

教育部人文社會學科學術強化創新計畫

【女性主義現象學經典研讀】

期中報告

年度成果總報告

補助單位：教育部顧問室

計畫類別：經典研讀課程

經典研讀活動

執行單位：真理大學英美語文學系

計畫主持人：葉雅茹助理教授

執行期程：99/08/01~100/01/31

日期：中華民國 100 年 1 月 31 日

一、計畫名稱：

女性主義現象學經典研讀

二、計畫目標：

本計畫希望透過相關著作之研讀，檢視女性主義現象學對於身體的思考角度有何特殊之處，以女性身體經驗為基礎思考，理解身體個別之特殊性與實質差異。因此本計畫目標有三：一為落實女性主義理論教學或研究層面的完整性；二為強化研讀成員對於女性主義現象學中的身體理論與實際經驗關懷；三為嘗試開啟女性主義現象學理論學家在身體社會研究或性別論述中的重要性。以此三者為目標，本計畫將研讀女性身體與空間理論，關切女性身體在不同情境之下如何發展出個別的身體經驗。

三、導讀：

1. 第一場讀書會

日期：99/9/25

主讀人：葉雅茹

主讀範圍：Fisher, Linda. “Feminist Phenomenology”; “Phenomenology and Feminism: Perspectives on Their Relation.” *Feminist Phenomenology*.

2. 第二場讀書會

日期：99/9/25

主讀人：蘇秋華

主讀範圍：Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. Excerpts from “The Body.” *The Phenomenology of Perception*.

3. 第三場讀書會

日期：99/10/30

主讀人：王念英

主讀範圍：Grosz, Elizabeth. “Refiguring Bodies.” *Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism*.

4. 第四場讀書會

日期：99/10/30

主讀人：施懿芹

主讀範圍：Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. “The Body in Its Sexual Being.” *The*

Phenomenology of Perception.

5. 第五場讀書會

日期：99/11/20

主讀人：李健美

主讀範圍：Beauvoir, Simone de. “Woman’s Situation and Character.” *The Second Sex.*

6. 第六場讀書會

日期：99/11/20

主讀人：談玉儀

主讀範圍：Moi, Toril. “What is a Woman? Sex, Gender, and the Body in Feminist Theory.” *What Is a Woman?: and Other Essays.*

7. 第七場讀書會

日期：99/12/18

主讀人：劉亞蘭

主讀範圍：Young, Iris Marion. “Introduction” ; “Lived Body vs. Gender: Reflection on Social Structure and Subjectivity.” *On Female Body Experience: “Throwing Like a Girl” and Other Essays.*

8. 第八場讀書會

日期：99/12/18

主讀人：王梅春

主讀範圍：Grosz, Elizabeth. “Lived Bodies: Phenomenology and the Flesh.” *Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism.*

9. 第九場讀書會

日期：100/1/22

主讀人：施懿芹

主讀範圍：Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. “The Spatiality of One’s Body and Motility.” *The Phenomenology of Perception.*

10. 第十場讀書會

日期：100/1/22

主讀人：張麗萍

主讀範圍：Young, Iris Marion. “Throwing Like a Girl: A Phenomenology of

Feminine Body Comportment, Motility, and Spatiality.” *On Female Body Experience: “Throwing Like a Girl” and Other Essays*.

四、研讀成果

第一場主讀綱要：Feminist Phenomenology by Linda Fisher

- I. Feminism and contemporary theoretical orientations
 1. Marxism
 2. Structuralism
 3. Psychoanalysis
 4. Deconstruction
 5. Post-modernism
 6. Phenomenology?
 - a. a skepticism on the part of feminists with regard to phenomenology
 - b. the possibility of a viable relation of feminism with phenomenology
- II. Why feminism and phenomenology are different projects
 1. Phenomenology represents a particular conceptual framework and approach
 2. The general absence in phenomenology of analyses of gender or sexual difference
- III. The issue: a feminist phenomenology or a phenomenological feminism (whether and how phenomenology is compatible with a feminist approach)

Phenomenology and Feminism: Perspectives on their Relation

- I. The putative incompatibility of feminism and phenomenology
 - A. Phenomenology as Masculinist
 1. Male-biased, masculinist: Merleau-Ponty
 2. Phenomenology as an instance of “male” philosophizing
- ↑
- The viability of developing a related but distinct phenomenology of women’s experience

B. Phenomenology as Essentialist

1. The concept “woman”
2. An alleged gender-neutrality
3. A male subject
4. Judith Bulter’s statements

↑

A careful and close reading of what phenomenology sets out to do

II. A feminist phenomenology or a phenomenological feminism

1. Commonality: commitment to descriptive and experiential analysis
2. Phenomenology for feminism: lived experience and situation
3. Feminism for phenomenology: sexual difference and specificity
4. Fusion of horizons: common ground, individual integrity
5. A situated, social, gendered subject

第二場主讀綱要：From Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception

Introduction to Merleau-Ponty’s idea of perception

A. Background

I. Husserl’s critique on modern science

- i. Absolute objectivity
- ii. Mathematicalization
- iii. abstraction

II. Merleau-Ponty’s critique on two methodologies of modern science

- i. Intellectualism
- ii. Empiricism

B. Perception

Body schema

纷 Capability = limited possibilities

纷 Meaning determined by the body

纷 Perception

纷 Corporeal sediment

纷 Learning

纷 The natural is always already habitual

C. Except from Phenomenology of Perception

Experience and Objective Thought. The Problem of the Body

纷 Habitation – knowing

The Body as Object and Mechanistic Physiology

纷 Phantom Limb

The Experience of the Body and Classical Psychology

纷 The double sensations of the body: écart

The Synthesis of One's own Body

纷 Bodily synthesis

#1099

My Cocoon tightens-Colors tease-

I'm feeling for the Air-

A dim capacity for Wings

Demeans the Dress I wear-

A power of Butterfly must be-

The Aptitude to fly

Meadows of Majesty implies

And easy Sweeps of Sky-

So I must baffle at the Hint

And cipher at the Sign

And make much blunder, if at least

I take the clue divine by

Emily Dickinson

第三場主讀綱要：Refiguring Bodies

Western philosophical thinking and contemporary feminist theory

Western tradition: Greek philosophy—Plato—Aristotle

Oppositional dichotomy: Mind / Body

Passion / Reason

Sense / Sensibility

Self / Other

Form / Matter

Reality / Appearance

Transcendence / Immanence

“The binarization of the sexes, the dichotomization of the world and of knowledge has

been effected already at the threshold of Western reason.”

Man—Mind—Reason Women—Body—Passion

The Christian tradition: Christ—the immortal soul and mortal body

Punishment and rewards for one’s soul are administered through corporeal pleasures and punishments.

Leprosy—a corporeal signifier of sin—lechery and covetousness

Dualism—Descartes

Substances

Intellect—Mind—Consciousness

Experience—Body—Movements

The separation of the natural sciences from the social sciences and humanities

Cartesianism: Three lines of investigation of modern philosophy

Natural sciences: biology and medicine

Social Sciences: philosophy, psychology, and ethnography

Both ignore the specificity of bodies in their researches

Refusing to acknowledge the complexities of organic bodies--

“...that bodies construct and in turn are constructed by an interior, a
psychical and a signifying view-point, a consciousness or perspective.”

The body as an instrument, a tool to be disposed of and possessed consciousness
a passive and reproductive object.

The body is a signifying medium, a vehicle of expression

Spinoza's Monism

Substance/Attributes Extension and thought—body and mind

“The Ethical Vision of the World”

What a body can do is what a mind can do

A body always goes as far as it can, so does a mind (to know God as

Nature the one and only substance)

“The body can't decide mind to thought, neither can the mind determine the
body determine the body to motion nor rest.”

Dismantling the oppositions between nature and culture, between essence and
social construction. “Bodies, individuals are historical social cultural
weavings of biology.”

Feminism and the Body

Reactions to the conceptions of femininity in term of women's bodies:

Essentialism—biological, corporeal, natural—femininity

Egalitarian Feminism

Biology is a problem

The specificities of the female body as a limitation on women's capacity for equality and transcendence

Social Constructionism

Body—natural, biological—sex—essentialism

Mind—social, ideological—gender—constructionism

Sexual Difference

Deconstructing dualism

distinction between sex and gender

sex-essentialism / gender-constructionism

Bodies—social and cultural acts—Gender performance

Body Traces

The specificity of bodies and subjectivities—racial, cultural and class particularities

Knowledges—Discourses

Nietzsche influence—Marxist ideology—Derrida's deconstruction

第四場主讀綱要：Feminist Phenomenology

Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. "The Body in Its Sexual Being." *The Phenomenology of Perception*.

A. "Perception is our most basic mode of being in the world, and the body is the ultimate and abiding subject of all perspectives available to us in principle"(Carman 3).

Merleau-Ponth's theory of perception is a bodily phenomenon. The body is "a mode of being in the world"(Carman 3, 82).

B. Case Study: Schneider, who no longer seeks sexual intercourse of his own accord.

1. What has disappeared from the patient is his power of projecting before himself

a

sexual world, of putting himself in an erotic situation, or, once such a situation is stumbled upon, of maintaining it or following it through to complete satisfaction (Merleau-Ponty 181).

2. Schneider can no longer put himself into a sexual situation any more than generally he occupies an affective or an ideological one (Merleau-Ponty 181-82).

3. So the question is not so much whether human life does or does not rest on sexuality, as of knowing what is to be understood by sexuality (Merleau-Ponty 183).

C. Case Study: a girl, who loses the use of speech.

1. Loss of speech, then, stands for the refusal of co-existence (Merleau-Ponty 186).

2. To have lost one's voice is not to keep silence: one keeps silence only when one can speak (Merleau-Ponty 187).

3. [T]he girl does not cease to speak, she "loses" her voice as one loses a memory . . .

the lost memory is not accidentally lost, it is lost rather in so far as it belongs to an area of my life which I reject, is so far as it has a certain significance and, like all significances, this one exists only for someone. Forgetfulness is therefore an act (Merleau-Ponty 187).

4. Generality: because our memories and our body . . . are enveloped in generality.

Through this generality we still "have them," but just enough to hold them at a distance from us (Merleau-Ponty 188).

a. Taylor Carman quotes from Merleau-Ponty, "All perception takes place in an atmosphere of generality and is given to us as anonymous, I cannot say I see the blue of the sky in the sense in which I say I understand a book, or again in which

I say I decide to devote my life to mathematics . . . if I wanted to render precisely the perceptual experience, I ought to say that one perceives in me, not that I perceive”(94).

b. Carman explains, “The prepersonal bodily subject of perception is thus not my conscious, reflective self, but simply ‘the one’”(94).

D. Body

1. But precisely because my body can shut itself off from the world, it is also what opens me out upon the world and places me in a situation there The memory or the voice is recovered when the body once more opens itself to others or to the past, when it opens the way to co-existence and once more (in the active sense) acquires significance beyond itself. Moreover, even when cut off from the circuit of existence, the body never quite falls back on to itself. Even if I become absorbed in the experience of my body and in the solitude of sensations, I do not succeed in abolishing all reference of my life to a world (Merleau-Ponty 191).

a. Taylor Carman explains that “perception is not an event or state in the mind or brain, but an organism’s entire bodily relation to its environment”(1).

b. My body is my point of view on the world (Carman 1).

c. Perception is “neither a subjective experience nor an objective property of the mind, but an aspect of our being in the world”(Carman 74).

d. Our bodily coexistence with others (Carman 149).

2. The body can symbolize existence because it realizes it and is its actuality (Merleau-Ponty 190).

3. [T]he body expresses total existence, not because it is an external accompaniment to that existence, but because existence realizes itself in the body (Merleau-Ponty 192).

E. Gaze

1. Master and slave: in so far as I have a body, I may be reduced to the status of an

object beneath the gaze of another person, and no longer count as a person for him,
or

else I may become his master and, in my turn, look at him (Merleau-Ponty 193).

2. Saying that I have a body is thus a way of saying that I can be seen as an object
and

that I try to be seen as a subject, that another can be my master or my slave
(Merleau-Ponty 193).

3. Taylor Carman explains, “To understand perception as bodily being in the
world is to pose a radical challenge to traditional distinctions between subject and
object, inner

and outer, mental and physical, mind and world”(2).

F. [O]nly if we take an abstract view of hands, feet, head or sexual apparatus,
regarding them, that is, as fragments of matter, and ignoring their living function.

Only, indeed, if we form an abstract notion of man in general, into which only
the Cogitatio is allowed to enter (Merleau-Ponty 197).

G. There is no explanation of sexuality which reduces it to anything other than
itself, for it is already something other than itself, and indeed, if we like, our
whole being

(Merleau-Ponty 198). Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. *The Phenomenology of
Perception*.

Carman, Taylor. *Merleau-Ponty*. London and New York: Routledge, 2008.

第五場主讀綱要：Woman’s Situation and Character

1. Women’s character

A woman’s situation determines/shapes her character

“The eternal feminine”

2. Feminine world

an integral part of the whole world

a subordinate place

within the frame of the masculine universe

3. The world is masculine

“the eternal child”

a respectable obedience—the lot of woman

4. Lack of technical training

“an assemblage of implements” / mysterious caprices / the mystery of a bloody

strawberry (reproduction) / alchemy (in the kitchen)

5. Women’s mentality

passive eroticism / primitive superstition (religion)

6. Woman clings to routine/repetition

Time-- not a creative flow ; a duplication of the past

Trust in the relentless force of destruction

7. Not familiar with the use of masculine logic

no sense of factual truth, for lack of effectiveness

8. Men make the gods; women worship them,

Accept masculine authority

9. Woman takes no part in history

Man regards history as a becoming; woman arrests the flow of time and takes no part in history. she rushes wildly to the defense of the old gods °

10. Women were most passionate in upholding slavery

11. Woman respects the law simply because it is law—resignation

“Women are born to suffer”

12. Women distinguish themselves by their calm tenacity.

A proud woman can make a lofty virtue of resignation.

But it also engenders a sterile prudence; women are always trying to conserve, to

adapt, to arrange, rather than to destroy and build anew; they prefer compromise and adjustment to revolution.

13. Women preferred what was familiar to adventuring.

14. Women's fate is bound up with that of perishable things; in losing them they lose

all. Only a free subject, asserting himself as above and beyond the duration of things, can check all decay; this supreme recourse has been denied to woman. Let the future be opened to her and she will no longer cling desperately to the past. When women are called upon for concrete action, when they recognize their interest in the designated goals, they are as bold and courageous as men.

15. Many of the faults for which women are reproached—mediocrity, laziness, frivolity, servility—simply express the fact that their horizon is closed. It is said that woman is

sensual, she wallows in immanence, but she has first been shut up in it. Sexual pleasure represents the stunning triumph of the immediate; in the violence of the instant, the future and the universe are denied; what lies outside the carnal flame is nothing; for the brief moment of this apotheosis, Woman is no longer mutilated and frustrated. But, once again, she values these triumphs of immanence only because immanence is her lot.

16. Her frivolity has the same cause as her "sordid materialism"; she considers little things important for lack of access to great things, and, furthermore, the futilities that fill her days are often of the most serious practical concern to her. The truth is that when a woman is engaged in an enterprise worthy of a human being, she is quite able to show herself as active, efficient, taciturn—and as ascetic—as a man.

17. She is accused of being servile, always ready to lie down at her master's feet and kiss the hand that strikes her, generally lacking in real pride . . . full of the

spirit of abject submission.

She is bound to suffer every humiliation; a slave cannot have the sense of human dignity; it is enough if a slave gets out of it with a whole skin.

18. If a woman is earthy, commonplace, basely utilitarian, it is because she is compelled to devote her existence to cooking and washing diapers—no way to acquire a sense of grandeur. It is her duty to assure the monotonous repetition of life in all its mindless factuality. She is occupied without ever *doing* anything, and thus she identifies herself with what she *has*. This dependence on things . . . explains her frugality, her avarice.

The things are inessential intermediaries between animal life and free existence.

The sole value that appertains to the inessential means is utility.

19. But no existent can be satisfied with an inessential role, for that immediately makes means into ends—as may be observed, for example, in politicians—and the value of the means comes to seem an absolute value. The utility reigns in the housekeeper's heaven, above beauty, truth, liberty; and it is in this perspective that she envisages the entire universe. Adopting the Aristotelian morality of the golden mean—that is, of mediocrity, she is not expected to show audacity, ardor, disinterestedness, grandeur. These qualities appear only when a free being strikes forward through an open future, emerging far beyond all given actuality. Woman is shut up in a kitchen or in a boudoir, and astonishment is expressed that her horizon is limited. Her wings are clipped, and it is found deplorable that she cannot fly. Let but the future be opened to her, and she will no longer be compelled to linger in the present.

20. The same inconsistency is displayed when, after being enclosed within the limits of her ego or her household, she is reproached for her narcissism, her egotism, with all their train: vanity, touchiness, malice, and so on. She is deprived of all possibility of concrete communication with others. She could hardly be

expected to transcend herself toward the general welfare. She stays obstinately within the one realm that is familiar to her, where she can control things and in the midst of which she enjoys a precarious sovereignty.

21. Woman fails to find complete security in her home. It is surrounded by that masculine universe which she respects from afar, without daring to venture into it. And precisely because she is incapable of grasping it through technical skill, sound logic, and definite knowledge, she feels, like the child and the savage, that she is surrounded by dangerous mysteries. She does not clearly distinguish between the possible and the impossible and is ready to believe anything, no matter what. She listens to and spreads rumors and starts panics. For woman condemned to passivity, the inscrutable future is haunted by phantoms of war, revolution, feminine, poverty; being unable to act, she worries. Woman flounders in confusion and darkness; she gets used to it because she does nothing; in her imagination all possibilities have equal reality. What she is endeavoring to exorcise in her gloomy ruminations is the specter of her own powerlessness.

22. Her anxiety is the expression of her distrust of the world as given. All those in whom women confide—doctors, priests, social workers—know that the usual tone is one of complaint.

23. A free individual blames only himself for his failures, he assumes responsibility for them; but everything happens to women through the agency of others, and therefore these others are responsible for her woes. Her mad despair spurns all remedies; it does not help matters to propose solutions to a woman bent on complaining: she finds none acceptable. She insists on living in her **situation** precisely as she does—that is, in a state of impotent rage. If some change is proposed she throws up her hands: “That’s the last straw!” She put the whole masculine universe under indictment. Resentment is the reverse side of dependence: when one gives all, one never receives enough in return.

24. Woman is obliged to regard the male universe with some respect; she would feel danger without a roof over her head, if she were in total opposition; so adopts the Manichaeist position—the clear separation of good and evil. Like the child, woman conceives good and evil in simple images, as co-existing, discrete entities; this Manichaeism of hers sets her mind at rest by doing away with the anxiety of making difficult choices.

25. She is always *against* someone or something.

26. A man who has begun to detest wife or mistress tries to get away from her; but woman wants to have the man she hates close at hand so she can make him pay.

27. Woman's aptitude for facile tears comes largely from the fact that her life is built upon a foundation of impotent revolt; it is also doubtless true that physiologically she has less nervous control than man and that her education has taught her to let herself go more readily.

Tears are a gentle if bitter caress; her face burns under the merciful flow. Tears are at once plaint and consolation, fever and cooling appeasement. Tears are woman's supreme alibi; sudden as a squall, loosed by fits and starts, typhoon.

28. Whenever tears are insufficient to express her revolt, she will make scenes of such incoherent violence as to abash a man still more. In some circles a husband may strike his wife actual blows; in others he declines to use violence precisely because he is the stronger and his fist is an effective weapon.

29. There is a way out that is open to the woman who has reached the end of her resistance—it is suicide. Successful suicides are much more common in men than in women, but attempts to end their lives are commoner in the latter. This may be so because women are more likely to be satisfied with play-acting: the *pretend* self-destruction more often than they really *want* it. She protests against man, against life, against her **situation**, but she does not make good her escape from them.

30. There are many aspects of feminine behavior that should be interpreted as forms of protest. She may be purposely careless and extravagant because he is methodical and economical. In making her wait a few minutes, the woman is above all protesting against that long wait: her life.

31. In her sense her whole existence is waiting, since she is confined in the limbo of immanence and contingency, and since her justification is always in the hands of others. She awaits the homage, the approval of men, she awaits love, she awaits the gratitude and praise of her husband or her lover. She awaits her support. She waits for man to put in an appearance, since her economic dependence places her at his disposal; **she is only one element in masculine life while man is her whole existence.**

32. All she can do is arrive later at the rendezvous her lover has set, not be ready at the time designated by her husband. But these are timid attempts at revenge; however persistent she may be in keeping men waiting, she will never compensate for the interminable hours she has spent in watching and hoping, in awaiting the good pleasure of the male.

33. Woman is bound in a general way to contest foot by foot the rule of man, though recognizing his over-all supremacy and worshipping his idols.

34. Women have no grasp on the world of men because their experience does not teach them to use logic and technique . . . There is a whole region of human experience which the male deliberately chooses to ignore because he fails to *think* it: this experience woman *lives*. The experience of the man is intelligible but interrupted by blanks; that of the woman is, within its own limits, mysterious and obscure but complete. ;

35. Woman takes exception to masculine logic. Not only is it inapplicable to her experience, but in his hands, as she knows, masculine reasoning becomes an underhand form of force; men's undebatable pronouncements are intended to

confuse her.

36. Woman does not entertain the positive belief that the truth is something *other* than men claim; she recognizes, rather, that there *is not* any fixed truth. She knows that masculine morality is a vast hoax. Man pompously thunders forth his code of virtue and honor; but in secret he invites her to disobey it, and he even counts on this disobedience.

37. Man gladly accepts as his authority Hegel's idea according to which the citizen acquires his ethical dignity in transcending himself toward the universal, but as a private individual he has a right to desire and pleasure. His relations with woman, then, lie in a contingent region, where morality no longer applies, where conduct is a matter of indifference. With other men he has relations in which values are involved; he is a free agent confronting other free agents under laws fully recognized by all; but with woman—she was invented for this purpose—he casts off the responsibility of existence . . . he puts himself on the plane of inauthenticity. He shows himself tyrannical, sadistic, violent, or puerile, masochistic, querulous, he tries to satisfy his obsessions and whims; he is “at ease,” he “relaxes,” in view of the rights acquired in his public life.

38. Man lauds chaste and faithful wives, but he asks his neighbor's wife to commit adultery. We have seen how hypocritically men decree that abortion is criminal, when each year in France a million women are put by men in a position to need abortion. They count openly on the woman's willingness to make herself guilty of a crime: her “immorality” is necessary to the harmony of the moral society respected by men.

39. The most flagrant example of this duplicity is the male's attitude toward prostitution, for it is his demand that creates the supply.

40. In many cases man, without besmirching his lofty image, can perpetrate with woman's connivance actions that for her are infamous.

41. Woman has need of the male in order to gain human dignity, to eat, to enjoy life, to procreate; it is through the service of sex that she gets these benefits; because she is confined to that function, she is wholly an instrumentality of exploitation.

42. Man demands play-acting: he wants her to be the *Other*, but all existents remain **subjects**, try as they will to deny themselves. Man wants woman to be **object**: she makes herself object; at the very moment when she does that, she is exercising a free activity. Therein is her original treason.

43. Woman is a victim of the paternalistic oppression. But it is clear that none of woman's traits manifest an originally perverted essence or will: they reflect a **situation**.

44. In Ibsen's *A Doll's House*, Helmer explains how strong, just, understanding, indulgent, a man feels when he pardons frail woman her childish fault. . . .

Woman's fault, then, are magnified the more in that she will not try to combat them but, on the contrary, will make an ornament of them.

45. Not accepting logical principles and moral imperatives, skeptical about the laws of nature, woman lacks the sense of the universal; to her the world seems a confused conglomeration of special cases.

Within her sphere all is magic; outside, all is mystery. She is unfamiliar with the criterion of plausibility; only immediate experience carries conviction—her own experience, or that of others if stated emphatically enough.

46. Women do not succeed in building up a solid counter-universe whence they can challenge the males.

47. In mythical worship of man she is lost and also finds herself again in her glory. This contradiction is easily explained, thanks to the variety of sexually potent individuals.

48. Carnally humiliated, she is all for Love. Because she is condemned to know

only the factual contingency of life, she makes herself priestess of the Ideal.

49. The ambivalence is evident in the way woman regards her body. It is a burden: worn away in service to the species, bleeding each month, proliferating passively, it is not for her a pure instrument for getting a grip on the world but an opaque physical presence; it is no certain source of pleasure and it creates lacerating pains; it contains menaces: woman feels endangered by her “insides.” It is a “hysteric” body.

50. Nature similarly presents a double face to her, supplying the soup kettle and stimulating mystical effusions. When she became a house-keeper and a mother, woman renounced her free roaming of field and wood, she preferred the quiet cultivation of her kitchen garden, she tamed the flowers and put them in vase: yet she is still entranced with moonlight and sunset. Life is not merely immanence and repetition: it has also a dazzling face of light; in flowery meadows it is revealed as Beauty. Enslaved as she is to her husband, her children, her home, it is ecstasy to find herself alone, sovereign on the hillsides; she is no longer mother, wife, housekeeper, but a human being; she contemplates the passive world, and she remembers that she is wholly a conscious being, an irreducible free individual.

51. This double allegiance to the carnal world and to a world of “poetry” defines the metaphysics, the wisdom, to which woman more or less explicitly adheres.

She endeavors to combine life and transcendence, which is to say that she rejects Cartesianism, with its formal logic, and all related doctrines.

52. She craves a good that is a living harmony in the midst of which she is placed simply by virtue of being alive. The concept of harmony is one of the keys to the feminine universe; it implies a stationary perfection, the immediate justification of each element depending on the whole and on its passive participation in the totality.

53. There is a justification, a supreme compensation, which society is ever wont to

bestow upon woman: that is, religion.

54. In modern civilization, which—even for woman—has a share in promoting freedom, religion seems much less an instrument of constraint than an instrument of deception.

55. We find a quite masculine firmness in many of the great female saints.

56. Although subordinated to the law of men by the will of God Himself, woman none the less finds in Him a mighty refuge from them. With the heavenly Father's connivance, woman can boldly lay claim to the glory of her femininity in defiance of man.

57. Thus God not alone restores the feminine sex in general to its place of dignity; but each woman will find in the heavenly absent One a special support. As a human person she has little influence, but once she acts in the name of divine inspiration, her wishes become sacred [Joan of Arc].

58. Woman makes religion a pretext for satisfying her own desires.

59. Whether she has chosen asceticism or sensuality, pride or humility, the concern she feels for her salvation leads her to yield to that pleasure which she prefers to all others: namely being occupied by herself.

60. It is evident that woman's "**character**"—her convictions, her values, her wisdom, her morality, her tastes, her behavior—are to be explained by her **situation**. The fact that transcendence is denied her keeps her as a rule from attaining the loftiest human attitudes: heroism, revolt, disinterestedness, imagination, creation; but even among the males they are none too common.

61. The office universe is essentially masculine.

Being against man's logic and morality, woman does not fall into these traps . . . she reveals her undisciplined thoughts, her emotions, her spontaneous reactions, more frankly. She reveals a limited but concrete experience.

62. The well-known "feminine sensitivity" derives somewhat from myth,

somewhat from make-believe; but it is also a fact that woman is more attentive than man to herself and to the world. Her wish to escape is expressed in her love of festivity.

63. Woman feels deep interest in the adventures of her heart, of her flesh, of her mind, because she knows that this is all she has on earth. When her imagination is not lost in empty dreams, she becomes all sympathy: she tries to understand others as individuals and to identify them with herself.

64. Her dependence forbids detachment, but from the well of her imposed self-sacrifice she sometimes draws up real generosity.

65. Their vain arrogance, their radical incapability, their obstinate ignorance, make them the most useless nonentities ever produced by the human species.

66. Women's situations are profoundly different. If we compare these situation rather than the people in them , we see clearly that man 's is far preferable; that is to say, he has many more opportunities to exercise his freedom in the world. Resignedness is only abdication and flight, there is no other way out for woman than to work for her liberation.

67. This liberation must be collective, and it requires first of all that the economic evolution of woman's condition be accomplished.

There have been however, and there are many women trying to achieve individual salvation by solitary effort. They are attempting to justify their existence in the midst of their immanence—that is, to realize transcendence in immanence.

第六場主讀綱要：“What is a Woman? Sex, Gender, and the Body in Feminist Theory”

- Table of Contents

1. 2 features in nature and social norms

- 1. a sexual ideology: the “pervasive picture of sex”

- 2. science and women's role in society
- 2. A discussion of the 1960s-70s formulation of the sex/gender distinction
- the work of Gayle Rubin
- 3. The poststructuralist attempt to revised the 1960s formulation
- the work of Judith Butler
- 4. Simone de Beauvoir's understanding of the body offers an alternative to sex/gender theories.
- 1. Biology and Social Norms
- 1.1 Pervasive Sex
- Thomas Laqueur's *Making Sex*
- ✖ *Man was on top and woman at the bottom of the same scale of values*
- 1913, a British doctor Walter Heape produced representative expression of the "two-sex" view of sexual difference
- ✖ *The male and female are complementary.*
- *The pervasive picture of sex*
- ✖ *To give rise to essentialism, biologism*
- ✖ *No difference between male and masculine, female and feminine, sex and gender*
- 1. Biology and Social Norms
- 1.2 Biological Determinism
- W. K. Brook's *The Law of Heredity* (1883)
- ✖ The account of women's intellectual inferiority and women cannot manage the intellectual reflection
- Patrick Geddes and J. Arthur Thomson's *The Evolution of Sex* (1889)
- ✖ "It is generally true that the males are more active, energetic, eager, passionate, and variable; the females more passive, conservative, sluggish, and stable" (270).
- ✖ 2. Sex and Gender in the 1960s and 1970s

- Robert Stoller’s “Gender Identity”
 - “Gender identity is the sense of knowing to which sex one belongs, that is, the awareness ‘I am a male’ or ‘I am a female.’”
- Gayle Rubin’s essay “The Traffic in Women” (1975)
 - How women’s oppression was maintained in widely different cultures
 - Sex means biological sexual difference; gender means the oppressive social norms
 - has been exceptionally influential in US feminism
 - ✖ **Judith Butler’s** consideration of sex to be an effect of power has been based on one of Rubin’s conceptions.
 - Inheriting Beauvoir’s hope for a society where women will no longer be cast as Other.
 - 3. The Poststructuralist Picture of Sex and Gender
 - 3.1 Sex Gender, and Sexual Difference
 - Poststructuralist theorists are unhappy with the way the 1960s accounts for personal identity and the body.
 - ✖ 2 objectives
 - To avoid biological determinism
 - To develop a fully historical and non-essentialist understanding of sex or the body
 - Joan Scott’s essay “Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis”
 - ✖ The word “gender” signals rejection of biological determinism, whereas “sex” and “sexual difference” signal acceptance of it.

✦ What is missing is some awareness of the specific ways in which the body may be political and historical and discursive

✦ the overlook of no particular understanding of subjectivity or identity

• 3. The Poststructuralist Picture

of Sex and Gender

• 3.3 Gender, Performativity, Subjectivity

○ Judith's Butler's "gender performativity" which has affinities with Sartre and Beauvoir's thought

✦ French existentialist: we are what we do

○ Gender is an act, and not a thing.

○ We fashion ourselves through our acts and choices.

✦ Butler translates Beauvoir's anti-essentialism into the conceptual register of sex and gender.

✦ 3. The Poststructuralist Picture

of Sex and Gender

• 3.4 Liberation, Subversion—Same Thing?

○ Poststructuralist theorists of sex and gender, however,

✦ prefer to think in terms of subversion of dominant social norms

✦ have yet to show how their politics differ from that of their feminist predecessors

✦ have **yet to show what questions concerning materiality,**

✦ whose work **plagued by internal contradictions** and mired in theoretical elaborations.

✦ 4. The Body is a Situation:

Simone De Beauvoir

• 4.1 The Body as an Object and the Body as a Situation

○ Women are always in the process of making themselves what they are.

○ “The body is our general medium for having a world”—Merleau-Ponty writes (Phenomenology 146)

○ “Lived experience” designates the whole of a person’s subjectivity.

○ For Sartre, a situation is a structural relationship between our projects (our freedom) and the world (which includes our bodies)

✖ My situation is not outside me, it does not relate to me as an object to a subject; it is a synthesis of facticity and freedom.

○ 4. The Body is a Situation:

Simone De Beauvoir

• 4.1 The Body as an Object and the Body as a Situation

○ Beauvoir’s “body-in-the-world” is an embodied intentional relationship to the world

✖ Understood as a situation in its own right, the body places us in the middle of many other situations.

○ Merleau-Ponty writes, “The body is to be compared, not to a physical object, but rather to a work of art” (*Phenomenology* 150).

○ For both, the body is our perspective on the world, and at the same time that body is engaged in a dialectical interaction with its surroundings.

○ 4. The Body is a Situation:

Simone De Beauvoir

• 4.1 The Body as an Object and the Body as a Situation

○ For Beauvoir and Merleau-Ponty, then,

✖ the body perceived as an object is not the ground on which the body as a situation is constructed;

✖ a woman is not the sum of the objective and the situational perspective on the body,

○ Not to breaking the body down into an objective and a subjective component

○ But an irreducible amalgam of the freedom of that subject and the conditions in which that freedom finds itself

- 4. The Body is a Situation:

Simone De Beauvoir

- 4.1 The Body as an Object and the Body as a Situation

○ For Beauvoir, a woman defines herself through the way she lives her embodied situation in the world,

✕ or in other words, through the way in which she makes something of what the world makes of her.

- 4. The Body is a Situation:

Simone De Beauvoir

- 4.2 One Is Not Born a Woman: Biology and Lived Experience

○ “One is not born, but rather becomes, a woman,” Beauvoir writes.

○ Beauvoir and Butler

✕ **Rejecting biological determinism:** Butler follows Beauvoir to deny that the objectively described factic body that gives rise to values

○ A claim that a woman is gender detached from all meaning

✕ Butler’s misreading of Beauvoir’s article

○ She loses touch with Beauvoir’s category of “lived experience.”

○ Her concept of gender does not encompass the concrete, historical and experiencing body.

- ✕ 4. The Body is a Situation:

Simone De Beauvoir

- 4.2 One Is Not Born a Woman: Biology and Lived Experience

○ Beauvoir and Butler

✕ They both are anti-essentialist

○ Phenomenological analysis of what a woman is

- Beauvoir works with a non-normative understanding of what a woman is
- oppressive social power structure
- Butler thinks of a woman as the ongoing production of a congealed ideological construct
- A woman is gender, and gender is simply an effect of an oppressive social power structure

✘ 4. The Body is a Situation:

Simone De Beauvoir

- 4.2 One Is Not Born a Woman: Biology and Lived Experience
- Beauvoir and Butler
- ✘ For Beauvoir, women exist.
- It is impossible to derive the definition of woman from an account of biological facts alone.
- ✘ For Butler, they must be deconstructed
- Reducing woman to **power** that is opposed to “sex” or “the body”
- A radical divorce between sex and woman/gender
- **That exiles sex from history and society**

✘ 4. The Body is a Situation:

Simone De Beauvoir

- 4.2 One Is Not Born a Woman: Biology and Lived Experience
- Beauvoir writes,
- ✘ **“One is not born, but rather becomes, a woman [*femme*].** No biological, psychological, or economic destiny defines the figure that the human female [*la femelle humaine*] acquires in society; it is civilization as a whole that develops this product, intermediate between male and eunuch, which one calls feminine [*feminin*]. Only the mediation of another [*autrui*] can establish an individual as an *Other*.

✦ 4. The Body is a Situation:

Simone De Beauvoir

• 4.2 One Is Not Born a Woman: Biology and Lived Experience

○ Moi's interpretation of Beauvoir's words

✦ Beauvoir is not distinguishing between sex and gender

○ But between *femme (woman)* and *femelle (female)*

○ Between human and animal

○ Between the world of values and meaning (lived experience) and the scientific account of our biology (the "objective view of the body")

✦ 4. The Body is a Situation:

Simone De Beauvoir

• 4.2 One Is Not Born a Woman: Biology and Lived Experience

○ Moi's interpretation of Beauvoir's words

✦ For Beauvoir, the question is not how someone of any sex becomes a woman, but what values, norms, and demands the female human being comes up against in her encounter with the Other (society).

✦ 4. The Body is a Situation:

Simone De Beauvoir

• 4.3 Sex and Gender in Beauvoir?

○ 1960s

✦ Sex—nature, biology

✦ Gender—culture, social norm, **gender identity**

○ Beauvoir

✦ Body as object—objectivist and scientific—1960's understanding of sex

✦ Body as **situation**

✦ **Lived experience (subjectivity)**

○ **Our experience of all kinds of situations (race, class, nationality, etc)**

✧ Myths of femininity (ideology; norms)—gender stereotype or norm

✧ Sex (the fact of being a man or a woman)

✧ 4. The Body is a Situation:

Simone De Beauvoir

• 4.3 Sex and Gender in Beauvoir?

○ Beauvoir's account of woman as an open-ended becoming

✧ It rejects both biological determinism.

○ A critique of sexism: stressing the fact that women's freedom and agency rarely disappear entirely, even under severely oppressive conditions

✧ It limits distinction between sex and gender

○ Accepting bodily differences of all kinds contribute to the meaning of our lived experience

✧ *The Second Sex* provides a brilliant starting point for future feminist investigations of the body, agency, and freedom.

第七場主讀綱要： On Female Body Experience, “Throwing Like a Girl” and Other Essays

Introduction

1. the Other 概念

2. lived body/ embodiment/ existential phenomenology

3. 女性肉身化的理論化方法: J. Kristeva, L. Irigaray

4. 英語系學者運用肉身話的女性主義觀點反思女性/男性身體及其延伸的經驗和意義: C. Battersby, S. Bordo, J. Butler, S. Kruks, G. Weiss, M. Gatens, E. Grosz 等。

Female/Feminine Experience

1. self-enclosed ego vs. female embodiment (Battersby)

2. female vs. feminine

The Tradition of Existential Phenomenology

1. 分析身體 vs. 視肉身化為在世存有的一種模式
2. Merleau-Ponty, Beauvoir and Sartre: being-in-the-world as situated 的意涵
3. 對存在現象學的批判與復甦

Order and Themes of the Essays

CH. 1 Lived Body vs. Gender: Reflections on Social Structure and Subjectivity

1. Toril Moi proposes that we throw over the concept of gender altogether and renew a concept of the lived body, because gender is a problematic concept.
2. But Young find Moi's argument incomplete, that is to say, we still need a reconstituted concept of gender.

I. The Sex-Gender Distinction

1. Before 1970s: sex refers to anatomy and physiology and gender refers to self-conception and behavior. → androgyny
2. late 1970s and early 1980s: social and psychological specificities of femininely gendered identity. Chodorow, Gilligan →essentialist.
3. J. Butler: Gender is nothing other than a social performative.

II. The Lived Body

1. body-in-situation: situation denotes the produce of facticity and freedom.
2. The person is an actor; she has an ontological freedom to construct herself in relation to this facticity.
3. Lived body replaces that of gender, and the distinction between sex and gender, because a category of lived body need not make sexual difference dimorphous.
4. The idea of the lived body recognizes that a person's subjectivity is a

conditioned by sociocultural facts and the behavior and expectations of others in ways that she has not chosen. At the same time, the theory of lived body says that each person takes up and acts in relation to these unchosen fact in her own way.

III. Is the Lived Body Enough?

1. Moi 對 lived body 的解釋無法說明權力關係(power relation)。因此，Young 主張仍需加入性別概念，以便於解釋社會結構和權力關係的問題。
2. 為什麼要關注結構? 為了解釋社會不平等的構成和原因。
3. 甚麼是結構?限制的結構(structures of constraint)→將性別概念當作是一個理論化結構的工具(the concept of gender as a tool for theorizing structures(more than subjects.))
4. There are three basic axes of gender structures: a sexual division of labor, normative heterosexuality and gendered hierarchies of power.
5. Gender as structured is also lived through individual bodies, always as personal experiential response and not as a set of attributes that individuals have in common.

第八場主讀綱要：“Lived Bodies: Phenomenology and the Flesh”

I. Corporeal Phenomenology

- Rejecting the Cartesian dualism of mind and body
- The subject:
 1. a “being-to-the-world”
 2. a “subject committed to the world”
 3. a subject of perception and behavior as well as cognition and reflection
- The body:
 1. both object (for other) and a lived reality (for the subject)
 2. “sense-borrowing” and “form-giving”

- The case of the brain-damaged aphasic Schneider
- The “corporeal schema”, or body image

II. The Visible and the Invisible

- The resonances that Merleau-Ponty’s emphasis on lived experience and perception has with feminist attempts to harness experience in political evaluation
- The concept of “the flesh: “the condition of both seeing and being seen, of touching and being touched, and of their intermingling and possible integration, a commonness in which both subject and object participate”
- The visible and vision

III. The Senses

- Sight as a spatial sense
- Hearing as a temporal sense
- Touch as a contact sense
- The interaction and transposability of the senses

IV. The Reversibility of the Flesh

- Double sensation
1. The various graduations between subjectivity and objectivity
 2. The indeterminate and reversible phenomenon of the being touched of the touching
- The slippage in the double sensation
 - The body as a “being of two leaves”

V. Feminist Phenomenology?

- Merleau-Ponty’s avoidance of the question of sexual difference and specificity
 - Irigaray’s critiques
1. The tangible as capable of an existence autonomous from the visible
 2. The role of the visual in phallogentrism

VI. Sexuality and the Lived Body

- The question of the body in its sexual being in Merleau-Ponty's theoretical paradigm
- The relationship between Merleau-Ponty's discussion of sexuality and feminist attempts to think a radical notion of sexual difference

第九場主讀綱要：Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. "The Spatiality of One's Own Body and Motility." *The Phenomenology of Perception*.

A. Body Image

1. The spatiality of one's own body: If my arm is resting on the table I should never think of saying that it is beside the ash-tray in the way in which the ash-tray is beside the telephone. The outline of my body is a frontier which ordinary spatial relations do not cross. This is because its parts are inter-related in a peculiar way: they are not spread out side by side, but enveloped in each other . . . Hence they form a system and the space of my hand is not a mosaic of spatial values. Similarly my whole body for me is not an assemblage of organs juxtaposed in space (112).

2. Definition One: Body image was at first understood to mean a compendium of our bodily experience, capable of giving a commentary and meaning to the internal impressions and the impression of possessing a body at any moment. It was supposed to register for me the positional changes of the parts of my body for each movement of one of them, the position of each local stimulus in the body as a whole . . . (113).

3. Definition Two: it is no longer seen as the straightforward result of associations established during experience, but a total awareness of my posture in the intersensory world . . . (114).

4. The spatiality of body: not a spatiality of position, but a spatiality of situation

(115). If I stand in front of my desk and lean on it with both hands, only my hands are stressed and the whole of my body trails behind them like the tail of a comet. It is not that I am unaware of the whereabouts of my shoulders or back, but these are simply swallowed up in the position of my hands, and my whole posture can be read so to speak in the pressure they exert on the table (115).

5. The body image is finally a way of stating that my body is in-the-world (115).

B. Body

1. [T]here would be no space at all for me if I had no body (117).

2. If bodily space and external space form a practical system, the first being the background against which the object as the goal of our action may stand out or the void in front of which it may come to light, it is clearly in action that the spatiality of our body is brought into being, and an analysis of one's own movement should enable us to arrive at a better understanding of it (117).

3. Case study: Then he [patient] moves his whole body and after a time his movements are confined to his arm, which the subject eventually 'finds' (126). Clearly the patient finds in his body only an amorphous mass into which actual movement alone introduces divisions and links. In looking to his body to perform the movement for him he is like a speaker who cannot utter a word without following a text written beforehand. The patient himself neither seeks nor finds his movement, but moves his body about until the movement comes (126). The patient either conceives the ideal formula for the movement, or else he launches his body into blind attempts to perform it, whereas for the normal person every movement is, indissolubly, movement and consciousness of movement (127).

4. Existential analysis: As long as the body is defined in terms of existence in-itself, it functions uniformly like a mechanism, and as long as the mind is defined in terms of pure existence for-itself, it knows only objects arrayed before it (143). The study of a pathological case, then, has enabled us to glimpse a new

mode of analysis—existential analysis—which goes beyond the traditional alternatives of empiricism and rationalism, of explanation and introspection (157).

C. Consciousness

1. Consciousness is in the first place not a matter of “I think that” but of “I can” (159) . . . Movement is not thought about movement, and bodily space is not space thought of or represented (159).

2. Consciousness is being-towards-the-thing through the intermediary of the body. A movement is learned when the body has understood it, that is, when it has incorporated it into its ‘word,’ and to move one’s body is to aim at things through it; it is to allow oneself to respond to their call . . . (159-61).

D. Body/ Space/ Time

1. We must therefore avoid saying that our body is in space, or in time. It inhabits space and time. If my hand traces a complicated path through the air, I do not need, in order to know its final position, to add together all movements made in the same direction and subtract those made in the opposite direction. Every identifiable change reaches consciousness already loaded with its relations to what has preceded it, as on a taximeter the distance is given already converted into shillings and pence (161).

2. In so far as I have a body through which I act in the world, space and time are not, for me, a collection of adjacent points nor are they a limitless number of relations synthesized by my consciousness, and into which it draws my body. I am not in space and time, nor do I conceive space and time; I belong to them, my body combines with them and includes them (162).

3. Our bodily experience of movement is not a particular case of knowledge; it provides us with a way of access to the world and the object, with a ‘praktognosia,’ which has to be recognized as original and perhaps as primary. My body has its world, or understands its world, without having to make use of my

‘symbolic’ or ‘objectifying function’ (162).

4. Imitation: In order to imitate the actions of someone facing me, it is not necessary that I should know expressly that ‘the hand which appears on the right side of my visual field is for my partner the left one’. Now it is precisely the victim of disturbances who has recourse to these explanations (163) . . . What we have called the body image is precisely this system of equivalents, this immediately given invariant whereby the different motor tasks are instantaneously transferable. It follows that it is not only an experience of my body, but an experience of my body-in-the-world, and that this is what gives a motor meaning to verbal orders. The function destroyed in apraxic disturbances is therefore a motor one. ‘It is not the symbolic or sense-giving function in general which is affected in cases of this kind: it is a much more primary function, in its nature motor, in other words, the capacity for motor differentiation within the dynamic body image (163-64).

E. Acquisition of a Habit

1. As has often been said, it is the body which ‘catches’ and ‘comprehends’ movement. The acquisition of a habit is indeed the grasping of a significance, but it is the motor grasping of a motor significance (165).

2. Example: If I am in the habit of driving a car, I enter a narrow opening and see that I can ‘get through’ without comparing the width of the opening with that of the wings, just as I go through a doorway without checking the width of the doorway against that of my body (165).

3. If habit is neither a form of knowledge nor an involuntary action, what then is it? It is knowledge in the hands, which is forthcoming only when bodily effort is made, and cannot be formulated in detachment from that effort (166).

4. We said earlier that it is the body which “understands” in the acquisition of habit. This way of putting it will appear absurd, if understanding is subsuming a

sense-datum under an idea, and if the body is an object. But the phenomenon of habit is just what prompts us to revise our notion of “understand” and our notion of the body. To understand is to experience the harmony between what we aim at and what is given, between the intention and the performance—and the body is our anchorage in a world (167).

F. What Body is

1. It is the origin of the rest, expressive movement itself, that which causes them to begin to exist as things, under our hands and eyes (169).
2. The body is our general medium for having a world. Sometimes it is restricted to the actions necessary for the conservation of life, and accordingly it posits around us a biological world; at other times, elaborating upon these primary actions and moving from their literal to a figurative meaning, it manifests through them a core of new significance: this is true of motor habits such as dancing (169).
3. We say that the body has understood and habit has been cultivated when it has absorbed a new meaning, and assimilated a fresh core of significance (169).

第十場主讀綱要：Throwing Like a Girl: A Phenomenology of Feminine Body Comportment, Motility, and Spatiality

The “remarkable difference” between two sexes:

A. “The girl of five does not make any use of lateral space. She does not stretch her arm sideward; she does not twist her trunk; she does not move her legs, which remain side by side. All she does in preparation for throwing is to lift her right arm forward to the horizontal and to bend the forearm backward in a pronate position....The ball is released without force, speed, or accurate aim....A boy of the same age, when preparing to throw, stretches his right arm sideward and backward; supinates the forearm, twists, turns and bends his trunk; and moves his

right foot backward. From this stance, he can support his throwing almost with the full strength of his total motorium....The ball leaves the hand with considerable acceleration; it moves toward its goal in a long flat curve” (Straus 157-160) .

B. Young indicates that Straus regards the difference as “the manifestation of a biological, not an acquired, difference” (Straus 157).

C. “Since the feminine style of throwing is observed in young children, it cannot result from the development of the breast....Straus explains the difference in style of throwing by referring to a ‘feminine attitude’ in relation to the world and to space. The difference for him is biologically based, but he denies that it is specifically anatomical. Girls throw in a way different from boys because girls are ‘feminine’” (Young 28).

D. “Every human existence is defined by its *situation*; the particular existence of the female person is no less defined by the historical, cultural, social, and economic limits of her situation....In denying such a feminine essence, however, we should not fall into that “nominalism” that denies the real differences in the behavior and experience of men and women” (Young 29) .

II. The situation of women:

A. “The situation of women within a given sociohistorical set of circumstances, despite the individual variation in each woman’s experience, opportunities, and possibilities, has a unity that can be described and made intelligible. It should be emphasized, however, that this unity is specific to a particular social formation during a particular epoch” (Young 29) .

B. Young thinks that Beauvoir “fails to give a place to the status and orientation of the woman’s body as relating to its surroundings in living action....By largely ignoring the situatedness of the woman’s actual bodily movement and orientation to its surroundings and its world, Beauvoir tends to create the impression that it is woman’s anatomy and physiology *as such* that at least in part determine her

unfree status” (Young 29) .

III. Aim of the article:

“This essay seeks to begin to fill a gap that thus exists in both existential phenomenology and feminist theory. It traces in a provisional way some of the basic modalities of feminine body comportment, manner of moving, and relation in space” (Young 30).

IV. The definition of “feminine existence”:

“In accordance with Beauvoir’s understanding, I take “femininity” to designate not a mysterious quality or essence that all women have by virtue of their being biologically female. It is, rather, a set of structures and conditions that delimit the typical *situation* of being a woman in a particular society, as well as the typical way in which this situation is lived by the women themselves. Defined as such, it is not necessary that any women be “feminine” — that is, it is not necessary that there be distinctive structures and behavior typical of the situation of women. This understanding of “feminine” existence makes it possible to say that some women escape or transcend the typical situation and definition of women in various degrees and respects....The account developed here combines the insights of the theory of the lived body as expressed by Merleau-Ponty and the theory of the situation of women as developed by Beauvoir” (Young 31).

V. The position of women in patriarchal society:

“The culture and society in which the female person dwells defines woman as Other, as the inessential correlate to man, as mere object and immanence. Woman is thereby both culturally and socially denied the subjectivity, autonomy, and creativity that are definitive of being human and that in patriarchal society are accorded the man.... The female person participates in transcendence, but her situation as a woman denies her that subjectivity and transcendence. My suggestion is that the modalities of feminine bodily comportment, motility, and

spatiality exhibit this same tension between transcendence and immanence, between subjectivity and being a mere object” (Young 31).

VI. The different reaction to physical activity: women vs. men:

A. “Women often approach a physical engagement with things with timidity, uncertainty, and hesitancy. Typically, we lack an entire trust in our bodies to carry us to our aims. There is, I suggest, a double hesitation here” (Young 34).

B. Women: “Lack confidence” & “a fear of getting hurt”

C. “We feel as though we much have our attention directed upon our bodies to make sure they are doing what we wish them to do, rather than paying attention to what we want to do *through* our bodies” (Young 34).

D. “All the above factors operate to produce in many women a greater or lesser feeling of incapacity, frustration, and self-consciousness....In entering a task we frequently are self-conscious about appearing awkward and at the same time do not wish to appear too strong. Both worries contribute to our awkwardness and frustration. If we should finally release ourselves from this spiral and really give a physical task our best effort, we are greatly surprised indeed at what our bodies can accomplish. It has been found that women more often than men underestimate the level of achievement they have reached” (Young 34).

VII. Three contradictory modalities of feminine bodily existence:

A. Ambiguous transcendence

1. “Merleau-Ponty reorients the entire tradition of that questioning by locating subjectivity not in mind or consciousness, but in the *body*. Merleau-Ponty gives to the lived body the ontological status that Sartre, as well as “intellectualist” thinkers before him, attribute to consciousness alone: the status of transcendence as being for itself. It is the body in its orientation toward and action upon and within its surroundings that constitutes the initial meaning-giving act (121,

146-47)” (Young 35).

2. “While feminine bodily existence is a transcendence and openness to the world, it is an *ambiguous transcendence*, a transcendence that is at the same time laden with immanence....The transcendence of the lived body that Merleau-Ponty describes is a transcendence that moves out from the body in its immanence in an open and unbroken directedness upon the world in action” (Young 36).

B. Inhibited intentionality:

1. “Merleau-Ponty locates intentionality in motility (110-12); the possibilities that are opened up in the world depend on the mode and limits of the bodily ‘I can’ (137, 148). Feminine existence, however, often does not enter bodily relation to possibilities by its own comportment toward its surroundings in an unambiguous and confident ‘I can.’ For example, as noted earlier, women frequently tend to posit a task that would be accomplished relatively easily once attempted as beyond their capacities before they begin it. Typically, the feminine body underuses its real capacity, both as existence is an *inhibited intentionality*, which simultaneously reaches toward a projected end with an ‘I can’ and withholds its full bodily commitment to that end in a self-imposed “‘I cannot’.” (Young 36)

2. “Their bodies project an aim to be enacted but at the same time stiffen against the performance of the task. In performing a physical task the woman’s body does carry her toward the intended aim, often not easily and directly, but rather circuitously, with the wasted motion resulting from the effort of testing and reorientation, which is a frequent consequence of feminine hesitancy.” (Young 37)

3. “For any lived body, the world appears as the system of possibilities that are correlative to its intentions (131)...For any bodily existence, that is, an ‘I cannot’ may appear to set limits to the ‘I can.’...When the woman enters a task with inhibited intentionality, she projects the possibilities of that task — thus projects an ‘I can’ —but projects them merely as the possibilities of ‘someone,’ and not

truly *her* possibilities — and thus projects an ‘*I cannot.*’” (Young 37)

C. Discontinuous unity:

1. Women tend to locate their motion in part of the body only, leaving the rest of the body relatively immobile. Motion such as this is discontinuous with itself....The character of the inhibited intentionality whereby feminine motion severs the connection between aim and enactment, between possibility in the world and capacity in the body, itself produces this discontinuous unity.

2. According to Merleau-Ponty, for the body to exist as a transcendent presence to the world and the immediate enactment of intentions, it cannot exist as an *object* (123). As subject, the body is referred not onto itself, but onto the world’s possibilities.

D. Summary of the three modalities:

“In summary, the modalities of feminine bodily existence have their root in the fact that feminine existence experiences the body as a mere thing — a fragile thing, which must be picked up and coaxed into movement, a thing that exists as *looked at and acted upon*. To be sure, any lived body exists as a material thing as well as a transcending subject. For feminine bodily existence, however, the body is often lived as a thing that is other than it, a thing like other things in the world. To the extent that a woman lives her body as a thing, she remains rooted in immanence, is inhibited, and retains a distance from her body as transcending movement and from engagement in the world’s possibilities.” (Young 39)

VIII. Erik Erikson’s inner space vs. outer space (girls vs. boys)

A. Erikson regards girls’ space as inner space, but boys’ as outer space. Young thinks it unconvincing. “If girls do tend to project an enclosed space and boys to project in open and outwardly directed space, it is far more plausible to regard this as a reflection of the way members of each sex live and move their bodies in space.” (Young 40)

B. "I observed that women frequently react to motions, even our own motions, as though we are the object of a motion that issues from an alien intention, rather than taking ourselves as the subject of motion. In its immanence and inhibition, feminine spatial existence is *positioned* by a system of coordinates that does not have its origin in a woman's own intentional capacities. The tendency for the feminine body to remain partly immobile in the performance of a task that requires the movement of the whole body illustrates this characteristic of feminine bodily existence as rooted *in place*. Likewise does the tendency of women to wait for an object to come within their immediate bodily field, rather than move out toward it." (Young 41)

VIII. Women's or girls' immobility:

A. "They have their source in the particular *situation* of women as conditioned by their sexist oppression in contemporary society." (Young 42)

B. "One of the sources of the modalities of feminine bodily existence is too obvious to dwell upon at length. For the most part, girls and women are not given the opportunity to use their full bodily capacities in free and open engagement with the world, nor are they encouraged as much as boys are to develop specific bodily skills." (Young 43)

C. "Girls' play is often more sedentary and enclosing than the play of boys." (Young 43)

D. "The modalities of feminine bodily existence are not merely privative, however, and thus their source is not merely in lack of practice, though this is certainly an important element. There is a specific positive feminine body comportment and movement, which is learned as the girl comes to understand that she is a girl." (Young 43)

E. "The more a girl assumes her status as feminine, the more she takes herself to be fragile and immobile and the more she actively enacts her own body

inhibition.” (Young 44)

F. “...patriarchal society defines woman as object, as a mere body, and that in sexist society women are in fact frequently regarded by others as objects and mere bodies. An essential part of the situation of being a woman is that of living the ever-present possibility that one will be gazed upon as a mere body, as shape and flesh that presents itself as the potential object of another subject’s intentions and manipulations, rather than as a living manifestation of action and intention....The source of this objectified bodily existence is in the attitude of others regarding her, but the woman herself often actively takes up her body as a mere thing. She gazes at it in the mirror, worries about how it looks to others, prunes it, shapes it, molds and decorates it.” (Young 44)

五、議題探討與結論

讀書會進行的議題如下：費雪對於女性主義與現象學的總論批判、葛洛茲的身體觀、以及梅洛龐蒂的身體與性別觀，西蒙波娃論女性身體與性別，莫伊論西蒙波娃的身體觀點，楊：活生生的身體與性別之反思，葛洛茲論肉體現象學，梅洛龐蒂論身體的空間性與行動力，楊論身體的空間性與行動力等，成員對於主要議題--身體以及對女性主義與現象學如何相互對話的可能性已有初步的掌握度，並期望能配合教學，有更多後續的課程進而衍生出來。

六、目標達成情況與自評


讀書會已全數舉辦完畢，討論情況良好，主讀人亦相當負責，製作詳細大綱並擬定議題討論，漸漸帶動成員的閱讀深度，至目前為止本讀書會進行順利。

七、執行過程之遭遇困難

本活動在執行上相當順利，並未遭遇特殊困難，在師生討論過程中同樣有相當多的議題相互激發，每位參與者都收穫良多，收益匪淺。


八、改進建議

無改進建議。



女性主義現象學經典研讀 成果報告


主辦單位：真理大學英美語文學系
計畫主持人：葉雅茹助理教授
計畫助理：莊雅鈞
計畫期限：99/8/1~100/1/31



研讀流程


- 第一場讀書會
- 日期：99/9/25
- 主讀人：葉雅茹
- 主讀範圍：Fisher, Linda. "Feminist Phenomenology"; "Phenomenology and Feminism: Perspectives on Their Relation." *Feminist Phenomenology*.

- 第二場讀書會
- 日期：99/9/25
- 主讀人：蘇秋華
- 主讀範圍：Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. Excerpts from "The Body." *The Phenomenology of Perception*.




- 第三場讀書會
- 日期：99/10/30
- 主讀人：王念英
- 主讀範圍：Grosz, Elizabeth. “Refiguring Bodies.” *Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism*.

- 第四場讀書會
- 日期：99/10/30
- 主讀人：施懿芹
- 主讀範圍：Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. “The Body in Its Sexual Being.” *The Phenomenology of Perception*.




- 第五場讀書會
- 日期：99/11/20
- 主讀人：李健美
- 主讀範圍：Beauvoir, Simone de. “Woman’s Situation and Character.” *The Second Sex*.

- 第六場讀書會
- 日期：99/11/20
- 主讀人：談玉儀
- 主讀範圍：Moi, Toril. “What is a Woman? Sex, Gender, and the Body in Feminist Theory.” *What Is a Woman?: and Other Essays*.



- 第七場讀書會
- 日期：99/12/18
- 主讀人：劉亞蘭
- 主讀範圍：Young, Iris Marion. "Introduction" ; "Lived Body vs. Gender: Reflection on Social Structure and Subjectivity." *On Female Body Experience: "Throwing Like a Girl" and Other Essays.*

- 第八場讀書會
- 日期：99/12/18
- 主讀人：王梅春
- 主讀範圍：Grosz, Elizabeth. "Lived Bodies: Phenomenology and the Flesh." *Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism.*



- 第九場讀書會
- 日期：100/1/22
- 主讀人：施懿芹
- 主讀範圍：Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. "The Spatiality of One's Body and Motility." *The Phenomenology of Perception.*

- 第十場讀書會
- 日期：100/1/22
- 主讀人：張麗萍
- 主讀範圍：Young, Iris Marion. "Throwing Like a Girl: A Phenomenology of Feminine Body Comportment, Motility, and Spatiality." *On Female Body Experience: "Throwing Like a Girl" and Other Essays.*

第一場導讀



- 主讀人：葉雅茹
- 職稱：真理大學英美語文學系助理教授
- 主題：議題介紹與研究方法說明

導讀文章：Fisher, Linda. "Feminist Phenomenology"; "Phenomenology and Feminism: Perspectives on Their Relation." *Feminist Phenomenology*.



Outline

- Feminism and contemporary theoretical orientations
- Why feminism and phenomenology are different projects
- The issue: a feminist phenomenology or a phenomenological feminism
- The putative incompatibility of feminism and phenomenology
- A feminist phenomenology or a phenomenological feminism

第二場導讀



- 主讀人：蘇秋華
- 職稱：東吳大學英文學系助理教授
- 主題：梅洛龐蒂概念介紹

導讀文章：Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. Excerpts from "The Body." *The Phenomenology of Perception*.

Outline



- Husserl's critique on modern science
- Merleau-Ponty's critique on two methodologies of modern science
- Experience and Objective Thought
- The Body as Object and Mechanistic Physiology
- The Experience of the Body and Classical Psychology
- The Synthesis of One's own Body

第三場導讀



- 主讀人：王念英
- 職稱：真理大學英美語文學系兼任講師
- 主題：女性主義的身體觀

導讀文章：Grosz, Elizabeth. "Refiguring Bodies." *Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism*

Outline

- Western philosophical thinking and contemporary feminist theory
- Western tradition: Greek philosophy—Plato—Aristotle
- The Christian tradition: Christ—the immortal soul and mortal body
- Cartesianism : Three lines of investigation of modern philosophy
- Bodies—social and cultural acts—Gender performance



第四場導讀



- 主讀人：施懿芹
- 職稱：淡江大學多元文化與語言學系助理教授
- 主題：梅洛龐蒂論身體與性別存在

導讀文章：Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. "The Body in Its Sexual Being." *The Phenomenology of Perception*.

Outline



- Merleau-Ponty's theory of perception is a bodily phenomenon. The body is "a mode of being in the world"(Carman 3, 82)
- Case Study: Schneider, who no longer seeks sexual intercourse of his own accord
- Case Study: a girl, who loses the use of speech
- The body can symbolize existence because it realizes it and is its actuality(Merleau-Ponty 190)

第五場導讀



- 主讀人：李健美
- 職稱：真理大學英美語文學系副教授
- 主題：西蒙波娃論女性身體與性別

導讀文章： Beauvoir, Simone de. "Woman's Situation and Character." *The Second Sex*.



Outline

- Women's character--A woman's situation determines/shapes her character "The eternal feminine"
- Feminine world--an integral part of the whole world a subordinate place within the frame of the masculine universe
- The world is masculine "the eternal child" a respectable obedience—the lot of woman

第六場導讀



- 主讀人：談玉儀
- 職稱：國立台北商業技術學院通識教育中心助理教授
- 主題：莫伊論西蒙波娃的身體觀點

導讀文章：Moi, Toril. "What is a Woman? Sex, Gender, and the Body in Feminist Theory." *What Is a Woman?: and Other Essays*.



Outline

- 2 features in nature and social norms
- A discussion of the 1960s-70s formulation of the sex/gender distinction
- The poststructuralist attempt to revised the 1960s formulation
- Simone de Beauvoir's understanding of the body offers an alternative to sex/gender theories.

第七場導讀



- 主讀人：劉亞蘭
- 職稱：真理大學人文與資訊學系副教授
- 主題：活生生的身體與性別之反思

導讀文章：Young, Iris Marion. "Introduction"; "Lived Body vs. Gender: Reflection on Social Structure and Subjectivity." *On Female Body Experience: "Throwing Like a Girl" and Other Essays*.

Outline



- 分析身體 vs. 視肉身化為在世存有的一種模式
- Merleau-Ponty, Beauvoir and Sartre: being-in-the-world as situated 的意涵
- 對存在現象學的批判與復甦
- Lived Body vs. Gender: Reflections on Social Structure and Subjectivity
- Moi對lived body的解釋無法說明權力關係(power relation)。因此，Young主張仍需加入性別概念，以便於解釋社會結構和權力關係的問題。

第八場導讀



- 主讀人：王梅春
- 職稱：佛光大學外國語文學系助理教授
- 主題：肉體現象學

導讀文章：Grosz, Elizabeth. "Lived Bodies: Phenomenology and the Flesh." *Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism*.



Outline

- Corporeal Phenomenology
- The Visible and the Invisible
- The Senses
- The Reversibility of the Flesh
- Feminist Phenomenology?
- ✓ Merleau-Ponty's avoidance of the question of sexual difference and specificity
- ✓ Irigaray's critiques
- Sexuality and the Lived Body

第九場導讀



- 主讀人：施懿芹
- 職稱：淡江大學多元文化與語言學系助理教授
- 主題：梅洛龐蒂論身體的空間性與行動力

導讀文章：Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. "The Spatiality of One's Body and Motility." *The Phenomenology of Perception*.



Outline

- The spatiality of one's own body
- Body image
- The spatiality of body
- Body
- Existential analysis
- Consciousness
- Body/ Space/ Time
- Acquisition of a Habit
- What Body is

第十場導讀



- 主講人：張麗萍
- 職稱：國立台北商業技術學院應用外語系助理教授
- 主題：楊論身體的空間性與行動力

導讀文章：Young, Iris Marion. "Throwing Like a Girl: A Phenomenology of Feminine Body Comportment, Motility, and Spatiality." *On Female Body Experience: "Throwing Like a Girl" and Other Essays*.

Outline



- The "remarkable difference" between two sexes:
- The situation of women
- Aim of the article
- The definition of "feminine existence"
- The position of women in patriarchal society
- The different reaction to physical activity: women vs. men
- Three contradictory modalities of feminine bodily existence