

教育部人文社會學科學術強化創新計畫

【史賓諾沙論上帝與心靈】

期中報告

年度成果總報告

補助單位：教育部顧問室

計畫類別： 經典研讀課程

經典研讀活動

執行單位：國立中正大學哲學系

計畫主持人：侯維之

執行期程：九十九年八月一日至九十九年十二月三十一日

日期：中華民國 100 年 2 月 26 日

一、 計畫名稱

史賓諾沙論上帝與心靈由教育部中綱計畫「經典教學計畫」補助,計畫編號 MOE-099-01-02-2-11-2-15。

二、 計畫目標

本計劃係延續九十八學年度經典教學課程：「狄卡爾 (Descartes)」與「洛克 (Locke)」。將教授史賓諾沙的 Ethics。奠基在對史賓諾沙就「上帝與心靈」的理論主軸上，期望能提供學生一個理解理性主義的窗口。

三、 導讀

史賓諾沙係理性主義第二位主要哲學家，影響他的所有哲學家，最重要的就是 Descartes。由於 Ethics 是一本以幾何學方式寫作的極細緻哲學作品，本課程僅擬專注於第一與第二部分：Part I On God(論上帝)與 Part II On the Nature and Origin of the Mind (論心靈的本質與起源)。其理由有二：第一，哲學史經典的教授必須輔以大量的補充說明，有益於學生對哲學文獻有初步瞭解，貪多不會有所助益；第二，九十八學年度的「笛卡爾」課程，專注於 Descartes 的 Meditations on First Philosophy，其中以懷疑論、人類心靈認知結構、與上帝存在三大議題為核心，而史賓諾沙對後二者議題（即本課程擬教學的 Part I & Part II）有許多分析，對 Descartes 的觀點做出攻擊與修正，而且其對後二議題的立場，正足以解釋為何對史賓諾沙而言，懷疑論根本不成為問題。

四、 研讀成果

此次經典研讀課程（史賓諾沙論上帝與心靈），延續九十八年度經典教學補助計畫（狄卡爾 (Descartes) 與洛克論天生觀念）。本次教學重點放在狄卡爾到史賓諾沙的哲學概念轉換。

九十九上學期十八周課程進度如下：

1. 史賓諾沙《倫理學》介紹（史賓諾沙《倫理學》的哲學方法論）
2. 《倫理學》第一部〈關於上帝〉（物質、性質與樣態）
3. 《倫理學》第一部〈關於上帝〉（相同本質不可能具備兩種以上物質）
4. 《倫理學》第一部〈關於上帝〉（物質是必然、永恆與無限的存在）
5. 《倫理學》第一部〈關於上帝〉（除了上帝，沒有其他物質可被理解）
6. 《倫理學》第一部〈關於上帝〉（上帝與事物）

7. 《倫理學》第一部 〈關於上帝〉(因果必然性，無限與有限樣態)
8. 《倫理學》第一部 〈關於上帝〉(決定論與必然論)
9. 《倫理學》第一部 〈關於上帝〉(神性自由與奇蹟)
10. 期中考試與報告
11. 《倫理學》第貳部 〈心靈的起源與本質〉(平行論)
12. 《倫理學》第貳部 〈心靈的起源與本質〉(心靈與軀體)
13. 《倫理學》第貳部 〈心靈的起源與本質〉(單元論與二元論)
14. 《倫理學》第貳部 〈心靈的起源與本質〉(觀念)
15. 《倫理學》第貳部 〈心靈的起源與本質〉(真理與適切性)
16. 《倫理學》第貳部 〈心靈的起源與本質〉(認識的不同方式)
17. 《倫理學》第貳部 〈心靈的起源與本質〉(自由與意志)
18. 期末考

目前達成課程進度，期中考於下周進行，屆時將更能掌握修課學生對課程內容的了解程度與困難。〈附件一〉為授課大綱。

五、 議題探討結論

狄卡爾有別於亞里斯多德/士林學派體系，意圖提供一個基礎來調和以數學為新的科學和基督教之間的衝突。十七世紀的哲學家皆受到笛卡兒的哲學的影響，史賓諾沙更是當時的狄卡爾專家。他甚至將笛卡兒的〈哲學原理〉用幾何學方式再編，用來協助學生理解笛卡兒的哲學想法。『上帝』、『自我』、『物理事物』、『他人』這些概念之間的生成關係是笛卡爾在確立自我存在之後，連結上帝存在論證、外在世界存在、與外在物體存在論證等的關鍵。背後牽涉了因果適切性原則與反對有生於無的主張。對此議題的深入討論有助學生了解笛卡爾如何重建被懷疑所摧毀的世界。

但是史賓諾沙在許多基本哲學議題上與狄卡爾意見相左，而我們可以從以下概念的比較，將〈倫理學〉這本書視為史賓諾沙對狄卡爾哲學錯誤的回應，主要探討議題如下：

(一)上帝

如同狄卡爾，上帝在史賓諾沙哲學體系中扮演非常重要得角色。不同的是，雖然上帝是一切事物的原由，但並不是猶太-基督教傳統下所意味的--上帝創造了一切事物。對史賓諾沙而言，上帝存在於所有事物中，一切事物也存在上帝中。每一個事物都是上帝的一部分，每件事物都展現出上帝的存在。上帝就是自然界，差別只在名稱上。在史賓諾沙的上帝觀下，上帝就是自然界。上帝不再具備猶太-基督教傳統下的人類特質。

〈倫理學〉分成五部，第一部完全在演繹、解釋並捍衛史賓諾沙不同於以往

的上帝觀。史賓諾沙首先提出一個理性論證，其結論是上帝必須存在，而且只有可能以史賓諾沙式的上帝觀存在。第一部的重點在闡明一切事物與上帝之間的關係，和解釋事物存在的因果關係。第一部的附錄，也是第一部最爲人所知之處，正是用一平易近人的方式，解釋說明爲何當時的學者都誤認了上帝的本質。

(二) 普遍式因果決定論

從「一切事物皆是上帝的一部分」可以推論出「所有事物的本質都融合在一具次序性與結構的整體」。對史賓諾沙來說就是因果次序、事件與事物皆是其他事件與事物在自然律下的結果 (the structuring principles of the divine Being)。每個事件都有一先前事件爲其原因，每個事件也都會導致結果，沒有原因沒有結果。原因出現，結果必然接續出現。此主張被稱之爲因果決定論。決定論不但與聖經所談論的奇蹟相衝突，也排除了人的自由意志、挑戰人類的道德責任。如果人的罪行僅是先前原因的必然結果，沒有選擇，那麼人要如何爲其行爲負責。

狄卡爾認爲，所有物理世界的現象必然符合自然律，但人的心靈不包括在內，人的自由意志不受自然律約束。史賓諾沙則不這麼認爲，他主張人不具有特殊地位，人和其他事物都受制於因果律。因此史賓諾沙不接受人有自由意志，但是史賓諾沙認爲人藉由理解「人是大自然的一部分」的同時，可以達到一種更爲重要也更爲有價值的自由。

(三) 心靈與身體

狄卡爾認爲人類是由屬於佔據三度空間的肉體和具思考與意志的心靈所構成的，肉體與心靈是完全不同的種類。史賓諾沙清楚反對狄卡爾二元論式主張，肉體與心靈對史賓諾沙而言並非完全不同種類的本體；肉體與心靈是對單一本體的兩種不同的理解與描述方式。史賓諾沙對心靈與肉體的見解提供了一了解人類情緒的概念基礎。

(四) 人類情緒

從古至今，每位對倫理學和道德心理學有興趣的學者，都必定要考慮情緒在人類行爲與經驗中所扮演的角色。在大部分的情況下，情緒皆被視爲不理性、一發不可收拾、具破壞性的。因此，倫理學的工作就是馴服人類的情緒，讓情緒被理智所控制。史賓諾沙同樣關注理智與情緒之間的關係，不同之處在於，他認爲焦點不在馴服情緒而是藉由對情緒的理解。從破壞力的統治之下解放情緒。

六、 目標達成情況與自評

在課程網站經營上，選擇了版面規劃自由度高，且沒有廣告和多餘 logo 干擾的 Blogger。部落格的內容包括(一)授課大綱、評分標準，以及老師與助教的聯絡方式。(二)在每次討論課後，部落格管理員會將事前準備好該次的作業題目。

(三)網路資源：國內重要哲學單位的網站、國外哲學百科全書，以及許多哲學部落格之連結。(四)書籍推薦：推薦學生課後的延伸教材。此課程架設網路平台讓修課學生與助教討論，並將課堂作業發表在此平台上。目標是希望藉由網路使得修課學生隨時有任何哲學奇想時便能留下看法主張。但使用情況並未達到預期的效果。除了將設計網路作業，另在成績計算上鼓勵修課學生在網路平台上勇於表達自我的想法。

課程網站討論題目：

2010年11月18日：

- 1.請解釋 Spinoza 為何選擇幾何學方法來呈現其理論。
- 2.請簡略說明 Spinoza 的 causal determinism，並說明兩個主要的反對意見 (miracle & free will) 為何。

2011年1月7日：

請根據下述(1)-(6)，詳細說明第十四個命題中 Spinoza 所宣稱的「除上帝外並無其他實體存在」是否成立。

I-P-5 (1), I-P-7—necessary existence is an attribute (2), I-P-8 (3), I-P-11 (4), I-P-13 (5) and Leibniz's criticism to I-P-5 (6) = I-P-14?

2011年1月13日：

請詳細說明 Spinoza 就上帝無限個屬性 (attribute) 間的 parallelism 為何?

史賓諾沙論上帝與心靈

此Blog是中正大學九十九年度第一學期哲學系「史賓諾沙論上帝與心靈」的網站平台，此課程由教育部中綱計畫「經典教學計畫」補助，計畫編號MOE-099-01-02-2-11-2-15。授課教授：洪維之老師。上課時間：[星期四]十點十分至十二點。助教：胡仲群。上課地點：文學館140室。

2011年1月13日 星期四

史賓諾沙討論三

請詳細說明Spinoza就上帝無限個屬性 (attribute) 間的parallelism為何?

張貼者：史賓諾沙 於 下午2:40

16 意見

2011年1月7日 星期五

史賓諾沙作業

請根據下述(1)-(6)，詳細說明第十四個命題中Spinoza所宣稱的「除上帝外並無其他實體存在」是否成立。

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張貼者：史賓諾沙 於 上午11:20

25 意見

2010年11月18日 星期四

史賓諾沙問題討論

- 1.請解釋Spinoza為何選擇幾何學方法來呈現其理論。
- 2.請簡略說明Spinoza的causal determinism，並說明兩個主要的反對意見 (miracle & free will) 為何。

關於我自己



史賓諾沙

檢視我的完整簡介

網誌存檔

▼ 2011 (2)

▼ 一月 (2)

史賓諾沙討論三

史賓諾沙作業

► 2010 (5)

► 2009 (3)

七、 執行過程遭遇之困難

了解歐美哲學最佳方式還是為直接閱讀英文教科書。簡單來說，史賓諾沙〈倫理學〉分成五部。第一部在說明上帝的本質以及有限的事物如何源自於無限與永恆的上帝。第二部介紹人類心靈，人類如何獲得知識，以及為何人類的思想常犯錯。第三部史賓諾沙發展一套系統性的情緒理論。第四部則是說明什麼樣的情緒生活會是一個幸福生活。在第五部中我們則將學習到理智與理解如何幫助我們克服情緒的破壞力，導引我們走向幸福與，或用史賓諾沙的話來說：獲得救贖。

為了使修課學生能清楚理解史賓諾沙的思想概念，避免中文翻譯本造成的語意流失，也為了增進修課學生英語能力與對哲學詞彙的掌握，本課程所使用的教材皆為英文。雖然每週除授課時段外皆有固定的助教討論，但修課學生仍反應課業壓力較大。未來將在教師授課時間外，安排更多的時段讓修課學生參與討論與對話。

八、 改進建議

非常感謝教育部中鋼計畫連續三學期給予補助。本次課程希望延續九十八年度中鋼計畫：「狄卡爾 (Descartes)」與「洛克 (Locke) 論天生觀念」。希望透過教授 Spinoza 的 Ethics。奠基在對史賓諾沙就「上帝與心靈」的理論主軸上，能提供學生一個理解理性主義的窗口並比較三位理性主義大師的差異。但是因為學生修課系所要求不同，以至大部分學生並未了解狄卡爾與洛克的思想，造成選修史賓諾沙的學生背景知識差異有別，難以達成計畫既定目標。希望藉由此次經驗，發展出改進方式，在未來規劃課程上作出修正。

計畫主持人：侯維之

計畫名稱：史賓諾沙論上帝與心靈

研讀經典	開課對象	參與授課教師數	修課學生數	計畫助理
<input type="checkbox"/> 中文經典 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 外文經典	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 大學部 <input type="checkbox"/> 碩士班	男 1 人 女 2 人	男 20 人 女 17 人	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 博士生教學助理(<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 男 <input type="checkbox"/> 女) <input type="checkbox"/> 兼任助理(<input type="checkbox"/> 男 <input type="checkbox"/> 女) <input type="checkbox"/> 無

Spinoza

Introduction

LIFE

Brief

- Spain—the Jew on exile
- Netherland
- Study to be a rabbi?

Cherem

- Study Hebrew scriptures and commentaries
- Learn Latin and study more secular academic works
- July 27, 1656.
Concluding with “no one should communicate with him, not even in writing, nor accord him any favour nor stay with him under the same roof nor [come] within four cubits in his vicinity; nor shall he read any treatise composed or written by him.”

Why?

- Why being punished with such extreme prejudice?
- What “evil opinions and acts” or what “abominable heresies” have been done or been practiced/taught by Spinoza?

THE GEOMETRIC METHOD

Why this method?

- Spinoza experimented actually with different formats to form his philosophical ideas—a variety of well-worn styles:
direct exposition (by many)
dialogue (by Plato)
autobiographical meditation (by Descartes)
- In a letter, he said that he can see no better way to demonstrate his ideas more clearly and briefly.

Why this method?

- Descartes was after the maximum certainty of his philosophy, so was Spinoza.
- Spinoza believes that philosophy could reach a degree of precision and indubitability that approximated or not equalled that achieved by mathematics.

Different from Descartes

- Descartes was not very fond of using the geometric order in non-mathematical domains.
- He notes that he was convinced that it is the *Meditations*—with their analytic, not synthetic or demonstrative, method—which will yield by far the greater benefit.
- Spinoza had apparently a stronger faith in the geometric fashion.

GEOMETRICAL EXPOSITION AND PHILOSOPHICAL THEORISATION

Doing and presenting philosophy

- Although Spinoza *presents* his philosophy in geometric method, it does not suggest that he *does* philosophy in the same fashion.
- For Spinoza, as for a good number of other philosophers in the period, the search for knowledge must be the search for absolutely certain truths by a systematic and proven method.

Methods of discovering and ways of presenting

- Spinoza did not go about discovering his principles about God, the human being, and everything else by starting with a few definitions, axioms, and propositions and then seeing what he could deduce from them *a priori*.
- Although he chose the geometric format to present his thought, that does not suggest that one is to do philosophy just as one does mathematics.

The connection between *what* and *how* Spinoza is saying in his works

- Is there any necessary connection between form and content in *Ethics*?
- Some claims that there is no meaningful relationship between form and content, and his choice should be explained on other ground.
- On the other hand, one could argue that there is a close, even necessary relationship between Spinoza's subject matter and the format in which he presents it.

necessitarianism

- For Spinoza, there is no contingency in Nature—causal determinism.
- Everything is necessitated by causes to be such as it is.
- The causal determinism governing all things in Nature derives from above—from Nature's eternal and infinite principles (that is, from God).

Why so?

- If Spinoza wants to exhibit the strictly mathematical necessity that governs reality and show that all things flow from God, he must employ a geometrically formatted series of demonstrations that reveal the logically necessary connections that unite propositions about those things with propositions about God.

The better interpretation

- The second reading is more interesting and potentially fruitful—that is, the geometric format is not an extrinsic and dispensable formulation but an essential one.
- Spinoza explicitly tells us that the goal of philosophical method is to make the order and connection of ideas in the mind mirror the order and connection of things in reality.

The geometric format and the emendative therapy

- The geometric format of the *Ethics* is, by the force of its reasoning, supposed to lead the reader to the correct re-arrangement of her ideas so that they, in their new, geometrically rigorous connections, match up with the order of reality itself.

ELEMENTS OF THE GEOMETRIC PRESENTATION

Definitions

The role they play

- The definitions are the bedrock of Spinoza's system.
- The definitions are the initial point of departure for Spinoza's overall argument.
- A definition describes the essence of a thing. It allows one to deduce the properties that necessarily belong to its object.

A good definition

- A definition must spell out its content in a perspicuous manner using accessible terms—be clear and conceivable.
- Definitions have to be relatively basic and simple.
- Understanding a definition must not require appealing to any subsequent elements in the system.

Think about definitions

- Definitions of words—stipulative definitions: When Euclid says "a point is that which has no part," it can be read that he's saying how he shall understand the word.
- Definitions of things—real definitions: In this sense, they are really bearers of truth.

Stipulative or real?

- "Will anyone in his right mind tell me that I have drawn a bad conclusion because I have perhaps used a false definition? Or will anyone require me to prove my definition? To do so would be to tell me that I have not conceived what I have conceived, or to require me to prove that I have conceived what I have conceived. Surely this is trifling."
- He sees the *Ethics* as laying out the truth.

How real?

- How does Spinoza know that these definitions are true and thus are real?
- One possibility is that the definitions are proven by their consequences.
- The more one sees how much follows from a given set of definitions, which in Spinoza's argument function as causes, and especially how much of reality they can explain, the greater is one's knowledge of those starting points.

Why real?

- Spinoza seems not be troubled by the epistemological worry of how to justify his definitions.
- Does it mean that Spinoza thinks that the definitions are self-evidently true?

Axioms

Some characteristics

- Axioms are general principles about things—the fundamental and abstract statements express common ontological and epistemological truths.
- "From universal axioms alone the intellect cannot descend to singulars, since axioms extend to infinity, and do not determine the intellect to the contemplation of one singular thing rather than another."

Kinds of axioms

- Fundamental, abstract as they may, only some axioms are *a priori*. Some are plainly matters of fact.
- They are either governed by logic alone, derived immediately from experience, offering insight into some basic metaphysical categories, specifying the requirement of knowledge, or stating basic laws of nature.

Three characteristics

- Axioms are not necessarily as basic as definitions. For instance, "we perceive that a certain body is affected in many ways".
- (1) Axioms, unlike definitions which may or may not be true, must be true.
"[A definition] differs from an axiom...in that it need only be conceived, without further condition, and need not, like an axiom be conceived as true."

Three characteristics

- (2) Axioms are self-evident—that is, they do not require independent proof.
- "The truth of a true definition, like the truth of any true idea, is something it wears on its sleeve."
"He, who has a true idea, simultaneously knows that he has a true idea, and cannot doubt of the truth of the thing perceived."

Three characteristics

- (3) Axioms are self-evident, but definitions can acquire support from the consequences derived from them.
This is a theoretical difference between definitions and axioms according to some interpreters.

Is the distinction between definitions and axioms arbitrary?

- For instance: the eighth definition of Part One "By 'eternity' I mean existence itself, in so far as it is conceived necessarily follow solely from the definition of that which is eternal."
- Why not an axiom?
"If the existence of a thing can be conceived to follow necessarily from its definition, then that thing is eternal." (Nadler, p. 50)

Propositions

What propositions stand for?

- They are the meat of Spinoza's system—259 in number—consisting of ontology, epistemology, psychology, political philosophy, and ethics.
- Nadler claims that, although Spinoza may have thought that the definitions and axioms are self-evident to the attentive and rational mind, he most certainly did not believe this to be true of the propositions as well.

Propositions with certainty

- All of Spinoza's propositions are accompanied by a demonstration to establish their truth, not just with a high degree of probability but with absolute and objective certainty.
- Spinoza does not pretend to offer merely a valid argument for an internally consistent set of claims. Rather, he believes that the *Ethics* represents a sound argument for what is the philosophical truth.

A priori system?

- Nadler indicates, "Although the geometric format serves well to capture the rigorously deductive nature of Spinoza's reasoning, it should not be mistaken for an *a priori* argument. Many of the elements...have an empirical origin, either in the senses or in the imagination; and it certainly should not be thought that Spinoza believed that he could logically deduce the actual state of the world at a given time from his first principles alone."

MAIN THEMES OF THE *ETHICS*

The intellectual revolution

- In Spinoza's works we see the most important characteristics of the Enlightenment and of modernity itself in clear relief. The powers that be were not wrong in thinking that these writings represented a threat to them, for in many ways Spinoza represented the future, and the future was not friendly to their conservative interests.

Other thinkers in the *Ethics*

- The geometric format obscures the extent to which Spinoza is addressing issues that had been raised by previous philosophers.
- We can see the signs of the ancient Stoics in his ethical doctrines and traces of Hobbes in his political theory, and, of course, those of the one who influenced him the most, namely, Descartes.

Spinoza vs. Cartesian

- Descartes' ideas influenced Spinoza's *Ethics* profoundly, but this influence does not show up as widespread agreement with Descartes on some of the most central issues in philosophy.
- The main themes of the *Ethics* can be seen as responses to and correctives for what Spinoza took to be fundamental errors in the new Cartesian philosophy.

God

The different account of God

- God plays a absolutely central role in Spinoza's philosophical system, which is common to the medieval philosophy and of Descartes' new system.
- The unusual part is that he develops and defends a wholly novel account of what God is.
- He argues that God must encompass everything that exists.

The delineation

- The first 15 propositions of the first part of the *Ethics* employ abstract metaphysical terms widely used by philosophers in the seventeenth century to present a rational argument that this God must exist and that only this God can possibly exist.
- The most famous Appendix of this part explains why the nature of God has been so widely misunderstood through the ages.

Impersonality

- If God is identical with all of nature, then God clearly does not have any of the personal, human-like characteristics attributed to God in the Judaeo-Christian tradition.
- He made it clear that in order to gain an adequate understanding of God and of human being's place in the world the reader will have to recognise the falsity of the traditional anthropomorphic *personal* conception of God.

Universal causal determinism

If God is Nature...

- If all things are parts of God, then a corollary of this idea is that all things in nature fit together in an orderly and structured whole.
- According to Spinoza, this is a causal order—things and events are caused by other things and events in accordance with the laws of nature (which might also be called the structuring principles of the divine Being).

Two objections to causal determinism

- Causal determinism seemed to pose a threat to certain religious and moral doctrines.
- First, religious doctrines: If every event in nature is caused by a prior event, in accordance with the laws of nature, there seem to be no place for the miracles attested to in the Bible.
- It is not surprising that Spinoza rejected miracles of the supernatural kind.

Two objections to causal determinism

- Second, the objection comes from those who concerned about the ethical implications.
- If every thing and every occurrence in nature is the necessary result of prior causes, then human actions must also be causally determined. This seems to rule out human free will, and that would seem to undermine our notions of moral responsibility.

Descartes' dualism

- Descartes had found this implication so troubling that he ultimately rejected determinism and held a dualist view regarding mind and world.
- Human mind possesses a free will that is not subject to the laws of nature and the decisions and actions results from this will are products of completely free and unconditioned choice.

Freedom

- For Spinoza the same causal laws govern all natural events, including human beings and their actions that are parts of nature.
- He accepts the implication of his causal determinism that there is no free will. But he argues in the latter part of the *Ethics* that there is a more important and more valuable kind of freedom that can be achieved by human beings by means of understanding ourselves as parts of nature.

Mind and body

Descartes' dualism again

- Descartes was interested in and supportive of the new natural sciences of mechanics, optics and astronomy, so he wanted to grant that there is universal causation in the world. But human man on the other hand is a totally different thing.
- Material substance vs. mental substance

Spinoza's rejection

- According to Spinoza, the mental and the physical are not two different kinds of things, but rather two different ways of understanding and describing one single thing.
- In the remainder of Part two Spinoza makes use of his theory of the identity of mind and body in explaining how we can acquire knowledge of ourselves and the world.

A Bird's Eye View

'ethics'

- The book *Ethics* is of course concerning ethics, but the word is used more in its ancient sense.
- When Aristotle, the Stoics, or the Epicureans pondered about the subject, they were seeking to discover what is the best kind of life for a human being, and how we can live that kind of life.

The approach

- Spinoza emphasises the importance of knowledge, which is understandable, and more specifically self-knowledge, for achieving the good life.
- But as human beings a part and product of nature, in order to understand ourselves we must understand the basic principles of nature.

The structure

- The *Ethics* consist of five parts.
- Part one deals with God or Nature and how the world of finite things follows from the infinite and eternal God.
- Part two introduces the human mind, explicating how we come to know, and how we so often go astray in our thinking.

The structure

- Part three is devoted to developing a detailed theory of emotions.
- Part four explains what kind of emotional life is conducive to a life of strength and happiness.
- Part five teaches us how reason and understanding can help to overcome destructive passions, and even provide a kind of *blessedness* and *salvation*.

The geometrical method

- In Part one, Spinoza spends the first ten propositions in elaborating on the notion of substance, and then in Proposition 11 he brings God back in by claiming that God is identical to the substance.
- Why proceed in this way?
- For notational reason, hereafter 'I-D-n' means a certain definition, 'I-A-n' a certain axiom, and 'I-P-n' a certain proposition in Part one.

The geometrical method

- Like Euclid's *Elements*, each proposition of the *Ethics* receives the deductive certainty from the initial premises—either the definitions, the axioms, or previously proved propositions.
- In the case of geometry, we eventually arrive at the ultimate starting points from which all else follows—the definitions and axioms that require no further justification.

The geometrical method

- If Spinoza's philosophical account of reality is to have the same kind of rational intelligibility as geometry, there must be a starting point for the system—something that requires no further cause in order to exist and requires no further explanation in order to be understood.
- This is the starting point required for reality to be rationally intelligible.

The concept of substance

- Spinoza's definition of substance (I-D-4) includes two kinds of claims which correspond relatively to the two underlined phrases in the last slice—an ontological claim and a conceptual claim.
- Ontological dependence:
That a thing B is *in* a thing A is to say that B is ontologically dependent on A.

The concept of substance

- In order to think of a sharp knife, one must think of a knife, but not the other way round.
- Conceptual dependence:
This kind of relationship can be called a conceptual dependence.
Sharpness is conceptually dependent on knives (and knives on matter).

Propositions I-XV

The startling conclusion

- God and Nature are one and the same thing.
- Rather than speaking of 'God and Nature', we should say 'God or Nature'.
- 'God' and 'Nature' are two co-referential words.

The startling conclusion

- What does Spinoza mean?
- Is God the whole of Nature?
Is God only certain universal aspects of Nature?
Is God somehow hidden within Nature but nonetheless distinct from it?
- His partisans are in favour of the most pious theism of Western philosophy—God is to be found everywhere.

The startling conclusion

- But the critics of his contemporaries, the ecclesiastic opponents, opted for the reading that he is offering a devious atheism, condemned him for blasphemy—God is reduced to nothing more than Nature.
- Nevertheless, Spinoza's goal in the first fifteen propositions of Part one is to establish that God is the unique, infinite, necessarily existing (self-caused) substance of the universe.

SUBSTANCE, ATTRIBUTE, AND MODE

substance

- I-D-3:
By 'substance' I mean that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself: in other words, that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other conceptions.
- Aristotelian concept: the ultimate subject of predication which is itself not predicated of anything, or to which properties belong but which is itself not a property of something else.

substance

- Cartesian concept: the subject and sustainer of properties that is not itself the property of something else.
- Strictly speaking, for Descartes, only God is a substance.
He is nevertheless willing to grant that finite, created things (such as souls) are substances in an *equivocal* or secondary sense.

attribute

- I-D-4:
By 'attribute' I mean that which the intellect perceives as constituting the essence of substance.
- The attribute of a substance, as its essence, is the determinable nature of which all of the particular properties of the thing are determinate manifestation.

attribute

- I-P-2:
Two substances, whose attributes are different, have nothing in common.
- Two questions are raised by the definition of attribute:
(1) Is there a genuine distinction between substance and attribute?
(2) Is an attribute a perspective of the intellect?

substance or attribute?

- (1) Is the substance some natureless thing or substratum underlying the attribute, or is it simply the attribute itself?
- For Descartes, his considered position is that while there is a conceptual distinction between substance and attribute, there is not a real distinction between them.
- 'attribute': The intellect perceives as constituting the essence of substance. (I-D-4)

substance or attribute?

- Spinoza also identifies a substance with its attribute.
- I-P-4—the proof:
"...Nothing is, therefore, given besides the understanding, by which several things may be distinguished one from the other, except the substance, or, in other words...their attributes and modifications."

substance or attribute?

- (2) Is an attribute a perspective of the intellect?
- I-D-4:
By 'attribute' I mean that which the intellect perceives as constituting the essence of substance.
- Is an attribute a real thing (objectivist) or rather simply a way of perceiving things (subjectivist).

mode

- I-D-5:
By 'mode' I mean the modifications (affections) of substance, or that which exists in, and is conceived through, something other than itself.
- The modes of a thing are concrete manifestations of the attribute or nature constituting that thing.

mode

- I-P-1:
Substance is by nature prior to its modifications.
- What Spinoza has in mind in this are both the ontological and the epistemological priority of substance over its modes, since modes are dependent upon the substance to which they belong for their being and their being understood.

Causal necessitarianism

- I-A-3:
From a given definite cause an effect necessarily follows; and, on the other hand, if no definite cause be granted, it is impossible that an effect can follow.
- The first part of it is causal necessitarianism: the relationship between a cause and its effect is a necessary one.

Causal rationalism

- I-A-4:
The knowledge of an effect depends on and involves the knowledge of a cause.
- Causal rationalism:
To know something is to understand how it came about and why it is as it is and not otherwise. That is, to know something is to know its aetiological history, to have a sufficient explanation of it in causal terms.

causality

- The notion of causation nowadays is different from Spinoza's in the sense that we think of the cause as occurring before the effect.
- The nature of a triangle is such that its angles always add up to 180 degrees. Spinoza would say that the nature of a triangle causes it to be true that the angles equal 180 degrees. No time relationship involves here.

I-P-5

The overview of the argument of I-P-1 to I-P-15

- (1) Spinoza will establish that there cannot be two or more substances having the same nature or attribute (I-P-1~5).
- (2) He will then prove that there necessarily is a substance with infinite (all possible) attributes, namely, God (I-P-6~11).
- (3) In conclusion, it follows that the existence of that infinite substance precludes the existence of any other substance (I-P-12~15).

The key premise

- I-P-5:
There cannot be two or more substances of the same nature.
- For any nature, *a*, there can only be one substance possess *a*—that is, no two substances belong to the kind *a*.

How to distinguish and individuate things?

- This is what the proof of I-P-5 relies on.
- If there are two distinct substances, then we need ways to distinguish one from the other. Therefore, if all ways are denied, then there cannot be more than one substance of each kind.
- Two ways of distinguishing: by their underlying nature (their attributes) or by their properties (modes or affections) that express those attributes.

Leibniz's criticism on the first way

- Spinoza assumes that if two substances have an attribute in common, then they cannot be distinguished from each other by their attributes.
- Leibniz thinks that this reasoning is valid only if one is also assuming that a substance cannot have more than one attribute.

Leibniz's criticism on the first way

- Leibniz is certainly correct on this criticism. And it is Descartes who commits to this view.
- Although Spinoza can hold this principle, it would be problematic when he soon claim in I-P-9 that substance can have many—infinite—attributes.

The second way

- Substances can be distinguished by their accidental characteristics—the modes or affections expressing their attributes.

The second way

- "...If by the difference of their modifications—as substance is naturally prior to its modifications (I-P-1)—it follows from that **setting the modifications aside**, and considering substance in itself, that is truly, (I-D-3 & 5), there cannot be conceived one substance different from another—that is (by I-P-4), there cannot be granted several substances, but one substance only."

SUBSTANCES ARE NECESSARILY EXISTING, ETERNAL, AND INFINITE

I-P-6

- "One substance cannot be produced by another substance."
- Two things can be causally related only when they have something in common. (cf. I-P-3)
- According to Spinoza's causal rationalism (cf. slice 27), if one thing is the effect of another, then the former must be able to be understood through the latter.

I-P-6

- But I-P-5 establishes that no two substances have the same attribute.
- A second argument of this proposition is in the corollary to I-P-6:
"For if substance be produced by an external cause [—that is, produced by another substance], the knowledge of it would depend on the knowledge of the cause (I-A-4), and (by I-D-3), it would itself not be substance."

The ontological argument

- I-P-7:
Existence belongs to the nature of substances.
- The proof:
Substance cannot be produced by anything external (corollary to I-P-6), it must, therefore, be its own cause—that is, its essence necessarily involve existence, or existence belongs to its nature.

The problems of the ontological argument

- Two readings of "Substance necessarily exists"
- First, if this is predication—that is, if 'exist' is a predicate—then this begs the question by presupposing the existence of substance.
- Second, if this is a definition—that is, if Substance exists, then it exists necessarily—then this does not guarantee that substance does exist.
- $\alpha(P, x, P, x \dots P, x) (= \mu)$

The problems of the ontological argument

- There is a special case of something more general, namely: *the thing satisfying such and such condition, satisfies that very condition.*
- This calls *the characterisation principle (CP)*—a thing has those properties by which it is characterised.
- If we paraphrase ' $\alpha(P, x, P, x \dots P, x)$ ' as ' μ ', then what CP says is that " $P, \mu, P, \mu \dots P, \mu$ " is true.

Infinite and absolutely infinite

- I-D-2:
A thing is called 'finite after its kind' when it can be limited by another thing of the same nature....
- I-D-6:
By 'God' I mean a being absolutely infinite—that is, a substance consisting in infinite attributes, of which each express eternal and infinite essentiality.

The infinitude of substance

- I-P-8:
Every substance is necessarily infinite.
- In the proof, Spinoza first argues that a substance cannot be finite, for this means that it can be limited by something with the same nature. But according to I-P-5, no two substances have the same nature, therefore it cannot be limited and thus is infinite.

Infinite attributes

- For Spinoza, an infinite substance will have infinite attributes or natures, that is, all possible attributes or natures.
- Each attribute is infinite in its own kind, since there is no other attribute like it to limit it. Substance itself, however, is absolutely infinite, and thus possesses an (absolute) infinity of attributes, each of which is infinite in its own kind.

Infinite substance and infinite attributes

- Although each of these attributes or natures is or exists *in itself* and is conceivable by itself and independently of any other attribute or nature, it is not the case that each attribute is a distinct substance.
- If substance is (absolutely) infinite, then it has infinite natures or attributes.

Substance as complex whole can be divided?

- Substance is not an aggregate or complex whole of which the attributes are parts into which it can be divided.
- I-P-12:
No attributes of substance can be conceived from which it would follow that substance can be divided.
- I-P-13:
Substance absolutely infinite is indivisible.

Indivisible totality of attributes

- The attributes are elements making up the absolutely infinite substance, but none can be removed or separated from the totality that is the substance itself, not even in principle.
- Each attribute is in itself and is conceived through itself. But for Spinoza this implies that each attribute necessarily exists, and from this it follows that no attribute could exist without the others.

The problem of identifying substance with God

- In discussing I-P-5, we mention Leibniz's criticism on Spinoza, that no two substances have the same attribute only if every substance has just one single attribute.
- The division of an absolute infinite substance could be understood as divided into substances each of which is infinite in its own kind—that is, each with its own single attribute—and this is not ruled out by I-P-8.

EXCEPT GOD, NO SUBSTANCE CAN BE OR BE CONCEIVED

The appearance of 'God'

- From the first ten propositions of the *Ethics*, nothing theologically bold even gives any hint. All of them are concerning basic metaphysical categories.
- I-P-11: God, or substance, consisting of infinite attributes, of which each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality, necessarily exists.

The first proof out of three

- The first proof takes the ontological proof for the existence of substance and transforms it into a proof for God's existence simply by substituting 'God' for 'substance', a substitution permitted by the definition of God as an infinite substance.

The second proof

- It argues to the claim that God necessarily exists and similarly relies on what has already been established about substance, along with the principle of sufficient reason—that is, for everything there must be a cause or reason why it either exists or does not exist, and this cause or reason must lie either in the nature of the thing or outside it.

The third proof

- This is different from the first two in the sense that it is *a posteriori*—taking as one of its premises the claim that we actually exist.
- (1) To be able to exist is to have power; to be able not to exist is to lack power.
- (2) If something exists, then it necessarily exists, either because it is necessary in itself or because its existence is necessitated by some external cause.

The third proof

- (3) If finite beings presently (necessarily) exist but an absolutely infinite being does not, then finite beings would be more powerful than an absolutely infinite being.
- (4) But it is absurd to think that finite beings are more powerful than an absolutely infinite being. So either nothing presently exists or an absolutely infinite being also presently exists. Since it is clear that the first disjunct is false, an absolutely infinite being—God—necessarily exists.

God as...

- Everything is in place for Spinoza to establish that God is the *only* substance in Nature.
- God is just the one, necessarily existing, eternal, infinite substance of Nature (I-P-14), and that everything else is *in* this substance, which he calls God or Nature (I-P-15).

I-P-14

- Besides God no substance can be granted or conceived.
- This directly follows from I-P-5 (no substances have the same attribute) and I-P-11 (there is a substance with infinite attributes).
- I-P-5 (1), I-P-7—necessary existence is an attribute (2), I-P-8 (3), I-P-11 (4), I-P-13 (5) and Leibniz's criticism to I-P-5 (6) = I-P-14?

I-P-15

- Whatsoever is, is in God, and without God nothing can be, or be conceived.
- (1) Modes or affections, by definition, must exist in and be conceived through the substance which they modify.
- (2) There is and can be nothing that is neither a substance nor a mode.

I-P-15

- (3) But because God is the only substance, whatever else exists besides God must be a mode, and therefore must exist in God.

GOD AS FIRST CAUSE OF ALL

I-P-15

- Whatsoever is, is in God, and without God nothing can be, or be conceived.
- Ontological dependence and causation.
- Things (or modes) are entirely dependent upon God; things are nothing but certain finite ways the divine substance is configured.
- For instance, a stone and the attribute of Extension.

Modes and attributes again

- It makes more sense if we remember that extension, as an attribute, is a way that we perceive the essence of God.
- God is power—power that expresses itself in an active way as the world around us.
- For Spinoza, there are uniform law-like regularities (the laws of extended nature) in accordance with which the power of God is expressed through the attribute of extension.

The necessity of the divine nature

- I-P-16:
From the necessity of the divine nature must follow an infinite number of things in infinite ways—that is all things which can fall within the sphere of infinite intellect.
- Spinoza does not say that from God's nature these things will or do follow, but from the necessity of God they must follow.

God acts...

- I-P-17:
God acts solely by the laws of his own nature, and is not constrained by anyone.
- In Spinoza's terminology, to say that God acts is just to say that things follow from the structured power which is the divine nature.

God is a free cause?

- God is the only truly free cause.
- I-D-7:
That thing is called 'free,' which exists solely by the necessity of its own nature, and of which the action is determined by itself alone. On the other hand, that thing is necessary, or rather constrained, which is determined by something external to itself to a fixed and definite method of existence or action.

Freedom?

- The Note to I-P-17:
"Others think that God is a free cause, because he can, as they think, bring it about, that those things which we have said follow from his nature—that is, which are in his power, should not come to pass, or should not be produced by him..."

Freedom?

- "But this is the same as if they said, that God could bring it about, that it should follow from the nature of a triangle that its three interior angles should not be equal to two right angles; or that from a given cause no effect should follow, which is absurd."
- By assigning a will to God, theologians argue about which is more basic—his intellect or his will. Spinoza thinks this is a pseudo question.

God as the immanent cause

- I-P-18:
God is the indwelling and not the transient cause of all things.
- To say that God is the immanent cause is to say that things are produced *in God by God*, and that they remain in God as the divine power that produced them remains in them.

THE INFINITE MODE

the immediate infinite mode

- I-P-21:
All things which follow from the absolute nature of any attribute of God must always exist and be infinite, or in other words, are eternal and infinite through the said attribute.
- The distinction between immediately and mediately following from the absolute nature of God's attributes.

the immediate infinite mode

- I-P-22:
Whatever follows from any attribute of God, in so far as it is modified by a modification, which exists necessarily and as infinite, through the said attribute, must also exist necessarily and as infinite.

the immediate infinite mode

- I-P-23:
Every mode, which exists both necessarily and as infinite, must necessarily follow either from the absolute nature of some attribute of God, or from an attribute modified by a modification which exists necessarily, and as infinite.

Thought

- (1) Under the attribute of thought, the immediate infinite mode is absolutely infinite intellect.
- (2) For Spinoza, the intellect consists of ideas (of thinkings of things).
- Therefore, the absolutely infinite intellect consists of the infinite ideas of everything that there is.

Extension

- According to Spinoza, the immediate infinite mode of extension is motion and rest.
- Perhaps it is that the power that is extension is immediately expressed as an infinity of things in motion and at rest.
- We can think of it as a way in which motion and rest occur always and everywhere throughout extended nature.

Curley's interpretation

- Curley suggests us to think of the infinite mode along the lines of the laws of nature.
- So when Spinoza speaks of 'motion and rest' as the immediate infinite and eternal mode under the attribute of extension, the term 'motion and rest' is a stand-in for the most general laws of physics.

MODES AS DEPENDENT ON GOD

No existence of any mode in virtue of its own essence

- I-P-24:
The essence of things produced by God does not involve existence.
- Even the infinite and eternal modes that we have been discussing, which do indeed exist eternally, do so not in virtue of their own essence or power, but in virtue of the power of God from which they follow with timeless necessity.

God as the efficient cause

- I-P-25:
God is the efficient cause not only of the existence of things, but also of their essence.
- Corollary:
Individual things are nothing but modifications of the attributes of God, or modes by which the attributes of God are expressed in a fixed and definite manner.

God as the efficient cause

- I-P-26:
A thing which is conditioned to act in a particular manner, has necessarily been thus conditioned by God; and that which has not been conditioned by God cannot condition itself to act.
- That is, whatever characteristics, and also whatever causal power a thing might have, follow from God.

God as the efficient cause

- I-P-27:
A thing, which has been conditioned by God to act in a particular way, cannot render itself unconditioned.
- It is clear that a mode cannot, as it were, resist the power of God by failing or refusing to do that which it is causally determined to do.

FINITE AND DETERMINATE MODES

Finite modes

- I-P-28:
Every individual thing, or everything which is finite and has a conditioned existence, cannot exist or be conditioned to act, unless it be conditioned for existence and action by a cause other than itself, which also finite, and has a conditioned existence; ...

Finite modes

- ... and likewise this cause cannot in its turn exist, or be conditioned to act, unless it be conditioned for existence and action by another cause, which also is finite, and has a conditioned existence and so on to infinity.
- According to I-P-21 and I-P-22, these finite things must be determined to exist and to act by another finite thing.

Curley's another interpretation

- Two types of modes:
How are them related to each other, and how does each play a role in the production of reality as we know it?
- The infinite and eternal modes are omnipresent nomological regularities of the workings of nature—law-like ways in which God/Nature always and everywhere acts.

The example

- In discussing a causation, consider a billiard ball, say, number 8 in motion across the table.
- This moving number-8-ball is a finite mode of extension, and by virtue of its motion it is capable of setting other balls in motion as well. This ball must have been set in motion by, say, the cue ball.
- The cue-ball collided the number-8-ball.

Two causal series

- The two causal series' at work in Spinoza's theory—the **vertical** and the **horizontal** orders of causations.
- The vertical order begins with the attribute: From the structured power that is the attribute, say, extension, follow certain law-like ways in which the power of God/Nature is always and everywhere expressed.

Two causal series

- The horizontal order of the interactions of the endless series of finite things is in turn conditioned and governed by these regularities.

DETERMINISM AND GOD

Universal causal determinism

- I-P-29:
Nothing in the universe is contingent, but all things are conditioned to exist and operate in a particular manner by the necessity of the divine nature.
- Perhaps the iteration of his point results from his fear of that some will continue to think in terms of God choosing to exercise his power by an act of divine will.

natura naturans and *natura naturata*

- In the Note of I-P-29:
1. nature viewed as **active** (*natura naturans*): Which is in itself and conceived through itself.
2. nature viewed as **passive** (*natura naturata*): Which follows from the necessity of the nature of God, or of any of the attributes of God...in so far as they are considered as things which are in God, and which without God cannot exist or be conceived.

An analogy

- Think of God's activity along the lines of a dance.
- Dancing → a structured activity
↳ a dance
The thing (a dance) is both the result of the activity (dancing) and identical with the activity (dancing).

No divine will

- I-P-31:
The intellect in function, whether finite or infinite, as will, desire, love, &c., should be referred to passive nature and not to active nature.
- Specific thoughts and volitions (whether in God or in us) are modes of the attribute of thinking and must be ascribed to the **produced** side of things (*natura naturata*).

No divine will

- According to Spinoza, the will consists of individual volitions, and each of these volitions is a finite mode, determined to be what it is by other finite modes and by the laws of the attribute of thought.
- I-P-32: Will cannot be a free cause, but only a necessary cause.

Uncompromisingly deterministic position

- I-P-33: Things could not have been brought into being by God in any manner or in any order different from that which has in fact obtained.
- Since all things follow from the nature of God, if it were possible for things to have been produced in another way, it would have to be possible for God to have had a different nature.

COULD GOD HAVE DONE OTHERWISE?

The biblical account of creation

- An account that is rejected by Spinoza as an anthropomorphic figment of an ancient writer's imagination.
- More thoughtful and philosophically sophisticated thinkers had held that God could have produced a different world.

Descartes

- He held that God created everything by an act of his radically free and unconstrained will.
- According to this view God could have made it the case that even the laws of logic or mathematics were different if he had so chosen.
- Spinoza sees this as literally unthinkable.

Leibniz

- He develops a view according to which God chose among a number of possible worlds the best one to create.
- This is because of God's divine perfection.
- Spinoza rejects this view, for it assumes that there is a standard of goodness, independent of and prior to God, to which God looks in deciding what to do.

The mistake

- All of these views are misguided, and that they ultimately derive from an erroneous conception of the nature of God and of his creative activity.
- So long as we think of God as having human-like psychological characteristics—thinking of God as making choices and decisions—we will mistakenly imagine that the world might have been different from the way it is.

The cure

- Only when we realise that the divine nature is what it must be, given that it is substance, and that the world follows from the divine nature with the same necessity as it follows from the nature of a triangle that its angles total 180 degrees, will we rightly understand God.

Slice 57

- I-P-5 (1), I-P-7—necessary existence is an attribute (2), I-P-8 (3), I-P-11 (4), I-P-13 (5) and Leibniz's criticism to I-P-5 (6) = I-P-14?
(6) → (1)
 $(1) + (3) + (6) \rightarrow -(4)$
 $\hookrightarrow \rightarrow \rightarrow (4??) \textcircled{B}$
(1) + (4) → (5)
(4) + (5) → -(6)
• (2) → -(6); (2) → (4) & (5); but -(2)!!!

Part II

On the Nature and the Origin of the Mind

Introduction

The conclusion of Part I

- The broad metaphysical picture:
"Everything that belongs to a single, necessarily existing, infinite substance, a unique and all-encompassing system outside of which there is nothing and whose own internal power and principles immanently bring about all things with an absolute or mathematical necessity." (Nadler, 122)

Spinoza's ultimate goal

- How is it possible for human happiness to be in a deterministic universe?
- Spinoza's anthropology: the opposition to any kind of 'dominion within a dominion'.

The preface

- "I now pass on to explaining the results, which must necessarily follow from the essence of God, or of the eternal and infinite being; not, indeed, all of them (for we proved in Part I, [I-P-16], that an infinite number must follow in an infinite number of ways), but only those which are able to lead us, as it were by the hand, to the knowledge of the human mind and its highest blessedness."

The first thirteen propositions

- This is the first section of Part II: Dealing in a systematic way with the relationship between the attribute of extension and the attribute of thinking.
- The first ten propositions give an analysis of the general relation.
- II-P-11~13 in turn apply the above general point to the human mind and body.

Uncharacteristic informality

- In II-P-11, Spinoza addresses the reader with uncharacteristic informality.
- In the Note of it, "Here, I doubt not, readers will come to a stand, and will call to mind many things which will cause them to hesitate; I therefore beg them to accompany me slowly, step by step, and not to pronounce on my statements, till they have read to the end."

Parallelism and mind/body problem

- The relationship between the finite modes of all attributes is parallel—what Spinoza's so-called **parallelism**.
- In II-P-10, Spinoza argues that the human being is not a substance in its own right.
- The remarkable part is the notion that the human mind is nothing but the *idea* of the human body.

Parallelism

CARTESIAN MIND/BODY PROBLEM

Cartesian model

- Descartes' model is the most well-known model, holding existent two types of created, finite substance—extended and mental substances.
- Except being capable of thinking, the mental substance is capable of determining itself to act.

The mind/body interaction

- How can a mental substance with no feature physical whatsoever has any relation to an extended substance which is with no feature mental whatsoever?
- Descartes apparently has to set up something which can move and be moved by both directions.

The pineal gland

- Descartes hypothesised that in brain there is a tiny, easily movable organ called the *pineal gland*.
- It is so sensitive that it can be moved by thoughts, even though thought is not physical at all, and similarly the thought can be moved by its being moved by some physical causes.

Spinoza's additional objection

- It is clear why Spinoza rejects this dichotomy between mind and body.
- He has proven that there can be only one substance—the infinite and eternal God.
- Human mind in its volitional aspect cannot be self-determined.
- But then what are the mind and the body, if they are not substances?

PROPOSITIONS I-XI

Why only thought and extension are conceivable?

- Except the existence of infinitely many unknown attributes is one of the most mysterious aspects of Spinoza's system, he actually does have an answer to it.
- But we have to first look at the nature of the human mind and its power in order to get a clear understanding of the answer.

ideas

- II-D-3:
By 'idea,' I mean the mental conception which is formed by the mind as a thinking thing.
- These ideas in Thought are not necessarily the familiar psychological contents of our own mental lives.
- The first and foremost are God's ideas or God's singular thoughts of things.

The uniqueness of Thought

- Thinking is always thinking of something.
→ intentionality
- Based on this, the modes of Thought can be distinguished from other modes of all the rest attributes.

Formal and objective existence

- II-P-7 (corollary):
 "...whatsoever follows from the infinite nature of God in the world of extension (formaliter), follows without exception in the same order and connection from the idea of God in the world of thought (objective)."
- All other modes exist objectively or are contained objectively in ideas.

114

II-P-1

- Thought is an attribute of God, or God is a thinking thing.
- Thought is seen as an attribute of God and singular thoughts or ideas as modes of it—as specific ways in which the one power of thinking can be expressed.

115

II-P-2

- Extension is an attribute of God, or God is an extended thing.
- Spinoza sees extension as an attribute and sees individual extended things as modes of it—as specific ways in which the one divine power acts extendedly in accordance with the laws of extensions.

116

II-P-3

- In God there is necessarily the idea not only of its essence, but also of all things which necessarily follow from his essence.
- What is an *idea* though?
- Idea is of a *state of affair*—thinking-that-it-is-the-case.

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What a difficult *idea*!

- II-P-3, DEM:
 God (by II-P-1) can think an infinite number of things in infinite ways, or (what is the same thing, by I-P-16) can form the idea of his essence, and of all things which necessarily follow therefrom. Now all that is in the power of God necessarily is (I-P-35). Therefore, such an idea as we are considering necessarily is, and in God alone. QED (I-P-15)

119

What a difficult *idea*!

- The modes in the other attributes are mirrored in the modes of Thought (ideas) that have them as their objects.
- Infinite number of things in infinite ways?
 Thought Extension X Y ...
 idea-of-*a* body *a* X(*a*) Y(*a*) ...

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What a difficult *idea*!

- For each individual mode *m* of each attribute, there is an exclusive corresponding individual mode of Thought, a correlative idea in God's infinite intellect, that has *m* as its object.
 Thought Extension X Y ...
 idea of body *a* body *a* X(*a*) Y(*a*) ...
 idea of X(*a*)
 idea of Y(*a*)
 ... (including an idea of the idea of body *a*...)

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II-P-5

- The actual being of ideas owns God as its cause, only in so far as he is considered as a thinking thing, not in so far as he is unfolded in any other attributes of God and of particular things do not own as their efficient cause their objects (ideata) or the things perceived, but God himself in so far as he is a thinking thing.

122

II-P-6

- The modes of any given attribute are caused by God, in so far as considered through the attribute of which they are modes, and not in so far as he is considered through any other attribute.

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II-P-6

- Corollary—Hence the actual being of things, which are not modes of thought, does not follow from the divine nature, because that nature has prior knowledge of the things. Things represented in ideas follow, and are derived from their particular attribute, in the same manner, and with the same necessity as ideas follow (according to what we have shown) from the attribute of thought.

II-P-7 (parallelism)

- The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things.
- Running parallel to each other, matched up at every point, for every idea there is an exactly corresponding mode of extension (or other modes of other attributes) (the *ideatum* of the idea).
- But are there *two* separate series of *distinct* things running parallel with one another?

All the modes of Thought?

- Spinoza sometimes speaks of all the modes of Thought taken together as the 'divine intellect' or 'the mind of God'.
- Thought Extension X Y ...
idea of body *a* body *a* X(*a*) Y(*a*) ...
idea of X(*a*)
idea of Y(*a*)
... (including an idea of the idea of body *a*...)

Only one series of modes

- A metaphysical ground of parallelism: Ultimately everything is an expression of the power of one and the same substance, a stance from which there must follow infinitely many things in infinitely many modes.
- For instance (II-P-7, Note), a circle existing in nature, and the idea of a circle existing, which is also in God, are one and the same thing displayed through different attributes.

II-P-7, Note

- "Thus, whether we conceive nature under the attribute of extension, or under the attribute of thought, or under any other attribute, we shall find the same order, or one and the same chain of causes—that is, the same things following in either case."
- 1. 'conceive'?
- 2. one and the same chain of causes?

Why only one and the same chain of cause?

- The denial of trans-attribute causality is established by his epistemology of causation. When one thing is the cause of another, the latter cannot be conceived without the former (I-A-4). Now the mode of any attribute is conceived through the attribute of which it is a mode and not through any other attribute, and each attribute is conceived only through itself and not through any other. (Nadler, p. 132-3)

II-P-8

- The ideas of particular things, or of modes, that do not exist, must be comprehended in the infinite idea of God, in the same way as the formal essences of particular things or modes are contained in the attributes of God.
- If there is a perfect parallel between the infinite series of ideas and extended things, then why do we still have ideas of, say, eohippus or other distinct things?

II-P-9

- The idea of an individual thing actually existing is caused by God, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he is considered as affected by another idea of a thing actually existing, of which he is the cause, in so far as he is affected by a third idea, and so on to infinity.

II-P-10

- The being of substance does not appertain to the essence of man—in other words, substance does not constitute the actual being (forma) of man.
- Is Spinoza claiming that it is not determined, one way or the other, whether or not a specific individual man exists?