

那個　惋惜　我的
溫暖，是，這個
游離　貓咪　我的
我的　閃爍　撞擊
就是　牠，
最愛　的
的　魚

擁抱

風是黑暗
門縫是睡
冷淡和懂是雨

突然是看見
混淆叫做房間

漏像海岸線

身體是流沙詩是冰塊
貓輕微但水鳥是時間

裙的海灘
虛線的火焰
寓言消滅括弧深陷

斑點的感官感官
你是霧
我是酒館

學術英文暨文學理論研習營

Summer School for
Academic English & Literary Theory

2009 英文論文格式

「學術英文暨文學理論」研習營

Summer School on Literary and Philosophical Theory and Academic Chinese

英文論文格式

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"THEY SAY / I SAY"

The Moves That Matter in Academic Writing

GERALD GRAFF

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both of the University of Illinois at Chicago

W · W · NORTON & COMPANY

NEW YORK LONDON

For
Aaron David

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Printed in the United States of America
First Edition

Composition by Matrix Publishing Services, Inc.
Book design by Maggie Wagner
Production manager: Diane O'Connor

ISBN 13: 978-0-393-92409-1 (pbk.)
ISBN 10: 0-393-92409-2 (pbk.)

W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 500 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10110
www.wwnorton.com

W. W. Norton & Company Ltd., Castle House, 75/76 Wells Street,
London W1T 3QT

8 9 0

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PREFACE

Demystifying Academic Conversation

EXPERIENCED WRITING INSTRUCTORS have long recognized that writing well means entering into conversation with others. Academic writing in particular calls upon writers not simply to express their own ideas, but to do so as a response to what others have said. The mission statement for the first-year writing program at our own university, for example, describes its goal as helping students "enter a conversation about ideas." A similar statement by another program holds that "intellectual writing is almost always composed in response to others' texts." These statements echo the ideas of rhetorical theorists like Kenneth Burke, Mikhail Bakhtin, and Wayne Booth as well as recent composition scholars like David Bartholomae, Patricia Bizzell, Peter Elbow, Joseph Harris, Andrea Lunsford, Elaine Maimon, Gary Olson, Tilly Warnock, Mike Rose, and others who argue that writing well means engaging the voices of others and letting them in turn engage us.

Yet despite this growing consensus that writing is a social, conversational act, helping student writers actually "enter a conversation about ideas" remains a formidable challenge. This book aims to meet that challenge. Its goal is to demystify academic writing by isolating its basic moves, explaining them clearly, and representing them in the form of templates. In this way, we hope

to help students become active participants in the important conversations of the academic world and the wider public sphere.

HIGHLIGHTS

- *Shows that writing well means entering a conversation*, summarizing others ("they say") to set up one's own argument ("I say").
- *Demystifies academic writing*, showing students "the moves that matter" in language they can readily apply.
- *Provides user-friendly templates* to help writers make those moves in their own writing.

HOW THIS BOOK CAME TO BE

The original idea for this book grew out of our shared interest in democratizing academic culture. First, it grew out of arguments that Gerald Graff has been making throughout his career that schools and colleges need to invite students into the conversations and debates that surround them. More specifically, it is a practical, hands-on companion to his recent book, *Clueless in Academe: How Schooling Obscures the Life of the Mind*, in which he looks at such conversations from the perspective of those who find them mysterious and proposes ways in which such mystification can be overcome. Second, this book grew out of writing templates that Cathy Birkenstein developed in the 1990s, for use in writing and literature courses she was teaching. Many students, she found, could readily grasp what it meant to summarize an author, to support a thesis with evidence, to entertain a counterargument, or to identify a textual

In order to grasp Hurston's point here, we need to be able to reconstruct the implicit view she is responding to: that racial identity is an innate quality we are simply born with. On the contrary, Hurston suggests, our race is imposed on us by society—something we "become" by virtue of how we are treated.

As these examples suggest, the "they say / I say" model can improve not just student writing, but student reading comprehension as well. Since reading and writing are deeply reciprocal activities, students who learn to make the rhetorical moves represented by the templates in this book figure to become more adept at identifying these same moves in the texts they read. And if we are right that effective arguments are always in dialogue with other arguments, then it follows that in order to understand the types of challenging texts assigned in college, students need to identify the views to which those texts are responding.

Working with the "they say / I say" model can also help with invention, finding something to say. In our experience, students best discover what they want to say not by thinking about a subject in an isolation booth, but by reading texts, listening closely to what other writers say, and looking for an opening in which they can enter the conversation. In other words, listening closely to others and summarizing what they have to say can help writers generate their own ideas.

THE USEFULNESS OF TEMPLATES

Our templates themselves have a generative quality, prompting students to make moves in their writing that they might not otherwise make or even know they should make. The templates in this book can be particularly helpful for students who are unsure about what to say, or who have trouble finding

enough to say, often because they see their own beliefs as so self-evident that they need not be argued for. Students like this are often helped, we've found, when we give them a simple template like the following one for entertaining a counterargument (or planting a naysayer, as we call it in Chapter 6).

- Of course some object that _____. Although I concede that _____, I still maintain that _____.

What this particular template helps students do is make the seemingly counterintuitive move of questioning their own beliefs, of looking at them from the perspective of those who disagree. In so doing, templates can bring out aspects of students' thoughts that, as they themselves sometimes remark, they didn't even realize were there.

Other templates in this book will help students make a whole host of sophisticated moves that they might not otherwise make: summarizing what someone else says, framing a quotation in one's own words, indicating the view that the writer is responding to, marking the shift from a source's view to the writer's own view, offering evidence for that view, entertaining and answering counterarguments and explaining what is at stake in the first place. In showing students how to make such moves, templates do more than organize students' ideas; they help bring those ideas into existence.

OKAY, BUT *TEMPLATES*?

We are aware, of course, that some instructors may have reservations about templates. Some, for instance, may object that such formulaic devices represent a return to prescriptive forms

of instruction that encourage passive learning or lead students to put their writing on automatic pilot.

This is an understandable reaction, we think, to kinds of rote instruction that have indeed encouraged passivity and drained writing of its creativity and dynamic relation to the social world. The trouble is that many students will never learn on their own to make the key intellectual moves that our templates represent. While seasoned writers pick up these moves unconsciously through their reading, many students do not. Consequently, we believe, students need to see these moves represented in the explicit ways that templates provide.

The aim of the templates, then, is not to stifle critical thinking but to be direct with students about the key rhetorical moves that comprise it. Admittedly, no teaching tool can guarantee that students will engage in hard, rigorous thought. Our templates do, however, provide concrete prompts that can stimulate and shape such thought: What do "they say" about my topic? What would a naysayer say about my argument? What is my evidence? Do I need to qualify my point? Who cares?

In fact, templates have a long and rich history. Public orators from ancient Greece and Rome through the European Renaissance studied rhetorical *topoi* or "commonplaces," model passages and formulas that represented the different strategies available to public speakers. In many respects, our templates echo this classical rhetorical tradition of imitating established models.

In our own day, the journal *Nature* offers aspiring contributors a templatelike guideline on the opening page of each manuscript: "Two or three sentences explaining what the main result [of their study] reveals in direct comparison with what was thought to be the case previously, or how the main result adds to previous knowledge."

In the field of education, a form designed by the education

theorist Howard Gardner asks postdoctoral fellowship applicants to complete the following template: "Most scholars in the field believe _____. As a result of my study, _____." That these two examples are geared toward postdoctoral fellows and advanced researchers shows that it is not only struggling undergraduates who can use help making these key rhetorical moves, but experienced academics as well.

Templates have even been used in the teaching of personal narrative. The literary scholar Jane Tompkins devised the following template to help student writers make the often difficult move from telling a story to explaining what it means: "X tells a story about _____ to make the point that _____. My own experience with _____ yields a point that is similar/different/both similar and different. What I take away from my own experience with _____ is _____. As a result, I conclude _____." We especially like this template because it suggests that "they say / I say" argument need not be mechanical, impersonal, or dry, and that telling a story and making an argument are more compatible activities than many think.

HOW THIS BOOK IS ORGANIZED

Because of its centrality, we have allowed the "they say / I say" format to dictate the structure of this book. So while Part 1 addresses the art of listening to others, Part 2 addresses how to offer one's own response. Part 1 opens with a chapter on "Starting with What Others Are Saying" that explains why it is generally advisable to begin a text by citing others rather than plunging directly into one's own views. Subsequent chapters take up the arts of summarizing and quoting what these others have to say. Part 2 begins with a chapter on different ways of respond-

ing, followed by chapters on marking the shift between what "they say" and what "I say," on introducing and answering objections, and on answering the all-important questions "so what?" and "who cares?" Part 3 offers strategies for "Tying It All Together," beginning with a chapter on connection and coherence; followed by a chapter on style, arguing that academic discourse is often perfectly compatible with the informal language that students use outside of school; and concluding with a chapter on the art of metacommentary, showing students how to guide the way readers understand their text. At the end of the book we include an appendix suggesting how the "they say / I say" model can improve classroom discussions, three model essays that we refer to in various chapters, and finally an Index of Templates.

WHAT THIS BOOK DOESN'T DO

There are some things that this book does not try to do. We do not, for instance, cover logical principles of argument such as syllogisms, warrants, logical fallacies, or the differences between inductive and deductive reasoning. Although such concepts can be useful, we believe most of us learn the ins and outs of argumentative writing not by studying logical principles in the abstract, but by plunging into actual discussions and debates, trying out different modes of response, and in this way getting a sense of what works to persuade different audiences and what doesn't. In our view, people learn more about arguing from hearing someone say, "You miss my point. What I'm saying is not _____, but _____," or, "I agree with you that _____, and would even add that _____," than they do from studying the differences between inductive and deductive reasoning. Such formulas give students an immediate sense

of what it feels like to enter a public conversation in a way that studying abstract warrants and logical fallacies does not.

We also do not cover the various modes of writing like description, definition, narrative, and comparison/contrast. Nor do we cover the different conventions of writing in the disciplines. It is our belief, that the "they say / I say" pattern cuts across different disciplines and genres of writing, including creative writing. Although students must eventually master the specific writing conventions of their majors, we believe that there is no major or discipline that does not require writers to frame their own claims as a response to what others before them have said. Indeed, students who master the elemental moves prompted by the templates in this book should actually become *better* able to appreciate the differences between disciplines and genres.

ENGAGING THE VOICE OF THE OTHER

A major virtue of the "they say / I say'" model is that it returns writing to its social, conversational base. Although writing does require some degree of solitude, the "they say / I say" model shows students that they can best develop their arguments not just by looking inward, but also by looking outward, listening carefully to other views, and engaging the voice of the other. As a result, this approach to writing has an ethical dimension: it asks students not simply to keep proving and reasserting what they already believe, but to stretch what they believe by putting it up against the beliefs of our increasingly diverse, global society, to engage in the reciprocal exchange that characterizes true democracy.

Gerald Graff
Cathy Birkenstein

INTRODUCTION

Entering the Conversation

THINK ABOUT AN activity that you do particularly well: cooking, playing the piano, shooting a basketball, even something as basic as driving a car. If you reflect on this activity, you'll realize that once you mastered it you no longer had to give much conscious thought to the various moves that go into doing it. Performing this activity, in other words, depends on your having learned a series of complicated moves—moves that may seem mysterious or difficult to those who haven't yet learned them.

The same applies to writing. Often without consciously realizing it, accomplished writers routinely rely on a stock of established moves that are crucial for communicating sophisticated ideas. What makes writers masters of their trade is not only their ability to express interesting thoughts, but their mastery of an inventory of basic moves that they probably picked up by reading a wide range of other accomplished writers. Less experienced writers, by contrast, are often unfamiliar with these basic moves, and unsure how to make them in their own writing. This book is intended as a short, user-friendly guide to the basic moves of academic writing.

One of our key premises is that these basic moves are so common that they can be represented in *templates* that you can use right away to structure and even generate your own writ-

ing. Perhaps the most distinctive feature of this book is its presentation of many such templates, designed to help you successfully enter not only the world of academic thinking and writing, but also the wider worlds of civic discourse and work.

Rather than focus solely on abstract principles of writing, then, this book offers model templates that help you to put those principles directly into practice. Working with these templates can give you an immediate sense of how to engage in the kinds of critical thinking you are required to do at the college level and in the vocational and public spheres beyond.

Some of these templates represent simple but crucial moves like those used to summarize some widely held belief.

- Many Americans assume that _____.

Others are more complicated.

- On the one hand, _____. On the other hand, _____.
- Author X contradicts herself. At the same time that she argues _____, she also implies _____.
- I agree that _____.
- This is not to say that _____.

It is true, of course, that critical thinking and writing go deeper than any set of linguistic formulas, requiring that you question assumptions, develop strong claims, offer supporting reasons and evidence, consider opposing arguments, and so on. But these deeper habits of thought cannot be put into practice unless you have a language for expressing them in clear, organized ways.

STATE YOUR OWN IDEAS AS A RESPONSE TO OTHERS

The single most important template that we focus on in this book is the "they say _____, I say _____" formula that gives our book its title. If there is any one point that we hope you will take away from this book, it is the importance not only of expressing your ideas ("I say"), but of presenting those ideas as a *response to some other person or group* ("they say"). For us, the underlying structure of effective academic writing—and of responsible public discourse—resides not just in stating our own ideas, but in listening closely to others around us, summarizing their views in a way that they will recognize, and responding with our own ideas in kind. Broadly speaking, academic writing is argumentative writing, and we believe that to argue well you need to do more than assert your own ideas. You need to enter a conversation, using what others say (or might say) as a launching pad or sounding board for your own ideas. For this reason, one of the main pieces of advice in this book is to write the voices of others into your text.

In our view, then, the best academic writing has one underlying feature: it is deeply engaged in some way with other people's views. Too often, however, academic writing is taught as a process of saying "true" or "smart" things in a vacuum, as if it were possible to argue effectively without being in conversation *with* someone else. If you have been taught to write a traditional five-paragraph essay, for example, you have learned how to develop a thesis and support it with evidence. This is good advice as far as it goes, but it leaves out the important fact that in the real world we don't make arguments without being provoked. We make arguments because someone has said or done something (or perhaps *not* said or done something) and we need to respond: "I can't

see why you like the Lakers so much"; "I agree: it was a great film"; "That argument is contradictory." If it weren't for other people and our need to challenge, agree with, or otherwise respond to them, there would be no reason to argue at all.

To make an impact as a writer, you need to do more than make statements that are logical, well supported, and consistent. You must also find a way of entering a conversation with others' views—with something "they say." In fact, if your own argument doesn't identify the "they say" that you're responding to, then it probably won't make sense. As Figure 1 suggests, *what* you are saying may be clear to your audience, but *why* you are saying it won't be. For it is what others are saying and thinking that motivates our writing and gives it a reason for being. It follows, then, as Figure 2 suggests, that your own argument—the "I say" moment of your text—should always be a response to the arguments of others.

Many writers make explicit "they say/I say" moves in their writing. One famous example is Martin Luther King Jr.'s "Let-



FIGURE 1

FIGURE 2

ter from Birmingham Jail," which consists almost entirely of King's eloquent responses to a public statement by eight clergymen deploring the civil rights protests he was leading. The letter—which was written in 1963, while King was in prison for leading a demonstration in Birmingham—is structured almost entirely around a framework of summary and response, in which King summarizes and then answers their criticisms. In one typical passage, King writes as follows.

> You deplore the demonstrations taking place in Birmingham. But your statement, I am sorry to say, fails to express a similar concern for the conditions that brought about the demonstrations.
>
> MARTIN LUTHER KING JR., "Letter from Birmingham Jail"

King goes on to agree with his critics that "It is unfortunate that demonstrations are taking place in Birmingham," yet he

hastens to add that "it is even more unfortunate that the city's white power structure left the Negro community with no alternative." King's letter is so thoroughly conversational, in fact, that it could be rewritten in the form of a dialogue or play.

> King's critics:
> King's response:
> Critics:
> Response:

Clearly, King would not have written his famous letter were it not for his critics, whose views he treats not as objections to his already-formed arguments, but as the motivating source of those arguments, their central reason for being. He quotes not only what his critics have said ("Some have asked: 'Why didn't you give the new city administration time to act?' "), but also things they *might* have said ("One may well ask: 'How can you advocate breaking some laws and obeying others?' ")—all to set the stage for what he himself wants to say.

A similar "they say/I say" exchange opens an essay about American patriotism by the social critic Katha Pollitt, who uses her own daughter's comment to represent the national fervor of post-9/11 patriotism that Pollitt goes on to oppose.

> My daughter, who goes to Stuyvesant High School only blocks from the former World Trade Center, thinks we should fly the American flag out our window. Definitely not, I say: The flag stands for jingoism and vengeance and war.
>
> KATHA POLLITT, "Put Out No Flags"

As Pollitt's example shows, the "they" you respond to in crafting an argument need not be a famous author, or even some-

one known to your audience. It can be a family member like Pollitt's daughter, or a friend or classmate who has made a provocative claim. It can even be something an individual or a group might say—or a side of yourself, something you once believed but no longer do, or something you partly believe but also doubt. The important thing is that the "they" (or "you" or "she") represent some wider group—in Pollitt's case, those who patriotically believe in flying the flag.

While King and Pollitt both identify the views they are responding to, in some cases those views, rather than being explicitly named, are left to the reader to infer. See, for instance, if you can identify the implied or unnamed "they say" that the following claim is responding to.

> I like to think I have a certain advantage as a teacher of literature because when I was growing up I disliked and feared books.
>
> GERALD GRAFF, "Disliking Books at an Early Age"

In case you haven't figured it out already, the phantom "they say" here is anyone who thinks that in order to be a good teacher of literature, one must have grown up liking and enjoying books.

As you can see from these examples, many writers use the "they say/I say" format to disagree with others, to challenge standard ways of thinking, and thus to stir up controversy. This point may come as a shock to you if you have always had the impression that in order to succeed academically you need to play it safe and avoid controversy in your writing, making statements that nobody can possibly disagree with. Though this view of writing may appear logical, it is actually a recipe for flat, lifeless writing, and for writing that fails to answer what we call the "so what?" and "who cares?" questions. "William Shakespeare wrote many famous plays and sonnets" may be a per-

fectly true statement, but precisely because nobody is likely to disagree with it, it goes without saying and thus would seem pointless if said.

WAYS OF RESPONDING

Just because much argumentative writing is driven by disagreement, it does not follow that *agreement* is ruled out. Although argumentation is often associated with conflict and opposition, the type of conversational "they say/I say" argument that we focus on in this book can be just as useful when you agree as when you disagree.

- She argues _____, and I agree because _____.
- Her argument that _____ is supported by new research showing that _____.

Nor do you always have to choose between either simply agreeing *or* disagreeing, since the "they say/I say" format also works to both agree and disagree at the same time.

- He claims that _____, and I have mixed feelings about it. On the one hand, I agree that _____. On the other hand, I still insist that _____.

This last option—agreeing and disagreeing simultaneously—is one we especially recommend, since it allows you to avoid a simple yes or no response and present a more complicated argument, while containing that complication within a clear "on the one hand/on the other hand" framework.

While the templates we offer in this book can be used to structure your writing at the sentence level, they can also be expanded as needed to almost any length, as the following elaborated "they say/I say" template demonstrates.

- In recent discussions of _____, a controversial issue has been whether _____. On the one hand, some argue that _____. From this perspective, _____. On the other hand, however, others argue that _____. In the words of one of this view's main proponents, "_____ ." According to this view, _____. In sum, then, the issue is whether _____ or _____.

- My own view is that _____. Though I concede that _____, I still maintain that _____. For example, _____. Although some might object that _____, I reply that _____. The issue is important because _____.

If you go back over this template, you will see that it helps you make a host of challenging moves (each of which is taken up in forthcoming chapters in this book). First, the template helps you open your text by identifying an issue in some ongoing conversation or debate ("In recent discussions of _____, a controversial issue has been"), then to map some of the voices in this controversy (by using the "on the one hand/on the other hand" structure). The template also helps you to introduce a quotation ("In the words of"), to explain the quotation in your own words ("According to this view"), and—in a new paragraph—to state your own argument ("My own view is that"), to qualify your argument ("Though I concede that"), and then to support your argument with evidence ("For example"). In addition, the template helps you make one of the most

crucial moves in argumentative writing, what we call "planting a naysayer in your text," in which you summarize and then answer a likely objection to your own central claim ("Although it might be objected that _____, I reply _____"). Finally, this template helps you shift between general, overarching claims ("In sum, then") and smaller-scale, supporting claims ("For example").

Again, none of us is born knowing these moves, especially when it comes to academic writing. Hence the need for this book.

DO TEMPLATES STIFLE CREATIVITY?

If you are like some of our students, your initial response to templates may be skepticism. At first, many of our students complain that using templates will take away their originality and creativity and make them all sound the same. "They'll turn us into writing robots," one of our students insisted. Another agreed, adding, "Hey, I'm a jazz musician. And we don't play by set forms. We create our own." "I'm in college now," another student asserted; "this is third-grade level stuff."

In our view, however, the templates in this book, far from being "third-grade level stuff," represent the stock in trade of sophisticated thinking and writing, and they often require a great deal of practice and instruction to use successfully. As for the belief that pre-established forms undermine creativity, we think it rests on a very limited vision of what creativity is all about. In our view, the above template and the others in this book will actually help your writing become *more* original and creative, not less. After all, even the most creative forms of expression depend on established patterns and structures. Most songwriters, for instance, rely on a time-honored verse-

chorus-verse pattern, and few people would call Shakespeare uncreative because he didn't invent the sonnet or dramatic forms that he used to such dazzling effect. Even the most avant-garde, cutting-edge artists (like improvisational jazz musicians) need to master the basic forms that their work improvises on, departs from, and goes beyond, or else their work will come across as uneducated child's play. Ultimately, then, creativity and originality lie not in the avoidance of established forms, but in the imaginative use of them.

Furthermore, these templates do not dictate the *content* of what you say, which can be as original as you can make it, but only suggest a way of formatting *how* you say it. In addition, once you begin to feel comfortable with the templates in this book, you will be able to improvise creatively on them and invent new ones to fit new situations and purposes. In other words, the templates offered here are learning tools to get you started, not structures set in stone. Once you get used to using them, you can even dispense with them altogether, for the rhetorical moves they model will be at your fingertips in an unconscious, instinctive way.

But if you still need proof that writing templates do not stifle creativity, consider the following opening to an essay on the fast-food industry that we've included at the back of this book.

> If ever there were a newspaper headline custom-made for Jay Leno's monologue, this was it. Kids taking on McDonald's this week, suing the company for making them fat. Isn't that like middle-aged men suing Porsche for making them get speeding tickets? Whatever happened to personal responsibility?
>
> I tend to sympathize with these portly fast-food patrons, though. Maybe that's because I used to be one of them.
>
> DAVID ZINCZENKO, "Don't Blame the Eater"

Although Zinczenko relies on a version of the "they say/I say" formula, his writing is anything but dry, robotic, or uncreative. While Zinczenko does not explicitly use the words "they say" and "I say," the template still gives the passage its underlying structure: "*They say* that kids suing fast-food companies for making them fat is a joke; but *I say* such lawsuits are justified."

PUTTING IN YOUR OAR

Though the immediate goal of this book is to help you become a better writer, at a deeper level it invites you to become a certain type of person: a critical, intellectual thinker who, instead of sitting passively on the sidelines, can participate in the debates and conversations of your world in an active and empowered way. Ultimately, this book invites you to become a critical thinker who can enter the types of conversations described eloquently by the philosopher Kenneth Burke in the following widely cited passage. Likening the world of intellectual exchange to a never-ending conversation at a party, Burke writes:

> You come late. When you arrive, others have long preceded you, and they are engaged in a heated discussion, a discussion too heated for them to pause and tell you exactly what it is about. . . . You listen for a while, until you decide that you have caught the tenor of the argument; then you put in your oar. Someone answers; you answer him; another comes to your defense; another aligns himself against you. . . . The hour grows late, you must depart. And you do depart, with the discussion still vigorously in progress.
>
> KENNETH BURKE, *The Philosophy of Literary Form*

What we like about this passage is its suggestion that stating an argument and "putting in your oar" can only be done in

conversation with others; that we all enter the dynamic world of ideas not as isolated individuals, but as social beings deeply connected to others who have a stake in what we say.

This ability to enter complex, many-sided conversations has taken on a special urgency in today's diverse, post-9/11 world, where the future for all of us may depend on our ability to put ourselves in the shoes of those who think very differently from us. The central piece of advice in this book—that we listen carefully to others, including those who disagree with us, and then engage with them thoughtfully and respectfully—can help us see beyond our own pet beliefs, which may not be shared by everyone. The mere act of crafting a sentence that begins "Of course, someone might object that _____" may not seem like a way to change the world; but it does have the potential to jog us out of our comfort zones, to get us thinking critically about our own beliefs, and perhaps even to change our minds.

Exercises

1. Read the following paragraph from an essay by Emily Poe, a student at Furman University. Disregarding for the moment what Poe says, focus your attention on the phrases Poe uses to structure what she says (italicized here). Find a paragraph or two in some other text that makes similar moves, and underline the words the writer uses to structure what he or she says. Essays, newspaper editorials, and textbooks might be good places to look.

   The term "vegetarian" tends to be synonymous with "tree-hugger" in many people's minds. *They see* vegetarianism as a cult that brainwashes its followers into eliminating an essential part of their daily diets for an abstract goal of "animal welfare." *However*, few vege-

tarians choose their lifestyle just to follow the crowd. *On the contrary*, many of these supposedly brainwashed people are actually independent thinkers, concerned citizens, and compassionate human beings. *For the truth is* that there are many very good reasons for giving up meat. Perhaps the best reasons are to improve the environment, to encourage humane treatment of livestock, or to enhance one's own health. *In this essay, then,* closely examining a vegetarian diet as compared to a meat-eater's diet will show that vegetarianism is clearly the better option for sustaining the Earth and all its inhabitants.

2. Write a short essay in which you first summarize our rationale for the templates in this book and then articulate your own position in response. If you want, you can use the template below to organize your paragraphs, expanding and modifying it as necessary to fit what you want to say. If you choose not to use the template, explain why you believe your own writing method is preferable.

▸ In the Introduction to *"They Say/I Say": The Moves That Matter in Academic Writing,* Gerald Graff and Cathy Birkenstein provide templates designed to _____. Specifically, Graff and Birkenstein argue that the types of writing templates they offer _____. As the authors themselves put it, "_____." Although some people believe _____, Graff and Birkenstein insist that _____. In sum, then, their view is that _____.

I agree/disagree/have mixed feelings. In my view, the types of templates that the authors recommend _____. For instance, _____. In addition, _____. Some might object, of course, on the grounds that _____. Yet I would argue that _____. Overall, then, I believe _____—an important point to make given _____.

1

"THEY SAY"

ONE

"THEY SAY"

Starting with What Others Are Saying

NOT LONG AGO we attended a talk at an academic conference where the speaker's central claim seemed to be that a certain sociologist—call him Dr. X—had done very good work in a number of areas of the discipline. The speaker proceeded to illustrate his thesis by referring extensively and in great detail to various books and articles by Dr. X and by quoting long passages from them. The speaker was obviously both learned and impassioned, but as we listened to his talk we found ourselves somewhat puzzled: the argument—that Dr. X's work was very important—was clear enough, but why did the speaker need to make it in the first place? Did anyone dispute it? Were there commentators in the field who had argued against X's work or challenged its value? Was the speaker's interpretation of what X had done somehow novel or revolutionary? Since he gave no hint of an answer to any of these questions, we could only wonder why he was going on and on about X. It was only after the speaker finished and took questions from the audience that we got a clue: in response to one questioner, he referred to several critics who had vigorously questioned Dr. X's ideas and convinced many sociologists that Dr. X's work was unsound.

This little story illustrates an important lesson: that to give writing the most important thing of all—namely, a point—a writer needs to indicate clearly not only his or her thesis, but also what larger conversation that thesis is responding to. Because our speaker failed to mention what others had said about Dr. X's work, he left his audience unsure about why he felt the need to say what he was saying. Perhaps the point was clear to other sociologists in the audience who were more familiar with the debates over Dr. X's work than we were. But even they, we bet, would have understood the speaker's point better if he'd sketched in some of the larger conversation his own claims were a part of and reminded the audience about what "they say."

This story also illustrates an important lesson about the *order* in which things are said: to keep an audience engaged, a writer needs to explain what he or she is responding to—either before offering that response or, at least, very early in the discussion. Delaying this explanation for more than one or two paragraphs in a very short essay, three or four pages in a longer one, or more than ten or so pages in a book-length text reverses the natural order in which readers process material—and in which writers think and develop ideas. After all, it seems very unlikely that our conference speaker first developed his defense of Dr. X and only later came across Dr. X's critics. As someone knowledgeable in his field, the speaker surely encountered the criticisms first and only then was compelled to respond and, as he saw it, set the record straight.

Therefore, when it comes to constructing an argument (whether orally or in writing), we offer you the following advice: remember that you are entering a conversation and therefore need to start with "what others are saying," as the title of this chapter recommends, and then introduce your own

ideas as a response. Specifically, we suggest that you summarize what "they say" as soon as you can in your text, and remind readers of it at strategic points as your text unfolds. Though it's true that not all texts follow this practice, we think it's important for all writers to master it before they depart from it.

This is not to say that you must start with a detailed list of everyone who has written on your subject before you offer your own ideas. Had our conference speaker gone to the opposite extreme and spent most of his talk summarizing Dr. X's critics with no hint of what he himself had to say, the audience probably would have had the same frustrated "why-is-he-going-on-like this?" reaction. What we suggest, then, is that as soon as possible you state your own position and the one it's responding to *together*, and that you think of the two as a unit. It is generally best to summarize the ideas you're responding to briefly, at the start of your text, and to delay detailed elaboration until later. The point is to give your readers a quick preview of what is motivating your argument, not to drown them in details this early.

Starting with a summary of others' views may seem to contradict the common advice (which you may have heard from many instructors) that writers lead with their own thesis or claim. Although we agree that you shouldn't keep readers in suspense too long about your central argument, we also believe that you need to present that claim as part of some larger conversation—and that it's important to indicate something about the arguments of others that you are supporting, opposing, amending, complicating, or qualifying. One added benefit of summarizing others' views as soon as you can: those others do some of the work of framing and clarifying the issue you're writing about.

Consider, for example, how George Orwell starts his famous essay "Politics and the English Language" with what others are saying.

> Most people who bother with the matter at all would admit that the English language is in a bad way, but it is generally assumed that we cannot by conscious action do anything about it. Our civilization is decadent and our language—so the argument runs—must inevitably share in the general collapse. . . .
>
> [But] the process is reversible. Modern English . . . is full of bad habits . . . which can be avoided if one is willing to take the necessary trouble.
>
> GEORGE ORWELL, "Politics and the English Language"

Orwell is basically saying, "Most people assume that we cannot do anything about the bad state of the English language. But I say we can."

Of course, there are many other powerful ways to begin. Instead of opening with someone else's views, you could start with an illustrative quotation, a revealing fact or statistic, or—as we do in this chapter—a relevant anecdote. If you choose one of these formats, however, be sure that it in some way illustrates the view you're addressing or leads you to that view directly, with a minimum of steps.

In opening this chapter, for example, we devote the first paragraph to an anecdote about the conference speaker and then move quickly at the start of the second paragraph to the anecdote's "important lesson" regarding what speakers should and shouldn't do. In the following opening, from a 2004 opinion piece in the *New York Times Book Review*, Christina Nehring also moves quickly from an anecdote illustrating something she

dislikes to her own claim—that book lovers think too highly of themselves.

> "I'm a reader!" announced the yellow button. "How about you?" I looked at its bearer, a strapping young guy stalking my town's Festival of Books. "I'll bet you're a reader," he volunteered, as though we were two geniuses well met. "No," I replied. "Absolutely not," I wanted to yell, and fling my Barnes & Noble bag at his feet. Instead, I mumbled something apologetic and melted into the crowd.
>
> There's a new piety in the air: the self congratulation of book lovers.
>
> CHRISTINA NEHRING, "Books Make You a Boring Person"

Nehring's anecdote is really a kind of "they say": book lovers keep telling themselves how great they are.

TEMPLATES FOR INTRODUCING WHAT "THEY SAY"

There are lots of conventional moves for introducing what others are saying. Here are some standard templates that we would have recommended to our conference speaker.

- A number of sociologists have recently suggested that X's work has several fundamental problems.
- It has become common today to dismiss X's contribution to the field of sociology.
- In their recent work, Y and Z have offered harsh critiques of Dr. X for _____.

TEMPLATES FOR INTRODUCING "STANDARD VIEWS"

The following templates can help you make what we call the "standard view" move, in which you introduce a view that has become so widely accepted that by now it is essentially the conventional way of thinking about a topic.

- Americans today tend to believe that _____.
- Conventional wisdom has it that _____.
- Common sense seems to dictate that _____.
- The standard way of thinking about topic X has it that _____.
- It is often said that _____.
- My whole life I have heard it said that _____.
- You would think that _____.
- Many people assume that _____.

These templates are popular because they provide a quick and efficient way to perform one of the most common moves that writers make: challenging widely accepted beliefs, placing them on the examining table and analyzing their strengths and weaknesses.

TEMPLATES FOR MAKING WHAT "THEY SAY" SOMETHING *YOU* SAY

Another way to introduce the views you're responding to is to present them as your own.

- I've always believed that _____.
- When I was a child, I used to think that _____.
- Although I should know better by now, I cannot help thinking that _____.
- At the same time that I believe _____, I also believe _____.

Templates for Introducing Something Implied or Assumed

Another sophisticated move a writer can make is to summarize a point that is not directly stated in what "they say" but is implied or assumed.

- Although none of them have ever said so directly, my teachers have often given me the impression that _____.
- One implication of X's treatment of _____ is that _____.
- Although X does not say so directly, she apparently assumes that _____.
- While they rarely admit as much, _____ often take for granted that _____.

These are templates that can really help you to think critically—to look beyond what others say explicitly and to consider their unstated assumptions, as well as the implications of what they say or assume.

TEMPLATES FOR INTRODUCING AN ONGOING DEBATE

Sometimes you'll want to open by summarizing a debate that presents two or more views. This kind of opening demonstrates your awareness that there are many ways to look at your subject, the clear mark of someone who knows the subject and therefore is likely to be a reliable, trustworthy guide. Furthermore, opening with a summary of a debate can help you to frame and explore the issue you are writing about before declaring your own view. In this way, you can use the writing process itself to help you discover where you stand instead of having to take a position before you are ready to do so.

Here is a basic template for opening with a debate.

▸ In discussions of X, one controversial issue has been _____.
On the one hand, _____ argues _____.
On the other hand, _____ contends _____. Others even maintain _____. My own view is _____.

The cognitive scientist Mark Aronoff uses this kind of template in an essay on the workings of the human brain.

> Theories of how the mind/brain works have been dominated for centuries by two opposing views. One, rationalism, sees the human mind as coming into this world more or less fully formed—preprogrammed, in modern terms. The other, empiricism, sees the mind of the newborn as largely unstructured, a blank slate.
>
> MARK ARONOFF, "Washington Sleeped Here"

Another way to open with a debate involves starting with a proposition many people agree with in order to highlight the point(s) on which they ultimately disagree.

> When it comes to the topic of _____, most of us will readily agree that _____. Where this agreement usually ends, however, is on the question of _____. Whereas some are convinced that _____, others maintain that _____.

The political writer Thomas Frank uses a variation on this sophisticated move.

> That we are a nation divided is an almost universal lament of this bitter election year. However, the exact property that divides us—elemental though it is said to be—remains a matter of some controversy.
>
> THOMAS FRANK, "American Psyche"

While templates like these help you introduce what others are saying at the start of your text, Chapters 2 and 3 explore the arts of summarizing and quoting in more detail.

KEEP WHAT "THEY SAY" IN VIEW

We can't urge you too strongly to keep in mind what "they say" as you move through the rest of your text. After summarizing the ideas you are responding to at the outset, it's very important to continue to keep those ideas in view. Readers won't be able to follow your unfolding response, much less any compli-

cations you may offer, unless you keep reminding them what claims you are responding to.

In other words, even when presenting your own claims, you should keep returning to the motivating "they say." The longer and more complicated your text, the greater the chance that readers will forget what ideas originally motivated it—no matter how clearly you lay them out at the outset. At strategic moments throughout your text, we recommend that you include what we call "return sentences." Here is an example.

▸ In conclusion, then, as I suggested earlier, defenders of _____ can't have it both ways. Their assertion that _____ is contradicted by their claim that _____.

We ourselves use such return sentences at every opportunity in this book to remind you of the view of writing that our book challenges—that good writing means making true or smart or logical statements about a given subject with little or no reference to what others say about it.

By reminding readers of the ideas you're responding to, return sentences ensure that your text maintains a sense of mission and urgency from start to finish. In short, they help ensure that your argument is a genuine response to others' views rather than just a set of observations about a given subject. The difference is huge. To be responsive to others and the conversation you're entering, you need not only to start with what others are saying, but also to continue keeping it in the reader's view.

Exercises

1. The following claims all provide an "I say." See if you can supply a plausible "they say" for each one. It may help to

use one of the Templates for Introducing What "They Say" (p. 21).

a. Our experiments suggest that there are dangerous levels of Chemical X in the Ohio groundwater.
b. My own view is that this novel has certain flaws.
c. Football is so boring.
d. Male students often dominate class discussions.
e. In my view the film is really about the problems of romantic relationships.
f. I'm afraid that templates like the ones in this book will stifle my creativity.

2. Below is a template that we derived from the opening of David Zinczenko's "Don't Blame the Eater" (p. 139). Use the template to structure a passage on a topic of your own choosing. Your first step here should be to find an idea that you support that others not only disagree with, but also actually find laughable (or, as Zinczenko puts it, worthy of a Jay Leno monologue). You might write about one of the topics listed in the previous exercise (the environment, sports, gender relations, the meaning of a book or movie) or any other topic that interests you.

▸ If ever there was an idea custom-made for a Jay Leno monologue, this was it: _____. Isn't that like _____? Whatever happened to _____?

I happen to sympathize with _____, though, perhaps because _____.

TWO

"HER POINT IS"

The Art of Summarizing

IF IT IS TRUE, as we claim in this book, that to argue persuasively you need to be in dialogue with others, then summarizing others' arguments is central to your arsenal of basic moves. Because writers who make strong claims need to map their claims relative to those of other people, it is important to know how to summarize effectively what those other people say. (We're using the word "summarizing" here to refer to any information from others that you present in your own words, including that which you paraphrase.)

Many writers shy away from summarizing—perhaps because they don't want to take the trouble to go back to the text in question and wrestle with what it says, or because they fear that devoting too much time to other people's ideas will take away from their own. When assigned to write a response to an article, such writers might offer their own views on the article's *topic* while hardly mentioning what the article itself argues or says. At the opposite extreme are those who do nothing *but* summarize. Lacking confidence, perhaps, in their own ideas, these writers so overload their texts with summaries of others' ideas that their own voice gets lost. And since these summaries

are not animated by the writers' own interests, they often read like mere lists of things that X thinks or Y says—with no clear focus.

As a general rule, a good summary requires balancing what the original author is saying with the writer's own focus. Generally speaking, a summary must at once be true to what the original author says while at the same time emphasizing those aspects of what the author says that interest you, the writer. Striking this delicate balance can be tricky, since it means facing two ways at once: both outward (toward the author being summarized) and inward (toward yourself). Ultimately, it means being respectful of others while simultaneously structuring how you summarize them in light of your own text's central claim.

ON THE ONE HAND, PUT YOURSELF IN *THEIR* SHOES

To write a really good summary, you must be able to suspend your own beliefs for a time and put yourself in the shoes of someone else. This means playing what the writing theorist Peter Elbow calls the "believing game," in which you try to inhabit the worldview of those whose conversation you are joining—and whom you are perhaps even disagreeing with—and try to see their argument from their perspective. This ability to temporarily suspend one's own convictions is a hallmark of good actors, who must convincingly "become" characters who in real life they may actually detest. As a writer, when you play the believing game really well, readers should not be able to tell whether you agree or disagree with the ideas you are summarizing.

If, as a writer, you cannot or will not suspend your own beliefs in this way, you are likely to produce summaries that are so

obviously biased that they undermine your credibility with readers. Consider the following summary.

> In his article "Don't Blame the Eater," David Zinczenko accuses the fast-food companies of an evil conspiracy to make people fat. I disagree because these companies have to make money.

If you review what Zinczenko actually says (pp. 139–41), you should immediately see that this summary amounts to an unfair distortion. While Zinczenko does argue that the practices of the fast-food industry have the *effect* of making people fat, he never goes so far as to suggest that the fast-food industry conspires to do so with deliberately evil intent.

Another tell-tale sign of this writer's failure to give Zinczenko a fair hearing is the hasty way he abandons the summary after only one sentence and rushes on to his own response. So eager is this writer to disagree that he not only caricatures what Zinczenko says but also gives the article a hasty, superficial reading. Granted, there are many writing situations in which, because of matters of proportion, a one- or two-sentence summary is precisely what you want. Indeed, as writing professor Karen Lunsford (whose own research focuses on argument theory) points out, it is standard in the natural and social sciences to summarize the work of others quickly, in one pithy sentence or phrase, as in the following example.

> Several studies (Crackle, 1992; Pop, 2001; Snap, 1987) suggest that these policies are harmless; moreover, other studies (Dick, 2002; Harry, 2003; Tom, 1987) argue that they even have benefits.

But if your assignment is to respond in writing to a single author like Zinczenko, then you will need to tell your readers enough

about his or her argument so they can assess its merits on their own, independent of you.

When a writer fails to play the believing game, he or she often falls prey to what we call "the closest cliché syndrome," in which what gets summarized is not the view the author in question has actually expressed, but a familiar cliché that the writer *mistakes* for the author's view (sometimes because the writer believes it and mistakenly assumes the author must too). So, for example, Martin Luther King Jr.'s passionate defense of civil disobedience in "Letter from Birmingham Jail" gets summarized not as the defense of political protest that it actually is, but as a plea for everyone to "just get along." Similarly, Zinczenko's critique of the fast-food industry might get summarized as a call for overweight people to take responsibility for their weight.

Whenever you enter into a conversation with others in your writing, then, it is extremely important that you go back to what those others have said, that you study it very closely, and that you not collapse it to something you already have heard or know. Writers who fail to do this end up essentially conversing with themselves—with imaginary others who are really only the products of their own biases and preconceptions.

On the Other Hand, Know Where *You* Are Going

Even as writing an effective summary requires you to temporarily adopt the worldviews of others, it does not mean ignoring your own views altogether. Paradoxically, at the same time that summarizing another text requires you to represent fairly what it says, it also requires that your own response exert a quiet influence. A good summary, in other words, has a focus

or spin that allows the summary to fit with your own overall agenda while still being true to the text you are summarizing.

If you read the essay by David Zinczenko (pp. 139–41), you should be able to see that an essay on the fast-food industry in general will call for a very different summary than will an essay on parenting, corporate regulation, or warning labels. If you want to include all three, fine; but in that case you'll need to subordinate these three issues to one of Zinczenko's general claims and then make sure this general claim directly sets up your own argument.

For example, suppose you want to argue that it is parents, not fast-food companies, who are to blame for children's obesity. To set up this argument, you will probably want to compose a summary that highlights what Zinczenko says about the fast-food industry and parents. Consider this sample.

> In his article "Don't Blame the Eater," David Zinczenko argues that today's fast-food chains fill the nutritional void in children's lives left by their overtaxed working parents. With many parents working long hours and unable to supervise what their children eat, Zinczenko claims, children today regularly turn to low-cost, calorie-laden foods that the fast-food chains are all too eager to supply. When he himself was a young boy, for instance, and his single mother was away at work, he ate at Taco Bell, McDonald's, and other chains on a regular basis, and ended up overweight. Zinczenko's hope is that with the new spate of lawsuits against the food industry, other children with working parents will have healthier choices available to them, and that they will not, like him, become obese.
>
> In my view, however, it is the parents, and not the food chains, who are responsible for their children's obesity. While it is true that many of today's parents work long hours, there are still several things that parents can do to guarantee that their children eat healthy foods.

This summary succeeds not only because it provides one big claim under which several of Zinczenko's points neatly fit ("today's fast-food chains fill the nutritional void in children's lives left by their overtaxed working parents"), but also because this big claim points toward the second paragraph: the writer's own thesis about parental responsibility. A less astute, less focused summary would merely include Zinczenko's indictment of the fast-food industry and ignore what he says about parents.

This advice—to summarize each author in terms of the specific issue your own argument focuses on—may seem painfully obvious. But writers who aren't attuned to these issues often summarize a given author on one issue even though their text actually focuses on another. To avoid this problem, you need to make sure that your "they say" and "I say" are well matched. In fact, aligning what they say with what you say is a good thing to work on when revising what you've written.

Often writers who summarize without regard to their own interests fall prey to what might be called "list summaries," summaries that simply inventory the original author's various points but fail to focus those points around any larger overall claim. If you've ever heard a talk in which the points were connected only by words like "and then," "also," and "in addition," you know how such lists can put listeners to sleep—as shown in Figure 3. A typical list summary sounds like this.

> The author says many different things about his subject. *First* he says. . . . *Then* he makes the point that. . . . *In addition* he says. . . . *And then* he writes. . . . *Also* he shows that. . . . *And then* he says. . . .

It may be boring list summaries like this that give summaries in general a bad name and even prompt some instructors to discourage their students from summarizing at all.

THE EFFECT OF A TYPICAL LIST SUMMARY

FIGURE 3

In conclusion, writing a good summary means not just representing an author's view accurately, but doing so in a way that fits your own composition's larger agenda. On the one hand, it means playing Peter Elbow's believing game and doing justice to the source; if the summary ignores or misrepresents the source, its bias and unfairness will show. On the other hand, even as it does justice to the source, a summary has to have a slant or spin that prepares the way for your own claims. Once a summary enters your text, you should think of it as joint property—reflecting both the source you are summarizing and you yourself.

SUMMARIZING SATIRICALLY

Thus far in this chapter we have argued that, as a general rule, good summaries require a balance between what someone else

has said and your own interests as a writer. Now, however, we want to address one exception to this rule: the satiric summary, in which a writer deliberately gives his or her own spin to someone else's argument in order to reveal a glaring shortcoming in it. Despite our previous comments that well-crafted summaries generally strike a balance between heeding what someone else has said and your own, independent interests, the satiric mode can at times be a very effective form of critique because it lets the summarized argument condemn itself without overt editorializing by you, the writer. If you've ever watched *The Daily Show*, you'll recall that it basically summarizes silly things political leaders have said or done, letting their words or actions undermine themselves.

Consider another example. In late September 2001, President Bush in a speech to Congress urged the nation's "continued participation and confidence in the American economy" as a means of recovering from the terrorist attacks of 9/11. The journalist Allan Sloan made fun of this proposal simply by summarizing it, observing that the president had equated "patriotism with shopping. Maxing out your credit cards at the mall wasn't self indulgence, it was a way to get back at Osama bin Laden." Sloan's summary leaves no doubt where he stands—he considers Bush's proposal ridiculous, or at least too simple.

Use Signal Verbs That Fit the Action

In introducing summaries, try to avoid bland formulas like "he talks about," "she says," or "they believe." Though language like this is sometimes serviceable enough, it often fails to capture accurately what the person has said. In some cases, "he says" may even drain the passion out of the ideas you're summarizing.

We suspect that the habit of ignoring the action in what we summarize stems from the mistaken belief we mentioned earlier that writing is about playing it safe and not making waves, a matter of piling up truths and bits of knowledge rather than a dynamic process of doing things to and with other people. People who wouldn't hesitate to *say* "X totally misrepresented" something when chatting with friends will in their writing often opt for far tamer and even less accurate phrases like "X said."

But the authors you summarize at the college level never simply "say" or "discuss" things; they "urge," "emphasize," and "insist on" them. David Zinczenko, for example, doesn't just *say* that fast-food companies contribute to obesity; he *complains* or *protests* that they do; he *challenges*, *chastises*, and *indicts* those companies. The Declaration of Independence doesn't just *talk about* the treatment of the colonies by the British; it *protests against* it. To do justice to the authors you cite, we recommend that when summarizing—or even when introducing a quotation—you use vivid and precise signal verbs as often as possible. Though "he says" or "she believes" will sometimes be the most appropriate language for the occasion, your text will often be more accurate and lively if you tailor your verbs to suit the precise actions you're describing.

TEMPLATES FOR INTRODUCING SUMMARIES AND QUOTATIONS

- She demonstrates that _____.
- In fact, they celebrate the fact that _____.
- _____, he admits.

VERBS FOR INTRODUCING SUMMARIES AND QUOTATIONS

VERBS FOR MAKING A CLAIM

argue
assert
believe
claim
emphasize
insist
observe
remind us
report
suggest

VERBS FOR EXPRESSING AGREEMENT

acknowledge
admire
agree
celebrate the fact that
corroborate
do not deny
endorse
extol
praise
reaffirm
support
verify

VERBS FOR QUESTIONING OR DISAGREEING

complain
complicate
contend
contradict
deny
deplore the tendency to
disavow
question
refute
reject
renounce
repudiate

VERBS FOR MAKING RECOMMENDATIONS

advocate
call for
demand
encourage
exhort
implore
plead
recommend
urge
warn

Exercises

1. To get a feel for Peter Elbow's "believing game," write a summary of some belief that you strongly disagree with. Then write a summary of the position that you actually hold on this topic. Give both summaries to a classmate or two, and see if they can tell which position you endorse. If you've succeeded, they won't be able to tell.

2. Write two different summaries of David Zinczenko's "Don't Blame the Eater" (pp. 139–41). Write the first one for an essay arguing that, contrary to what Zinczenko claims, there *are* inexpensive and convenient alternatives to fast-food restaurants. Write the second for an essay that agrees with Zinczenko in blaming fast-food companies for youthful obesity, but questions his view that bringing lawsuits against those companies is a legitimate response to the problem. Compare your two summaries: though they are of the same article, they should look very different.

THREE

"As He Himself Puts It"

The Art of Quoting

A KEY PREMISE of this book is that to launch an effective argument you need to write the arguments of others into your text. One of the best ways to do this is by not only summarizing what "they say," as suggested in Chapter 2, but by quoting their exact words. Quoting someone else's words gives a tremendous amount of credibility to your summary and helps ensure that it is fair and accurate. In a sense, then, quotations function as a kind of evidence, saying to readers: "Look, I'm not just making this up. She makes this claim and here it is in her exact words."

Yet many writers make a host of mistakes when it comes to quoting, not the least of which is the failure to quote enough in the first place, if at all. Some writers quote too little—perhaps because they don't want to bother going back to the original text and looking up the author's exact words, or because they think they can reconstruct the author's ideas from memory. At the opposite extreme are writers who so overquote that they end up with texts that are short on commentary of their own—maybe because they lack confidence in their ability to comment on the quotations, or because they don't fully under-

stand them and therefore have trouble explaining what they mean.

But the main problem with quotation arises when writers assume that quotations speak for themselves. Because the meaning of a quotation is obvious to *them*, many writers assume that this meaning will also be obvious to their readers, when often it is not. Writers who make this mistake think that their job is done when they've chosen a quotation and inserted it into their text. They draft an essay, slap in a few quotations, and whammo, they're done.

Such writers fail to see that quoting means more than simply enclosing what "they say" in quotation marks. In a way, quotations are orphans: words that have been taken from their original contexts and that need to be integrated into their new textual surroundings. This chapter offers two key ways to produce this sort of integration: (1) by choosing quotations wisely, with an eye to how well they support a particular part of your text, and (2) by surrounding every major quotation with a frame explaining whose words they are, what the quotation means, and how the quotation relates to your text. The point we want to emphasize is that quoting what "they say" must always be connected with what *you* say.

QUOTE RELEVANT PASSAGES

Before you can select appropriate quotations, you need to have a sense of what you want to do with them—that is, how they will support your text at the particular point where you insert them. Be careful not to select quotations just for the sake of demonstrating that you've read the author's work; you need to make sure they are relevant to your work.

However, finding relevant quotations is not always easy. In fact, sometimes quotations that were initially relevant to your overall argument, or to a key point in it, become less so as your text changes during the process of writing and revising. Given the evolving and messy nature of writing, you may sometimes think that you've found the perfect quotation to support your argument, only to discover later on, as your text develops, that your focus has changed and the quotation no longer works. It can be somewhat misleading, then, to speak of finding your thesis and finding relevant quotations as two separate steps, one coming after the other. When you're deeply engaged in the writing and revising process, there is usually a great deal of back-and-forth between your argument and any quotations you select.

Frame Every Quotation

Finding relevant quotations is only part of your job; you also need to present them in a way that makes their relevance and meaning clear to your readers. Since quotations do not speak for themselves, you need to build a frame around them in which you do that speaking for them.

Quotations that are inserted into a text without such a frame are sometimes called "dangling" quotations for the way they're left dangling without any explanation. One graduate teaching assistant we work with, Steve Benton, calls these "hit-and-run" quotations, likening them to car accidents in which the driver speeds away and avoids taking responsibility for the dent in your fender or the smashed taillights as in Figure 4.

On the following page is a typical hit-and-run quotation by a writer responding to an essay by the feminist philosopher Susan Bordo (reprinted on pp. 149–61).

DON'T BE A HIT-AND-RUN QUOTER.



FIGURE 4

> Susan Bordo writes about women and dieting. "Fiji is just one example. Until television was introduced in 1995, the islands had no reported cases of eating disorders. In 1998, three years after programs from the United States and Britain began broadcasting there, 62 percent of the girls surveyed reported dieting."
>
> I think Bordo is right. Another point Bordo makes is that. . . .

This writer fails to introduce the quotation adequately or explain why he finds it worth quoting. Besides neglecting to say who Bordo is or even that the quoted words are hers, the writer does not explain how her words connect with anything he is saying. He simply drops the quotation in his haste to zoom on to another point.

To adequately frame a quotation, you need to insert it into what we like to call a "quotation sandwich," with the statement introducing it serving as the top slice of bread and the explanation following it serving as the bottom slice. The introductory or lead-in claims should explain who is speaking and

set up what the quotation says; the follow-up statements should explain why you consider the quotation to be important and what you take it to say.

Templates for Introducing Quotations

- X states, "_____."
- As the prominent philosopher X puts it, "_____."
- According to X, "_____."
- X himself writes, "_____."
- In her book, _____, X maintains that "_____."
- Writing in the journal *Commentary*, X complains that "_____."
- In X's view, "_____."
- X agrees when she writes, "_____."
- X disagrees when he writes, "_____."
- X complicates matters further when she writes, "_____."

When adding such introductory phrases, be sure to use language that accurately reflects the spirit of the quoted passage. It is quite serviceable to write "Bordo states" or "asserts" in introducing the quotation about Fiji. But given the fact that Bordo is clearly alarmed by the effect of the extension of the media's reach to Fiji, it is far more accurate to use language that reflects her alarm: "Bordo is alarmed that" or "is disturbed by" or "complains." (See Chapter 2 for a list of verbs for introducing what others say.)

TEMPLATES FOR EXPLAINING QUOTATIONS

- Basically, X is saying _____.
- In other words, X believes _____.
- In making this comment, X argues that _____.
- X is insisting that _____.
- X's point is that _____.
- The essence of X's argument is that _____.

We suggest getting in the habit of following every major quotation with explanatory sentences structured by templates like these. Consider, for example, how the passage on Bordo might be revised using some of these moves.

> The feminist philosopher Susan Bordo deplores the hold that the Western obsession with dieting has on women. Her basic argument is that increasing numbers of women across the globe are being led to see themselves as fat and in need of a diet. Citing the island of Fiji as a case in point, Bordo notes that "until television was introduced in 1995, the islands had no reported cases of eating disorders. In 1998, three years after programs from the United States and Britain began broadcasting there, 62 percent of the girls surveyed reported dieting" (149–50). Bordo's point is that the West's obsession with dieting is spreading even to remote places across the globe. Ultimately, Bordo complains, the culture of dieting will find you, regardless of where you live.
>
> Bordo's observations ring true to me because a friend of mine from a remote area in China speaks of the cult of dieting among young women there. . . .

This framing of the quotation not only helps to better integrate Bordo's words into the writer's text, but also serves to demonstrate the writer's interpretation of what Bordo is saying. While "the feminist philosopher" and "Bordo notes" provide basic information that readers need to know, the sentences that follow the quotation build a bridge between Bordo's words and those of the writer. Just as important, these sentences explain what Bordo is saying in the writer's own words—and thereby make clear that the quotation is being used purposefully to set up the writer's own argument and has not been stuck in just for padding or merely to have a citation.

Blend the Author's Words with Your Own

The above framing material works well because it accurately represents Bordo's words while at the same time giving those words the writer's own spin. Instead of simply repeating Bordo word for word, the follow-up sentences echo just enough of her text while still moving the discussion in the writer's own direction.

Notice how the passage refers several times to the key concept of dieting, and how it echoes Bordo's references to "television" and to U.S. and British "broadcasting" by referring to "culture," which is further specified as that of "the West."

Despite some repetition, this passage avoids merely restating what Bordo says. Her reference to 62 percent of Fijian girls dieting is no longer an inert statistic (as it was in the flawed passage presented earlier), but a quantitative example of how "the West's obsession with dieting is spreading . . . across the globe." In effect, the framing creates a kind of hybrid text, a mix of Bordo's words and those of the writer.

But is it possible to overexplain a quotation? And how do you know when you've explained a quotation thoroughly enough? After all, not all quotations require the same amount of explanatory framing, and there are no hard-and-fast rules for knowing how much explanation any quotation needs. As a general rule, the most explanatory framing is needed for quotations that may be hard for readers to process: quotations that are long and complex, that are filled with details or jargon, or that contain hidden complexities.

And yet, though the particular situation usually dictates when and how much to explain a quotation, we will still offer one piece of advice: when in doubt, go for it. It is better to risk being overly explicit about what you take a quotation to mean than to leave the quotation dangling and your readers in doubt. Indeed, we encourage you to provide such explanatory framing even when writing to an audience that you know to be familiar with the author being quoted and able to interpret your quotations on their own. Even in such cases readers need to see how *you* interpret the quotation, since words—especially those of controversial figures—can be interpreted in various ways and used to support different, sometimes opposing, agendas. Your readers need to see what you make of the material you've quoted, if only to be sure that your reading of the material and theirs is on the same page.

How *Not* to Introduce Quotations

We want to conclude this chapter by surveying some ways *not* to introduce quotations. Although some writers do so, you should not introduce quotations by saying something like "X asserts an idea that" or "A quote by X says." Introductory

phrases like these are both redundant and misleading. In the first example, you could write either "X asserts that" or "X's idea is that," rather than redundantly combining the two. The second example misleads readers, since it is the writer who is doing the quoting, not X (as "a quote by X" implies).

The templates in this book will help you avoid such mistakes. And once you have mastered such templates you probably won't even have to think about them—and will be free to focus on the important, challenging ideas that the templates frame.

Exercises

1. Find a text that quotes someone's exact words as evidence of something that "they say." How has the writer integrated the quotation into his or her own text? How has he or she introduced it, and what if anything has the writer said to explain it and tie it to his or her own text? Based on what you've read in this chapter, are there any changes you would suggest?

2. Look at an essay or a report that you have written for one of your classes. Have you quoted any sources? If so, how have you integrated the quotation into your own text? How have you introduced it? Explained what it means? Indicated how it relates to *your* text? If you haven't done all these things, revise your text to do so, perhaps using the Templates for Introducing Quotations (p. 43) and Explaining Quotations (p. 44). If you've not written anything with quotations, try revising some academic text you've written to do so.

FOUR

"YES / NO / OKAY, BUT"

Three Ways to Respond

THE FIRST THREE chapters discuss the "they say" stage of writing, in which you devote your attention to the views of some other person or group. In this chapter we move to the "I say" stage, in which you offer your own argument as a response to what "they" have said.

There are a great many ways to respond, but this chapter concentrates on the three most common and recognizable ways: agreeing, disagreeing, or some combination of both. Although each way of responding is open to endless variation, we focus on these three because readers come to any text needing fairly quickly to learn where the writer stands, and they do this by placing the writer on a mental map of familiar options: the writer agrees with those he or she is responding to, disagrees with them, or presents some combination of both agreeing and disagreeing.

When writers take too long to declare their position relative to views they've summarized or quoted, readers get frustrated, wondering, "Is this guy agreeing or disagreeing? Is he *for* what this other person has said, against it, or what?" For this reason, this chapter's advice applies to reading as well as to

writing. Especially with difficult texts, you not only need to find the position the writer is responding to—the "they say"—but you also need to determine whether the writer is agreeing with it, challenging it, or both.

Perhaps you'll worry that fitting your own response into one of these three categories will force you to oversimplify your argument or lessen its complexity, subtlety, or originality. In fact, however, the more complex and subtle your argument is, and the more it departs from the conventional ways people think, the more your readers will need to be able to place it on their mental map in order to process the complex details you present. That is, the complexity, subtlety, and originality of your response are more likely to stand out and be noticed if readers have a baseline sense of where you stand relative to any ideas you've cited. As you move through this chapter, we hope you'll agree that the forms of agreeing, disagreeing, and both agreeing and disagreeing that we discuss, far from being simplistic or one-dimensional, are able to accommodate a high degree of creative, complex thought.

It is always a good tactic to begin your response not by launching directly into a mass of details, but by stating clearly whether you agree, disagree, or both, using a direct, no-nonsense move such as: "I agree," "I disagree," or "I am of two minds. I agree that _____, but I cannot agree that _____." Once you have offered one of these straightforward statements (or one of the many variations discussed below), readers will have a strong grasp of your position and then be able to appreciate whatever complexity you offer as your response unfolds.

Still, you may object that these three basic ways of responding don't cover all the options—that they ignore interpretive or analytical responses, for example. In other words, you might

think that when you interpret a literary work you don't necessarily agree or disagree with anything, but simply explain the work's meaning, style, or structure. Many essays about literature and the arts, it might be said, take this form—they interpret a work's meaning, thus rendering matters of agreeing or disagreeing irrelevant.

We would argue, however, that the best interpretations do in fact agree, disagree, or both—that instead of being offered solo, the best interpretations take strong stands relative to other interpretations. In fact, there would be no reason to offer an interpretation of a work of literature or art unless you were responding to the interpretations or possible interpretations of others. Even when you point out features or qualities of an artistic work that others have not noticed, you are implicitly disagreeing with what those interpreters have said by pointing out that they missed or overlooked something that, in your view, is important. In any effective interpretation, then, you need to not only state what you yourself take the work of art to mean, but to do so relative to the interpretations of other readers—be they professional scholars, teachers, classmates, or even hypothetical readers (as in, "Although some readers might think that this poem is about _____, it is in fact about _____").

Disagree—and Explain Why

Disagreeing may seem like one of the simpler moves a writer can make, but in fact it poses hidden challenges. You need to do more than simply assert that you disagree with a particular view; you also have to offer persuasive reasons *why* you disagree. After all, disagreeing means more than adding "not" to what someone else has said, more than just saying, "Although they

say women's rights are improving, I say women's rights are not improving." Such a response merely contradicts the view it responds to and fails to add anything interesting or new. To make an argument, you need to give reasons why you disagree: because another's argument fails to take relevant factors into account; because it is based on faulty or incomplete evidence; because it rests on questionable assumptions; or because it uses flawed logic, is contradictory, or overlooks what you take to be the real issue. To move the conversation forward (and, indeed, to justify your very act of writing), you need to demonstrate that you yourself have something to contribute.

You can even disagree by making what we call the "duh" move, in which you disagree not with the position itself but with the assumption that it is a new or stunning revelation. Here is an example of such a move, used to open a 2003 essay on the state of American schools.

> According to a recent report by some researchers at Stanford University, high school students with college aspirations "often lack crucial information on applying to college and on succeeding academically once they get there."
>
> Well, duh. . . . It shouldn't take a Stanford research team to tell us that when it comes to "succeeding academically," many students don't have a clue.
>
> GERALD GRAFF, "Trickle-Down Obfuscation"

Like all of the other moves discussed in this book, the "duh" move can be tailored to meet the needs of almost any writing situation. If you find the expression "duh" too brash to use with your intended audience, you can always dispense with the term itself and write something like "It is true that . . . ; but we already knew that."

TEMPLATES FOR DISAGREEING, WITH REASONS

- I think X is mistaken because she overlooks _____.
- X's claim that _____ rests upon the questionable assumption that _____.
- I disagree with X's view that _____ because, as recent research has shown, _____.
- X contradicts herself/can't have it both ways. On the one hand, she argues _____. But on the other hand, she also says _____.
- By focusing on _____, X overlooks the deeper problem of _____.
- X claims _____, but we don't need him to tell us that. Anyone familiar with _____ has long known that _____.

You can also disagree by making what we call the "twist it" move, in which you agree with the evidence that someone else has presented, but show through a twist of logic that this evidence actually supports your own position. For example:

> X argues for stricter gun control legislation, saying that the crime rate is on the rise and that we need to restrict the circulation of guns. I agree that the crime rate is on the rise, but that's precisely why I oppose stricter gun control legislation. We need to own guns to protect ourselves against criminals.

In this example of the "twist it" move, the second speaker agrees with the first speaker's claim that the crime rate is on the rise,

but then argues that this increasing crime rate is in fact a valid reason for *opposing* gun control legislation.

At times you might be reluctant to express disagreement, for any number of reasons—not wanting to be unpleasant, to hurt someone's feelings, or to make yourself vulnerable to being disagreed with in return. One of these reasons may in fact explain why the conference speaker we describe at the start of Chapter 1 avoided mentioning the disagreement he had with other scholars until he was provoked to do so in the discussion that followed his talk.

As much as we understand this reluctance and have felt it ourselves, we nevertheless believe it is better to state our disagreements in frank yet considerate ways than to deny them. After all, suppressing disagreements doesn't make them go away; it only pushes them underground, where they can fester in private unchecked. Nevertheless, there is no reason why disagreements need to take the form of personal put-downs. Furthermore, there is usually no reason to take issue with *every* aspect of someone else's views. You can single out for criticism only those aspects of what someone else has said that are troubling, and then agree with the rest—although that situation, as we will see, leads to the somewhat more complicated terrain of both agreeing and disagreeing at the same time, taken up later in this chapter.

AGREE—BUT WITH A DIFFERENCE

Like disagreeing, agreeing is less simple than it may appear. Just as you need to avoid simply contradicting views you disagree with, you also need to do more than simply echo views you agree with. Even as you're agreeing, it's important to bring

something new and fresh to the table, adding something that makes you a valuable participant in the conversation.

There are many moves that enable you to contribute something of your own to a conversation even as you agree with what someone else has said. You may point out some unnoticed evidence or line of reasoning that supports X's claims that X herself hadn't mentioned. You may cite some corroborating personal experience, or a situation not mentioned by X that her views help readers understand. If X's views are particularly challenging or esoteric, what you bring to the table could be an accessible translation—an explanation for readers not already in the know. In other words, your text can usefully contribute to the conversation simply by pointing out unnoticed implications or explaining something that needs to be better understood.

Whatever mode of agreement you choose, the important thing is to open up some difference between your position and the one you're agreeing with rather than simply parroting what it says.

Templates for Agreeing

- I agree that _____ because my experience _____ confirms it.
- X is surely right about _____ because, as she may not be aware, recent studies have shown that _____.
- X's theory of _____ is extremely useful because it sheds insight on the difficult problem of _____.
- I agree that _____, a point that needs emphasizing since so many people believe _____.
- Those unfamiliar with this school of thought may be interested to know that it basically boils down to _____.

FOUR "YES / NO / OKAY, BUT"

Some writers avoid the practice of agreeing almost as much as others avoid disagreeing. In a culture like America's that prizes originality, independence, and competitive individualism, writers sometimes don't like to admit that anyone else has made the same point, seemingly beating them to the punch. In our view, however, as long as you can support a view taken by someone else without merely restating what he or she has said, there is no reason to worry about being "unoriginal." Indeed, there is good reason to rejoice when you agree with others since those others can lend credibility to your argument. While you don't want to present yourself as a mere copycat of someone else's views, you also need to avoid sounding like a lone voice in the wilderness.

But do be aware that whenever you agree with one person's view, you are most likely disagreeing with someone else's. It is hard to align yourself with one position without at least implicitly positioning yourself against others. The feminist psychologist Carol Gilligan does just that in an essay in which she agrees with scientists who argue that the human brain is "hard-wired" for cooperation, but in so doing aligns herself against anyone who believes that the brain is wired for selfishness and competition.

> These findings join a growing convergence of evidence across the human sciences leading to a revolutionary shift in consciousness. . . . If cooperation, typically associated with altruism and self-sacrifice, sets off the same signals of delight as pleasures commonly associated with hedonism and self-indulgence; if the opposition between selfish and selfless, self vs. relationship biologically makes no sense, then a new paradigm is necessary to reframe the very terms of the conversation.
>
> CAROL GILLIGAN, "Sisterhood Is Pleasurable: A Quiet Revolution in Psychology"

In agreeing with some scientists that "the opposition between selfish and selfless . . . makes no sense," Gilligan implicitly disagrees with anyone who thinks the opposition *does* make sense. Basically, what Gilligan says could be boiled down to a template.

- I agree that _____, a point that needs emphasizing since so many people believe _____.
- If group X is right that _____, as I think they are, then we need to reassess the popular assumption that _____.

What such templates allow you to do, then, is to agree with one view while challenging another—a move that leads into the domain of agreeing and disagreeing simultaneously.

Agree and Disagree Simultaneously

This last option is often our favorite way of responding. One thing we particularly like about agreeing and disagreeing simultaneously is that it helps us get beyond the kind of "is too"/"is not" exchanges that often characterize the disputes of young children and the more polarized shouting matches of talk radio and TV.

Templates for Agreeing and Disagreeing Simultaneously

"Yes and no." "Yes, but . . . " "Although I agree up to a point, I still insist . . . " These are just some of the ways you can make your argument complicated and nuanced while maintaining a clear, reader-friendly framework. The parallel structure—"yes

and no"; "on the one hand I agree, on the other I disagree"—enables readers to place your argument on that map of positions we spoke of earlier while still keeping your argument sufficiently complex.

Another aspect we like about this option is that it can be tipped subtly toward agreement or disagreement, depending on where you lay your stress. If you want to stress the disagreement end of the spectrum, you would use a template like the one below.

- Although I agree with X up to a point, I cannot accept his overall conclusion that _____.

Conversely, if you want to stress your agreement more than your disagreement, you would use a template like this one.

- Although I disagree with much that X says, I fully endorse his final conclusion that _____.

The first template above might be called a "yes, but . . . " move, the second a "no, but . . . " move. Other versions include the following.

- Though I concede that _____, I still insist that _____.
- X is right that _____, but she seems on more dubious ground when she claims that _____.
- While X is probably wrong when she claims that _____, she is right that _____.
- Whereas X provides ample evidence that _____, Y and Z's research on _____ and _____ convinces me that _____ instead.

Another classic way to agree and disagree at the same time is to make what we call an "I'm of two minds" or a "mixed feelings" move.

- I'm of two minds about X's claim that _____. On the one hand, I agree that _____. On the other hand, I'm not sure if _____.

- My feelings on the issue are mixed. I do support X's position that _____, but I find Y's argument about _____ and Z's research on _____ to be equally persuasive.

This move can be especially useful if you are responding to new or particularly challenging work and are as yet unsure where you stand. It also lends itself well to the kind of speculative investigation in which you weigh a position's pros and cons rather than come out decisively either for or against. But again, as we suggest earlier, whether you are agreeing, disagreeing, or both agreeing and disagreeing, you need to be as clear as possible, and making a frank statement that you are ambivalent is one way to be clear.

Nevertheless, many writers are as reluctant to express ambivalence as they are to disagree or agree. Some may worry that by expressing ambivalence they will come across as evasive, wishy-washy, or unsure of themselves. Or they may think that their ambivalence will end up confusing readers who require clear-cut statements. In fact, however, expressing ambivalent feelings can serve to demonstrate deep sophistication as a writer. There is nothing wrong with forthrightly declaring that you have mixed feelings, especially after you've considered various options. Indeed, although you never want to be merely evasive, leaving your ambivalence thoughtfully

unresolved can demonstrate your integrity as a writer, showing that you are not easily satisfied with viewing complex subjects in simple yes-or-no terms.

Exercises

1. Read the following passage by Jean Anyon, an education professor at Rutgers University, Newark. As you'll see, she summarizes the arguments of several other authors before moving on to tell us what she thinks. Does she agree with those she summarizes, disagree, or some combination of both? How do you know?

   Scholars in political economy and the sociology of knowledge have recently argued that public schools in complex industrial societies like our own make available different types of educational experience and curriculum knowledge to students in different social classes. Bowles and Gintis, for example, have argued that students in different social-class backgrounds are rewarded for classroom behaviors that correspond to personality traits allegedly rewarded in the different occupational strata—the working classes for docility and obedience, the managerial classes for initiative and personal assertiveness. Basil Bernstein, Pierre Bourdieu, and Michael W. Apple, focusing on school knowledge, have argued that knowledge and skills leading to social power and regard (medical, legal, managerial) are made available to the advantaged social groups but are withheld from the working classes, to whom a more "practical" curriculum is offered (manual skills, clerical knowledge). While there has been considerable argumentation of these points regarding education in England, France, and North America, there has

been little or no attempt to investigate these ideas empirically in elementary or secondary schools and classrooms in this country.

This article offers tentative empirical support (and qualification) of the above arguments by providing illustrative examples of differences in student *work* in classrooms in contrasting social-class communities. . . .

JEAN ANYON, "Social Class and the Hidden Curriculum of Work"

2. Read one of the essays at the back of this book, underlining places where the author agrees with others, disagrees, or both. Then write an essay of your own, responding in some way to the essay. You'll want to summarize and/or quote some of the author's ideas and make clear whether you're agreeing, disagreeing, or both agreeing and disagreeing with what he or she says. Remember that there are templates in this book that can help you get started; see Chapters 1–3 for templates that will help you represent other people's ideas, and Chapter 4 for templates that will get you started with your response.

FIVE

"AND YET"

Distinguishing What You Say from What They Say

IF GOOD ACADEMIC writing involves putting yourself into dialogue with others, it is extremely important that readers be able to tell at every point when you are expressing your own view and when you are stating someone else's. This chapter takes up the problem of moving from what *they* say to what *you* say without confusing readers about who is saying what.

DETERMINE WHO IS SAYING WHAT IN THE TEXTS YOU READ

Before examining how to signal who is saying what in your own writing, let's look at how to recognize such signals when they appear in the texts you read—an especially important skill when it comes to the challenging works assigned in school. Frequently, when students have trouble understanding difficult texts, it is not just because the texts contain unfamiliar ideas or words, but because they rely on subtle clues to let readers

know when a particular view should be attributed to the writer or to someone else. Especially with texts that present a true dialogue of perspectives, readers need to be alert to the often subtle markers that indicate whose voice the writer is speaking in.

Consider how the social critic and educator Gregory Mantsios uses these "voice markers," as they might be called, to distinguish the different perspectives in his essay on America's class inequalities.

> "We are all middle-class," or so it would seem. Our national consciousness, as shaped in large part by the media and our political leadership, provides us with a picture of ourselves as a nation of prosperity and opportunity with an ever expanding middle-class life-style. As a result, our class differences are muted and our collective character is homogenized.
>
> Yet class divisions are real and arguably the most significant factor in determining both our very being in the world and the nature of the society we live in.
>
> GREGORY MANTSIOS, "Rewards and Opportunities: The Politics and Economics of Class in the U.S."

Although Mantsios makes it look easy, he is actually making several sophisticated rhetorical moves here that help him distinguish the common view he opposes from his own position.

In the opening sentence, for instance, the phrase "or so it would seem" shows that Mantsios does not necessarily agree with the view he is describing, since writers normally don't present views they themselves hold as ones that only "seem" to be true. Mantsios also places this opening view in quotation marks to signal that it is not his own. He then further distances himself from the belief being summarized in the opening paragraph

by attributing it to "our national consciousness, as shaped in large part by the media and our political leadership," and then attributing to this "consciousness" a negative, undesirable "result": one in which "our class differences" get "muted" and "our collective character" gets "homogenized," stripped of its diversity and distinctness. Hence, even before Mantsios has declared his own position, readers can get a pretty solid sense of where he probably stands.

Furthermore, the second paragraph opens with the word "yet," indicating that Mantsios is now shifting to his own view (as opposed to the view he has thus far been referring to). Even the parallelism he sets up between the first and second paragraphs—between the first paragraph's claim that class differences do not exist and the second paragraph's claim that they do—helps throw into sharp relief the differences between the two voices. Finally, Mantsios's use of a direct, authoritative, declarative tone in the second paragraph also suggests a switch in voice. Although he does not use the words "I say" or "I argue," he clearly identifies the view he holds by presenting it not as one that merely *seems* to be true or that *others tell us* is true, but as a view that *is* true or, as Mantsios puts it, "real."

These voice markers are an aspect of reading comprehension that is frequently overlooked. Readers who are unfamiliar with them often take an author's summaries of what someone else believes to be an expression of what the author himself or herself believes. Thus when we teach Mantsios's essay, some students invariably come away thinking that the statement "we are all middle-class" is Mantsios's own position rather than the perspective he is opposing, failing to see that in writing these words Mantsios acts as a kind of ventriloquist, mimicking what others say rather than directly expressing what he himself is thinking.

To see how important such voice markers are, consider what the Mantsios passage looks like if we remove them.

> We are all middle-class. . . . We are a nation of prosperity and opportunity with an ever expanding middle-class life-style. . . .
>
> Class divisions are real and arguably the most significant factor in determining both our very being in the world and the nature of the society we live in.

In contrast to the careful delineation between voices in Mantsios's original text, this unmarked version leaves it hard to tell where his voice begins and the voices of others end. With the markers removed, readers would probably not be able to tell that "We are all middle-class" represents a view the author opposes, and that "Class divisions are real" represents what the author himself believes. Indeed, without the markers, readers might well miss the fact that the second paragraph's claim that "Class divisions are real" contradicts the first paragraph's claim that "We are all middle-class."

Templates for Signaling Who Is Saying What in Your Own Writing

To avoid confusion in your own writing, make sure that at every point your readers can clearly tell who is saying what. To do this, you can use as voice-identifying devices many of the templates presented in previous chapters.

- X argues _____.
- According to both X and Y, _____.

- Politicians, X argues, should _____.
- Most athletes will tell you that _____.
- My own view, however, is that _____.
- I agree, as X may not realize, that _____.

When stating your own position, as in the last two templates above, you can generally limit the voice markers to your opening and closing claims, since readers will automatically assume that any declarative statements you make between these statements, unless marked otherwise, are your own.

Notice that the last template above uses the first-person "I," as do many of the templates in this book, thus contradicting the common advice about avoiding the first person in academic writing. Although you may have been told that the "I" word encourages self-indulgent opinions rather than well-grounded arguments, we believe that texts using "I" can be just as well supported—or, conversely, just as self-indulgent—as those that don't. For us, well-supported arguments are grounded in persuasive reasons and evidence, not in their use of any particular pronouns.

Furthermore, if you consistently avoid the first person in your writing, you may have trouble making the key move addressed in this chapter: differentiating your views from those of others, or even offering your own views in the first place. But don't just take our word for it. See for yourself how freely the first person is used by the writers quoted in this book, and also by the writers in all your assigned courses.

Nevertheless, certain occasions may warrant avoiding the first person and writing, for example, that "She is correct" or

"It is a fact that she is correct," instead of "I think that she is correct." And since it can be monotonous to read an unvarying series of "I" statements—"I believe . . . I think . . . I argue"—it is a good idea to mix first-person assertions with ones like the following.

- X is right that _____.
- The evidence shows that _____.
- X's assertion that _____ does not fit the facts.
- Anyone familiar with _____ should agree that _____.

One might even follow Mantsios's lead, as in the following template.

- But _____ are real, and are arguably the most significant factor in _____.

Another Trick for Identifying Who Is Speaking

To alert readers about whose perspective you are describing at any given moment, you don't always have to use overt voice markers like "X argues" followed by a summary of the argument. Instead, you can alert readers about whose voice you're speaking in by *embedding* a reference to X's argument in your own sentences. Hence, instead of writing:

> Liberals believe that cultural differences need to be respected. I have a problem with this view, however.

you might write:

> I have a problem with *what liberals call cultural differences.*
>
> There is a major problem with the liberal doctrine about *so-called cultural differences.*

You can also embed references to something you yourself have previously said. So instead of writing two cumbersome sentences like:

> Earlier in this chapter we coined the term "voice markers." We would argue that such markers are extremely important for reading comprehension.

you might write:

> We would argue that "voice markers," as we identified them earlier, are extremely important for reading comprehension.

Embedded references like these allow you to economize your train of thought and refer to other perspectives without any major interruption.

TEMPLATES FOR EMBEDDING VOICE MARKERS

- X overlooks what I consider an important point about _____.
- My own view is that what X insists is a _____ is in fact a _____.
- I wholeheartedly endorse what X calls _____.

- These conclusions, which X discusses in _____, add weight to the argument that _____.

When writers fail to use voice-marking devices like these, their summaries of others' views tend to become confused with their own ideas—and vice versa. When readers cannot tell if you are summarizing your own views or endorsing a certain phrase or label, they have to stop and think: "Wait. I thought the author disagreed with this claim. Has she actually been asserting this view all along?" or "Hmmm, I thought she would have objected to this kind of phrase. Is she actually endorsing it?" Getting in the habit of using voice markers will keep you from confusing your readers and help alert you to similar markers in the challenging texts you read.

Exercises

1. To see how one writer signals when she is asserting her own views and when she is summarizing those of someone else, read the following passage by the social historian Julie Charlip. As you do so, identify those spots where Charlip refers to the views of others and the signal phrases she uses to distinguish her views from theirs.

   Marx and Engels wrote: "Society as a whole is more and more splitting up into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each other—the bourgeoisie and the proletariat" (10). If only that were true, things might be more simple. But in late twentieth-century America, it seems that society is splitting more and more into a plethora of class factions—the working class, the working poor, lower-middle class, upper-middle class, lower uppers, and upper uppers. I find myself not knowing what class I'm from.

In my days as a newspaper reporter, I once asked a sociology professor what he thought about the reported shrinking of the middle class. Oh, it's not the middle class that's disappearing, he said, but the working class. His definition: if you earn thirty thousand dollars a year working in an assembly plant, come home from work, open a beer and watch the game, you are working class; if you earn twenty thousand dollars a year as a school teacher, come home from work to a glass of white wine and PBS, you are middle class.

How do we define class? Is it an issue of values, lifestyle, taste? Is it the kind of work you do, your relationship to the means of production? Is it a matter of how much money you earn? Are we allowed to choose? In this land of supposed classlessness, where we don't have the tradition of English society to keep us in our places, how do we know where we really belong? The average American will tell you he or she is "middle class." I'm sure that's what my father would tell you. But I always felt that we were in some no man's land, suspended between classes, sharing similarities with some and recognizing sharp, exclusionary differences from others. What class do I come from? What class am I in now? As an historian, I seek the answers to these questions in the specificity of my past.

JULIE CHARLIP, "A Real Class Act: Searching for Identity in the Classless Society"

2. Study a piece of your own writing to see how many perspectives you account for, and how well you distinguish your own voice from those you are summarizing. Consider the following questions:

   a. How many perspectives do you engage?
   b. What other perspectives might you include?

c. How do you distinguish your views from the other views you summarize?
d. Do you use clear voice-signaling phrases?
e. What options are available to you for clarifying who is saying what?
f. Which of these options are best suited for this particular text?

If you find that you do *not* include multiple views, or clearly distinguish between your views and others', revise your text to do so.

SIX

"SKEPTICS MAY OBJECT"

Planting a Naysayer in Your Text

THE WRITER JANE TOMPKINS describes a pattern that repeats itself whenever she writes a book or an article. For the first couple of weeks when she sits down to write, things go relatively well. But then in the middle of the night, several weeks into the writing process, she'll wake up in a cold sweat, suddenly realizing that she has overlooked some major criticism that readers will surely make against her ideas. Her first thought, invariably, is that she will have to give up on the project, or that she will have to throw out what she's written thus far and start over. Then she realizes that "this moment of doubt and panic is where my text really begins." She then revises what she's written in a way that incorporates the criticisms she's anticipated, and her text becomes stronger and more interesting as a result.

This little story contains an important lesson for all writers, experienced and inexperienced alike. It suggests that even though most of us are upset at the idea of someone criticizing our work, such criticisms can actually work to our advantage. Although it's naturally tempting to ignore objections to our ideas, doing so may in fact be a big mistake, since everyone's writing actually improves when we not only listen to these objections but give them an

contradiction, but they often had trouble putting these concepts into practice in their own writing. When Cathy sketched out templates on the board, however, giving her students some of the language and patterns that these sophisticated moves require, their writing—and even their quality of thought—significantly improved.

This book began, then, when we put our ideas together and realized that these templates might have the potential to open up and clarify academic conversation. We proceeded from the premise that all writers rely on certain stock formulas that they themselves didn't invent—and that many of these formulas are so commonly used that they can be represented in model templates that students can use to structure and even generate what they want to say.

As we developed a working draft of this book, we began using it in first-year writing courses that we teach at UIC. In classroom exercises and writing assignments, we found that students who otherwise struggled to organize their thoughts, or even to think of something to say, did much better when we provided them with templates like the following.

- In discussions of _____, a controversial issue is whether _____. While some argue that _____, others contend that _____.

- This is not to say that _____.

One virtue of such templates, we found, is that they focus writers' attention not just on what is being said, but on the *forms* that structure what is being said. In other words, they help students focus on the rhetorical patterns that are key to academic success but often pass under the classroom radar.

THE CENTRALITY OF "THEY SAY / I SAY"

The central rhetorical move that we focus on in this book is the "they say / I say" template that gives our book its title. In our view, this template represents the deep, underlying structure, the internal DNA as it were, of all effective argument. Effective persuasive writers do more than make well-supported claims ("I say"); they also map those claims relative to the claims of others ("they say").

Here, for example, the "they say / I say" pattern structures a passage from a recent essay by the media and technology critic Steven Johnson.

> For decades, we've worked under the assumption that mass culture follows a path declining steadily toward lowest-common-denominator standards, presumably because the "masses" want dumb, simple pleasures and big media companies try to give the masses what they want. But . . . the exact opposite is happening: the culture is getting more cognitively demanding, not less.
>
> STEVEN JOHNSON, "Watching TV Makes You Smarter"

In generating his own argument from something "they say," Johnson suggests *why* he needs to say what he is saying: to correct a popular misconception.

Even when writers do not explicitly identify the views they are responding to, as Johnson does, an implicit "they say" can often be discerned, as in the following passage by Zora Neale Hurston.

> I remember the day I became colored.
>
> ZORA NEALE HURSTON, "How It Feels to Be Colored Me"

explicit hearing in our writing. Indeed, no single device more quickly improves a piece of writing than the practice of planting a naysayer in the text—saying, for example, that "although some readers may object" to something in your argument, you "would reply that _____."

ANTICIPATE OBJECTIONS

But wait, you say. Isn't the advice to incorporate critical views a recipe for destroying your credibility and undermining your argument? Here you are, trying to say something that will hold up, and we want you to tell readers all the negative things someone might say against you?

Exactly. We *are* urging you to tell readers what others might say against you, but our point is that doing so will actually *enhance* your credibility, not undermine it. For as we argue throughout this book, writing well does not mean piling up uncontroversial truths in a vacuum; it means engaging others in a dialogue or debate—not only by opening your text with a summary of what others have to say, as we suggest in Chapter 1, but also by imagining what others might say against your argument as it unfolds. Once you see writing as an act of entering a conversation, you should also see how opposing arguments can work for you rather than against you.

Paradoxically, the more you give voice to your critics' objections, the more you can disarm those critics, especially if you go on to answer them in convincing ways. When you entertain a counter-argument, you make a kind of preemptive strike, identifying problems with your argument before others can point them out for you. Furthermore, by entertaining counter-arguments, you show respect for your readers, treating them not

as gullible dupes but as independent, critical thinkers who are aware that yours is not the only view in town. In addition, by imagining what others might say against your claims, you come across as a generous, broad-minded person who is secure enough to open himself or herself to debate—like the writer in Figure 5.

Conversely, if you don't entertain counter-arguments, you may very likely come across as closed-minded, as if you think your claims are beyond dispute. You might also leave important questions hanging and concerns about your arguments unaddressed. Finally, if you fail to plant a naysayer in your text, you may find that you have very little to say. Many of our own students have said that entertaining counter-arguments makes it easier to generate enough text to meet their assignment's page-length requirements.

Planting a naysayer in your own text is a relatively simple move, as you can see by looking at the following passage from a book by the feminist writer Kim Chernin. Having spent some thirty pages complaining about the pressure on American women to lose weight and be thin, Chernin inserts a whole chapter entitled "The Skeptic," opening it as follows.

> At this point I would like to raise certain objections that have been inspired by the skeptic in me. She feels that I have been ignoring some of the most common assumptions we all make about our bodies and these she wishes to see addressed. For example: "You know perfectly well," she says to me, "that you feel better when you lose weight. You buy new clothes. You look at yourself more eagerly in the mirror. When someone invites you to a party you don't stop and ask yourself whether you want to go. You feel sexier. Admit it. You like yourself better."
>
> KIM CHERNIN, *The Obsession: Reflections on the Tyranny of Slenderness*


OH. NO! THEY'RE GONNA
SAY THAT I'VE MISREPRESENTED
X'S WORK!
"YOU WILL PROBABLY OBJECT THAT I HAVE
MISREPRESENTED X'S WORK HERE. AND I CONCEDE
THAT X NEVER SAYS _____ IN SO MANY
WORDS. NEVERTHELESS...."
GG

FIGURE 5

In the remainder of the chapter, Chernin answers this skeptic. Though Chernin's inner skeptic challenges her book's central claim (that the pressure to diet seriously harms women's lives), she responds not by repressing its voice but by embracing it and writing it into her text. Note too that instead of dispatching this naysaying voice quickly, as many of us would be tempted to do, Chernin stays with it and gives it a full paragraph's worth of space. By borrowing some of Chernin's language, we can come up with templates for entertaining virtually any objection.

TEMPLATES FOR ENTERTAINING OBJECTIONS

- At this point I would like to raise some objections that have been inspired by the skeptic in me. She feels that I have been ignoring _____. "_____," she says to me, "_____."
- Yet some readers may challenge my view that _____. After all, many believe that _____. Indeed, my own argument that _____ seems to ignore _____ and _____.
- Of course, many will probably disagree with this assertion that

Note that the objections in the above templates are attributed not to any specific person or group, but to "skeptics," "readers," or "many." This kind of nameless, faceless naysayer is perfectly appropriate in many cases. But the ideas that motivate arguments and objections often can—and, where possible, should—be ascribed to a specific ideology or school of thought (for example, liberals, Christian fundamentalists, neopragma-

tists) rather than to anonymous anybodies. In other words, naysayers can be labeled, and you can add precision and impact to your writing by identifying what they are.

TEMPLATES FOR NAMING YOUR NAYSAYERS

- Here many *feminists* would probably object that _____.
- But *social Darwinists* would certainly take issue with the argument that _____.
- *Biologists*, of course, may want to dispute my claim that _____.
- Nevertheless, both *followers and critics of Malcolm X* will probably suggest otherwise and argue that _____.

To be sure, some people dislike such labels and may even resent having them applied to themselves. Some feel that such labels put individuals in boxes, stereotyping them and glossing over what makes each individual unique. And it's true that labels can be used inappropriately, in ways that ignore individuality and promote stereotypes. But since the life of ideas, including many of our most private thoughts, is conducted through groups and types rather than by solitary individuals, intellectual exchange requires labels to give definition and serve as a convenient shorthand. If you categorically reject all labels, you give up an important resource and even mislead readers by presenting yourself and others as having no connection to anyone else. You also miss an opportunity to generalize the importance and relevance of your work to some larger conversation. When you attribute a position you are summarizing to liberalism, say, or historical materialism, your argu-

ment is no longer just about your own solitary views, but about the intersection of broad ideas and habits of mind that many readers may already have a stake in.

The way to minimize the problem of stereotyping, then, is not to categorically reject labels but to refine and qualify their use, as the following templates demonstrate.

- Although not all *Christians* think alike, some of them will probably dispute my claim that _____.
- *Non-native English speakers* are so diverse in their views that it's hard to generalize about them, but some are likely to object on the grounds that _____.

Another way to avoid needless stereotyping is to qualify labels carefully, substituting "pro bono lawyers" for "lawyers" in general, for example, or "quantitative sociologists" for all "social scientists," and so on.

TEMPLATES FOR INTRODUCING OBJECTIONS INFORMALLY

Objections can also be introduced in ways that are a bit more informal. For instance, you can frame objections in the form of questions.

- But is my proposal realistic? What are the chances of its actually being adopted?
- Yet is it always true that _____? Is it always the case, as I have been suggesting, that _____?
- However, does the evidence I've cited prove conclusively that _____?

You can also let your naysayer speak directly.

- "Impossible," you say. "Your evidence must be skewed."

Moves like this allow you to cut directly to the skeptical voice itself, as the singer-songwriter Joe Jackson does in the following excerpt from a 2003 *New York Times* article complaining about the restrictions on public smoking in New York City bars and restaurants.

> I like a couple of cigarettes or a cigar with a drink, and like many other people, I only smoke in bars or nightclubs. Now I can't go to any of my old haunts. Bartenders who were friends have turned into cops, forcing me outside to shiver in the cold and curse under my breath. . . . It's no fun. Smokers are being demonized and victimized all out of proportion.
>
> "Get over it," say the anti-smokers. "You're the minority." I thought a great city was a place where all kinds of minorities could thrive. . . . "Smoking kills," they say. As an occasional smoker with otherwise healthy habits, I'll take my chances. Health consciousness is important, but so are pleasure and freedom of choice.
>
> JOE JACKSON, "Want to Smoke? Go to Hamburg"

Jackson could have begun his second paragraph, in which he shifts from his own voice to that of his imagined naysayer, as follows: "Of course anti-smokers will object that since we smokers are in the minority, we should get over it and sacrifice for the larger social good." Or "Anti-smokers might ask, however, whether the smoking minority shouldn't submit to the nonsmoking majority." We think, however, that Jackson gets the job done very well with the more colloquial form he chooses.

Borrowing a standard move of playwrights and novelists, Jackson cuts directly to the objectors' view and then to his own retort, then back to the objectors' view and then to his own retort again, thereby creating a kind of dialogue or miniature play within his own text. This move works well for Jackson, but only because (using one of the strategies suggested in Chapter 5) he uses quotation marks to make clear at every point whose voice he is in.

REPRESENT OBJECTIONS FAIRLY

Once you've decided to introduce a differing or opposing view into your writing, your work has only just begun, since you still need to represent and explain that view with fairness and generosity. Although it is tempting to give opposing views short shrift, to hurry past them, or even to mock them, doing so is usually counterproductive. When writers make the best case they can for their critics (playing what Peter Elbow calls the "believing game"), they actually bolster their credibility with readers, rather than undermine it.

We recommend, then, that whenever you entertain objections in your writing you stay with them for several sentences or even paragraphs and take them as seriously as possible. We also recommend that you read your summary of opposing views with an outsider's eye: put yourself in the shoes of someone who disagrees with you and ask if such a reader would recognize himself in your summary. Would that reader think you have taken his views seriously, as beliefs that reasonable people might hold? Or would he detect a mocking tone, or an oversimplification of his views?

There will always be certain objections, to be sure, that you believe do not deserve to be represented, just as there will be objections that seem so unworthy of respect that they inspire ridicule. Remember, however, that if you do choose to mock a view that you oppose, you are likely to alienate those readers who don't already agree with you—likely the very readers you want to reach. Also be aware that in mocking another's view you may contribute to a hostile argument culture in which someone could ridicule you in return.

Answer Objections

Finally, besides summarizing objections fairly in your writing, you need to answer those objections persuasively. After all, when you write objections into a text, you always take the risk that readers will find those objections more convincing than the argument you yourself are advancing. In the editorial quoted above, for example, Joe Jackson takes the risk that non-smokers will identify more with the anti-smoking view he summarizes than with the pro-smoking position he endorses. Another case in point is presented in *The Autobiography of Benjamin Franklin* (1868), where at one point Franklin recounts how he was converted to Deism (a religion that exalts reason over spirituality) by reading *anti*-Deist books. When he encountered the views of Deists being negatively summarized by authors who opposed them, Franklin ended up finding the Deist position more persuasive. To avoid having this kind if unintentional reverse effect on readers, you need to do your best to make sure that any counter-argument you address is not more convincing than your own claims. It is good to

address objections in your writing, but only if you are able to overcome them.

One surefire way to *fail* to overcome an objection is to dismiss it out of hand—saying, for example, "That's just wrong." The difference between such a response (which offers no supporting reasons whatsoever) and the types of nuanced responses we're promoting in this book is the difference between bullying your readers and genuinely persuading them.

Often the best way to overcome an objection is not to try to refute it completely, but to agree with certain parts while challenging only those you dispute. In other words, in answering counter-arguments, it is often best to say "yes, but" or "yes and no," as we suggest in Chapter 4, treating the counter-view as an opportunity to revise and refine your own position. Rather than building your argument into an impenetrable fortress, it is often best to make concessions while still standing your ground, as Kim Chernin does in the following response to the counter-argument quoted above. While in the voice of the "skeptic," Chernin writes: "Admit it. You like yourself better when you've lost weight." In response, Chernin replies as follows.

> Can I deny these things? No woman who has managed to lose weight would wish to argue with this. Most people feel better about themselves when they become slender. And yet, upon reflection, it seems to me that there is something precarious about this well-being. After all, 98 percent of people who lose weight gain it back. Indeed, 90 percent of those who have dieted "successfully" gain back more than they ever lost. Then, of course, we can no longer bear to look at ourselves in the mirror.

In this way, Chernin shows how you can use a counter-view to improve and refine your overall argument by making a con-

cession. Even as she concedes that losing weight feels good in the short run, she argues that in the long run the weight always returns, making the dieter far more miserable.

Templates for Making Concessions while Still Standing Your Ground

- Although I grant that _____, I still maintain that _____.
- Proponents of X are right to argue that _____. But they exaggerate when they claim that _____.
- While it is true that _____, it does not necessarily follow that _____.
- On the one hand, I agree with X that _____. But on the other hand, I still insist that _____.

Templates like these show that answering naysayers' objections does nbt have to be an all-or-nothing affair in which you either definitively refute your critics or they definitively refute you. Often the most productive engagements among differing views end with a combined vision that incorporates elements of each one.

But what if you've tried out all the possible answers you can think of to an objection you've anticipated and you *still* have a nagging feeling that the objection is more convincing than your argument itself? In that case, the best remedy is to go back and make some fundamental revisions to your argument, changing its very substance. Although finding out late in the game that you aren't fully convinced by your own argument can be painful, it can actually make your final text more intellectually honest, challenging, and serious. After all, the goal of writing

is not to keep proving that whatever you initially said is right, but to stretch the limits of your thinking. So if planting a strong naysayer in your text forces you to change your mind, that's not a bad thing. Indeed, some would argue that that is what the academic world is all about.

Exercises

1. Read the following passage by the cultural critic Eric Schlosser. As you'll see, he's not planted any naysayers in this text. Do it for him. Insert a brief paragraph stating an objection to his argument and then responding to the objection as he might.

   The United States must declare an end to the war on drugs. This war has filled the nation's prisons with poor drug addicts and small-time drug dealers. It has created a multibillion-dollar black market, enriched organized crime groups and promoted the corruption of government officials throughout the world. And it has not stemmed the widespread use of illegal drugs. By any rational measure, this war has been a total failure.

   We must develop public policies on substance abuse that are guided not by moral righteousness or political expediency but by common sense. The United States should immediately decriminalize the cultivation and possession of small amounts of marijuana for personal use. Marijuana should no longer be classified as a Schedule I narcotic, and those who seek to use marijuana as medicine should no longer face criminal sanctions. We must shift our entire approach to drug abuse from the criminal justice system to the public health system. Congress should appoint an independent commission to study the harm-reduction policies that have

been adopted in Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, and the Netherlands. The commission should recommend policies for the United States based on one important criterion: what works.

In a nation where pharmaceutical companies advertise powerful antidepressants on billboards and where alcohol companies run amusing beer ads during the Super Bowl, the idea of a "drug-free society" is absurd. Like the rest of American society, our drug policy would greatly benefit from less punishment and more compassion.

ERIC SCHLOSSER, "A People's Democratic Platform"

2. Look over something you've written that makes an argument. Check to see if you've anticipated and responded to any objections. If not, revise your text to do so. If so, have you anticipated all the likely objections? Who if anyone have you attributed the objections to? Have you represented them fairly? Have you answered the objections well enough, or do you think you now need to qualify your own argument? Did you use any of the language found in this chapter's templates? Does the introduction of a naysayer strengthen your argument—why, or why not?

SEVEN

"So What? Who Cares?"

Saying Why It Matters

BASEBALL IS THE national pastime. Bernini was the best sculptor of the baroque period. Evolution is central to the teaching of biology. So what? Who cares? Why does any of this matter?

How many times have you had reason to ask—or answer—these questions? Regardless of how interesting a topic may be to you as a writer, readers always need to know what is at stake in a text and why they should care. All too often, however, these questions are left unanswered—mainly because writers and speakers assume that audiences will know or will figure out the answers on their own. As a result, students come away from lectures feeling like outsiders to what they've just heard, and their own instructors come away from academic conferences feeling alienated by many of the presentations. The problem is not necessarily that these talks lack a clear, well-focused thesis, or that the thesis is inadequately supported with evidence. Instead, the problem is that the speakers don't address the crucial question of why their arguments matter.

That this crucial question is so often left unaddressed is unfortunate since the speakers generally *could* offer interesting, engaging answers. When pressed, for instance, most academics

will tell you that their lectures and articles matter because they address some belief that needs to be corrected or updated—and because their arguments have important, real-world consequences. Yet many academics fail to explicitly identify these reasons and consequences in what they say and write. Rather than assume that audiences will know why their claims matter, all writers need to answer the "so what?" and "who cares?" questions up front. Not everyone can claim to have a cure for cancer or a solution to end poverty. But writers who cannot show that others *should* care and *do* care about their claims will ultimately lose their audiences' interest.

This chapter focuses on various moves that you can make to answer the "who cares?" and "so what?" questions in your own writing. In one sense, the two questions get at the same thing: the relevance or importance of what you are saying. Yet they get at this significance in different ways. Whereas "who cares?" literally asks you to identify a person or group who cares about your claims, "so what?" asks about the real-world applications and consequences of those claims—what difference it would make if they were accepted. We'll look first at ways of making clear who cares.

"Who Cares?"

To see how one writer answers the "who cares?" question, consider the following passage from the science writer Denise Grady. Writing in the *New York Times*, she explains some of the latest research into fat cells.

> Scientists used to think body fat and the cells it was made of were pretty much inert, just an oily storage compartment. But within the past decade research has shown that fat cells act like chemi-

> cal factories and that body fat is potent stuff: a highly active tissue that secretes hormones and other substances with profound and sometimes harmful effects. . . .
>
> In recent years, biologists have begun calling fat an "endocrine organ," comparing it to glands like the thyroid and pituitary, which also release hormones straight into the bloodstream.
>
> DENISE GRADY, "The Secret Life of a Potent Cell"

Notice how Grady's writing reflects the central advice we give in this book, offering a clear claim and also framing that claim as a response to what someone else has said. In so doing, Grady immediately identifies at least one group with a stake in the new research that sees fat as "active," "potent stuff": namely, the scientific community, which formerly believed that body fat is inert. By referring to these scientists, Grady implicitly acknowledges that her text is part of a larger conversation and shows who besides herself has an interest in what she says.

Consider, however, how the passage would read had Grady left out what "scientists used to think" and simply explained the new findings in isolation.

> Within the past few decades research has shown that fat cells act like chemical factories and that body fat is potent stuff: a highly active tissue that secretes hormones and other substances. In recent years, biologists have begun calling fat an "endocrine organ," comparing it to glands like the thyroid and pituitary, which also release hormones straight into the bloodstream.

Though this statement is clear and easy to follow, it lacks any indication that anyone needs to hear it. Okay, one nods while reading this passage, fat is an active, potent thing. Sounds plausible enough; no reason to think it's not true. But does anyone really care? Who, if anyone, is interested?

Templates for Indicating Who Cares

To address "who cares?" questions in your own writing, we suggest using templates like the following, the first of which mimics Grady's style in the *New York Times*.

- _____ used to think _____. But recently [or within the past few decades] _____ suggests that _____.
- This interpretation challenges the work of those critics who have long assumed that _____.
- These findings challenge the work of earlier researchers, who tended to assume that _____.
- Recent studies like these shed new light on _____, which previous studies had not addressed.

Grady might have been more explicit by writing the "who cares?" question directly into her text, as in the following template.

- But who really cares? Who besides me and a handful of recent researchers has a stake in these claims? At the very least, the researchers who assumed that fat _____ should care.

To gain greater authority as a writer, it helps to name specific people or groups who have a stake in your claims and to go into some detail about their views.

- Researchers have long assumed that _____. For instance, one eminent scholar of cell biology, _____, assumed in _____, her seminal work on cell structures and functions, that fat cells _____. As _____ herself put it, "_____" (200–).

Another leading scientist, _____, argued that fat cells "_____" (200–). Ultimately, when it came to the nature of fat, the basic assumption was that _____.

But a new body of research shows that fat cells are far more complex and that _____.

In other cases, you might refer to certain people or groups who *should* care about your claims.

- If sports enthusiasts stopped to think about it, many of them might simply assume that the most successful athletes _____. However, new research shows _____.
- These findings challenge dieters' common assumption that _____.
- At first glance, teenagers might say _____. But on closer inspection _____.

Such templates help you to generate interest in your subject by identifying populations of readers who are likely to have a stake in it.

"SO WHAT?"

Although answering the "who cares?" question is crucial, in many cases it is not enough, especially if you are writing for general readers who don't necessarily have a strong investment in your subject (as Grady is in the *New York Times*). In the case of Grady's argument about fat cells, such readers may still wonder why it matters that some researchers think fat cells are active and others think they're inert. Or, to move to a differ-

ent field of study, *so what* if some scholars disagree about Huck Finn's relationship with the runaway slave Jim? Why should anyone besides a few specialists in the field care about such disputes? What, if anything, hinges on them?

The best way to answer such questions about the larger consequences of your claims is to appeal to something that your audience already figures to care about. Whereas the "who cares?" question asks you to identify an interested person or group, the "so what?" question asks you to link your argument to some larger matter that readers already deem important. Thus in analyzing *Huckleberry Finn*, a writer could argue that seemingly narrow disputes about the hero's relationship with Jim actually shed light on what Twain's canonical, widely read novel says about racism in America.

Let's see how Grady invokes such broad, general concerns in her article on fat cells. Her first move is to link researchers' interest in fat cells to a general concern with obesity and health.

> Researchers trying to decipher the biology of fat cells hope to find new ways to help people get rid of excess fat or, at least, prevent obesity from destroying their health. In an increasingly obese world, their efforts have taken on added importance.

Further showing why readers should care, Grady's next move is to demonstrate the even broader relevance and urgency of her subject matter.

> Internationally, more than a billion people are overweight. Obesity and two illnesses linked to it, heart disease and high blood pressure, are on the World Health Organization's list of the top 10 global health risks. In the United States, 65 percent of adults weigh too much, compared with about 56 percent a decade ago, and government researchers blame obesity for at least 300,000 deaths a year.

What Grady implicitly says here is: "Look, dear reader, you may think that these questions about the nature of fat cells I've been pursuing have little to do with everyday life. In fact, however, these questions are extremely important—particularly in our 'increasingly obese world' in which we need to prevent obesity from destroying our health."

Notice that Grady's phrase "in an increasingly _____ world" can be adapted as a strategic move to address the "so what?" question in other fields as well. For example, a sociologist analyzing back-to-nature movements of the past thirty years might make the following statement.

> In a world increasingly dominated by cellphones and sophisticated computer technology, these attempts to return to nature and simplify one's life are extremely significant forms of protest.

This type of move can be readily applied to other disciplines because no matter how much these disciplines may differ, the need to justify the importance of one's concerns is common to them all.

TEMPLATES FOR ESTABLISHING WHY YOUR CLAIMS MATTER

- X matters/is important because _____.
- Although X may seem trivial, it is in fact crucial in terms of today's concern over _____.
- Ultimately, what is at stake here is _____.

- These findings have important consequences for the broader domain of _____.
- My discussion of X is in fact addressing the larger matter of _____.
- These conclusions/This discovery will have significant applications in _____ as well as in _____.

Finally, you can also treat the "so what?" question as a related aspect of the "who cares?" question.

- Although X may seem of concern to only a small group of _____, it should in fact concern anyone who cares about _____.

All these templates help you to hook your readers. By suggesting the real-world applications of your claims, the templates not only demonstrate that others care about your claims but also tell your readers why *they* should care. Again, it bears repeating that simply stating and proving your thesis isn't enough. You also need to frame it in a way that helps readers care about it.

What about Readers Who Already Know Why It Matters?

At this point, you might wonder if you need to answer the "who cares?" and "so what?" questions in *everything* you write. Is it really necessary to address these questions if you're proposing something so obviously consequential as, say, a cure for a child-

hood disease or a program to eliminate illiteracy? Isn't it obvious that everyone cares about such problems? Does it really need to be spelled out? And what about when you're writing for audiences who you already know are interested in your claims and who understand perfectly well why they're important? In other words, do you always need to address the "so what?" and "who cares?" questions?

As a rule, yes—although it's true that you can't keep answering them forever and at a certain point must say enough is enough. Although a determined skeptic can infinitely ask why something matters—"Who cares about dieting?" And then, "Who cares about health?"—you have to stop answering at some point in your text. Nevertheless, we urge you to go as far as possible in answering such questions. If you ignore them or give them short shrift, you run the risk that readers will dismiss your text as irrelevant and unimportant. And though some expert readers might already know why your claims matter, even they need to be reminded. Thus the safest move is to be as explicit as possible in answering the "so what?" question, even for those already in the know.

If you take it for granted that readers will somehow intuit the answers to "so what?" and "who cares?" on their own, you may make your work seem less interesting and exciting than it actually is. Therefore we suggest that whether you are offering a cure for cancer or trying to change the way we read Walt Whitman's poetry, be sure to present what you're saying *as* a cure for cancer or a challenge to how Whitman's poetry is read. When you are careful to explain who cares and why, it's a little like bringing a cheerleading squad into your text. When you step back from the text—a move that we discuss in Chapter 10—and explain why it matters, you are urging your audience to keep reading, pay attention, and care.

Exercises

1. Read several articles and essays to see whether they address the "so what?" and "who cares?" questions. Probably you'll find that some do, some don't. The question to consider then is whether it makes a difference to you as a reader. Are those texts that say why it matters more interesting? More persuasive?

2. Look over something you've written yourself. Do you indicate "so what?" and "who cares?"? If not, revise your text to do so. You might use the following template to get started.

▸ My point here—that _____—should interest those who _____. Beyond this limited audience, however, my point should speak to anyone who cares about the larger issue of _____.

1 Research and Writing

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1.10. Language and Style
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1.1. THE RESEARCH PAPER AS A FORM OF EXPLORATION

Personal Essays and Research Papers

During your school career you have probably written many personal essays that presented your thoughts, feelings, and opinions and that did not refer to any other source of information or ideas. Some subjects and assignments, however, require us to go beyond our personal knowledge and experience. We undertake research when we wish to explore an idea, probe an issue, solve a problem, or make an argument that compels us to turn to outside help. We then seek out, investigate, and use materials beyond our personal resources. The findings and conclusions of such an inquiry appear in the research paper. The term *research paper* describes a presentation of student research that may be in a printed, an electronic, or a multimedia format.

Types of Research

The research paper is generally based on primary research, secondary research, or a combination of the two. *Primary research* is the study of a subject through firsthand observation and investigation, such as analyzing a literary or historical text, a film, or a performance; conducting a survey or an interview; or carrying out a laboratory experiment. Primary sources include statistical data, historical documents, and works of literature or art. *Secondary research* is the examination of studies that other researchers have made of a subject. Examples of secondary sources are books and articles about political issues, historical events, scientific debates, or literary works.

Using Secondary Research

Most academic papers depend at least partly on secondary research. No matter what your subject of study, learning to investigate, review, and productively use information, ideas, and opinions of other researchers will play a major role in your development as a student. The sorts of activities that constitute a research paper—identifying, locating, assessing, and assimilating others' research and then developing and expressing your own ideas clearly and persuasively—are at the center of the educational experience.

Combining Research and Original Ideas

Research increases your knowledge and understanding of a subject. Sometimes research will confirm your ideas and opinions; sometimes it will challenge and modify them. But almost always it will help to shape your thinking. Unless your instructor specifically directs you otherwise, a research paper should not merely review publications and extract a series of quotations from them. Rather, you should look for sources that provide new information, that helpfully survey the various positions already taken on a specific subject, that lend authority to your viewpoint, that expand or nuance your ideas, that offer methods or modes of thought you can apply to new data or subjects, or that furnish negative examples against which you wish to argue. As you use and scrupulously acknowledge sources, however, always remember that the main purpose of doing research is not to summarize the work of others but to assimilate and to build on it and to arrive at your own understanding of the subject.

Different Approaches to Research and Writing

A book like this cannot present all the profitable ways of doing research. Because this handbook emphasizes the mechanics of preparing effective papers, it may give you the mistaken impression that the process of researching and writing a research paper follows a fixed pattern. The truth is that different paths can and do lead to successful research papers. Some researchers may pursue a more or less standard sequence of steps, but others may find themselves working less sequentially. In addition, certain projects lend themselves to a standard approach, whereas others may call for different strategies. Keeping in mind that researchers and projects differ, this book discusses activities that nearly all writers of research papers perform, such as selecting a suitable topic, conducting research, compiling a working bibliography, taking notes, outlining, and preparing the paper.

An Intellectual Adventure

If you are writing your first research paper, you may feel overwhelmed by the many tasks discussed here. This handbook is designed to help you learn to manage a complex process efficiently. As you follow the book's advice on how to locate and document sources, how to format your paper, and so forth, you may be tempted

to see doing a paper as a mechanical exercise. Actually, a research paper is an adventure, an intellectual adventure rather like solving a mystery: it is a form of exploration that leads to discoveries that are new—at least to you if not to others. The mechanics of the research paper, important though they are, should never override the intellectual challenge of pursuing a question that interests *you* (and ultimately your reader). This quest or search should guide your research and your writing. Even though you are just learning how to prepare a research paper, you may still experience some of the excitement of pursuing and developing ideas that is one of the great satisfactions of research and scholarship.

Research Papers and Professional Writing

Skills derived from preparing research papers are by no means just academic. Many reports and proposals required in business, government, and other professions similarly rely on secondary research. Learning how to write a research paper, then, can help prepare you for assignments in your professional career. It is difficult to think of any profession that would not require you to consult sources of information about a specific subject, to combine this information with your ideas, and to present your thoughts, findings, and conclusions effectively.

1.2. THE RESEARCH PAPER AS A FORM OF COMMUNICATION

A research paper is a form of written communication. Like other kinds of nonfiction writing—letters, memos, reports, essays, articles, books—it should present information and ideas clearly and effectively. You should not let the mechanics of gathering source materials, taking notes, and documenting sources make you forget to apply the knowledge and skills you have acquired through previous writing experiences.

This handbook is a guide for the preparation of research papers. It is not a book about expository writing. (See 1.11 for a selected list of useful books on usage, language, and style.) Nonetheless, no set of conventions for preparing a manuscript can replace lively and intelligent writing, and no amount of research and documentation can

compensate for a poor presentation of ideas. Although you must fully document the facts and opinions you draw from your research, the documentation should only support your statements and provide concise information about the sources cited; it should not overshadow your own ideas or distract the reader from them.

1.3. SELECTING A TOPIC

1.3.1. Freedom of Choice

Different courses and different instructors offer widely varying degrees of freedom to students selecting topics for research papers. The instructor of a course in a specific discipline (e.g., art, history, literature, science) may supply a list of topics from which to choose or may, more generally, require that the paper relate to an important aspect of the course. If you are given the latter option, review course readings and class notes to find topics that particularly interest you. Discuss possibilities with other students and with your instructor. If your choice is limited to a set list of topics, you will probably still need to decide which aspect of a topic to explore or which approach to use.

In a writing class, you may have more freedom to select a topic. The instructor may assign a general problem that can generate many kinds of responses—for example, you might be asked to choose a modern invention and show what benefits and problems it has brought about. If you have complete freedom to choose a topic, consider using a personal interest that lends itself to research (e.g., education, the environment, movies, new technologies, nutrition, politics, the business of sports) or an issue that has recently generated public interest or controversy (e.g., cloning, global warming, biological warfare, terrorism).

Teachers understand the importance of choosing an appropriate topic for a research paper. When freedom of choice is permitted, students are commonly required to submit topics to the instructor for approval early in the research project.

1.3.2. Finding an Appropriate Focus

As you choose a topic, remember the time allotted to you and the expected length of the research paper. "International politics in the modern age" would obviously be too broad a subject for a ten-page term paper. You may prefer to begin with a fairly general topic and then to refine it, by thought and research, into a more specific one that can be fully explored. Try to narrow your topic by focusing on an aspect of the subject or an approach to it. A student initially interested in the general subject of "violence in the media" might decide, after careful thought and reading, to write on "the effects of cartoon violence on preschool children." Likewise, an interest in architecture could lead to a focus on the design and construction of domes, which could in turn be narrowed to a comparison between the ancient Roman dome and the Byzantine dome.

Preliminary reading is essential as you evaluate and refine topics. Consult, in print or electronic form, general reference works, such as encyclopedias, as well as articles and books in the areas you are considering (see 1.4 on conducting research). You can also refine your topic by doing subject searches in reference databases (see 1.4.4d) and in online catalogs (see 1.4.5a) and through Internet search tools (see 1.4.8e). Such preliminary reading and searches will also let you know if enough work has been done on the subject to permit adequate research and whether the pertinent source materials are readily accessible.

Selecting an appropriate topic is seldom a simple matter. Even after you discover a subject that attracts your interest, you may well find yourself revising your choice, modifying your approach, or changing topics altogether after you have begun research.

1.3.3. SUMMING UP

- Give yourself plenty of time to think through and rethink your choice of a topic.
- Look for a subject or an issue that will continue to engage you throughout research and writing.
- Consult library materials and other print and electronic information resources to refine the topic and to see if sufficient work has been done on the subject to make it a viable topic for the research paper.

- Before settling on a final topic, make sure you understand the amount and depth of research required and the type and length of paper expected.
- If you encounter problems at any point in the project, do not hesitate to consult your instructor, whether to clarify the assignment or to get help in choosing, developing, or researching a topic or in preparing the paper.

1.4. CONDUCTING RESEARCH

1.4.1. The Modern Academic Library

The library will generally be your most reliable guide as you conduct research for papers that draw on the published work of experts. Librarians evaluate resources for authority and quality before acquiring them for use in research. You should therefore become thoroughly acquainted with the libraries available to you and take full advantage of the resources and services they provide on-site and over the Internet.

Resources and Services

The modern academic library typically offers resources in print and electronic forms and in other nonprint media (e.g., films, sound recordings), as well as computer services, such as word processing, high-quality printers, and access to the Internet. Whereas some important resources are available only in the library building (e.g., most books and other publications solely in print form, microfilm materials, special collections), your library probably provides a number of electronic resources, such as bibliographic and full-text databases, that are accessible not only through computer terminals in the library but also over the Internet through the library's Web site.

Orientation and Instruction

Most academic libraries have programs of orientation and instruction to meet the needs of all students, from beginning researchers to graduate students. Ask about introductory pamphlets or handbooks and guided tours as well as lectures and classes on using the library and on related subjects like developing research strategies and

searching the World Wide Web. The library's Web site likely contains scheduling information on such classes as well as descriptions of available resources and services. The site may also offer a virtual tour of the library.

Professional Reference Librarians

Nearly all public and academic libraries have desks staffed by professional reference librarians who can tell you about available instructional programs and help you locate sources. Specialist librarians often prepare and distribute, in print and electronic forms, research guides to specific fields of study. Consulting a librarian at key points in your research may save you considerable time and effort.

1.4.2. Library Research Sources

Touring or reading about your library will reveal the many important sources of information it makes available to researchers. Information sources fall into four general categories.

Books and Similar Publications

The library typically houses a vast number of books as well as similar publications such as pamphlets and perhaps dissertations. Books are essential sources for many projects, and some instructors require that students use books—in addition to articles, Internet sites, and other materials—during research. Relatively few books are available electronically over the Internet, but you can usually borrow most books from the library. A common exception is the library's collection of reference works (see 1.4.4). Although reference works usually cannot be borrowed, many important ones are likely available to you through the library's Web site. (See 5.6 on citing books and other nonperiodical publications in the list of works cited.)

Articles and Other Publications in Print Periodicals

The library gives access to numerous articles and similar writings (e.g., reviews, editorials) published in print periodicals such as scholarly journals, newspapers, and magazines. (See 5.7 on citing articles and other publications in print periodicals in the list of works cited.)

Miscellaneous Print and Nonprint Sources

Most libraries also provide nonprint sources such as sound recordings and video recordings and possibly also unpublished writings (e.g., manuscripts or private letters in special collections). (See 5.8 on citing these sources in the list of works cited.)

Electronic Sources

Your library probably offers reference works in electronic form (see 1.4.4) and full-text databases (see 1.4.6) and may also recommend useful Internet sites (see 1.4.8). Your library may also subscribe to journals available only in electronic form. (See 5.9 on citing electronic sources in the list of works cited.)

1.4.3. The Central Information System

Most academic libraries provide an online central information system to guide students and faculty members to research sources. The system ordinarily includes

- **the library's catalog of holdings** (books, periodicals, electronic sources, audiovisual materials, etc.; see 1.4.5)
- **bibliographic databases**, such as *Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature*, *Business Periodicals Index*, *Humanities Index*, *Social Sciences Index*, and *General Science Index*
- **other electronic resources**, including reference works (see 1.4.4), full-text databases to which the library subscribes (see 1.4.6), and recommended Internet sites to which the library provides links (see 1.4.8)

The central information system might also be part of a network linking the catalogs of a number of libraries. For instance, the system in your school might permit you to search the holdings of local public libraries or of other schools. If your library is part of a network such as the Center for Research Libraries (CRL), the Online Computer Library Center (OCLC), or the Research Libraries Information Network (RLIN), you may be able to locate sources recorded in the catalogs of thousands of other libraries. (The central information system has almost completely replaced the card catalog in academic libraries. Card catalogs are sometimes still used for materials such as special collections that have not yet been incorporated into the information system.)

1.4.4. Reference Works

A useful way to begin a research project is to consult relevant reference works. Some reference works, like indexes and bibliographies, categorize research materials by subject and provide data that permit you to locate sources—author, title, date of publication, and so forth. Other reference works, like encyclopedias, dictionaries, and biographical sources, give basic information about subjects. This section provides a brief introduction to the range of general and specialized reference works you should know about, many of which are available in print and electronic forms. For a more comprehensive listing by subject area, see appendix A.

a. Reference Works That Provide Data about Research Materials

Indexes guide you to material in newspapers, magazines, and journals as well as to writings in book collections.

- *The New York Times Index*, *The Wall Street Journal Index*, and *The Washington Post Index* list news stories and feature articles in three major newspapers.
- *Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature* indexes the contents of popular magazines.
- *Essay and General Literature Index* lists essays and articles published in books.
- Most subject areas have their own specialized indexes, such as *Art Index*, *Business Periodicals Index*, *Education Index*, *General Science Index*, *Humanities Index*, *Index to Legal Periodicals and Books*, *The Philosopher's Index*, and *Social Sciences Index*.

Bibliographies are lists of related publications and other materials.

- Bibliographies in specific disciplines include *Bibliography of Agriculture*, *Bibliographic Guide to Art and Architecture*, *Bibliography and Index of Geology*, and *MLA International Bibliography* (for the field of language and literature).
- *Bibliographic Index* contains citations of bibliographies that are published as books or pamphlets, as parts of books, or in periodicals.

Collections of abstracts present summaries of journal articles and other literature.

- *Newspaper Abstracts* covers the *Atlanta Constitution*, the *Boston Globe*, the *Chicago Tribune*, the *Christian Science Monitor*, the *Los*

Angeles Times, the *New York Times*, *USA Today*, the *Wall Street Journal*, and the *Washington Post*.

- *Periodical Abstracts* treats a wide range of English-language academic journals and newsmagazines.
- Collections of abstracts in specific disciplines include *Art Abstracts*, *Biological Abstracts*, *Business Abstracts*, *Chemical Abstracts*, *Historical Abstracts*, *Humanities Abstracts*, *Linguistics and Language Behavior Abstracts*, *Physics Abstracts*, *Psychological Abstracts*, and *Sociological Abstracts*.
- Summaries of doctoral dissertations are available in *Dissertation Abstracts International*.

Guides to research seek to direct you to the most important sources of information and scholarship in the area you are researching. Unlike indexes, bibliographies, and collections of abstracts, which tend to strive for comprehensiveness and objectivity in presenting information, guides to research are usually selective and evaluative.

- Some research guides cover entire fields, such as James L. Harner's *Literary Research Guide* (4th ed. [New York: MLA, 2002]); other, similar works have titles like *Art Information: Research Methods and Resources*, *A Guide to the Literature of Pharmacy and the Pharmaceutical Sciences*, and *Philosophy: A Guide to the Reference Literature*.
- Some guides to research are devoted to specific subjects within fields (e.g., *Reference Guide to Mystery and Detective Fiction*).

To learn of any guides that might be useful to your project, consult the latest edition of the American Library Association's *Guide to Reference Books*, your instructor, or a librarian.

b. Reference Works That Give Basic Information about Subjects

Dictionaries are alphabetically arranged works that provide information, usually in concise form, about words or topics.

- Among the most authoritative dictionaries for English words are *Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language* and, especially for the history of a word's meanings and usages, *The Oxford English Dictionary*.
- More concise English-language dictionaries often recommended for student writers are *The American Heritage College Dictionary*, *Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary*, and *Random House Webster's College Dictionary*.

- Foreign language dictionaries typically present words in one language followed by translations of those words into another language—for instance, *The New World Spanish-English, English-Spanish Dictionary* (also titled *El New World diccionario español-inglés, inglés-español*). Some language dictionaries in specialized fields are in a multilingual format, such as *Elsevier's Dictionary of Environment in English, French, Spanish, and Arabic.*
- A thesaurus lists groups of synonyms—words with similar meanings. It is useful for writers who wish to find the most precise word for a particular context or to vary their choice of words. Examples are *The Merriam-Webster Collegiate Thesaurus* and *Roget's International Thesaurus.*
- Major fields of study have specialized dictionaries, such as *The Dictionary of Art, Dictionary of Computing, Black's Law Dictionary, Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary, The New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians, A Dictionary of Philosophy, The Anchor Bible Dictionary,* and *The Penguin Dictionary of Sociology.*

Encyclopedias are works, usually alphabetically arranged, that give introductory information about subjects.

- Popular general encyclopedias are *Academic American Encyclopedia, The Columbia Encyclopedia, The Encyclopedia Americana,* and *The New Encyclopaedia Britannica.*
- Specialized encyclopedias include *Encyclopedia of Architecture, The Film Encyclopedia, Encyclopedia of American History, The New Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics, The Corsini Encyclopedia of Psychology and Behavioral Science,* and *McGraw-Hill Encyclopedia of Science and Technology.*

Biographical sources present information on the lives of prominent persons.

- Information on living persons is collected in *Current Biography, The International Who's Who, The Canadian Who's Who,* and *Who's Who in America.* Similar books exist for other countries as well: *Who's Who in Australia, Who's Who in Italy, Who's Who in Latin America, Who's Who in the Arab World,* and so forth.
- Sources for persons no longer living are *American National Biography* (for the United States), *Dictionary of Canadian Biography, Dictionary of National Biography* (for Great Britain), and *Webster's New Biographical Dictionary.*

Yearbooks present information about specific years in the past. Examples are *The Americana Annual*, *Britannica Book of the Year*, and *The Europa Yearbook*.

Almanacs are annual publications containing data, especially statistics, about many subjects. Examples are *The World Almanac and Book of Facts* and *The World Factbook*.

Atlases are collections of maps. *The National Atlas of the United States of America* is the official atlas of the United States; *The Times Atlas of the World* covers regions and nations of the entire world.

Gazetteers provide geographic information. Examples are *The Columbia Gazetteer of the World* and *Merriam-Webster's Geographical Dictionary*.

Statistical resources provide numerical or quantitative information.

- Collections of statistics are often published by government agencies. Such works include the following annual publications: *Statistical Abstract of the United States*, issued by the United States Bureau of the Census, and *Statistical Yearbook* and *Demographic Yearbook*, both published by the United Nations.
- The United States government has also created a number of Internet sites that provide statistical data. *American FactFinder*, produced by the Census Bureau, is a source for population, housing, economic, and geographic data. *FedStats*, published by the Federal Interagency Council on Statistical Policy, gives access to statistics and other information produced by more than seventy United States government agencies. The Congressional Information Service's *CIS Statistical Universe* provides comprehensive United States statistical information, including an index to over 100,000 statistical publications.

c. Publication Forms of Reference Works: Print and Electronic

Your library probably has reference works in print and electronic forms.

Print. Print works may be located in a reference room. General reference books, like dictionaries, encyclopedias, biographical sources, yearbooks, atlases, and gazetteers, may all be shelved together in one place, while specialized reference books may be grouped according to subject area—biology, business, literature, psychology, and so

forth. The volumes of reference works published annually—indexes, bibliographies, and abstracts collections—are likely lined up in chronological order.

Electronic. Reference works available as electronic databases are usually online or on CD-ROM. Searching and drawing material from the library's databases can be done in the library building and probably from outside as well, over the Internet.

Print versus electronic. Online and CD-ROM databases have a number of advantages over print versions of reference works.

- Much more information is generally available in a database. Whereas the print version of an annual bibliography covers research and scholarship for only one year, the electronic version of the work typically covers several years. Let us say, then, that you want to find out what was written on a subject during the last five years. With the print version of an annual bibliography, you would need to consult five volumes—in effect, conduct five searches—to identify what you want. With the electronic version, you would need to do just one search.
- Information is usually more current in electronic formats. The printed volume of an annual reference work, for example, is published once a year. A CD-ROM version of the same work is commonly updated and issued to subscribers several times a year. An online database is normally an ongoing, continually updated project and is therefore the most up-to-date of the three forms.
- Electronic databases generally allow you to print out or download any information you wish to record, whereas you need to write out information when using printed sources. You can transfer downloaded data from your computer diskette to your research paper without the risk of introducing errors through copying by hand. Since compilers of bibliographic reference works sometimes make errors, however, you need to verify the information derived from a database (author's name, title, etc.) against the source itself when you consult it.
- Some bibliographic databases provide hypertextual links that can take you directly from a reference to a full-text electronic version of the source.
- Most important of all, you can search electronic versions of a reference work in many more ways than you can the printed version (see 1.4.4d).

d. Searching a Reference Database

Every field of study has standard reference works. One such work is the *MLA International Bibliography*, which lists studies in the fields of language and literature. This work is published in print and electronic formats.

VERSIONS

- **Print.** The printed library edition of this work is published annually in two clothbound books. The first contains listings in five areas: literature in English, literature in other languages, linguistics, general literature and related topics, and folklore. The second book provides a subject index to the first.
- **Electronic.** The *MLA International Bibliography* is also published in online and CD-ROM versions, which contain all citations published in annual volumes of the bibliography from 1963 to the present. Therefore, while an annual print volume of the *MLA International Bibliography* lists around sixty thousand titles, the electronic versions offer information on more than 1.5 million titles. Using these electronic editions, which are available from different vendors, involves searching techniques common to most databases. The standard ways of searching this database and similar ones are by author, title, and subject. Each vendor's system has help screens to guide you through its software interface.

TYPES OF SEARCHES

- **Author searches.** By entering the name of a scholar, you can obtain a list of the titles by the author that are collected in the database. For example, if you want to know what studies by the writer Deborah Tannen have been published in the fields covered by this bibliography, you can enter her name and receive a list of titles.
- **Title searches.** If you know only the title of a work—like the essay "Black Matter(s)" or the book *Talking Voices*—you can call forth complete bibliographic information about the work from the database by entering the title. If you remember only part of the title (e.g., "city"), you can request a listing of all titles containing that term (e.g., "Fun City: TV's Urban Situation Comedies of the 1990s," "The City in Modern Polish and Hungarian Poetry," "The London Scene: City and Court," "Japanese Adolescent Speech Styles in Hiroshima City: An Ethnographic Study").
- **Subject searches.** Since every work added to this bibliography is accompanied by at least one descriptor—a term that describes the

work's subject matter—you can also search the database by subject. Thus, if you ask for studies that discuss, for instance, "detective fiction," the system will search through its files and present you with all titles that have "detective fiction" as a descriptor. If you want studies of Toni Morrison's novels, you can search for records with "Toni Morrison" as a descriptor.

- **Expanded searches.** Databases like the *MLA International Bibliography* also permit you to expand or narrow your searches usefully. While you are trying to decide on a topic, you may want to do expanded searches to get a broad sense of possibilities. An expanded subject search of this database can be particularly helpful when you are developing a suitable research topic. If you have a general idea that you want to write on detective fiction, you can find related subjects by entering the word "detective" in your expanded subject search. The following is a sampling of the related topics you will receive, with links to relevant bibliographic listings:

detective comics	female detective
detective drama	French detective
detective fiction	hard-boiled detective
detective film	American detective fiction
detective magazines	Egyptian detective fiction
detective novel	English detective fiction
detective story	paranormal detective fiction
detective television	Senegalese detective fiction

Also useful for expanded searches is the truncation (or wild card) feature. By using a truncated, or shortened, term—for example, a word root—followed by an asterisk (or the symbols *:* or *$*, depending on the vendor's software interface), you can retrieve all variants of it. If you wish, for instance, to do a paper on feminism but cannot decide what aspect to focus on, you can enter as a search term "femini*" and receive records on, among other subjects, "feminine discourse," "femininity," "feminist literary theory and criticism," "feminist movement," and "feminist writers."

- **Boolean searches.** The electronic *MLA International Bibliography* also permits searching according to Boolean logic—named after the nineteenth-century British mathematician and logician George Boole. In this kind of searching, you customize your search request with the operators *and*, *or*, and *not* (see fig. 1, on the next page). For example, you can use the Boolean operator *or* to expand your search. The following search expression will furnish



Fig. 1. Boolean searching. When using the *MLA International Bibliography* through the *WinSPIRS* software, you can enter this search phrase to find scholarship about short stories or novels relating to Zimbabwe. The search will exclude PhD dissertations.

more titles than either "Arthur Conan Doyle" or "Sherlock Holmes" by itself would:

Arthur Conan Doyle or Sherlock Holmes

If you want to perform narrower searches, the Boolean operators *not* and *and* can limit the field of titles accessed. If you are interested in finding studies on, say, versions of the story of Othello other than Shakespeare's, enter the following:

Othello not Shakespeare

Or if you would like to identify studies that compare Shakespeare's play with *Otello*, Verdi's operatic adaptation of it, keying the following rather than just "Othello" will result in a shorter, more focused list of sources:

Othello and Otello

- **Other advanced searches.** The *MLA International Bibliography* in its electronic versions offers other ways to restrict your search. It allows you to retrieve titles from a single publication source—for instance, articles on *Othello* that have appeared in *Shakespeare Quarterly* over the last several decades. The database also allows you to limit your search according to language of publication (e.g., Japanese, Spanish), publication type (e.g., book, journal article), and publication year. You can obtain a list, for example, of books

on Goethe's *Faust* that were written in German and published in 2000 or later.

BIBLIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION PROVIDED

The database allows you to print out and download bibliographic information. It also gives you a choice of how to view, print, or download data. The display style varies among the interfaces through which the *MLA International Bibliography* is offered. Figures 2 and 3 present two ways in which the bibliographic information may appear. The complete record (fig. 2) includes title, author, source, international standard serial number (ISSN), language of publication, publication type, publication year, subject descriptors, sequence number, update code, and accession number. The shortened citation (fig. 3) usually gives only title, author, and source.

TITLE: Gender in Research on Language: Researching Gender-Related Patterns in Classroom Discourse
AUTHOR(S): Tannen,-Deborah
SOURCE: TESOL-Quarterly (TESOLQ) Alexandria, VA. 1996 Summer; 30(2): 341-44.
INTERNATIONAL STANDARD SERIAL NUMBER: 0039-8322
LANGUAGE: English
PUBLICATION TYPE: journal-article
PUBLICATION YEAR: 1996
DESCRIPTORS: language-; sociolinguistics-; social-dialects; role of gender-; in classroom-discourse
SEQUENCE NUMBER: 1996-3-2795
UPDATE CODE: 199601
ACCESSION NUMBER: 1996090615

Fig. 2. A complete citation from a bibliographic database.

TI: Gender in Research on Language: Researching Gender-Related Patterns in Classroom Discourse
AU: Tannen,-Deborah
SO: TESOL-Quarterly (TESOLQ) Alexandria, VA. 1996 Summer; 30(2): 341-44.

Fig. 3. A shortened citation from a bibliographic database.

The advantage of the short form is that it saves time and space while providing the information necessary for locating the material and for creating a preliminary entry for your works-cited list. You can easily convert the bibliographic data in figure 3 to MLA documentation style (see ch. 5):

Tannen, Deborah. "Gender in Research on Language: Researching Gender-Related Patterns in Classroom Discourse." TESOL Quarterly 30 (1996): 341-44.

1.4.5. The Online Catalog of Library Holdings

An important part of a library's central information system is the online catalog of holdings (e.g., books, journals, electronic publications, audiovisual materials). There is no standard system for online catalogs. Systems differ, for example, in how users access information and in what appears on the screen. All systems, however, permit searching.

a. Searching an Online Catalog

When using an online catalog, you can locate a work in a number of ways. The most common are by author, by title, and by subject.

- **Author searches.** If you enter the author's full name—whether a personal name (e.g., Maxine Hong Kingston) or a corporate name (e.g., United States Central Intelligence Agency)—the screen displays a list of all the works the library has by that author. If you know only an author's last name (e.g., Kingston), you can obtain a list of all authors with that last name.
- **Title searches.** Entering the title produces a list of all works the library has with that title. The online catalog contains not only book titles but also titles of other works in the system, including journals (e.g., *Psychology and Marketing*), databases (e.g., *Sociofile*), and book series. If you enter the name of a book series, such as "Approaches to Teaching World Literature" or "Loeb Classical Library," you will receive a list of all book titles in the series. If you know only the beginning of a title—for example, only *Advertising, Competition*, instead of *Advertising, Competition, and Public Policy: A Simulation Study*—you can enter what you know, and the screen will display all titles that begin with those words.

- **Subject heading searches.** If you have no author or title in mind, you can enter a subject heading to produce a list of works about the subject. Most academic libraries exclusively use the subject headings that appear in the *Library of Congress Subject Headings.* Many headings have more specific subheadings. For example, you can enter "Mass media and the environment" and receive a list of all works assigned that general subject heading, or you can obtain a more specialized list by entering one of the following:

  Mass media and the environment—Great Britain
  Mass media and the environment—India
  Mass media and the environment—Latin America
  Mass media and the environment—United States

- **Call number searches.** If you know a work's call number, the designation by which the work is shelved in the library, you can enter it and receive bibliographic information about the work. For example, if you enter "PA817.B43 1992," you will learn that it applies to the book *An Introduction to New Testament Greek,* written by Frank Beetham and published in London by Bristol Classical Press in 1992.
- **Keyword searches.** An online catalog also helps you to initiate more sophisticated searches. A keyword search looks for individual words regardless of their location in a name, title, or subject heading. You can, for example, call up a list of all works that contain "competition" anywhere in their titles, such as

  Information Agreements, Competition, and Efficiency
  Conglomerate Mergers and Market Competition
  Competition and Human Behavior

  A subject heading search using the keyword "competition" will produce the titles of all works whose subject descriptions include the word, such as *Europe versus America? Contradictions of Imperialism,* one of whose subject headings is "Competition, International," or *Unequal Freedoms: The Global Market as an Ethical System,* one of whose subject headings is "Competition—Moral and ethical aspects."
- **Boolean searches.** Online catalogs also typically permit searching according to Boolean logic—that is, using the operators *and, or,* and *not.* For instance, suppose you are interested in studies on the relation between nutrition and cancer. A search using "nutrition" alone or "cancer" alone would yield a list of all works having anything to do with the subject of each search, and you would have to

pick out the items dealing with the two subjects together. In contrast, a Boolean search using "nutrition *and* cancer" excludes all works not about both subjects. Likewise, if you want to see which authors besides Goethe wrote about the Faust theme, you can enter "Faust *not* Goethe." In addition to narrowing lists of titles, Boolean searching is useful for expanding them. For example, if you wish to research solar heating, you might enter "solar *or* sun *and* heating," which will produce more titles than would just "solar *and* heating." (On using Boolean logic in searching a reference database, see 1.4.4d.)

- **Other advanced searches.** Online catalogs allow you to limit your search in various ways. You may ask for titles published during a certain range of years (e.g., 2000 to the present) or titles located only in one specific part of your library (e.g., the main collection). You may be able, too, to limit your search to specific media (e.g., books, serials, electronic publications, archives, manuscripts, musical scores, films, video or sound recordings). This feature will permit you, say, to request a list of books that were published in Spanish between 1990 and 2000 about cave paintings in Spain, or it will let you find out if your library has any video recordings about mythology or the Civil War.

b. Bibliographic Information Provided

When you access a title, the screen shows something like the example in figure 4. The top lines of the screen image contain the author's name (McCann, Sean), the full title of the book (*Gumshoe America: Hard-Boiled Crime Fiction and the Rise and Fall of New Deal Liberalism*), and complete publication information (the book was published by Duke University Press in Durham, North Carolina, in 2000). Then follows the call number. The next section tells you that the library possesses one copy of the work, which is located on an open shelf (the "stack"), and that the copy is in the library and not on loan to anyone. The following lines describe the physical characteristics of the book (it has 8 pages of front matter—material before the main text—and 370 pages of text and measures 23 centimeters in height); indicate that it contains a bibliography and an index; show the subject headings under which the book is cataloged; and give the international standard book numbers (ISBNs) for the cloth and paperback versions of the book.

c. Information Needed for Research and Writing

For the purposes of researching and writing your paper, you normally will not use most of the information that appears in the catalog entry. You need to know the call number, of course, to locate the work in the library (see 1.4.5d); and, for your paper's works-cited list, you also need to know the author, title, and full publication information (see ch. 5 on information needed for compiling the list of works cited). Following is the entry in the works-cited list for the title given above:

McCann, Sean. Gumshoe America: Hard-Boiled Crime Fiction and the Rise and Fall of New Deal Liberalism. Durham: Duke UP, 2000.

Transcribe this information carefully. Online catalog systems typically give the option of printing out or downloading the bibliographic data displayed on the screen. This feature saves you the effort of copying the information and eliminates the possibility of

AUTHOR: McCann, Sean

TITLE: Gumshoe America: Hard-Boiled Crime Fiction and the Rise and Fall of New Deal Liberalism

IMPRINT: Durham [N.C.]: Duke University Press, 2000

CALL NUMBER: PS374.D4 M38 2000

LOCATION	COPY	STATUS
Stack	#1	In Library

PHYSICAL FEATURES: viii, 370 p.: 23cm.

NOTES: Includes bibliographical references (p. 349-64) + index

SUBJECTS:

Detective and mystery stories, American--History and criticism
Politics and literature--United States--History--20th century
American fiction--20th century--History and criticism
Liberalism--United States--History--20th century
Political fiction, American--History and criticism
New Deal, 1933-39
Crime in literature

ISBN: 0822325802 (cloth) * 0822325942 (pbk.)

Fig. 4. An entry from an online catalog.

transcription errors. You should, of course, verify the information you derive from the catalog against the source itself; errors sometimes occur during cataloging.

d. Call Numbers

The call numbers in your library probably follow one of two systems of classification: the Library of Congress system or the Dewey decimal system. Learning your library's system will not only help you to find works and know their contents from their call numbers but also guide you to sections of the library in which to browse.

The Library of Congress system divides books into twenty major groups:

A	General works
B	Philosophy, psychology, and religion
C	General history
D	World history
E–F	American history
G	Geography and anthropology
H	Social sciences
J	Political science
K	Law
L	Education
M	Music
N	Fine arts
P	Language and literature
Q	Science
R	Medicine
S	Agriculture
T	Technology
U	Military science
V	Naval science
Z	Bibliography and library science

The Dewey decimal system classifies books under ten major headings:

000	General works
100	Philosophy and psychology
200	Religion
300	Social sciences
400	Language
500	Natural sciences and mathematics

600 Technology and applied sciences
700 Fine arts
800 Literature
900 Geography and history

e. Location of Library Materials

The library catalog normally indicates not only the call number for a title but also the section in which to find the work, whether in the main collection or in a different location. It may also indicate if a title is checked out, missing, at the bindery, or on order. Check with the circulation desk to see if it is possible to recall or search for a missing book.

- **Open shelves and closed stacks.** Most library holdings are kept on open shelves, to which the public has direct access. To obtain a work in closed stacks, you usually have to present a call slip to a library staff member, who will locate the work for you.
- **Sections for reserved works and reference works.** If the word *Reserved* appears in a catalog entry, it indicates that the work is required in a course and stored in a special section, at the instructor's request, so that the work may not be borrowed but stays available for students in the course. A work shelved in the reference section, designated in the catalog entry by *R* or *Ref*, is too widely used to be borrowed and thus must also remain in the library.
- **Other sections.** Libraries also commonly set aside areas for other types of materials—current periodicals, pamphlets, and nonprint materials, like CD-ROMs, films, and audio and video recordings. Some libraries have additional special collections, such as rare books or government documents, that are similarly kept separate from the main collection. Consult the library directory or a librarian for locations.

1.4.6. Full-Text Databases

Modern academic libraries subscribe to and make generally available a wide variety of databases: not only those containing bibliographic citations and abstracts (see 1.4.4a), which guide researchers to relevant sources, but also full-text databases, which offer complete texts of many sources. Your library likely subscribes to full-

text databases of reference works and other book-length texts as well as of articles from periodicals (newspapers, magazines, scholarly journals). Some of these databases may be limited to use in the library, but many probably can also be accessed from outside, through the library's Web site. Virtually all full-text databases are searchable by author, title, and subject and through more sophisticated strategies (e.g., keyword searching, Boolean searching), as discussed in 1.4.4d and 1.4.5a.

a. Reference Works and Other Book-Length Texts

- **Online reference works** to which libraries typically subscribe include *The Oxford English Dictionary*, *The New Encyclopaedia Britannica*, *American National Biography*, *The Grove Dictionary of Art Online*, and *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.
- **Other book-length texts** may also be available to you through library subscriptions. One ambitious project is the University of Chicago's Project for American and French Research on the Treasury of the French Language (or the ARTFL Project), which is a collection of nearly two thousand French texts from the seventeenth to the twentieth century, ranging from classic works of French literature to nonfiction prose and technical writing. Similarly, the Digital History Books Project, a collaboration among the University of Pennsylvania Library, Oxford University Press, and Cambridge University Press, includes over four hundred books in its database.

b. Articles in Periodicals

Many full-text databases to which academic libraries subscribe comprise articles from periodicals—newspapers, magazines, and especially scholarly journals.

- **Major newspapers**, like the *New York Times* and *Wall Street Journal*, are available individually through library subscription.
- **Major scholarly journal publishers**—those that issue numerous journals, often in different fields—permit libraries to subscribe to databases containing all journals that each press publishes. Such publishers include Academic Press, American Chemical Society, American Mathematical Society, Cambridge University Press, Elsevier, Oxford University Press, University of Chicago Press, and Wiley. Thus, a subscription to, for example, American Mathe-

matical Society Journals gives access to all journals published by that society.

- **A scholarly journal archive** collects articles from journals published by different presses. *JSTOR*, for instance, is a collection of articles from over one hundred scholarly journals in such fields as the humanities, the social sciences, the natural sciences, and business.

c. Database Subscription Services

Information service companies, such as EBSCO, Gale, and Lexis-Nexis, amass huge numbers of bibliographic and full-text materials, organize these materials into different kinds of databases, and offer these databases, often in different combinations, by subscription to academic libraries. Some typical packages of databases follow:

- **EBSCO.** Your library may subscribe to a number of EBSCO's bibliographic databases as well as to its full-text databases, such as *Academic Search Premier* (articles from over three thousand scholarly publications in all major disciplines), *Business Source Premier* (articles from over two thousand scholarly business journals), *Health Source* (articles from over five hundred scholarly medical journals), *Newspaper Source* (articles from some two hundred United States and international newspapers), and *Masterfile Premier* (articles from nearly two thousand periodicals on a variety of subjects, including general reference, business, and health).
- **Gale.** The following is a typical package of Gale databases to which a library might subscribe: *Custom Newspapers* (articles from, e.g., the *New York Times*, the *Wall Street Journal*, and local newspapers selected by the library), *General Reference Center* (articles from reference books, magazines, and newspapers on topics of general interest—e.g., current events, popular culture, arts, sciences), *Health Reference Center* (articles on topics related to health—e.g., medicine, nutrition, diseases, public health, occupational health and safety), *Business and Company Resource Center* (company profiles, brand information, investment reports, etc.), *Contemporary Authors* (biographical and bibliographic information on thousands of authors), and *Contemporary Literary Criticism* (critical introductions to modern authors).
- **Lexis-Nexis.** *Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe*, one of many products and services provided by this company, collects material from over five thousand publications and organizes information

under the following topics: news, business, legal research, medicine, and general reference.

d. Information Needed for List of Works Cited

Most documents in databases were previously or simultaneously published in print form. Therefore, most bibliographic citations of database sources begin with the publication information the database supplies for the print version of the source (see 5.9.1). The citation then continues with facts about the electronic publication. Subscription databases vary considerably in the amount and kind of electronic publication information they furnish, and bibliographic citations of these sources vary accordingly. For some sources, a URL (uniform resource locator, or network address) of the specific document is available; for others, a URL of only a search page must be given; and for still others, no URL can be cited.

- **URL of specific document.** Some databases connect you to an Internet site, give relatively short and logical URLs for each document, and even provide full documentation information for each document. For example, the information in figure 5 appears at the end of an entry in the electronic database for *American National Biography.* Such information makes it easy to create a bibliographic entry for the source using MLA style (see 5.9.1):

  Malleck, Daniel J. "Leavitt, Mary Greenleaf Clement." American National Biography Online. Oxford UP, 2000. Amer. Council of Learned Socs. 14 Jan. 2002 <http://www.anb.org/articles/15-00398.html>.

- **URL of search page.** Sometimes the URL of a document is so long and complicated that reproducing it would invite transcription

Citation:
Daniel J. Malleck. "Leavitt, Mary Greenleaf Clement."
http://www.anb.org/articles/15-00398.html
American National Biography Online February 2000
Access date: Monday, January 14, 2002
Copyright © 2000 American Council of Learned Societies.
Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.

Fig. 5. Bibliographic information provided by a database publisher.

errors or would at least cause inconvenience. In such instances, it is preferable to give instead the URL of the site's search page, if such a page exists. Once there, the reader can readily access the document by keying in other publication facts recorded in the citation (e.g., author's name, title). For example, *JSTOR* assigns the following URL to a 1998 article by Nancy Tolson in *African American Review*:

http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=1062-4783%28199821%2932%3A1%3C9%3AMBATRO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-2

Rather than try to reproduce such a URL, simply give the URL of the database's search page.

Tolson, Nancy. "Making Books Available: The Role of Early Libraries, Librarians, and Booksellers in the Promotion of African American Children's Literature." African American Review 32 (1998): 9-16. JSTOR. 1 Oct. 2002 <http://www.jstor.org/search>.

- **No URL.** Some database subscription services assign no apparent URLs to documents or assign URLs that are unique to the subscribing institution or to the current research session. Such URLs are useless to the general reader. For example, an article that Sami Youakim published in 2001 in *American Family Physician* is included in Gale's database *Health Reference Center*. When you access this article from the Bergen County Cooperative Library System in New Jersey, you find that its URL contains over 130 characters and concludes with the suffix "sw_aep=bergen_main," which is unique to this library system. Consequently, the URL of the article has no value for anyone without access to the system and has virtually no value for anyone who does, for you can locate the article much more easily by using the search page of the database than by typing in the URL. When writing the bibliographic citation for this source, then, you may conclude not with the URL of the document but rather with the URL of the home page of the service, if you know it, or you may simply end with the date of access (see 5.9.7):

Youakim, Sami. "Work-Related Asthma." American Family Physician 64 (2001): 1839-52. Health Reference Center. Gale. Bergen County Cooperative Lib. System, NJ. 12 Jan. 2002 <http://www.galegroup.com/>.

1.4.7. Other Library Resources and Services

Besides knowing about the print and nonprint materials discussed above, you should become familiar with the library's other resources and services.

a. Microforms

Microform designates printed matter greatly reduced in size by microphotography; common types are microfilm, microfiche, and microcard. Libraries use microforms to store such materials as back copies of periodicals (newspapers, magazines, scholarly journals) and rare books (see fig. 6). Microforms are usually kept in a special section of the library. To use them, you need a reader that magnifies them; a special photocopier can reproduce microform pages. Library staff members are usually on hand to assist researchers in locating microform materials and operating the readers and photocopiers.



Fig. 6. An enlargement of part of a microfiche containing pages from the journal *PMLA*.

b. Media Center

Many libraries have a special section devoted to audio recordings (e.g., compact discs, audiotapes, long-playing records), video recordings (e.g., on VHS or DVD), and multimedia materials. These resources are generally kept in closed stacks and used only in the library, although there may be exceptions, such as for use in the classroom.

c. Electronic and Other Resources

Photocopying machines are typically located at various sites in the library, as are computer terminals that give access to the central catalog and other databases and to the Internet. Your school may also permit students to borrow laptop computers, with Internet connections, for use in the library. Some schools have electronic-resource centers in the library as well. Such centers provide, for student use, a variety of software applications for tasks such as word processing, spreadsheet analysis, database management, desktop publishing, drawing, image processing, and drafting. Output services might include high-quality printing, CD mastering, and image and text scanning. Some schools have facilities for photographic, audio, and video production.

d. Interlibrary Loans

Most libraries have agreements for the exchange of research materials on a regional, statewide, national, or even international basis. If your library does not have the materials you need, ask whether it can borrow them from another library. If it can, ask your librarian for help in initiating an interlibrary loan. Finding the source in a nearby library rather than a faraway one will save considerable time. To discover which libraries own your title, you may search other library catalogs included in your library's central information system or consult such databases as the Online Computer Library Center (OCLC) or the Research Libraries Information Network (RLIN), if they are available to you. Or you can consult such print sources as *National Union Catalog*, for book holdings at other libraries, or *Union List of Serials* and *New Serial Titles*, for periodicals.

1.4.8. Internet Sources

a. Range of Sources

Researchers regularly use facts and ideas from Internet sources to complement those derived from traditional print sources. Through the World Wide Web, a researcher can read and transfer material from library catalogs and millions of other useful sites, created by professional organizations (e.g., American Chemical Society, American Philosophical Association), government agencies (e.g., Library of Congress, Bureau of the Census), commercial enterprises (e.g.,

publishers of encyclopedias, news organizations), educational entities (e.g., universities, libraries, academic departments, research centers, scholarly projects), and individual scholars. These sites provide not only information sources but also the full texts of documents—such as historical papers, literary and religious works, and articles in periodicals (e.g., journals, magazines, newspapers)—and audiovisual materials (e.g., photographs, paintings, sound and video recordings).

b. Using Recommended Sites

Even those who are familiar with the World Wide Web find that using it to do research requires practice and training just as using a library does. Therefore, whenever possible, follow the guidance of an instructor, an academic department, or a librarian in selecting Internet sites for research. In addition to online databases available through subscription (see 1.4.6), your library may recommend important Internet sources that were likely selected after careful evaluation and consultation. Check the library's Web site for links to such resources. A librarian might also be able to advise you about sites relevant to your research. Similarly, you may find sites recommended by academic departments and individual instructors on Web pages for the department, the instructor, or the course.

c. Gateway Sites

Your librarian or instructor might direct you to a "metapage" or "gateway" that provides links to other sites. Examples of gateway sites follow (the URLs shown may change):

- *Voice of the Shuttle* (Univ. of California, Santa Barbara; http://vos.ucsb.edu/) offers on its home page a menu of subjects in the humanities—anthropology, archaeology, architecture, history, literature, philosophy, and so forth. Selecting "media studies," for example, gives you a list of specific fields (e.g., journalism, television, film and video, popular music, comics, cyberculture). The choice of "media history and theory" presents links to numerous resources in this area: professional organizations, bibliographies, chronologies, journals, articles and papers, course descriptions, and other related sites, including some created and maintained by scholars in media studies. The home page also provides general links to libraries and museums, reference works, journals, publishers and booksellers, e-mail discussions and news groups, conferences, and travel resources.

- *Social Science Information Gateway* (Univ. of Bristol; http://sosig.esrc.bris.ac.uk/) likewise presents a menu of subjects—business, economics, education, psychology, sociology, and so forth. If you click on "sociology," you receive a list of specific subject areas (the sociology of, e.g., adolescence, children, gender, law and crime, medicine, race and ethnicity, religion, sport, work). Selecting one of these areas yields links to relevant articles, papers, reports, bibliographies, data, educational materials, government publications, journals, discussion groups, professional organizations, research projects, and resource guides.
- *Women's Studies Database* (Univ. of Maryland; http://www.mith2.umd.edu/WomensStudies/) allows the researcher to choose from such categories as the following: conferences, announcements, bibliographies, syllabi, film reviews, gender issues, other Web sites, and reference room. If you choose the last of these, you receive links to academic papers, book reviews, fiction, history, nonfiction, and poetry.

d. Peer-Reviewed Sites

Some gateway sites are refereed (see 1.6.1 on refereed publications). *Argos* (Univ. of Evansville; http://argos.evansville.edu/), for example, is a "peer-reviewed, limited-area search engine" designed for students, teachers, and scholars of the "ancient and medieval worlds." An editorial board of specialists reviews and approves each site before it is included in this search engine. The home page of *Argos* contains a list of these "associate sites," such as the following:

- *Abzu: Guide to Resources for the Study of the Ancient Near East Available on the Internet* (Univ. of Chicago)
- *Byzantium: Byzantine Studies on the Internet* (Fordham Univ.)
- *Diotima: Materials for the Study of Women and Gender in the Ancient World* (Univ. of Kentucky)
- *The Labyrinth: Resources for Medieval Studies* (Georgetown Univ.)
- *The Perseus Digital Library* (Tufts Univ.)

e. Searching the Internet

Search tools. If you are working without professional guidance, whether developing a research topic or looking for research sources, use the search tools created to help locate Internet materials. Common ways to conduct searches with these tools are by subject and by keyword. Some search tools, such as *Google* and *Yahoo!*,

offer hierarchically arranged subject directories through which you can navigate until you find specific topics you wish to explore.

- ***Google.*** If you click on the subject "arts" on the directory page for *Google*, you might receive a list of categories like architecture, art history, classical studies, humanities, and literature. Choosing "humanities" would lead you to a list containing anthropology, history, languages, philosophy, and so on. The subject "history" might offer such selections as "by region," "by time period," and "by topic." If you choose "sixteenth century" from the list of periods, you could receive a choice of two topics: "Reformation" and "Renaissance." Selecting the latter would result in a list of relevant Web sites, including *Plague and Public Health in Renaissance Europe* (Univ. of Virginia). If you click on the prompt "Similar pages" next to this link, you are directed to other relevant sites, such as *The Black Death: Bubonic Plague* (Brigham Young Univ.) and *Plague* (Virginia Polytechnic Inst. and State Univ.). In ranking a Web site, *Google* takes into account the number of links there are to the site as well as the importance and quality of the linking sites.
- ***Yahoo!*** Similarly, if you select "humanities" among the categories listed in the *Yahoo!* directory, you might receive a list of such categories as classics, critical theory, cultural studies, history, literature, medical humanities, philosophy, and theology. The selection "medical humanities" would lead you to "biomedical ethics," which would prompt another set of subtopics (abortion issues, animal experimentation, cloning, euthanasia, genetic engineering). Your eventual choice of a specific subject (e.g., human cloning) will yield a listing of documents and files devoted to the subject.

Specific searches. If you know at the outset the exact topic you wish to research, you can perform a keyword search, which produces a listing of files containing the word or words you specify. To avoid long lists containing many irrelevant sites, be as specific as possible in your commands—thus, "human cloning" will yield a shorter, more unified list than "cloning" alone would (see fig. 7). Most search tools offer instructions on how to phrase search requests for the best results. You can often use Boolean and other operators to make searches precise (see 1.4.4d and 1.4.5a).

Current issues and current events. The Internet is particularly helpful when you want to find materials related to current issues

and current events. The Web site *NewsDirectory.com* (http://www.newsdirectory.com/) provides thousands of links to online newspapers, magazines, television stations, and other media. Examples follow (the URLs shown may change):

- **Newspapers**
  New York Times (http://www.nytimes.com/)
  Wall Street Journal (http://www.wsj.com/)
  Washington Post (http://www.washingtonpost.com/)
- **Magazines**
  Atlantic Monthly (http://www.theatlantic.com/)
  Harper's (http://www.harpers.org/)
  Newsweek (http://www.newsweek.com/)
  Time (http://www.time.com/)
  U.S. News and World Report (http://www.usnews.com/)
- **Television and radio news and information organizations**
  CNN (http://www.cnn.com/)
  C-Span (http://www.c-span.org/)
  Discovery (http://www.discovery.com/)
  The History Channel (http://www.historychannel.com/)
  National Public Radio (http://www.npr.org/)
  Public Broadcasting System (http://www.pbs.org/)

Bookmarking and recording the URL. Whenever you discover what seems a useful document or site, be sure to add it to your bookmark or favorites list. In so doing, you can easily return to the source for further information or clarification. If you cannot use a bookmark—



Fig. 7. Narrowing an Internet search. Changing the searching term from "cloning" to "human cloning" reduced the results by more than half at *Google*.

perhaps because you share a computer—keep a precise record of the URL. In any event, you may want to keep a log of all sites you visit, whether or not you initially bookmark them, since a site you originally passed over may seem more useful later.

Recording the date of access. Always make note of the date or dates on which you consult a source. The date of access is important because the material could be revised after you visit the site. The URL and the date of access are items of information you will need for your working bibliography and your list of works cited.

Internet sources among other sources. Whereas many instructors encourage using Internet sources, few consider a search of the World Wide Web alone adequate research for most research papers. Instructors generally require that other materials, including print publications, be sought. Similarly, e-mail discussion lists and online "chat rooms" are helpful for sharing ideas but are rarely deemed acceptable resources for research papers. (See 1.6 on evaluating source materials.)

1.4.9. SUMMING UP

Your school library is likely to be your most reliable guide when you conduct research. You should therefore become as familiar as possible with the library's print and electronic resources and its various services. Library resources include

- books and similar publications (e.g., pamphlets)
- print periodicals (e.g., journals, newspapers, magazines)
- miscellaneous print and nonprint sources (e.g., sound and video recordings)
- electronic resources (e.g., online catalog of holdings, reference works, bibliographic and full-text databases)

Library services may include

- a media center
- photocopying machines
- access to computers
- use of software applications, printers, scanning devices, and other hardware
- interlibrary loans

Useful Internet sources are

- sites recommended by instructors and librarians
- gateway sites
- peer-reviewed sites

1.5. COMPILING A WORKING BIBLIOGRAPHY

1.5.1. Keeping Track of Sources

As you discover information and opinions on your topic, you should keep track of sources that you may use for your paper. A record of such sources is called a *working bibliography*. Your preliminary reading will probably provide the first titles for this list. Other titles will emerge when you consult reference works and the library's central catalog and when you explore the Internet. If you read carefully through the bibliography and notes of each work you consult, more often than not you will discover additional important sources. Your working bibliography will frequently change during your research as you add titles and eliminate those that do not prove useful and as you probe and emphasize some aspects of your subject in preference to others. The working bibliography will eventually evolve into the list of works cited that appears at the end of the research paper.

1.5.2. Creating a Computer File for the Working Bibliography

A computer is particularly useful for compiling the working bibliography. Create a computer file for this purpose, and enter full information about sources into the file as you proceed with your research. Whenever you wish to add new works to the list, to remove works you no longer think helpful, or to correct entries already stored, you retrieve the file, make the changes, and save the revised file for future use. As you research, you can arrange and rearrange your sources however you wish (e.g., in alphabetical order, in chronological order by date of publication, in order of relevance to your topic); you can also divide sources into groups (e.g., those already consulted and those not yet consulted, those most useful and those less so). At any point, you can print the file to review it or to use it for research. Since bibliography files are essential to researching and

writing the paper, be certain to save these files and to keep copies of them on paper and on a backup disk.

1.5.3. Recording Essential Publication Information

When you add sources to your working bibliography, be sure you enter all the publication information needed for the works-cited list. The information to be recorded depends on the kind of source used. Following are typical examples of citations for a book, an article in a scholarly journal, a newspaper or magazine article, and an Internet source. The sources you encounter might require more information. See chapter 5 for complete guidelines on compiling the works-cited list of the research paper.

BOOK (see 5.6)

1. Author's full name (last name first)
2. Full title (including any subtitle)
3. Edition (if the book is a second or later numbered edition or a revised edition)
4. Number of the volume and the total number of volumes (if the book is a multivolume work)
5. City of publication
6. Shortened form of the publisher's name (see 7.5)
7. Year of publication

Budden, Julian. The Operas of Verdi. Rev. ed. 3 vols. Oxford: Clarendon, 1992.

ARTICLE IN A SCHOLARLY JOURNAL (see 5.7.1–4)

1. Author's name
2. Title of the article
3. Title of the journal
4. Volume number
5. Year of publication
6. Inclusive page numbers of the article (i.e., the number of the page on which the article begins, a hyphen, and the number of the page on which the article ends)

Frith, Simon. "The Black Box: The Value of Television and the Future of Television Research." Screen 41 (2000): 33-50.

NEWSPAPER OR MAGAZINE ARTICLE (see 5.7.5–6)

1. Author's name
2. Title of the article
3. Title of the periodical
4. Date of publication
5. Inclusive page numbers of the article

Hoover, Eric. "New Attacks on Early Decision." Chronicle of Higher Education 11 Jan. 2002: A45-46.

INTERNET SOURCE (see 5.9.1–4)

1. Author's name
2. Title of the document
3. Full information about any previous or simultaneous publication in print form
4. Title of the scholarly project, database, periodical, or professional or personal site
5. Name of the editor of the scholarly project or database
6. Date of electronic publication or last update
7. Name of the institution or organization sponsoring or associated with the site
8. Date when you accessed the source
9. Network address, or URL

A document previously or simultaneously published in print form

Mistral, Gabriela. "Silueta de Sor Juana Inés." Abside 15 (1951) : 501-06. The Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz Project. Ed. Luis M. Villar. Feb. 1998. Dartmouth Coll. 23 Jan. 2002 <http://www.dartmouth.edu/~sorjuana/Commentaries/Mistral/Mistral.html>.

A document published only in electronic form

Bitel, Lisa M. "St. Brigit of Ireland: From Virgin Saint to Fertility Goddess." Matrix. Ed. Katherine Gill and Bitel. Feb. 2001. Boston Coll. 23 Jan. 2002 <http://matrix.bc.edu/commentaria/bitel01.html>.

1.5.4. Noting Other Useful Information

Besides the data needed for the works-cited list, it is useful to add other information to items in the working bibliography. For example, if you derive a source from a bibliographic work, record where you found the reference, in case you need to recheck it. Always also note the library call number, the network address (URL), or other identifying information required to locate each work.

The following entry in a working bibliography contains not only all the facts needed for the final bibliography (author's name, full title, and relevant publication information) but also information useful for research: the origin of the reference (the electronic database of the *MLA International Bibliography*) and the call number (PS374.D4 M38 2000). You will delete reference origins and call numbers when you convert your working bibliography into the list of works cited.

McCann, Sean. Gumshoe America: Hard-Boiled Crime Fiction and the Rise and Fall of New Deal Liberalism. Durham: Duke UP, 2000. [MLA Bib.; PS374.D4 M38 2000]

1.5.5. Verifying Publication Information

Whenever you consult a source, carefully verify the publication facts against your records—even if you have printed out or downloaded the data. Add any missing information that you will need for the works-cited list, and correct any part of your records that does not match the data obtained from the work itself. Recording and verifying all the information about your sources when you first consult them will spare you many last-minute problems and frustrations.

1.5.6. Converting the Working Bibliography to the Works-Cited List

Eventually, you will transform your working bibliography into a works-cited list. If your working bibliography is in a computer file, edit the entries to remove unnecessary information (e.g., origin of reference, call number), arrange them alphabetically by author (see 5.5 on the arrangement of entries), and title the list "Works Cited" (see 5.3 on titles for other kinds of source lists). When you have fin-

ished the final draft of your paper, transfer the edited bibliography file to the end of the file containing the paper (see 5.4 on the format of the list).

1.5.7. SUMMING UP

If compiled with care and attention, the working bibliography will be invaluable to you throughout the preparation of your paper. It will, on the one hand, function as an efficient tool for finding and acquiring information and ideas and, on the other, provide all the data you will need for your list of works cited.

1.6. EVALUATING SOURCES

All researchers, students as well as professional scholars, need to assess the quality of any work scrupulously before using and citing it. Students writing their first research papers often find it difficult to evaluate sources. Not all sources are equally reliable or of equal quality. In reading and evaluating potential sources, you should not assume that something is truthful or trustworthy just because it appears in print or is on the Internet. Some material may be based on incorrect or outdated information or on poor logic, and the author's knowledge or view of the subject may be biased or too limited. Weigh what you read against your own knowledge and intelligence as well as against other treatments of the subject. Focus particularly on the *authority*, *accuracy*, and *currency* of the sources you use. Following are some criteria to keep in mind when you evaluate sources. If you have doubts about a source, your instructor or a librarian can probably help you.

1.6.1. Authority

Peer Review

Most scholarly journals and academic book publishers are committed to a policy of consultant review—commonly referred to by scholars as "peer review." In peer review, publishers seek the advice of

expert readers, or referees, before considering a manuscript for publication. Each consultant reads the work and sends the publisher a report evaluating the manuscript and, in general, either recommending or not recommending it for publication. Readers comment on such matters as the importance of the subject, the originality and soundness of the argument, the accuracy of the facts, and the currency of the research. At most scholarly journals and presses, moreover, there is also an editorial board that similarly reviews the manuscript, along with the readers' reports, before deciding whether to publish the work. Thus, a manuscript submitted to a refereed publication must undergo rigorous scrutiny before it is published.

Internet Sources

Assessing Internet resources is a particular challenge. Whereas the print publications that researchers depend on are generally issued by reputable publishers, like university presses, that accept accountability for the quality and reliability of the works they distribute, relatively few electronic publications currently have comparable authority. Some Internet publications are peer-reviewed, but many are not. Online materials are often self-published, without any outside review.

What to Look For

In evaluating any source, print or electronic, look especially for information on the following aspects. Figure 8 shows how these considerations apply to a specific Web site.

- **Author.** When we consult a printed book or article, we expect to find prominently displayed the name of the author of the work. Whenever you consult a source, print or electronic, make sure that the author of the document or the person or group responsible for the publication or site is identified. Once you establish authorship, consider the authoritativeness of the work. Publications sometimes indicate an author's credentials in the field by including relevant biographical information (e.g., professional title or affiliation, list of publications or other accomplishments). On the Web, you may find the author's credentials by following a link to a home page or to a page (labeled, e.g., "About Us") that lists personnel responsible for the site. You can also search the Internet and other sources to find information about an author. For example, if you are evaluating a book, you might consult *Book Review*

Index and *Book Review Digest* to see how experts in the field of study received this book and any others by the author.

- **Text.** If you are working with historical documents or literary texts that exist in various versions, make certain you use reliable editions. For example, versions of Shakespeare's plays published during his lifetime and shortly after his death sometimes differ drastically. The task of a modern scholarly editor is to compare,



Fig. 8. Evaluating the authority of an Internet source. The Web site *Romantic Circles* (http://www.rc.umd.edu/) has the characteristics of an authoritative source suitable for scholarly research.

analyze, and evaluate these variations and produce an edition that is as historically authoritative as possible. Therefore, if you want to use, say, an electronic text of a Shakespeare play, look for one that, at a minimum, clearly states who the editor of the text is and when the electronic edition was published or identifies the printed source that was the basis for the electronic version.

- **Editorial policy.** Take note of the entire work or site you are using even if you are interested only in a particular document within it. In a journal or at a Web site, look for a statement of mission or purpose as well as for evidence that the document underwent consultant review (e.g., the listing of an editorial board, for a journal, or of a moderator, for a discussion group).
- **Publisher or sponsoring organization.** Like the name of the author, the name of the publisher is normally evident in print publications. Similarly, the name of the publisher or sponsoring organization of an Internet site should be clearly stated, preferably with access to information about the organization (e.g., through a prompt such as "About the Project"). To determine the kind of organization from which a Web site emanates, note the last part of the domain name (e.g., the *.org* in "www.npr.org"). This suffix identifies where the source originates from—for example, a commercial enterprise (*.com*), an educational institution (*.edu*), a government agency (*.gov*), or a not-for-profit organization (*.org*). There is no guarantee that material from, say, an *.edu* site is reliable; such a site probably includes students' unsupervised personal pages as well as peer-reviewed scholarly projects. Nonetheless, knowing the organization involved might help you evaluate potential usefulness or shortcomings. For instance, many sites ending in *.com* offer helpful information, but some are no more than advertisements, such as a book company's lavish praise for books that it publishes.

1.6.2. Accuracy and Verifiability

If you are evaluating scholarly material, check to see that the work's sources are indicated, so that its information can be verified. The sources probably appear in a list of works cited. The titles in the list might also tell you something about the breadth of the author's knowledge of the subject and about any possible bias. The author of a Web publication might supply hypertextual links to the sources.

Note, too, if the document or site gives an e-mail address or otherwise tells how you can ask the author or sponsoring organization for further information or clarification.

1.6.3. Currency

The publication date of a print source suggests how current the author's scholarship is. Although online documents and sites have the potential for continual updating, many remain in their original states and, depending on the subject, may be out-of-date. When considering any resource, be sure at least one date is assigned to it. Several dates are sometimes listed for an electronic publication. For example, if a document on the Internet had a previous print existence, there could be the date of print publication as well as the date of electronic publication. In addition, there might be the date when the material was last revised or updated. Ideally, a document should record all dates of publication and revision (see 5.9.1 on including all relevant dates in works-cited-list entries). Finally, scrutinizing the publication dates of works cited in the text also reveals the currency of its scholarship.

1.6.4. SUMMING UP

Evaluate all sources you use for your research. Focus on the authority, accuracy, and currency of the sources. Consider such questions as the following:

- Who is the author of the work, and what are the author's credentials for writing and publishing this work?
- When judged against your previous reading and your understanding of the subject, is the information furnished by the author correct? Is the argument presented with logic and without bias?
- Are the author's sources clearly and adequately indicated, so that they can be verified?
- Are the author's sources current, or are they outdated?
- Who is the publisher, or what is the sponsoring organization, of the work?
- Is the work peer-reviewed—that is, has it been read and recommended for publication by experts?

1.7. TAKING NOTES

When you determine that material is reliable and useful, you will want to take notes on it.

1.7.1. Methods of Note-Taking

Although everyone agrees that note-taking is essential to research, probably no two researchers use exactly the same methods. Some prefer to take notes by hand on index cards or sheets of paper. Using a computer might save you time and should improve the accuracy with which you transcribe material, including quotations, from your sources into the text of your paper. However you take notes, set down first the author's full name and the complete title of the source—enough information to enable you to locate the source easily in your working bibliography. If the source is not yet in the working bibliography, record all the publication information you will need for research and for your works-cited list (see 1.5.3–4), and add the source to the working bibliography.

1.7.2. Types of Note-Taking

There are, generally speaking, three types of note-taking:

- **Summary.** Summarize if you want to record only the general idea of large amounts of material.
- **Paraphrase.** If you require detailed notes on specific sentences and passages but do not need the exact wording, you may wish to paraphrase—that is, to restate the material in your own words.
- **Quotation.** When you believe that some sentence or passage in its original wording might make an effective addition to your paper, transcribe that material exactly as it appears, word for word, comma for comma. Whenever you quote verbatim from a work, be sure to use quotation marks scrupulously in your notes to distinguish the quotation from summary and paraphrase. Using electronic materials calls for special vigilance. If you download a text and integrate quotations from it into your paper, check to see that you have placed quotation marks around words taken from the source.

1.7.3. Recording Page Numbers

In summarizing, paraphrasing, or quoting, keep an accurate record of the pages or other numbered sections (e.g., numbered paragraphs in an electronic text) that you use. When a quotation continues to another page or section, carefully note where the page or section break occurs, since only a small portion of what you transcribe may ultimately find its way into your paper.

1.7.4. Using a Computer for Note-Taking

Using a word processor to store notes is handy, but while you are doing research, you may find yourself in a situation—for example, working in the library—where you do not have access to a computer. Then you will need to write your notes by hand and transfer them into a computer later. Strategies of storing and retrieving notes vary (see 1.9 for using note files during writing). A few common strategies follow:

- For a short paper for which you have taken few notes, you may place all notes in a single file and draw material from it whenever you want.
- For a longer paper that makes use of numerous sources, you may create a new file for each source.
- Another strategy is to write out summaries and paraphrases of the source by hand and to enter into computer files only quotations, which you can electronically copy into your text as you write. At the least, this strategy will eliminate the time and effort and, more important, the possibility of error involved in transcribing quoted words more than once.
- By downloading quotations from a database to your computer disk, you of course do not need to transcribe them at all.

When you use a computer for note-taking, be certain to save all note files on your working disk and to keep copies of them on paper and on a backup disk.

1.7.5. Amount and Accuracy of Note-Taking

In taking notes, seek to steer a middle course between recording too much and recording too little. In other words, try to be both thor-

ough and concise. Above all, strive for accuracy, not only in copying words for direct quotation but also in summarizing and paraphrasing authors' ideas.

1.7.6. SUMMING UP

The three main types of note-taking are *summary*, *paraphrase*, and *quotation*. There are, however, varying methods and strategies for note-taking. You may take notes by hand or use a computer. If you are using a computer, you can type in or download material, you can create one file for all sources or separate files for different sources, and so forth. Whichever method or strategy you follow, be sure to save and back up all computer files, to set down or verify publication information you will need for research and writing, to keep a careful record of page numbers, and, most important of all, to take accurate notes. Precise note-taking will help you avoid the problem of plagiarism (see ch. 2).

1.8. OUTLINING

1.8.1. Working Outline

A Useful Intermediate Activity

Some writers like to work from an outline; others do not. For research papers, outlining can be a particularly useful intermediate activity between research and writing. In fact, some instructors require each student to hand in an outline with the final draft. Others require a draft outline earlier, asking the student to submit not only a topic for the paper but also a tentative list of subtopics for research. They then suggest that this working outline be continually revised—items dropped, added, modified—as the research progresses. Instructors who require submission of a research project portfolio (see 1.9.4) sometimes ask that at least one version of the working outline be included in the portfolio in addition to the final outline (see 1.8.3).

An Overall View of the Paper

You may find a series of outlines helpful, whether or not your instructor requires them, especially if you are a beginning writer of research papers. An outline will help you to get an overall view of your paper and, perhaps more important, to figure out how each section of the paper relates to the others. Thus, developing an outline can help you to see the logical progression of your argument. A working outline will also make it easier to keep track of all important aspects of your subject and to focus your research on relevant topics. Continual revision of the working outline, moreover, will encourage you to change your thinking and your approach as new information modifies your understanding of the subject.

Creating a Computer File for Each Version

Word processing is useful for preparing a working outline, which may well pass through many and sometimes quite different versions. Word-processing programs commonly have an outlining feature that offers several formats with automatic numbering and lettering. It is probably best to create a different computer file for each version of an outline. For example, assign the first version a name like "outline1," and save the file when it is finished. When you are ready to revise the outline, create a new file for the second version ("outline2"), copy the first-draft file into the new file, and revise. If you become dissatisfied with the way the second or a subsequent one is progressing, you can discard it, return to an earlier draft, which is stored untouched on the disk, and begin revising in another direction. Printing out each new version will let you compare it more easily with other versions.

1.8.2. Thesis Statement

An Answer to a Question or Problem

As you get closer to writing, you can begin to shape the information you have at hand into a unified, coherent whole by framing a thesis statement for your paper: a single sentence that formulates both your topic and your point of view. In a sense, the thesis statement is your

answer to the central question or problem you have raised. Writing this statement will enable you to see where you are heading and to remain on a productive path as you plan and write. Try out different possibilities until you find a statement that seems right for your purpose. Moreover, since the experience of writing may well alter your original plans, do not hesitate to revise the thesis statement as you write the paper. Word processing, through its storage and retrieval capabilities, can help you build effectively on previous drafts of a thesis statement.

Purpose and Audience

Two factors are important to the shaping of a thesis statement—your *purpose* and your *audience*:

- What *purpose* will you try to achieve in the paper? Do you want to describe something, explain something, argue for a certain point of view, or persuade your reader to think or do something?
- What *audience* are you writing for? Is your reader a specialist on the subject? someone likely to agree or disagree with you? someone likely to be interested or uninterested in the subject?

The answers to these questions should to a large extent give your research the appropriate slant or point of view not just in your thesis statement but also in the final outline and the paper itself.

Requirements and Assistance of the Instructor

Many instructors require students to submit thesis statements for approval some two or three weeks before the paper is due. The statement is often included in a research project portfolio (see 1.9.4). If you have difficulty writing a thesis statement, talk with your instructor about the research you have done and about what you want to say; given this information, your instructor can probably help you frame an appropriate thesis statement.

Sample Thesis Statement

The following sample is a thesis statement for section 1.4 ("Conducting Research") of this book:

> Students who wish to write successful research papers must know as much as possible about the modern academic library—its central information system, reference works, online catalog of holdings, full-

text databases, and other resources and services—and must be knowledgeable about finding useful Internet sources.

1.8.3. Final Outline

From Working Outline to Final Outline

After you have a satisfactory thesis statement, you can begin transforming your working outline into a final one. This step will help you organize your ideas and the accumulated research into a logical, fluent, and effective paper. Again, many instructors request that final outlines be submitted with papers or included in a research project portfolio (see 1.9.4).

Deleting Irrelevant Material

Start by carefully reviewing all your notes to see how strongly they will support the various points in the working outline. Next, read over your working outline *critically* and delete everything that is irrelevant to the thesis statement or that might weaken your argument.

Eliminating material is often painful since you might have a natural desire to use everything you have collected and to impress your readers (especially teacher readers) with all the work you have done and with all you now know on the subject. But you should resist these temptations, for the inclusion of irrelevant or repetitive material will lessen the effectiveness of your paper. Keep your thesis statement and your audience in mind. Include only the ideas and information that will help you accomplish what you have set out to do and that will lead your readers to care about your investigation, your presentation, and your conclusions.

Shaping a Structure for the Paper

As you continue to read, reread, and think about the ideas and information you have decided to use, you will begin to see new connections between items, and patterns of organization will suggest themselves. Bring related material together under general headings, and arrange these sections so that one logically connects with another. Then order the subjects under each heading so that they, too, proceed logically. Finally, plan an effective introduction and a conclusion appropriate to the sequence you have worked out.

Organizing Principles

Common organizing principles include

- **chronology** (useful for historical discussions—e.g., how the Mexican War developed)
- **cause and effect** (e.g., the consequences a scientific discovery will have)
- **process** (e.g., how a politician got elected)
- **deductive logic**, which moves from the general to the specific (e.g., from the problem of violence in the United States to violence involving handguns)
- **inductive logic**, which moves from the specific to the general (e.g., from violence involving handguns to the problem of violence in the United States)

Methods of Development

As you choose an organizational plan, keep in mind the method or methods you will use in developing your paper. For example, which of the following do you plan to accomplish?

- to define, classify, or analyze something
- to use descriptive details or give examples
- to compare or contrast one thing with another
- to argue for a certain point of view

The procedures you intend to adopt will influence the way you arrange your material, and they should be evident in your outline.

Integrating Quotations and Reference Sources

It is also a good idea to indicate in the outline, specifically and precisely, the quotations and reference sources you will use. All this planning will take a good deal of time and thought, and you may well make several preliminary outlines before arriving at the one you will follow. But the time and thought will be well spent. The more planning you do, the easier and more efficient the writing will be.

Types of Outlines

If the final outline is only for your use, its form will have little importance. If it is to be submitted, your instructor will probably discuss the various forms of outline and tell you which to use. Whatever the form, maintain it consistently. The two most common forms are

- **the topic outline** (which uses only short phrases throughout)
- **the sentence outline** (which uses complete sentences throughout)

Labeling Parts of an Outline

The descending parts of an outline are normally labeled in the following order:

I.
  A.
    1.
      a.
        (1)
          (a)
          (b)
        (2)
      b.
    2.
  B.
II.

Logic requires that there be a *II* to complement a *I*, a *B* to complement an *A*, and so forth.

Sample Outline

The following sample is a topic outline of section 1.4 of this book. Next to each major topic, in brackets, is the number of the subsection in 1.4 to which the topic in the outline corresponds. These numbers are added so that you can easily compare the outline with the corresponding text.

Conducting Research

I. The modern academic library *[compare with subsection 1.4.1]*
  A. Resources and services
    1. Print, electronic, and other nonprint resources
    2. Computer services
    3. Availability of resources: on campus and off campus
  B. Orientation and instruction
    1. Introductory pamphlets and handbooks
    2. Orientation tours, lectures, classes
  C. Professional reference librarians
II. Library research sources *[cf. 1.4.2]*
  A. Books and similar publications (pamphlets, dissertations)

B. Articles and other publications in print periodicals (scholarly journals, newspapers, magazines)
C. Miscellaneous print and nonprint sources (sound recordings, video recordings, manuscripts, private letters)
D. Electronic sources (reference works, full-text databases, Internet links)

III. The central information system *[cf. 1.4.3]*
A. Library's catalog of holdings
B. Bibliographic databases
C. Other electronic resources
D. Links to other library catalogs

IV. Reference works *[cf. 1.4.4]*
A. Reference works that provide data about research materials
1. Indexes
2. Bibliographies
3. Collections of abstracts
4. Guides to research
B. Reference works that give basic information
1. Dictionaries
2. Encyclopedias
3. Biographical sources
4. Yearbooks
5. Almanacs
6. Atlases
7. Gazetteers
8. Statistical data sources
C. Publication forms of reference works
1. Print
2. Electronic (online databases, CD-ROM databases)
3. Print versus electronic
D. Searching a reference database (example: *MLA International Bibliography*)
1. Versions (print and electronic)
2. Types of searches (author, title, subject, expanded, Boolean, other advanced searches)
3. Bibliographic information provided

V. The online catalog of library holdings *[cf. 1.4.5]*
A. Searching an online catalog (author, title, subject heading, call number, keyword, Boolean, etc.)
B. Bibliographic information provided
C. Information needed for research and writing

D. Call numbers
1. Library of Congress system
2. Dewey decimal system

E. Location of library materials
1. Main collection (open shelves, closed stacks)
2. Sections for reserved works and reference works
3. Other sections (e.g., periodicals, nonprint materials, special collections)

VI. Full-text databases *[cf. 1.4.6]*

A. Reference works and other book-length texts

B. Articles in periodicals
1. Newspapers
2. Scholarly journals
3. Scholarly journal archive

C. Database subscription services (e.g., EBSCO, Gale, LexisNexis)

D. Information needed for list of works cited
1. URL of specific document
2. URL of search page
3. No URL

VII. Other library resources and services *[cf. 1.4.7]*

A. Microforms (microfilm, microfiche, microcard)

B. Media center (audio recordings, video recordings, multimedia materials)

C. Electronic and other resources (e.g., photocopying, computers, Internet access, software applications, printers)

D. Interlibrary loans

VIII. Internet sources *[cf. 1.4.8]*

A. Range of sources
1. Types of useful sites
2. Resources available (information sources, full texts, audiovisual materials)

B. Using professionally recommended sites

C. Gateway sites (e.g., *Voice of the Shuttle, Social Science Information Gateway, Women's Studies Database*)

D. Peer-reviewed sites (*Abzu, Byzantium*, etc.)

E. Searching the Internet
1. Search tools (e.g., *Google, Yahoo!*)
2. Specific searches
3. Current issues and current events (newspapers, magazines, television and radio)

4. Bookmarking and recording the URL
5. Recording the date of access
6. Internet sources among other sources

IX. Summing up *[cf. 1.4.9]*

Creating Computer Files for Major Topics

If you have stored your notes in your computer, a helpful intermediate activity between outlining and writing is to incorporate your notes into your outline. Using this strategy, you should create a separate file for each major topic of your outline and shift relevant material, in appropriate order, from note files into the various topic files. Then, as you write, you can call up the topic files one by one and blend material from them into the text of the paper. Be sure to save and to back up your outline files.

1.8.4. SUMMING UP

- **A working outline** is a useful intermediary document between research and writing. It helps you gain an overview of the paper and keep track of all important aspects of the subject.
- **A thesis statement** is a single sentence that formulates both your topic and your point of view. It is an answer to the central question or problem you have raised. When preparing the thesis statement, keep in mind your purpose in writing and the audience you are writing for.
- **The final outline** helps you organize your ideas and research into a coherent paper. Organizing principles include chronology, cause and effect, and deductive and inductive logic. The most common forms of outlining are the topic outline and the sentence outline. If you create a separate computer file for each major topic, you can write the paper by calling up each file in turn, following the progression of the outline.

1.9. WRITING DRAFTS

1.9.1. The First Draft

Do not expect your first draft to be the finished product. The successful research paper is usually the culmination of a series of drafts. Habits, capacities, and practices of writers differ widely. Some individuals write more slowly and come close to a final draft the first time through. Others prefer to work in stages and expect to undertake several drafts. In any case, review and rewriting are always necessary. Plan ahead and leave plenty of time for revision.

You might start off by trying to set down all your ideas in the order in which you want them to appear. Do not be concerned if the writing in the first draft is hasty and fairly rough. Attempt to stay focused by following your outline closely. Revise the outline, of course, whenever new ideas occur to you and it no longer works. After you complete a rough draft, read it over and try to refine it.

1.9.2. Subsequent Drafts

In revising, you may add, eliminate, and rearrange material. If a section in the first draft seems unclear or sketchy, you may have to expand it by writing another sentence or two or even a new paragraph. Similarly, to improve the fluency and coherence of the paper, you may need to add transitions between sentences and paragraphs or to define connections or contrasts. Delete any material that is irrelevant, unimportant, repetitive, or dull and dispensable. If the presentation of ideas seems illogical or confusing, you may find that you can clarify by rearranging phrases, clauses, sentences, or paragraphs.

In later drafts you should concern yourself with the more mechanical kinds of revision. For example, strive for more precise and economical wording. Try, in addition, to vary your sentence patterns as well as your choice of words. Finally, correct all technical errors, using a standard writing guide to check punctuation, grammar, and usage and consulting a standard dictionary for the spelling and meaning of words. Your last draft, carefully proofread and corrected, is the text of your research paper.

1.9.3. Writing with a Word Processor

a. Advantages

If you do not own a computer, see whether your school has personal computers available for student use. With a word processor, you can store a first draft—or just a portion of one—and later retrieve and revise it. If you create a different file for each draft, you can return to a preceding draft whenever you wish.

Word processing makes it easy to insert words into, or delete words from, your text and to shift a word or a block of words from one part of the text to another. Moreover, you can produce a printed version of a revision without having to retype the whole new draft. Word processing can also help you center titles, format pages, and perform other such mechanical tasks. For example, the global revision feature of word processing permits you to search for and automatically change text. Thus, if you realize you misspelled the same word several times in your draft, you can correct all the misspellings with a single command.

Word processing similarly allows for more efficient transitions between the various activities related to the research paper. After developing an outline, for instance, you can copy it into a new file, where the outline can serve as the basis for your writing of the text. Or if you created a file of notes for each major topic in your outline (see 1.8.3), you can copy into the text file each topic file in sequence as you write. If your paper will be short and you have taken few notes, you may choose to copy the entire note file into the text file. Using this approach, you can scroll up and down the file and transfer what you want into the text of the paper. If your paper will be longer and you have created a separate file for each of numerous sources, you can readily transfer material (e.g., an effective quotation) from a note file to the text file. You might find it easier to print out all your notes before writing the paper and to decide in advance which ones you want to use in the text. In this way, when you retrieve note files, you will know exactly what parts you are seeking.

Another way to proceed is to use split screens or multiple windows to read note files as you write the paper. When you have completed your final draft, you can simply add the file containing the works-cited list to the end of the paper. With practice and planning, then, as you write your paper you can use a word processor strategi-

cally to draw on outline, note, and bibliography files that you created earlier in the project.

b. Limitations

Word processing has certain limitations. Since no more than a fixed number of lines of text are visible on a computer screen, you may find it difficult to get a sense of your whole project. Some writers like to print out text regularly to see better how the writing is developing from paragraph to paragraph and from page to page. Use spelling and usage checkers cautiously, for they are only as effective as the dictionaries they contain. On the one hand, a spelling checker will call your attention to words that are correctly spelled if they are not in its dictionary. On the other, it will not point out misspellings that match words in the dictionary—for example, *their* used for *there* or *its* for *it's*.

Finally, in working on a computer file, you run the risk of losing it, through a technical mistake, equipment failure, or a power outage. Be sure to save your work frequently (after writing a page or so), not just when you finish with it or leave the computer. It is also a good idea to keep a paper copy of text you write and to create a backup disk in case something happens to the disk you are using to prepare the paper. Most important of all, leave yourself ample time to cope with any technical problems that may arise.

1.9.4. The Final Draft and the Research Project Portfolio

All instructors require submission of the final draft of the research paper. Some instructors ask students to prepare and submit a research project portfolio, which documents the evolution of the paper. The portfolio might contain such items as the approved thesis statement, the final outline, an early draft, and the final draft.

1.9.5. SUMMING UP

Research papers are normally composed through a series of drafts. The first draft is usually rough, and subsequent drafts are increasingly refined revisions of the original version. A word processor is

useful for writing research papers, although it has some limitations as well. The assignment concludes with the submission of the final draft or of a research project portfolio.

1.10. LANGUAGE AND STYLE

Effective writing depends as much on clarity and readability as on content. The organization and development of your ideas, the unity and coherence of your presentation, and your command of sentence structure, grammar, and diction are all important considerations, as are the mechanics of writing—capitalization, spelling, punctuation, and so on. The key to successful communication is using the right language for the audience you are addressing. In all writing, the challenge is to find the words, phrases, clauses, sentences, and paragraphs that express your thoughts and ideas precisely and that make them interesting to others.

Because good scholarship requires objectivity, careful writers of research papers avoid language that implies unsubstantiated or irrelevant generalizations about such personal qualities as age, economic class, ethnicity, sexual orientation, political or religious beliefs, race, or sex. Discussions about this subject have generally focused on wording that could be labeled sexist. For example, many writers no longer use *he*, *him*, or *his* to express a meaning that includes women or girls: "If a young artist is not confident, he can quickly become discouraged." The use of *she*, *her*, and *hers* to refer to a person who may be of either sex can also be distracting and momentarily confusing. Both usages can often be avoided through a revision that recasts the sentence into the plural or that eliminates the pronoun: "If young artists are not confident, they can quickly become discouraged" or "A young artist who is not confident can quickly become discouraged." Another technique is to make the discussion refer to a person who is identified, so that there is a reason to use a specific singular pronoun. *They*, *them*, *their*, and *theirs* cannot logically be applied to a single person, and *he or she* and *her or him* are cumbersome alternatives to be used sparingly. Many authors now also avoid terms that unnecessarily integrate a person's sex with a job or role. For instance, *anchorman*, *policeman*, *stewardess*, and *poetess* are commonly replaced with *anchor*, *police officer*, *flight attendant*, and

poet. For advice on current practices, consult your instructor or one of the guides to bias-free language listed in 1.11.

1.11. GUIDES TO WRITING

A good dictionary is an essential tool for all writers. Your instructor will probably recommend a standard American dictionary such as *The American Heritage College Dictionary, Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary,* or *Random House Webster's College Dictionary.* Because dictionaries vary in matters like word division and spelling preference, you should, to maintain consistency, use the same one throughout your paper.

You should also keep on hand at least one reliable guide to writing. A selected list of writing guides appears below, classified under three headings: dictionaries of usage, guides to bias-free language, and books on style. Your instructor can help you choose among these titles.

Dictionaries of Usage

Bernstein, Theodore M. *The Careful Writer: A Modern Guide to English Usage.* New York: Atheneum, 1965.

Bryant, Margaret M. *Current American Usage: How Americans Say It and Write It.* New York: Funk, 1962.

Copperud, Roy H. *American Usage and Style: The Consensus.* New York: Van Nostrand, 1980.

Evans, Bergen, and Cornelia Evans. *A Dictionary of Contemporary American Usage.* New York: Random, 1957.

Follett, Wilson. *Modern American Usage: A Guide.* Ed. Jacques Barzun. New York: Hill, 1966.

———. *Modern American Usage: A Guide.* Rev. Erik Wensberg. Rev. ed. New York: Hill-Farrar, 1998.

Fowler, H[enry] W. *A Dictionary of Modern English Usage.* Ed. Ernest Gowers. 2nd ed. New York: Oxford UP, 1965.

———. *The New Fowler's Modern English Usage.* Ed. R. W. Burchfield. Rev. 3rd ed. New York: Oxford UP, 1998.

Garner, Bryan A. *A Dictionary of Modern American Usage.* New York: Oxford UP, 1998.

———. *The Oxford Dictionary of American Usage and Style.* New York: Oxford UP, 2000.

Lovinger, Paul W. *The Penguin Dictionary of American English Usage and Style.* New York: Penguin, 2002.

Mager, Nathan H., and Sylvia K. Mager. *Prentice Hall Encyclopedic Dictionary of English Usage.* 2nd ed. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice, 1992.

Morris, William, and Mary Morris. *Harper Dictionary of Contemporary Usage.* 2nd ed. New York: Harper, 1985.

Nicholson, Margaret. *A Dictionary of American-English Usage Based on Fowler's* Modern English Usage. New York: Oxford UP, 1957.

Waite, Maurice, Edmund S. Weiner, and Andrew Delahunty. *The Oxford Dictionary and Usage Guide to the English Language.* New York: Oxford UP, 1995.

Weiner, Edmund S., and Andrew Delahunty. *The Oxford Guide to English Usage.* 2nd ed. New York: Oxford UP, 1994.

Wilson, Kenneth G. *The Columbia Guide to Standard American English.* New York: Columbia UP, 1993.

Guides to Bias-Free Language

American Psychological Association. "Guidelines to Reduce Bias in Language." *Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association.* 5th ed. Washington: Amer. Psychological Assn., 2001. 61–76.

Frank, Francine Wattman, and Paula A. Treichler, with others. *Language, Gender, and Professional Writing: Theoretical Approaches and Guidelines for Nonsexist Usage.* New York: MLA, 1989.

International Association of Business Communication. *Without Bias: A Guidebook for Nondiscriminatory Communication.* Ed. Judy E. Pickens, Patricia W. Rao, and Linda C. Roberts. 2nd ed. New York: Wiley, 1982.

Maggio, Rosalie. *The Bias-Free Word Finder: A Dictionary of Nondiscriminatory Language.* Boston: Beacon, 1992.

———. *The Dictionary of Bias-Free Usage: A Guide to Nondiscriminatory Language.* Phoenix: Oryx, 1991.

———. *The Nonsexist Word Finder: A Dictionary of Gender-Free Usage.* Phoenix: Oryx, 1987.

———. *Talking about People: A Guide to Fair and Accurate Language.* Phoenix: Oryx, 1997.

Miller, Casey, and Kate Swift. *The Handbook of Nonsexist Writing.* 2nd ed. New York: Harper, 1988.

———. *Words and Women.* Rev. ed. New York: Harper, 1991.
Schwartz, Marilyn, and the Task Force of the Association of American University Presses. *Guidelines for Bias-Free Writing.* Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1995.
Sorrels, Bobbye D. *The Nonsexist Communicator: Solving the Problems of Gender and Awkwardness in Modern English.* Englewood Cliffs: Prentice, 1983.
Warren, Virginia L. "Guidelines for the Nonsexist Use of Language." *American Philosophical Association Proceedings* 59 (1986): 471–84.

Books on Style

Barzun, Jacques. *Simple and Direct: A Rhetoric for Writers.* 4th ed. New York: Harper, 2001.
Beardsley, Monroe C. *Thinking Straight: Principles of Reasoning for Readers and Writers.* 4th ed. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice, 1975.
Cook, Claire Kehrwald. *Line by Line: How to Edit Your Own Writing.* Boston: Houghton, 1985.
Eastman, Richard M. *Style: Writing and Reading as the Discovery of Outlook.* 3rd ed. New York: Oxford UP, 1984.
Elbow, Peter. *Writing without Teachers.* 2nd ed. New York: Oxford UP, 1998.
———. *Writing with Power: Techniques for Mastering the Writing Process.* 2nd ed. New York: Oxford UP, 1998.
Gibson, Walker. *Tough, Sweet, and Stuffy: An Essay on Modern American Prose Styles.* Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1966.
Gowers, Ernest. *The Complete Plain Words.* Ed. Sidney Greenbaum and Janet Whitcut. Rev. ed. Boston: Godine, 1990.
Lanham, Richard A. *Style: An Anti-textbook.* New Haven: Yale UP, 1974.
Smith, Charles K. *Styles and Structures: Alternative Approaches to College Writing.* New York: Norton, 1974.
Strunk, William, Jr., and E. B. White. *The Elements of Style.* 4th ed. New York: Longman-Allyn, 2000.
Williams, Joseph M. *Style: Ten Lessons in Clarity and Grace.* 7th ed. New York: Longman-Allyn, 2002.
———. *Style: Toward Clarity and Grace.* Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1990.

2 Plagiarism

2.1. Definition of Plagiarism
2.2. Consequences of Plagiarism
2.3. Information Sharing Today
2.4. Unintentional Plagiarism
2.5. Forms of Plagiarism
2.6. When Documentation Is Not Needed
2.7. Other Issues
  2.7.1. Reusing a Research Paper
  2.7.2. Collaborative Work
  2.7.3. Copyright Infringement
2.8. Summing Up

You have probably read or heard about charges of plagiarism in disputes in the publishing and recording industries. You may also have had classroom discussions about student plagiarism in particular and academic dishonesty in general. Many schools have developed guidelines or procedures regarding plagiarism. Honor codes and other means to promote academic integrity are also common.

2.1. DEFINITION OF PLAGIARISM

Derived from the Latin word *plagiarius* ("kidnapper"), *plagiarism* refers to a form of cheating that has been defined as "the false assumption of authorship: the wrongful act of taking the product of another person's mind, and presenting it as one's own" (Alexander Lindey, *Plagiarism and Originality* [New York: Harper, 1952] 2). Plagiarism involves two kinds of wrongs. Using another person's ideas, information, or expressions without acknowledging that person's work constitutes intellectual theft. Passing off another person's ideas, information, or expressions as your own to get a better grade or gain some other advantage constitutes fraud. Plagiarism is sometimes a moral and ethical offense rather than a legal one since some instances of plagiarism fall outside the scope of copyright infringement, a legal offense (see 2.7.3).

2.2. CONSEQUENCES OF PLAGIARISM

Plagiarism is almost always seen as a shameful act, and plagiarists are usually regarded with pity and scorn. They are pitied because they have demonstrated their inability to develop and express their own thoughts. They are scorned because of their dishonesty and their willingness to deceive others for personal gain. As Verlyn Klinkenborg points out, "Plagiarism is an ugly word and an all-encompassing one. We make more distinction among degrees of murder than we do among kinds of plagiarism" ("From the Pulpit, a Borrowed Word," *New York Times* 16 Mar. 2002, late ed.: A14).We not only distinguish degrees of murder; we also recognize degrees of theft. These distinctions allow us to urge leniency for a starving person who steals a loaf of bread and to approve a substantial prison

term for a wealthy CEO who steals from employees' pension funds. We are less likely to consider extenuating circumstances when someone takes credit for another person's work, because fraud is involved. Plagiarism is plagiarism whether the theft is committed by a student or an experienced journalist. Moreover, although many of us would agree that a starving person who steals a loaf of bread can be rehabilitated, plagiarists rarely recover the trust of those they try to deceive.

The charge of plagiarism is a serious one for all writers. Students exposed as plagiarists suffer severe penalties, ranging from failure in the assignment or in the course to expulsion from school. They must also live with the distrust that follows an attempt to deceive others for personal gain. When professional writers, like journalists, are exposed as plagiarists, they are likely to lose their jobs, and they are certain to suffer public embarrassment and loss of prestige. For example, a well-known historian charged with plagiarism was asked to resign from prominent public positions even though she admitted responsibility for the theft, compensated the author whose work she took, and announced her intention to issue a corrected edition of her book. Almost always, the course of a professional writer's career is permanently affected by a single act of plagiarism.

The serious consequences of plagiarism reflect the value the public places on trustworthy information. A complex society that depends on well-informed citizens maintains high standards of quality and reliability for documents that are publicly circulated and used in government, business, industry, the professions, higher education, and the media. Because research has the power to affect opinions and actions, responsible writers compose their work with great care. They specify when they refer to another author's ideas, facts, and words, whether they want to agree with, object to, or analyze the source. This kind of documentation not only recognizes the work writers do; it also tends to discourage the circulation of error, by inviting readers to determine for themselves whether a reference to another text presents a reasonable account of what that text says. Plagiarists undermine these important public values.

Student plagiarism does considerable harm. For one thing, it damages teachers' relationships with students, turning teachers into detectives instead of mentors and fostering suspicion instead of trust. By undermining institutional standards for assigning grades and awarding degrees, student plagiarism also becomes a matter of significance to the public. When graduates' skills and knowledge fail

to match their grades, an institution's reputation is damaged. For example, no one would choose to be treated by a physician who obtained a medical degree by fraud. Finally, students who plagiarize harm themselves. They waste their tuition and lose an important opportunity to learn how to write a research paper. Knowing how to collect and analyze information and reshape it in essay form is essential to academic success. This knowledge is also required in a wide range of careers in law, journalism, engineering, public policy, teaching, business, government, and not-for-profit organizations.

Plagiarism betrays the personal element in writing as well. Discussing the history of copyright, Mark Rose notes the tie between our writing and our sense of self—a tie that, he believes, influenced the idea that a piece of writing could belong to the person who wrote it. Rose says that our sense of ownership of the words we write "is deeply rooted in our conception of ourselves as individuals with at least a modest grade of singularity, some degree of personality" (*Authors and Owners: The Invention of Copyright* [Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1993] 142). Gaining skill as a writer opens the door to learning more about yourself and to developing a personal voice and approach in your writing.

2.3. INFORMATION SHARING TODAY

Innumerable documents on a host of subjects are posted on the Web apparently for the purpose of being shared. The availability of research materials and the ease of transmitting, modifying, and using them have influenced the culture of the Internet, where the free exchange of information is an ideal. In this sea of materials, some students may question the need to acknowledge the authorship of individual documents. Professional writers, however, have no doubt about the matter. They recognize the importance of avoiding plagiarism whether they base their research on print or electronic publications. And so they continue to cite their sources and to mark the passages they quote.

In the culture of the academy, too, the free exchange of information is a long-standing ideal. Under certain circumstances, this ideal is described as academic freedom. But nothing about academic freedom or the free exchange of information implies ignoring authorship. Academic standards require student and experienced writers

to acknowledge the authors whose work they use when preparing papers and other kinds of studies and reports.

New technologies have made information easier to locate and obtain, but research projects only begin with identifying and collecting source material. The essential intellectual tasks of a research project have not changed. These tasks call for a student to understand the published facts, ideas, and insights about a subject and to integrate them with the student's own views on the topic. To achieve this goal, student writers must rigorously distinguish between what they borrow and what they create.

As information sharing has become easier, so has plagiarism. For instance, on the Internet it is possible to buy and download completed research papers. Some students are misinformed about buying research papers, on the Internet or on campus. They believe that if they buy a paper, it belongs to them, and therefore they can use the ideas, facts, sentences, and paragraphs in it, free from any worry about plagiarism. Buying a paper, however, is the same as buying a book or a magazine. You own the physical copy of the book or magazine, which you may keep in your bookcase, give to a friend, or sell. And you may use whatever you learn from reading it in your own writing. But you are never free from the obligation to let your readers know the source of the ideas, facts, words, or sentences you borrow. Whether in print or electronic formats, publications are a special kind of property. You can own them physically, but the publisher or author retains rights to the content. You should also know that purchased papers are readily recognizable, and teachers can often trace downloaded materials through an Internet search.

2.4. UNINTENTIONAL PLAGIARISM

The purpose of a research paper is to synthesize previous research and scholarship with your ideas on the subject. Therefore, you should feel free to use other persons' words, facts, and thoughts in your research paper, but the material you borrow must not be presented as if it were your own creation. When you write your research paper, remember that you must document everything that you borrow—not only direct quotations and paraphrases but also information and ideas.

Often plagiarism in student writing is unintentional, as when an

elementary school pupil, assigned to do a report on a certain topic, goes home and copies down, word for word, everything on the subject in an encyclopedia. Unfortunately, some students continue to use such "research methods" in high school and even in college, not realizing that these practices constitute plagiarism. To guard against the possibility of unintentional plagiarism during research and writing, keep careful notes that always distinguish among three types of material: your ideas, your summaries and paraphrases of others' ideas and facts, and exact wording you copy from sources. Plagiarism sometimes happens because researchers do not keep precise records of their reading, and by the time they return to their notes, they have forgotten whether their summaries and paraphrases contain quoted material that is poorly marked or unmarked. Presenting an author's exact wording without marking it as a quotation is plagiarism, even if you cite the source. For this reason, recording only quotations is the most reliable method of note-taking in substantial research projects, especially for beginning students. It is the surest way, when you work with notes, to avoid unintentional plagiarism. Similar problems can occur in notes kept electronically. When you copy and paste passages, make sure that you add quotation marks around them. (See 1.7 for more on note-taking.)

Another kind of unintentional plagiarism happens when students write research papers in a second language. In an effort to avoid grammatical errors, they may copy the structure of an author's sentences. When replicating grammatical patterns, they sometimes inadvertently plagiarize the author's ideas, information, words, and expressions.

If you realize after handing a paper in that you accidentally plagiarized an author's work, you should report the problem to your instructor as soon as possible. In this way you eliminate the element of fraud. You may receive a lower grade than you had hoped for, but getting a lower grade is better than failing a course or being expelled. It is also better than experiencing the shame of plagiarism.

2.5. FORMS OF PLAGIARISM

The most blatant form of plagiarism is to obtain and submit as your own a paper written by someone else (see 2.3). Other, less conspicu-

ous forms of plagiarism include the failure to give appropriate acknowledgment when repeating or paraphrasing another's wording, when taking a particularly apt phrase, and when paraphrasing another's argument or presenting another's line of thinking.

Repeating or Paraphrasing Wording

Suppose, for example, that you want to use the material in the following passage, which appears on page 625 of an essay by Wendy Martin in the book *Columbia Literary History of the United States.*

ORIGINAL SOURCE

> Some of Dickinson's most powerful poems express her firmly held conviction that life cannot be fully comprehended without an understanding of death.

If you write the following sentence without documentation, you have plagiarized because you borrowed another's wording without acknowledgment, even though you changed its form:

PLAGIARISM

> Emily Dickinson firmly believed that we cannot fully comprehend life unless we also understand death.

But you may present the material if you cite your source:

> As Wendy Martin has suggested, Emily Dickinson firmly believed that we cannot fully comprehend life unless we also understand death (625).

The source is indicated, in accordance with MLA style, by the name of the author ("Wendy Martin") and by a page reference in parentheses, preferably at the end of the sentence. The name refers the reader to the corresponding entry in the works-cited list, which appears at the end of the paper.

> Martin, Wendy. "Emily Dickinson." Columbia Literary History of the United States. Emory Elliott, gen. ed. New York: Columbia UP, 1988. 609-26.

Taking a Particularly Apt Phrase

ORIGINAL SOURCE

> Everyone uses the word *language* and everybody these days talks about *culture*. . . . "Languaculture" is a reminder, I hope, of the

necessary connection between its two parts. . . . (Michael Agar, *Language Shock: Understanding the Culture of Conversation* [New York: Morrow, 1994] 60)

If you write the following sentence without documentation, you have committed plagiarism because you borrowed without acknowledgment a term ("languaculture") invented by another writer:

PLAGIARISM

At the intersection of language and culture lies a concept that we might call "languaculture."

But you may present the material if you cite your source:

At the intersection of language and culture lies a concept that Michael Agar has called "languaculture" (60).

In this revision, the author's name refers the reader to the full description of the work in the works-cited list at the end of the paper, and the parenthetical documentation identifies the location of the borrowed material in the work.

Agar, Michael. Language Shock: Understanding the Culture of Conversation. New York: Morrow, 1994.

Paraphrasing an Argument or Presenting a Line of Thinking

ORIGINAL SOURCE

Humanity faces a quantum leap forward. It faces the deepest social upheaval and creative restructuring of all time. Without clearly recognizing it, we are engaged in building a remarkable civilization from the ground up. This is the meaning of the Third Wave.

Until now the human race has undergone two great waves of change, each one largely obliterating earlier cultures or civilizations and replacing them with the ways of life inconceivable to those who came before. The First Wave of change—the agricultural revolution—took thousands of years to play itself out. The Second Wave—the rise of industrial civilization—took a mere hundred years. Today history is even more accelerative, and it is likely that the Third Wave will sweep across history and complete itself in a few decades. (Alvin Toffler, *The Third Wave* [1980; New York: Bantam, 1981] 10)

If you write the following sentence without documentation, you have committed plagiarism because you borrowed another writer's line of thinking without acknowledgment:

PLAGIARISM

There have been two revolutionary periods of change in history: the agricultural revolution and the industrial revolution. The agricultural revolution determined the course of history for thousands of years; the industrial civilization lasted about a century. We are now on the threshold of a new period of revolutionary change, but this one may last for only a few decades.

But you may present the material if you cite your source:

According to Alvin Toffler, there have been two revolutionary periods of change in history: the agricultural revolution and the industrial revolution. The agricultural revolution determined the course of history for thousands of years; the industrial civilization lasted about a century. We are now on the threshold of a new period of revolutionary change, but this one may last for only a few decades (10).

In this revision, the author's name refers the reader to the full description of the work in the works-cited list at the end of the paper, and the parenthetical documentation identifies the location of the borrowed material in the work.

Toffler, Alvin. The Third Wave. 1980. New York: Bantam, 1981.

2.6. WHEN DOCUMENTATION IS NOT NEEDED

Common sense as well as ethics should determine your documentation. For example, you rarely need to give sources for familiar proverbs ("You can't judge a book by its cover"), well-known quotations ("We shall overcome"), or common knowledge ("George Washington was the first president of the United States"; "At a red light, drivers come to a full stop"). But you must indicate the source of any information or material that you took from someone else. If you have any doubt about whether you are committing plagiarism, cite your source or sources.

2.7. OTHER ISSUES

Other issues related to plagiarism include reusing a research paper, collaborative work, and copyright infringement.

2.7.1. Reusing a Research Paper

If you must complete a research project to earn a grade in a course, handing in a paper you already earned credit for in another course is deceitful. Moreover, you lose the opportunity to improve your knowledge and skills. If you want to rework a paper that you prepared for another course, ask your current instructor for permission to do so.

2.7.2. Collaborative Work

An example of collaborative work is a group project you carry out with other students. Joint participation in research and writing is common and, in fact, encouraged in many courses and in many professions. It does not constitute plagiarism provided that credit is given for all contributions. One way to give credit, if roles were clearly demarcated or were unequal, is to state exactly who did what. Another way, especially if roles and contributions were merged and shared, is to acknowledge all concerned equally. Ask your instructor for advice if you are not certain how to acknowledge collaboration.

2.7.3. Copyright Infringement

Whereas summaries, paraphrases, and brief quotations in research papers are normally permissible with appropriate acknowledgment, reproducing and distributing an entire copyrighted document or significant portions of it without obtaining permission to do so from the author or publisher is an infringement of copyright law and a legal offense, even if the violator acknowledges the source. This is true for documents published on the Internet or in print. For a detailed discussion of copyright and other legal issues related to publishing, see

chapter 2 of the *MLA Style Manual and Guide to Scholarly Publishing* (2nd ed. [New York: MLA, 1998]).

2.8. SUMMING UP

You have plagiarized if

- you took notes that did not distinguish summary and paraphrase from quotation and then you presented wording from the notes as if it were all your own.
- while browsing the Web, you copied text and pasted it into your paper without quotation marks or without citing the source.
- you presented facts without saying where you found them.
- you repeated or paraphrased someone's wording without acknowledgment.
- you took someone's unique or particularly apt phrase without acknowledgment.
- you paraphrased someone's argument or presented someone's line of thought without acknowledgment.
- you bought or otherwise acquired a research paper and handed in part or all of it as your own.

You can avoid plagiarism by

- making a list of the writers and viewpoints you discovered in your research and using this list to double-check the presentation of material in your paper.
- keeping the following three categories distinct in your notes: your ideas, your summaries of others' material, and exact wording you copy.
- identifying the sources of all material you borrow—exact wording, paraphrases, ideas, arguments, and facts.
- checking with your instructor when you are uncertain about your use of sources.

MLA STYLE MANUAL

AND GUIDE TO SCHOLARLY PUBLISHING

THIRD EDITION

THE MODERN LANGUAGE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA

NEW YORK

2008

© 1985, 1998, 2008 by The Modern Language Association of America

First edition 1985. Second edition 1998. Third edition 2008.

Printed in the United States of America

For information about obtaining permission to reprint material from MLA book publications, send your request by mail (see address below), e-mail (permissions@mla.org), or fax (646 458-0030).

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

MLA style manual and guide to scholarly publishing. — 3rd ed.
p. cm.
Rev. ed. of: MLA style manual and guide to scholarly publishing / Joseph Gibaldi. 2nd ed. 1998.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-87352-297-7 (cloth : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-0-87352-298-4 (large print : alk. paper)
1. Authorship—Style manuals. 2. Humanities literature—Authorship—Handbooks, manuals, etc. 3. Scholarly publishing—Handbooks, manuals, etc. 4. Academic writing—Handbooks, manuals, etc. I. Gibaldi, Joseph, 1942– MLA style manual and guide to scholarly publishing.
PN147.G444 2008
808′.027—dc22 2008002894

Text design by Ellen C. Dawson
Typeset in Dante and Egyptienne
Printed on acid-free paper

Published by The Modern Language Association of America
26 Broadway, 3rd floor, New York, New York 10004-1789

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FOREWORD

Domna C. Stanton

"For me, having a style would be worse than being a murderer," declares Olive, one of the central illustrators in Orhan Pamuk's *My Name Is Red* (457). Set in late-sixteenth-century Istanbul, this murder mystery is a serious reflection on the implications of shifts in style: Sultan Murat III orders the great Osman, master of eighty apprentices, to produce a secret book that incorporates the techniques and sensibilities of European "infidels," who dare to draw, not from God's perspective, but from the level of a mangy street dog (191). Does this radical aim to give an impression of reality rather than create the likeness of a painting that follows traditional rules constitute a heresy prompted by Satan, as the murdering Olive claims? If a collective style is the mark of a civilization, would the shift to Western techniques destroy the Eastern conception of art and reduce the East to being a bad imitation of the West (486–89)? Yet for Stork, one of the suspects, this shift might signal a return to even older Arab masters who perceived the world as the "infidels" now do (83). And if individual style is a flaw inimical to the goals inculcated in—beaten into—apprentices by their demanding masters, how can it be that Black, the protagonist, and Osman painstakingly solve the crime by the clipped nostril of a horse the murderer illustrated?[1] Indeed, how is it that one master and not another can produce the clearly recognizable, "absolutely matchless red" that gives Pamuk's novel its title (278)?

The ambiguities that mark Pamuk's own matchless novel and its murderous debates about artistic style may seem to bear little relation to the questions raised by the *MLA Style Manual and Guide to Scholarly Publishing* in its third edition. Still, Pamuk's

James C. Hatch with chapters 6 and 7, and Lucy Anderson with the index. Marcia Henry answered questions about permissions, and Joseph Gibaldi explained procedures used in the development of the previous editions. In the MLA's editorial department, headed by Judy Goulding, staff members played important roles in developing and producing the volume. Eric Wirth served as principal copyeditor, although his role was greater: I consulted him throughout the writing and revision of the manuscript. Laurie Russell assisted in preparing the index. Others in the department who provided advice and support include Judith Altreuter, Angela Gibson, David Hodges, Elizabeth Holland, Michael Kandel, Margit Longbrake, and Sara Pastel. Barbara Chen, director of bibliographic information services and editor of the *MLA International Bibliography*, reviewed sections on electronic databases and helped identify new sources of examples. Rosemary G. Feal, the MLA executive director, reviewed the entire manuscript and made comments and suggestions. MLA members make important contributions to all association publications, and this one is no exception. In addition to the assistance of the Ad Hoc Committee on MLA Style, noted above, I benefited from the counsel of the Committee on Scholarly Editions (on the description of kinds of editions) and the Committee on the Status of Graduate Students in the Profession (on the submission of electronic theses and dissertations). Officers of the Council of Editors of Learned Journals, an allied organization of the MLA, assisted in describing their mediation service. Heidi Byrnes provided advice on German spelling. Stephen E. Tabachnick advised me on documenting graphic narratives. The staff hears regularly from users of MLA style, and the following correspondents submitted suggestions or queries that are addressed in this edition of the *MLA Style Manual*: Damon Abilock, Grace Boyce, Laura Hammons, James L. Harner, Caroline E. Jones, Jan Phillips, Thomas G. Rice, Howard A. Rodman, and Mark Ziomeck. Last but certainly not least, this volume benefited from the leadership of Domna C. Stanton, MLA president in 2005. The work of the Task Force on Evaluating Scholarship for Tenure and Promotion, which she chaired, inspired many of the revisions here. She also graciously provided the foreword for this volume. I thank everyone who supported me in the creation of this new edition.

1

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1.1
SCHOLARS AND SCHOLARLY PUBLISHING

To publish is to make public. When scholars make their work public, they educate, enlighten, stimulate learning, and further intellectual pursuit, serving the academic community and society at large. Scholarly publication is also often used within the academy as a measure when professional advancement is decided.

The publication of scholarship takes many forms, depending on field, objective, medium, and audience. Teaching is probably the most common way of making scholarship public. Other ways are contributing to an electronic discussion group and offering a presentation at a local, regional, national, or international meeting. This book primarily concerns itself with the more formal modes of academic publishing in the field of language and literature, especially journal articles and books. It also discusses such forms as reviews, review essays, translations, scholarly editions, anthologies, reference works, theses, dissertations, and pedagogical materials. This chapter provides guidance for authors on the protocols for working with the two major outlets for scholarly communication, journals and presses.

Scholarly publication is a collaborative enterprise that comprises diverse and complex relations among numerous persons besides you, as the author, and your reader. Academic authors normally submit their work to editors, who in turn customarily seek the advice and judgment of other scholars—for example, consultant readers (specialists in the field addressed by the author) and members of editorial boards. Various other persons, though perhaps less visible to the author, also play vital roles in making scholarship public; these include publishing professionals in areas like copyediting, design, typesetting, printing, electronic production, and marketing. Such intermediary figures add value to the author's work by enhancing its intellectual quality and communicative presentation and by helping to bring it to the attention of its potential audience.

Publishers are as intrinsic to the scholarly community as academic institutions and professional organizations are. While institutions provide a forum for teaching and organizations plan meetings that primarily promote the oral exchange of ideas and information among attendees, publishers make possible the dissemination of scholarship in finished forms to varied and broadly dispersed audiences. Book and journal publication, then, exists on a continuum with teaching and convention presentations. Scholars turn to a publisher when they be-

lieve they can make a contribution to scholarship that warrants wider circulation than the classroom and the conference hall permit. And libraries, by acquiring scholarly publications, preserve the record of scholarship and make it accessible to present and future readers.

1.2 REFEREED AND NONREFEREED PUBLICATIONS

Academic journals and presses can be divided into two broad categories: those that seek and rely on the advice of referees or consultant readers and those that do not. The editor of a refereed journal asks specialist readers to review a manuscript before it is accepted or rejected. Each consultant reads the work and sends the editor a report evaluating the manuscript and, in most instances, either recommending or not recommending it for publication. The editor, editorial staff, or editorial board—whichever is appropriate to the journal—refers to the consultants' evaluations and recommendations when deciding whether to publish the article. Most academic presses follow like procedures, soliciting reviews by experts before deciding on publication of a book manuscript or other scholarly work. (For more on the refereeing of articles and books, see 1.4.5 and 1.5.6, respectively.)

A nonrefereed journal, by contrast, generally publishes a manuscript without specialist review, as do some presses. The use of referees normally adds several months to the time between completion of the manuscript and its publication. Although it is desirable to get your work published as soon as possible, there are many advantages to seeking a publisher committed to a policy of refereeing.

Specialist readings constitute professional service to authors. As experts in the work's general subject, reviewers can identify scholarly errors and omissions and thus save the author the embarrassment of having a flawed manuscript reach publication. In addition, consultants often offer suggestions for revision that improve manuscripts or help make them publishable.

Academic institutions, moreover, invariably attach greater prestige to works that underwent formal review than to those that did not. Hiring, promotion, and tenure committees, whose members are frequently not specialists in the candidate's field, almost always assign a refereed publication significantly more professional standing and scholarly authority than they do a nonrefereed publication. Most scholars believe that the assistance derived from referees' reports and the value

and prestige conferred on a published work that successfully passes through rigorous critical examination more than compensate for the publication delay that consultant evaluation necessitates.

1.3 DECIDING TO SUBMIT A MANUSCRIPT

Professional circumstances tend to press scholars to publish early and abundantly. Before you consider submitting a manuscript for publication, however, no matter the stage of your career, you will do well to ask a number of colleagues, especially other experts in your field, to read and assess your work, including revised versions of it; to advise you on whether the manuscript is appropriate and ready for publication; and to recommend possible publishers. These readers are likely to provide useful comments on intellectual and scholarly issues and on such matters as the organization and development of ideas, the coherence of the discussion, the cogency of the argument, and the clarity of expression. Many scholars share their work at conferences, workshops, and reading groups before seeking publication. Some scholars also place drafts—clearly labeled as works in progress—on the Internet and invite comments from interested readers.

You should not consider a work ready for submission to a publisher, moreover, until you have given it a final editorial review that includes, among other things, confirming the accuracy of all paraphrases, quotations, bibliographic references, and textual citations. Your manuscript should also follow the technical specifications discussed in chapter 4 of this manual.

You should be aware that most publishers adhere to a house editorial style, which dictates such features of scholarly presentation as the documentation system and mechanics of writing. Chapters 6 and 7 offer an authoritative and comprehensive explanation of the style followed by the Modern Language Association of America.

The submitted manuscript should also contain clear copies of illustrations you want to publish with the work. It is useful to consider at an early stage whether you will need permission to reproduce any quotations, photographs, charts, or other material that you take from others (see 2.2.13–14) and whether such permission will be easily obtained.

The author's concerns before submitting a manuscript, then, are many and wide-ranging: they include not only intellectual and scholarly but also stylistic and technical questions. Attention to this full

range of authorial considerations before submission will facilitate the passage of a manuscript through the publishing process.

The next two sections discuss the typical procedures for placing a scholarly manuscript with a journal (1.4) and with an academic press (1.5). Because the two paths are not completely dissimilar, there is some inevitable repetition in the two sections that will permit you to consult these sections independently from each other. Particular attention is paid to the two most prevalent forms of scholarly publication, articles and books.

1.4 PLACING A MANUSCRIPT WITH A JOURNAL

1.4.1 SCHOLARLY JOURNALS

The scope of scholarly journals ranges from the broadly focused to the more specific. At one end of the spectrum, for example, is a journal like *PMLA*, which, according to its current statement of editorial policy, publishes "essays of interest to those concerned with the study of language and literature" and is "receptive to a variety of topics, whether general or specific, and to all scholarly methods and theoretical perspectives." Most journals, however, are more specialized, focusing on a specific literature, language, culture, period, genre, ethnicity, theory, methodology, theme, author, and so forth.

The editorial staff of a scholarly journal is usually identified on the copyright page, in the opening pages of each printed issue, in the opening section of an electronic journal, or as part of the journal's home page on the Internet. The roster typically designates at least one editor of the journal, and other persons may be listed as, for example, associate editor, book review editor, managing editor, manuscript editor, production editor, and editorial assistant.

The page also likely names the members of the journal's editorial board, sometimes given a title such as "advisory board" or "board of editorial consultants." This group of scholars, which may range in number from a half dozen to several dozen, assists the editorial staff in setting the direction of the journal as well as in evaluating submissions. Depending on the journal, publication decisions are made by the editor or editors or by the editorial board, sometimes in conjunction with the staff.

Most scholarly journals are associated with a sponsoring organization—a college, university, learned society, library, museum, foundation,

research institute, or government agency. In addition, some journals have business affiliations with academic presses: the journal staff supplies the copy for each issue, and the press produces and distributes the publication.

1.4.2 TYPES OF SCHOLARLY ARTICLES

The typical issue of a scholarly journal in language and literature is devoted primarily to articles containing new research and original interpretations of texts and data. Some journals also publish book reviews, review essays, reviews of research, and translations. Other contributions include letters to the editor commenting on articles previously published in the journal or on general matters, interviews, notes, conference proceedings, and bibliographies. Most published articles are unsolicited, although some articles and even whole issues may be commissioned by the journal. Book reviews, review essays, reviews of research, and translations are almost always assigned.

Book Reviews. When commissioning book reviews, journal editors normally set the format, length, and coverage. A book review tends to be devoted to a single work, which is documented at the beginning (or sometimes at the end) of the review, usually with more information than a reference in a works-cited list gives. Besides the name of the author, title, city of publication, publisher, and date of publication, the reviewer often records the number of pages, price, and, if the book is not published by a major press, ordering information. If you would like to review books for a journal, you should write to the editor or the book review editor, if there is one, indicating your interest, your field of expertise, and your qualifications.

Review Essays and Reviews of Research. Review essays are extended book reviews, usually covering more than one recent book and giving full publication information for each work discussed. Review essays normally allow the writer greater compass to describe and compare the works under consideration and to place them in perspective. Reviews of research are extended review essays that describe, evaluate, and indicate the importance of significant works in a specific field or on a specific issue published over a broader period of time, often helping to set the terms of discussion for future work in the field. Normally longer than a book review and a review essay, the review of research

generally provides only essential bibliographic information for sources (e.g., author, title, city of publication, publisher, and date of publication but not number of pages, price, and so forth). If you wish to contribute a review essay or a review of research, you should write to an appropriate journal to inquire if there is interest in such a contribution before you embark on it.

Other Features. Many journals also present bibliographies, exhibition reviews, interviews, little-known primary sources, performance reviews, and translations of articles and creative works originally published in other languages. If you are interested in submitting such a work to a journal that does not provide guidelines on doing so, you should write to the editor to see if the journal is willing to consider it.

1.4.3 SELECTING A JOURNAL

One of the keys to successful scholarly publishing is locating the right publishers. Your research will doubtless bring you in contact with numerous journals in your field. Colleagues might direct you to additional suitable journals. To learn of others, consult bibliographies and similar reference works in the discipline, library catalogs, and directories of periodicals.

The *MLA Directory of Periodicals*, a companion to the electronic *MLA International Bibliography*, is a guide to thousands of journals and book series that address the scholarship on and teaching of language, literature, film, and folklore. Each entry in this online directory provides contact information, a description of editorial aims, submission requirements, and information on subscriptions and advertisements. The entry includes the mailing address, e-mail address, telephone and fax numbers, and date of first publication, among other general information. The data on subscriptions include frequency of publication, circulation, and availability in electronic media (URLs and full-text providers may be noted). The entry describes the editorial scope of the periodical and gives such information as whether it reviews books, what languages submissions may be written in, and what its policy on author anonymity is (see 1.4.4). The entry gives specifications concerning submission, under categories like the following ones: restrictions on contributors, desired length of articles, editorial style followed, number of manuscript copies required, time between submission and publication decision, time between acceptance and publication, number

of reviewers used, number of articles submitted to the periodical in a year, and number of articles published in a year. The *Directory* allows you to search all its entries by such topics as subject scope, sponsoring organizations, editorial personnel, and languages published. *Ulrich's International Periodicals Directory* is another useful source.

Once you have identified potential journals, you should consult recent issues of each to determine its nature and quality and to learn about any recent changes in editorial policy, about the editors' special interests, and about details of submission procedures. You might also consult with colleagues whose work has appeared in any of the journals to find out whether their experience was professionally satisfactory.

Journals frequently devote entire issues to specific topics. Editors planning special issues may seek submissions by announcing the topics in advance. (Editors' calls for papers can be found, for example, on the MLA Web site and in relevant electronic discussion groups and information lists.)

1.4.4 SUBMITTING A MANUSCRIPT TO A JOURNAL

In submitting a manuscript, follow the instructions in the journal concerning such matters as the number of copies required, submission fees (uncommon in the humanities), and any information you are expected to provide along with the manuscript. Be sure that your manuscript falls within the range of lengths requested and follows the appropriate editorial style. For journals published by professional organizations, check that you have the requisite membership status. If the journal has an anonymous-submission policy, your name should appear only on a separate or a duplicate title page (see 4.2.4), and the manuscript should not identify you in any other way; for example, cite yourself in the third person instead of using a self-identifying reference such as "See my article. . . ."

Unless the journal specifies otherwise, submit one printout of the manuscript prepared according to the guidelines in chapter 4. Some journals accept submissions by e-mail, disk, or an online interface, and most will request a copy of your electronic file if the manuscript is accepted for publication. Always keep a paper version of the manuscript, as well as electronic copies in at least two places.

Address the submission to the journal's editor. Include a brief cover letter that states the full title of the article, identifies you and any other author of the work, calls attention to special features (e.g., illustrations, tables), describes permissions that might be required and tells

whether they have been or can easily be obtained, and supplies addresses for future correspondence. Send a printed manuscript by first-class mail, indicating in your cover letter if the manuscript is available in electronic format and enclosing a self-addressed mailer and unattached return postage if you wish the manuscript returned in case it is not accepted.

Journal editors do not have a common policy concerning the submission of manuscripts to more than one periodical at a time. Publications that have each manuscript evaluated by specialist readers often will not consider a submission that is under review elsewhere. If you decide to submit a manuscript to more than one journal simultaneously, you must inform each editor involved.

After submitting the manuscript, you should expect to receive a written acknowledgment of the journal's receipt of it within about two weeks. If there is no response within a month, you should inquire to see whether the manuscript was received.

1.4.5 EVALUATION OF A MANUSCRIPT

The editor of a refereed periodical generally reviews a manuscript soon after submission to verify that it is suitable for the journal. If it is not, the editor rejects the manuscript without further review. If it is suitable, the editor sends the manuscript for evaluation to consultant readers (usually two), sometimes simultaneously and sometimes consecutively. Although the questions asked of readers vary from journal to journal, most editors request comments on the importance of the subject, the originality and soundness of the argument, the accuracy of the facts, the clarity and readability of the style, and the validity of the documentation.

In addition, editors usually ask for a recommendation regarding publication—for example, one of the following choices: recommended without reservations or with only minor changes, not recommended without substantial revision, or not recommended. Consultants are typically encouraged to give specific reasons for their recommendations, to describe reservations in as much detail as possible, and to suggest ways to improve the manuscript.

With guidance from the readers' reports, the editor, editorial staff, or editorial board may accept the manuscript for publication, reject it, ask the author to revise and resubmit it, or accept it pending revision. The last two options have the potential for misunderstandings between editors and authors. If the editor asks for revisions, the requested changes

and the conditions determining publication should be fully and clearly detailed in writing: you should understand whether the revisions are optional or required, whether there is a deadline for submitting a revised manuscript, whether revision will ensure acceptance or lead to another round of consultant review and publication decision, and, if there is to be a new evaluation, whether the same or different referees will be used. If you are unsure about any of these matters, do not hesitate to ask the editor for clarification.

Consider requests for revision carefully and deliberately. If you choose to undertake the revisions, inform the editor of your intent and give an expected date of resubmission or confirm that you will meet the deadline. When returning the revised manuscript, include in your cover letter a summary of the changes made.

If you do not agree with all the revisions requested, tell the editor in writing which changes you are willing to make and which you are not, giving explicit reasons for your decision, before reworking the article. If the editor does not concur with your plan of revision, you should withdraw the manuscript and submit it elsewhere.

Copies of the consultant readers' reports usually accompany requests for revision. Some journals remove the reviewer's name from each report whether it is favorable or not; others give consultants the option of anonymity. If the journal follows an anonymous review process, the editor is responsible for deleting references in the report (including metadata in electronic files) that may identify the reviewer. Many journal editors send the author copies of the reports—or excerpts from or summaries of them—regardless of the publication decision. Thus, even if the manuscript is rejected, the author might be able to use the reviews to improve it and make it publishable elsewhere.

The editor's acknowledgment letter at the start of the process may tell you approximately how long it will take before a decision is made. Many journals complete review of an article in about two or three months, although referees' schedules and the time of the academic year could delay the decision. If you do not hear again from the journal within four months after the initial acknowledgment, feel free to inquire about the status of the manuscript. When an editorial board, rather than an editor or editorial staff, decides on publication, the process can take longer because the board may meet only two or three times a year. If the journal is unable to make a decision after four to six months, depending on the type of journal, and the editor and you cannot agree on a timetable, you may send the manuscript to another journal after notifying the editor of your decision.

1.4.6 ACCEPTANCE OF A MANUSCRIPT

A journal generally accepts an article for publication either as is or subject to revisions that only the editor needs to review. Sometimes editors prescribe changes; sometimes they merely suggest them and allow the author to decide which to perform. Even if your article is accepted without the need for revision, you may receive an opportunity to update the manuscript or make final improvements before copyediting and production begin. Whatever the circumstances, make revisions as expeditiously as possible, carefully observing any deadline the editor sets. Submit the final version of the article in the form or forms required by the journal (e.g., printout and electronic file). When the journal receives the final version, the editor should be able to notify you of the projected date of publication. After accepting a manuscript, the journal usually offers the author a contract, or memorandum of agreement, for publication of the work (see 2.3.2).

Occasionally, communication between an author and a journal editor breaks down. The Council of Editors of Learned Journals mediates disputes between authors and the staffs of member journals. To request mediation, write the president at the address on the council's Web site.

On the production and publication of journal articles, see 1.6.

1.5 PLACING A MANUSCRIPT WITH A PRESS

1.5.1 SCHOLARLY PRESSES

Most scholarly books are published by university presses, professional organizations, commercial academic presses, and trade publishers. University presses and publication programs within professional organizations are usually headed by a director and include staff members in such areas as acquisitions, copyediting, design, production, marketing, sales, and business (e.g., contracts, royalties, rights, permissions). At both types of publishers, editorial boards composed of faculty members or association members normally make final decisions on publication (see 1.5.6, on evaluation).

By contrast, at commercial academic presses and trade publishers, which are rarely affiliated with an educational or a professional institution, decisions are usually made by staff editors rather than academic committees. Both types of publishers are set up to make a profit, but

Where entries show variant spellings, use the form given first or, if the variants have separate listings, the form that appears with the full definition. Inform your editor, before copyediting begins, of any necessary deviations from this practice—for example, a variant commonly used in your discipline.

3.3.2 WORD DIVISION

Dividing words at the ends of lines makes the manuscript less readable and can cause typesetting errors. If a word will not fit on a line, leave the line short and begin the word on the next line. The "word-wrap" feature of word-processing programs performs this operation automatically, provided that any automatic-hyphenation option is turned off. If you choose to divide a word, consult your dictionary about where the break should occur.

3.3.3 PLURALS

The plurals of English words are generally formed by addition of the suffix *-s* or *-es* (*laws, taxes*), but there are exceptions (e.g., *children, halves, mice, sons-in-law, bison*). The tendency in American English is to form the plurals of words naturalized from other languages in the standard manner. The plurals *librettos* and *formulas* are therefore now more common in American English than *libretti* and *formulae*. But some adopted words, like *alumnus* and *phenomenon*, retain the original plurals (*alumni, phenomena*). Consult a dictionary for guidance. If the dictionary gives more than one plural form for a word (*appendixes, appendices; syllabi, syllabuses*), use the first listed. (See 3.4.7 for plurals of letters and for possessive forms of plurals.)

3.3.4 ACCENTS

In quoting, reproduce all accents and other diacritical marks exactly as they appear in the original. Handwrite marks that your word processor lacks. Accented letters do not always retain the accent mark when capitalized (the accent in the French word *école* may be omitted in *Ecole*, for example), but an accent is never unacceptable over a capital letter that would require one if it were lowercase (*École*). When transcribing words that appear in all capitals and changing them to lowercase (as in transcribing a title from a title page), insert the necessary accents.

3.3.5 UMLAUTS

In German words the umlaut should not be replaced with *e* (*ä, ö, ü* rather than *ae, oe, ue*), even for initial capitals (*Über*). But common usage must be observed for names: *Götz*, but *Goethe*. In alphabetizing such words, Germanists treat an umlauted vowel as if the letter were followed by an *e*; thus, *Götz* would be alphabetized as *Goetz* and would precede *Gott* in an alphabetical listing. Nonspecialists, however, and many libraries in English-speaking countries alphabetize such words without regard to the umlaut; for publications addressed primarily to speakers of English, this is the recommended practice. (For more on the arrangement of entries in the list of works cited, see 6.4.3.)

3.3.6 LIGATURES AND OTHER SPECIAL CHARACTERS

A ligature is a combination of letters that is united in print: *æ* and *Æ* in Danish, Norwegian, and Old English; *œ* and *Œ* in French; and *ß* in German. When addressing a specialist audience, you should reproduce these characters in your manuscript, through your word processor or by hand notation, if they appear in the source you are duplicating. When addressing a general readership, you may omit the connection between letters (*ae, Ae, oe, Oe, ss*). For words adopted into English from other languages, omit the connection between letters (*aesthetic, oeuvre, schuss*). Other special characters—for example, Old English and Middle English letters that are not used in modern English, quotation marks following alternative typographic conventions outside English—should be reproduced from the source regardless of your audience.

3.4 PUNCTUATION

3.4.1 PURPOSE OF PUNCTUATION

The primary purpose of punctuation is to ensure the clarity and readability of writing. Punctuation clarifies sentence structure, separating some words and grouping others. It adds meaning to written words and guides the understanding of readers as they move through sentences. The rules set forth here cover many of the situations common

Many of the usage examples in 3.4–5 are quotations or adaptations of quotations. The sources are listed on pages 305–08.

in scholarly writing. For the punctuation of quotations in the text, see 3.9.7. For the punctuation of parenthetical references and bibliographies, see chapters 6 and 7. See also the individual listings in the index for specific punctuation marks.

3.4.2 COMMAS

a. Use a comma before a coordinating conjunction (*and, but, for, nor, or, so,* or *yet*) joining independent clauses in a sentence.

> Synonyms have a basic similarity of meaning, but at the margins they can differ greatly.
>
> Inexpensive examples of literary annuals still turn up in secondhand stores, for the craze leaped the Atlantic, and the books became as popular in the United States as in England.

But the comma may be omitted when the sentence is short and the connection between the clauses is not open to misreading if unpunctuated.

> Wallace sings and Armstrong plays cornet.

b. Use commas to separate words, phrases, and clauses in a series.

> ### Words
>
> Priests, conjurers, magicians, and shamans have long known the importance of using words correctly in prayers, petitions, hexes, and incantations.
>
> ### Phrases
>
> To some writers the computer is a subtle saboteur, subverting their intentions, reconstituting their words, and redirecting their attention to the layout of the page.
>
> ### Clauses
>
> Originally the plantations were rather small, there were fewer slaves than colonists, and social discrimination was less harsh than in the eighteenth century.

But use semicolons when items in a series have internal commas.

Perhaps the most ambitious English-language poem of the decolonized Third World, Walcott's *Omeros* fills hundreds of pages with rolling hexameters in terza rima; alludes abundantly to Homer, James Joyce, and Aimé Césaire; and ranges historically from precolonial Africa to contemporary Ireland and Saint Lucia.

c. Use a comma between coordinate adjectives—that is, adjectives that separately modify the same noun.

For men, heroism was usually described as bravery and the active, successful overcoming of adversity.
(The adjectives *active* and *successful* each modify *overcoming*.)

but

The dialogue soon reveals the reason for her mysterious daily sojourns there.
(The adjective *mysterious* modifies *daily sojourns*.)

d. Use commas to set off a parenthetical comment, or an aside, if it is brief and closely related to the rest of the sentence. (For punctuation of longer, more intrusive, or more complex parenthetical elements, see 3.4.5.)

A title or a headline, for instance, functions as a signal and determines our approach to the ensuing text.

It is not, I submit, about the body at all.

e. Use commas to set off a nonrestrictive modifier—that is, a modifier that is not essential to the meaning of the sentence. A nonrestrictive modifier, unlike a restrictive one, could be dropped without changing the main sense of the sentence. Modifiers in the following three categories are either nonrestrictive or restrictive. (For the use of parentheses and dashes around complex nonrestrictive modifiers, see 3.4.5b.)

Words in Apposition

NONRESTRICTIVE

Baron François-Pascal-Simon Gérard, court painter to Louis XVIII, made Duras's heroine the subject of a painting.

RESTRICTIVE

The painter Baron François-Pascal-Simon Gérard made Duras's heroine the subject of a painting.

Clauses That Begin with *Who, Whom, Whose, Which,* and *That*

NONRESTRICTIVE

All these subjects seemed irrelevant to Seneca, who thought that the only valid use of literature was as a model for conduct.

A brief comparison with the most famous chivalric drama, which was written fifteen years earlier, clarifies the uniqueness of Thon's play.

RESTRICTIVE

All these subjects seemed irrelevant to philosophers who thought that the only valid use of literature was as a model for conduct.

A brief comparison with a chivalric drama that was written fifteen years earlier clarifies the uniqueness of Thon's play.

Many writers prefer to use *which* to introduce nonrestrictive clauses and *that* to introduce restrictive clauses.

Adverbial Phrases and Clauses

NONRESTRICTIVE

After the separation, she moved to Lunéville, where she was under the protection of the ducal court.

RESTRICTIVE

After the separation, she moved to a town where she was under the protection of the ducal court.

f. Use a comma after a long introductory phrase or clause.

PHRASE

In this charged atmosphere of cultural victory and cultural defeat, Americanists undertook the search for a central myth of America.

CLAUSE

When Zilia begins learning how to write French, she is writing to Aza.

g. Use commas to set off alternative or contrasting phrases.

Fin de siècle Spain was simply not receptive to feminism, especially not to the fundamental feminism that formed the basis of Pardo Bazán's thought on sex roles.

Sometimes this is where the deeper motives for the work are most clearly, if inadvertently, revealed.

but

Alexander Pope uses classical myths and allusions for incidental yet incisive contributions to his overarching satiric design.
(The conjunction *yet* links *incidental* and *incisive*, making commas unnecessary.)

h. Do not use a comma between subject and verb.

What makes Sartre's theory of commitment relevant to our discussion [no comma] is its insistence that choice in today's world can be only political.

i. Do not use a comma between verb and object.

In 1947 Allen Walker Read devoted to dialect geography [no comma] only the fifth day of his twenty-eight-day course.

j. Do not use a comma between the parts of a compound subject, compound object, or compound verb.

COMPOUND SUBJECT

Bakhtin's notion of novelistic languages as "ideologically saturated" [no comma] and his conception of them as "rejoinders" in a dialogue with the extraliterary (271, 274) are heuristic tools that can be applied not only to the analysis of prose fiction but also to the interpretation of poetic texts.

COMPOUND OBJECT

Miller has taken pride in citing the civic function of the theater [no comma] and the way in which the spectacle influences the private tensions of the individual.

COMPOUND VERB

In the afterlife, the poem suggests, African artists such as Wheatley will have "gem-blaz'd" crowns of their own [no comma] and will take their rightful places in "the heav'nly choirs."

k. Do not use a comma between two parallel subordinate elements.

From his darkness, Lear has gained insight into himself as fallible man and negligent king [no comma] and into the evil of Goneril and Regan.

The current political and cultural climate has given rise to a public that demands training in basic literacy [no comma] but that is unwilling to pay for it.

l. Use a comma in a date whose order is month, day, and year. If such a date comes in the middle of a sentence, include a comma after the year.

Martin Luther King, Jr., was born on January 15, 1929, and died on April 4, 1968.

But commas are not used with dates whose order is day, month, and year.

Martin Luther King, Jr., was born on 15 January 1929 and died on 4 April 1968.

m. Do not use a comma between a month and a year or between a season and a year.

The events of July 1789 are as familiar to the French as those of July 1776 are to Americans.

The prime minister announced his resignation in spring 2007.

See 3.9.7 for commas with quotations.

3.4.3 SEMICOLONS

a. Use a semicolon between independent clauses not linked by a conjunction.

> Shelley remarks that "the blank incapability of invention . . . is the greatest misery of authorship" (x); that misery overcome, she is pleased to write the "Author's Introduction" to a tale in which authorship proves a misery to her protagonist.

b. Use semicolons between items in a series when the items contain commas.

> Thérèse, the washerwoman; Sethe, the cook; Eva, the shelter giver and caretaker; and Baby Suggs, the churchless preacher, negotiate this paradox successfully within the narrative context.

3.4.4 COLONS

The colon is used between two parts of a sentence when the first part creates a sense of anticipation about what follows in the second. Leave only one space after a colon, not two.

a. Use a colon to introduce a list, an elaboration of what was just said, or the formal expression of a rule or principle.

> LIST
>
> All five of the relatively distinct types of early Japanese religious belief and practice are present in the book: Shinto, Buddhism, Taoism, Confucianism, and folk religion.
>
> ELABORATION
>
> As Emerson's friend at Walden Pond suggested, it takes two to speak the truth: one to speak and another to hear.
>
> RULE OR PRINCIPLE
>
> Most such standards no doubt point to the *delectare* and *prodesse* of Horace's advice to the poet: Delight and benefit your reader!
> (A rule or principle after a colon should begin with a capital letter.)

But do not use a colon before a list if the list is grammatically essential to the introductory wording.

> Atwood's other visual art includes a drawing for the cover of *Good Bones*, collages in *The Journals of Susanna Moodie*, and comic strips.
> (The list is the object of the verb *includes*.)

> Atwood has produced other visual art, such as a drawing for the cover of *Good Bones*, collages in *The Journals of Susanna Moodie*, and comic strips.
> (The list continues the expression *such as*.)

b. Use a colon to introduce a quotation that is independent from the structure of the main sentence.

> The new art relation of modernism is a concept that was most memorably given expression by Walter Pater: "All art constantly aspires towards the condition of music" (140).

A quotation that is integral to the sentence structure is generally preceded by no punctuation or, if a verb of saying (*says*, *exclaims*, *notes*, *writes*) introduces the quotation, by a comma. A colon is used after a verb of saying, however, if the verb introduces certain kinds of formal literary quotations, such as long quotations set off from the main text (see 3.9.2–4, 3.9.7–8). On colons separating titles and subtitles, see 3.8.1.

3.4.5 DASHES AND PARENTHESES

Dashes make a sharper break in the continuity of the sentence than commas do, and parentheses make a still sharper one. To indicate a dash, type two hyphens, with no space before, between, or after. (Your word processor may convert the two hyphens into a dash, as seen in the examples below.) Your writing will be smoother and more readable if you use dashes and parentheses sparingly. Limit the number of dashes in a sentence to two paired dashes or one unpaired dash.

a. Use dashes or parentheses to enclose a sentence element that interrupts the train of thought.

> The human race has survived, and the planet seems to have replenished itself—there are fish, oceans, forests—but what kind of society exists in 2195?

b. Use dashes or parentheses to set off a parenthetical element that contains a comma and that might be misread if set off with commas.

> Most newcomers to both states soon accommodate to the "correct" pronunciation—that is, to the pronunciation used by most westerners.
>
> The Italian sonnet (which is exemplified in Petrarch's *Canzoniere*, along with other kinds of poems) developed into the English sonnet.

c. Use a dash to introduce words that summarize a preceding series.

> Whether we locate meaning in the text, in the act of reading, or in some collaboration between reader and text—whatever our predilection, let us not generate from it a straitjacket.

A dash may also be used instead of a colon to introduce a list or an elaboration of what was just said (see 3.4.4a).

3.4.6 HYPHENS

Compound words of all types—nouns, verbs, adjectives, and so on—are written as separate words (*hard drive, hard labor*), with hyphens (*hard-and-fast, hard-boiled*), and as single words (*hardcover, hardheaded*). The dictionary shows how to write many compounds. A compound not in the dictionary should usually be written as separate words unless a hyphen is needed to prevent readers from misunderstanding the relation between the words. Following are some rules to help you decide whether you need a hyphen in compounds and other terms that may not appear in the dictionary.

a. Use a hyphen in a compound adjective beginning with an adverb such as *better, best, ill, lower, little,* or *well* when the adjective precedes a noun.

> better-prepared ambassador
>
> best-known work
>
> ill-informed reporter
>
> lower-priced tickets
>
> well-dressed announcer

But do not use a hyphen when the compound adjective comes after the noun it modifies.

> The ambassador was better prepared than the other delegates.

b. Do not use a hyphen in a compound adjective beginning with an adverb ending in *-ly* or with *too*, *very*, or *much*.

thoughtfully presented thesis
very contrived plot
too hasty judgment
much maligned performer

c. Use a hyphen in a compound adjective ending with the present participle (e.g., *loving*) or the past participle (e.g., *inspired*) of a verb when the adjective precedes a noun.

hate-filled speech
sports-loving throng
fear-inspired loyalty

d. Use a hyphen in a compound adjective formed by a number and a noun when the adjective precedes a noun.

twelfth-floor apartment
second-semester courses
early-thirteenth-century architecture

e. Use hyphens in other compound adjectives before nouns to prevent misreading.

children's-book library
(The hyphen indicates that the term refers to a library for children's books and not to a library belonging to children.)

Portuguese-language student
(The hyphen makes it clear that the term refers to a student who is studying Portuguese and not to a language student who is Portuguese.)

f. Do not use hyphens in familiar unhyphenated compound terms, such as *social security*, *high school*, and *liberal arts*, when they appear before nouns as modifiers.

social security tax
high school reunion
liberal arts curriculum

g. Use hyphens to join coequal nouns.

writer-critic
scholar-athlete
author-chef

But do not use a hyphen in a pair of nouns in which the first noun modifies the second.

father figure
opera lover

h. In general, do not use hyphens after prefixes (e.g., *anti-, co-, multi-, non-, over-, post-, pre-, re-, semi-, sub-, un-, under-*).

antiwar	overpay	semiretired
coworker	postwar	subsatellite
multinational	prescheduled	unambiguous
nonjudgmental	reinvigorate	underrepresented

But sometimes a hyphen is called for after a prefix.

post-Victorian
(Use a hyphen before a capital letter.)

re-cover
(The hyphen distinguishes this verb, meaning "cover again," from *recover*, meaning "get back.")

anti-icing
(Without the hyphen, the doubled vowel would make the term hard to recognize.)

3.4.7 APOSTROPHES

A principal function of apostrophes is to indicate possession. They are also used in contractions (*can't, wouldn't*), which are rarely acceptable in scholarly writing, and the plurals of the letters of the alphabet (*p's and q's, three A's*).

a. To form the possessive of a singular noun, add an apostrophe and an *s*.

a poem's meter

b. To form the possessive of a plural noun ending in *s*, add only an apostrophe.

photographers' exhibit

c. To form the possessive of an irregular plural noun not ending in *s*, add an apostrophe and an *s*.

women's studies

d. To form the possessive of nouns in a series, add a single apostrophe and an *s* if the ownership is shared.

Palmer and Colton's book on European history

But if the ownership is separate, place an apostrophe and an *s* after each noun.

Palmer's and Colton's books on European history

e. To form the possessive of any singular proper noun, add an apostrophe and an *s*.

Dickens's reputation
Descartes's philosophy
Marx's precepts
Venus's beauty

f. To form the possessive of a plural proper noun, add only an apostrophe.

the Dickenses' economic woes
the Vanderbilts' estate

g. Do not use an apostrophe to form the plural of an abbreviation or a number.

MAs	fours
PhDs	GRE score in the 1400s
1990s	

On using apostrophes to abbreviate dates, see 3.10.5.

3.4.8 QUOTATION MARKS

a. Place quotation marks around a word or phrase given in someone else's sense or in a special sense or purposefully misused.

> Teachers often make use of visual "texts" from current exhibits at the college's art gallery.
>
> Baillie relies on metaphors that contrast "bad" ancien régime-style formal gardens to "good" British natural landscapes.
>
> One commentator would go so far as to say that nothing is less traditional than "primitive" societies.

If introduced unnecessarily, this device can make writing heavy-handed. Quotation marks are redundant after *so-called*.

> One commentator would go so far as to say that nothing is less traditional than so-called primitive societies.

b. Use quotation marks for a translation of a foreign word or phrase.

> From its inception in the *tragosodos*, the "goat songs" whose dithyrambic intensity galvanized early Greek audiences of tragedy, the tragic has served this self-reflexive purpose.
>
> During the Meiji period, the emperor was recuperated as a divine monarch embodying the national polity (*kokutai*, literally "national body").

You may use single quotation marks for a translation that follows the original directly, without intervening words or punctuation.

> In a 1917 letter to the publisher Kurt Wolff, for example, Kafka refers to "[der] tief in mir sitzende Beamte" 'the deep-seated bureaucrat inside me' (*Briefe, 1902-1924* 158; *Letters* 134).

On quotation marks with titles, see 3.8.3–4. On quotation marks with quotations and with translations of quotations, see 3.9.7 and 3.9.8, respectively.

3.4.9 SQUARE BRACKETS

Use square brackets around a parenthesis within a parenthesis, so that the levels of subordination can be easily distinguished.

> The editor decided to use the Leningrad Codex (preserved in the Saltykov-Shchedrin State Public Library in Leningrad [now Saint Petersburg]).

For square brackets around an ellipsis or an interpolation in a quotation, see 3.9.5 and 3.9.6, respectively. For square brackets around missing, unverified, or interpolated data in documentation, see 6.6.2, 6.6.22, and 6.6.24.

3.4.10 SLASHES

The slash, or diagonal, is rarely necessary in formal prose. Other than in quotations of poetry (see 3.9.3), the slash has a place mainly between two terms paired as opposites or alternatives and used together as a noun.

> The essay traces a number of crossings over hypothetical borders or divisions: East/West, female/male, homosexual/heterosexual, colonized/colonizer, among others.

> The class studies Meyer Schapiro's discussion of such pictorial properties of painting as right/left or frame/center.

But use a hyphen when such a compound precedes and modifies a noun.

> nature-nurture conflict
> either-or situation
> East-West relations

3.4.11 PERIODS, QUESTION MARKS, AND EXCLAMATION POINTS

A sentence can end with a period, a question mark, or an exclamation point. Periods end declarative sentences. (For the use of periods with ellipsis points, see 3.9.5.) Question marks follow interrogative sentences. Except in direct quotation, avoid exclamation points in scholarly writing.

Place a question mark inside a closing quotation mark if a question mark occurs there in the quoted passage. But if the quotation ends a sentence that is a question, place a question mark outside the quotation. If a question mark occurs where a comma or period would normally be required, omit the comma or period. Note the use of the question mark and other punctuation marks in the following sentences:

Whitman asks, "Have you felt so proud to get at the meaning of poems?"

Where does Whitman speak of "the meaning of poems"?

"Have you felt so proud to get at the meaning of poems?" Whitman asks.

3.4.12 SPACING AFTER CONCLUDING PUNCTUATION MARKS

In an earlier era, writers using a typewriter commonly left two spaces after a period, a question mark, or an exclamation point. Publications in the United States today usually have the same spacing after concluding punctuation marks as between words on the same line. Since word processors make available the same fonts used by typesetters for printed works, many writers, influenced by the look of typeset publications, now leave only one space after a concluding punctuation mark. In addition, some publishers' guidelines for preparing a manuscript's electronic files ask professional authors to type only the spaces that are to appear in print. Because it is increasingly common for manuscripts to be prepared with a single space after all concluding punctuation marks, this spacing is recommended and shown in the examples in this manual.

3.5 ITALICS

In preparing manuscripts, authors commonly italicize text meant to be italicized in the final publication. This practice is assumed in the discussion and examples in this manual. In manuscripts that will be submitted for production by editors, typesetters, and the like, the clarity of every detail of the text is important. Choose a type font in which the italic style contrasts clearly with the regular style.

The rest of this section discusses using italics for words and letters referred to as words and letters, foreign words in an English text, and emphasis. (See 3.8.2 for the italicizing of titles.)

3.5.1 WORDS AND LETTERS REFERRED TO AS WORDS AND LETTERS

Italicize words and letters that are referred to as words and letters.

> The exercise is designed to help students understand critical terms like *irony*, *symbol*, and *metaphor*.
>
> Shaw spelled *Shakespeare* without the final *e*.

3.5.2 FOREIGN WORDS IN AN ENGLISH TEXT

In general, italicize foreign words used in an English text.

> The Renaissance courtier was expected to display *sprezzatura*, or nonchalance, in the face of adversity.

The numerous exceptions to this rule include quotations entirely in another language ("Julius Caesar said, 'Veni, vidi, vici' "); non-English titles of works published within larger works (poems, stories, essays, articles), which are placed in quotation marks and not italicized ("El sueño," the title of a poem by Quevedo); proper nouns (the Entente Cordiale), except when italicized through another convention (SS *Normandie* [see 3.8.2]); and foreign words anglicized through frequent use. Since American English rapidly naturalizes foreign words, use a dictionary to decide whether a foreign expression requires italics. Following are some adopted foreign words, abbreviations, and phrases commonly not italicized:

ad hoc	et al.	lieder
cliché	etc.	raison d'être
concerto	genre	sic
e.g.	hubris	versus

3.5.3 EMPHASIS

Italics for emphasis is a device that rapidly becomes ineffective. It is rarely appropriate in scholarly writing.

3.6 NAMES OF PERSONS

3.6.1 FIRST AND SUBSEQUENT USES OF NAMES

In general, the first time you use a person's name in the text of your manuscript, state it fully and accurately, exactly as it appears in your source.

Arthur George Rust, Jr.
Victoria M. Sackville-West

Do not change Arthur George Rust, Jr., to Arthur George Rust, for example, or drop the hyphen in Victoria M. Sackville-West. In subsequent references to the person, you may give the last name only (Rust, Sackville-West)—unless, of course, you refer to two or more persons with the same last name—or you may give the most common form of the name (e.g., Garcilaso for Garcilaso de la Vega). In casual references to the very famous—say, Mozart, Shakespeare, or Michelangelo—it is not necessary to give the full name initially. In some languages (e.g., Chinese, Hungarian, Japanese, Korean, and Vietnamese), surnames precede given names (see 3.6.7 and 3.6.12).

3.6.2 TITLES OF PERSONS

In general, do not use formal titles (Mr., Mrs., Miss, Ms., Dr., Professor, Reverend) in first or subsequent references to men or women, living or dead (Churchill, not Mr. Churchill; Mead, not Professor Mead; Hess, not Dame Myra; Montagu, not Lady Montagu). A few women in history are traditionally known by their titles as married women (e.g., Mrs. Humphry Ward, Mme de Staël), although the tendency is to omit such titles (Lafayette, not Mme de Lafayette). Treat other women's names the same as men's.

The appropriate way to refer to persons with titles of nobility can vary. For example, the full name and title of Henry Howard, earl of Surrey, should be given at first mention, and thereafter Surrey alone may be used. In contrast, for Benjamin Disraeli, first earl of Beaconsfield, it is sufficient to give Benjamin Disraeli initially and Disraeli subsequently. Follow the example of your sources in citing titles of nobility.

3.6.3 NAMES OF AUTHORS AND FICTIONAL CHARACTERS

It is common and acceptable to use simplified names of famous authors (Vergil for Publius Vergilius Maro, Dante for Dante Alighieri). Also acceptable are pseudonyms of authors.

Molière (Jean-Baptiste Poquelin)
Voltaire (François-Marie Arouet)
George Sand (Amandine-Aurore-Lucie Dupin)
George Eliot (Mary Ann Evans)
Mark Twain (Samuel Clemens)
Stendhal (Marie-Henri Beyle)
Novalis (Friedrich von Hardenberg)

Refer to fictional characters in the same way that the work of fiction does. You need not always use their full names, and you may retain titles (Dr. Jekyll, Mme Defarge).

3.6.4 DUTCH AND GERMAN NAMES

With some exceptions, especially in English-language contexts, Dutch *van*, *van der*, and *van den* and German *von* are generally not used with the last name alone.

Beethoven (Ludwig van Beethoven)
Droste-Hülshoff (Annette von Droste-Hülshoff)
Kleist (Heinrich von Kleist)
Vondel (Joost van den Vondel)

but

Van Dyck (Anthony Van Dyck)
Von Braun (Wernher Von Braun)

See 3.3.5 for German names with an umlaut.

3.6.5 FRENCH NAMES

With some exceptions, especially in English-language contexts, French *de* following a first name or a title such as *Mme* or *duc* is not used with the last name alone.

La Boétie (Étienne de La Boétie)
La Bruyère (Jean de La Bruyère)
Maupassant (Guy de Maupassant)
Nemours (Louis-Charles d'Orléans, duc de Nemours)
Ronsard (Pierre de Ronsard)
Scudéry (Madeleine de Scudéry)

but

De Quincey (Thomas De Quincey)

When the last name has only one syllable, however, *de* is usually retained.

de Gaulle (Charles de Gaulle)
de Man (Paul de Man)

The preposition also remains, in the form *d'*, when it elides with a last name beginning with a vowel.

d'Arcy (Pierre d'Arcy)
d'Arsonval (Arsène d'Arsonval)

The forms *du* and *des*—combinations of *de* with *le* and *les*—are always used with last names and are capitalized.

Des Périers (Bonaventure Des Périers)
Du Bos (Charles Du Bos)

A hyphen is frequently used between French given names, as well as between their initials (Marie-Joseph Chénier, M.-J. Chénier). Note that *M.* and *P.* before names may be abbreviations for the titles *Monsieur* and *Père* (M. René Char, P. J. Reynard).

3.6.6 GREEK NAMES

In Greek books, the author's name appears on the title page in the genitive case ("Hypo ["by"] Perikleous Alexandrou Argyropoulou"). The first name and usually the surname of a man are nominative (some surnames, however, are always genitive). The second, or patronymic, remains genitive because it means "son of" (Periklés Alexandrou Argyropoulos, Konstantinos Petrou Kavafis). The first name of a woman

is nominative, the patronymic and surname both genitive (Roxanes Demetriou Argyropoulu). On romanization, see 3.11.

3.6.7 HUNGARIAN NAMES

In Hungarian, the surname precedes the given name.

Bartók Béla
Bessenyei György
Illyés Gyula
Molnár Ferenc
Nagy László
Szabó Magda

In English texts, Hungarian names usually appear with given name first and the surname last.

Béla Bartók
György Bessenyei
Gyula Illyés
Ferenc Molnár
László Nagy
Magda Szabó

3.6.8 ITALIAN NAMES

The names of many Italians who lived before or during the Renaissance are alphabetized by first name.

Bonvesin da la Riva
Cino da Pistoia
Dante Alighieri
Iacopone da Todi
Michelangelo Buonarroti

But other names of the period follow the standard practice.

Boccaccio, Giovanni
Cellini, Benvenuto
Stampa, Gaspara

The names of members of historic families are also usually alphabetized by last name.

Este, Beatrice d'
Medici, Lorenzo de'

In modern times, Italian *da, de, del, della, di,* and *d'* are usually capitalized and used with the last name alone.

Da Ponte (Lorenzo Da Ponte)
D'Azeglio (Massimo D'Azeglio)
Del Buono (Oreste Del Buono)
Della Casa (Giovanni Della Casa)
De Sica (Vittorio De Sica)
Di Costanzo (Angelo Di Costanzo)

3.6.9 RUSSIAN NAMES

See J. Thomas Shaw's *The Transliteration of Modern Russian for English-Language Publications* (1967; New York: MLA, 1979; print) for a more extended discussion of which system of romanization to use for Russian names in various circumstances and when to use common Western forms of names. The following is adopted from Shaw.

Russian names have three parts: prename, patronymic, and surname (Anton Pavlovich Chekhov). Prenames of Russians should be romanized according to the appropriate system rather than given in their English equivalents (Ivan, not John). The only exception is the prename of a Russian ruler used alone (without the patronymic); in this case, use the English equivalent (Michael I, but Mikhail Pavlovich).

The form of patronymics in Russian varies by sex, as the form of surnames often does. For example, Aleksandr Sergeevich Pushkin was the husband of Natalia Nikolaevna Pushkina. The treatment of such names in an English text depends on the audience, on the predominance of masculine or feminine names in the text, and particularly on whether the text uses names without prenames. In general, the feminine forms should be used for the feminine names and the masculine forms for the masculine names. On occasion, however, especially in a casual reference to Russians in a work not on Russian studies, some modifications may be acceptable. Scholars not familiar with Russian names must exercise care in balancing accuracy with clarity.

3.6.10 SPANISH NAMES

Spanish *de* is not used before the last name alone.

Las Casas (Bartolomé de Las Casas)
Madariaga (Salvador de Madariaga)
Rueda (Lope de Rueda)
Timoneda (Juan de Timoneda)

Spanish *del*, formed from the fusion of the preposition *de* and the definite article *el*, is capitalized and used with the last name alone.

Del Río (Angel Del Río)

A Spanish surname may include both the paternal name and the maternal name, with or without the conjunction *y*. The surname of a married woman usually includes her paternal surname and her husband's paternal surname, connected by *de*. Alphabetize Spanish names by the full surnames (consult your sources or a biographical dictionary for guidance in distinguishing surnames and given names).

Carreño de Miranda, Juan
Cervantes Saavedra, Miguel de
Díaz del Castillo, Bernal
García Márquez, Gabriel
Larra y Sánchez de Castro, Mariano José
López de Ayala, Pero
Matute, Ana María
Ortega y Gasset, José
Quevedo y Villegas, Francisco Gómez de
Sinues de Marco, María del Pilar
Zayas y Sotomayor, María de

Even the names of persons commonly known by the maternal portions of their surnames, such as Galdós and Lorca, should be alphabetized by the full surnames.

García Lorca, Federico
Pérez Galdós, Benito

3.6.11 LATIN NAMES

Roman male citizens generally had three names: a praenomen (given name), a nomen (clan name), and a cognomen (family or familiar name). Men in this category are usually referred to by nomen, cognomen, or both; your source or a standard reference book such as *The Oxford Classical Dictionary* will provide guidance.

Brutus (Marcus Iunius Brutus)
Calpurnius Siculus (Titus Calpurnius Siculus)
Cicero (Marcus Tullius Cicero)
Lucretius (Titus Lucretius Carus)
Plautus (Titus Maccius Plautus)

Roman women usually had two names—a nomen (the clan name in the feminine form) and a cognomen (often derived from the father's cognomen): Livia Drusilla (daughter of Marcus Livius Drusus). Sometimes a woman's cognomen indicates her chronological order among the daughters of the family: Antonia Minor (younger daughter of Marcus Antonius). Most Roman women are referred to by nomen: Calpurnia, Clodia, Octavia, Sulpicia. Some, however, are better known by cognomen: Agrippina (Vipsania Agrippina).

When citing Roman names, use the forms most common in English.

Horace (Quintus Horatius Flaccus)
Julius Caesar (Gaius Iulius Caesar)
Juvenal (Decimus Iunius Iuvenalis)
Livy (Titus Livius)
Ovid (Publius Ovidius Naso)
Quintilian (Marcus Fabius Quintilianus)
Terence (Publius Terentius Afer)
Vergil (Publius Vergilius Maro)

Finally, some medieval and Renaissance figures are best known by their adopted or assigned Latin names.

Albertus Magnus (Albert von Bollstädt)
Comenius (Jan Amos Komenský)
Copernicus (Niklas Koppernigk)
Paracelsus (Theophrastus Bombast von Hohenheim)

3.6.12 ASIAN NAMES

In Chinese, Japanese, Korean, and Vietnamese, surnames precede given names.

CHINESE

Deng Nan

Deng Xiaoping

JAPANESE

Ueda Akinari

Ueda Makoto

KOREAN

Kim Jong-gil

Kim Nam-ju

VIETNAMESE

Nguyen Du

Nguyen Trai

Western authors should follow known preferences, however, even if the preferred forms do not accord with normal practice or standard romanization (Y. R. Chao, Syngman Rhee). (On romanization, see 3.11.)

In the older Wade-Giles system of romanizing Chinese, the given name appears in two syllables, separated by a hyphen (Huang Tso-lin, Mao Tse-tung); in the pinyin system, the given name appears without a hyphen (Huang Zuolin, Mao Zedong). Scholars presenting Chinese names need to balance the sometimes conflicting goals of consistency and clarity. In general, if you use the pinyin system, add the Wade-Giles spelling, in parentheses, for the names of persons who died before 1950 or who are better known by the older spelling. This practice allows a reader unfamiliar with the systems of romanization to become acquainted with the differences between them and to locate in other scholarly works information you cite. Many figures from the past are known by names of only two syllables, sometimes hyphenated: Lao-tzu, Han-shan, Li Po, Wang Wei.

3.6.13 NAMES IN OTHER LANGUAGES

For the names of persons in a language with which you are not familiar, consult relevant reference works or knowledgeable scholars for guidance on the order of names and on the use of prefixes (as in Arabic names). When a work you cite includes a romanization of the author's name on the title page, spell the author's name in your bibliography according to the system recommended in 3.11, and follow the name by the romanization (in parentheses) printed on the title page, if it is different.

3.7 CAPITALIZATION

3.7.1 ENGLISH

Capitalized in English are (1) the first word of a sentence, (2) the subject pronoun *I*, (3) the names and initials of persons (except for some particles), (4) the names of months and days of the week, (5) titles that immediately precede personal names (President Wilson) but not persons' titles used alone (*the president, a professor of English*), (6) other proper nouns, and (7) most adjectives derived from proper nouns.

In the title or subtitle of a work, capitalize the first word, the last word, and all principal words, including those that follow hyphens in compound terms. Therefore, capitalize the following parts of speech:

- Nouns (e.g., *flowers* and *Europe*, as in *The Flowers of Europe*)
- Pronouns (e.g., *our*, as in *Save Our Children*; *that*, as in *The Mouse That Roared*)
- Verbs (e.g., *watches*, as in *America Watches Television*; *is*, as in *What Is Literature?*)
- Adjectives (e.g., *more*, as in *No More Parades*; *that*, as in *Who Said That Phrase?*)
- Adverbs (e.g., *slightly*, as in *Only Slightly Corrupt*; *down*, as in *Go Down, Moses*)
- Subordinating conjunctions (e.g., *after, although, as if, as soon as, because, before, if, that, unless, until, when, where, while*, as in *One If by Land* and *Anywhere That Chance Leads*)

Do not capitalize the following parts of speech when they fall in the middle of a title:

- Articles (*a, an, the*, as in *Felix Holt, the Radical*)

- Prepositions (e.g., *against, as, between, in, of, to,* as in *The Merchant of Venice* and "A Dialogue between the Soul and Body")
- Coordinating conjunctions (*and, but, for, nor, or, so, yet,* as in *Romeo and Juliet*)
- The *to* in infinitives (as in *The Courage to Be*)

Use a colon and a space to separate a title from a subtitle, unless the title ends in a question mark, an exclamation point, or a dash. Include other punctuation only if it is part of the title.

The following examples illustrate how to capitalize and punctuate a variety of titles. For a discussion of which titles to italicize and which to place in quotation marks, see 3.8.2–3.

Death of a Salesman

The Teaching of Spanish in English-Speaking Countries

Storytelling and Mythmaking: Images from Film and Literature

Life As I Find It

The Artist as Critic

What Are You Doing in My Universe?

Whose Music? A Sociology of Musical Language

Where Did You Go? Out. What Did You Do? Nothing.

"Ode to a Nightingale"

"Italian Literature before Dante"

"What Americans Stand For"

"Why Fortinbras?"

When the first line of a poem serves as the title of the poem, reproduce the line exactly as it appears in the text.

Dickinson's poem "I heard a Fly buzz—when I died—" contrasts the mundane and the momentous.

In the name of a periodical, an initial definite article is usually not treated as part of the title (the *Washington Post*). Capitalize the word *series* or *edition* only when it is part of a title (Norton Critical Edition, Twayne World Authors Series; but Penguin edition, *Oxford Companion* series). Do not capitalize the descriptive name for a part of a work—for example, *preface, introduction,* or *appendix*—unless it is a well-known title, such as Wordsworth's Preface to *Lyrical Ballads.*

Do not capitalize a noun, spelled out or abbreviated, followed by a numeral or letter indicating place in a sequence (*act 5, version A, ch. 3,*

no. 20, pl. 4, vol. 2). Never capitalize entire words (i.e., every letter) in titles, even if the words are capitalized on the title page, except for terms composed of initials (*MLN*).

3.7.2 FRENCH

In prose and verse, French capitalization is the same as English except that the following terms are not capitalized in French unless they begin sentences or, sometimes, lines of verse: (1) the subject pronoun *je* 'I,' (2) the names of months and days of the week, (3) the names of languages, (4) adjectives derived from proper nouns, (5) titles preceding personal names, and (6) the words meaning "street," "square," "lake," "mountain," and so on, in most place-names.

Un Français m'a parlé anglais près de la place de la Concorde.

Hier j'ai vu le docteur Maurois qui conduisait une voiture Ford.

Le capitaine Boutillier m'a dit qu'il partait pour Rouen le premier jeudi d'avril avec quelques amis normands.

There are two widely accepted methods of capitalizing French titles and subtitles of works. One method is to capitalize the first word in titles and subtitles and all proper nouns in them. This method is normally followed in publications of the Modern Language Association.

L'ami du peuple
La chambre claire: Note sur la photographie
Du côté de chez Swann
Le grand Meaulnes
La guerre de Troie n'aura pas lieu
Nouvelle revue d'onomastique

In the other method, when a title or subtitle begins with an article, the first noun and any preceding adjectives are also capitalized.

L'Ami du peuple
La Chambre claire: Note sur la photographie
Du côté de chez Swann
Le Grand Meaulnes
La Guerre de Troie n'aura pas lieu

In this system, all major words in titles of series and periodicals are sometimes capitalized.

Nouvelle Revue d'Onomastique

Whichever practice you choose or your publisher requires, follow it consistently throughout your manuscript.

3.7.3 GERMAN

In prose and verse, German capitalization differs considerably from English. Always capitalized in German are all nouns—including adjectives, infinitives, pronouns, prepositions, and other parts of speech when used as nouns—as well as the pronoun *Sie* 'you' and its possessive, *Ihr* 'your,' and their inflected forms. Not capitalized unless they begin sentences or, usually, lines of verse are (1) the subject pronoun *ich* 'I,' (2) the names of languages and of days of the week used as adjectives, adverbs, or complements of prepositions, and (3) adjectives and adverbs formed from proper nouns, except when the proper nouns are names of persons and the adjectives and adverbs refer to the persons' works or deeds.

Ich glaube an das Gute in der Welt.

Er schreibt, nur um dem Auf und Ab der Buch-Nachfrage zu entsprechen.

Fahren Sie mit Ihrer Frau zurück?

Ein französischer Schriftsteller, den ich gut kenne, arbeitet sonntags immer an seinem neuen Buch über die platonische Liebe.

Der Staat ist eine der bekanntesten Platonischen Schriften.

In letters and ceremonial writings, the pronouns *du* and *ihr* 'you' and their derivatives are capitalized.

In a title or subtitle, capitalize the first word and all words normally capitalized.

Thomas Mann und die Grenzen des Ich

Ein treuer Diener seines Herrn

Zeitschrift für vergleichende Sprachforschung

3.7.4 ITALIAN

In prose and verse, Italian capitalization is the same as English except that in Italian centuries and other large divisions of time are capitalized (*il Seicento*) and the following terms are not capitalized unless they begin sentences or, usually, lines of verse: (1) the subject pronoun *io* 'I,' (2) the names of months and days of the week, (3) the names of languages and nationalities, (4) nouns, adjectives, and adverbs derived from proper nouns, (5) titles preceding personal names, and (6) the words meaning "street," "square," and so on, in most place-names.

> Un italiano parlava francese con uno svizzero in piazza di Spagna.
>
> Il dottor Bruno ritornerà dall'Italia giovedì otto agosto e io partirò il nove.

In a title or subtitle, capitalize only the first word and all words normally capitalized.

> *L'arte tipografica in Urbino*
> *Bibliografia della critica pirandelliana*
> *Collezione di classici italiani*
> *Dizionario letterario Bompiani*
> *Studi petrarcheschi*

3.7.5 PORTUGUESE

In prose and verse, Portuguese capitalization is the same as English except that the following terms are not capitalized in Portuguese unless they begin sentences or, sometimes, lines of verse: (1) the subject pronoun *eu* 'I,' (2) the names of days of the week, (3) the names of months in Brazil (they are capitalized in Portugal), (4) adjectives derived from proper nouns, (5) titles preceding personal names in Portugal (they are capitalized in Brazil), and (6) the words meaning "street," "square," and so on, in most place-names in Portugal (they are capitalized in Brazil). As in English, points of the compass are not capitalized when indicating direction (*ao norte da América*), but they are capitalized when indicating regions (*os americanos do Norte*). Brazilian Portuguese capitalizes nouns used to refer to abstract concepts, to institutions, or to branches of knowledge (*a Igreja, a Nação, a Matemática*).

PENINSULAR USAGE

Vi o doutor Silva na praça da República.

BRAZILIAN USAGE

O francês falava da História do Brasil na Praça Tiradentes, utilizando o inglês.

Ontem eu vi o Doutor Garcia, aquele que tem um carro Ford.

Então me disse Dona Teresa que pretendia sair para o Recife a primeira segunda-feira de abril com alguns amigos mineiros.

In a title or subtitle, capitalize only the first word and all words normally capitalized.

O bico da pena
O espírito das leis
Gabriela, cravo e canela
Problemas das linguagem e do estilo
Boletim de filologia
Revista lusitana
Correio da manhã

Some editors and presses, however, capitalize all major words: *Gabriela, Cravo e Canela* and *Boletim de Filologia*.

3.7.6 RUSSIAN

In prose and verse, Russian capitalization is the same as English except that the following terms are not capitalized in Russian unless they begin sentences or, sometimes, lines of verse: (1) the subject pronoun я 'I,' (2) the names of months and days of the week, (3) the names of languages, (4) adjectives derived from proper nouns, (5) titles preceding personal names, and (6) the words meaning "street," "square," and so on, in most place-names. Romanized Russian should follow the same usage (on romanization, see 3.11).

В субботу, тринадцатого апреля, празднуя свой день рождения, доктор Петухов вновь вспомнил о своей встрече с французом из Лиона на улице Марата.

В то время петербургская знать предпочитала говорить по-французски.

Напрасно я пытался уговорить его не делать этого.

In a title or subtitle and in the name of an organization or institution, capitalize the first word and all words normally capitalized.

«К истории образования восточнославянских языков: По данным Галицкого евангелия 1266-1301 гг.»

Общественные науки за рубежом: Литературоведение

Вопросы литературы

3.7.7 SPANISH

In prose and verse, Spanish capitalization is the same as English except that the following terms are not capitalized in Spanish unless they begin sentences or, sometimes, lines of verse: (1) the subject pronoun *yo* 'I,' (2) the names of months and days of the week, (3) the names of languages and nationalities, (4) nouns and adjectives derived from proper nouns, (5) titles preceding personal names, and (6) the words meaning "street," "square," and so on, in most place-names.

El francés hablaba inglés en la plaza Colón.

Ayer yo vi al doctor García en un coche Ford.

Me dijo don Jorge que iba a salir para Sevilla el primer martes de abril con unos amigos neoyorquinos.

In a title or subtitle, capitalize only the first word and words normally capitalized.

Breve historia del ensayo hispanoamericano

Extremos de América

La gloria de don Ramiro

Historia verdadera de la conquista de la Nueva España

Revista de filología española

Trasmundo de Goya

Some editors and presses follow other rules. In titles of series and periodicals, they capitalize all major words: *Revista de Filología Española*.

3.7.8 LATIN

Although practice varies, Latin most commonly follows the English rules for capitalization, except that *ego* 'I' is not capitalized.

> Semper ego auditor tantum? Numquamne reponam / Vexatus totiens rauci Theseide Cordi?
>
> Quidquid id est, timeo Danaos et dona ferentes.
>
> Nil desperandum.
>
> Quo usque tandem abutere, Catilina, patientia nostra?

In a title or subtitle, capitalize only the first word and all words normally capitalized.

> *De senectute*
>
> *Liber de senectute*
>
> *Pro Marcello*

3.7.9 OTHER LANGUAGES

In romanizing languages that do not have capital letters (e.g., Arabic, Chinese, Japanese), capitalize the first words of sentences and, sometimes, of lines of poetry and all names of persons and places. (On romanization, see 3.11.) In romanized Arabic, the article *al* (and its forms) is lowercase except when it begins a sentence. Capitalize romanized names of institutions, religions, movements, and the like if comparable names are capitalized in English. A lowercase romanized term appearing in English text is italicized; a capitalized romanized name (other than the titles listed in 3.8.2) in English text is not italicized, unless it is part of an expression that is otherwise lowercase. In a title or subtitle, capitalize only the first word and all words normally capitalized.

For additional information on capitalization in a variety of languages, consult *The Chicago Manual of Style* (15th ed.; Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2003; print, Web), the United States Government Printing Office's *Style Manual* (29th ed.; Washington: GPO, 2000; CD-ROM, print, Web), *ALA-LC Romanization Tables: Transliteration Schemes for Non-Roman Scripts* (comp. and ed. Randall K. Barry; Washington: Lib. of Cong., 1997; print, Web),

and *Words into Type* (by Marjorie E. Skillin et al.; 3rd ed.; Englewood Cliffs: Prentice, 1974; print).

3.8 TITLES OF WORKS IN THE MANUSCRIPT

3.8.1 GENERAL GUIDELINES

Whenever you cite the title of a published work in your manuscript, take the title from the title page, not, for example, from the cover or from the top of a page. Do not reproduce any unusual typographic characteristics, such as special capitalization or lowercasing of letters (see 3.7.1). Place a colon between a title and a subtitle, unless the title ends in a question mark, an exclamation point, or a dash. A title page may present a title designed like one of the following examples:

MODERNISM & NEGRITUDE

READING SITES
Social Difference and
Reader Response

Turner's early sketchbooks

These titles should appear in a manuscript as follows:

Modernism and Negritude

Reading Sites: Social Difference and Reader Response

Turner's Early Sketchbooks

To indicate titles in your manuscript, whether in English or in another language, either italicize them or enclose them in quotation marks. In general, italicize the titles of works published independently (see 3.8.2) and use quotation marks for titles of works published within larger works and for unpublished works (see 3.8.3).

3.8.2 ITALICIZED TITLES

Italicize the names of books, plays, poems published as books, pamphlets, periodicals (newspapers, magazines, and journals), Web sites,

online databases, films, television and radio broadcasts, compact discs, audiocassettes, record albums, dance performances, operas and other long musical compositions (except those identified simply by form, number, and key; see 3.8.5), paintings, works of sculpture, ships, aircraft, and spacecraft.

The Awakening (book)
The Piano Lesson (play)
The Waste Land (poem published as a book)
New Jersey Driver Manual (pamphlet)
Wall Street Journal (newspaper)
Time (magazine)
PMLA (journal)
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Web site)
LexisNexis Academic (online database)
Die bitteren Tränen der Petra von Kant (film)
Star Trek (television broadcast)
What's the Word? (radio broadcast)
Sgt. Pepper's Lonely Hearts Club Band (compact disc, audiocassette, record album)
Ailey's *Revelations* (dance performance)
Rigoletto (opera)
Berlioz's *Symphonie fantastique* (long musical composition identified by name)
Chagall's *I and My Village* (painting)
French's *The Minute Man* (sculpture)
HMS *Vanguard* (ship)
Spirit of St. Louis (aircraft)
Challenger (spacecraft)

3.8.3 TITLES IN QUOTATION MARKS

Enclose in quotation marks the titles of articles, essays, stories, and poems published within larger works; chapters of books; pages in Web sites; individual episodes of television and radio broadcasts; and short musical compositions (e.g., songs). Also use quotation marks for un-

published works, such as lectures, addresses delivered at conferences, manuscripts of any length, and dissertations.

"Literary History and Sociology" (journal article)

"Etruscan" (encyclopedia article)

"The Fiction of Langston Hughes" (essay in a book)

"The Lottery" (story)

"Kubla Khan" (poem)

"Contemporary Theory, the Academy, and Pedagogy" (chapter in a book)

"Philosophy of Economics" (page in a Web site)

"The Trouble with Tribbles" (episode of the television broadcast *Star Trek*)

"Lost Homelands" (episode of the radio broadcast *What's the Word?*)

"Mood Indigo" (song)

"Adapting to the Age of Information" (lecture)

"Cybernetic Constructivism" (address)

"Coffee at the Automat" (manuscript)

"Acts of Coercion: Father-Daughter Relationships and the Pressure to Confess in British Women's Fiction, 1778-1814" (dissertation)

3.8.4 TITLES AND QUOTATIONS WITHIN TITLES

Italicize a title normally indicated by italics when it appears within a title enclosed in quotation marks.

"*Romeo and Juliet* and Renaissance Politics" (an article about a play)

"Language and Childbirth in *The Awakening*" (an article about a novel)

Enclose in single quotation marks a title normally indicated by quotation marks when it appears within another title requiring quotation marks.

"Lines after Reading 'Sailing to Byzantium'" (a poem about a poem)

"The Uncanny Theology of 'A Good Man Is Hard to Find'" (an article about a story)

Also place single quotation marks around a quotation that appears within a title requiring quotation marks.

"Emerson's Strategies against 'Foolish Consistency'" (an article with a quotation in its title)

Use quotation marks around a title normally indicated by quotation marks when it appears within an italicized title.

"The Lottery" and Other Stories (a book of stories)
New Perspectives on "The Eve of St. Agnes" (a book about a poem)

If a period is required after an italicized title that ends with a quotation mark, place the period before the quotation mark.

The study appears in *New Perspectives on "The Eve of St. Agnes."*

There are two common methods for identifying a normally italicized title when it appears within an italicized title. In one practice, the title within is neither italicized nor enclosed in quotation marks. This method is preferred in publications of the Modern Language Association.

Approaches to Teaching Murasaki Shikibu's The Tale of Genji (a book about a novel)
From The Lodger *to* The Lady Vanishes*: Hitchcock's Classic British Thrillers* (a book about films)

In the other method, all titles within italicized titles are placed in quotation marks and italicized.

Approaches to Teaching Murasaki Shikibu's "The Tale of Genji"
From "The Lodger" to "The Lady Vanishes": Hitchcock's Classic British Thrillers

Each approach has advantages and disadvantages. In the first method, the titles of works published independently and the material containing them are always given opposite treatments. This practice has the advantage of consistency, but it can lead to ambiguity: it is sometimes hard to tell where a title like *Approaches to Teaching Murasaki Shikibu's* The Tale of Genji ends and where the adjacent text begins.

The second method prevents confusion between titles and the adjacent text. However, it treats titles of works published independently two ways: they receive quotation marks in italicized titles but nowhere else. In addition, within italicized titles this method abandons the distinction between works that are published independently and those that are not.

Whichever practice you choose or your publisher requires, follow it consistently throughout your manuscript.

3.8.5 EXCEPTIONS

The convention of using italics and quotation marks to indicate titles does not generally apply to the names of scriptural writings (including all books and versions of the Bible); of laws, acts, and similar political documents; of musical compositions identified by form, number, and key; of series, societies, buildings, and monuments; and of conferences, seminars, workshops, and courses. These terms all appear without italics or quotation marks.

SCRIPTURE

Bible	Talmud
Old Testament	Koran
Genesis	Upanishads
Gospels	

But italicize titles of individual published editions of scriptural writings (*The Interlinear Bible, The Talmud of the Land of Israel: A Preliminary Translation and Explanation, The Upanishads: A Selection for the Modern Reader*) and treat the editions in the works-cited list like any other published book.

LAWS, ACTS, AND SIMILAR POLITICAL DOCUMENTS

Magna Carta
Declaration of Independence
Bill of Rights
Treaty of Trianon

MUSICAL COMPOSITIONS IDENTIFIED BY FORM, NUMBER, AND KEY

Beethoven's Symphony no. 7 in A, op. 92
Vivaldi's Concerto for Two Trumpets and Strings in C, RV539

SERIES

Bollingen Series
University of North Carolina Studies in Comparative Literature
Masterpiece Theatre

SOCIETIES

American Historical Association

Renaissance Society of America

BUILDINGS AND MONUMENTS

Moscone Center

Sears Tower

Arch of Constantine

CONFERENCES, SEMINARS, WORKSHOPS, AND COURSES

The Social Poem: A Conference on Contemporary Poetry in the Public Sphere

Canadian Writers' Workshop

MLA Annual Convention

Introduction to Linguistics

Portuguese 102

Words designating the divisions of a work are also not italicized or put within quotation marks, nor are they capitalized when used in the text ("The author says in her preface . . . ," "In canto 32 Ariosto writes . . .").

preface	bibliography	act 4
introduction	appendix	scene 7
list of works cited	index	stanza 20
chapter 2	canto 32	

3.8.6 SHORTENED TITLES

If you cite a title often in the text of your manuscript, you may, after stating the title in full at least once, use a shortened form, preferably a familiar or obvious one (e.g., "Nightingale" for "Ode to a Nightingale"), or an abbreviation (for guidance on abbreviating titles of works, see 8.6).

3.9 QUOTATIONS

3.9.1 ACCURACY OF QUOTATIONS

The accuracy of quotations is extremely important. They must reproduce the original sources exactly. Unless indicated in square brackets or

parentheses (see 3.9.6), changes must not be made in the spelling, capitalization, or interior punctuation of the source. You must construct a clear, grammatically correct sentence that allows you to introduce or incorporate a quotation with complete accuracy. Alternatively, you may paraphrase the original and quote only fragments, which may be easier to integrate into the text. If you change a quotation in any way, make the alteration clear to the reader, following the rules and recommendations below.

3.9.2 PROSE

If a prose quotation runs no more than four lines and requires no special emphasis, put it in quotation marks and incorporate it into the text.

> "It was the best of times, it was the worst of times," wrote Charles Dickens about the eighteenth century.

You need not always reproduce complete sentences. Sometimes you may want to quote just a word or phrase as part of your sentence.

> For Charles Dickens the eighteenth century was both "the best of times" and "the worst of times."

You may put a quotation at the beginning, middle, or end of your sentence or, for the sake of variety or better style, divide it by your own words.

> Joseph Conrad writes of the company manager in *Heart of Darkness*, "He was obeyed, yet he inspired neither love nor fear, nor even respect."

or

> "He was obeyed," writes Joseph Conrad of the company manager in *Heart of Darkness*, "yet he inspired neither love nor fear, nor even respect."

If a quotation ending a sentence requires a parenthetical reference, place the sentence period after the reference. (For more information on punctuating quotations, see 3.9.7.)

> For Charles Dickens the eighteenth century was both "the best of times" and "the worst of times" (35).

> "He was obeyed," writes Joseph Conrad of the company manager in *Heart of Darkness*, "yet he inspired neither love nor fear, nor even respect" (87).

If a quotation runs to more than four lines when run into the text, set it off from your text by beginning a new line, indenting one inch from the left margin, and typing it double-spaced, without adding quotation marks. A colon generally introduces a quotation displayed in this way, though sometimes the context may require a different mark of punctuation or none at all. If you quote only a single paragraph or part of one, do not indent the first line more than the rest. A parenthetical reference for a prose quotation set off from the text follows the last line of the quotation.

> At the conclusion of *Lord of the Flies*, Ralph and the other boys realize the horror of their actions:
>
> > The tears began to flow and sobs shook him. He gave himself up to them now for the first time on the island; great, shuddering spasms of grief that seemed to wrench his whole body. His voice rose under the black smoke before the burning wreckage of the island; and infected by that emotion, the other little boys began to shake and sob too. (186)

If you need to quote two or more paragraphs, indent the first line of each paragraph an additional quarter inch. If the first sentence quoted does not begin a paragraph in the source, however, do not indent it the additional amount. Indent only the first lines of the successive paragraphs.

> In *Moll Flanders* Defoe maintains the pseudoautobiographical narration typical of the picaresque tradition:
>
> > My true name is so well known in the records, or registers, at Newgate and in the Old Bailey, and there are some things of such consequence still depending there relating to my particular conduct, that it is not to be expected I should set my name or the account of my family to this work. . . .
> >
> > It is enough to tell you, that . . . some of my worst comrades, who are out of the way of doing me harm . . . know me by the name of Moll Flanders. . . . (1)

On omitting words within quotations, see 3.9.5. For translations of quotations, see 3.9.8.

3.9.3 POETRY

If you quote part or all of a single line of verse that does not require special emphasis, put it in quotation marks within your text. You may also incorporate two or three lines in this way, using a slash with a space on each side (/) to separate them.

> Bradstreet frames the poem with a sense of mortality: "All things within this fading world hath end" (1).
>
> Reflecting on the "incident" in Baltimore, Cullen concludes, "Of all the things that happened there / That's all that I remember" (11-12).

Verse quotations of more than three lines should begin on a new line. Unless the quotation involves unusual spacing, indent each line one inch from the left margin and double-space between lines, adding no quotation marks that do not appear in the original. A parenthetical reference for a verse quotation set off from the text follows the last line of the quotation (as in quotations of prose); a parenthetical reference that will not fit on the line should appear on a new line, flush with the right margin of the page.

> Elizabeth Bishop's "In the Waiting Room" is rich in evocative detail:
>
> It was winter. It got dark
> early. The waiting room
> was full of grown-up people,
> arctics and overcoats,
> lamps and magazines. (6-10)

A line that is too long to fit within the right margin should be continued on the next line and the continuation indented an additional quarter inch. You may reduce the indention of the quotation to less than one inch from the left margin if doing so will eliminate the need for such continuations. If the spatial arrangement of the original lines, including indention and spacing within and between them, is unusual, reproduce it as accurately as possible.

E. E. Cummings concludes the poem with this vivid description of a carefree scene, reinforced by the carefree form of the lines themselves:

> it's
> spring
> and
> the
> goat-footed
> balloonMan whistles
> far
> and
> wee (16-24)

When a verse quotation begins in the middle of a line, the partial line should be positioned where it is in the original and not shifted to the left margin.

In a poem on Thomas Hardy ("T. H."), Molly Holden recalls her encounter with a "young dog fox" one morning:

> I remember
> he glanced at me in just that way, independent
> and unabashed, the handsome sidelong look
> that went round and about but never directly
> met my eyes, for that would betray his soul.
> He was not being sly, only careful. (43-48)

For translations of quotations, see 3.9.8.

3.9.4 DRAMA

If you quote dialogue between two or more characters in a play, set the quotation off from your text. Begin each part of the dialogue with the appropriate character's name indented one inch from the left margin and written in all capital letters: HAMLET. Follow the name with a period, and start the quotation. Indent all subsequent lines in that character's speech an additional quarter inch. When the dialogue shifts to another character, start a new line indented one inch from the left margin. Maintain this pattern throughout the entire quotation.

Marguerite Duras's screenplay for *Hiroshima mon amour* suggests at the outset the profound difference between observation and experience:

HE. You saw nothing in Hiroshima. Nothing.
SHE. I saw *everything. Everything.* . . . The hospital, for instance, I saw it. I'm sure I did. There is a hospital in Hiroshima. How could I help seeing it?
HE. You did not see the hospital in Hiroshima. You saw nothing in Hiroshima. (2505-06)

A short time later Lear loses the final symbol of his former power, the soldiers who make up his train:

GONERIL. Hear me, my lord.
What need you five-and-twenty, ten or five,
To follow in a house where twice so many
Have a command to tend you?
REGAN. What need one?
LEAR. O, reason not the need! (2.4.254-58)

For the other aspects of formatting, follow the recommendations above for quoting prose and poetry (3.9.2–3). In general, stage directions are treated like other quoted text: they should be reproduced exactly as they appear in the original source (see 3.9.1). When stage directions interrupt the grammatical sense of your sentence, they may be replaced with an ellipsis (see 3.9.5).

3.9.5 ELLIPSIS

Whenever you wish to omit a word, a phrase, a sentence, or more from a quoted passage, you should be guided by two principles: fairness to the author quoted and the grammatical integrity of your writing. A quotation should never be presented in a way that could cause a reader to misunderstand the sentence structure of the original source. If you quote only a word or a phrase, it will be obvious that you left out some of the original sentence.

In his inaugural address, John F. Kennedy spoke of a "new frontier."

But if omitting material from the original sentence or sentences leaves a quotation that appears to be a sentence or a series of sentences, you must use ellipsis points, or three spaced periods, to indicate that your quotation does not completely reproduce the original. Whenever you omit words from a quotation, the resulting passage—your prose and the quotation integrated into it—should be grammatically complete and correct.

For an ellipsis within a sentence, use three periods with a space before each and a space after the last (. . .).

ORIGINAL

Medical thinking, trapped in the theory of astral influences, stressed air as the communicator of disease, ignoring sanitation or visible carriers. (Barbara W. Tuchman, *A Distant Mirror: The Calamitous Fourteenth Century* [1978; New York: Ballantine, 1979; print; 101–02])

QUOTATION WITH AN ELLIPSIS IN THE MIDDLE

In surveying various responses to plagues in the Middle Ages, Barbara W. Tuchman writes, "Medical thinking . . . stressed air as the communicator of disease, ignoring sanitation or visible carriers" (101-02).

When the ellipsis coincides with the end of your sentence, use three periods with a space before each following a sentence period—that is, four periods, with no space before the first or after the last.

QUOTATION WITH AN ELLIPSIS AT THE END

In surveying various responses to plagues in the Middle Ages, Barbara W. Tuchman writes, "Medical thinking, trapped in the theory of astral influences, stressed air as the communicator of disease. . . ."

If a parenthetical reference follows the ellipsis at the end of your sentence, however, use three periods with a space before each, and place the sentence period after the final parenthesis.

QUOTATION WITH AN ELLIPSIS AT THE END FOLLOWED BY A PARENTHETICAL REFERENCE

In surveying various responses to plagues in the Middle Ages, Barbara W. Tuchman writes, "Medical thinking, trapped in the theory of astral influences, stressed air as the communicator of disease . . ." (101-02).

In a quotation of more than one sentence, an ellipsis in the middle can indicate the omission of any amount of text.

ORIGINAL

Presidential control reached its zenith under Andrew Jackson, the extent of whose attention to the press even before he became a candi

date is suggested by the fact that he subscribed to twenty newspapers. Jackson was never content to have only one organ grinding out his tune. For a time, the *United States Telegraph* and the *Washington Globe* were almost equally favored as party organs, and there were fifty-seven journalists on the government payroll. (William L. Rivers, *The Mass Media: Reporting, Writing, Editing* [2nd ed.; New York: Harper, 1975; print; 7])

QUOTATION OMITTING A SENTENCE

In discussing the historical relation between politics and the press, William L. Rivers notes:

> Presidential control reached its zenith under Andrew Jackson, the extent of whose attention to the press even before he became a candidate is suggested by the fact that he subscribed to twenty newspapers. . . . For a time, the *United States Telegraph* and the *Washington Globe* were almost equally favored as party organs, and there were fifty-seven journalists on the government payroll. (7)

QUOTATION WITH AN OMISSION FROM THE MIDDLE OF ONE SENTENCE TO THE END OF ANOTHER

In discussing the historical relation between politics and the press, William L. Rivers notes, "Presidential control reached its zenith under Andrew Jackson. . . . For a time, the *United States Telegraph* and the *Washington Globe* were almost equally favored as party organs, and there were fifty-seven journalists on the government payroll" (7).

QUOTATION WITH AN OMISSION FROM THE MIDDLE OF ONE SENTENCE TO THE MIDDLE OF ANOTHER

In discussing the historical relation between politics and the press, William L. Rivers notes that when presidential control "reached its zenith under Andrew Jackson . . . there were fifty-seven journalists on the government payroll" (7).

The omission of words and phrases from quotations of poetry is also indicated by three or four periods (as in quotations of prose).

ORIGINAL

In Worcester, Massachusetts,
I went with Aunt Consuelo
to keep her dentist's appointment
and sat and waited for her
in the dentist's waiting room.
It was winter. It got dark
early. The waiting room
was full of grown-up people,
arctics and overcoats,
lamps and magazines.
(Elizabeth Bishop, "In the Waiting Room," lines 1–10)

QUOTATION WITH AN ELLIPSIS AT THE END

Elizabeth Bishop's "In the Waiting Room" is rich in evocative detail:

> In Worcester, Massachusetts,
> I went with Aunt Consuelo
> to keep her dentist's appointment
> and sat and waited for her
> in the dentist's waiting room.
> It was winter. It got dark
> early. The waiting room
> was full of grown-up people. . . . (1-8)

The omission of a line or more in the middle of a poetry quotation that is set off from the text is indicated by a line of spaced periods approximately the length of a complete line of the quoted poem.

QUOTATION OMITTING A LINE OR MORE IN THE MIDDLE

Elizabeth Bishop's "In the Waiting Room" is rich in evocative detail:

> In Worcester, Massachusetts,
> I went with Aunt Consuelo
> to keep her dentist's appointment
> . . . . . .
> It was winter. It got dark
> early. (1-3, 6-7)

If the author you are quoting uses ellipsis points, you should distinguish them from your ellipses by putting square brackets around the ones you add or by including an explanatory phrase in parentheses after the quotation.

ORIGINAL

"We live in California, my husband and I, Los Angeles. . . . This is beautiful country; I have never been here before." (N. Scott Momaday, *House Made of Dawn* [1968; New York: Perennial-Harper, 1977; print; 29])

QUOTATION WITH AN ADDED ELLIPSIS

In N. Scott Momaday's *House Made of Dawn*, when Mrs. St. John arrives at the rectory, she tells Father Olguin, "We live in California, my husband and I, Los Angeles. . . . This is beautiful country [. . .]" (29).

or

In N. Scott Momaday's *House Made of Dawn*, when Mrs. St. John arrives at the rectory, she tells Father Olguin, "We live in California, my husband and I, Los Angeles. . . . This is beautiful country . . ." (29; 1st ellipsis in orig.).

Some publishers prefer that square brackets always be placed around ellipsis points inserted into quotations, so that all alterations in quotations are indicated by brackets (cf. 3.9.6).

3.9.6 OTHER ALTERATIONS OF SOURCES

Occasionally, you may decide that a quotation will be unclear or confusing to your reader unless you provide supplementary information. For example, you may need to insert material missing from the original, to add *sic* ("thus," "so") to assure readers that the quotation is accurate even though the spelling or logic might make them think otherwise, or to italicize words for emphasis. While such contributions to a quotation are permissible, you should keep them to a minimum and make sure to distinguish them from the original, usually by explaining them in parentheses after the quotation or by putting them in square brackets within the quotation.

A comment or an explanation that immediately follows the closing quotation mark appears in parentheses.

> Shaw admitted, "Nothing can extinguish my interest in Shakespear" (sic).
>
> Lincoln specifically advocated a government "*for* the people" (emphasis added).

A comment or an explanation that goes inside the quotation must appear within square brackets, not parentheses.

> He claimed he could provide "hundreds of examples [of court decisions] to illustrate the historical tension between church and state."
>
> Milton's Satan speaks of his "study [pursuit] of revenge."

Similarly, if a pronoun in a quotation seems unclear, you may add an identification in square brackets.

> In the first act he soliloquizes, "Why she would hang on him [Hamlet's father] / As if increase of appetite had grown / By what it fed on. . . ."

3.9.7 PUNCTUATION WITH QUOTATIONS

Whether set off from the text or run into it, quoted material is usually preceded by a colon if the quotation is formally introduced and by a comma or no punctuation if the quotation is an integral part of the sentence structure.

> Shelley held a bold view: "Poets are the unacknowledged legislators of the World" (794).
>
> Shelley thought poets "the unacknowledged legislators of the World" (794).
>
> "Poets," according to Shelley, "are the unacknowledged legislators of the World" (794).

Do not use opening and closing quotation marks to enclose quotations set off from the text, but reproduce any quotation marks that are in the passage quoted.

> In "Memories of West Street and Lepke," Robert Lowell, a conscientious objector (or "C.O."), recounts meeting a Jehovah's Witness in prison:
>
> > I was so out of things, I'd never heard
> > of the Jehovah's Witnesses.
> > "Are you a C.O.?" I asked a fellow jailbird.
> > "No," he answered, "I'm a J.W." (36-39)

Use double quotation marks around quotations incorporated into the text, single quotation marks around quotations within those quotations.

> In "Memories of West Street and Lepke," Robert Lowell, a conscientious objector (or "C.O."), recounts meeting a Jehovah's Witness in prison: "'Are you a C.O.?' I asked a fellow jailbird. / 'No,' he answered, 'I'm.a J.W.'" (38-39).

When a quotation consists entirely of material enclosed by quotation marks in the source work, usually one pair of double quotation marks is sufficient, provided that the introductory wording makes clear the special character of the quoted material.

> Meeting a fellow prisoner, Lowell asks, "Are you a C.O.?" (38).

Except for changing internal double quotation marks to single ones when you incorporate quotations into your text, you should reproduce internal punctuation exactly as in the original. The closing punctuation, though, depends on where the quoted material appears in your sentence. Suppose, for example, that you want to quote the following sentence: "You've got to be carefully taught." If you begin your sentence with this line, you have to replace the closing period with a punctuation mark appropriate to the new context.

> "You've got to be carefully taught," wrote Oscar Hammerstein II about how racial prejudice is perpetuated.

If the quotation ends with a question mark or an exclamation point, however, the original punctuation is retained, and no comma is required.

> "How can I describe my emotions at this catastrophe, or how delineate the wretch whom with such infinite pains and care I had endeavoured to form?" wonders the doctor in Mary Shelley's *Frankenstein* (42).

> "What a wonderful little almanac you are, Celia!" Dorothea Brooke responds to her sister (7).

By convention, commas and periods that directly follow quotations go inside the closing quotation marks, but a parenthetical reference should intervene between the quotation and the required punctuation. Thus, if a quotation ends with a period, the period appears after the reference.

> N. Scott Momaday's *House Made of Dawn* begins with an image that also concludes the novel: "Abel was running" (7).

If a quotation ends with both single and double quotation marks, the comma or period precedes both.

> "The poem alludes to Stevens's 'Sunday Morning,'" notes Miller.

All other punctuation marks—such as semicolons, colons, question marks, and exclamation points—go outside a closing quotation mark, except when they are part of the quoted material.

> ORIGINAL
>
> I believe taxation without representation is tyranny!
>
> QUOTATIONS
>
> He attacked "taxation without representation" (32).
>
> Did he attack "taxation without representation"?
>
> What dramatic events followed his attack on "taxation without representation"!

but

> He declared, "I believe taxation without representation is tyranny!"

If a quotation ending with a question mark or an exclamation point concludes your sentence and requires a parenthetical reference, retain the original punctuation within the quotation mark and follow with the reference and the sentence period outside the quotation mark.

> In Mary Shelley's *Frankenstein*, the doctor wonders, "How can I describe my emotions at this catastrophe, or how delineate the wretch whom with such infinite pains and care I had endeavoured to form?" (42).

Dorothea Brooke responds to her sister, "What a wonderful little almanac you are, Celia!" (7).

3.9.8 TRANSLATIONS OF QUOTATIONS

If you believe that a significant portion of your audience will not be familiar with the language of a quotation you present, you should add a translation. If the translation is not yours, give its source in addition to the source of the quotation. In general, the translation should immediately follow the quotation whether they are run into or set off from the text, although their order may be reversed if most readers will not likely be able to read the original. If the quotation is run into the text, use double quotation marks around a translation placed in parentheses following the quotation but single quotation marks around a translation that immediately follows without intervening punctuation.

At the opening of Dante's *Inferno*, the poet finds himself in "una selva oscura" ("a dark wood"; 1.2; Ciardi 28).

At the opening of Dante's *Inferno*, the poet finds himself in "una selva oscura" 'a dark wood' (1.2; Ciardi 28).

Do not use quotation marks around quotations and translations set off from the text.

Dante's *Inferno* begins literally in the middle of things:

> Nel mezzo del cammin di nostra vita
> mi ritrovai per una selva oscura,
> ché la diritta via era smarrita.
> Ahi quanto a dir qual era è cosa dura
> esta selva selvaggia e aspra e forte
> che nel pensier rinova la paura! (1.1-6)
> Midway in our life's journey, I went astray
> from the straight road and woke to find myself
> alone in a dark wood. How shall I say
> what wood that was! I never saw so drear,
> so rank, so arduous a wilderness!
> Its very memory gives a shape to fear. (Ciardi 28)

5.6.2 ABSTRACT

ProQuest requires the candidate to submit with the agreement an abstract, or summary, of the dissertation. The abstract is published in *Dissertation Abstracts International*, in print, CD-ROM, microform, and online formats. The abstract generally describes the problem studied, the materials and methods used, and the conclusions reached. Although there is no limit on the length of the abstract, ProQuest truncates abstracts included in the print version of *Dissertation Abstracts International*. Abstracts in the print version run no longer than 350 words for dissertations and no longer than 150 for master's theses.

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Most graduate school guidelines make it optional whether the copyright in theses and dissertations is registered with the Copyright Office at the Library of Congress (see 2.2.8) but strongly recommend registration for the dissertation. For a fee, ProQuest will have the dissertation copyright registered for you, or you may submit the application on your own. MA candidates are generally responsible for registering their copyrights themselves. Whether or not your copyright is registered, place a copyright notice on the copyright page (see 2.2.9).

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6.9 A Work in More Than One Publication Medium

6.1 THE PURPOSES OF DOCUMENTATION

Scholarly authors include documentation in their works to fulfill several aims. The first is to acknowledge the sources considered in the preparation of the work. Scholarly authors generously acknowledge their debts to predecessors by giving credit to each source. Whenever scholars draw on another's work, they specify what they borrowed—whether facts, ideas, opinions, or quotations—and where they borrowed it from. A second aim is to provide readers with a description of key features of each source; such qualities as authorship, medium of publication, date of publication, and the identity of the publisher are important for understanding the nature of a source and how the author encountered it. Finally, authors aim to invite the reader to locate and examine the sources they use.

As you conduct your research, you should establish an accurate record of your experience with sources. Assess the authority of each source (i.e., the identity of its author or authors and the editorial oversight performed by its publisher); understand how the medium of delivery shapes your encounter with a source, and cite only the sources you have consulted directly; and record sufficient information to allow readers to find the source, when possible.

6.2 DOCUMENTATION AND ETHICS

Using another person's ideas or expressions in your writing without acknowledging the source constitutes plagiarism. Derived from the Latin word *plagiarius* ("kidnapper"), *to plagiarize* means "to commit literary theft" and to "present as new and original an idea or product derived

from an existing source" (*Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary* [11th ed.; 2003; print]). In short, the act of plagiarism gives the impression that you wrote or thought something that you in fact borrowed from someone, and to do so is a violation of professional ethics.

Forms of plagiarism include the failure to give appropriate acknowledgment when repeating another's wording or particularly apt phrase, paraphrasing another's argument, and presenting another's line of thinking. You may certainly use other persons' words and thoughts, but the borrowed material must not appear to be your creation.

In your writing, then, you must document nearly everything that you borrow. In addition to documenting direct quotations and paraphrases, you should consider the status of the information and ideas you glean from sources in relation to your audience and to the scholarly consensus on your topic. In general, information and ideas you deem broadly known by your readers and widely accepted by scholars, such as the basic biography of an author or the dates of a historical event, can be used without documentation. But where readers are likely to seek more guidance or where the facts are in significant dispute among scholars, documentation is needed; you could attribute a disputed fact to the source with which you agree or could document the entire controversy. While direct quotations and paraphrases are always documented, scholars seldom document proverbs, sayings, and clichés. You must indicate the source of any appropriated material that readers might otherwise mistake for yours.

Plagiarism is a moral and ethical offense rather than a legal one. Most instances of plagiarism fall outside the scope of copyright infringement, a legal offense. Plagiarism remains an offense even if the plagiarized work is not covered by copyright law or if the amount of material used and the nature of the use fall within the scope of fair use; copyright infringement remains a legal offense even if the violator acknowledges the source (see 2.2.13–15). The penalties for plagiarism can be severe, ranging from loss of respect to loss of degrees, tenure, or even employment. At all stages of research and writing, guard against the possibility of inadvertent plagiarism by keeping careful notes that distinguish between your musings and thoughts and the material you gather from others.

Another issue related to plagiarism concerns not outside sources but the author's own earlier writing. Whereas reprinting one's published work, such as having a journal article appear in a subsequent book of essays, is professionally acceptable—as long as appropriate permission is secured and complete bibliographic information about the original pub-

lication accompanies the reprint—professionals generally disapprove if previously published work is reissued, whether verbatim or slightly revised, under another title or in some other manner that gives the impression it is a new work. Although not the same as plagiarizing someone else's writing, self-plagiarism is another type of unethical activity. If your current work draws on your own previously published work, you must give full bibliographic information about the earlier publication.

6.3 MLA STYLE

Although all fields of research agree on the need to document scholarly borrowings, they do not all agree on the form documentation should take, and different fields generally follow different documentation conventions. MLA style is widely used in the humanities, especially in the field of language and literature. Generally simpler and more economical than other styles, MLA style shares with most others its central feature: brief parenthetical citations in the text keyed to an alphabetical list of works cited that appears at the end of the work.

Unlike documentation in other systems, a citation in MLA style contains only enough information to enable readers to find the source in the works-cited list, so that interruptions in the reading are kept to a minimum. A typical citation consists of an author's last name and a page reference: "(Marcuse 197)." If the author's name is mentioned in the text, only the page number appears in the citation: "(197)." If more than one work by the author is in the list of works cited, a shortened version of the title is given, but this too may be omitted from the citation if the title appears in the text. (See ch. 7 for a fuller discussion of parenthetical citations in MLA style.)

As you conduct your research, you should note the provenance of the sources you use. What are the available editions of a work? If a work is available in several media, which version did you choose to consult and why? What are the differences between a live performance and a recording? Attention to such questions will assist you in creating a persuasive and authoritative publication. Key features of sources should be recorded in the entries in the list of works cited. Sometimes you may wish to expand your description of sources in your text or in a note.

Chapters 6 and 7 offer an authoritative and comprehensive presentation of MLA style. For a list of guides to other citation styles, see the appendix.

6.4 THE LIST OF WORKS CITED

6.4.1 INTRODUCTION

MLA style provides a flexible, modular format for recording key features of works cited or consulted in the preparation of a scholarly publication. This chapter describes several sequences of elements that can be combined to form entries in the list of works cited. In building an entry, you should know which elements to look for in the source. Not all elements will be present in a given source. Moreover, since MLA style is flexible about the inclusion of some information and even about the ordering of the elements, you should understand how your choice relates to your research project. For example, as noted in 6.8.3, a publication on the work of a film director may list the director's name first, while a publication on the work of a film actor may list the performer's name first (the guidelines for citing editions [6.6.10] and translations [6.6.11] are similarly flexible). While it is tempting to think that every source has only one complete and correct format for its entry in the list of works cited, in truth there are often several options for recording key features of a work. For this reason, software programs that generate entries are not likely to be useful. You may need to improvise when the type of scholarly project or the publication medium of a source is not anticipated by this manual. Be consistent in your formatting throughout your work. Choose the format that is appropriate to your project and that will satisfy your readers' needs.

Although the list of works cited appears at the end of your text, you need to draft the section in advance, so that you will know what information to give in parenthetical references as you write—for example, whether you need to add a shortened title if you cite two or more works by the same author or to give an initial or first name if two of the cited authors have the same last name: "(K. Roemer 123–24)," "(M. Roemer 67)." This chapter explains how to prepare a list of works cited, and the next chapter demonstrates how to document sources as you use them in your text.

As the heading *Works Cited* indicates, this list contains all the works that you will cite in your text. The list simplifies documentation by permitting you to make only brief references to these works in the text. Other names for such a listing are *Bibliography* (literally, "description of books") and *Literature Cited*. Usually, however, the broader title

Works Cited is most appropriate, since scholarly work draws on not only printed books and articles but also nonprint sources.

Titles used for other kinds of source lists include *Annotated Bibliography*, *Works Consulted*, and *Selected Bibliography*. An annotated bibliography, also called *Annotated List of Works Cited*, contains descriptive or evaluative comments on the sources. (For more information on such listings, see James L. Harner, *On Compiling an Annotated Bibliography* [2nd ed.; New York: MLA, 2000; print].)

The title *Works Consulted* indicates that the list is not confined to works cited. The headings *Selected Bibliography*, *Selected List of Works Consulted*, and *Suggestions for Further Reading* are appropriate for lists that suggest readings.

6.4.2 PLACEMENT OF THE LIST OF WORKS CITED

The list of works cited appears at the end of the scholarly work; in a book or dissertation the list precedes only the index. Occasionally, as in textbooks or collections of pieces by different authors, each chapter or essay ends with its own list.

Begin the list of works cited on a new page and number each page, continuing the page numbers of the text (see fig. 8). Center the title, *Works Cited*, an inch from the top of the page. Double-space between the title and the first entry. Begin each entry flush with the left margin; if an entry runs more than one line, indent the subsequent line or lines one-half inch from the left margin. This format is sometimes called *hanging indention*, and you can set your word processor to create it automatically for a group of paragraphs. Hanging indention makes alphabetical lists easier to use. Double-space the entire list,



Fig. 8. The top of the first page of a works-cited list.

both between and within entries. Continue the list on as many pages as necessary.

6.4.3 ARRANGEMENT OF ENTRIES

Entries in a works-cited list are arranged in alphabetical order, which helps the reader to find the entry corresponding to a citation in the text. In general, alphabetize entries by the author's last name, using the letter-by-letter system. In this system, the order of names is determined by the letters before the commas that separate last names and first names. Spaces and other punctuation marks are ignored. The letters following the commas are considered only when two or more last names are identical. The following examples are alphabetized letter by letter. (For more information on alphabetizing names, see 3.6.4–13.)

Descartes, René
De Sica, Vittorio

MacDonald, George
McCullers, Carson

Morris, Robert
Morris, William
Morrison, Toni

Saint-Exupéry, Antoine de
St. Denis, Ruth

If two or more entries citing coauthors begin with the same name, alphabetize by the last names of the second authors listed.

Scholes, Robert, and Robert Kellogg
Scholes, Robert, Carl H. Klaus, and Michael Silverman
Scholes, Robert, and Eric S. Rabkin

If the author's name is unknown, alphabetize by the title, ignoring any initial *A*, *An*, or *The* or the equivalent in another language. For example, the title *An Encyclopedia of the Latin American Novel* would be alphabetized under the letter *e* rather than *a*, the title *Le théâtre en France au Moyen Âge* under *t* rather than *l*. If the title begins with a numeral, alphabetize the title as if the numeral were spelled out. For instance, *1914: The Coming of the First World War* should be alphabetized as if it

began "Nineteen-Fourteen. . . ." (But see 6.8.14 on alphabetizing titles from the United States Code.)

If the name of an author whose works you used appears in various spellings in the works (e.g., Virgil, Vergil), consolidate all the entries for the sources under the preferred variant in your works-cited list. If your sources include works published under both an author's real name and a pseudonym, either consolidate the entries under the better-known name or list them separately, with a cross-reference at the real name and with the real name in square brackets after the pseudonym. If works by a woman are published under both her natal and her married names, list them separately, with cross-references at both names.

Bakhtin, M. M. (*see also* Vološinov, V. N.). *The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays*. Ed. Michael Holquist. Trans. Caryl Emerson and Holquist. Austin: U of Texas P, 1981. *Google Book Search*. Web. 3 Dec. 2007.

Penelope, Julia (*see also* Stanley, Julia P.). "John Simon and the 'Dragons of Eden.'" *College English* 44.8 (1982): 848-54. *JSTOR*. Web. 3 Dec. 2007.

Stanley, Julia P. (*see also* Penelope, Julia). "'Correctness,' 'Appropriateness,' and the Uses of English." *College English* 41.3 (1979): 330-35. *JSTOR*. Web. 3 Dec. 2007.

Vološinov, V. N. [M. M. Bakhtin]. *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language*. Trans. Ladislav Matejka and I. R. Titunik. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1986. *Google Book Search*. Web. 3 Dec. 2007.

Other kinds of bibliographies may be arranged differently. An annotated list, a list of works consulted, or a list of selected readings for a historical study, for example, may be organized chronologically by publication date. Some bibliographies are divided into sections and the items alphabetized in each section. A list may be broken down into primary and secondary sources or into different research media or genres (books, articles, films). Alternatively, it may be arranged by subject matter (literature and law, law in literature, law as literature), by period (classical utopia, Renaissance utopia), or by area (Egyptian mythology, Greek mythology, Norse mythology).

6.4.4 TWO OR MORE WORKS BY THE SAME AUTHOR

To cite two or more works by the same author, give the name in the first entry only. Thereafter, in place of the name, type three hyphens,

followed by a period and the title. The three hyphens stand for exactly the same name as in the preceding entry. If the person named edited, translated, or compiled the work, place a comma (not a period) after the three hyphens, and write the appropriate abbreviation (*ed.*, *trans.*, or *comp.*) before giving the title. If the same person served as, say, the editor of two or more works listed consecutively, the abbreviation *ed.* must be repeated with each entry. This sort of label does not affect the order in which entries appear; works listed under the same name are alphabetized by title.

Borroff, Marie. *Language and the Poet: Verbal Artistry in Frost, Stevens, and Moore*. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1979. Print.

---, trans. *Pearl*. New York: Norton, 1977. Print.

---. "Sound Symbolism as Drama in the Poetry of Robert Frost." *PMLA* 107.1 (1992): 131-44. Print.

---, ed. *Wallace Stevens: A Collection of Critical Essays*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice, 1963. Print.

Frye, Northrop. *Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays*. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1957. Print.

---, ed. *Design for Learning: Reports Submitted to the Joint Committee of the Toronto Board of Education and the University of Toronto*. Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1962. Print.

---. *The Double Vision: Language and Meaning in Religion*. Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1991. Print.

---, ed. *Sound and Poetry*. New York: Columbia UP, 1957. Print.

---. "Varieties of Eighteenth-Century Sensibility." *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 24.2 (1990-91): 157-72. *JSTOR*. Web. 17 Jan. 2007.

If a single author cited in an entry is also the first of multiple authors in the following entry, repeat the name in full; do not substitute three hyphens. Repeat the name in full whenever you cite the same person as part of a different authorship. The three hyphens are never used in combination with persons' names.

Scholes, Robert. *Protocols of Reading*. New Haven: Yale UP, 1989. Print.

---. "Toward a Semiotics of Literature." *Critical Inquiry* 4.1 (1977): 105-20. *JSTOR*. Web. 2 Feb. 2007.

Scholes, Robert, and Robert Kellogg. *The Nature of Narrative*. New York: Oxford UP, 1966. Print.

Scholes, Robert, and Eric S. Rabkin. *Science Fiction: History, Science, Vision*. New York: Oxford UP, 1977. Print.

Tannen, Deborah, ed. *Gender and Conversational Interaction*. New York: Oxford UP, 1993. Print.

---. *You Just Don't Understand: Women and Men in Conversation*. New York: Morrow, 1990. Print.

Tannen, Deborah, and Roy O. Freedle, eds. *Linguistics in Context: Connecting Observation and Understanding*. Norwood: Ablex, 1988. Print.

Tannen, Deborah, and Muriel Saville-Troike, eds. *Perspectives on Silence*. Norwood: Ablex, 1985. Print.

6.4.5 TWO OR MORE WORKS BY THE SAME AUTHORS

To cite two or more works by the same authors, give the names in the first entry only. Thereafter, in place of the names, type three hyphens, followed by a period and the title. The three hyphens stand for exactly the same names, in the same order, as in the preceding entry. Authors' names whose order in the source work is different from that of the previously listed names should be listed in the same order as in the work and alphabetized appropriately.

Durant, Will, and Ariel Durant. *The Age of Voltaire*. New York: Simon, 1965. Print.

---. *A Dual Autobiography*. New York: Simon, 1977. Print.

Gilbert, Sandra M., and Susan Gubar, eds. *The Female Imagination and the Modernist Aesthetic*. New York: Gordon, 1986. Print.

---. "Sexual Linguistics: Gender, Language, Sexuality." *New Literary History* 16.3 (1985): 515-43. *JSTOR*. Web. 26 June 2007.

6.4.6 CROSS-REFERENCES

To avoid unnecessary repetition in citing two or more works from the same collection, you may create a complete entry for the collection and cross-reference individual pieces to the entry. In a cross-reference, state the author and the title of the piece, the last name of the editor of the collection, and the inclusive page or reference numbers. If the piece is a translation, add the name of the translator after the title, unless one person translated the entire collection.

Hamill, Pete. Introduction. Sexton and Powers xi-xiv.

Mayakovsky, Vladimir. "Brooklyn Bridge." Trans. Max Hayward and George Reavey. Sexton and Powers 136-41.

McCullers, Carson. "Brooklyn Is My Neighborhood." Sexton and Powers 143-47.

Sexton, Andrea Wyatt, and Alice Leccese Powers, eds. *The Brooklyn Reader: Thirty Writers Celebrate America's Favorite Borough.* New York: Harmony, 1994. Print.

Walcott, Derek. "A Letter from Brooklyn." Sexton and Powers 264-65.

Whitman, Walt. "Crossing Brooklyn Ferry." Sexton and Powers 267-74.

If you list two or more works under the editor's name, however, add the title (or a shortened version of it) to the cross-reference.

Angelou, Maya. "Pickin Em Up and Layin Em Down." Baker, *Norton Book* 276-78.

Baker, Russell, ed. *The Norton Book of Light Verse.* New York: Norton, 1986. Print.

---, ed. *Russell Baker's Book of American Humor.* New York: Norton, 1993. Print.

Hurston, Zora Neale. "Squinch Owl Story." Baker, *Russell Baker's Book* 458-59.

Lebowitz, Fran. "Manners." Baker, *Russell Baker's Book* 556-59.

Lennon, John. "The Fat Budgie." Baker, *Norton Book* 357-58.

6.5 CITING PERIODICAL PRINT PUBLICATIONS

6.5.1 INTRODUCTION

Print periodicals—newspapers, magazines, journals—appear regularly at fixed intervals. Unlike newspapers and magazines, which typically appear daily, weekly, or monthly and include varied forms of writing on diverse topics, journals are usually issued no more than four times a year and address a discrete domain of scholarly, professional, or aesthetic concern through critical or creative writing. Also unlike newspapers and magazines, most journals are paginated continuously throughout each annual volume—that is, if the first issue for a year ends on page 130, the second issue begins on page 131 and so forth. Some scholarly

journals do not number pages continuously throughout an annual volume but begin each issue on page 1. Include the issue number, whenever available, along with the volume number in a citation for any journal, since the issue number is essential for identifying issues paginated separately in annual volumes and is useful even for specifying consecutively paginated issues (e.g., in retrievals by interlibrary loan or from online databases). The volume and issue numbers of newspapers and magazines are not cited.

Entries for publications in print periodicals consist of several elements in a prescribed sequence. This list shows most of the possible components of an entry for an article in a print periodical and the order in which they are normally arranged:

1. Author's name (for more than one author, see 6.6.4; for a corporate author, see 6.6.5; for an anonymous work, see 6.5.9)
2. Title of the article (in quotation marks)
3. Name of the periodical (italicized)
4. Series number or name (if relevant; see 6.5.4)
5. Volume number (for a scholarly journal)
6. Issue number (if available, for a scholarly journal)
7. Date of publication (for a scholarly journal, the year; for other periodicals, the day, month, and year, as available)
8. Inclusive page numbers
9. Medium of publication consulted (*Print*)
10. Supplementary information (see esp. 6.5.12)

Section 6.5.2 explains how to formulate the most common entry for a periodical publication, an article in a scholarly journal. The rest of 6.5 explains how to cite additional items. For information on citing periodical publications accessed through the Web, see 6.7.3–4.

6.5.2 AN ARTICLE IN A SCHOLARLY JOURNAL

The works-cited-list entry for an article in a printed scholarly journal has three main divisions:

> Author's name. "Title of the article." Publication information.

Here is an example:

> Piper, Andrew. "Rethinking the Print Object: Goethe and the Book of Everything." *PMLA* 121.1 (2006): 124-38. Print.

Author's Name. Take the author's name from the beginning or the end of the article. Reverse the name for alphabetizing, adding a comma after the last name. Put a period after the complete name.

Piper, Andrew.

Apart from reversing the order, give the author's name as it appears in the article. Never abbreviate a name given in full. If, for example, the journal lists the author as "Carleton Brown," do not enter the name as "Brown, C." But use initials if the journal does. For additional advice on this topic, see 6.6.2.

Title of the Article. In general, follow the recommendations for titles given in 3.8. State the full title of the article, enclosed in quotation marks (not italicized). Unless the title has its own concluding punctuation (e.g., a question mark), put a period before the closing quotation mark.

Piper, Andrew. "Rethinking the Print Object: Goethe and the Book of Everything."

Publication Information. In general, after the title of the article, give the journal title (italicized), the volume number, the issue number, the year of publication (in parentheses), a colon, the inclusive page numbers, a period, the medium of publication consulted, and a period.

Piper, Andrew. "Rethinking the Print Object: Goethe and the Book of Everything." *PMLA* 121.1 (2006): 124-38. Print.

Take these facts directly from the journal, not from a source such as a bibliography. Publication information usually appears on the cover or title page of a journal. Omit any introductory article in the title of an English-language journal (*William and Mary Quarterly*, not *The William and Mary Quarterly*), but retain articles before titles of non-English-language journals (*La rivista dalmatica*). For newspaper titles, see 6.5.5. Do not precede the volume number with the word *volume* or the abbreviation *vol.*

In addition to the volume number, the journal's cover or title page may include an issue number ("Number 3") or a month or season before the year ("January 1998," "Fall 2006"). In general, the issues of a journal published in a single year compose one volume. Volumes are usually numbered in continuous sequence—each new volume is numbered one higher than its predecessor—while the numbering of issues starts over with 1 in each new volume. Add a period and the issue number directly after the volume number, without any interven-

ing space: "14.2" signifies volume 14, issue 2; "10.3–4," volume 10, issues 3 and 4 combined. Some scholarly journals use issue numbers alone, without volume numbers; on citing articles in such journals, see 6.5.3. Annuals, which are published only once a year, are usually numbered in sequence. Some annuals, such as *Profession*, are not numbered; instead, each issue's place in the series is identified by the year of publication. Use the information available to complete your citation.

The inclusive page numbers cited should encompass the complete article, not just the portion you used. (Specific page references appear parenthetically at appropriate places in your text; see ch. 7.) Follow the rules for writing inclusive numbers in 3.10.6. Write the page reference for the first page exactly as shown in the source ("198–232," "A32–34," "lxii–lxv"). If an article is not printed on consecutive pages—if, for example, after beginning on page 6 it skips to page 10—write only the first page number and a plus sign, leaving no intervening space: "6+." (See examples in 6.5.5–6.)

Here are some additional examples of the basic entry for an article printed in a scholarly journal:

Barthelme, Frederick. "Architecture." *Kansas Quarterly* 13.3-4 (1981): 77-80. Print.

Brueggeman, Brenda Jo, and Debra A. Moddelmog. "Coming-Out Pedagogy: Risking Identity in Language and Literature Classrooms." *Pedagogy* 2.3 (2002): 311-35. Print.

Forti-Lewis, Angelica. "Virginia Woolf, Dacia Maraini e *Una stanza per noi*: L'autocoscienza politica e il testo." *Rivista di studi italiani* 12.2 (1994): 29-47. Print.

Hernández-Reguant, Ariana. "Copyrighting Che: Art and Authorship under Cuban Late Socialism." *Public Culture* 16.1 (2004): 1-29. Print.

MLA Committee on the Status of Women in the Profession. "Women in the Profession, 2000." *Profession* (2000): 191-217. Print.

Tibullus, Albius. "How to Be Tibullus." Trans. David Wray. *Chicago Review* 48.4 (2002-03): 102-06. Print.

Vickeroy, Laurie. "The Politics of Abuse: The Traumatized Child in Toni Morrison and Marguerite Duras." *Mosaic* 29.2 (1996): 91-109. Print.

Williams, Linda. "Of Kisses and Ellipses: The Long Adolescence of American Movies." *Critical Inquiry* 32.2 (2006): 288-340. Print.

6.5.3 AN ARTICLE IN A SCHOLARLY JOURNAL THAT USES ONLY ISSUE NUMBERS

Some scholarly journals do not use volume numbers at all, numbering issues only. Cite the issue numbers of such journals alone.

Chauí, Marilena. "Politica cultural, cultura política." *Brasil* 13 (1995): 9-24. Print.

Litvak, Lily. "La Buena Nueva: Cultura y prensa anarquista (1880-1913)." *Revista de Occidente* 304 (2006): 5-18. Print.

Stein, Karen. "Margaret Atwood's Modest Proposal: *The Handmaid's Tale*." *Canadian Literature* 148 (1996): 57-73. Print.

6.5.4 AN ARTICLE IN A SCHOLARLY JOURNAL WITH MORE THAN ONE SERIES

Some scholarly journals have been published in more than one series. In citing a journal with numbered series, write the number (an arabic digit with the appropriate ordinal suffix: *2nd*, *3rd*, *4th*, etc.) and the abbreviation *ser.* between the journal title and the volume number.

Striner, Richard. "Political Newtonism: The Cosmic Model of Politics in Europe and America." *William and Mary Quarterly* 3rd ser. 52.4 (1995): 583-608. Print.

For a journal divided into a new series and an original series, indicate the series with *ns* or *os* before the volume number.

Helmling, Steven. "A Martyr to Happiness: Why Adorno Matters." *Kenyon Review* ns 28.4 (2006): 156-72. Print.

6.5.5 AN ARTICLE IN A NEWSPAPER

To cite an English-language newspaper, give the name as it appears on the masthead but omit any introductory article (*New York Times*, not *The New York Times*). Retain articles before the names of non-English-language newspapers (*Le monde*). If the city of publication is not included in the name of a locally published newspaper, add the city in square brackets, not italicized, after the name: "*Star-Ledger* [Newark]." For nationally published newspapers (e.g., *Wall Street Journal*, *Chronicle of Higher Education*), you need not add the city of

publication. Next give the complete date—day, month, and year. Abbreviate the names of all months except May, June, and July (see 8.2). Do not give the volume and issue numbers even if they are listed. If an edition is named on the masthead, add a comma after the date and specify the edition (e.g., *natl. ed.*, *late ed.*), because different editions of the same issue of a newspaper contain different material. Follow the edition—or the date if there is no edition—with a colon and the page number or numbers. Then state the medium of publication consulted. Here are examples illustrating how an article appeared in different sections of two editions of the *New York Times* on the same day:

Rosenberg, Geanne. "Electronic Discovery Proves an Effective Legal Weapon." *New York Times* 31 Mar. 1997, late ed.: D5. Print.

Rosenberg, Geanne. "Electronic Discovery Proves an Effective Legal Weapon." *New York Times* 31 Mar. 1997, natl. ed.: C5. Print.

If each section is paginated separately, include the appropriate section number or letter. Determining how to indicate a section can sometimes be complicated. The *New York Times*, for example, is currently divided in two distinct ways, depending on the day of the week, and each system calls for a different method of indicating section and page. On Monday through Saturday, there are normally several sections, labeled *A*, *B*, *C*, *D*, and so forth and paginated separately, and the section letter is part of each page number: "A1," "B1," "C5," "D3." Whenever the pagination of a newspaper includes a section designation, copy the page number or numbers exactly.

DAILY *NEW YORK TIMES*

Barbaro, Michael. "Early Holiday Sales Are Strong at Department Stores." *New York Times* 1 Dec. 2006, late ed.: C4. Print.

The Sunday edition contains numerous individually paged sections (covering the arts and entertainment, business, sports, travel, and so on) designated not by letters but by numbers ("Section 4," "Section 7"), which do not appear as parts of the page numbers. Whenever the section designation of a newspaper is not part of the pagination, put a comma after the date (or after the edition, if any) and add the abbreviation *sec.*, the appropriate letter or number, a colon, the page number or numbers, and the medium of publication.

SUNDAY *NEW YORK TIMES*

Haughney, Christine. "Women Unafraid of Condo Commitment." *New York Times* 10 Dec. 2006, late ed., sec. 11: 1+. Print.

Newspaper articles are often not printed on consecutive pages—for example, an article might begin on page 1, then skip to page 16. For such articles, write only the first page number and a plus sign, leaving no intervening space: "6+," "C3+." The parenthetical reference in the text tells readers the exact page from which material was used.

Here are some additional examples from different newspapers:

McKay, Peter A. "Stocks Feel the Dollar's Weight." *Wall Street Journal* 4 Dec. 2006: C1+. Print.

Melikian, Souren. "Fading Charms of 1700s Decor." *International Herald Tribune* 24-25 May 1997: 8. Print.

Perrier, Jean-Louis. "La vie artistique de Budapest perturbée par la loi du marché." *Le monde* 26 Feb. 1997: 28. Print.

Taylor, Paul. "Keyboard Grief: Coping with Computer-Caused Injuries." *Globe and Mail* [Toronto] 27 Dec. 1993: A1+. Print.

Van der Werf, Martin. "Brown U. Documents Ties to Slavery, but Does Not Apologize." *Chronicle of Higher Education* 27 Oct. 2006: A27. Print.

6.5.6 AN ARTICLE IN A MAGAZINE

To cite a magazine published every week or every two weeks, give the complete date (beginning with the day and abbreviating the month, except for May, June, and July; see 8.2), followed by a colon, the inclusive page numbers of the article, and the medium of publication consulted. If the article is not printed on consecutive pages, write only the first page number and a plus sign, leaving no intervening space. Do not give the volume and issue numbers even if they are listed.

Kaminer, Wendy. "The Last Taboo." *New Republic* 14 Oct. 1996: 24+. Print.

McEvoy, Dermot. "Little Books, Big Success." *Publishers Weekly* 30 Oct. 2006: 26-28. Print.

To cite a magazine published every month or every two months, give the month or months and year. If the article is not printed on con-

secutive pages, write only the first page number and a plus sign, leaving no intervening space. Do not give the volume and issue numbers even if they are listed.

Csikszentmihalyi, Mihaly. "The Creative Personality." *Psychology Today* July-Aug. 1996: 36-40. Print.

Laskin, Sheldon H. "Jena: A Missed Opportunity for Healing." *Tikkun* Nov.-Dec. 2007: 29+. Print.

Wood, Jason. "Spellbound." *Sight and Sound* Dec. 2005: 28-30. Print.

6.5.7 A REVIEW

To cite a review, give the reviewer's name and the title of the review (if there is one); then write *Rev. of* (neither italicized nor enclosed in quotation marks), the title of the work reviewed, a comma, the word *by*, and the name of the author. If the work of someone other than an author—say, an editor, a translator, or a director—is under review, use the appropriate abbreviation, such as *ed.*, *trans.*, or *dir.*, instead of *by*. For a review of a performance, add pertinent information about the production (see the sample entry for Tommasini). If more than one work is under review, list titles and authors in the order given at the beginning of the review (see the entry for Bordewich). Conclude the entry with the name of the periodical and the rest of the publication information.

If the review is titled but unsigned, begin the entry with the title of the review and alphabetize by that title (see the entry for "The Cooling of an Admiration"). If the review is neither titled nor signed, begin the entry with *Rev. of* and alphabetize it under the title of the work reviewed (see the entry for *Anthology of Danish Literature*).

Rev. of *Anthology of Danish Literature*, ed. F. J. Billeskov Jansen and P. M. Mitchell. *Times Literary Supplement* 7 July 1972: 785. Print.

Bordewich, Fergus M. Rev. of *Once They Moved like the Wind: Cochise, Geronimo, and the Apache Wars*, by David Roberts, and *Brave Are My People: Indian Heroes Not Forgotten*, by Frank Waters. *Smithsonian* Mar. 1994: 125-31. Print.

"The Cooling of an Admiration." Rev. of *Pound/Joyce: The Letters of Ezra Pound to James Joyce, with Pound's Essays on Joyce*, ed. Forrest Read. *Times Literary Supplement* 6 Mar. 1969: 239-40. Print.

Koestenbaum, Wayne. "Call It Hollywood." Rev. of *Dark Lover: The Life and Death of Rudolf Valentino*, by Emily Leider. *London Review of Books* 16 Dec. 2004: 31-32. Print.

Mendelsohn, Daniel. "September 11 at the Movies." Rev. of *United 93*, dir. Paul Greengrass, and *World Trade Center*, dir. Oliver Stone. *New York Review of Books* 21 Sept. 2006: 43-46. Print.

Strandberg, Victor. Rev. of *Dangerous Intimacy: The Untold Story of Mark Twain's Final Years*, by Karen Lystra. *American Literature* 77.1 (2005): 186-87. Print.

Tommasini, Anthony. "In G. and S., Better to Have More Words, Less Voice." Rev. of *The Mikado*, by William S. Gilbert and Arthur Sullivan. New York City Opera. New York State Theater, New York. *New York Times* 10 Mar. 1997, late ed.: C22. Print.

Updike, John. "Fine Points." Rev. of *The New Fowler's Modern English Usage*, ed. R. W. Burchfield. *New Yorker* 23-30 Dec. 1996: 142-49. Print.

6.5.8 AN ABSTRACT IN AN ABSTRACTS JOURNAL

An abstracts journal publishes summaries of journal articles and of other literature. If you are citing an abstract, begin the entry with the publication information for the original work. Then add the relevant information for the journal from which you derived the abstract—title (italicized), volume number, issue number, year (in parentheses), item number or, when the abstract is not numbered, inclusive page numbers, and medium of publication for the abstracts journal. Precede an item number with the word *item*. If the title of the journal does not make clear that you are citing an abstract, add the word *Abstract*, neither italicized nor in quotation marks, immediately after the original publication information.

Dissertation Abstracts International (*DAI*) has a long and complex history that might affect the way you cite an abstract in it. Before volume 30 (1969), *Dissertation Abstracts International* was titled *Dissertation Abstracts* (*DA*). From volume 27 to volume 36, *DA* and *DAI* were paginated in two series: A, for humanities and social sciences, and B, for sciences and engineering. With volume 37, *DAI* added a third separately paginated section, C, for abstracts of European dissertations; in 1989 this section expanded its coverage to include institutions throughout the world. The abstracts in *DAI* are available electronically from ProQuest.

(For recommendations on citing dissertations themselves, see 6.6.25–26 and 6.7.2. On citing dissertation abstracts in an online database, see 6.7.4.)

Pineda, Marcela. "Desire in Postmodern Discourse: An Analysis of the Poetry of Cristina Peri Rossi." Diss. Indiana U, 2004. *DAI*.65.12 (2005): item DA3156288. Print.

6.5.9 AN ANONYMOUS ARTICLE

If no author's name is given for the article you are citing, begin the entry with the title. Ignore any initial *A*, *An*, or *The* when you alphabetize the entry. Do not include the name of a wire service or news bureau.

"The Decade of the Spy." *Newsweek* 7 Mar. 1994: 26-27. Print.

"Dubious Venture." *Time* 3 Jan. 1994: 64-65. Print.

6.5.10 AN EDITORIAL

If you are citing a signed editorial, begin with the author's name, give the title, and then add the descriptive label *Editorial*, neither italicized nor enclosed in quotation marks. Conclude with the appropriate publication information. If the editorial is unsigned, begin with the title and continue in the same way.

"It's Subpoena Time." Editorial. *New York Times* 8 June 2007, late ed.: A28. Print.

Zuckerman, Mortimer B. "Are Order and Liberty at Odds?" Editorial. *US News and World Report* 5 Aug. 1996: 64. Print.

6.5.11 A LETTER TO THE EDITOR

To identify a letter to the editor, add the descriptive label *Letter* after the name of the author, but do not italicize the word or place it in quotation marks.

Carlos, Sabarimuthu. Letter. *PMLA* 119.3 (2004): 555. Print.

Safer, Morley. Letter. *New York Times* 31 Oct. 1993, late ed., sec. 2: 4. Print.

Identify a published response to a letter as "Reply to letter of . . . ," adding the name of the writer of the initial letter. Do not italicize this phrase or place it in quotation marks.

Shih, Shu-mei. Reply to letter of Sabarimuthu Carlos. *PMLA* 119.3 (2004): 555-56. Print.

6.5.12 A SERIALIZED ARTICLE

To cite a serialized article or a series of related articles published in more than one issue of a periodical, include all bibliographic information in one entry if each installment has the same author and title.

Meserole, Harrison T., and James M. Rambeau. "Articles on American Literature Appearing in Current Periodicals." *American Literature* 52.4 (1981): 688-705; 53.1 (1981): 164-80; 53.2 (1981): 348-59. Print.

Sedgwick, Eve Kosofsky. "Epistemology of the Closet." *Raritan* 7.4 (1988): 39-69; 8.1 (1988): 102-30. Print.

If the installments bear different titles, list each one separately. You may include a brief supplementary description at the end of the entry to indicate that the article is part of a series.

Dillon, Sam. "Special Education Absorbs School Resources." *New York Times* 7 Apr. 1994, late ed.: A1+. Print. Pt. 2 of a series, A Class Apart: Special Education in New York City, begun 6 Apr. 1994.

Richardson, Lynda. "Minority Students Languish in Special Education System." *New York Times* 6 Apr. 1994, late ed.: A1+. Print. Pt. 1 of a series, A Class Apart: Special Education in New York City.

Winerip, Michael. "A Disabilities Program That 'Got out of Hand.'" *New York Times* 8 Apr. 1994, late ed.: A1+. Print. Pt. 3 of a series, A Class Apart: Special Education in New York City, begun 6 Apr. 1994.

6.5.13 A SPECIAL ISSUE

To cite an entire special issue of a journal, begin the entry with the name of the person who edited the issue (if given on the title page), followed by a comma and the abbreviation *ed.* (or *eds.* if there are multiple editors). Next give the title of the special issue (italicized), followed by *Spec. issue of* and the name of the journal (the name is italicized). Conclude the entry with the journal's volume and issue numbers (separated by a period: "9.1"), the year of publication (in parentheses), a colon, a space, the complete pagination of the issue, a period, the me-

dium of publication consulted, and a period. (To cite a book that is a reprint of a special issue of a journal, see 6.6.16.)

Appiah, Kwame Anthony, and Henry Louis Gates, Jr., eds. *Identities.* Spec. issue of *Critical Inquiry* 18.4 (1992): 625-884. Print.

Perret, Delphine, and Marie-Denise Shelton, eds. *Maryse Condé.* Spec. issue of *Callaloo* 18.3 (1995): 535-711. Print.

Symposium Issue: Race, Ethnicity, and Civic Identity in the Americas. Spec. issue of *American Literary History* 17.3 (2005): 419-644. Print.

If you are citing one article from a special issue and wish to indicate complete publication information about the issue, use the following form:

Makward, Christiane. "Reading Maryse Condé's Theater." *Maryse Condé.* Ed. Delphine Perret and Marie-Denise Shelton. Spec. issue of *Callaloo* 18.3 (1995): 681-89. Print.

6.6 CITING NONPERIODICAL PRINT PUBLICATIONS

6.6.1 INTRODUCTION

Entries for nonperiodical print publications, such as books and pamphlets, consist of several elements in a prescribed sequence. This list shows most of the possible components of a book entry and the order in which they are normally arranged:

1. Name of the author, editor, compiler, or translator (for more than one author, see 6.6.4; for a corporate author, see 6.6.5; for an anonymous work, see 6.6.9)
2. Title of the book (italicized)
3. Edition used (see 6.6.13)
4. Number(s) of the volume(s) used (see 6.6.14)
5. City of publication, name of the publisher, and year of publication
6. Medium of publication consulted (*Print*)
7. Supplementary bibliographic information and annotation (see esp. 6.6.11, 6.6.14–15)

Section 6.6.2 explains how to formulate the most common entry for a nonperiodical print publication, a book by a single author. The rest of 6.6 explains how to cite additional items.

6.6.2 A BOOK BY A SINGLE AUTHOR

One of the most common items in works-cited lists is the entry for a book by a single author. Such an entry characteristically has three main divisions:

Author's name. *Title of the book.* Publication information.

Here is an example:

Spacks, Patricia Meyer. *Privacy: Concealing the Eighteenth-Century Self.* Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2003. Print.

Author's Name. Reverse the author's name for alphabetizing, adding a comma after the last name. Put a period after the complete name.

Spacks, Patricia Meyer.

Apart from reversing the order, give the author's name as it appears on the title page. Never abbreviate a name given in full. If, for example, the title page lists the author as "Carleton Brown," do not enter the name as "Brown, C." But use initials if the title page does.

Mitchell, W. J. T.

Rowling, J. K.

You may spell out a name abbreviated on the title page if you think the additional information would be helpful to readers. Put square brackets around the material you add.

Lewis, C[live] S[taples].

Nesbit, E[dith].

Tolkien, J[ohn] R[onald] R[euel].

Similarly, you may give the real name of an author listed under a pseudonym, enclosing the added name in square brackets (see 6.4.3).

Eliot, George [Mary Ann Evans].

Novalis [Friedrich von Hardenberg].

If the name of the author is known but not stated on the title page, give the name in brackets. Add a question mark if the authorship is not universally accepted.

[Medici, Lorenzo de'?].

In general, omit titles, affiliations, and degrees that precede or follow names.

ON TITLE PAGE	IN WORKS-CITED LIST
Anthony T. Boyle, PhD	Boyle, Anthony T.
Sister Jean Daniel	Daniel, Jean.
Gerard Manley Hopkins, SJ	Hopkins, Gerard Manley.
Lady Mary Wortley Montagu	Montagu, Mary Wortley.
Sir Philip Sidney	Sidney, Philip.
Saint Teresa de Jesús	Teresa de Jesús.

A suffix that is an essential part of the name—like *Jr.* or a roman numeral—appears after the given name, preceded by a comma.

Rockefeller, John D., IV.

Rust, Arthur George, Jr.

Title of the Book. In general, follow the recommendations for titles given in 3.8. State the full title of the book, including any subtitle. If the book has a subtitle, put a colon directly after the main title, unless the main title ends in a question mark, an exclamation point, or a dash. Place a period after the entire title (including any subtitle), unless it ends in another punctuation mark. Italicize the entire title, including any colon, subtitle, and punctuation in the title.

Spacks, Patricia Meyer. *Privacy: Concealing the Eighteenth-Century Self.*

Extremely long titles or titles usually condensed may be shortened. In shortening a title, include the beginning words of the title up to the first noun and the words by which the work is customarily known. Indicate any omissions by three spaced periods or by four periods if the omission is at the end of the title (see 3.9.5, on ellipsis). For example, *Some Thoughts concerning the Present Revival of Religion in New-England, and the Way in Which It Ought to Be Acknowledged and Promoted, Humbly Offered to the Publick, in a Treatise on That Subject, in Five Parts* may be cited as

Some Thoughts concerning the Present Revival of Religion in New-England. . . .

Publication Information. In general, give the city of publication, the publisher's name, the year of publication, and the medium of publication.

Take these facts directly from the book, not from a source such as a bibliography or a library catalog. The publisher's name that appears on the title page is generally the name to cite. The name may be accompanied there by the city and date. Any publication information not available on the title page can usually be found on the copyright page (i.e., the reverse of the title page) or, particularly in books published outside the United States, in the colophon, at the back of the book. Use a colon between the city of publication and the publisher, a comma between the publisher and the date, and a period after the date. Add the medium of publication consulted, followed by a period.

Spacks, Patricia Meyer. *Privacy: Concealing the Eighteenth-Century Self.* Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2003. Print.

If several cities are listed in the book, give only the first. It is not necessary to identify a state, province, or country after the city name. Shorten the publisher's name, following the guidelines in 8.5. If the year of publication is not recorded on the title page, use the latest copyright date.

Additional examples of the basic book entry follow. (For citing books in languages other than English, see 6.6.22.)

Burgess, Anthony [John Burgess Wilson]. *A Dead Man in Deptford.* New York: Carroll, 1995. Print.

Johnson, Roberta. *Gender and Nation in the Spanish Modernist Novel.* Nashville: Vanderbilt UP, 2003. Print.

Mathy, Jean-Philippe. *French Resistance: The French-American Culture Wars.* Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2000. Print.

Metcalf, John. *What Is a Canadian Literature?* Guelph: Red Kite, 1988. Print.

Mitchell, William J. *City of Bits: Space, Place, and the Informationbahn.* Cambridge: MIT P, 1995. Print.

Yousef, Nancy. *Isolated Cases: The Anxieties of Autonomy in Enlightenment Philosophy and Romantic Literature.* Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2004. Print.

6.6.3 AN ANTHOLOGY OR A COMPILATION

To cite an anthology or a compilation (e.g., a bibliography) that was edited or compiled by someone whose name appears on the title page,

begin your entry with the name of the editor or compiler, followed by a comma and the abbreviation *ed.* or *comp.* If the person named performed more than one function—serving, say, as editor and translator—give both roles in the order in which they appear on the title page.

Kepner, Susan Fulop, ed. and trans. *The Lioness in Bloom: Modern Thai Fiction about Women.* Berkeley: U of California P, 1996. Print.

Sevillano, Mando, comp. *The Hopi Way: Tales from a Vanishing Culture.* Flagstaff: Northland, 1986. Print.

Shell, Marc, ed. *American Babel: Literatures of the United States from Abnaki to Zuni.* Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2002. Print.

Spafford, Peter, comp. and ed. *Interference: The Story of Czechoslovakia in the Words of Its Writers.* Cheltenham: New Clarion, 1992. Print.

See also the sections on works in an anthology (6.6.6); introductions, prefaces, and similar parts of books (6.6.8); editions (6.6.10); and translations (6.6.11).

6.6.4 A BOOK BY TWO OR MORE AUTHORS

To cite a book by two or three authors, give their names in the same order as on the title page—not necessarily in alphabetical order. Reverse only the name of the first author, add a comma, and give the other name or names in normal form (Deleuze, Gilles, and Félix Guattari). Place a period after the last name. Even if the authors have the same last name, state each name in full (Lee, Matt, and Ted Lee). If the persons listed on the title page are editors, translators, or compilers, place a comma (not a period) after the final name and add the appropriate abbreviation (*eds.*, *trans.*, or *comps.* for "editors," "translators," or "compilers").

Booth, Wayne C., Gregory G. Colomb, and Joseph M. Williams. *The Craft of Research.* 2nd ed. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2003. Print.

Broer, Lawrence R., and Gloria Holland. *Hemingway and Women: Female Critics and the Female Voice.* Tuscaloosa: U of Alabama P, 2002. Print.

Welsch, Roger L., and Linda K. Welsch. *Cather's Kitchens: Foodways in Literature and Life.* Lincoln: U of Nebraska P, 1987. Print.

If there are more than three authors, you may name only the first and add *et al.* ("and others"), or you may give all names in full in the order in which they appear on the title page.

Gilman, Sander, et al. *Hysteria beyond Freud.* Berkeley: U of California P, 1993. Print.

Quirk, Randolph, et al. *A Comprehensive Grammar of the English Language.* London: Longman, 1985. Print.

or

Gilman, Sander, Helen King, Roy Porter, George Rousseau, and Elaine Showalter. *Hysteria beyond Freud.* Berkeley: U of California P, 1993. Print.

Quirk, Randolph, Sidney Greenbaum, Geoffrey Leech, and Jan Svartvik. *A Comprehensive Grammar of the English Language.* London: Longman, 1985. Print.

6.6.5 A BOOK BY A CORPORATE AUTHOR

A corporate author may be a commission, an association, a committee, or any other group whose individual members are not identified on the title page. Omit any initial article in the name of the corporate author, and do not abbreviate its name. Cite the book by the corporate author, even if the corporate author is the publisher. (On citing government publications, see 6.6.20.)

American Council of Learned Societies. *Teaching the Humanities: Essays from the ACLS Elementary and Secondary Schools Teacher Curriculum Development Project.* New York: ACLS, 1994. Print.

Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching. *Campus Life: In Search of Community.* Princeton: Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, 1990. Print.

6.6.6 A WORK IN AN ANTHOLOGY

If you are citing an essay, a short story, a poem, or another work that appears in an anthology or some other book collection, you need to add the following information to the basic book entry (6.6.2).

Author, Title, and (If Relevant) Translator of the Part of the Book Being Cited. Begin the entry with the author and title of the piece, normally enclosing the title in quotation marks.

Allende, Isabel. "Toad's Mouth."

But if the work was originally published independently (as, e.g., autobiographies, plays, and novels generally are), italicize its title instead (see the sample entries below for Hansberry and Sastre). Follow the title of the part of the book with a period. If the anthology contains the work of more than one translator, give the translator's name next, preceded by the abbreviation *Trans.* ("Translated by").

Allende, Isabel. "Toad's Mouth." Trans. Margaret Sayers Peden.

Then state the title of the anthology (italicized).

Allende, Isabel. "Toad's Mouth." Trans. Margaret Sayers Peden.
A Hammock beneath the Mangoes: Stories from Latin America.

Name of the Editor, Translator, or Compiler of the Book Being Cited. If all the works in the collection have the same translator or if the book has an editor or compiler, write *Trans.*, *Ed.*, or *Comp.* ("Translated by," "Edited by," or "Compiled by"), as appropriate, after the book title and give that person's name. If the editor or compiler is also the person named earlier in the entry as the author of the work, use only the last name after *Ed.* or *Comp.*

Allende, Isabel. "Toad's Mouth." Trans. Margaret Sayers Peden.
A Hammock beneath the Mangoes: Stories from Latin America.
Ed. Thomas Colchie.

If someone served in more than one role—say, as editor and translator—state the roles in the order in which they appear on the title page (e.g., "Ed. and trans."; see the entry below for Hanzlík). Similarly, if different persons performed different roles, give the names in the order in which they appear on the title page: "Trans. Jessie Coulson. Ed. George Gibian."

Page Numbers of the Cited Piece. Give the inclusive page numbers of the piece you are citing. Be sure to provide the page numbers for the entire piece, not just for the material you used (on writing inclusive numbers, see 3.10.6). Inclusive page numbers follow the publication

date and a period. (If the book has no page numbers, see 6.6.24.) The entry concludes with the medium of publication consulted.

Allende, Isabel. "Toad's Mouth." Trans. Margaret Sayers Peden. *A Hammock beneath the Mangoes: Stories from Latin America.* Ed. Thomas Colchie. New York: Plume, 1992. 83-88. Print.

Here are additional sample entries for works in anthologies:

Bordo, Susan. "The Moral Content of Nabokov's *Lolita*." *Aesthetic Subjects*. Ed. Pamela R. Matthews and David McWhirter. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2003. 125-52. Print.

Hansberry, Lorraine. *A Raisin in the Sun. Black Theater: A Twentieth-Century Collection of the Work of Its Best Playwrights.* Ed. Lindsay Patterson. New York: Dodd, 1971. 221-76. Print.

Hanzlík, Josef. "Vengeance." Trans. Ewald Osers. *Interference: The Story of Czechoslovakia in the Words of Its Writers.* Comp. and ed. Peter Spafford. Cheltenham: New Clarion, 1992. 54. Print.

Sastre, Alfonso. *Sad Are the Eyes of William Tell.* Trans. Leonard Pronko. *The New Wave of Spanish Drama*. Ed. George E. Wellwarth. New York: New York UP, 1970. 165-321. Print.

"A Witchcraft Story." *The Hopi Way: Tales from a Vanishing Culture.* Comp. Mando Sevillano. Flagstaff: Northland, 1986. 33-42. Print.

Often works in anthologies have been published before. If you wish to inform your reader of the date when a previously published piece other than a scholarly article first appeared, you may follow the title of the piece with the year of original publication and a period. You do not need to record the medium of the previous publication.

Douglass, Frederick. *Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, an American Slave, Written by Himself.* 1845. *Classic American Autobiographies.* Ed. William L. Andrews. New York: Mentor, 1992. 229-327. Print.

Franklin, Benjamin. "Emigration to America." 1782. *The Faber Book of America.* Ed. Christopher Ricks and William L. Vance. Boston: Faber, 1992. 24-26. Print.

To cite a previously published scholarly article in a collection, give the complete data for the earlier publication and then add *Rpt. in*

("Reprinted in"), the title of the collection, and the new publication facts. (On citing articles in print periodicals, see 6.5.2; on citing articles accessed through the Web, see 6.7.3–4.)

Appadurai, Arjun. "Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy." *Public Culture* 2.2 (1990): 1-24. Rpt. in *Colonial Discourse and Post-colonial Theory: A Reader*. Ed. Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman. New York: Columbia UP, 1994. 324-39. Print.

If the article was originally published under a different title, first state the new title and publication facts, followed by *Rpt. of* ("Reprint of"), the original title, and the original publication facts.

Lewis, C. S. "Viewpoints: C. S. Lewis." *Twentieth-Century Interpretations of* Sir Gawain and the Green Knight. Ed. Denton Fox. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice, 1968. 100-01. Rpt. of "The Anthropological Approach." *English and Medieval Studies Presented to J. R. R. Tolkien on the Occasion of His Seventieth Birthday*. Ed. Norman Davis and C. L. Wrenn. London: Allen, 1962. 219-23. Print.

Some anthologies reprint excerpts from previously published material. If the work you are citing is an excerpt, use *Excerpt from* instead of *Rpt. of*.

If you refer to more than one piece from the same collection, you may wish to cross-reference each citation to a single entry for the book (see 6.4.6). On citing articles in reference books, see 6.6.7. On citing introductions, prefaces, and the like, see 6.6.8. On citing a piece in a multivolume anthology, see 6.6.14.

6.6.7 AN ARTICLE IN A REFERENCE BOOK

Treat an encyclopedia article or a dictionary entry as you would a piece in a collection (6.6.6), but do not cite the editor of the reference work. If the article is signed, give the author's name first (often articles in reference books are signed with initials identified elsewhere in the work); if it is unsigned, give the title first. If the encyclopedia or dictionary arranges articles alphabetically, you may omit volume and page numbers.

When citing widely used reference books, especially those that frequently appear in new editions, do not give full publication information. For such works, list only the edition (if stated), the year of publication, and the medium of publication consulted.

"Azimuthal Equidistant Projection." *Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary*. 11th ed. 2003. Print.

"Ginsburg, Ruth Bader." *Who's Who in America*. 62nd ed. 2008. Print.

"Japan." *The Encyclopedia Americana*. 2004 ed. Print.

Mohanty, Jitendra N. "Indian Philosophy." *The New Encyclopaedia Britannica: Macropaedia*. 15th ed. 1987. Print.

"Noon." *The Oxford English Dictionary*. 2nd ed. 1989. Print.

If you are citing a specific entry among several for the same word, add *Entry* and the appropriate designation (e.g., number).

"Manual." Entry 2. *Webster's Third New International Dictionary*. 1981. Print.

If you are citing a specific definition among several, add the abbreviation *Def.* ("Definition") and the appropriate designation (e.g., number, letter).

"Noon." Def. 4b. *The Oxford English Dictionary*. 2nd ed. 1989. Print.

When citing specialized reference books, however, especially those that have appeared in only one edition, give full publication information.

Bram, Jean Rhys. "Moon." *The Encyclopedia of Religion*. Ed. Mircea Eliade. 16 vols. New York: Macmillan, 1987. Print.

Le Patourel, John. "Normans and Normandy." *Dictionary of the Middle Ages*. Ed. Joseph R. Strayer. 13 vols. New York: Scribner's, 1987. Print.

6.6.8 AN INTRODUCTION, A PREFACE, A FOREWORD, OR AN AFTERWORD

To cite an introduction, a preface, a foreword, or an afterword, begin with the name of its author and then give the name of the part being cited, neither italicized nor enclosed in quotation marks (*Introduction, Preface, Foreword, Afterword*). If the writer of the piece is different from the author of the complete work, cite the author of the work after

its title, giving the full name, in normal order, preceded by the word *By*. If the writer of the piece is also the author of the complete work, use only the last name after *By*. If the complete work is a translation, add the name of the translator next. Continue with full publication information, the inclusive page numbers, and, finally, the medium of publication consulted.

Borges, Jorge Luis. Foreword. *Selected Poems, 1923-1967*. By Borges. Ed. Norman Thomas Di Giovanni. New York: Delta-Dell, 1973. xv-xvi. Print.

Drabble, Margaret. Introduction. *Middlemarch*. By George Eliot. New York: Bantam, 1985. vii-xvii. Print.

Elliott, Emory. Afterword. *The Jungle*. By Upton Sinclair. New York: Signet, 1990. 342-50. Print.

Felstiner, John. Preface. *Paul Celan: Selected Poems and Prose*. By Paul Celan. Trans. Felstiner. New York: Norton, 2000. xvii-xxxi. Print.

Knox, Bernard. Introduction. *The Odyssey*. By Homer. Trans. Robert Fagles. New York: Viking, 1996. 3-64. Print.

If the introduction, preface, foreword, or afterword has a title, give the title, enclosed in quotation marks, immediately before the name of the part.

Brodsky, Joseph. "Poetry as a Form of Resistance to Reality." Foreword. *Winter Dialogue*. By Tomas Venclova. Trans. Diana Senechal. Evanston: Hydra-Northwestern UP, 1997. vii-xviii. Print.

Wallach, Rick. "Cormac McCarthy's Canon as Accidental Artifact." Introduction. *Myth, Legend, Dust: Critical Responses to Cormac McCarthy*. Ed. Wallach. New York: Manchester UP, 2000. xiv-xvi. Print.

6.6.9 AN ANONYMOUS BOOK

If a book has no author's or editor's name on the title page, begin the entry with the title. Do not use either *Anonymous* or *Anon*. Alphabetize the entry by the title, ignoring any initial article regardless of the language of the title. (Note that the first two sample entries are alphabetized by *Chicago* and *Holy*.)

The Chicago Manual of Style. 15th ed. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2003. Print.

The Holy Bible. Wheaton: Crossway-Good News, 2003. Print. Eng. Standard Vers.

New York Public Library American History Desk Reference. New York: Macmillan, 1997. Print.

6.6.10 A SCHOLARLY EDITION

A scholarly edition (or edition, for short) is a work prepared for publication by someone other than the author—by an editor. For example, for a 2007 printing of Shakespeare's *Hamlet*, an editor would have selected a version of the play from the various versions available, decided on any changes in spelling or punctuation, and perhaps added explanatory notes or written an introduction. The editor's name would most likely appear on the title page along with Shakespeare's.

To cite a scholarly edition, begin with the author's name (or the title, for an anonymous work) if you refer primarily to the text itself; give the editor's name, preceded by the abbreviation *Ed.* ("Edited by"), after the title. If for clarity you wish to indicate the original date of publication, place the year directly after the title (see the entry for Crane).

Crane, Stephen. *The Red Badge of Courage: An Episode of the American Civil War*. 1895. Ed. Fredson Bowers. Charlottesville: UP of Virginia, 1975. Print.

Edgeworth, Maria. Castle Rackrent *and* Ennui. Ed. Marilyn Butler. London: Penguin, 1992. Print.

Henderson, George Wylie. *Harlem Calling: The Collected Stories of George Wylie Henderson: An Alabama Writer of the Harlem Renaissance*. Ed. David G. Nicholls. Ann Arbor: U of Michigan P, 2006. Print.

Octovian. Ed. Frances McSparran. London: Oxford UP, 1986. Print. Early English Text Soc. 289.

Shakespeare, William. *Hamlet*. Ed. Barbara A. Mowat and Paul Werstine. New York: Washington Square-Pocket, 1992. Print.

Twain, Mark. *Roughing It*. Ed. Harriet E. Smith and Edgar M. Branch. Berkeley: U of California P, 1993. Print.

Wollstonecraft, Mary. *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman*. Ed. Carol H. Poston. New York: Norton, 1975. Print.

To cite a facsimile edition, follow the author's name and title with the original publication information (see 6.6.23 for a book published before 1900), the abbreviation *Facsim. ed.* ("Facsimile edition"), the new publication information, and the medium of publication.

> Milton, John. *Poems*. London, 1645. Facsim. ed. Oxford: Clarendon, 1924. Print.

If you are citing a specific work in a facsimile edition, treat it as you would a piece in a collection (see 6.6.6), giving inclusive page numbers at the end of the entry. If you wish to indicate the date of the specific work, place the year directly after the title of the piece.

> Milton, John. "Lycidas." 1638. *Poems*. London, 1645. Facsim. ed. Oxford: Clarendon, 1924. 57-65. Print.

If your citations are generally to the work of the editor (e.g., the introduction, the notes, or editorial decisions regarding the text), begin the entry with the editor's name, followed by a comma and the abbreviation *ed.* ("editor"), and give the author's name, preceded by the word *By*, after the title.

> Bowers, Fredson, ed. *The Red Badge of Courage: An Episode of the American Civil War*. By Stephen Crane. 1895. Charlottesville: UP of Virginia, 1975. Print.

If the edition is based on a named version of the text, as editions of the Bible usually are, then the name of the version can be recorded at the end of the entry, as supplementary bibliographic information.

> *The Bible*. Introd. and notes by Robert Carroll and Stephen Prickett. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1998. Print. Oxford World's Classics. Authorized King James Vers.

Consult 6.6.14 if you are citing more than one volume of a multivolume work or if the book is a part of a multivolume edition—say, *The Works of Mark Twain*—and you wish to give supplementary information about the entire project.

6.6.11 A TRANSLATION

To cite a translation, state the author's name first if you refer primarily to the work itself; give the translator's name, preceded by the abbreviation *Trans.* ("Translated by"), after the title. If the book has an editor as

well as a translator, give the names, with appropriate abbreviations, in the order in which they appear on the title page (see the sample entry for Dostoevsky).

Dostoevsky, Feodor. *Crime and Punishment*. Trans. Jessie Coulson. Ed. George Gibian. New York: Norton, 1964. Print.

Homer. *The Odyssey*. Trans. Robert Fagles. New York: Viking, 1996. Print.

Mankell, Henning. *Firewall*. Trans. Ebba Segerberg. New York: Vintage-Random, 2003. Print.

Murasaki Shikibu. *The Tale of Genji*. Trans. Edward G. Seidensticker. New York: Knopf, 1976. Print.

If your citations are mostly to the translator's comments or choice of wording, begin the entry with the translator's name, followed by a comma and *trans.* ("translator"), and give the author's name, preceded by the word *By*, after the title. (On citing anthologies of translated works by different authors, see 6.6.6.)

Coulson, Jessie, trans. *Crime and Punishment*. By Feodor Dostoevsky. Ed. George Gibian. New York: Norton, 1964. Print.

Although not required, some or all of the original publication facts may be added as supplementary information at the end of the entry, after the medium of publication.

Genette, Gérard. *The Work of Art: Immanence and Transcendence*. Trans. G. M. Goshgarian. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1997. Print. Trans. of *L'œuvre d'art: Immanence et transcendence*. Paris: Seuil, 1994.

Levi, Primo. *Survival in Auschwitz: The Nazi Assault on Humanity*. Trans. Stuart Woolf. New York: Collier-Macmillan, 1987. Print. Trans. of *Se questo è un uomo*. Torino: Einaudi, 1958.

On citing a book in a language other than English, see 6.6.22.

6.6.12 AN ILLUSTRATED BOOK OR A GRAPHIC NARRATIVE

Illustrations serve a range of functions in nonperiodical print publications. For a volume in which illustrations supplement the written text, such as an illustrated edition of a literary work, give the illustrator's name, preceded by the abbreviation *Illus.* ("Illustrated by"), after the

title. If an editor or a translator is also cited after the title, place the names in the order in which they appear on the title page.

Baum, L. Frank. *The Wonderful Wizard of Oz.* Introd. Regina Barreca. Illus. W. W. Denslow. New York: Signet-Penguin, 2006. Print.

If you refer mainly to the illustrator's work instead of the author's, begin the entry with the illustrator's name, followed by *illus.* ("illustrator"), and give the author's name preceded by the word *By*, after the title.

Denslow, W. W., illus. *The Wonderful Wizard of Oz.* By L. Frank Baum. Introd. Regina Barreca. New York: Signet-Penguin, 2006. Print.

In a graphic narrative, text and illustrations are intermingled. Format the works-cited-list entry for a graphic narrative entirely created by one person like that for any other nonperiodical print publication.

Spiegelman, Art. *Maus: A Survivor's Tale.* 2 vols. New York: Pantheon-Random, 1986-91. Print.

Many graphic narratives are created through collaboration. Begin the entry for such a work with the name of the person whose contribution is most relevant to your research, following it with a label identifying the person's role. List other collaborators after the title in the order in which they appear on the title page, also with labels identifying their roles.

Benoit, Ted, adapt. *Playback: A Graphic Novel.* By Raymond Chandler. Illus. François Ayroles. Introd. Philippe Garnier. New York: Arcade, 2006. Print.

Pekar, Harvey, writer. *The Quitter.* Art by Dean Haspiel. Gray tones by Lee Loughridge. Letters by Pat Brosseau. New York: Vertigo-DC Comics, 2005. Print.

If the graphic narrative is part of a multivolume work, you may add information about the series following the medium of publication. (See 6.6.14 for more guidance on citing a multivolume work.)

Yabuki, Kentaro, writer and artist. *Showdown at the Old Castle.* Eng. adapt. by Kelly Sue DeConnick. Trans. JN Productions. Touch-up art and lettering by Gia Cam Luc. San Francisco: Viz, 2007. Print. Vol. 9 of *Black Cat.*

For additional guidelines on citing visual art, see 6.8.6 and 6.8.9.

6.6.13 A BOOK PUBLISHED IN A SECOND OR SUBSEQUENT EDITION

A book with no edition number or name on its title page is usually a first edition. Unless informed otherwise, readers assume that bibliographic entries refer to first editions. When you use a later edition of a work, identify the edition in your entry by number (*2nd ed.*, *3rd ed.*, *4th ed.*), by name (*Rev. ed.*, for "Revised edition"; *Abr. ed.*, for "Abridged edition"), or by year (*2006 ed.*)—whichever the title page indicates. The specification of edition comes after the name of the editor, translator, or compiler, if there is one, or otherwise after the title of the book. (On citing encyclopedias, dictionaries, and similar works that are revised regularly, see 6.6.7.)

Baker, Nancy L., and Nancy Huling. *A Research Guide for Undergraduate Students: English and American Literature*. 6th ed. New York: MLA, 2006. Print.

Cavafy, C. P. *Collected Poems*. Trans. Edmund Keeley and Philip Sherrard. Ed. George Savidis. Rev. ed. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1992. Print.

Chaucer, Geoffrey. *The Works of Geoffrey Chaucer*. Ed. F. N. Robinson. 2nd ed. Boston: Houghton, 1957. Print.

Murasaki Shikibu. *The Tale of Genji*. Trans. Edward G. Seidensticker. Abr. ed. New York: Vintage-Random, 1985. Print.

Newcomb, Horace, ed. *Television: The Critical View*. 7th ed. New York: Oxford UP, 2007. Print.

6.6.14 A MULTIVOLUME WORK

If you are using two or more volumes of a multivolume work, cite the total number of volumes in the work ("5 vols."). This information comes after the title—or after any editor's name or identification of edition—and before the publication information. Specific references to volume and page numbers ("3: 212–13") belong in the text. (See ch. 7 for parenthetical documentation.)

Blanco, Richard L., ed. *The American Revolution, 1775-1783: An Encyclopedia*. 2 vols. Hamden: Garland, 1993. Print.

Doyle, Arthur Conan. *The Oxford Sherlock Holmes*. Ed. Owen Dudley Edwards. 9 vols. New York: Oxford UP, 1993. Print.

Lauter, Paul, et al., eds. *The Heath Anthology of American Literature.* 5th ed. 5 vols. Boston: Houghton, 2006. Print.

Sadie, Stanley, ed. *The New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians.* 2nd ed. 29 vols. New York: Grove, 2001. Print.

Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr., gen. ed. *History of U.S. Political Parties.* 4 vols. New York: Chelsea, 1973. Print.

Weinberg, Bernard. *A History of Literary Criticism in the Italian Renaissance.* 2 vols. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1961. Print.

If the volumes of the work were published over a period of years, give the inclusive dates at the end of the citation ("1955–92"). If the work is still in progress, write *to date* after the number of volumes ("3 vols. to date") and leave a space after the hyphen that follows the beginning date ("1982– ").

Boswell, James. *The Life of Johnson.* Ed. George Birkbeck Hill and L. F. Powell. 6 vols. Oxford: Clarendon, 1934-50. Print.

Cassidy, Frederic, and Joan Houston Hall, eds. *Dictionary of American Regional English.* 4 vols. to date. Cambridge: Belknap-Harvard UP, 1985- . Print.

Churchill, Winston S. *A History of the English-Speaking Peoples.* 4 vols. New York: Dodd, 1956-58. Print.

Crane, Stephen. *The University of Virginia Edition of the Works of Stephen Crane.* Ed. Fredson Bowers. 10 vols. Charlottesville: UP of Virginia, 1969-76. Print.

Wellek, René. *A History of Modern Criticism, 1750-1950.* 8 vols. New Haven: Yale UP, 1955-92. Print.

If you are using only one volume of a multivolume work, state the number of the volume in the bibliographic entry ("Vol. 2") and give publication information for that volume alone; then you need give only page numbers when you refer to that work in the text.

Doyle, Arthur Conan. *The Oxford Sherlock Holmes.* Ed. Owen Dudley Edwards. Vol. 8. New York: Oxford UP, 1993. Print.

Parker, Hershel. *Melville: A Biography.* Vol. 1. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1996. Print.

Stowe, Harriet Beecher. "Sojourner Truth, the Libyan Sibyl." 1863. *The Heath Anthology of American Literature.* Ed. Paul Lauter et al. 5th ed. Vol. B. Boston: Houghton, 2006. 2601-09. Print.

Wellek, René. *A History of Modern Criticism, 1750-1950*. Vol. 5. New Haven: Yale UP, 1986. Print.

Although not required, the complete number of volumes may be added as supplementary information at the end of the listing, after the medium of publication, along with other relevant publication facts, such as inclusive dates of publication if the volumes were published over a period of years (see the sample entry for Wellek below).

Doyle, Arthur Conan. *The Oxford Sherlock Holmes*. Ed. Owen Dudley Edwards. Vol. 8. New York: Oxford UP, 1993. Print. 9 vols.

Stowe, Harriet Beecher. "Sojourner Truth, the Libyan Sibyl." 1863. *The Heath Anthology of American Literature*. Ed. Paul Lauter et al. 5th ed. Vol. B. Boston: Houghton, 2006. 2601-09. Print. 5 vols.

Wellek, René. *A History of Modern Criticism, 1750-1950*. Vol. 5. New Haven: Yale UP, 1986. Print. 8 vols. 1955-92.

If you are using only one volume of a multivolume work and the volume has an individual title, you may cite the book without reference to the other volumes in the work.

Churchill, Winston S. *The Age of Revolution*. New York: Dodd, 1957. Print.

Durant, Will, and Ariel Durant. *The Age of Voltaire*. New York: Simon, 1965. Print.

Although not required, supplementary information about the complete multivolume work may follow the basic citation: the volume number, preceded by *Vol.* and followed by the word *of*; the title of the complete work; the total number of volumes; and, if the work appeared over a period of years, the inclusive publication dates.

Churchill, Winston S. *The Age of Revolution*. New York: Dodd, 1957. Print. Vol. 3 of *A History of the English-Speaking Peoples*. 4 vols. 1956-58.

Durant, Will, and Ariel Durant. *The Age of Voltaire*. New York: Simon, 1965. Print. Vol. 9 of *The Story of Civilization*. 11 vols. 1935-75.

If the volume you are citing is part of a multivolume scholarly edition (see 6.6.10), you may similarly give supplementary information about the entire edition. Follow the publication information for the volume with the appropriate volume number, preceded by *Vol.* and followed by the word *of*; the title of the complete work; the name of

the general editor of the multivolume edition, followed by a comma and *gen. ed.*; the total number of volumes; and the inclusive publication dates for the edition (see the entry for Howells). If the entire edition was edited by one person, state the editor's name after the title of the edition rather than after the title of the volume (see the entry for Crane).

Crane, Stephen. *The Red Badge of Courage: An Episode of the American Civil War*. 1895. Charlottesville: UP of Virginia, 1975. Print. Vol. 2 of *The University of Virginia Edition of the Works of Stephen Crane*. Ed. Fredson Bowers. 10 vols. 1969-76.

Howells, W. D. *Their Wedding Journey*. Ed. John K. Reeves. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1968. Print. Vol. 5 of *A Selected Edition of W. D. Howells*. Edwin H. Cady, gen. ed. 32 vols. 1968-83.

6.6.15 A BOOK IN A SERIES

If the title page or the preceding page (the half-title page) indicates that the book you are citing is part of a series, include the series name, neither italicized nor enclosed in quotation marks, and the series number (if any), followed by a period, at the end of the listing, after the medium of publication. Use common abbreviations for words in the series name (see 8.4), including *Ser.* if *Series* is part of the name.

Anderson, Danny, and Jill S. Kuhnheim, eds. *Cultural Studies in the Curriculum: Teaching Latin America*. New York: MLA, 2003. Print. Teaching Langs., Lits., and Cultures.

Bernstein, Elsa. *Twilight: A Drama in Five Acts*. Trans. Susanne Kord. New York: MLA, 2003. Print. Texts and Trans. 14.

Neruda, Pablo. *Canto General*. Trans. Jack Schmitt. Berkeley: U of California P, 1991. Print. Latin Amer. Lit. and Culture 7.

Pihl, Marshall R. *The Korean Singer of Tales*. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1994. Print. Harvard-Yenching Inst. Monograph Ser. 37.

6.6.16 A REPUBLISHED BOOK OR JOURNAL ISSUE

To cite a republished book—for example, a paperback version of a book originally published in a clothbound version—give the original publication date, followed by a period, before the publication information for the book you are citing.

García Márquez, Gabriel. *Love in the Time of Cholera*. Trans. Edith Grossman. 1988. New York: Penguin, 1989. Print.

Holier, Denis, ed. *A New History of French Literature*. 1989. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1994. Print.

New material added to the republication, such as an introduction, should be cited after the original publication facts.

Dreiser, Theodore. *Sister Carrie*. 1900. Introd. E. L. Doctorow. New York: Bantam, 1982. Print.

To cite a republished book that was originally issued under a different title, first state the new title and publication facts, followed by *Rpt. of* ("Reprint of"), the original title, and the original date.

The WPA Guide to 1930s New Jersey. New Brunswick: Rutgers UP, 1986. Print. Rpt. of *New Jersey: A Guide to Its Past and Present*. 1939.

To cite a book that is a reprint of a special issue of a journal, begin the entry with the name of the person who edited the book, followed by a comma and the abbreviation *ed.* (or *eds.* if there are multiple editors). Next give the title of the book (italicized), the publication information for the book, and the medium of publication. Conclude the entry with *Rpt. of spec. issue of*, the name of the journal (italicized), the journal's volume and issue numbers (separated by a period: "9.1"), the year of publication (in parentheses), a colon, a space, and the complete pagination of the issue.

Appiah, Kwame Anthony, and Henry Louis Gates, Jr., eds. *Identities*. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1995. Print. Rpt. of spec. issue of *Critical Inquiry* 18.4 (1992): 625-884.

6.6.17 A PUBLISHER'S IMPRINT

Publishers often group some of their books under imprints, or special names. If an imprint appears on a title page along with the publisher's name, state the imprint and follow it by a hyphen and the name of the publisher ("Anchor-Doubleday," "Collier-Macmillan," "Vintage-Random").

Cassidy, Frederic, and Joan Houston Hall, eds. *Dictionary of American Regional English*. 4 vols. to date. Cambridge: Belknap-Harvard UP, 1985- . Print.

Findlater, Mary, and Jane Findlater. *Crossriggs*. 1908. Introd. Paul Binding. New York: Virago-Penguin, 1986. Print.

Lopate, Phillip, ed. *The Art of the Personal Essay: An Anthology from the Classical Era to the Present*. New York: Anchor-Doubleday, 1994. Print.

Rhodes, Dan. *Timoleon Vieta Come Home: A Sentimental Journey*. Orlando: Harvest-Harcourt, 2004. Print.

6.6.18 A BOOK WITH MULTIPLE PUBLISHERS

If the title page lists two or more publishers—not just two or more offices of the same publisher—include all of them, in the order given, as part of the publication information, putting a semicolon after the name of each but the last.

Duff, J. Wight. *A Literary History of Rome: From the Origins to the Close of the Golden Age*. Ed. A. M. Duff. 3rd ed. 1953. London: Benn; New York: Barnes, 1967. Print.

Wells, H. G. *The Time Machine*. 1895. London: Dent; Rutland: Tuttle, 1992. Print.

6.6.19 A BROCHURE, PAMPHLET, OR PRESS RELEASE

Treat a brochure or pamphlet as you would a book.

Evans, Grose. *French Painting of the Nineteenth Century in the National Gallery of Art*. Washington: Natl. Gallery of Art, 1980. Print.

Modern Language Association. *Language Study in the Age of Globalization: The College-Level Experience*. New York: MLA, n.d. Print.

Document a press release the same way, but cite the day and month of the release, if available, along with the year.

Modern Language Association. *Modern Language Association Announces New and Improved MLA Language Map*. New York: MLA, 18 Apr. 2006. Print.

6.6.20 A GOVERNMENT PUBLICATION

Government publications emanate from many sources and so present special problems in bibliographic citation. In general, if you do

not know the writer of the document, cite as author the government agency that issued it—that is, state the name of the government first, followed by the name of the agency, using an abbreviation if the context makes it clear. (But see below for citing a document whose author is known.)

California. Dept. of Industrial Relations.

United States. Cong. House.

If you are citing two or more works issued by the same government, substitute three hyphens for the name in each entry after the first. If you also cite more than one work by the same government agency, use an additional three hyphens in place of the agency in the second entry and each subsequent one.

United States. Cong. House.

---. ---. Senate.

---. Dept. of Health and Human Services.

The title of the publication, italicized, should follow immediately.

In citing the *Congressional Record* (abbreviated *Cong. Rec.*), give only the date, page numbers, and medium of publication.

Cong. Rec. 7 Feb. 1973: 3831-51. Print.

In citing other congressional documents, include such information as the number and session of Congress, the house (*S* stands for Senate, *HR* for House of Representatives), and the type and number of the publication. Types of congressional publications include bills (S 33, HR 77), resolutions (S. Res. 20, H. Res. 50), reports (S. Rept. 9, H. Rept. 142), and documents (S. Doc. 333, H. Doc. 222, Misc. Doc. 67).

The usual publication information (i.e., place, publisher, and date) and the medium of publication consulted come next. Most federal publications, regardless of the branch of government issuing them, are published by the Government Printing Office (GPO), in Washington, DC; its British counterpart is Her (or His) Majesty's Stationery Office (HMSO), in London. Documents issued by the United Nations and most local governments, however, do not all emanate from a central office; give the publication information that appears on the title page.

Great Britain. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Food.
Radionuclide Levels in Food, Animals, and Agricultural Products: Post-Chernobyl Monitoring in England and Wales.
London: HMSO, 1987. Print.

New York State. Commission on the Adirondacks in the Twenty-First Century. *The Adirondack Park in the Twenty-First Century.* Albany: State of New York, 1990. Print.

---. Committee on State Prisons. *Investigation of the New York State Prisons.* 1883. New York: Arno, 1974. Print.

United Nations. *Consequences of Rapid Population Growth in Developing Countries.* New York: Taylor, 1991. Print.

---. Centre on Transnational Corporations. *Foreign Direct Investment, the Service Sector, and International Banking.* New York: United Nations, 1987. Print.

---. Dept. of Economic and Social Affairs. *Industrial Development for the Twenty-First Century: Sustainable Development Perspectives.* New York: United Nations, 2007. Print.

United States. Cong. House. Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. *Al-Qaeda: The Many Faces of an Islamist Extremist Threat.* 109th Cong., 2nd sess. H. Rept. 615. Washington: GPO, 2006. Print.

---. ---. Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack. *Hearings.* 79th Cong., 1st and 2nd sess. 32 vols. Washington: GPO, 1946. Print.

---. Dept. of Labor. *Child Care: A Workforce Issue.* Washington: GPO, 1988. Print.

---. Dept. of State. *U.S. Climate Action Report—2002: Third National Communication of the United States of America under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.* Washington: GPO, 2002. Print.

If known, the name of the document's author may either begin the entry or, if the agency comes first, follow the title and the word *By* or an abbreviation (such as *Ed.* or *Comp.*).

Poore, Benjamin Perley, comp. *A Descriptive Catalogue of the Government Publications of the United States, September 5, 1774-March 4, 1881.* US 48th Cong., 2nd sess. Misc. Doc. 67. Washington: GPO, 1885. Print.

or

United States. Cong. *A Descriptive Catalogue of the Government Publications of the United States, September 5, 1774-March 4,*

1881. Comp. Benjamin Perley Poore. 48th Cong., 2nd sess. Misc. Doc. 67. Washington: GPO, 1885. Print.

To cite an online government document, see 6.7. To cite a legal source, see 6.8.14.

6.6.21 THE PUBLISHED PROCEEDINGS OF A CONFERENCE

Treat the published proceedings of a conference like a book, but add pertinent information about the conference (unless the book title includes such information).

Brady, Brigid, and Patricia Verrone, eds. *Proceedings of the Northeast Region Annual Meeting, Conference on Christianity and Literature: Christ Plays in Ten-Thousand Places: The Christ-Figure in Text and Interpretation*. 22 Oct. 2005, Caldwell Coll. N.p.: Northeast Regional Conf. on Christianity and Lit., n.d. Print.

Freed, Barbara F., ed. *Foreign Language Acquisition Research and the Classroom*. Proc. of Consortium for Lang. Teaching and Learning Conf., Oct. 1989, U of Pennsylvania. Lexington: Heath, 1991. Print.

Cite a presentation in the proceedings like a work in a collection of pieces by different authors (see 6.6.6).

Mann, Jill. "Chaucer and the 'Woman Question.'" *This Noble Craft: Proceedings of the Tenth Research Symposium of the Dutch and Belgian University Teachers of Old and Middle English and Historical Linguistics, Utrecht, 19-20 January 1989*. Ed. Erik Kooper. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1991. 173-88. Print.

6.6.22 A BOOK IN A LANGUAGE OTHER THAN ENGLISH

Cite a book published in a language other than English like any other book. Give the author's name, title, and publication information as they appear in the book, and conclude with the medium of publication. You may need to look in the colophon (a listing at the back of the book) for some or all of the publication information found on the title or copyright page of English-language books. If it seems necessary to clarify the title, provide a translation, in square brackets: "*Gengangere* [*Ghosts*]." Similarly, you may use square brackets to give the English

name of a foreign city — "Wien [Vienna]" — or you may substitute the English name, depending on your readers' knowledge of the language. Shorten the publisher's name appropriately (see 8.5). For capitalization in languages other than English, see 3.7.2–9.

Barthes, Roland. *O grau zero da escrita: Seguido de novos ensaios críticos*. Trans. Mario Laranjeira. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2004. Print.

Dahlhaus, Carl. *Musikästhetik*. Köln: Gerig, 1967. Print.

Eco, Umberto. *Il nome della rosa*. Milano: Bompiani, 1980. Print.

Esquivel, Laura. *Como agua para chocolate: Novelas de entregas mensuales, con recetas, amores y remedios caseros*. Madrid: Mondadori, 1990. Print.

Poche, Emanuel. *Prazské Palace*. Praha [Prague]: Odeon, 1977. Print.

6.6.23 A BOOK PUBLISHED BEFORE 1900

When citing a book published before 1900, you may omit the name of the publisher and use a comma, instead of a colon, after the place of publication.

Brome, Richard. *The Dramatic Works of Richard Brome*. 3 vols. London, 1873. Print.

Dewey, John. *The School and Society*. Chicago, 1899. Print.

Segni, Bernardo, trans. *Rettorica et poetica d'Aristotile*. By Aristotle. Firenze, 1549. Print.

6.6.24 A BOOK WITHOUT STATED PUBLICATION INFORMATION OR PAGINATION

When a book does not indicate the publisher, the place or date of publication, or pagination, supply as much of the missing information as you can, using square brackets to show that it did not come from the source.

New York: U of Gotham P, [2006].

If the date can only be approximated, put it after a *c.*, for *circa* ("around"): "[c. 2006]." If you are uncertain about the accuracy of the information you supply, add a question mark: "[2006?]." Use the following abbreviations for information you cannot supply.

n.p.	No place of publication given
n.p.	No publisher given
n.d.	No date of publication given
n. pag.	No pagination given

Inserted before the colon, the abbreviation *n.p.* indicates *no place*; after the colon, it indicates *no publisher*. *N. pag.* explains the absence of page references in citations of the work.

NO PLACE

N.p.: U of Gotham P, 2006.

NO PUBLISHER

New York: n.p., 2006.

NO DATE

New York: U of Gotham P, n.d.

NO PAGINATION

New York: U of Gotham P, 2006. N. pag.

The examples above are hypothetical; the following ones are entries for actual books.

Bauer, Johann. *Kafka und Prag*. [Stuttgart]: Belser, [1971?]. Print.

Malachi, Zvi, ed. *Proceedings of the International Conference on Literary and Linguistic Computing*. [Tel Aviv]: [Fac. of Humanities, Tel Aviv U], n.d. Print.

Michelangelo. *The Sistine Chapel*. New York: Wings, 1992. N. pag. Print.

Photographic View Album of Cambridge. [Eng.]: n.p., n.d. N. pag. Print.

Sendak, Maurice. *Where the Wild Things Are*. New York: Harper, 1963. N. pag. Print.

6.6.25 AN UNPUBLISHED DISSERTATION

Enclose the title of an unpublished dissertation in quotation marks; do not italicize it. Then write the descriptive label *Diss.*, and add the name

of the degree-granting university, followed by a comma and the year. Conclude with the work's medium.

Kane, Sonia. "Acts of Coercion: Father-Daughter Relationships and the Pressure to Confess in British Women's Fiction, 1778-1814." Diss. City U of New York, 2003. Print.

Stephenson, Denise R. "Blurred Distinctions: Emerging Forms of Academic Writing." Diss. U of New Mexico, 1996. Print.

To cite a master's thesis, substitute the appropriate label (e.g., *MA thesis, MS thesis*) for *Diss*. On documenting other unpublished writing, see 6.8.12–13.

6.6.26 A PUBLISHED DISSERTATION

Cite a published dissertation as you would a book, but add pertinent dissertation information before the publication facts. If the dissertation was privately published, state *privately published* in place of the publisher's name.

Dietze, Rudolf F. *Ralph Ellison: The Genesis of an Artist.* Diss. U Erlangen-Nürnberg, 1982. Nürnberg: Carl, 1982. Print. Erlanger Beiträge zur Sprach- und Kunstwissenschaft 70.

Valentine, Mary-Blair Truesdell. *An Investigation of Gender-Based Leadership Styles of Male and Female Officers in the United States Army.* Diss. George Mason U, 1993. Ann Arbor: UMI, 1993. Print.

Wendriner, Karl Georg. *Der Einfluss von Goethes* Wilhelm Meister *auf das Drama der Romantiker.* Diss. U Bonn, 1907. Leipzig: privately published, 1907. Print.

See 6.7.2 for dissertations on the Web, 6.5.8 for dissertation abstracts published in the print version of *Dissertation Abstracts* or *Dissertation Abstracts International*, and 6.7.4 for dissertation abstracts on the Web.

6.7 CITING WEB PUBLICATIONS

6.7.1 INTRODUCTION

On the World Wide Web, scholars access bibliographic databases, academic journals, archives of print publications, critical editions, reference

works, dissertations, and a wide variety of other documents and recordings. Citations of Web publications share some traits with those of print publications and other traits with those of reprinted works, broadcasts, and live performances. For example, most works on the Web have an author, a title, and publication information and are thus analogous to print publications. But while readers seeking a cited print publication can be reasonably assured that a copy in a local library will be identical to that consulted by the author, they can be less certain that a Web publication will be so. Electronic texts can be updated easily and at irregular intervals. They may also be distributed in multiple databases and accessed through a variety of interfaces displayed on different kinds of equipment. Multiple versions of any work may be available. In this sense, then, accessing a source on the Web is akin to commissioning a performance. Any version of a Web source is potentially different from any past or future version and must be considered unique. Scholars therefore need to record the date of access as well as the publication data when citing sources on the Web.

Publications on the Web present special challenges for documentation. Because of the fluidity of the network and the many hypertextual links between works accessed there, it is often difficult to determine where one work stops and another begins. How, for instance, does one define a Web site? One definition would consider all pages affiliated with a particular domain name, like www.mla.org, to constitute a site. Another view would consider all the pages organized by a particular editor or project team as a site, even if the project is housed under a larger body's domain name or distributed over several domains; the *Victorian Women Writers Project*, for example, appears under Indiana University's domain name (www.indiana.edu). Since both views have merit, the guidelines presented here do not take one side but instead offer a method to record the relation of works on the Web to the information hierarchies surrounding them.

In the past, the *MLA Style Manual and Guide to Scholarly Publishing* recommended including URLs of Web sources in works-cited-list entries. Inclusion of URLs has proved to have limited value, however, for they often change, can be specific to a subscriber or a session of use, and can be so long and complex that typing them into a browser is cumbersome and prone to transcription errors. Readers are now more likely to find resources on the Web by searching for titles and authors' names than by typing URLs. You should include a URL as supplementary information only when the reader probably cannot locate the source without it or when your publisher requires it. If you present a

URL, give it immediately following the date of access, a period, and a space. Enclose the URL in angle brackets, and conclude with a period. If a URL must be divided between two lines, break it only after a slash; do not introduce a hyphen at the break or allow your word-processing program to do so. If possible, give the complete address, including the access-mode identifier (e.g., *http*, *ftp*), for the specific work you are citing.

> Eaves, Morris, Robert Essick, and Joseph Viscomi, eds. *The William Blake Archive*. Lib. of Cong., 28 Sept. 2007. Web. 20 Nov. 2007. <http://www.blakearchive.org/blake/>.

The recommendations in this section mostly treat peer-reviewed, scholarly sources and primary sources for which a considerable amount of relevant publication information is available. In truth, though, many sources do not supply all desired information—for instance, many texts do not include reference markers, such as page or paragraph numbers, so it is difficult if not impossible to direct a reader to the exact location of the material you are citing. Thus, while aiming for comprehensiveness, writers must often settle for citing whatever information is available to them. Since the Web can deliver sound and images as well as written text, you may want to describe your source in your text or endnotes when there is a risk that readers will not appreciate important aspects of the work. MLA style is flexible, and sometimes you must improvise to record features not anticipated by this manual. In some cases, citation formats devised to handle complex print publications may serve as a basis for improvisation; see in particular the sections on an article in a reference book (6.6.7), scholarly editions (6.6.10), translations (6.6.11), and government documents (6.6.20). Remember to be consistent in your formatting throughout your work. Since sites and other resources on the Web sometimes disappear altogether, you should consider downloading or printing the material you use during your research, so that you can verify it if it is inaccessible later.

Section 6.7.2 explains how to cite the vast majority of works found on the Web: nonperiodical publications. Section 6.7.3 covers works in scholarly journals. Section 6.7.4 explains how to cite works from periodical publications that are collected in online databases. Publishers well known for their periodical publications in media not online, such as newspapers, magazines, and regular news broadcasts, also publish works at nonperiodical, or irregular, intervals on the Web. Thus, it is

important to look carefully at the work you are consulting and establish the context for its publication. Note that 6.7 addresses only sources accessed on the Web. For electronic publications you consult apart from a network, such as digital files stored on your computer and on CD-ROMs, see 6.8–9.

6.7.2 A NONPERIODICAL PUBLICATION

a. Introduction

Most works on the Web are nonperiodical—not released on a regular schedule. This section begins by describing the basic entry for nonperiodical works on the Web. Sometimes it is important to indicate that a work consulted on the Web also appeared in another medium. For example, you may want to give bibliographic data for a book that was scanned for viewing on the Web or the full description of a film that was digitized for viewing in your browser. Sections 6.7.2c–d provide guidelines for citing such works.

b. A Work Cited Only on the Web

An entry for a nonperiodical publication on the Web usually contains most of the following components, in sequence:

1. Name of the author, compiler, director, editor, narrator, performer, or translator of the work (for more than one author, see 6.6.4; for a corporate author, see 6.6.5; for an anonymous work, see 6.6.9)
2. Title of the work (italicized if the work is independent; in roman type and quotation marks if the work is part of a larger work [see 3.8.2–3])
3. Title of the overall Web site (italicized), if distinct from item 2
4. Version or edition used (see 6.6.13)
5. Publisher or sponsor of the site; if not available, use *N.p.*
6. Date of publication (day, month, and year, as available); if nothing is available, use *n.d.*
7. Medium of publication (*Web*)
8. Date of access (day, month, and year)

Each item is followed by a period except the publisher or sponsor, which is followed by a comma. Untitled works may be identified by a genre label (e.g., *Home page*, *Introduction*, *Online posting*), neither italicized

nor enclosed in quotation marks, in the place where the title goes (see 6.6.8 and 6.8.7–10 for additional guidance). For inclusion of other information that may be pertinent (e.g., the name of the composer of a performed work), see the sample entries. If not otherwise recorded in the entry, the name of a creator of the overall Web site, such as its editor, may be listed following the title of the site (see the Yager example). If you cannot find some of this information, cite what is available.

Antin, David. Interview by Charles Bernstein. *Dalkey Archive Press.* Dalkey Archive P, n.d. Web. 21 Aug. 2007.

Committee on Scholarly Editions. "Guidelines for Editors of Scholarly Editions." *Modern Language Association.* MLA, 25 Sept. 2007. Web. 20 Nov. 2007.

Concerto Palatino, perf. "Canzon à 6 per l'Epistola." By Giovanni Priuli. *Boston Early Music Festival and Exhibition.* Boston Early Music Festival, 2003. Web. 20 July 2007.

"de Kooning, Willem." *Encyclopaedia Britannica Online.* Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2007. Web. 19 Mar. 2007.

Eaves, Morris, Robert Essick, and Joseph Viscomi, eds. *The William Blake Archive.* Lib. of Cong., 28 Sept. 2007. Web. 20 Nov. 2007.

Garcia Landa, José Ángel, comp. *A Bibliography of Literary Theory, Criticism and Philology.* 12th ed. U de Zaragoza, 2007. Web. 29 Nov. 2007.

Green, Joshua. "The Rove Presidency." *The Atlantic.com.* Atlantic Monthly Group, Sept. 2007. Web. 29 Nov. 2007.

"Hourly News Summary." *National Public Radio.* Natl. Public Radio, 20 July 2007. Web. 20 July 2007.

Lessig, Lawrence. "Free Debates: More Republicans Call on RNC." *Lessig 2.0.* N.p., 4 May 2007. Web. 20 Nov. 2007.

Liu, Alan, ed. Home page. *Voice of the Shuttle.* Dept. of English, U of California, Santa Barbara, n.d. Web. 21 Feb. 2007.

"Maplewood, New Jersey." Map. *Google Maps.* Google, 23 July 2007. Web. 23 July 2007.

Quade, Alex. "Elite Team Rescues Troops behind Enemy Lines." *CNN.com.* Cable News Network, 19 Mar. 2007. Web. 19 Mar. 2007.

Salda, Michael N., ed. *The Cinderella Project.* Vers. 1.2. U of Southern Mississippi, Oct. 2005. Web. 21 Nov. 2007.

"The Scientists Speak." Editorial. *New York Times*. New York Times, 20 Nov. 2007. Web. 20 Nov. 2007.

"Six Charged in Alleged N.J. Terror Plot." *WNBC.com*. WNBC, 8 May 2007. Web. 9 May 2007.

Tyre, Peg. "Standardized Tests in College?" *Newsweek*. Newsweek. 16 Nov. 2007. Web. 21 Nov. 2007.

"Utah Mine Rescue Funeral." *CNN.com*. Cable News Network, 21 Aug. 2007. Web. 21 Aug. 2007.

"Verb Tenses." Chart. *The OWL at Purdue*. Purdue U Online Writing Lab, 2001. Web. 23 July 2007.

Yager, Susan, narr. "The Former Age." By Geoffrey Chaucer. *Chaucer Metapage*. Ed. Mark E. Allen et al. U of North Carolina, 13 Feb. 2007. Web. 30 Nov. 2007.

If you need to include a URL, follow the guidelines in 6.7.1.

c. A Work on the Web Cited with Print Publication Data

If the nonperiodical work you are citing also appeared in print, you may determine that it is important to include the bibliographic data for the print publication as part of your entry. A book that was scanned for access in a database, for example, is usually cited in this way. Begin the entry with the relevant facts about print publication as described in 6.6. See in particular the guidelines for a work in an anthology (6.6.6), a translation (6.6.11), a multivolume work (6.6.14), a government publication (6.6.20), and an unpublished dissertation (6.6.25). Instead of concluding with *Print* as the medium of publication, record the following information in sequence:

1. Title of the database or Web site (italicized)
2. Medium of publication consulted (*Web*)
3. Date of access (day, month, and year)

If the guidelines in 6.6 call for inclusive page numbers and they are not present in the source, use *n. pag.* Supplementary bibliographic information that in 6.6 follows the medium of publication should be included immediately before item 1 above. Here are examples of entries for nonperiodical publications on the Web that have a previous or concurrent publication in print:

Bierce, Ambrose. "Academy." *The Devil's Dictionary. The Collected Works of Ambrose Bierce.* Vol. 7. New York: Neale, 1911. N. pag. *The Ambrose Bierce Project.* Web. 12 Mar. 2007.

Bown, Jennifer M. "Going Solo: The Experience of Learning Russian in a Non-traditional Environment." Diss. Ohio State U, 2004. *OhioLINK.* Web. 8 May 2007.

Cascardi, Anthony J. *Ideologies of History in the Spanish Golden Age.* University Park: Pennsylvania State UP, 1997. *Penn State Romance Studies.* Web. 12 Mar. 2007.

Child, L. Maria, ed. *The Freedmen's Book.* Boston, 1866. *Google Book Search.* Web. 12 Mar. 2007.

Heim, Michael Henry, and Andrzej W. Tymowski. *Guidelines for the Translation of Social Science Texts.* New York: ACLS, 2006. *American Council of Learned Societies.* Web. 12 Mar. 2007.

United States. Dept. of Justice. Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention. *Law Enforcement and Juvenile Crime.* By Howard N. Snyder. 2001. *National Criminal Justice Reference Service.* Web. 21 Aug. 2007.

Whitman, Walt. Preface. *Leaves of Grass.* By Whitman. Brooklyn, 1855. iii-xii. *The Walt Whitman Archive.* Web. 12 Mar. 2007.

Whittier, John G. "A Prayer." *The Freedmen's Book.* Ed. L. Maria Child. Boston, 1866. 178. *Google Book Search.* Web. 15 Aug. 2007.

You may add supplementary information about the database or Web site (such as the name of its editor, sponsor, or publisher) following its name.

Ovid. *Metamorphoses.* Trans. Arthur Golding. London, 1567. *The Perseus Digital Library.* Ed. Gregory Crane. Tufts U. Web. 12 Mar. 2007.

If you need to include a URL, follow the guidelines in 6.7.1. See 6.7.4 for periodical print publications in online databases.

d. A Work on the Web Cited with Publication Data for Another Medium besides Print

The Web presents images (still and moving) and sound as well as written text. It is sometimes important to indicate that a source online is available in another medium besides print. If you viewed a digitized

version of a film on the Web, for example, you may want to include in your entry the details usually cited for a film. To document sources such as these, begin the entry by following the recommendations in 6.8 but drop the medium of original publication (e.g, *Television*, *Photograph*). Conclude the entry with the following items:

1. Title of the database or Web site (italicized)
2. Medium of publication consulted (*Web*)
3. Date of access (day, month, and year)

Supplementary bibliographic information that in 6.8 follows the medium of publication should be included immediately before item 1 above. Be mindful of the distinction between sources accessed entirely on the Web and digital files used apart from an electronic network; for the latter, follow the directions in 6.8.18. Here are examples of entries for works available on the Web and in another medium besides print:

Currin, John. *Blond Angel.* 2001. Indianapolis Museum of Art. *IMA: It's My Art.* Web. 9 May 2007.

The Great Train Robbery. Dir. Edward Porter. Thomas Edison, 1903. *Internet Archive.* Web. 9 May 2007.

Lange, Dorothea. *The Migrant Mother.* 1936. Prints and Photographs Div., Lib. of Cong. *Dorothea Lange: Photographer of the People.* Web. 9 May 2007.

"Protest on Behalf of Southern Women." 1932. Mary Cornelia Barker Papers. Robert W. Woodruff Lib., Emory U. *Online Manuscript Resources in Southern Women's History.* Web. 23 July 2007.

If you need to include a URL, follow the guidelines in 6.7.1.

6.7.3 A SCHOLARLY JOURNAL

Some scholarly journals exist only in electronic form on the Web, while others appear both in print and on the Web. This section addresses journals published independently on the Web; periodicals collected in online databases are covered in 6.7.4. Following the legacy of print periodicals, most scholarly journals on the Web are organized by volume number (usually on an annual basis) and include issue numbers and the dates of publication. To cite a work from a scholarly journal on the Web, including an article, a review, an editorial, and a letter to the editor, begin the entry by following the recommendations in 6.5 for citing works in print periodicals, but drop the medium of publication (*Print*).

A periodical publication on the Web may not include page numbers. If pagination is not available, use *n. pag.* in place of inclusive page numbers. Conclude the entry with the following items:

1. Medium of publication consulted (*Web*)
2. Date of access (day, month, and year)

If the guidelines you are following in 6.5 call for supplementary bibliographic information after the medium of publication, this information should be included immediately before item 1 above. Here are examples of entries for scholarly journals on the Web:

Armstrong, Grace. Rev. of *Fortune's Faces: The* Roman de la Rose *and the Poetics of Contingency*, by Daniel Heller-Roazen. *Bryn Mawr Review of Comparative Literature* 6.1 (2007): n. pag. Web. 8 Nov. 2007.

Dionísio, João, and Antonio Cortijo Ocaña, eds. *Mais de pedras que de livros / More Rocks Than Books*. Spec. issue of *eHumanista* 8 (2007): 1-263. Web. 8 Nov. 2007.

Landauer, Michelle. "Images of Virtue: Reading, Reformation and the Visualization of Culture in Rousseau's *La nouvelle Héloïse*." *Romanticism on the Net* 46 (2007): n. pag. Web. 8 Nov. 2007.

Nater, Miguel. "El beso de la Esfinge: La poética de lo sublime en *La amada inmóvil* de Amado Nervo y en los *Nocturnos* de José Asunción Silva." *Romanitas* 1.1 (2006): n. pag. Web. 8 Nov. 2007.

Ouellette, Marc. "Theories, Memories, Bodies, and Artists." Editorial. *Reconstruction* 7.4 (2007): n. pag. Web. 28 Nov. 2007.

Raja, Masood Ashraf. Rev. of *Voices of Resistance: Muslim Women on War, Faith, and Sexuality*, ed. Sarah Husain. *Postcolonial Text* 3.2 (2007): n. pag. Web. 8 Nov. 2007.

Schmidt-Nieto, Jorge R. "The Political Side of Bilingual Education: The Undesirable Becomes Useful." *Arachne@Rutgers* 2.2 (2002): n. pag. Web. 12 Mar. 2007.

Shah, Parilah Mohd, and Fauziah Ahmad. "A Comparative Account of the Bilingual Education Programs in Malaysia and the United States." *GEMA Online Journal of Language Studies* 7.2 (2007): 63-77. Web. 8 Nov. 2007.

Shehan, Constance L., and Amanda B. Moras. "Deconstructing Laundry: Gendered Technologies and the Reluctant Redesign of Household Labor." *Michigan Family Review* 11 (2006): n. pag. Web. 8 Nov. 2007.

Wood, Michael. "The Last Night of All." *PMLA* 122.5 (2008): 1394-402. Web. 22 Jan. 2008.

If you need to include a URL, follow the guidelines in 6.7.1.

6.7.4 A PERIODICAL PUBLICATION IN AN ONLINE DATABASE

Many databases include digital scans of entire periodicals that were previously published in print; often these scans present facsimiles of the printed works. Other databases aggregate articles from disparate periodicals, sometimes organizing the articles by subject. In some databases, typographic features and even the pagination found in print versions may be altered or lost. Sometimes copyrighted third-party materials (illustrations or text) in a print version may have been eliminated because permission for the electronic publication could not be cleared. Web presentations of periodicals may include enhancements, such as hypertextual links, sound recordings, and film clips, that are not present in their print counterparts.

To cite a work from a periodical in an online database, such as an article, a review, an editorial, or a letter to the editor, begin the entry by following the recommendations in 6.5 for citing works in print periodicals, but drop the medium of original publication (*Print*). A periodical article on the Web may not include page numbers. If possible, give the inclusive page numbers or, when pagination is not continuous, the first page number and a plus sign; if pagination is not available, use *n. pag.* Conclude the entry with the following items:

1. Title of the database (italicized)
2. Medium of publication consulted (*Web*)
3. Date of access (day, month, and year)

If the guidelines you are following in 6.5 call for supplementary bibliographic information after the medium of publication, this information should be included immediately before item 1 above (see the Richardson entry). Here are examples of entries for periodical publications collected in online databases:

Chan, Evans. "Postmodernism and Hong Kong Cinema." *Postmodern Culture* 10.3 (2000): n. pag. *Project Muse*. Web. 20 May 2002.

Evangelista, Stefano. Rev. of *Victorian and Edwardian Responses to the Italian Renaissance*, ed. John E. Law and Lene

Østermark-Johansen. *Victorian Studies* 46.4 (2006): 729-31. *Academic Search Premier*. Web. 12 Mar. 2007.

France, Anatole. "Pour la Paix, pour la Liberté." *New Age* 5 Sept. 1907: 297-98. *The Modernist Journals Project*. Web. 12 Mar. 2007.

Lal, Ananda. Letter. *TDR* 51.3 (2007): 17-18. *Project Muse*. Web. 30 Nov. 2007.

Miller, Steven, and Sara Guyer, eds. *Literature and the Right to Marriage*. Spec. issue of *Diacritics* 35.4 (2005): 1-120. *Project Muse*. Web. 30 Nov. 2007.

Mowitt, John. "Fictions of Security: (Re)Reading the Political Thriller in the Era of Globalization." Diss. U of Minnesota, 2007. *DAI* 69.8 (2008): item AAT3279708. *ProQuest Dissertations and Theses*. Web. 22 Jan. 2008.

Richardson, Lynda. "Minority Students Languish in Special Education System." *New York Times* 6 Apr. 1994, late ed.: A1+. Pt. 1 of a series, A Class Apart: Special Education in New York City. *LexisNexis*. Web. 15 Aug. 2007.

Rosenberg, Mark. "Something Old, Something New. . . ." Editorial. *Canadian Journal on Aging / La revue canadienne du vieillissement* 26.2 (2007): 81. *Project Muse*. Web. 30 Nov. 2007.

Tolson, Nancy. "Making Books Available: The Role of Libraries, Librarians, and Booksellers in the Promotion of African American Children's Literature." *African American Review* 32.1 (1998): 9-16. *JSTOR*. Web. 1 Oct. 2002.

If you need to include a URL, follow the guidelines in 6.7.1.

6.8 CITING ADDITIONAL COMMON SOURCES

6.8.1 A TELEVISION OR RADIO BROADCAST

The information in an entry for a television or radio broadcast usually appears in the following order:

1. Title of the episode or segment, if appropriate (in quotation marks)
2. Title of the program or series (italicized)
3. Name of the network (if any)

4. Call letters and city of the local station (if any)
5. Broadcast date
6. Medium of reception (e.g., *Radio, Television*)
7. Supplementary information

For instance, among the examples below, "Frederick Douglass" is an episode of the program *Civil War Journal.* Use a comma between the call letters and the city and between the city and the broadcast date ("KETC, Saint Louis, 13 Jan. 2006"). A period follows each of the other items. For the inclusion of other information that may be pertinent (e.g., performers, director, narrator, number of episodes), see the sample entries. In general, information relating to a particular episode follows the title of the episode, while information pertinent to a series follows the title of the series.

Don Giovanni. By Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart. Perf. James Morris, Bryn Terfel, and Carol Vaness. Cond. Yakov Kreizberg. Lyric Opera of Chicago. Nuveen-Lyric Opera of Chicago Radio Network. WFMT, Chicago, 8 June 1996. Radio.

"Frederick Douglass." *Civil War Journal.* Narr. Danny Glover. Dir. Craig Haffner. Arts and Entertainment Network. 6 Apr. 1993. Television.

"The Phantom of Corleone." Narr. Steve Kroft. *Sixty Minutes.* CBS. WCBS, New York, 10 Dec. 2006. Television.

"Shakespearean Putdowns." Narr. Robert Siegel and Linda Wertheimer. *All Things Considered.* Natl. Public Radio. WNYC, New York, 6 Apr. 1994. Radio.

If your reference is primarily to the work of a particular individual, cite that person's name before the title.

Wadey, Maggie, adapt. "The Buccaneers." By Edith Wharton. Perf. Mira Sorvino, Alison Elliott, and Carla Gugino. 3 episodes. *Masterpiece Theatre.* Introd. Russell Baker. PBS. WGBH, Boston, 27 Apr.-11 May 1997. Television.

Welles, Orson, dir. "The War of the Worlds." By H. G. Wells. Adapt. Howard Koch. *Mercury Theatre on the Air.* CBS Radio. WCBS, New York, 30 Oct. 1938. Radio.

If you are citing a transcript of a program, list its medium of publication and add the description *Transcript* at the end of the entry.

"Shakespearean Putdowns." Narr. Robert Siegel and Linda Wertheimer. *All Things Considered*. Natl. Public Radio. WNYC, New York, 6 Apr. 1994. Print. Transcript.

See 6.8.7 for interviews on television and radio broadcasts; see also 6.7.2d for television and radio broadcasts on the Web, 6.8.2–3 for sound, film, and video recordings, 6.8.4 for performances, and 6.8.17 for television and radio programs on CD-ROM.

6.8.2 A SOUND RECORDING

In an entry for a commercially available recording, which person or group is cited first (e.g., the composer, conductor, ensemble, or performer) depends on the desired emphasis. List the title of the recording (or the titles of the works included), the artist or artists (when distinct from a first-listed person or group), the manufacturer (*Capitol*), and the year of issue (if the year is unknown, write *n.d.*). Indicate the medium, neither italicized nor enclosed in quotation marks, after the date of publication: *Audiocassette*, *Audiotape* (reel-to-reel tape), *CD* (compact disc), or *LP* (long-playing record). Place a comma between the manufacturer and the date; periods follow the other items.

In general, italicize titles of recordings (*Romances for Saxophone*). You may wish to indicate, in addition to the year of issue, the date of recording (see the entries for Ellington and Holiday).

de Larrocha, Alicia, perf. *Mozart Piano Concertos Nos. 19 and 27*. By Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart. English Chamber Orch. Cond. Colin Davis. Red Seal-RCA Victor, 1997. CD.

Ellington, Duke, cond. *First Carnegie Hall Concert*. Duke Ellington Orch. Rec. 23 Jan. 1943. Prestige, 1977. LP.

The Mamas and the Papas. *Gold*. Comp. Andy McKaie. Geffen, 2005. CD.

Marsalis, Branford. *Romances for Saxophone*. English Chamber Orch. Cond. Andrew Litton. CBS, 1986. Audiocassette.

Sondheim, Stephen. *Passion*. Orch. Jonathan Tunick. Perf. Donna Murphy, Jere Shea, and Marin Mazzie. Cond. Paul Gemignani. Angel, 1994. CD.

If you are citing a specific song, place its title in quotation marks.

Bartoli, Cecilia, perf. "Les filles de Cadix." By Pauline Viardot. *Chant d'amour*. London, 1996. CD.

Camper Van Beethoven. "Ambiguity Song." *Telephone Free Landslide Victory*. Rough Trade, n.d. LP.

Gabriel, Peter. "A Different Drum." Perf. Gabriel, Shankar, and Youssou N'Dour. *Passion: Music for* The Last Temptation of Christ, *a Film by Martin Scorsese*. Geffen, 1989. CD.

Holiday, Billie, perf. "God Bless the Child." Rec. 9 May 1941. *The Essence of Billie Holiday*. Columbia, 1991. CD.

Treat a spoken-word recording as you would a musical recording. Begin with the speaker, the writer, or the production director, depending on the desired emphasis. If relevant, you may add the date of the work's original publication immediately after the title.

Burnett, Frances Hodgson. *The Secret Garden*. 1911. Narr. Helena Bonham Carter. Penguin-High Bridge, 1993. Audiocassette.

Shakespeare, William. *Othello*. Dir. John Dexter. Perf. Laurence Olivier, Maggie Smith, Frank Finley, and Derek Jacobi. RCA Victor, 1964. LP.

Welles, Orson, dir. *The War of the Worlds*. By H. G. Wells. Adapt. Howard Koch. Rec. 30 Oct. 1938. Evolution, 1969. LP.

Whitman, Walt. "America." *In Their Own Voices: A Century of Recorded Poetry*. Rhino, 1996. CD.

Do not italicize or enclose in quotation marks the title of a private or archival recording or tape. Include the date recorded (if known) and the location and identifying number of the recording.

Wilgus, D. K. Southern Folk Tales. Rec. 23-25 Mar. 1965. Audiotape. Archives of Folklore, U of California, Los Angeles. B.76.82.

In citing the libretto, the booklet, the liner notes, or other material accompanying a recording, give the author's name, the title of the material (if any), and a description of the material (*Libretto*). Then provide the usual bibliographic information for a recording.

Boyd, Malcolm. Booklet. *The Bach Album*. Deutsche Grammophon, 1992. CD.

Colette. Libretto. *L'enfant et les sortilèges*. Music by Maurice Ravel. Orch. National Bordeaux-Aquitaine. Cond. Alain Lombard. Valois, 1993. CD.

Lewiston, David. Liner notes. *The Balinese Gamelan: Music from the Morning of the World.* Nonesuch, n.d. LP.

See 6.7.2d for sound recordings on the Web.

6.8.3 A FILM OR A VIDEO RECORDING

An entry for a film usually begins with the title, italicized, and includes the director, the distributor, the year of release, and the medium. You may include other data that seem pertinent—such as the names of the screenwriter, performers, and producer—between the title and the distributor. For films dubbed or subtitled in English, you may give the English title and follow it with the original title, italicized, in square brackets.

It's a Wonderful Life. Dir. Frank Capra. Perf. James Stewart, Donna Reed, Lionel Barrymore, and Thomas Mitchell. RKO, 1946. Film.

Like Water for Chocolate [*Como agua para chocolate*]. Screenplay by Laura Esquivel. Dir. Alfonso Arau. Perf. Lumi Cavazos, Marco Lombardi, and Regina Torne. Miramax, 1993. Film.

If you are citing the contribution of a particular individual, begin with that person's name.

Chaplin, Charles, dir. *Modern Times.* Perf. Chaplin and Paulette Goddard. United Artists, 1936. Film.

Jhabvala, Ruth Prawer, adapt. *A Room with a View.* By E. M. Forster. Dir. James Ivory. Prod. Ismail Merchant. Perf. Maggie Smith, Denholm Eliot, Helena Bonham Carter, and Daniel Day-Lewis. Cinecom Intl., 1985. Film.

Mifune, Toshiro, perf. *Rashomon.* Dir. Akira Kurosawa. Daiei, 1950. Film.

Rota, Nino, composer. *Juliet of the Spirits* [*Giulietta degli spiriti*]. Dir. Federico Fellini. Perf. Giulietta Masina. Rizzoli, 1965. Film.

Cite a DVD (digital videodisc), videocassette, laser disc, slide program, or filmstrip as you would a film. Include the original release date when it is relevant.

Don Carlo. By Giuseppe Verdi. Dir. Franco Zeffirelli. Perf. Luciano Pavarotti and Samuel Ramey. La Scala Orch. and Chorus. Cond. Riccardo Muti. EMI, 1994. Videocassette.

It's a Wonderful Life. Dir. Frank Capra. Perf. James Stewart, Donna Reed, Lionel Barrymore, and Thomas Mitchell. 1946. Republic, 2001. DVD.

Looking at Our Earth: A Visual Dictionary. Natl. Geographic Educ. Services, 1992. Sound filmstrip.

Mifune, Toshiro, perf. *Rashomon.* Dir. Akira Kurosawa. 1950. Home Vision, 2001. Videocassette.

Noujaim, Jehane, dir. *Control Room.* Lions Gate, 2004. DVD.

Renoir, Jean, dir. *Grand Illusion [La grande illusion].* Perf. Jean Gabin and Erich von Stroheim. 1938. Voyager, 1987. Laser disc.

For television broadcasts of films, adapt the guidelines in 6.8.1; for films or film clips on CD-ROM, see 6.8.17; for films or film clips on the Web, see 6.7.2d.

6.8.4 A PERFORMANCE

An entry for a performance (play, opera, dance, concert) usually begins with the title, contains facts similar to those given for a film (see 6.8.3), and concludes with the site of the performance (usually the theater and city, separated by a comma and followed by a period), the date of the performance, and (in the place where the medium of publication is usually recorded) an indication that you are citing a performance.

Hamlet. By William Shakespeare. Dir. John Gielgud. Perf. Richard Burton. Shubert Theatre, Boston. 4 Mar. 1964. Performance.

Heartbreak House. By George Bernard Shaw. Dir. Robin Lefevre. Perf. Philip Bosco and Swoosie Kurtz. Roundabout Theatre Company. Amer. Airlines Theatre, New York. 1 Oct. 2006. Performance.

The River. Chor. Alvin Ailey. Dance Theater of Harlem. New York State Theater, New York. 15 Mar. 1994. Performance.

The Siege of Paris. Marionettes of the Cooperativa Teatroarte Cuticchio. Sylvia and Danny Kaye Playhouse, New York. 22 Mar. 1997. Performance.

Les vêpres siciliennes. By Giuseppe Verdi. Libretto by Eugène Scribe and Charles Duveyrier. Dir. Federico Tiezzi. Cond. John Nelson. Perf. Daniela Dessì, David Kuebler, and Ferruccio Furlanetto. Teatro dell'Opera, Rome. 17 Jan. 1997. Performance.

If you are citing the contribution of a particular individual or group, begin with the appropriate name.

Ars Musica Antiqua, perf. *In Praise of Women: Music by Women Composers from the Twelfth through the Eighteenth Centuries.* Scotch Plains Public Lib., NJ. 5 Apr. 1994. Performance.

Culkin, Kieran, perf. *Suburbia.* By Eric Bogosian. Second Stage Theatre, New York. 16 Sept. 2006. Performance.

Freni, Mirella, perf. *Fedora.* By Umberto Giordano. Cond. Roberto Abbado. Metropolitan Opera. Metropolitan Opera House, New York. 26 Apr. 1997. Performance.

Joplin, Scott. *Treemonisha.* Dir. Frank Corsaro. Perf. Carmen Balthrop, Betty Allen, and Curtis Rayam. Houston Grand Opera Orch. and Chorus. Cond. Gunther Schuller. Miller Theatre, Houston. 18 May 1975. Performance.

For television and radio broadcasts of performances, see 6.8.1; for sound recordings of performances, see 6.8.2; for films and video recordings of performances, see 6.8.3.

6.8.5 A MUSICAL SCORE

Treat a published score like a book. Begin with the composer's name, and then give the title, italicized, as it appears on the title page, capitalizing the abbreviations *no.* and *op.* Continue with the date of composition (if the year is unknown, write *N.d.*), the place of publication, the name of the publisher, the date of publication, and the medium of publication consulted. If the score is part of a series, include the information about the series after the medium of publication.

Donizetti, Gaetano. *Don Pasquale: An Opera in Three Acts with Italian-English Text.* 1842. New York: Belwin, 1969. Print. Kalmus Vocal Scores.

See 6.7.2 for scores on the Web, 6.8.1 for television and radio broadcasts of music, 6.8.2 for sound recordings of musical compositions, 6.8.3 for films and video recordings of musical performances, and 6.8.4 for musical performances.

6.8.6 A WORK OF VISUAL ART

To cite a painting, lithograph, sculpture, or similar work, state the artist's name first when available. In general, italicize the title and then list the date of composition (if the year is unknown, write *N.d.*). Indicate the medium of composition. Name the institution that houses the work (e.g., a museum); for a work in a private collection, give the name of the collection (*Collection of...*) or, if the collector is unknown or wishes to be anonymous, *Private collection.*

Bearden, Romare. *The Train.* 1974. Photogravure and aquatint. Museum of Mod. Art, New York.

Heckman, Albert. *Windblown Trees.* N.d. Lithograph on paper. Private collection.

Perutz, Dolly Hellman. *Bird Flying Machine.* 1973. Bronze. Central Park, New York.

Rembrandt Harmensz van Rijn. *Aristotle with a Bust of Homer.* 1653. Oil on canvas. Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York.

Seurat, Georges. *Man Leaning on a Fence.* 1880-81? Graphite on paper. Collection of André Bromberg.

Cite a photograph in a museum or collection as you would a painting or sculpture.

Evans, Walker. *Penny Picture Display.* 1936. Photograph. Museum of Mod. Art, New York.

If you use a reproduction of a painting, sculpture, or photograph, state not only the institution or private owner and the city (if available) but also the complete publication information for the source in which the reproduction appears, including the page, slide, figure, or plate number, whichever is relevant. Indicate the medium of reproduction.

Eakins, Thomas. *Spinning.* 1881. Private collection. *Thomas Eakins.* Ed. Darrel Sewell. Philadelphia: Philadelphia Museum of Art in assn. with Yale UP, 2001. Plate 91. Print.

Moholy-Nagy, László. *Photogram.* N.d. Museum of Mod. Art, New York. *The Contest of Meaning: Critical Histories of Photography.* Ed. Richard Bolton. Cambridge: MIT P, 1989. 94. Print.

See 6.7.2d for works of visual art on the Web; see 6.8.17 for works of visual art on CD-ROM.

6.8.7 AN INTERVIEW

For purposes of documentation, there are two kinds of interviews: those published or broadcast and those conducted by the researcher. Begin with the name of the person interviewed. If the interview is part of a publication, recording, or program, enclose the title of the interview, if any, in quotation marks; if the interview was published independently, italicize the title. If the interview is untitled, use the descriptive label *Interview*, neither italicized nor enclosed in quotation marks. The interviewer's name may be added if known and pertinent to your work (see the sample entries for Blackmun and Updike). Conclude with the appropriate bibliographic information and the medium of publication.

Blackmun, Harry. Interview by Ted Koppel and Nina Totenberg. *Nightline*. ABC. WABC, New York. 5 Apr. 1994. Television.

Blanchett, Cate. "In Character with: Cate Blanchett." *Notes on a Scandal*. Dir. Richard Eyre. Fox Searchlight, 2006. DVD.

Fellini, Federico. "The Long Interview." *Juliet of the Spirits*. Ed. Tullio Kezich. Trans. Howard Greenfield. New York: Ballantine, 1966. 17-64. Print.

Gordimer, Nadine. Interview. *New York Times* 10 Oct. 1991, late ed.: C25. Print.

Lansbury, Angela. Interview. *Off-Camera: Conversations with the Makers of Prime-Time Television*. By Richard Levinson and William Link. New York: Plume-NAL, 1986. 72-86. Print.

Updike, John. Interview by Scott Simon. *Weekend Edition*. Natl. Public Radio. WBUR, Boston. 2 Apr. 1994. Radio.

To cite an interview that you conducted, give the name of the person interviewed, the kind of interview (*Personal interview*, *Telephone interview*), and the date.

Pei, I. M. Personal interview. 22 July 1993.

Reed, Ishmael. Telephone interview. 10 Dec. 2007.

See 6.7.2b for interviews on the Web.

6.8.8 A MAP OR CHART

In general, treat a map or chart like an article or a book, but add the appropriate descriptive label (*Map*, *Chart*).

Japanese Fundamentals. Chart. Hauppauge: Barron, 1992. Print.

Michigan. Map. Chicago: Rand, 2000. Print.

"Western Boundaries of Brazil, 1600, 1780, and the Present." Map. *Brazilian Narrative Traditions in a Comparative Context*. By Earl E. Fitz. New York: MLA, 2005. 43. Print.

See 6.7.2b for maps and charts on the Web.

6.8.9 A CARTOON OR COMIC STRIP

To cite a cartoon or comic strip, state the artist's name; the title of the cartoon or comic strip (if any), in quotation marks; and the descriptive label *Cartoon* or *Comic Strip*, neither italicized nor enclosed in quotation marks. Conclude with the usual publication information and the medium of publication.

Chast, Roz. Cartoon. *New Yorker* 4 Feb. 2002: 53. Print.

Trudeau, Garry. "Doonesbury." Comic strip. *Star-Ledger* [Newark] 4 May 2002: 26. Print.

See 6.6.12 for graphic narratives.

6.8.10 AN ADVERTISEMENT

To cite an advertisement, state the name of the product, company, or institution that is the subject of the advertisement, followed by the descriptive label *Advertisement*, neither italicized nor enclosed in quotation marks. Conclude with the usual publication information and the medium of publication.

Air Canada. Advertisement. CNN. 1 Apr. 1997. Television.

Baccarat. Advertisement. *New York* Nov. 2007: 4. Print.

6.8.11 A LECTURE, A SPEECH, AN ADDRESS, OR A READING

In a citation of an oral presentation, give the speaker's name; the title of the presentation (if known), in quotation marks; the meeting and

the sponsoring organization (if applicable); the location; and the date. Use an appropriate descriptive label (*Address*, *Lecture*, *Keynote speech*, *Reading*), neither italicized nor enclosed in quotation marks, to indicate the form of delivery.

Alter, Robert, and Marilynne Robinson. "The Psalms: A Reading and Conversation." 92nd Street Y, New York. 17 Dec. 2007. Reading.

Matuozzi, Robert. "Archive Trauma." Archive Trouble. MLA Annual Convention. Hyatt Regency, Chicago. 29 Dec. 2007. Address.

Terkel, Studs. Conf. on Coll. Composition and Communication Convention. Palmer House, Chicago. 22 Mar. 1990. Address.

6.8.12 A MANUSCRIPT OR TYPESCRIPT

To cite a manuscript or typescript, state the author, the title or a description of the material (e.g., *Notebook*), the date of composition (at least the year; if the year is unknown, write *N.d.*), and the form of the material (*MS* for a manuscript, *TS* for a typescript). As appropriate, give the name and location of the library, research institution, or personal collection housing the material.

Chaucer, Geoffrey. *The Canterbury Tales*. 1400-10. MS Harley 7334. British Lib., London.

Dickinson, Emily. "Distance Is Not the Realm of Fox." 1870? MS. Pierpont Morgan Lib., New York.

Henderson, George Wylie. *Baby Lou and the Angel Bud*. N.d. TS. Collection of Roslyn Kirkland Allen, New York.

Jones, Celia. "Shakespeare's Dark Lady Illuminated." 1988. TS.

See 6.7.2d for manuscripts and typescripts on the Web.

6.8.13 A LETTER, A MEMO, OR AN E-MAIL MESSAGE

As bibliographic entries, letters fall into three general categories:

- Published letters
- Unpublished letters in archives
- Letters received by the researcher

Treat a published letter like a work in a collection (see 6.6.6), adding the date of the letter and the number (if the editor assigned one).

Woolf, Virginia. "To T. S. Eliot." 28 July 1920. Letter 1138 of *The Letters of Virginia Woolf*. Ed. Nigel Nicolson and Joanne Trautmann. Vol. 2. New York: Harcourt, 1976. 437-38. Print.

If you use more than one letter in a published collection, however, provide a single entry for the entire work and cite the letters individually in the text, following the form recommended for cross-references in works-cited lists (see 6.4.6).

In citing an unpublished letter, follow the guidelines for manuscripts and typescripts (see 6.8.12).

Benton, Thomas Hart. Letter to Charles Fremont. 22 June 1847. MS. John Charles Fremont Papers. Southwest Museum Lib., Los Angeles.

Cite a letter that you received as follows:

Sorby, Angela. Letter to the author. 20 July 2003. MS.

Treat memos similarly: give the name of the writer of the memo, a description of the memo that includes the recipient, the date of the document, and the medium of delivery. Any title of the memo should be enclosed in quotation marks and placed immediately after the writer's name.

Cahill, Daniel J. Memo to English dept. fac., Brooklyn Technical High School, New York. 1 June 2000. TS.

To cite e-mail, give the name of the writer; the title of the message (if any), taken from the subject line and enclosed in quotation marks; a description of the message that includes the recipient (e.g., *Message to the author*); the date of the message; and the medium of delivery.

Boyle, Anthony T. "Re: Utopia." Message to Daniel J. Cahill. 21 June 1997. E-mail.

Harner, James L. Message to the author. 20 Aug. 2002. E-mail.

6.8.14 A LEGAL SOURCE

The citation of legal documents and law cases may be complicated. If your work requires many such references, consult the most recent edition of *The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation* (Cambridge: Harvard Law Rev. Assn.; print), an indispensable guide in this field. *The*

Bluebook uses footnotes instead of parenthetical references keyed to a list of works cited, however, so its recommendations must be adapted to MLA style.

In general, do not italicize or enclose in quotation marks the titles of laws, acts, and similar documents in either the text or the list of works cited (Declaration of Independence, Constitution of the United States, Taft-Hartley Act). Such titles are usually abbreviated, and the works are cited by sections. The years are added if relevant. Although lawyers and legal scholars adopt many abbreviations in their citations, use only familiar abbreviations when writing for a more general audience (see ch. 8). References to the United States Code, which is often abbreviated *USC*, begin with the title number.

17 USC. Sec. 304. 2000. Print.

In the above entry, title 17 refers to laws concerned with copyrights. Alphabetize a USC entry as if it began *United States Code*. When including more than one reference to the code, list the entries in numerical order by title and, within titles, by section.

If you are citing an act in the works-cited list, state the name of the act, its Public Law number, its Statutes at Large volume number and inclusive page numbers, the date it was enacted, and its medium of publication. Use the abbreviations *Pub. L.* for Public Law and *Stat.* for Statutes at Large.

Aviation and Transportation Security Act. Pub. L. 107-71. 115 Stat. 597-647. 19 Nov. 2001. Print.

Names of law cases are similarly abbreviated ("Brown v. Board of Educ.," for the case of Oliver Brown versus the Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas), but the first important word of each party's name is always spelled out. Names of cases, unlike those of laws, are italicized in the text but not in bibliographic entries. When you cite a case, include, in addition to the names of the first plaintiff and the first defendant, the volume, name (not italicized), and inclusive page or reference numbers of the law report cited; the name of the court that decided the case; the year of the decision; and appropriate publication information for the medium consulted. Once again, considerable abbreviation is the norm.

Brown v. Board of Educ. 347 US 483-96. Supreme Court of the US. 1954. *Supreme Court Collection*. Legal Information Inst., Cornell U Law School, n.d. Web. 3 Aug. 2007.

It is common in legal scholarship to refer to a case by the first nongovernmental party. Thus, for a case named *NLRB v. Yeshiva University*, scholars are likely to use *Yeshiva* as a short title. But in MLA style readers need the first part of the name (*NLRB*) to locate the full citation in the list of works cited. You should bear this in mind when formulating parenthetical references to legal sources.

To cite a government document, see 6.6.20.

6.8.15 AN ARTICLE IN A MICROFORM COLLECTION OF ARTICLES

If you are citing an article that was provided by a reference source such as NewsBank, which formerly selected periodical articles and made them available on microfiche, begin the entry with the original publication information, followed by the medium of publication. Then add the relevant information concerning the microform from which you derived the article—title of source (italicized), volume number, year (in parentheses), and appropriate identifying numbers ("fiche 42, grids 5–6").

Chapman, Dan. "Panel Could Help Protect Children." *Winston-Salem Journal* 14 Jan. 1990: 14. Microform. *NewsBank: Welfare and Social Problems* 12 (1990): fiche 1, grids A8-11.

6.8.16 AN ARTICLE REPRINTED IN A LOOSE-LEAF COLLECTION OF ARTICLES

If you are citing a reprinted article that was provided by an information service such as the Social Issues Resources Series (SIRS), which formerly selected articles from periodicals and published them in loose-leaf volumes, each dedicated to a specific topic, begin the entry with the original publication information, followed by the medium of publication. Then add the relevant information for the loose-leaf volume in which the article is reprinted, treating the volume like a book (see 6.6)—title (italicized), name of editor (if any), volume number (if any), city of publication, publisher, year of publication, and article number (preceded by the abbreviation *Art.*).

Edmondson, Brad. "AIDS and Aging." *American Demographics* Mar. 1990: 28+. Print. *The AIDS Crisis*. Ed. Eleanor Goldstein. Vol. 2. Boca Raton: SIRS, 1991. Art. 24.

See 6.7.3–4 for articles on the Web.

.17 A PUBLICATION ON CD-ROM OR DVD-ROM

Citations for publications on CD-ROM and DVD-ROM are similar to those for print sources, with the following important differences.

Vendor's Name. The persons or groups responsible for supplying the information in publications on CD-ROM and DVD-ROM are sometimes also the publishers of the works. But many information providers choose instead to lease the data to vendors (e.g., ProQuest) for distribution. It is important to state the vendor's name in your works-cited list, if it is given in your source, because the information provider may have leased versions of the data to more than one vendor and the versions may not be identical. Usually the vendor's name is recorded in the part of the entry reserved for supplementary information.

Publication Dates. Some databases published on CD-ROM or DVD-ROM are updated regularly (e.g., annually, quarterly). Updates add information and may also correct or otherwise alter information that previously appeared in the database. Therefore, a works-cited-list entry for material derived from such a database commonly contains the publication date of the document, as indicated in the source, as well as the publication date of the database (or the date of its most recent update [see 6.8.17b]).

The sections below contain recommendations for citing nonperiodical publications on CD-ROM or DVD-ROM (6.8.17a), materials from periodically published databases on CD-ROM or DVD-ROM (6.8.17b), and multidisc publications (6.8.17c).

a. A Nonperiodical Publication on CD-ROM or DVD-ROM

Many publications on CD-ROM or DVD-ROM are issued as books are—that is, without a plan to update or otherwise revise the work regularly. Cite a nonperiodical publication on CD-ROM or DVD-ROM as you would a book, but add a description of the medium of publication. When the information provider and the publisher are the same, no vendor's name appears, and only one publication date is given. The typical works-cited-list entry for the source consists of the following items:

1. Author's name (if given). If only an editor, a compiler, or a translator is identified, cite that person's name, followed by the appropriate abbreviation (*ed.*, *comp.*, *trans.*).

2. Title of the publication (italicized)
3. Name of the editor, compiler, or translator (if relevant)
4. Edition, release, or version (if relevant)
5. Place of publication
6. Name of the publisher
7. Date of publication
8. Medium of publication consulted
9. Supplementary information

If you cannot find some of this information, cite what is available.

Le Robert électronique. Paris: Robert, 1992. CD-ROM.

Shakespeare, William. *Macbeth*. Ed. A. R. Braunmuller. New York: Voyager, 1994. CD-ROM.

If publication information for a printed source or printed analogue is indicated, begin the citation with that information. Give the publication data for the CD-ROM or DVD-ROM following the record of the medium of publication.

Aristotle. *The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation*. Ed. Jonathan Barnes. 2 vols. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1984. CD-ROM. Clayton: InteLex, 1994.

If the work you are citing is part of another work, state which part. If the work is of a type likely to be published on its own, such as a book, italicize the title; if not, enclose the title in quotation marks. If the source supplies page numbers, paragraph numbers, screen numbers, or some other kind of section numbers, state the range of the numbers in the part if a single numbering encompasses all the parts.

"Albatross." *The Oxford English Dictionary*. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1992. CD-ROM.

Coleridge, Samuel Taylor. "Dejection: An Ode." *The Complete Poetical Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge*. Ed. Ernest Hartley Coleridge. Vol. 1. Oxford: Clarendon, 1912. 362-68. CD-ROM. *English Poetry Full-Text Database*. Rel. 2. Cambridge: Chadwyck-Healey, 1993.

"Parque." *Le Robert électronique*. Paris: Robert, 1992. CD-ROM.

Rodes, David S. "The Language of Ambiguity and Equivocation." *Macbeth*. By William Shakespeare. Ed. A. R. Braunmuller. New York: Voyager, 1994. CD-ROM.

b. Material from a Periodically Published Database on CD-ROM or DVD-ROM

Some periodicals (journals, magazines, newspapers) and periodically published reference works, such as annual bibliographies and collections of abstracts, are published both in print and on CD-ROM or DVD-ROM as databases or as parts of databases. To cite such a work, begin with the publication data for the printed source or printed analogue, as identified in the disc publication. If the print version is a book or a pamphlet (see the entry for *Guidelines for Family Television Viewing*), follow the guidelines in 6.6; if the print version is an article in a periodical, follow 6.5. The typical works-cited-list entry consists of the following items:

1. Author's name (if given)
2. Publication information for the printed source or printed analogue (including title and date of print publication)
3. Medium of publication consulted
4. Title of the database (italicized)
5. Name of the vendor
6. Publication date of the database

If you cannot find some of this information, cite what is available.

Brady, Philip. "Teaching Tu Fu on the Night Shift." *College English* 57.5 (1995): 562-69. Abstract. CD-ROM. *ERIC*. SilverPlatter. Sept. 1996.

Coates, Steve. "Et Tu, Cybernetica Machina User?" *New York Times* 28 Oct. 1996, late ed.: D4. CD-ROM. *New York Times Ondisc*. UMI-ProQuest. Dec. 1996.

Guidelines for Family Television Viewing. Urbana: ERIC Clearinghouse on Elementary and Early Childhood Educ., 1990. CD-ROM. *ERIC*. SilverPlatter. June 1993.

Rodríguez, Miguel Angel. "Teatro de los Puppets: Diversión y educación." *Opinión* 6 Sept. 1993: 1D. CD-ROM. *Ethnic Newswatch*. Dataware Technologies. 1995.

Russo, Michelle Cash. "Recovering from Bibliographic Instruction Blahs." *RQ: Reference Quarterly* 32 (1992): 178-83. CD-ROM. *Infotrac: Magazine Index Plus*. Information Access. Dec. 1993.

Stephenson, Denise R. "Blurred Distinctions: Emerging Forms of Academic Writing." Diss. U of New Mexico, 1996. *DAI* 57.4 (1996):

item DA9626438. CD-ROM. *Dissertation Abstracts Ondisc*. UMI-ProQuest. Dec. 1996.

United States. Cong. House. Committee on the Judiciary. *Report on the Fair Use of Copyrighted Works*. 102nd Cong., 1st sess. CD-ROM. *Congressional Masterfile 2*. Congressional Information Service. Dec. 1996.

c. A Multidisc Publication

If you are citing a CD-ROM or DVD-ROM publication of more than one disc, complete the entry either with the total number of discs or with a specific disc number if you use material from only one.

The Complete New Yorker. New York: New Yorker, 2005. DVD-ROM. 8 discs.

United States. Dept. of State. *Patterns of Global Terrorism*. 1994. CD-ROM. *National Trade Data Bank*. US Dept. of Commerce. Dec. 1996. Disc 2.

6.8.18 A DIGITAL FILE

Digital files can exist independently from the Web or a published disc. Examples are a PDF file stored on your computer, a document created by a colleague using a word processor, a scanned image you received as an e-mail attachment, and a sound recording formatted for playing on a digital audio player. In general, determine the kind of work you are citing (e.g., a book, a manuscript, a photograph, a sound recording), and follow the relevant guidelines in this manual for formatting the entry in the works-cited list. In the place reserved for the medium of publication, record the digital file format, followed by the word *file*—*PDF file*, Microsoft Word *file*, *JPEG file*, *MP3 file*, *XML file*, and so on—neither italicized (except for titles of software programs) nor enclosed in quotation marks. The file type is usually indicated by the extension at the end of the file name, after a period: OurCulturalCommonwealth.pdf. If you cannot identify the file type, use *Digital file*.

American Council of Learned Societies. Commission on Cyberinfrastructure for the Humanities and Social Sciences. *Our Cultural Commonwealth*. New York: ACLS, 2006. PDF file.

Cortez, Juan. "Border Crossing in Chicano Narrative." 2007. *Microsoft Word* file.

Delano, Jack. *At the Vermont State Fair*. 1941. Lib. of Cong., Washington. JPEG file.

Hudson, Jennifer, perf. "And I Am Telling You I'm Not Going." *Dreamgirls: Music from the Motion Picture*. Sony BMG, 2006. MP3 file.

Your research may require that you cite more facts about the file, such as its date or name. For example, you may encounter multiple versions of a document with the same author and title, such as a sequence of drafts an author made in developing a work. Record such facts in the place reserved for the version or edition of a work.

Cortez, Juan. "Border Crossing in Chicano Narrative." File last modified on 4 Apr. 2007. *Microsoft Word* file.

6.9 A WORK IN MORE THAN ONE PUBLICATION MEDIUM

If a work you used is published in more than one medium (e.g., a book with a CD-ROM), follow the format for the medium of the component you primarily consulted. In the place for the medium of publication, specify alphabetically all the media you consulted.

Bauman, H-Dirksen L., Jennifer L. Nelson, and Heidi M. Rose, eds. *Signing the Body Poetic: Essays on American Sign Language Literature*. Berkeley: U of California P, 2006. DVD, print.

Burnard, Lou, Katherine O'Brien O'Keeffe, and John Unsworth, eds. *Electronic Textual Editing*. New York: MLA, 2006. CD-ROM, print.

Or, if you consulted only one part:

Rahtz, Sebastian. "Storage, Retrieval, and Rendering." *Electronic Textual Editing*. Ed. Lou Burnard, Katherine O'Brien O'Keeffe, and John Unsworth. New York: MLA, 2006. 310-33. Print.

SIX

Postmodernism in China: A Sketch and Some Queries

HAUN SAUSSY

The various "posts" that have attracted so much attention in China lately—principally postmodernism (*houxiandai zhuyi*) and postcolonialism (*houzhimin zhuyi*), and in an idiomatic sense poststructuralism (*houjiegou zhuyi*), or as the Chinese authors conveniently call them for short, postlearning (*houxue*)—look like translations into modern Chinese idiom of terms and ideas pioneered elsewhere. But I mean by that no more than "look like." The key to making sense of them, I think, is to discard the hope that understanding them, and above all judging them, can be accomplished by reference to a more familiar "original" postmodernism. What more uncomfortable paradox can be imagined than attempting to argue that one's own postmodernism is the real, the authentic, the historically originary, the ancestrally legitimate brand? Rather than fall into the trap of saying that the Chinese post-ists have got it wrong, and trying to put them right by a more heavily supported reading of Derrida or Foucault or Lyotard, let us ask what the appropriate frame of reference for understanding Chinese post-ism is.

Because contemporary Chinese literature is not my main interest, I have relied on friends and colleagues for guidance through the dense bibliography on these questions. My biggest debts are to Zhang Kuan (who knew that I would disagree with him but generously supplied information nonetheless), Wang Youqin, and Guan Qi. I also thank Wen-hsin Yeh for inviting me to look into these issues. Errors of fact and judgment can be lodged securely with me. For two stimulating surveys of the questions discussed here, see Sheldon Hsiao-peng Lu, "Art, Culture, and Cultural Criticism in Post-New China," *New Literary History* 28 (1997): 111–33; Zhang Xudong, *Chinese Modernism in the Era of Reforms* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1997), especially "On Some Motifs in the Cultural Discussion," 71–99.

Not that we—or our Chinese contemporaries—are quite ready to answer that question. Certainly part of the frame of reference we will require is the academic context of present-day Europe and America, in which the post-ideologies were first elaborated, distributed, and made part of the intellectual lives of scholars and readers (Chinese-speaking or not). And the availability, the relative transparence and familiarity of the words and gestures, tempts us into thinking that post-ism amounts to an application to Chinese realities of something Jameson or Rorty has already said. But that would set us on precisely the path that a cursory reading of Chinese post-ist publications causes me to fear—namely, that of taking for granted the correspondence of discursive universes to the nondiscursive, possibly unutterable, situations in which they are pronounced. Euro-American precedents are only part of the frame of reference, and far from the most interesting part.

A first gesture toward derailing the Euro-American reader's confidence—the confidence that says, If that's postmodernism, then I already know all about that (including whether I like it or not)—would be to adopt the attitude of some scholars of traditional Chinese philosophy who like to say that Chinese thought was always postmodern because it never bothered to become modern.[1] I think this is a fallacy in its original setting, but it can be helpful here for its air of paradox. The original fallacy is that of supposing that two things are alike because they are different from a third thing. That fallacy may, nonetheless, guard us from a second fallacy, that of assuming that there is only one right way to get to postmodernism, by taking the path that leads (etymologically enough) through and past modernism. Both accidental similarity and historical inevitability furnish disreputable grounds for argument. By mixing together a bit of each we may discredit both.

One might say that philosophical modernism is an attempt to regulate the relationship of fact and value and that postmodernism is the abandonment of such attempts—resulting in claims that knowledge can never be grounded, or that values are entirely arbitrary, or that trying to work out principles for either is just a thinly disguised policing of discourse. Then in traditional China one would not have the relevant illusions to discard, since generally speaking the project of Chinese thought has not been to

[1] A. C. Graham, discussing Derrida in his historical work *Disputers of the Tao* (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1989), opened up this now quasi-obligatory topic.

propose transcendental guarantees for reliable knowledge or exception-free prescriptions for conduct.[2] Postmodernism then looks like an absurd detour in the Chinese context—the taking of medicine to cure ills one never suffered from. Is this the secret of the discursive vigor that has been shown in these late debates—the fact that nothing very real is at stake? What kind of critique is it in which no one's ox is relevantly gored?

But here it would be good to recall that no twentieth-century Chinese person, of whatever degree of literacy, has been able to live a purely traditional Chinese life, and therefore the imported oddities are live targets for critique. Indeed, how far back in history would we have to go to discover the inhabitants of so blissfully isolated a Peach Blossom Spring? The very ideals and models many people would distinguish from the enterprise of canonical Chinese thought have been active in the Chinese world for at least the past 150 years, furnishing one regime after another with challenges, forms of legitimacy, or aims of struggle. Their attraction survives much clumsiness in translation. The idea that one could know the world as it is, and that by knowing it one could transform it into the world as it should be, has quite a pull, and one doesn't have to be a professional philosopher to feel it.

The postmodernist gesture that I see most insistently brought forth in my readings is the rejection of modernist, cosmopolitan legitimation-devices. Are we called to submit our judgments to the court of science? To the norms of democratic constitutionalism? To the aesthetic canons of Sophocles and Phidias? If it's a norm, it's out of bounds. The fact that for most of this century the ruling standards, not to mention ideological currents and political influence, have been derived from international culture, commerce, and technology means that for mainland Chinese thinkers

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[2] See, as an early report on this contrast, I. A. Richards's observations. Richards speaks of

> the very absence in Mencius of anything which we can recognize as a theory of knowledge....[H]is reflections are nearly all about action, its sources and control....[H]is arguments are less demonstrations than instructions." *Mencius on the Mind* (London: Kegan Paul, 1932), 61. More generally, "Pragmatism, as a doctrine that ideas are tools to be judged by the work they do...is a fairly modern doctrine [in the West], a result of reflection and a result still treated in most European schools of philosophy as a heresy to be refuted. In Chinese philosophy, in its main streams at least, there seems to have been no Problem of Truth as such. Reflection has not exercised itself on the question 'What do we mean when we say that a statement is true?' The place of this problem has been taken by an assumption, so initial as to be unformulated, that what is true is what had better be accepted.

Basic in Teaching: East and West (London: Kegan Paul, Trench and Trubner, 1935), 24–25.

the rejection of existing modes of legitimation is doubled with the identification of these modes as specifically Western. (I normally refuse to bow to the idol referred to by this term, but in some contexts "Western" is the only right one, however many distinctions are sacrificed by pronouncing it.) Within living memory, indigenous Chinese standards have not had the backing needed to command belief and practice, saving a few exceptionally constituted domains such as family life, specific areas of scholarship, religion (where and when tolerated), and some forms of art. The ghostly local standards can therefore furnish a comfortably vague countermodel to the models derided as hegemonic yet obsolete. I see in several authors a mood that might be paraphrased as follows: "The European Enlightenment went bankrupt—we have only to follow the postmodernist argument to see it collapse. No matter for us! We still have something to fall back on—cultural goods that escaped the crash because nobody thought to bid them unrealistically high."

As received in China, the devices and authorities of postmodernism have produced not a uniform set of doctrines but a set of opportunities variously taken. It would be folly to try to summarize them all under one ideological or sociological heading. Nor do I have the space or the learning to describe the whole intellectual ecology of 1990s China. But by exploring some of the niches in which argument grows, I may be able to describe the conditions under which these opportunities arise and guess about their likely consequences.

While I was writing this essay I made my first trip to Beijing in more than ten years and was predictably startled by all that was new and much that wasn't. Just as on an earlier trip, someone thought to take me to see the stone set up over the ashes of Edgar Snow, next to the lake on the campus of Peking University. "Edgar Snow—An American Friend of the Chinese People" reads the inscription. Snow, of course, is the American journalist who "discovered" and loyally championed Mao Zedong and his Yan'an rebels, returning several times in the 1960s and 1970s to interview Mao and tell the world that collectivization, the Great Leap Forward, and the Cultural Revolution were splendid and beneficial transformations. Taking American visitors to see Snow's tomb is a gesture of solicitude, and it would have been poor manners to say what I thought of the definition of friendship the stone implied. "The American friend of *some* Chinese people,"

I said instead, and this was all right, because it led the conversation toward Mao's personal foibles, which is a permitted, indeed encouraged, subject.

Many of the "postmodern" essays suppose that communication between China and foreigners interested in it should be held up to the ideal represented by Snow's truckling to Mao. It is no longer the charismatic leader, but rather Chineseness, to which the acceptable foreigner must pay respect. I'm less concerned about the implicit xenophobia than about what cultural nationalism does to its domestic public. Whose interests are advanced by the circuits of identification that cause people to make much of "China's ability to say No" while many individual Chinese are unable to say no to each other?[3] Is not the cause of national unity supremely useful, in peacetime, for foreclosing both majority rule and minority protections? Is "cultural democracy" a barricade worth mounting while Chinese political economy, based on a mode of production that is both low wage and increasingly high tech, works its way toward constitutional guarantees of worker docility and efficiency? The "friend of *some* Chinese people" that I am worries about these things, because I worry about them at home too.

Xu Jilin describes the conditions making for an eager reception of the anti-Enlightenment streak in postmodern thinking as in part intellectual, in part sociological:

> To consider the factors internal to epistemology, [the "anti-Western" theorists of the 1990s] all had begun by accepting the mainstream discourse of the Western intellectual genealogy. They believed that Western modernist thought should and could contribute to China's modernization adequate intellectual resources and patterns for action. As a consequence, the deeper their previous commitment, the more they were able to discover that the supposed universals of modernist theory were really nothing more than particular products of Western history or culture and were separated by a great gulf from the discourse of Chinese contemporary culture and historical tradition. This gap between Western theory and Chinese discourse made it impossible for them not to

[3] An allusion to the title of the best-seller by Song Jiang, *Zhongguo keyi shuo "bu"* (Beijing: Zhonghua gongshang lianhe chubanshe, 1996). For a brief but thoughtful discussion of such nay-saying, see Rey Chow, "Can One Say No to China?" *New Literary History* 28 (1997): 147–51. I am glad to see misgivings similar to mine expressed by Xu Ben, "Zai tan Zhongguo 'houxue' de zhengzhixing he lishi yishi" (Again on Chinese postmodernism's political character and historical consciousness), *Ershiyi shiji* 39 (February 1997): 135.

> shift their gaze from Western mainstream discourse and toward marginal discourses such as postcolonial cultural theory, analytical Marxism, and so on. They hoped to find there inspiration for a pattern of modernization that would fit Chinese conditions. ...Unlike previous cultural conservatives, these scholars' plan was not to "confront Western learning with native learning," but rather to "use the aliens to control the aliens," to use Western marginal discourses to resist Western mainstream discourse....
>
> From the external, sociological perspective, the anti-Western trend is closely connected to a series of changes in the environment at home and abroad. Following the sudden take-off of the Chinese economy, the national strength of China grew enormously; and the first reaction of a disfavored people that is emerging from its disfavored status is always to say "No" to those privileged peoples it has long been attempting to overtake. In the 1980s, China's contacts with the West were limited, conflicts of interest were rare, and intellectuals had a flattering image of the West, so that Westernization had a suitable psychological support. But from the beginning of the 1990s China began to enter the international political-economic system, and conflicts between China and the West became more and more direct: the opposition of the Western countries, and particularly the United States, to China's joining the WTO [World Trade Organization] and hosting the Olympic Games, trade frictions, the *Yinhe* incident,[4] and a series of other events caused Chinese intellectuals to lose a great part of their faith in the West. Behind their beautiful Western discourse they discovered ugly relationships of power and an unequal power relationship that the Western countries were determined to force onto China....Thus the nationalistic feeling of Chinese intellectuals was greatly awakened, so that anti-Westernism had a deep psychological foundation.[5]

One thing is missing from the chronology. If Xu's account accurately represents the thinking of Chinese intellectuals, then someone has perfected the art of spin control. Although the trade frictions and boycotts Xu lists surely harmonized with the self-

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[4] The ship *Yinhe* was pursued and boarded on the open seas by an American vessel, under the suspicion (unfounded) that it was carrying arms to Iraq.

[5] Xu Jilin, "Wenhua rentong de kunjing: 90 niandai Zhongguo zhishijie de fanxihua sichao" (The difficulties of cultural identity: The anti-Western trend in Chinese intellectual life of the 1990s), *Zhanlue yu guanli* 18 (1996): 100–1. In another essay, Xu acknowledges that "the Tiananmen incident of 1989 not only brought an abrupt halt to the 'culture fever' [of the 1980s], it also caused mainland intellectuals to lose some of their passion for politics." "Bi pipan geng zhongyao de shi lijie" (Understanding is more important than critique), *Ershiyi shiji* 30 (August 1995): 131.

interest of many of China's trade partners (though not all, and certainly not for long), the proclaimed reason for denying China such badges of international recognition as WTO membership and the hosting of the Olympic Games was to punish the government for its violent repression of the popular movements of 1989. To have done otherwise would have been to display friendship for the wrong people. As "unequal power relationships" go, some are uglier than others. Better that some contracts be cancelled and some international meetings be spoiled by an unwelcome speech or two than that the memory of the dead be too quickly swept under the rug. That June 1989 marked a turning point in recent Chinese intellectual life I am sure is a fact; but it would startle me to think that the main pivot of the turn was the discovery by Westernizing scholars that foreign countries have economies of their own, advantages to protect, and a weakness for self-serving policies, especially in election years. Does no one remember the principled boycotts of Japanese goods during the Pacific War? Or was the short-lived, American-led cooling of trade relations with China such a propaganda failure that none of the people who, in China, had the best chance to learn of it could ever figure out what it was about? In any case, Xu's analysis of anti-Westernism assumes that the educated classes of China recognize the power aims of their present government as identical to their own aims, or those of the Chinese people generally—which I should think needs to be shown, even without the killings of unarmed students to inspire reflection.[6] (If Chinese intellectuals are disappointed with Enlightenment ideals, does it follow that they are delighted with obscurantism?) The critique of universalism seems to have skipped over some important steps. Or then, it may be that Xu is using an advanced Aesopian technique, and counting on us to note the omission and therefore read the whole essay ironically.

It takes a *xenos* like me to imagine that a Chinese intellectual movement is all about xenophilia or xenophobia. One ought to try to keep things in proportion, just as one ought not to assume that *houxiandai zhuyi* attempts to reproduce French or American

[6] Rey Chow, in her previously mentioned essay, names "the scarcely touched issues of *China's relation to those whom it deems politically and culturally subordinate.* I am referring, specifically, to Tibet, Taiwan and Hong Kong" (151, italics Chow's). Scarcely touched, indeed, because to discuss them would be to infringe the Four Great Principles that currently mark the boundaries of permitted debate within China.

discourses about "postmodernism." Where a Chinese writer seems to "get it wrong," to conjoin incompatible streams of thought, we need to ask if the story being told is different from the one we already know. The poet-professor Zheng Min's essay "Shijimo de huigu: Hanyu yuyan biange yu Zhongguo xinshi chuangzuo" (Retrospect at century's end: The transformation of the Chinese language and modern Chinese poetic creation)[7] is confusing—and therefore, I will argue, inspiring—on precisely these grounds. By attempting to correct its author's historical perspective or theoretical information, its readers overlook its most provocative aspect, its revision of the collective story about Chinese modernity (poetic and political).

Zheng's opening question seems calculated to address the national-interest theme: "Why is it that literature in Chinese, with thousands of years of poetic history behind it, has been unable to produce internationally recognized great works or great authors?"[8] Zheng proposes to reexamine the history of the Chinese language and literature over the last hundred years as a way of tracing the insufficiencies of modern poetry to their social and linguistic sources. The May Fourth modernizers—leaders of the vernacular literature movement and the New Literature movement—erred by

> cutting themselves off from classical literature....They forced literary creators to turn their backs on and abandon classical poetry, and they rejected the ideas of those scholars (Zhu Jingnong, Ren Hongjun, Qian Xuantong, and others) who advocated integrating classical poetry with the new literature. Moreover it was announced by Chen Duxiu [one of the leaders of the May Fourth movement and cofounder, in 1921, of the Chinese Communist Party] that [on the adoption of vernacular language] "we must not allow our opponents any room for discussion." (Zheng, "Shijimo," 5)

Zheng sees as the cause of this dogmatism an oversimple understanding of language and meaning. Hu Shi (1891–1962) and Chen Duxiu (1880–1942) saw in language nothing more than a tool for exchanging information and therefore demanded a literal, immediately understandable, contemporary idiom (19). But for Zheng,

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[7] *Wenxue pinglun* 3 (1993): 5–20.

[8] Zheng, "Shijimo," 5. Michelle Yeh surmises that the low estimate of modern Chinese poetry cited by Zheng mainly refers to Stephen Owen's review of Bei Dao, "The Anxiety of Global Influence: What Is World Poetry?" *New Republic*, November 19, 1990, 28–32.

following Saussure, "language is principally an *arbitrary, inherited* system of signs that *admits of no choice*, and its reform must be on the basis of inheritance" (emphasis Zheng's); moreover the reformers "were not aware of the gap between the signifier and the signified, a fissure that, according to the theory of J. Lacan, is never completely bridged, causing a part of every language to remain hidden from view" (10). By calling for writing to base itself on speech, rather than on previous examples of writing, Hu Shi and Chen Duxiu attempted to erase the "archi-writing" of cultural codes, of memorized literature, of the whole Chinese past. If by "language" we mean what Saussure, Heidegger, Lacan, or Derrida mean by language, then the May Fourth generation hated language. What they wanted from language simply could not be given within language. But rather than admit that they were engaged in a futile project, the modernizers simply went on the offensive against backsliders. Zheng sees in this radicalization of the modernizing movement a pattern that remained consistent in twentieth-century Chinese literary theory—

> the logic of the binary opposition: protecting this, overthrowing that. The result is that we turned the complex relations of culture, literature, and history into pairs of mutually exclusive binary oppositions: vernacular writing / classical writing; proletarian culture / bourgeois culture; traditional literature / up-to-date literature; authentic literature / inauthentic literature; poetry for the masses / Misty Poetry; revolutionary poetry / decorative poetry about little grasses and flowers.... This strategic logic seems to have been our normal logic ever since the May Fourth movement, and its authority has been uncontested. (Zheng, "Shijimo," 6)

In the early years of the vernacular movement, Zheng concedes, it must have been helpful to have an ideology that cast aside complexities and qualifications, splitting the world into good and bad camps. But the consequences have been severe, amounting to a public neurosis. "From 1919 onward, every cultural movement in China has been marked by the same extraordinary tensions. The unprecedented Cultural Revolution of the 1960s went from literary skirmishes to actual battles, from the flourishing of pens to the flailing of whips, resulting in a bloody revolutionary drama."[9] Zheng's reconsideration of the May Fourth reformers, then, is

[9] Zheng, "Shijimo," 7. This picture of literary modernization closely corresponds to what Jean Paulhan called "Terror": the attempt to extirpate rhetoric and style in the name of an always elusive authenticity. *Les fleurs de Tarbes ou la Terreur dans les Lettres* (1941, rpt. Paris: Gallimard, 1990).

meant to trace the radicalizing logic to its roots and to critique it, not only in its effects but in its basic structure, which she calls "precisely a closed, metaphysical way of thinking that proceeds through symmetrical contradictions" (7).

Zheng's essay puts European literary theory to strategic use, invoking "recent linguistic science" to correct the instrumentalist views of Hu and Chen and benefiting from the general intellectual climate of the present in discrediting the logic of binary oppositions. Some of her readers have been shocked by her tradition-minded reading of theory: it is surely idiomatic to put together Derrida's reading of Freud's "scene of psychic writing" and Lacan's claim that "the unconscious is structured like a language" to reach the conclusion that the more traditional a language is, the more deeply it is connected with the unconscious, and therefore that language reform represents an attack on the unconscious by the conscious mind (18–19). Her Saussure and Derrida sit on the same bench with the Eliot of *Notes toward the Definition of Culture* and Heidegger in *völkisch* mood. These and other applications of theory are bound to surprise readers more familiar with a canonical set of poststructuralist writers and positions.

Does Zheng's essay represent a postmodern understanding, or a mishmash of postmodernistic citations in an old-fashioned argument? Is it, as Zhao Yiheng puts it, an example of "a neoconservative trend that uses postmodern theory as a base or corroboration"? "Surprised" to see that "the conservative judgment on the May Fourth movement current abroad has now found its way back to the Chinese mainland," Zhao is equally astonished to find that "although the topic is an old view on an old subject, the author uses new theories: Lacan's psychoanalysis and Derrida's deconstruction."[10] He finds the essay evidence of "the neoconservative trend with, as one of its symptoms, the return to traditional culture.... Zheng Min blames modernistic poetry for 'cutting itself off from the ancients.'"[11] In a response, Zheng characterizes Zhao's objection as revealing his

orthodox [modern] traditional viewpoint: he seeks to defend the

[10] Zhao Yiheng, "'Houxue' yu Zhongguo xin baoshouzhuyi" ("Post-ism" and Chinese neo-conservatism), *Ershiyi shiji* 27 (February 1995): 4–15. The "conservative" source mentioned by Zhao is Lin Yü-sheng, *The Crisis of Chinese Consciousness* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1979). Lin's analysis of "totalistic anti-traditionalism" bears some resemblance to Zheng's description of May Fourth "binarism."

[11] Zhao Yiheng, "'Houxue,'" 5, 9–10.

> 'evolutionary character' of the May Fourth movement, without suspecting that my article was intended precisely to bring us out of this traditional position of reducing literature to politics.... To leave behind us this binary political theory of 'revolution' versus 'conservatism' is... the urgent task of the twenty-first century.[12]

Zhao is, for Zheng, a part of the problem she seeks to diagnose (binarism, all-or-nothing-ism, triumphal history, the political immediacy of art). For Zhao, history has a sequence: it goes from right to left, and if it harks back to themes discarded in the leftward progress, this is only to be described as "conservatism."

By calling on a label like that one, Zhao apparently wishes to regain territory that might have been lost to the minions of polysemy and ambiguity. "Conservatism" underrates the revisionary force of Zheng's arguments. I think that if some peculiar interpretations can be forgiven it, the essay performs precisely the work of classical deconstruction on the territory of modern literature as studied in China. It describes a logic of airtight oppositions—for example, the polarizing of past and present in modern literary history—and tries to discover ways of subverting the distinctions, as for example with the claim that language is always and necessarily an "inheritance" from the past. Moreover, it returns to the root of a historical paradigm, partly in the mode of classical cause-seeking, but also with the aim of showing that what one history narrates as necessity and prescience becomes, in another history's telling, repression and bad faith. Zhao's response, then, shows why Zheng's article makes a difference. The disagreement between Zheng and Zhao amounts to a choice of narratives and confirms Zheng in the tacit argument that legitimacy (both literary-historical and political) grows from the barrel of a story. Zheng's critique of twentieth-century poetic language—a critique carried out almost totally without citation of poetic texts!—may seem the least consequential, most apolitical of essays, but if you want to displace a master-narrative (*yuan xushu*), the best way to start is to propose a rival master-narrative. If the adventuresomeness and determination displayed in Zheng's essay were more common, there would be more excitement and less hackwork in Chinese literary criticism. Even in its shortcomings it shows the possibility of generating within mainland literary

[12] Zheng Min, "Wenhua, zhengzhi, yuyan sanzhe guanxi de wojian" (The relations among culture, politics, and language as I see them), *Ershiyi shiji* 29 (June 1995): 120, 124.

history positions corresponding to some of the histories proposed and debated in the less rigidly ordered circumstances of Taiwan and the overseas Chinese world. And that would break down some large, publicly held "binary oppositions" indeed.

What the casual reader of Zheng's essay notices as an asymmetry—the absence of a general account of cultural constructedness, resulting in the critique of modernist vernacular literature for its artificiality and the repeated endorsement of premodern classical literature as the "house of being" proper to Chinese writers and readers, their "cultural unconscious"—suggests that some forms of nativism pass without comment in contemporary China. Part of the appeal of postmodern theories (especially postcolonialism) lies in their seeming to make room for Chineseness. If the postmodern impulse amounts to marginalizing the center and centralizing the margins, then Chinese intellectuals have nothing to lose from identifying their own central themes with the once-marginal, now-prominent values and cultures in postmodern Western discourse. Zhang Kuan seeks to take Edward Said's *Orientalism* one step further, arguing that

> Said has only critiqued a hollow "Orient" molded by the West, he has not sketched out what the real Orient ought to be like. If he is unable to supply a real Orient to replace the false Orient, then his castigations of "orientalism" are without force. Moreover, Said's critiques of the West find their moral support in the very humanism championed by Westerners. He must have forgotten that the Renaissance, when the flag of humanism was brandished most boldly, was the bloodiest period of the West's colonial expansion and that the understanding of "man" in Renaissance humanism as well as its concept of universal human nature were the moral anchors of colonialism.[13]

For Zhang, it's a package deal: if you want Montaigne, you have

[13] Zhang Kuan, "Zai tan Sayide" (On Said again), *Dushu*, October 1994, 9. In a characteristically condensed argument, Zhang states that "the cruelty of the German Fascists toward the Jewish people was the necessary consequence of the logic of Enlightenment discourse" and blames the May Fourth intellectuals for drinking at the same sources. "Wenhua xinzhimin de keneng" (The possibility of cultural neocolonialism), *Tianya*, February 1996, as cited in Lei Yi, "Shenme shi baoshou? Shei fandui minzhu?" (What is conservatism? Who opposes democracy?), *Ershiyi shiji* 40 (April 1997): 123. A more detailed discussion of the historical problems surrounding colonialism and its relation to modernization is Li Tuo, "Rang zhenglun fuchu haimian" (Let the debates rise to the surface), *Dushu*, December 1997, 52–59.

to take Cortez and the Inquisition; if you admire Matteo Ricci, you'll have to extend your appreciation to the Opium War. Zhang is able to wrap up cultures so comprehensively because his view of the Chinese past is equally without differentiation. He does not apologize for the Boxers and the Qing court, the better to praise the reformist statesmen of 1898. History for him no longer sorts out into thematic streams of "progressives" and "reactionaries" (or what-have-you) establishing their principles through internal and external struggle; rather it is primarily a field of ethnic or culturewide agency.[14] This fits with his view of the relevance of postcolonial theory to the present moment in world politics:

> The international situation since the end of the Cold War shows an ever more obvious tendency toward reorganization on the basis of ethnic characteristics and cultural identity. Ideology correspondingly pales. While the West continues to present itself as powerful, postcolonial criticism brings a bit of deconstruction to all the myths of the grandiose Western discourse—and for us this is surely a good thing. No doubt about it, Said and anticolonialism are not reasons for stopping China's processes of reform and openness in favor of closing the door and protectionism, but for the sake of strengthening the cultural self-image and ethnic solidarity of Chinese people as we go forth to face the stirrings of a "clash of cultures," these are questions that no responsible Chinese intellectual can fail to take seriously.[15]

As with Zheng, the combination and linking of sources in Zhang's writings is surprising. For the American left-liberal reader, there is no great chasm separating Said from Chomsky, and Chomsky's denunciation of the United States as "the leading violator of the three principles America claims to campaign for"[16] is often echoed by citizens critical of our country's foreign policy. Where Zhang leaves the beaten track is his disavowal of humanistic principles as such. If Chomsky were simply interested in maximizing the power of the United States, he would doubtless still be critical of his country's foreign policy, but in different ways and with different standards. To go from Chomsky's rights-based

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[14] For examples of this narrative economy, see Zhang Kuan, "Oumeiren yanzhong de 'fei wo zulei'" (The "ethnic other" in the eyes of Europeans and Americans), *Dushu*, September 1993, 3–9.

[15] Zhang, "Zai tan Sayide," 14.

[16] Cited ibid., 12. I have been unable to locate the exact passage to which Zhang refers. A detailed presentation of the ideas involved occurs in chapter 5, "Democracy and Markets in the New World Order," in Chomsky's *Powers and Prospects: Reflections on Human Nature and the Social Order* (Boston: South End Press, 1996).

criticism to Samuel Huntington's theory of a coming "clash of cultures" based on ethnic and cultural power blocs is to travel quite a distance in terms of assumptions held and company kept.[17] (In the eyes of American liberals, Huntington's main accomplishment has been to discover a new excuse for maintaining our military budget at Cold War levels.) Zhang is able to make this transition because the language of rights appears to him only as a dialect of the "language of the powerful" used by Western countries in coercing China. Talk of human rights has no substance; the only real story is ethnic. "Reform and openness" likewise are good policies only insofar as they add to the national wealth and power.

Postmodern appropriations like Zhang's show how unpredictable the circulation of theories can be. Foucault, Chomsky, and Said gain our attention by denouncing not just abuses, but hypocrisy—the practice of claiming to be generous or objective when one is actually rather more small-minded. Their critique asks us to be as good as our word. So in the most revisionary theories there may be a core of idealism. In Zhang's picture of history there is no room for hypocrisy or its critique. Is this a consequence of Foucault's having passed through an American filter of presentation and translation (emphasizing the criticism of liberal institutions) on his way to China? In his Chinese version, Foucault is the person who described democratic society as a prison, the demolisher of Enlightenment folklore about the free individual conscience—certainly not the activist who sought "the point of linkage between ethical preoccupation and the political struggle for the respect of rights, the connection between critical reflection against abusive governmental techniques and the search for an ethics on which individual freedom may be based."[18]

Now, it is always a failure of critical sense to "absolve a certain political regime of its responsibilities in the name of the 'principles' that inspire it,"[19] but there is a difference between the

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[17] Huntington's *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996) was an instant success in China. "His view that America should look on China as its greatest future antagonist was exciting to a number of Chinese, because it restored to the long-downtrodden Chinese the proud feeling of belonging to a great imperial power. Many people are still drawing advances on this pride, though I cannot see what it contributes to China's present progress." Chen Xiaoming, "'Wenhua minzu zhuyi' de xingqi" (The rise of "cultural nationalism"), *Ershiyi shiji* 39 (February 1997): 37.

[18] Michel Foucault, "L'éthique du souci de soi comme pratique de la liberté," *Dits et écrits 1954–1988* (Paris: Gallimard, 1994), 4:727–28.

[19] Michel Foucault, "Discourse on Power" (interview with Duccio Trombadori), in Foucault, *Remarks on Marx*, trans. R. James Goldstein and James Cascaito (New

critique of Enlightenment theories or practices by people who think enlightenment is a good thing and its critique qua enlightenment by people who think other objectives are more worthy. In the United States, postmodernism has provided a big tent for both sorts of critique, and some prominent figures (Stanley Fish, for example) are hard to pin down as definitively belonging to one side or the other; but this coexistence is possible because postmodern critique has yet to affect the comforts and liberties of daily life in any tangible way. If there were something more important than professional standing to be gained or lost, presumably the temporary community of those who dissent from the Cartesian-Kantian model of the subject would begin to dissent from one another more vigorously. What is the purpose of dissolving the consensus around liberal society—to create more truly autonomous individuals, or to strengthen the collectivity? Without making the cultural argument that communitarianism is natural to China (that habit will come in for examination later), one can see why, under present conditions, the Foucault who comes across most easily in translation is a fragment.

One evening, I go out to Dachengfang Street to browse from the used-book carts. Among the software manuals and tales of derring-do I find *Gaige qianhou luewang lu—julong fusu* (A record of things overlooked in the reform process—the giant dragon revives) by the apparently pseudonymous Wei Da.[20] The next night's insomnia sees me reading its chapters on the Democracy Wall movement of 1979, especially "Shou che" (The tow trucks are coming), on its aftermath. Wei Da is surprisingly fierce in describing the sloppiness of the trial that convicted Wei Jingsheng of "selling state secrets."[21] Wei Da underlines the vagueness of the charges, the predetermined outcome, the flimsiness of the evidence. What I find most useful in Wei Da's account is that although he or she is able to cite foreign scholars and newspapers—Roderick MacFarquhar, the *Manchester Guardian, Le Monde,* the *Bangkok Post*—the case against Wei Jingsheng's accusers is not made by instancing some international standard of human rights. Rather, Chinese notions of consistency, proportion,

York: Semiotexte, 1991), 171.

[20] (Chengdu: Chengdu keji daxue chubanshe, 1993.) In my opinion the book is too intelligent to have been a CIA plant.

[21] Some of Wei Jingsheng's writings have been collected as *The Courage to Stand Alone,* trans. Kristina M. Torgeson (New York: Viking Penguin, 1998).

and due process are adequate to revealing the show trial as a scandal; and that is encouraging, though not yet a bill of rights. It is good to be reminded that this is possible; also that the protection of powerful outsiders is not always the protester's only guarantee. The notion that human rights are a gospel that the Chinese are only reluctantly coming to accept suits the needs of certain international organizations, along with the Chinese and American governments—it gives them all a space in which to exhibit "determination," "flexibility," and "understanding," score "victories" and make "concessions"—but it is probably worse than useless to citizens in a tight spot. Without universalistic or particularistic fanfare, counting on pedestrian, everyday reactions to unfairness, Wei Da shows how to make native rights talk work.

I carry these thoughts to dinner with a group of professors and administrators whose specialty is the teaching of Chinese to foreigners. In a discussion of the international reach of Chinese cultural figures, someone brings it up as an article of praise that "no matter how bitterly Hu Shi railed against his opponents in China, whenever he went abroad he had nothing but nice things to say about Chinese culture." In other words, Napoleon's rule about dirty linen—it's to be washed *en famille*. That the mere mention of Amnesty International or the concern of external organizations in relation to a case like Wei Jingsheng's is usually sufficient to cloud matters is made plain by historical excerpts like the following:

> How can it be that foreigners aim to bestow on the Chinese [concepts of] "human rights" and "democracy"? Impossible!... Before Liberation, the whips, knives, and guns of imperialism never breathed a word about "human rights" and "democracy." In certain parks there were signs reading: "No Dogs or Chinese Allowed."[22]
>
> What business does a millionaire who has stuffed his paunch with the blood and sweat of laboring people have preaching "human rights"?[23]

Conveniently, through such feints, all foreigners collapse into one; the writers of Amnesty letters are as one with the empire builders and union busters, the better to mold the home population into a matching ideal unity. The quotations immediately above date from 1979, but the technique, the use of supposed

[22] *Beijing ribao*, April 2, 1979, cited in Wei Da, *Gaige qianhou*, 328.

[23] *Zhongguo qingnian bao*, cited ibid., 328–29.

ethnic and national interests to discredit anything said by foreigners or through foreign channels, is very much in force twenty years later. Its ongoing persuasiveness may show that some of the themes of the Chinese postmodernists—their communitarianism, their refusal of universal ideals or narratives, their self-depiction as "decolonizers of the mind"—mirror a consensus, or a deadlock, of the moment.[24] Is the theory of postmodernism a fortuitous epicycle upon untheorized social grounds? To answer this question one would need to see into the future of China—farther than I can, at any rate.

The reader will have divined that I see in the postliberal, Huntingtonian theory of history a resource for governments that like to speak for the collectivity and show their "strength" by "standing up" to the meddling of other peoples in their "internal affairs." The question of which kinds of argument harmonize with the "official line" is often raised in essays on *houxue*, usually in the form of an accusation. Liu Kang finds that "authoritarian capitalist modernization, spread by the global cultural imaginary, has become the mainstream school of thought among Chinese intellectual and cultural figures, filling in the ideological gaps left by the declining hegemony of the Communist Party"; for Zhao Yiheng, the situation sketched by Liu amounts to "neoconservatism under the slogan of exceptionalism, with theoretical support from the various 'post-' discourses of the West and a background of cultural nationalism," putting into question the project of modernization. Xu Ben's analysis faults the postmodernists for staying well within the zone of "permitted discourse" and even chiming in with "the official discourse that says that 'the meaning of human rights is just the right to survival, food, and clothing.'"[25] Under contemporary Chinese conditions, postmodernity's antipathy to universals together with its inability to formulate a principled pluralism gives it the specific contours of an official-thought-in-

[24] The allusion is to Ngugi wa Thiong'o's work *Decolonizing the Mind* (London and Portsmouth, N.H.: James Currey / Heinemann, 1986).

[25] Liu Kang, "Quanqiuhua yu Zhongguo xiandaihua de butong xuanze" (Globalization and the distinctive choice of Chinese modernization), *Ershiyi shiji* 37 (October 1996): 145. The phrase "filling in the gaps" is ambiguous here—supplanting the CCP or supporting it?—and not, I think, just a matter of style. Zhao Yiheng, "Moxuyou xiansheng yu tamen de watiao" (The lords of unreality and their leapfrogging), *Ershiyi shiji* 38 (December 1996): 137. Xu Ben, "Zai tan Zhongguo 'houxue' de zhengzhixing he lishi yishi," 135.

waiting. For many post-ists, the specificity of their moment in history—the "post-new period"—is best defined through a contrast to the enthusiasm for civil society and liberal regimes that marked the 1980s. The 1980s were a period of "Western studies"; the 1990s, of "national studies" (*guoxue*).[26] "National" is taken in a special and rather defensive sense. Zhang Kuan: "Freedom, democracy, pluralism, the independence of authors—these have been discussed for years, but the key issue is that distinctions must be made under differing historical conditions, and we cannot embrace unconditionally this chain of capitalist concepts.... Our thinking on these problems today cannot stop at the 1980s; we must take a step forward."[27] Zhang Yiwu: "The split between the new period and the post-new period has already become obvious. The old style of discourse used to interpret mainland Chinese culture has been rejected by the new cultural practices of the present."[28] So much for critique: by declaring a "post-new period" and consecrating the intellectual attitudes appropriate to

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[26] In the early 1980s, according to Chen Xiaoming, a number of scholars began to "have second thoughts about Western studies and return to national studies" (*fanxing xixue, huidao guoxue*): "'Wenhua minzu zhuyi' de xingqi," 35. The term *guoxue* first appeared in the late nineteenth century as a calque on the Japanese term *kokugaku*. It bears the connotation of a celebratory account of national culture, often in the frame of a story about essential national characteristics (*guocui/kokusui*). The reported idols of "New National Studies" or "Post-National Studies" are Zhang Taiyan, Chen Yinke, Wang Guowei, Gu Jiegang, Liang Shuming, Zhang Junli, Du Yaquan (ibid., 36)—anticolonialists to a man, but hardly cultural chauvinists. For similar lists, see Xu Ben, "Zai tan Zhongguo 'houxue' de zhengzhixing he lishi yishi," 136; Zhang Yiwu, "Chanshi 'Zhongguo' de jiaolü" (Interpreting the concern about "China"), *Ershiyi shiji* 29 (June 1995): 134. On "national essence" thinking in the 1930s and 1940s, see Lydia Liu, *Translingual Practice: Literature, National Culture, and Translated Modernity: China, 1900–1937* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1995), 239–56.

[27] Zhang Kuan, "Jiaqiang dui xifang zhuliu huayu de pipan" (Reinforcing the criticism of mainstream Western discourse), *Zuojia bao*, June 24, 1995, cited in Lei Yi, "Shenme shi baoshou? Shei fandui minzhu?" (What is conservatism? Who opposes democracy?), *Ershiyi shiji* 40 (April 1997): 124.

[28] Zhang Yiwu, "Chanshi 'Zhongguo' de jiaolü," 128. Elsewhere Zhang defines the "post-new period" of the 1990s "as a total surpassing of the 'modernity' sought by 'new period' culture from the late 1970s onward; it gives the general outline and description of the contemporary Chinese cultural situation in the global post-Cold War cultural context. It is a new period led by consumption, dominated by mass media, structured by pluralist cultural discourse, and strongly utilitarian." "Hou xin shiqi wenhua: tiaozhan yu jiyu" (Post-new period culture: Challenge and opportunity), *Zhanlue yu guanli* 2 (1994): 112–14.

it, one may hope to restrict radically the circulation of permitted ideas.

It is perhaps too much to expect anyone to adopt willingly the label of *guanfang* (official) thinker, although the post-ists seem unable to avoid positions that echo, resemble, or are convenient to the policies of China's rulers.[29] The citation-history of Zheng Min's essay on modernist poetics is instructive. That essay's redescription of the institutionalization of modern vernacular literature as a process, not of creation but of elimination, might be read as pointing the way to a more truly pluralistic politics—pluralistic in the sense of putting forward more than one legitimation-story for the community to consider. But the criticism of the May Fourth movement in that essay has also been used as a cat's-paw for the critique of all "Westernization" movements, including the 1980s influx of liberal-democratic ideas. Zhang Yiwu appropriates Zheng Min's second thoughts about the modernist movement to denounce the whole project of enlightenment: for him, "May Fourth" is simply "the completion of a process begun in the Opium Wars" whereby Chinese intellectuals "internalized the point of view of the Western subject." Even Chinese nationalism is stained by its relation to Western nation-state thinking. "This process of 'othering' one's own culture is the most important mark of modernity in China."[30] So the sooner an end to modernity is proclaimed, the better for all Chinese, goes the story. When Zhao Yiheng, descrying a conservative agenda in Zheng's essay, recited the more conventional foundation-story of modern Chinese literature, he was doubtless spurred to do so by this set of implications. What meaning does the term "conservative" have in this context? Appealing to a longer, more complex account of the Chinese past may suggest the legitimacy of rival versions of modern history, thereby breaking the monopoly of textbook triumphalism, but if a more searching discussion is impossible it may only bring grist to the mill of national-interest theoreticians who see in it a chance to discredit cosmopolitan ideals. The opening represented by some aspects of Zheng Min's essay closes down all too soon. Perhaps it is simply intolerable—intolerable because undecidable?

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[29] The dilemma of giving aid to the official doctrine is discussed in Lu Jia, "'Fan xifang zhuyi' huichao" (The return of anti-Westernism), *Zhongguo shibao zhoukan* (Hong Kong), January 2, 1994, 17–18.

[30] Zhang Yiwu, "'Xiandaixing' de zhongjie—yige wufa huibi de keti" (The end of "modernity"—an unavoidable topic), *Zhanlue yu guanli* 4 (1994): 106.

The question of pluralism is, like the label "conservative," ambiguously dependent on the contexts of its use. The theory of "cultural democracy" developed as an annex to Chinese postcolonialism provides a case in point. According to Zhang Yiwu, it is "thanks to postmodernism [that] the basis of a powerful cultural practice, a pluralist culture, a new cultural democracy, and limitless options have all sprung up overnight."[31] Zhang's optimism is interestingly interwoven with the idea of "resistance."

> At the beginning of the 1990s, quite a few overseas scholars painted a dark and gloomy picture of mainland Chinese culture, but the vitality and richness of that culture has proved them wrong. The irony of history as it comes sharply into view at present is that the process of Chinese politics, culture, and economics has completely escaped the control of those discourse-centered "intellectuals"; it has also completely escaped the grasp of the ready-made discourses and interpretative models produced abroad or at home. China seems to have become an uncontrollable "Other."[32]

Like Zhang Kuan, Zhang Yiwu takes his cues from Edward Said, but he reads many of Said's gestures as in a mirror. Said argued that the West built a scholarly discourse around the East to dominate it. Zhang Yiwu's conclusion is that China must be incomprehensible if it is to shake off outside domination. Against "orientalism"—which he defines broadly enough to include any opinion about China that foreigners may express—Zhang Yiwu insists on "Chinese cultural specificities." The point is not to form a theory or description of Chineseness, but to "resist" foreign (or foreign-tainted) discourses about China in any way possible. Sneering is a favorite method:

> These two essays [Xu Ben's "Disanshijie piping zai dangjin Zhongguo de chujing" (The place of third-world criticism in contemporary China) and Zhao Yiheng's "'Houxue' yu Zhongguo xin baoshou zhuyi" ("Post-ism" and Chinese neo-conservatism)] have one extremely obvious common feature, a strong degree of what Homi K. Bhabha calls the "pedagogical" style. This "pedagogy"

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[31] Cited in He Jiadong, "Houxiandai pai ruhe nayong xiandaixing huayu" (How the postmodernists have appropriated the discourse of modernism), *Zhanlue yu guanli* 27 (1998): 74.

[32] Zhang Yiwu, "Chanshi 'Zhongguo' de jiaolü," 128. The "overseas scholars" surely include Perry Link (*Evening Chats in Beijing* [New York: Norton, 1992]) and Merle Goldman (*Sowing the Seeds of Democracy in China* [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994]).

> does not just take the form of ideas; it is also a rhetorical strategy. It shows a lofty condescension, a sympathetic, nay tragic understanding, as if the writer were a prophet holding the blueprint of history and surveying from a high tower the native critic in his troubled realm; it is the style of a writer in the "observer" position, taking note of the struggles and pursuits of the "observed."[33]

Moreover, persuaded that the observations or analyses of foreigners (or of Chinese-born people living abroad) are "regulated by Western cultural hegemony" and aimed at "making China an obedient 'Other'" to the West, he refuses to grant them the status of knowledge and marks this by surrounding the words "knowledge" and "China" with quotation marks. This passive-aggressive style—casting every dialogue or critique as an unequal contest—is in itself such a heavy verdict on Zhang Yiwu's intellectual self-respect that I marvel at his appetite for controversy.[34] But it is not simply a mannerism: it mirrors the substance of what he has to say.

Zhang's recommendations for criticism at the present time are not bold.

> This exploration tries, first, to find a new position: "the Other of the Other." While seeking to transcend the old condition of "Otherness," refusing to take either side of the oppositions of universal / particular, classic / modern, it reflects on both in the context of contemporary culture and offers new insights. Secondly, it implies participation in contemporary culture—it implies the Gramscian role of the "organic intellectual." It neither stands apart from culture, nor tries to transcend culture, but seeks theoretical advances from within the dialectical thought of transformations in society and culture. It maintains a critique of Western cultural hegemony, but this critique does not imply a decisively nativistic conservative perspective. This new perspective allows a new grasp on the "condition" of hybridity in contemporary China. This grasp was made possible by the appropriation of Western theories, but this appropriation does not imply the use of theory to advance interpretations of the Chinese context; rather it recognizes that the transcendence of theoretical hegemony is dependent on reflection about and critique of theory. This requires the use of theory to critique theory, using contemporary Chinese conditions to reflect on theory, and using theory to match

[33] Zhang Yiwu, "Chanshi 'Zhongguo' de jiaolü," 129.

[34] For another example, this time referring to an essay by Zhang Longxi, see Zhang Yiwu, "Zai shuo 'Chanshi Zhongguo de jiaolü'" (Once again on the "anxiety of interpreting China"), *Ershiyi shiji* 34 (April 1996): 121–26.

contemporary Chinese conditions, to produce a two-sided hermeneutic and gain a new cultural imagination and creativity.[35]

I see a determined defensiveness in this program. It is as if Zhang has compiled a list of the current terms of abuse—"conservatism," "hegemony," "elitism," "commercialism," "radicalism," and the like—and devised postmodern-sounding formulas that steer clear of all of them. Committed to nothing, but also standing apart from nothing, it is a very safe place to be. It resembles what Roland Barthes, reporting from the bourgeois world, called "Neither-Nor criticism."[36]

A criticism without thorns or horns, seemingly—but in practice things can be quite different. After repeating some points of this program in another essay, Zhang mentions two styles of play that he finds "unhelpful": "the desire for a discourse that privileges politics" and "the desire for a discourse that privileges values." In response to a reader's objection that his resistance to human rights talk makes him sound like "the [Chinese] Foreign Ministry's official spokesman," Zhang Yiwu retorts that this amounts to "calling any 'Other' whose choices are different from one's own, whose scholarly opinions go in a different direction, a 'spokesman for the Foreign Ministry'—and the implications are so obvious that they do not need to be stated....It all turns into a dramatic 007-style combat between the angel of freedom and the devil's advocate." Likewise, when fellow scholars argue that the attack on modernity is indiscriminate and fails to recognize the better purposes to which modernization has sometimes been put, Zhang Yiwu complains that he has been "picked out as a person with evil motives."[37] People who attack *houxue* show that they cling to "absolute values beyond experience"—and that clearly renders them unfit for the job.[38] If politics and values are both out of bounds, and the role of "theoretical reflection on theory" is to shift discussion from substantive issues to one's displeasure at being criticized—if, in short, no "privileged discourse" is permitted—then a kind of perfection of pluralism has been achieved, and the power of debate to change minds and worlds is at a standstill.

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[35] Zhang Yiwu, "Chanshi 'Zhongguo' de jiaolü," 134–35. On "the Other of the Other," see also "'Xiandaixing' de zhongjie," 109.

[36] Roland Barthes, *Mythologies* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1970), 144–46.

[37] Zhang Yiwu, "Zai shuo 'Chanshi Zhongguo de jiaolü,'" 125.

[38] Zhang Yiwu, "Miandui quanqiuhua de tiaozhan" (Facing the challenge of globalization), *Ershiyi shiji* 38 (December 1996): 140.

Zhang Yiwu shares with all the "post-ists" an unfavorable verdict on the May Fourth movement with its enthusiasms for John Dewey, Bertrand Russell, and Lev Tolstoy. Like Zhang Kuan, he describes modernity as "a set of knowledge/power discourses centered on Western Enlightenment values. As far as non-Western societies and peoples are concerned, 'modernity' is a concept bound up with the colonizing process."[39] A historical coincidence perhaps? "In the Chinese context, 'modernity' meant the construction of 'enlightenment' and 'salvation' as measured by Western discourse.... 'Modernity' in China...gave rise to a body of 'knowledge' about China / the West, with the purpose of determining China's place in the world by the application of this 'knowledge.'" As we have already seen, Zhang considers the May Fourth movement to have marked the definitive self-colonization of Chinese intellectuals by their imagination of the West. "'Modernity' is a set of important 'knowledges,' the contours of which cannot be separated from the function of intellectuals. 'Modernity' and its 'knowledge' produced intellectuals who received and expressed them, and the 'intellectuals' reinforced the indubitable authority of the 'knowledge' of the discourse of 'modernity.'" The new-style intellectual was "named and scripted by Western discourse.... This 'othering' was involved in the whole process of producing 'modernity' and 'knowledge.' The classical form of this production was the making, through Chinese-Western comparisons, of a discourse of 'otherness' concerning the specificities of Chinese culture and a way of knowing in reference to China." But the promulgation of ethnic stereotypes, however unflattering, could not have undermined ethnic consciousness to the degree desired by the modernizers. That job fell to the concept of the "human," the universal Enlightenment subject: "from Lu Xun's call for 'real people' [*zhende ren*] to the 1980s theoretical thinking about 'the objectification of the intrinsic powers of the person' and 'subject-formation,' an unconditional identification with the values of universal human nature prevailed." Now, says Zhang, that is all over. "Modernity" has been shown to be an effect of "othering," all its goals are discredited as side effects of colonial false consciousness, and as a result "reflection on and critique of 'modernity' is the basic task of contemporary culture."[40]

[39] Zhang Yiwu, "'Xiandaixing' de zhongjie," 104. A critical discussion of Zhang's essay occurs in Lei Yi, "Shenme shi baoshou? Shei fandui minzhu?"

[40] Zhang Yiwu, "'Xiandaixing' de zhongjie," 105, 106, 107, 108.

"The old-time 'pathfinders,' the traditional Enlightenment intellectuals" find themselves on the wrong side of an "Althusserian epistemological break," and a new species, the "post-intellectual," has already come forth to replace them. "Thanks to pluralist culture and its multiple strategies of progress, the phase [of modernity] is on its way out."[41]

"Pluralism" and "hybridity" are occasional synonyms for the "cultural democracy" Zhang Yiwu advocates. But when actual hybrid cultures—like May Fourth modernity—come into view, he faults them for their "surrender" to foreign notions. In a proper "cultural democracy," no one would presumably compare Chinese values to Western Enlightenment values—at least, never unfavorably—and there would be no forcing of universals of any kind down the throats of autonomous people. Zhang does not give a substantive account of "Chinese culture" or tell us what is precious about it. He defends it on principle. One need only know that in the twentieth century it has been the subject of a "subaltern discourse" and the whipping boy of indigenous reforming intellectuals. If Lu Xun and Chen Duxiu were degraded, foreign-devil-worshiping Chinamen, then how pure indeed must the true, non-Othered China be! In the present, Zhang finds much to correct in

> the "knowledge" about "China" created by global cultural interests. Major cultural products about the special political circumstances of China have already become an indispensable resource for international investment. From the discourse of "human rights" advanced by Western governments to the striking use of Chinese politics in the films of Zhang Yimou and Chen Kaige, Chinese politics has become a precious cultural bit of recycled goods. "Human rights" has long been a bargaining chip in the effort to take control of Chinese markets and mastermind commerce; it is the last shadow determining the Otherness of "China." As Rey Chow has shown, the democracy represented by the [statue of] the Goddess of Democracy [in Tiananmen Square, May 1989] was "a naïve, idealistic clamor for democracy 'American style,'...converg[ing] on the symbolism of the white-woman-as-liberty."[42] And the major symbolic products about the oppres-

[41] Zhang Yiwu, "Hou xin shiqi wenhua: tiaozhan yu jiyu," 112; idem, "'Xiandaixing' de zhongjie," 109.

[42] As a matter of fact, the "Goddess" did not have the features of a white woman. See *Tiananmen yijiubajiu* (Taipei: Lianjing chubanshe, 1989), 155–56, for photos. The statue made, of course, a direct reference to an American national symbol, but ethnicity and political regimes are not identical.

> siveness of the Chinese government, just now wildly popular, ... turn this "clamor" into marketable commodities... that display the "Otherness" of China.[43]

If foreigners who address problems in China can be shown (or suspected) to have selfish motives—including the pleasurable frisson of horror at the "oppressiveness of the Chinese government"—then the problems, magically, no longer exist. Chinese objectors may, surely, be characterized as having "othered" themselves, with or without the rewards of participation in the discourse of authority. Knowledge (well-founded or not) about China becomes "knowledge" about "China," projections of a false consciousness. In his triumph, Zhang has confused autonomy with autism.

Just for the record, the fact that rascals and thieves glorify something does not make it bad. Nor does the fact that something is odious make its opposite (or supposed opposite) automatically good. One must make appropriate distinctions; otherwise it would be enough to look no farther than slogans. Postmodernism, it is good to remember, began as literary criticism and all along has excelled in showing strange relations of mutual influence between the content of cultural products and their ways of being in the world. But when the story disappears and cultural critique exclusively addresses the story about the story, or the story about the story about the story, perhaps another type of questioning better deserves the name of critique.

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[43] Zhang Yiwu, "Chanshi 'Zhongguo' de jiaolü," 131. Zhang cites Rey Chow, "Violence in the Other Country: Preliminary Remarks on the 'China Crisis,' June 1989," *Radical America* 22 (July–August 1988 [*sic*]): 24–33; the quoted passage appears on page 27. An expanded version of Chow's article appears in Chandra Talpade Mohanty, Ann Russo, and Lourdes Torres, eds., *Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), 81–100. Chow's article shares with Zhang Yiwu the resentment against the "intrusion" of foreign news media in the Chinese physical and political scene, comparing it to the colonial-period privilege of "extraterritoriality" granted to foreign residents in China; like Zhang, too, Chow sees "democracy" as a stalking-horse for Western hegemony. "Don't they [the Chinese students of 1989] know what atrocities have been committed in the name of liberty and democracy?" she asks, citing as example "the way Margaret Thatcher's British government is treating the citizens of Hong Kong," namely, denying them any form of United Kingdom citizenship. Surely no definition of "democracy" is broad enough to contain the British government's behavior toward Hong Kong. I am unable to see in what way Chow's warnings address the problems of political and mediatic representation that concern most Chinese advocates of democratization.

The strategic role of the term "culture" varies—consider only the British study of "working-class culture" in the second-tier universities of the 1950s and 1960s, where establishing that the working class had a culture was the main task, as contrasted with the easy accreditation of "cultures" in the American system of competing interest groups. In China, "culture" (*wenhua*, with or without its newly acquired opprobrious epithet, "elitist": *jingying wenhua*) is the category through which the intellectual vanguard (carefully distanced from direct political power since 1949, but still the primary audience for state speech) can think of itself as "China." Zhang Yiwu does have some things right. He sees, for example, that modernization conferred on the educated few the right to speak for the masses, to speak as China. And Zhang, like other post-ists, sees the reorientation of Chinese society toward consumption and production for the outside market as the twilight of the intellectuals.[44] "Cultural democracy" speaks for the destitution of intellectuals' authority: it will be a pluralism, thus an absence of guiding role, carried to the one province where the educated classes might still claim leadership. The one-party consumer state no longer needs them, except as specialists in technology, management, entertainment, and advertising. The new "organic intellectuals" will be employees. Disruptions like those of 1919 and 1989 will no longer be their affair.

A certain "Chinese postmodernism" occurs outside China too. It is reliably produced under some of the same conditions that I have shown influencing contemporary Chinese critical theory. It certainly deserves the attention of all who reflect on economic and political globalization, although the currently available ways of posing the problem are doomed, as I will argue in a moment, to present it in misleadingly clear-cut fashion.

Is there any truth to the consensus of journalists and diplomats that the economic liberalization of China prepares the way for a stronger conception of personal rights?[45] Or is that theory a

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[44] Zhang Yiwu, "'Xiandaixing' de zhongjie," 108.

[45] The phrase "civil rights" might be less confusing than "human rights," resting as it does on a more modest philosophical basis. The crucial distinction of vocabulary is that human rights tend to be ascribed to individuals qua humans, and civic rights to individuals qua citizens. Universalism doesn't go away—the exemplary civil-rights question is, Why should there be distinctions of privilege among citizens?—but the historical specificity of particular constitutions is preserved well into the normative part of the discussion. "Civil rights" should not be confused with Jürgen Habermas's account of the emergence of modernity from an auton-

product of inappropriate universal humanism? Postmodern thinkers, with their diagnoses of the dissolution of the freely choosing, autonomous self, should provide valuable guidance on this point. Comparative philosophy, too, deals with conceptual differences, and with its frequent admission that "rights as defined in the classical Western tradition entail assumptions that are in many ways incompatible with Chinese social considerations" it should be able to start the discussion from a more or less neutral ground.[46] In fact nothing is less certain. The comparative philosophers, when they have an actual text to analyze, are almost always found working with the language of Confucius (551–479 B.C.) or Mencius (4th c. B.C.). Or when they look to modern China, what they see is timeless and unspecific. Hall and Ames, for example, contrasting the Chinese idea of "ritual" (*li*) to the modern European notion of "rights," find that

> *li* is not passive deference to external patterns or norms: it is a "making" of society that requires the investment of oneself, one's judgment, and one's own sense of cultural importances.... Beyond any formal social patterning is an open texture of ritual that is personalized and reformulated to accommodate the uniqueness and the quality of each participant....There are variable degrees of personalization in ritual practices, and as a consequence, the roles they establish are hierarchical. These roles form a kind of social syntax that generates meaning through coordinating patterns of deference....It follows, then, that individuality in the liberal democratic sense of autonomy and independence is anathema to ritually constituted society, suggesting even idiocy and immorality.[47]

> Ritual-based order seeks to guarantee tolerance, for it is the basic nature of harmony, the aspiration of ritual practice, that it is enhanced by a coordinated diversity among its elements.[48]

The optimism of this account is obvious; the problem, however, is to figure out whether the "ritually constituted society" Hall and Ames speak of existed in the fifth century B.C., the twelfth century

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omous "public sphere" or "civil society," a theory much discussed in China in the 1980s but vitiated by its use to stand for another thing China "lacked."

[46] Donald Hall and Roger Ames, *Thinking from the Han* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), 276.

[47] Ibid., 271. It would be an exaggeration to say that a ritually constituted life appears to a liberal society's ideology as "idiotic" and "immoral" (maybe just premoral), but consider the connotations of the English word "ritualistic" as explored in Hall and Ames, 271.

[48] Ibid., 281.

A.D., the eighteenth century, or the present, or in all and none of these as an "ideal type." The China that is currently (as some would put it) withstanding an assault of rights language from outside is, in any case, a late-twentieth-century collection of more or less interdependent areas of Chinese language and culture, and it would be useful to know whether any of these is a working "ritually constituted society," and if so, whether the rites do produce order for all and protection for those in need of it. Hall and Ames sketch a present-tense realm of communitarian ritual creativity in which one might detect a version of the modern People's Republic:

> In China, political directives appear to take the form of broad and abstract slogans promulgated in the public institutions and the press. What is not apparent is the degree to which such directives require interpretation and application as they ramify back down through society. Communication and consensus is, in fact, arrived at by a much less abstract mechanism than would be characteristic of a society constituted of strictly autonomous individuals. This is true in a large measure because the Chinese conception of humanness does not presuppose any notion of a moral order transcending the consensual order that could justify either demagogic appeals or appeals to individual conscience, and that might disrupt the consensus.[49]

On a good day, this might be a very fine system indeed, allowing me as much room for choice and creativity as does ballot-box democracy (if not more); but constitutional safeguards are designed for the bad days, and it would be unconvincing to describe twentieth-century Chinese history as a "consensual order" immune to both "demagogic appeals" and "appeals to individual conscience." It has not all been self-regulating harmony, nor have all the destructive influences come from outside.

Leaving comparative philosophy aside, another reason for confusion in the discussion of democratic culture and its spread is that there is at present no way to know whether people want more democracy than they have. The spokesmen, self-appointed or not, are always unreliable (though the "they don't have it and they don't want it" argument is, I think, particularly suspect). Satellite television, often described as the inevitable herald of democracy, teaches more about consumption and celebrities than about autonomy. It is after all imaginable that the majority of

[49] Ibid., 279.

Chinese people (or for that matter, American people) are persuaded that economic growth, international prestige, social order, and a thriving culture are best achieved without the distractions of democracy and rights talk; and in that case, it will be futile to tell them otherwise—though no one has asked them yet in any way that counts. The very thought of asking them would be a tremendous departure from the history of Chinese modernization, not to mention postmodernization.

The question about democracy comes down, finally, not to a matter of concepts or culture but to a matter of speech in the most pragmatic sense. Who has the floor? Can the floor be shared? Can it be yielded? The greatest cause of distortion in the *houxue* democratization debate is that the conversation takes the form of intellectuals asking each other what they think about concepts and principles. It is not as a concept that democracy is valuable, but as a practice. In 1989 students, teachers, office personnel, factory workers, small merchants, casual laborers, and others took to the streets to ask for a broadening of reform. These innovations in social action have not been repeated since, however often issues of "elitism," "vulgar culture," "market values," and intellectuals' "participation in contemporary culture" have been invoked in the 1990s debate. The term "culture" has expanded so relentlessly in its passage from Euro-American literary theory to Chinese "post-" studies because it allows the issues to be handled as matters of verbal discrimination, not of things done in shops, buses, prisons, and streets; and intellectuals are at home with verbal discriminations, while new forms of relation underpinned by economics, for example, escape their guidance.

What people need, if modernity—and postmodernity, for that matter—is to make good on its promises, is more narratives, more debate about what goes on and why; which is to say that unlicensed citizens need to speak and be heard. Of course, debate is a form of practical action, and it emerges on the basis of other practices. The most oppressive thing about Zhang Yiwu's "cultural democracy" is that it is conducted in a sort of last-round international chess tournament space, where his tales of postcolonial resistance are all alone with the Fukuyama-CNN-IMF modernization narrative. Where are the veterans of China's regional conflicts? the soldiers of June 1989? the people who produce export goods of higher and lower added value? No one but fellow intellectuals who share a great deal of background with the

contenders has even a supporting role. That is more discouraging practically than theoretically. The historiography of the Taiwan liberation movement, for example, is deeply flawed—irresponsible and transparently self-serving on many counts—but in the event of reunification the independence movement's narratives are not going to be debated, merely suppressed (along with their authors, no doubt) as contrary to public order. Authentic pluralism would protect from punishment the fashioners of these and many more sorts of narrative. But this is not what the emitters or the receivers of human rights and democracy talk are bargaining about, as the transcript of President Clinton's speeches in China shows.[50]

Reform under tightly controlled conditions—that could summarize not only the last twenty years of Chinese internal politics, but the ambitions for the future expressed by Chinese "post-" studies. The capitalization of "Chinese political cruelty" denounced by Zhang Yiwu is a predictable consequence of Chinese governmental decisions, at the beginning of the economic reform process, to open up some areas of history for reconsideration (the Hundred Flowers, the Cultural Revolution, the cult of Mao Zedong) while keeping the rest under lock and key. It was a strategic move—redirecting criticism toward safe targets. Postmodernism with its particular pluralisms offers a similarly limited critique. But pluralism with a checklist is plural only in the barest numerical sense. It is still answerable to the grantors. Although its metaphysical background is dodgy, the concept of universal, natural, or inborn rights has the practical advantage of favoring the subject claiming a right at the moment of justification. Would you rather have your liberties as an assumption, the limitation of which needs special argument, or as a privilege to be sought on every occasion of their use? If the people of China were sure of their ability to form peaceful assemblies, petition for redress, and coordinate labor actions, the result would be a pluralism worth listening to—and ample compensation, if it came to that, for the

[50] The parallel press conference conducted by the two leaders often took the following form: Clinton would urge the adoption of a right or principle; Jiang replied that the right in question already existed in China but followed this reassurance with a reminder that the inappropriate exercise of any right would be punished by the law. The talk of rights began to seem more and more a hollow exercise without the fashioning of means of recourse—these being beyond the concerns of the diplomatic script. At the writing of this essay (August 1998), transcripts were available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/New/China/speeches.html>.

fading-away of the leadership of the educated class. The opposition, beloved of comparatist scholars in a hurry, between Western individualism and Chinese communitarianism reposes on silences of long standing. In principle, every community with a grievance is capable of producing its "organic intellectuals." And every community has a grievance—that is what spawns narratives and maintains communities. At present, however, China, like its postmodernists, recognizes only one community. So what we should be talking about, if the consensus of modernity really is at an end in China, is forming the preconditions for the practices the Western countries, with their curious theologies and ethical assumptions, describe as the exercise of individual rights. But none of this will come to pass so long as Chinese nationhood has the monopoly on requests for representation and "cultural identity" in the global information order.

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FIVE

Chinese Postmodernism and the Cultural Politics of Modern Chinese Poetry

MICHELLE YEH

If we were to choose one word to describe modern Chinese poetry, it would have to be "revolution." Modern Chinese poetry is an aesthetic revolution in the full sense of the word, encompassing all poetic conventions, including form, prosody, subject matter, and, above all, language. The advocacy of the modern vernacular to replace the literary classical Chinese struck the fatal blow to the formidable, seemingly indestructible edifice of traditional poetry. The use of the vernacular also distinguishes the literary revolution of 1917 from its predecessor in the late Qing known as the "revolution in the poetic realm" (*shijie geming*), led by Huang Zunxian, Xia Zengyou, and Tan Sitong. Although Hu Shi did not actually use "revolution" (*geming*) in the published version of "A Preliminary Proposal for Literary Reform" (Wenxue gailiang chuyi), generally regarded as the first manifesto of modern Chinese poetry, the word was in fact used in the drafts and appeared frequently both before and after January 1917,[1] not to mention the equally famous battle cry raised by Chen Duxiu: "On Literary Revolution" (Wenxue geming lun).

My sincere thanks to Rey Chow for her helpful comments and to the audience at the Center for Chinese Studies, University of California, Berkeley.

[1] See relevant writings collected in Hu Shi, *Hu Shi shihua* (Discourses on poetry by Hu Shi) (Chengdu: Sichuan wenyi chubanshe, 1991).

The Literary Revolution of 1917

The notion of a literary revolution—spearheaded and epitomized by poetry—was articulated as early as September 1915, when Hu Shi wrote a long farewell poem for his friend Mei Guangdi when Mei was headed for Harvard and Hu himself for Columbia University for graduate studies. The poem contains these lines:

> The literature of China has long withered;
> No leader was born in the last hundred years.
> One cannot stop the new waves;
> Now is the time for a literary revolution![2]

Hu did not expect that, for using eleven transliterations of foreign words, including ten proper nouns (names of places and writers) and one common noun (*yanshipilichun* for "inspiration"), his poem would invite a sharp response from Ren Shuyong, also a dear friend, in which he mocked the "literary revolution" that Hu envisioned:

> Newton, Edison,
> Bacon, Calvin,
> Thoreau and Hawthorne,
> "Inspiration."
> Whip the ghosts filling a cart load
> To bring you, Sir, fine jade.
> Now that literature is undergoing a revolution,
> I write this song to bid Mr. Hu farewell.[3]

All the images and names are taken from Hu's poem. In the original context, however, "ghosts" refers to those traditional poets whom Hu aims to overthrow to bring in the "new century." But Ren turns it around and uses it to refer to the foreign thinkers and writers whom Hu invokes. By saying that Hu looks to those "foreign ghosts" (*yangguizi;* a derogatory name by which the Chinese call Westerners) for inspiration, Ren also implies that Hu rejects China in favor of the West, thus providing an antecedent of the dichotomy of China versus the West that is to dominate most debates in the history of modern Chinese poetry.

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[2] Hu Shi, "Song Mei Jinzhuang wang Hafo daxue" (Poem for Mei Jinzhuang leaving for Harvard University), cited from *Hu Shi shihua*, 59–61.

[3] Cited ibid., 21.

One important, perhaps inevitable consequence of polarizing China and the West is the politicization of the issue of language. The dichotomy of China versus the West is invariably replicated in the dichotomy of classical Chinese versus the modern vernacular. If the former is identified with China, the latter is always treated as evidence of being influenced by and imitating the West. In his letter of July 24, 1916, after dismissing Hu's poem "Reply to Guangdi: On Vernacular Poetry" as a "beggars' jingle" (*lianhua-lao*), Mei sees a parallel between Hu's revolution and the literary scene in the West: "In the world of Western poetry today, there are many who, like you, Sir, hoist the banner of revolution." The tone grows more acrimonious as Mei continues, "I have heard so much about the so-called new waves and new trends in contemporary Europe and America. A man of will must stand steadfast and not be swayed. I sincerely hope you, Sir, will not plagiarize (*piaoqie*) those worthless new waves to dupe our compatriots."[4]

Even if we accept the historical reality that the avant-garde in literature and art is, by definition, "ahead of its time," the harshness with which Mei rejects Hu's proposal for vernacular poetry goes beyond a mistrust or misunderstanding of the new. His rejection stems from a deeper cause, which has to do with Hu's supposedly uncritical acceptance of the West as superior. (On the list of new waves of the West are futurism, imagism, and free verse under literature, and symbolism, cubism, and impressionism under art.) In other words, underlying the contention between classical and vernacular Chinese as the poetic medium for Chinese poetry is the subtext of China versus the West. Once vernacular Chinese is perceived as non-Chinese and the literary revolution as an imitation of the West, the plane of discussion shifts from aesthetics to cultural identity. This explains why Mei simply ignores Hu's reasoning that vernacular literature has a long indigenous tradition, from the *Book of Songs* to the Music Bureau poetry beginning in Han times, to Song lyrics and Yuan dramatic arias, to the epistles and analects of Song and Ming philosophers and literati, and to Ming and Qing vernacular fiction. Neither is he open to Hu's explanation that the literary revolution that he advocates "is based only on the status quo of Chinese literature" and "has nothing to do with new trends in Anglo-European literature." "When from time to time I refer to Western literary history for examples, I only cite how 'national literature' of European

[4] Ibid., 99.

countries was born three or four centuries ago, because today China's need for a vernacular literature is very similar to that of Europe at that time."[5]

Whether one believes Hu or not in this exchange is beside the point. What is noteworthy is that both Mei and Hu find it necessary to discuss China's literary reform in an international context, especially in reference to the Anglo-European part of the world. It is no longer possible to discuss China solely in terms of China; any such discussion must take into account a worldview that is both broader (geographically) and deeper (historically). If, as evident from Hu's writings in the 1910s (including diaries and correspondence with friends), the adoption of the modern vernacular as the new poetic medium invited vehement opposition from some intellectuals, I would argue that, as the episodes of Ren Shuyong and Mei Guangdi suggest, such opposition arose because the issue of language was inextricable from broader cultural issues, especially those related to China's cultural identity as a modern nation.

When seen from this perspective, the theorizing of language in modern Chinese poetry takes on far-reaching significance in that it reveals one of the deep-rooted tensions that China has yet to resolve since the late nineteenth century, namely, the tension between China's dependence on the West for modernization and its simultaneous resistance to the West in its effort to establish a distinct self-identity as a modern nation. The early debate on the poetic language in many ways epitomizes the tug-of-war between these two opposite forces, and it is no wonder that language has remained a thorny issue since Hu Shi's time. In other words, the ramifications of discourses on modern Chinese poetry point to the intricate relationship between the aesthetic and the political.

To explore some of these ramifications, in what follows I focus on the debate in the 1990s that revolves around Zheng Min's essay "Retrospect at the End of the Century: Chinese Language Reform and Modern Chinese Poetry" (Shijimo de huigu: Hanyu yuyan biange yu Zhongguo xinshi chuangzuo). First published in the March 1993 issue of *Wenxue pinglun* (Literary criticism), Zheng's critique, directed not only at modern Chinese poetry but also at the modern Chinese language in general, has triggered a debate

[5] Hu Shi, "Bishang Liangshan" (Driven to rebellion), cited from *Hu Shi gudian wenxue yanjiu lunji* (Essays on classical literature by Hu Shi) (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1986), 213.

among scholars in China in the ensuing years. The debate is worth investigating for several reasons. First, Zheng's essay calls into question the use of modern vernacular Chinese as the dominant literary medium in the twentieth century. To the extent that it criticizes the theoretical polarization of classical and modern Chinese, it belongs to a long line of reevaluations of the May Fourth legacy throughout the modern period. It differs, however, from earlier critiques in that it draws almost exclusively upon contemporary critical theory, in particular Saussure, Derrida, and Lacan, hence providing a good example of Chinese appropriation of Western theory in the 1990s. Finally, some of the points of view emerging in the debate, including Zheng's own follow-up essays, are symptomatic of recent trends in the literary and cultural scene in mainland China, especially those subsumed under the rubric of postmodernism. By analyzing Zheng's polemical essay, hereafter referred to as "Retrospect," and other related pieces, I address these issues from a critical perspective.

Summary and Critique of Zheng's Argument

Let me begin by examining the logic by which "Retrospect" presents its argument. It goes like this: modern Chinese poetry written in the vernacular has severed itself from the classical linguistic and literary tradition and therefore has deprived itself of that valuable cultural resource. As a result, modern Chinese poetry to date has not produced world-class poets and world-acclaimed masterpieces. Finally, this deplorable state has come about because the leaders of the literary revolution of 1917, Hu Shi and Chen Duxiu in particular, committed two fundamental mistakes: they fell into an extremist, dualistic mode of thinking, and they were ignorant of modern theories of language. To prove the point of extremism, "Retrospect" cites Chen's statement that the literary revolution "will not allow room for discussion with the opponents."[6] By dualistic mode of thinking, Zheng refers to the binary oppositions that underscore Hu and Chen's position, which she summarizes as follows:[7]

[6] Zheng Min, "Shijimo de huigu: Hanyu yuyan biange yu Zhongguo xinshi chuangzuo" (Retrospect at the end of the century: Chinese language reform and modern Chinese poetry), *Wenxue pinglun* 3 (1993): 5.

[7] Zheng Min, "Guanyu 'Ruhe pingjjia "Wusi" baihuawen yundong' shangque zhi shangque" (A rejoinder to the rejoinder "How to evaluate the May Fourth vernacular movement"), *Wenxue pinglun* 2 (1994): 118.

cultural reform	inheritance of the tradition
vernacular Chinese	classical Chinese
spoken language	written language
Ming-Qing vernacular literature	earlier classical literature
new culture	old culture

Instead of seeing the two sides as complementary, Hu and Chen pitched one against the other and brought harm to both. Rather than carrying out language reform based on classical Chinese, which was proposed, for instance, by the Xueheng School, Hu and Chen tried to do away with classical Chinese once and for all. In a 1994 rejoinder, Zheng reiterates her point that "tradition can be inherited in a critical spirit...but it cannot be overthrown" and holds that compared to modern Chinese, classical Chinese is a better "vehicle of culture."[8] The other mistake, according to "Retrospect," is that Hu and Chen did not understand that language is "a system of signs which are arbitrary, inherited, and not open to choice." Their attempt to "completely erase" classical Chinese from modern Chinese violates the "nature and rules of language itself" as theorized by Saussure, Lacan, and Derrida.[9]

Zheng's argument contains some gross generalizations and serious distortions. First, it equates the literary revolution of Hu and Chen of the 1910s–20s with the political revolution of Chinese communism throughout the twentieth century and equates the struggle between the vernacular and the classical language with that between "proletarian culture" and "bourgeois culture." If for Chen the distinction between literary and political aspirations was never clear, the same cannot be said of Hu. As to the claim that Hu and Chen's dualism has been the "orthodox logic and has enjoyed indisputable authority"[10] in China since the May Fourth period, it contradicts Zheng's main argument in that at the beginning of "Retrospect" she lists other viewpoints on language reform during the May Fourth period and faults Hu and Chen for not listening to them. Further, as Xu Ming has pointed out, the 1920s were indeed a time of diverse voices and multiple positions when it came to linguistic and literary reform.[11] Hu and Chen

[8] Ibid., 118, 119.

[9] Zheng Min, "Shijimo de huigu," 5, 7.

[10] Ibid., 6.

[11] Xu Ming, "Wenhua jijin zhuyi lishi weidu" (Historical dimensions of cultural radicalism), *Wenxue pinglun* 4 (1994): 115.

came out the winners not because they possessed any coercive, political power to impose their view on society but because it struck a sympathetic chord in the younger generation, who saw classical Chinese as both a cause and product of China's backwardness. Thus, Zhang Yiwu emphasizes the connection between the literary revolution and China's modernization discourse, between the triumph of the vernacular and China's drive toward modernity.[12] Although I agree that the literary reform was inextricably related to China's modernization project, modernization is not to be understood solely in political, economic, and social terms; it embodies, above all, significant aesthetic considerations, to which I will return.

Zheng's equating the literary revolution with the political revolution also leads her to associate the former with the Anti-rightist Literature, Great Leap Forward Literature of the People's Commune, and Anti-imperialist, Anti-revisionist Literature of the 1950s–60s and the literature of the Cultural Revolution later on. Further, Zheng identifies the polarity between classical and vernacular Chinese with that between Misty Poetry and "popular poetry."[13] Despite its ideal of making poetry more accessible to an increasingly literate population, the new poetry launched by the 1917 literary revolution was not directed by political decisions. Not only is it mystifying to subsume Misty Poetry under classical Chinese, which it plainly is not, but to pit it against "popular poetry" is to espouse the official line against the experimental spirit that Misty Poetry embodies. When Misty Poetry was under attack by the cultural establishment in the early 1980s, one of the criticisms was that it exhibited characteristics of Western modernism and was therefore undesirable. Misty Poetry shares such modernist themes as alienation and social critique and employs such modernist techniques as stream of consciousness, ambiguity, and personal symbolism. Besides acknowledged, albeit limited, Western influences, its native genealogy can be traced through the modernist poetry of the pre-Communist era, especially the School of Nine Leaves (Jiuyepai) of the 1940s, the works of Bian Zhilin and He Qifang of the 1930s, and the early Ai Qing, to the New Poetry of the May Fourth period.

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[12] Zhang Yiwu, "Chonggu 'xiandaixing' yu Hanyu shumianyu lunzheng" (A reevaluation of "modernity" and the debate on written Chinese), *Wenxue pinglun* 4 (1994): 107–13, 120.

[13] Zheng Min, "Shijimo de huigu," 14.

These distortions and fallacies stem from Zheng's failure to grasp fully the historical context. Chen Pingyuan points out in *The Establishment of Modern Chinese Scholarship* that "it was the vogue of the time for late Qing intellectuals to advocate the vernacular." Whether as a vehicle for enlightenment or as a means of literary expression, "the promotion of the vernacular did not begin with Hu Shi; Hu's invention lies in his giving 'classical Chinese' a death sentence."[14]

Namely, Zheng overlooks the historical fact that the so-called extremism was a strategy rather than praxis, in view of the traditional elite culture still dominant at the time. In "Chinese Literature of the Past Fifty Years" (Wushi nian lai Zhongguo zhi wenxue), Hu Shi recalls that in naming the first individual collection of modern Chinese poetry "Experiments" (Changshi ji), he adopted a more moderate attitude than Chen Duxiu. Expressing admiration for Chen's "courage," Hu regards Chen's extremist position as a necessary complement to his own, because "if we had followed my way, the literary revolution would have taken at least ten more years of discussion and trials" and "had we not had Chen's spirit of 'not allowing any room for discussion with the opponents,' the literary revolution would not have attracted that much attention."[15]

The failure to distinguish theory from practice accounts for another contradiction in "Retrospect." That is, although Zheng claims that Hu and Chen's negation of the classical tradition is total and complete, she nevertheless cites Hu's poems "Two Butterflies" and "Dream and Poetry" as revealing "traces" of classical poetry. In fact, the common criticism and *self*-criticism of early modern poets is that they are overly indebted to traditional poetry. Almost all the pioneers of modern poetry were well versed in classical Chinese literature. Hu Shi made fun of his own work as "bound feet unbound," admitting a marked influence by Song lyrics. Liu Dabai (1890–1932) was a degree-holder under the late Qing and, in the preface to his first collection of modern poetry, *Old Dreams* (*Jiumeng*), describes himself as "steeped in old poetry for almost thirty years." Zong Baihua (b. 1897) tells us that his miniature poems, which led the trend in the early 1920s, are

[14] Chen Pingyuan, *Zhongguo xiandai xueshu zhi jianli—yi Zhang Taiyan Hu Shizhi wei zhongxin* (The establishment of modern Chinese scholarship centered on Zhang Taiyan and Hu Shizhi) (Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 1998), 195–96.

[15] Cited from Hu Shi, *Hu Shi gudian wenxue yanjiu lunji*, 156, 157.

directly influenced by Tang *jueju* (quatrain) and have nothing to do with Tagore, Goethe, or Japanese haiku, as some critics have suggested.[16] Elements of classical literature, whether it's late-Tang poetry or Taoism-Buddhism, are clearly discernible in such poets as different as Zhou Zuoren (1885–1968), Yu Pingbo (b. 1900), Li Jinfa (1900–76), Fei Ming (1901–67), and Dai Wangshu (1905–50). What is also true is that Zhou, Yu, Wen, and many other early modern poets turned to writing classical poetry exclusively after a short while, and some even became scholars of classics. Rather than accusing them of "forgetting and abandoning" classical literature, as Zheng does, it is more accurate to say that exactly *because* the pioneers knew the resources as well as the limitations of the classical tradition they deemed it necessary to emphasize difference over continuity, radical departure over inheritance.

More important than the strategic iconoclasm that I defend, however, is that in reacting against the classical tradition, the literary revolution is always already a reinterpretation, even re-invention, of that tradition. "Retrospect" is predicated on the unexamined assumption that the Chinese classical tradition is a permanent, immutable, universally accepted entity, but historically it has never been such. Each generation of writers and scholars redefines tradition to carve out its own position, whether for creative or intellectual purposes. It is true that the pioneers of modern Chinese poetry rejected certain strands of classical literature and culture, but they differed widely in their emphasis on what was culturally and artistically useful. The literary revolution of 1917 was an overall effort to radically revise the tradition by challenging the canon, elevating thitherto neglected authors and works, and creating a vernacular poetry free from all poetic and aesthetic conventions. One of my favorite quotations about modern Chinese poetry is from Ye Gongchao, who said in 1937, "Although there are conspicuous differences between old and new poetry, our ultimate hope is that we will add the voice of our time to Chinese poetry as a whole, making it necessary to reevaluate once again all that has come before."[17] The seeming anachronism

[16] Liu Dabai, "'Jiumeng' fuyin ziji" (Preface to *Old Dreams*) (1922), cited from *Zhongguo xinshi ji xu ba xuan* (Selected prefaces and postscripts to collections of modern Chinese poetry), ed. Chen Shaowei (Changsha: Hunan wenyi chubanshe, 1986), 104. Zong Baihua, "Wo he shi—'Liuyun xiaoshi' houji" (Poetry and me: Postscript to "Floating Clouds") (1923), cited from *Zhongguo xinshiji xu ba*, 122.

[17] Ye Gongchao, *Ye Gongchao sanwen ji* (Collected essays of Ye Gongchao) (Taipei: Hongfan shudian, 1982), 81.

points to the paradox inherent in any literary tradition: it is in the emergence of the new that tradition gets defined over and over again. We always go "back to the future."

This also brings us to the greatest significance of the literary revolution. Early modern Chinese poets were not content with merely changing the diction, imagery, subject matter, or formal conventions—changes that had already been attempted to some degree in the late Qing—but aimed to establish the vernacular language as a new, viable poetic medium on which a new poetics could be developed. In 1922 Hu Shi himself made a clear distinction between the call for "the vernacular" in the earlier era and the call for "vernacular literature" that he and Chen advocated. In the 1920s–30s such poets as Liang Shiqiu, Xu Zhimo, and Yu Pingbo expressed their awareness of the necessary but difficult process of transition from "the vernacular" to "vernacular poetry." Modern Chinese poetry is arguably the boldest experiment in Chinese literary history inasmuch as it raises fundamental questions about the nature and purpose of poetry that have never been raised before. Coupled with simultaneous, profound transformations of China's political, economic, educational, and cultural conditions, the literary revolution compelled poets and readers to ask themselves What is poetry? Whom does poetry address? Why poetry? The literary revolution is both a cause of and a response to the new cultural context of modern China, and its most original contribution lies in effecting a paradigm shift through the invention of a new poetic medium and explorations of new poetics.[18]

Ironically, although her criticism of the logocentrism of Hu and Chen is valid, Zheng cannot escape from the rigid dichotomy of the written language versus the spoken, classical versus modern Chinese. She insists on seeing the two terms as discrete and, in fact, opposed to each other, rather than as forming a continuum. Even a cursory observation of how modern Chinese is spoken and written suffices to show how much classical Chinese is very much part of modern Chinese, not so much in terms of grammar as in terms of idioms and phrases, proverbs, sayings, oft-quoted verses, and the like, many of which are traceable to Confucian, Buddhist, or Taoist traditions. Contrary to the rigid dichotomy on which "Retrospect" bases its argument, I see modern and classical Chinese as forming a wide spectrum of formality and erudition.

[18] See Michelle Yeh, *Modern Chinese Poetry: Theory and Practice since 1917* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1991), esp. chap. 1.

In modern Chinese poetry there is a similar range of language use, from the elegant and classically flavored to the colloquial and even slangy.

Neither in theory nor in practice does modern Chinese poetry define the vernacular exclusively as the spoken language in an attempt, as Zheng claims, to "replace both the spoken and written language" with the spoken. The insistence with which she holds on to such a dichotomy, I submit, is inseparable from the theoretical model that she employs, namely, structuralist and poststructural theory. Her understanding of poststructuralism in particular leads to the following pronouncement: "Another major mistake of Hu and Chen was that they only emphasized *parole* and did not consider *langue* carefully, they only knew synchronicity but neglected diachronicity."[19] Based on such evidence, she criticizes Hu and Chen as logocentric.

Saussure's contribution lies in his original approach to language as a self-contained system of relationally defined signs (each further divided into the signifier and the signified). Unlike historical linguists of his time, he was interested not in the evolution of language over time—the diachronic view—but in the state of the system at any one point in time—the synchronic view. Whereas he calls the system of discursive possibilities *langue*, *parole* is the actualization, particular utterance, or speech event whose meaning is made possible by the system. The former is likened to the structure and rules of the chess game, the latter to individual games actually played. Although each actualized game is different, it is understood as a chess game because of the structure and rules behind it. Thus, meaning derives from structure.

Many Euro-American scholars interpret *parole* as the spoken language. However, Zheng's equating the vernacular with the spoken language and then criticizing Hu and Chen as logocentric is farfetched. By constructing a genealogy of vernacular literature throughout Chinese history and emphasizing that "the vernacular is capable of producing first-rate literature," Hu became a seminal figure in rewriting Chinese literary history. The vernacular that he advocated is by no means limited to the spoken language but includes a large amount of vernacular poetry and prose. Wang Hui sums up the situation clearly: "The issue at hand is one in which one system of written Chinese replaces another system of written Chinese....As a system of written language, the replace-

[19] Zheng Min, "Shijimo de huigu," 17, 10.

ment of the classical language with the vernacular cannot be described as logocentrism."[20]

Both Lacan and Derrida drew upon Saussure's structural linguistics, especially his theory of language as a system of differences, which they carry to a radical conclusion in psychoanalysis and philosophy, respectively. Both deny the necessary link between the signifier and the signified, and both emphasize the absolute autonomy of the signifier. For Lacan, language as a symbolic order defines the nature of human psychology. His famous formulation that "the unconscious is structured like a language" suggests that desire functions much like the signifier. Just as the signifier "always anticipates meaning by unfolding its dimension before it"[21] and is always situated in "the signifying chain" that, through metonym (displacement) and metaphor (substitution), produces the effect of the signified, desire always points to an absent Other (the object of desire) and marks the symbolic differentiation and relationships that govern human activity. Similarly for Derrida, the signifier leads not to the signified but only to other signifiers, just as metaphor as a "transference" is not a detour to the literal "truth" but leads to more metaphors. The infinite play of the signifier debunks such Western metaphysical notions as presence, Being, origin, and Logos, which are constituted by the play of the signifier, also denoted by notions of *differance,* trace, and supplement.

In refuting Hu and Chen's claim that a new poetry written in the modern vernacular would be more accessible, Zheng invokes Lacan's notion that the bar separating the signifier from the signified cannot be crossed; the signified, she argues, remains inaccessible whether it is in classical or modern Chinese. She also turns to Derrida's notion of trace to make a point about how futile it was for Hu and Chen to try to erase classical Chinese because its traces are everywhere in modern Chinese.

Zheng's appropriation of poststructuralism is questionable on several counts. First, she accepts it uncritically, treating it as if it were a newly discovered, absolute truth rather than an interpreta-

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[20] Hu Shi, "Bishang Liangshan," 212. Wang Hui, "Difang xingshi, fangyan tuyu yu kangri zhanzheng shiqi 'minzu xingshi' de lunzheng" (Local form, dialect, and the debate on "national form" during the anti-Japanese war), in *Wang Hui zixuan ji* (Self-selected work by Wang Hui) (Guangxi: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe, 1997), 342.

[21] Jacques Lacan, *Ecrits,* trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: W. W. Norton, 1977), 153.

tion, however illuminating it may be, that challenges earlier interpretations. (For instance, Lacan's theory of desire as lack or absence is vastly different from Deleuze and Guattari's, in which desire is a creative, productive force.) Her confidence in the infallibility of poststructuralism comes across clearly when she chastises Hu and Chen "from the height of contemporary linguistic theories."[22] Ironically, on one hand, Zheng repeatedly emphasizes the ideographic nature of Chinese characters in sharp contrast to Western alphabetic languages, attributing the unique qualities of classical Chinese poetry to the former; on the other hand, she does not hesitate in imposing a Western theory about the signifier and the signified, *parole* and *langue*, on the Chinese language.

Second, Lacan's opaque, idiosyncratic style notwithstanding, Zheng reads him too simplistically and too literally. For Lacan, language is a metaphor for human psychology. To the extent that he deconstructs the one-to-one correspondence between the signifier and the signified, he does not deny the existence of meaning (i.e., signification) but only radically redefines how meaning comes about. To say that modern Chinese is just as inaccessible as classical Chinese because the signifier never leads to the signified is missing the point.

Third, Zheng's use of Derrida is self-contradictory in that if indeed there are "numerous 'traces' of classical literature...in the so-called vernacular poetry and prose,"[23] can one still claim that the vernacular has "toppled," "smashed," and "erased" the classical tradition? Why then worry about classical Chinese not being part of modern Chinese if it is always already there?

Finally, Zheng's appropriation of poststructuralism fails to take into account that its production and significance are inseparable from the Western philosophical tradition. Neither Lacan nor Derrida holds the only universal truth; to treat them as such is to misunderstand and misuse them. The other side of the irony is that "Retrospect" also neglects the historical context of modern Chinese poetry. Tradition—with a capital T—is upheld as if it were a self-contained, stable, unchanging entity. In doing so, Zheng postulates an originary presence, a concept that again violates the deconstructive spirit. Let us recall what Derrida says about *trace:* "The trace is not only the disappearance of origin...it means that the origin did not even disappear, that it was never

[22] Zheng Min, "Shijimo de huigu," 7, 8.

[23] Ibid., 10.

constituted except reciprocally by a non-origin, the trace, which thus becomes the origin of the origin."[24] By polarizing classical and modern, written and spoken Chinese, by insisting on tradition as an originary presence that has somehow been obscured and awaits restoration to its original fullness, "Retrospect" exhibits the same logocentric tendency that Derrida seeks to deconstruct. "Retrospect" merely reverses the hierarchy of modern and classical Chinese, leaving the logocentric structure intact. To the extent that classical Chinese has never disappeared from modern Chinese, it has never existed as pure and complete-in-itself either.

The Subtext: A Chinese Alternative to Postmodernism?

In light of the critical analysis of Zheng Min's essay presented above, we cannot help asking why a veteran poet—and a modernist poet at that—would engage in a violent assault on modern Chinese poetry. Why would a senior literary scholar seem so lacking in critical self-awareness and self-reflexivity that she would commit as many logical and intellectual blunders as she does? Finally, given the wholesale attack on modern Chinese language and poetry, why has the essay not been subjected to more critical responses than what has been published thus far? Is it because the essay is beneath countering? Or is the dearth of criticism the result of other factors? In other words, I am interested in investigating the issue further as a cultural phenomenon whose ramifications, as I suggested at the beginning, go beyond literary history and provide some clues toward answering the above questions.

To understand the cultural significance of the controversy, we need to revisit the "Retrospect" essay, which opens with these remarks: "Modern Chinese poetry has a history of nearly one century. Recently international sinology has raised this question in the mass media: Why has Chinese literature, with a tradition of millennia of poetry, not produced masterpieces that garner the recognition of the international literary community?"[25] Zheng's critique is motivated by the allegation that modern Chinese poetry has not lived up to the glory of its classical counterpart, which has won universal praise. Besides well-known social and political

[24] Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), 61.

[25] Ibid., 5.

forces that have severely impeded the free and natural development of literature, she attributes the situation to the fact that modern Chinese poetry has willfully severed itself from the classical linguistic and literary tradition. Modern poetry is not part of that tradition because, first, it is iconoclastic, and, second, it borrows extensively from the West. These interrelated factors account for the loss of Chineseness. And Chineseness is China's only admission ticket to the international cultural community.

My reading is further supported by Zheng's rejoinder to Fan Qinlin, in which she proclaims, "When an ancient nation enters the forest of world culture, the possession that it needs most to bring with it is its own cultural tradition. If it goes empty-handed, it will not be a partner of...world culture."[26] For Zheng, world culture is like a multinational corporation; one must own sufficient capital to become a partner. The capital in this case is Chinese culture, for it is the only attribute that distinguishes China from all other nations in the world. Without it, China would be "empty-handed" and would not be accepted into partnership.

That modern Chinese is influenced significantly by Western languages and literature through translation is seen as a negative phenomenon on the ground that it has brought about the loss of Chineseness. Referring to Mu Dan (1918–77), a fellow-poet and fellow-student at the Southwest Associated University in Kunming in the early 1940s, Zheng acknowledges the artistic accomplishment of his work but still finds it unsatisfactory because it reveals a "modern consciousness" whose "main source is Western languages and literature" and is thus even "farther off from classical Chinese literature" than May Fourth poetry. The other side of losing touch with the indigenous tradition is that modern Chinese poetry borrows extensively from foreign cultures, especially those of the West. Zheng deplores the situation: "We have been forced to borrow vocabulary, syntax, grammar from Western languages."[27] The implication is clear: modern Chinese poetry, influenced more by Western than by classical Chinese literature, is not Chinese, or at least not Chinese enough. Zheng's series of essays amounts to a lament that modern Chinese poetry embodies

[26] Zheng Min, "Guanyu 'Ruhe pingjjia "Wusi" baihuawen yundong,'" 120.

[27] Zheng Min, "Shijimo de huigu," 13. Zheng Min, "Guanyu 'Ruhe pingjjia "Wusi" baihuawen yundong,'" 120.

the "loss of language" and the concomitant "loss of personality and culture" of modern China.

However, Zheng is neither alone nor even the first in voicing this concern in the 1990s. At the beginning of her essay she appeals to "international sinology" as an authoritative source of evidence. We do not know which sinologists she is thinking of, but two come to mind.

William J. F. Jenner, a prolific translator and scholar of modern Chinese literature at the Australian National University, published a review in the January 1990 issue of the *Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs*. The short essay begins with a supposedly factual statement: "Great poetry can no longer be written in Chinese....No really memorable Chinese verse has been written for the last forty years, and not so very much was created in the half century before that." He goes on to describe the poetry under review as "rarely ha[ving] the inevitability, the weight, the structure, the authority of real poetry." Further, the low quality of the poetry under review is symptomatic of a general "cultural decline" during the Cultural Revolution when "the resources of China's literary tradition were out of reach"; what *was* available to the poet was "the politically degraded language of the Mao era."[28]

I agree with Jenner (and Zheng Min, for that matter) that the Cultural Revolution wrought a massive destruction on Chinese culture from which it is still struggling to recover. I also agree that most, if not all, of the modern poetry produced during the Mao era is of little literary worth. However, I find it problematic when Jenner, like Zheng, goes beyond the historicity of Mao's China and makes a blanket statement about modern Chinese poetry in general.

Jenner holds that there is an unbridgeable gulf between the classical tradition and modern poetry. "While purporting to reflect living speech," the vernacular "could in fact only be used to its full effect by people soaked in the concise but daunting written code of the past."[29] Both the wording and the argument bear a striking similarity to Zheng's.

Jenner goes on to say, "Even the classically educated have found it almost impossible to create poetry in the vernacular that

[28] William J. F. Jenner, Review of *The August Sleepwalker*, by Bei Dao, translated and introduced by Bonnie S. McDougall, *Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs* 23 (January 1990): 193, 194.

[29] Ibid.

is better than quite good. Wen Yiduo and Xu Zhimo are not up there with Auden and Yeats."[30] The statement is not convincing because although most of us would probably agree that Auden and Yeats made a greater contribution in poetry than Xu and Wen, let us not forget that Xu (1896–1931), who started writing poetry at the age of twenty-four, died in a plane crash at the age of thirty-five, and Wen (1899–1946) stopped writing modern poetry by the end of the 1920s and devoted himself exclusively to the study of classics until he was assassinated at the age of forty-seven. Each poet had a brilliant but brief career of a decade whereas, in contrast, Auden and Yeats continued writing poetry for half a century. Jenner's statement that even classically trained poets like Xu and Wen "found it almost impossible to create poetry in the vernacular" only attests to the immense challenge that modern Chinese poetry faces in establishing a new poetic tradition, a goal all pioneers strove toward through experiments that were not always successful even by their own accounts.

Incidentally, in dismissing modern Chinese poetry in toto as a failure, neither Jenner nor Zheng pays much attention to the poetry that has come out of Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Chinese communities in Southeast Asia and other parts of the world for decades. It is no surprise, then, that when they deal with a limited number of samples they find few to be any good. Jenner and Zheng complain that modern Chinese poetry has nothing to show while at the same time ignoring its robust development outside mainland China especially during the period when poetry was stifled under Mao. The elision not only smacks of sinocentrism but weakens their argument against modern Chinese poetry.

Another likely source of authority that Zheng has in mind may be Stephen Owen at Harvard University. Interestingly, Owen's reflection on modern Chinese poetry was prompted by the same book of poetry that Jenner reviewed, and both essays were published in 1990, only ten months apart. In his review article Owen makes basically the same argument that modern Chinese poetry has lost its Chineseness, although he provides a more nuanced analysis as to how it came about. Implicitly referring to the literary revolution of 1917, Owen describes modern Chinese poetry as originating from "that first hope for a poetry free of history, for words that could be transparent vehicles of the liberated imagination and pure human feeling."[31] The result was a poetry in-

[30] Ibid., 194–95.

[31] Stephen Owen, "What Is World Poetry?" *New Republic*, November 19, 1990.

distinguishable from "world poetry," which is modeled primarily on the Anglo-European traditions of Romantic and modernist poetry.

In Owen's view, modern Chinese poetry suffers from a double lack: it fails to measure up to traditional Chinese poetry on the one hand, to Western poetry on the other. Cut off from its roots, modern Chinese poetry is doomed to mimic the Western original, becoming an inferior hybrid that is neither Chinese nor Western. He concludes, "We, the Anglo-American or European part of the international audience, are reading translations of a poetry that originally grew out of reading translations of our own poetic heritage."[32] Hence, the question "Is this Chinese literature, or literature that began in the Chinese language?" For him, the answer is definitely the latter.

I appreciate Owen's insight that international recognition has become the most coveted form of capital for many contemporary Chinese poets. Such a desire underscores much of the politics in the transnational circles of contemporary Chinese literature and sinology. The inordinate amount of attention to the so-called international reception and recognition is an issue I will come back to at the end of the essay. But international reception per se is irrelevant to our present discussion on cultural identity. Without repeating the various responses to Owen's essay that have come from Gregory B. Lee (1996), Andrew F. Jones (1994), Rey Chow (1993), and me (1991), I would like to address briefly Jones's defense as presented in his 1994 essay "Chinese Literature in the 'World' Literary Economy."[33]

Jones praises Owen's essay for "pinpointing the *structural inequalities* that underlie the creation and consumption of world literature" and for "rais[ing] questions of vital importance to anyone interested in deconstructing the orientalist discourse that continues to plague the translation, reception, and marketing of Chinese literature in the American context." "Owen's contribution," according to Jones, "lies in the way in which he situates

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[32] Ibid., 29.

[33] Gregory B. Lee, *Troubadours, Trumpeters, Troubled Makers: Lyricism, Nationalism and Hybridity in China and Its Others* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1995), chap. 4; Andrew F. Jones, "Chinese Literature in the 'World' Literary Economy," *Modern Chinese Literature* 8 (1994): 171–90; Rey Chow, *Writing Diaspora: Tactics of Intervention in Contemporary Cultural Studies* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), Introduction; and Michelle Yeh, "Chayi de youlu: yige huixiang" (The anxiety of difference: A rejoinder), *Jintian* (Today) 1 (1991): 94–96.

'world poetry' within the larger problem of Western cultural hegemony vis-à-vis the so-called 'third world.'" Whereas an earlier response to Owen from Rey Chow critiques sinology for its "valorization of China's traditional heritage and concomitant 'disdain' for contemporary Chinese culture," Jones employs the same strategy but directs his criticism not at the institution of sinology but at the institution of "world literature"—"the system in which the distribution of international (i.e., Western) recognition, literary prizes, and lucrative book contracts are awarded."[34]

Jones mounts a forceful attack on the Orientalist underpinnings of the concept and praxis of "world literature." But whereas he criticizes Goethe's notion of *Weltliteratur* as projecting an essentialized difference "onto a passive East for the narcissistic benefit of the Western spectator," he does not tell us how Owen's essentialism differs from Goethe's. He remarks further, "Despite Goethe's universalizing rhetoric, it rapidly becomes clear that world literature is, for the most part, a European phenomenon."[35] What he does not say is that "national literature," which he and Owen both defend, is just as European in its origin and conceptualization. The crux of the problem is how to define "national literature," specifically, how to define "Chineseness" when it comes to modern China. For Jenner, Owen, and Zheng, classical Chinese literature is the sole depository of Chineseness, and their disappointment with and disdain for modern Chinese poetry stems from this conscious or unconscious assumption and a common subscription to what I would call "the myth of purity," "the myth of authenticity," or, borrowing from Julia Kristeva, "the cult of origin."[36] In the foregoing analysis of Zheng's "Retrospect" essay, I have already pointed out its inherent logocentrism in ignoring the fact that tradition itself undergoes constant transformation and is always subject to negotiation and reinterpretation. However radical it may seem, modern Chinese poetry is very much part of Chinese tradition, which is going through its latest phase of transformation and being subjected to the latest round of reinterpretations. As such, it is integral to any discussion of Chineseness in the modern context.

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[34] Jones, "Chinese Literature," 176, 175, 176.

[35] Ibid., 180, 179.

[36] See discussion in Michelle Yeh, "International Theory and the Transnational Critic: China in the Age of Multiculturalism," *Boundary 2* 25.3 (Fall 1998): 193–222.

I believe that the critics under discussion have a genuine respect and love for Chinese literature, nor do I doubt their honorable intentions in speaking against Western cultural hegemony in an attempt to rescue China from being "trapped in a 'secondary position.'"[37] I would further characterize the "secondary position" that Jones talks about as a twofold crisis: a temporal crisis (of always falling behind the West) as well as a normative crisis (of never measuring up to the Western original). This is a perception shared by many critics and writers alike. For Zheng, the solution to the problem is to reassert Chineseness by reconnecting modern literature with the classical tradition. I find this solution problematic—and ultimately ineffective—because the reification of China versus the West is exactly the problem. Equating Chineseness only with China's past, with Tradition, she traps herself in a vicious circle created by her own logic: modern Chinese poetry is not Chinese enough, so we go back to Tradition to look for Chineseness, which nevertheless has nothing to do with modern Chinese poetry. Modern Chinese poetry remains hopelessly in a double bind, suffering from an acute anxiety of belatedness on one hand and of inauthenticity on the other. To put it in a different way, the defense of tradition against modernity, of Chineseness against Westernness, is itself an articulation of the structural inequalities that Owen and Jones critique since it is the reverse side of Orientalism.

Orientalism goes both ways. To the extent that the critics in question essentialize Chineseness, they also essentialize Westernness. The predominantly modern Anglo-European literary traditions that the critics oppose to the classical Chinese tradition do not embody "pure" Westernness but are similarly the result of continuing processes of transformation, contestation, and revision. We tend to forget that "the works of neither Dante nor Shakespeare nor Cervantes were considered classics... until well after the beginning of the nineteenth century,"[38] that romantic and modernist poetry in the West was regarded as foreign and strange when it first emerged, and that poets such as William Blake, Wordsworth, Baudelaire, Rimbaud, Ezra Pound, and E. E. Cummings were all notoriously iconoclastic but were eventually canonized in the literary tradition that they helped shape.

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[37] Jones, "Chinese Literature," 188.

[38] Claudio Guillén, *The Challenge of Comparative Literature* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1993), 39.

Is modern Chinese poetry the product of imitating Anglo-European originals, hence doomed to forever lag behind? Or is it, in responding to internal needs for change, predisposed to certain influences—mainly coming from Anglo-European cultures—because they deal with similar problems and answer similar questions? In other words, is modern Chinese poetry a passive receiver of Western imperial culture? Or is it an agent of self-transformation? I have argued—and will continue to argue—for the latter in view of the documented painstaking efforts of the pioneers of modern Chinese poetry. But unfortunately, all too often critics—both in and outside China—and sometimes even poets themselves adhere to the former assumption, hence accepting a priori Western norms and standards and leaving China with no choice but to fall back on cultural nationalism. Reification of Chineseness becomes the only way to *out-original* the West, thus setting in motion the vicious circle that we see in Zheng Min's argument.

In an essay appropriately titled "The World Language of Modern Poetry," Hans Magnus Enzensberger reminds us that twentieth-century poetry is aptly characterized by its cosmopolitanism in view of the multicultural backgrounds and international aspirations of poets everywhere: "In most disparate areas of the world, writers who have never heard of each other are simultaneously and independently encountering the same problems and finding the same solutions....Poetry no longer is nationalistic. The great masters of modern poetry, from Chile to Japan, have more in common than do all those who parade their national origin." Citing examples as diverse as Apollinaire, Aimé Cesaire, Vallejo, Hikmet, Pound, Neruda, and Kavafis, Enzensberger concludes,

> The list can be continued almost indefinitely. A person setting out to claim poets such as these for any one country would find himself in no small dilemma. Today it is less possible than ever to demand of poetry a passport. Such biographical details deserve to be recorded because their significance is more than just superficial and they serve to show how little can be achieved, in the face of modern poetry, by the concept of autonomous national literature.[39]

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[39] Hans Magnus Enzensberger, "The World Language of Modern Poetry," in *The Consciousness Industry: On Literature, Politics, and the Media* (New York: Seabury Press, 1974), 50, 51.

That some of the leading modern poets are committed Marxists and that the international community of poets that Enzensberger celebrates may be as much political as cultural does not detract from the validity of his observation. In fact it accentuates the changing connotations of "international" along the divide of the Cold War era. Whereas internationalism symbolized a transcendence of political and ideological conflicts in an earlier time, in the 1990s it takes on the new meaning of sweeping capitalist globalization, which is sometimes perceived as threatening to national cultural distinctness. Enzensberger's point still stands, however, in that national identity is a conceptual straitjacket especially when it comes to modern poetry. To Owen's despair that there is only "world poetry" but very little authentic "national poetry" in this day and age, Enzensberger's answer would be that the issue of national identity is irrelevant.

Which brings us to this central question: Why do the critics focus on cultural identity when they read modern Chinese poetry? To elaborate, why is it that for them the fact that a poem is written in modern Chinese is insufficient evidence of its "Chinese" identity? What other kinds of cultural-literary evidence besides the linguistic indicator would satisfy them? And, finally, what would or should a modern Chinese poem look like? Would it satisfy the critics if modern Chinese poetry were more like classical Chinese poetry? But, then, wouldn't that be classical Chinese poetry even though it is written in the twentieth century, something that in fact does exist and is alive and well in China, Taiwan, and other Chinese communities? But that wouldn't be modern Chinese poetry, only classical Chinese poetry of the twentieth century. So we must look elsewhere for the answer.

I don't pretend to know what modern Chinese poetry should be like. But I do wonder why it is the first and foremost question asked about modern Chinese poetry. Perhaps it has something to do with the longevity of the poetic tradition and the pride China takes in being a nation of poetry. Perhaps it has something to do with the high prestige that poetry traditionally enjoys in Chinese culture and society. More than any other literary genre, poetry, along with calligraphy and literati painting, defines the "essence" of cultural China. When the foundation of that poetic tradition was shaken by the literary revolution of 1917, concurring with the equally fundamental changes in the political, social, and educational spheres, there was bound to be a culture shock, an identity crisis. This also explains why the question of cultural identity is

raised far less often with regard to modern Chinese fiction or drama.

It is a universal human need to have a sense of belonging, to establish and hold on to an identity whether at the individual or collective level. However, I have argued so far that the exclusive focus on cultural identity in relation to modern Chinese poetry often leads to a cultural essentialism that merely replicates rather than successfully deconstructs Orientalism. As a result, there is little attention to the actual works produced in modern Chinese and little recognition of the original artistic innovations that modern poets have made through an individualistic, imaginative transformation of both Chinese and foreign linguistic and literary elements.

It is ironic that one argument for a return to the classical Chinese tradition that Zheng Min makes is that it has inspired a number of Western poets, most notably Ezra Pound: "Western Modernism...was inspired by the pictographic nature of the Chinese character and the rich imagery of classical poetry," yet "in its ancestral home it has been mocked, cursed, even banned."[40] In both logic and rhetoric, Zheng parallels Owen so closely that we can rephrase Zheng with Owen's own sentence, changing only the reference to the cultural tradition: "We, the *Chinese* part of the international audience, are reading translations of a poetry that originally grew out of reading translations of our own poetic heritage"! If Pound's indebtedness is used as a testimony to the beauty and power of classical Chinese poetry, the fact is no critic has ever suspected, much less declared, that in drawing on classical Chinese poetry for his imagist poetics, Pound lost his cultural identity as an American poet. If we follow the same logic, why does Zheng regard modern Chinese poets as un-Chinese when they are inspired by Western poetry? More important, she seems to discount the fact that the classical Chinese poetry that inspired Pound (via Ernest Fenellosa) is not the classical Chinese poetry that Zheng or Owen or Jenner has in mind because it is a radical, idiosyncratic interpretation and invention of "China."[41] Why can't the same creative process be recognized with regard to modern Chinese poets in relation to Western traditions? Describing modern Chinese poetry as a mere imitation of

[40] Zheng Min, "Shijimo de huigu," 9.

[41] Longxi Zhang, *The Tao and the Logos: Literary Hermeneutics, East and West* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1994), 22–33.

Western models, Zheng and the other critics in effect deny it the capacity of agency—the problem that Jones addresses and tries to solve.

The discussion on the cultural identity of modern Chinese poetry dramatizes a tension that has been at work throughout modern Chinese history and inherent in China's twofold objective of modernization from the late Qing onward—namely, the tension between enlightenment (by learning from the West) and national salvation (by resisting the West), between particularism and universalism, and finally, between nationalism and internationalism.

The last form of tension comes to the fore in the recent round of discussion about modern Chinese poetry in that it reveals a profound desire for self-validation, an eagerness for affirmation of Chinese values in a global context—on the basis of the classical literary tradition for Jenner, Owen, and Zheng, contemporary avant-garde fiction for Jones. But in all of these cases self-validation is ultimately inextricable from validation by the West—whether it is the "international literary community," "international sinology," or the "world literature" market. Although each critic presents his or her notion of Chineseness as an explicit critique of the West, that notion is inseparable from international reception and would be meaningless without it.

As a solution to Western cultural domination, Jones proposes that we "pay consistent and meticulous attention to what Chinese critics have to say" and "promote dialogue and even 'communal action' directed against the perpetuation of a system mired in unidirectionality." The danger, however, is a return to the simplistic binarism of the foreign and the indigenous, "Western" audiences and "Chinese" writers and critics. Especially in the 1990s the "contact zone" where Chinese and Western cultures encounter each other is no longer limited to geographical locations defined by national boundaries. Much of "what Chinese critics have to say" is often dictated by Western agendas and based, implicitly or explicitly, on a Western frame of reference. The West, in other words, remains the perennial "preferred Other" of China.[42]

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[42] Jones, "Chinese Literature," 189. Arif Dirlik, "Chinese History and the Question of Orientalism," in *The Postcolonial Aura: Third World Criticism in the Age of Global Capitalism*, ed. Arif Dirlik (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1997), 105–28. Rey Chow, "Can One Say No to China?" *New Literary History* 28.1 (Winter 1997): 147–51.

This is evident in the postmodern slant to how the issue of modern Chinese poetry resurfaces in the 1990s. If Zheng Min invokes semiotics and poststructuralism, Stephen Owen and Andrew F. Jones couch their arguments in the language of postcolonial theory. In his response to Zheng's "Retrospect" essay, Zhang Yiwu also invokes postmodern and postcolonial theory to critique the West-dominated modernization discourse. And he does this not without self-awareness: "Although these two kinds of new 'knowledge' obviously also come from a Western academic background, our appropriation and elaboration can no doubt stimulate our ability of self-reflection and self-reevaluation." Zhang goes on to quote Homi K. Bhabha's concept of "mimicry" as a means to "expose the contradiction and unease of Western discourses."[43] Zhang's subscription to postmodernism is complete with his newly coined term "postvernacular" (*hou baihua*), which supposedly transcends the old binary opposition of classical versus modern that underscores China's modernization discourse.

In recent years there has been much talk about Chinese alternatives to Western paradigms. Can postmodernism offer a viable Chinese alternative to the hegemonic West? Can China finally be free from the dominance of Western norms and standards? The attractiveness of postmodernism comes from several interrelated factors. At one level, postmodernism lends itself to empowering the marginalized non-West. Compared to modernism, postmodernism seems to be a more affirmative, liberatory discourse with regard to the non-West in that it espouses an aesthetics that emphasizes imitation over originality, fragmentation over organic unity, return of the repressed over perpetuating the authority of the center. Postmodernism may be seen as the cultural counterpart of the fragmentation and decentralization that is unfolding in the global political and economic order, and it is an eloquent articulation of the ideal of multiculturalism.

However, postmodernism is empowering largely through a logic of reductionism. According to this logic, the West is identified with modernization or the Enlightenment project, and any critique of modernization discourse is seen as a critique of the West. Thus, as a critique of modernization, postmodernism, with its aforementioned aesthetics, becomes a de facto ally of the non-West. I believe that the eagerness with which some Chinese critics embrace postmodernism in the 1990s can be partly explained by

[43] Zhang Yiwu, "Chonggu 'xiandaixing,'" 112.

this *perception* of postmodernism as anti-West and pro-China. In this respect, postmodernism is certainly "politically correct" in terms of the official nationalist ideology of the Chinese Communist Party, however unintended it may be.[44]

To give an example, Zhang Yiwu describes the poetry of the 1990s as postmodern and postcolonial (in addition to "post–New Era" [*hou xinshiqi*] and "post-allegory" [*hou yuyan*]) and as seeking to "redefine Chineseness" (*Zhonghuaxing*). This new poetry is distinguished from earlier poetry in that it does not self-orientalize to cater to the West. Zhang's reference to Owen in support of his argument gives an interesting twist to the issue under discussion. Both have a negative view of modern Chinese poetry because it is dependent on and submissive to the hegemonic West. Both criticize modern Chinese poetry as inauthentic. However, whereas for Owen inauthenticity stems from a departure from the Chinese tradition, for Zhang the problem is one of overt Chineseness or "national allegory." Whereas for Owen (as well as for Zheng and Jenner) the remedy is to return to the classical tradition, Zhang advocates a poetry "based on the current situation of Chinese language and reality to establish...a dialogue with other cultures and poetry."[45] The so-called Chinese postmodernism—including its strands of postcolonialism and multiculturalism—is thus underscored by cultural nationalism.

Postmodernism also provides a way of bypassing the arduous, century-long journey of modernization that China has embarked on. The reification of tradition characteristic of the cultural nationalism that I have critiqued in this essay is not new in modern Chinese history. It is but another expression of the frustration and anxiety that accompanies China's modernization, which is still perceived as incomplete.[46]

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[44] This point is raised by Zhao Yiheng (Henry Yiheng Zhao) in "Post-Isms and Chinese New Conservatism" (Houxue yu Zhongguo xin baoshou zhuyi), *Twenty-First Century* 27 (February 1995): 4–15; and by Xu Ben in "The State of 'Third World Criticism' in China Today" ("Disan shijie piping" zai dangjin Zhongguo de chujing), *Twenty-First Century* 27 (February 1995): 16–27. For an analysis of the controversy surrounding these essays, see Yeh, "International Theory and the Transnational Critic."

[45] Zhang Yiwu, "Duanlie zhong de shengzhang: 'Zhonghua xing' de xunqiu" (Growth in the midst of rupture: The search for "Chineseness"), *Shi tansuo* 13 (January 1994): 40–44; Zhang Yiwu, "Yuyan/zhuangtai: hou xinshiqi shige de xuanze" (Allegory/state of being: Poetry's choice in the post–New Era), *Shige bao* 184 (November 1994): 43–45; quotation at 43.

[46] Yeh, "International Theory and the Transnational Critic."

Finally, postmodernism is inseparable from globalization, which has been going on throughout the modern age but has accelerated dramatically in our own time. From a post-colonial/postmodern perspective, the cases of Zheng and others suggest that the quest of cultural identity is the flip side of an equally strong desire for international recognition and participation. Nationalism reinforces internationalism so long as the nation-state is still the common denominator of international transactions. To be part of the "global village" brings a sense of pride as well as anxiety. If being "international" is accorded a higher prestige and authority than ever before, the "admission ticket"—to recall Zheng's metaphor—is national culture. Hence, the paradox of the simultaneous ascendency of internationalism and nationalism around the world and, in particular, in Chinese literary and cultural studies. Zheng's appropriation of contemporary theory is itself an example of self-validation in terms of what is "new" and "international."[47]

Yet another example of the internationalism/nationalism symbiosis is the intense attention that Chinese intellectuals and writers have focused on the Nobel Prize in Literature in recent years. Not only do newspapers and magazines in Taiwan devote much space to the prize every early October when it is announced, but books have been published and conferences hosted in China on the topic. Chinese intellectuals regularly complain that the most populous nation and one with one of the longest literary traditions in the world has yet to be honored by the Swedish Royal Academy, especially in view of the fact that authors from two of its Asian neighbors, Japan and India, have been awarded the prize.[48] The anxiety seems to have escalated since Göran Malmqvist, a renowned sinologist, was appointed to the academy in 1985. In the multicultural climate of the late 1990s, it is a common phenomenon that the more China wishes to be seen as international, the more nationalist it becomes.

Taken together, the above-mentioned aspects of postmodernism cast most talk about Chinese alternatives to postmodernism, whether in or outside China, in a suspicious light. The prefix "post" has become a mantra for some critics, as if it automatically resolves the contradictions and tensions in the cross-cultural rela-

[47] Ibid.

[48] Dong Dingshan, "Nuobeier wenxue jiang beihou" (Behind the Nobel Prize in Literature), *Dushu* 202 (January 1996): 93–97.

tionships between China and "the West." Given the transnational cultural politics of contemporary China, any facile appropriation of postmodernism only camouflages such theoretical issues as cultural identity and modernity rather than confronting them head-on.

Glossary

Changshiji 嘗試集
Chen Duxiu 陳獨秀
Chen Pingyuan 陳平原
Dai Wangshu 戴望舒
Fei Ming 廢名
hou baihua 後白話
hou xinshiqi 後新時期
hou yuyan 後寓言
Hu Shi 胡適
Huang Zunxian 黃遵憲
Jiumeng 舊夢
Jiuyepai 九葉派
jueju 絕句
Li Jinfa 李金髮
Liang Shiqiu 梁實秋
lianhualao 蓮花落
Liu Daibai 劉大白
Mei Guangdi 梅光迪
Mu Dan 穆旦
piaoqie 剽竊
Ren Shuyong 任叔永
"Shijimo de huigu: Hanyu yuyan biange yu Zhongguo xinshi chuangzuo" 世紀末的回顧: 漢語語變革與中國新詩
shijie geming 詩界革命
Tan Sitong 譚嗣同
Wen Yiduo 聞一多
Wenxue pinglun 文學評論
"Wenxuegailiang chuyi" 文學改良芻議
"Wenxue geming lun" 文學革命論
Wang Hui 汪暉
"Wushi nian lai Zhongguo zhi wenxue" 五十年來中國之文學
Xia Zengyou 夏曾佑
Xu Ming 許明
Xu Zhimo 徐志摩
Xueheng School 學衡派
yangguizi 洋鬼子
yanshipilichun 煙士披里純
Ye Gongchao 葉公超
Yu Pingbo 俞平伯
Zhang Yiwu 張頤武
Zheng Min 鄭敏
Zhonghuaxing 中華性
Zhou Zuoren 周作人
Zong Baihua 宗白華